


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TO

THE UNION VOLUNTEERS

OF 1861—4:

WHO FLEW TO THE RESCUE OF THEIR IMPERILED COUNTRY

BECAUSE

THEY SO LOVED HER

THAT THEY JOYFULLY PROFFERED THEIR OWN LIVES TO SAVE HERS;

This Volume,

BEING A RECORD OF

THEIR PRIVATIONS, HARDSHIPS, AND SUFFERINGS,

AS ALSO OF THEIR

VALOR, FIDELITY, CONSTANCY, AND TRIUMPH,

Is Respectfully Inscribed

BY

THE AUTHOR.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE author had expected to finish this work early in the current year, but he found himself unable to compress it within the limits originally intended. The important events of the War for the Union were so many; its area was so vast, its duration so considerable; the minor collisions and other incidents were so multifarious, yet often so essential to a clear understanding of its progress and results, that this volume has expanded far beyond his intent, and required for its preparation extra months of assiduous and engrossing labor. Even now, though its contents probably exceed in amount those of any other single volume which the War has called forth, it barely touches some points which may be deemed essential to a clear understanding of the whole matter. Of the War itself, however—that is, of the Military events which made up the physical struggle initiated by Secession—this volume aspires to give a clear though necessarily condensed account, from the opening of the year 1862 down to the final and complete overthrow of the Confederacy. That all his judgments will be concurred in by every reader, the author has no right to expect; but his aim has been to set forth events as they occurred, and as they will appear to clear-sighted observers a century hence; and he rests in the confident belief that those who dissent from his conclusions will nevertheless respect the sincerity with which they are cherished, and the frankness wherewith they are avowed.

EXPLANATORY.

THE History which this Volume completes was not contemplated by its author till just after the Draft Riots by which this Emporium was damaged and disgraced in July, 1863. Up to the occurrence of those Riots, I had not been habitually confident of an auspicious immediate issue from our momentous struggle. Never doubting that the *ultimate* result would be such as to vindicate emphatically the profoundly wise beneficence of God, it had seemed to me more probable—in view of the protracted and culpable complicity of the North in whatever of guilt or shame, of immorality or debasement, was inseparable from the existence and growth of American Slavery—that a temporary triumph might accrue to the Confederates. The real danger of the Republic was not that of permanent division, but of *general* saturation by and subjugation to the despotic ideas and aims of the Slaveholding Oligarchy. Had the Confederacy proved able to wrest from the Federal authorities an acknowledgment of its Independence, and had Peace been established and ratified on that basis, I believe the Democratic Party in the loyal States would have forthwith taken ground for 'restoration' by the secession of their respective States, whether jointly or severally, from the Union, and their adhesion to the Confederacy under its Montgomery Constitution—making Slavery universal and perpetual. And, under the moral influence of Southern triumph and Northern defeat, in full view of the certainty that thus only could rĕunion be achieved, there can be little doubt that the law of political gravitation, of centripetal force, thus appealed to, must have ultimately prevailed. Commercial and manufacturing thrift would have gradually vanquished moral repugnance. It might have required some years to heal the wounds of War and secure a popular majority in three or four of the Border States in favor of Annexation; but the geographic and economic incitements to Union are so urgent and palpable, that State after State would have concluded to go to the mountain, since it stubbornly refused to come to Mahomet; and, all the States that the Confederacy would consent to accept, on conditions of penitence and abjuration, would, in time, have knocked humbly at its grim portals for admission and fellowship. That we have been saved from such a fate is due to the valor of our soldiers, the constancy of our ruling statesmen, the patriotic faith and courage of those citizens who, within a period of three years, loaned more than Two Billions to their Government when it seemed to many just tottering on the brink of ruin; yet, more than all else, to the favor and blessing of Almighty God. They who, whether in Europe or America, from July, 1862, to July, 1863, believed the Union death-stricken, had the balance of material probabilities on their side: they erred only in underrating the potency of those intellectual, moral, and Providential forces, which in our age operate with accelerated power and activity in behalf of Liberty, Intelligence, and Civilization.

So long as it seemed probable that our War would result more immediately in a Rebel triumph, I had no wish, no heart, to be one of its historians; and it was only when—following closely on the heels of the great Union successes of July, 1863, at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and Helena—I had seen the Rebellion resisted and defeated in

this City of New York (where its ideas and vital aims were more generally cherished than even in South Carolina or Louisiana), that I confidently hoped for an immediate and palpable, rather than a remote and circuitous triumph of the Union, now and evermore blended inseparably with Emancipation—with the legal and National recognition of every man's right to himself. Thenceforward, with momentary intervals of anxiety, depression, and doubt, it has been to me a labor of love to devote every available hour to the history of the American Conflict.

This Volume is essentially Military, as the former was Civil: that is, it treats mainly of Armies, Marches, Battles, Sieges, and the alternations of good and ill fortune that, from January, 1862, to May, 1865, befell the contending forces respectively of the Union and the Confederacy. But he who reads with attention will discern that I have regarded even these under a moral rather than a purely material aspect. Others have doubtless surpassed me in the vividness, the graphic power, of their delineations of 'the noise of the captains, and the shouting:' I have sought more especially to portray the silent influence of these collisions, with the efforts, burdens, sacrifices, bereavements, they involved, in gradually molding and refining Public Opinion to accept, and ultimately demand, the overthrow and extinction of Human Slavery, as the one vital, implacable enemy of our Nationality and our Peace. Hence, while at least three-fourths of this Volume narrates Military or Naval occurrences, I presume a larger space of it than of any rival is devoted to tracing, with all practicable brevity, the succession of Political events; the sequences of legislation in Congress with regard to Slavery and the War; the varying phases of Public Sentiment; the rise, growth, and decline, of hopes that the War would be ended through the accession of its adversaries to power in the Union. I labor under a grave mistake if this be not judged by our grandchildren (should any of them condescend to read it) the most important and interesting feature of my work.

I have differed from most annalists, in preferring to follow a campaign or distinct military movement to its close before interrupting its narration to give accounts of simultaneous movements or campaigns in distant regions, between other armies, led by other commanders. In my historical reading, I have often been perplexed and confused by the facility wherewith chroniclers leap from the Euphrates to the Danube, and from the Ebro to the Vistula. In full view of the necessary inter-dependence of events occurring on widely separated arenas, it has seemed to me preferable to follow one movement to its culmination before dealing with another; deeming the inconveniences and obscurities involved in this method less serious than those unavoidable (by me, at least) on any different plan. Others will judge between my method and that which has usually been followed.

I have bestowed more attention on marches, and on the minor incidents of a campaign, than is common: historians usually devoting their time and force mainly to the portrayal of great, decisive (or at least destructive) battles. But battles are so often won or lost by sagaciously planned movements, skillful combinations, well-conducted marches, and wise dispositions, that I have extended to these a prominence which seemed to me more clearly justified than usually conceded. He was not an incapable general who observed that he chose to win battles with his soldiers' legs rather than their muskets.

As to dates, I could wish that commanders on all hands were more precise than they usually are; but, wherever dates were accessible, I have given them, even though invested with no special or obvious consequence. Printed mainly as foot-notes, they consume little space, and do not interrupt the flow of the narrative. The reader who does

not value need not heed them; while the critical student will often find them of decided use. Should any one demur to this, I urge him to examine thoughtfully the dates of the dispatches received and sent by McClellan between his retreat to Harrison's bar and Pope's defeat at Groveton; also, those given in my account of his movements from the hour of his arrival at Frederick to that of Lee's retreat from Sharpsburg across the Potomac.

I trust it will be observed by candid critics that, while I seek not to disguise the fact that I honor and esteem some of our commanders as I do not others, I have been blind neither to the errors of the former nor to the just claims of the latter—that my high estimation of Grant and Sherman (for instance) has not led me to conceal or soften the lack of reasonable precautions which so nearly involved their country in deplorable if not irremediable disaster at Pittsburg Landing. So with Banks's mishap at Sabine Cross-roads and Butler's failure at Fort Fisher. On the other hand, I trust my lack of faith in such officers as Buell and Fitz John Porter has not led me to represent them as incapable or timorous soldiers. What I believe in regard to these and many more of their school is, that they were misplaced—that they halted between their love of country and their traditional devotion to Slavery—that they clung to the hope of a compromise which should preserve both Slavery *and* the Union, long after all reasonable ground of hope had vanished; fighting the Rebellion with gloved hands and relaxed sinews because they mistakenly held that so only was the result they sighed for (deeming it most beneficent) to be attained. If the facts do not justify my conviction, I trust they will be found so fairly presented in the following pages as to furnish the proper corrective for my errors.

Without having given much heed to rival issues, I presume this volume will be found to contain accounts (necessarily very brief) of many minor actions and skirmishes which have been passed unheeded by other historians, on the assumption that, as they did not perceptibly affect the great issue, they are unworthy of record. But the nature and extent of that influence is matter of opinion, while the qualities displayed in these collisions were frequently deserving of grateful remembrance. And, beside, an affair of outposts or foraging expeditions has often exerted a most signal influence over the spirits of two great antagonist armies, and thus over the issues of a battle, and even of a campaign. Compressed within the narrowest limits, I have chosen to glance at nearly every conflict of armed forces, and to give time to these which others have devoted to more elaborate and florid descriptions of great battles. It has been my aim to compress within the allotted space the greatest number of notable facts and circumstances; others must judge how fully this end has been achieved.

Doubtless, many errors of fact, and some of judgment, are embodied in the following pages: for, as yet, even the official reports, &c., which every historian of this war must desire to study, are but partially accessible. I have missed especially the Confederate reports of the later campaigns; only a few of which have been made public, though many more, it is probable, will in time be. Some of these may have been destroyed at the hasty evacuation of Richmond; but many must have been preserved, in manuscript if not in print, and will yet see the light. So far as they were attainable, I have used the reports of Confederate officers as freely as those of their antagonists, and have accorded them nearly if not quite equal credit. I judge that the habit of understating or concealing their losses was more prevalent with Confederate than with Union commanders; in over-estimating the numbers they resisted, I have not been able to perceive

any difference. It is simple truth to say that such over-estimates seem to have been quite common on both sides.

I shall be personally obliged to any one, no matter on what side he served, who will furnish me with trustworthy data for the correction of any misstatement embodied in this work. If such correction shall dictate a revision of any harsh judgment on friend or foe, it will be received and conformed to with profound gratitude. My convictions touching the origin, incitements, and character, of the War from which we have so happily emerged, are very positive, being the fruits of many years' almost exclusive devotion to National affairs; but my judgments as to occurrences and persons are held subject to modification upon further and clearer presentments of facts. It is my purpose to revise and correct the following pages from day to day as new light shall be afforded; and I ask those who may feel aggrieved by any statement I shall herein have given to the public, to favor me with the proofs of its inaccuracy. Unwilling to be drawn into controversy, I am most anxious to render exact justice to each and all.

The subject of *Reconstruction* (or Restoration) is not within the purview of this work, and I have taken pains to avoid it so far as possible. The time is not yet for treating it exhaustively, or even historically; its importance, as well as its immaturity, demand for its treatment thoughtful hesitation as well as fullness of knowledge. Should I be living when the work is at length complete, I may submit a survey of its nature, progress, and results: meantime, I will only avow my undoubting faith that the same Divine Benignity which has guided our country through perils more palpable if not more formidable, will pilot her safely, even though slowly, through those which now yawn before her, and bring her at last into the haven of perfect Peace, genuine Fraternity, and everlasting Union—a Peace grounded on reciprocal esteem; a Fraternity based on sincere, fervent love of our common country; and a Union cemented by hearty and general recognition of the truth, that the only abiding security for the cherished rights of any is to be found in a full and hearty recognition of Human Brotherhood as well as State sisterhood—in the establishment and assured maintenance of All Rights for All.

H. G.

New York, July 21, 1866.

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Horace Greeley

THE AMERICAN CONFLICT.

VOLUME II.

I.

TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO.

The frontiers of Texas, Mexican and savage, were guarded, prior to the outbreak of Secession, by a line of forts or military posts stretching from Brownsville, opposite Matamoras, to the Red River. These forts were located at average distances of one hundred miles, and were severally held by detachments of from 50 to 150 of the regular army. San Antonio, 150 miles inland from Indianola, on Matagorda Bay, was the headquarters of the department, whence the most remote post—Fort Bliss, on the usual route thence to New Mexico—was distant 675 miles. The whole number of regulars distributed throughout Texas was 2,612, comprising nearly half the effective force of our little army.

When, soon after Mr. Lincoln's election, but months prior to his inauguration, Gen. David E. Twiggs was dispatched by Secretary Floyd from New Orleans to San Antonio, and assigned to the command of the department, it was doubtless understood between them that his business in Texas was to betray this entire force, or so much of it as possible, into the hands of the yet undeveloped traitors with whom Floyd was secretly in league. Twiggs's age and infirmities had for some time excused him from active service, until this ungracious duty—if duty it can be called—was imposed upon and readily accepted by him. Within 90 days after his arrival[1] at Indianola, he had surrendered[2] the entire force at and near San Antonio, with all their arms, munitions, and supplies, to three persons acting as "Commissioners on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety," secretly appointed[3] by the Convention which had just before assumed to take Texas out of the Union.[4] The

[1] December 5, 1860.

[2] February 18, 1861. He immediately and openly declared that the Union could not last 60 days, and warned officers, if they had pay due them, to draw it at once, as this would be the last.

[3] February 5, 1861.

[4] Feb. 1. The Convention met this day at Austin, and at once passed an ordinance of Secession, subject to a vote of the people at an election to be held on the 23d inst.; the ordinance, if approved, to take effect on the 2d of March. Texas was therefore still in the Union, even according to the logic of Secession.

betrayal was colored, not fairly cloaked, by a slim display of military force in behalf of the sovereign State of Texas, Col. Ben. McCulloch, an original and ardent Secessionist, having undertaken and fulfilled the duty of raising that force and posting it in and around San Antonio, so as to give countenance to the demand for capitulation. It was fairly stipulated in writing between the contracting parties, that our troops should simply evacuate Texas, marching to and embarking at the coast, where their artillery and means of transportation were to be given up, while they, with their small arms, should proceed by water to any point outside of Texas; but these conditions, though made by a traitor in Federal uniform with fellow-traitors who had cast off all disguise, were shamefully violated. Col. C. A. Waite, who, after the withdrawal of Floyd from the Cabinet, had been sent down to supersede Twiggs in his command, reached San Antonio the morning after the capitulation, when all the material of war had been turned over to the Rebel Commissioners, and 1,500 armed Texans surrounded our little band, in the first flush of exultation over their easy triumph. Unable to resist this rapidly augmenting force, Waite had no alternative but to ratify the surrender, dispatching, by permission, messengers to the frontier posts, to apprise the other commanders that they were included in its terms. Collecting and dispatching his men as rapidly as he might, he had some 1,200 encamped at Indianola ready for embarkation, when they were visited by Col. E. Van Dorn, of the Confederate service, recently a captain in our army, who had been sent from Montgomery with authority to offer increased rank and pay to all who would take service with the Rebels. His mission was a confessed failure. A few of the higher officers had participated in Twiggs's treason; but no more of these, and no private soldiers, could be cajoled or bribed into deserting the flag of their country.

Col. Waite was still at San Antonio, when news reached Indianola[a] of the reduction[a] of Fort Sumter; and Col. Van Dorn, with three armed steamers from Galveston, arrived with instructions from Montgomery to capture and hold as prisoners of war all Federal soldiers and officers remaining in Texas. Maj. Sibley, in command at that port, had chartered two small schooners and embarked thereon a part of his force, when he was compelled to surrender again unconditionally. Col. Waite was in like manner captured at San Antonio, by order of Maj. Macklin, late an officer in our service, under Twiggs; Capt. Wilcox, who made the arrest, answering Waite's protest with the simple words, "I have the force." Waite, and a few officers with him, were compelled to accept paroles not to serve against the Confederacy unless regularly exchanged.

Of course, the forces at the several posts protecting the frontiers of Texas, being isolated and cut off from all communication with each other, or with a common head-quarters, fell an easy prey to the Rebels. A part of them were commanded by officers in full sympathy and perfect understanding with the Texas conspirators for Secession, who, by means of the se-

[a] April 17, 1861.

[a] April 13.

cret organization known as "Knights of the Golden Circle," having its Texas head-quarters at San Antonio, and its 'castles' or affiliated lodges in every part of the State, had prosecuted its undertaking at immense advantage over the unorganized and often unsuspecting as well as uninformed Unionists. The conspirators had long before made themselves acquainted with the loyal or disloyal proclivities of the Federal officers; and, wherever an important position was held by an inflexible Unionist, they were able, by secret representations at the War Department, to procure such a substitution as they desired; and thus Col. Loring, a North Carolinian, deep in their counsels, had been sent out by Floyd, in the Spring of 1860, to take command of the department of New Mexico, while Col. G. B. Crittenden, a Kentuckian, of like spirit and purposes, was appointed by Loring to command an expedition against the Apaches, to start from Fort Staunton in the Spring of 1861. Lieut. Col. B. S. Roberts, however, who here joined the expedition with two companies of cavalry, soon discovered that Crittenden was devoting all his sober moments—which were few—to the systematic corruption of his subordinates, with intent to lead his regiment to Texas, and there turn it over to the service and support of the Rebellion. Roberts repelled his solicitations,[1] and refused to obey any of his orders which should be prompted by the spirit of treason. He finally accepted a furlough, suggested by Loring, and quickly repaired under it to Santa Fé, the head-quarters of the department, making a revelation of Crittenden's treachery to its commander, Col. Loring, and his adjutant, but only to find them both as thoroughly disloyal as Crittenden. He was rudely rebuked by them as a meddler with other men's business, and ordered directly back to Fort Staunton, but found opportunity to give notice to Capt. Hatch, commanding at Albuquerque, to Capt. Morris, who held Fort Craig, and other loyal officers, of the treachery of their superiors, and the duty incumbent on them of resisting it.

Meantime, desperate efforts were made by the prominent traitors to bring their men over to their views, by assurances that the Union had ceased to exist—that it had no longer a Government able to pay them or feed them—while, if they would but consent to go to Texas and take service with the Confederacy, they should be paid in full, and more than paid, beside having great chances of promotion. To their honor be it recorded, not one man listened to the voice of the charmer, though Capt. Claiborn, at Fort Staunton, made several harangues to his company, intended to entice them into the Confederate service. Of the 1,200 regulars in New Mexico, one only deserted during this time of trial, and he, it is believed, did not join the enemy. Finally, the disloyal officers, headed by Loring and Crittenden, were glad to escape unattended, making their rendezvous at Fort Fillmore, twenty miles from the Texas line, not far from El Paso, where Maj. Lynde commanded. Here they renewed their intrigues and importunities, finding a large portion of the officers equally traitorous with themselves. But Maj. Lynde appeared to hold out

[1] See his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.—Report, Part 3, pp. 364–72.

against their solicitations. His forces, however, were so demoralized that, soon afterward,* when he led 480 of them, out of 700, to the village of Mesilla, some twenty miles distant, he fell into an ambuscade of 200 badly armed Texans, and, after a skirmish, wherein his conduct can only be vindicated from the imputation of cowardice by the presumption of treason, he ordered a retreat to the fort, which his men were next day engaged in fortifying, when surprised, at 10½ A. M., by an order to evacuate that night. The commissary was ordered to roll out the whisky, from which the men were allowed to fill their canteens, and drink at discretion. No water was furnished for the weary march before them, over a hot and thirsty desert. They started as ordered; but, before they had advanced ten miles, men were dropping out of the ranks, and falling to the earth exhausted or dead drunk.

At 2 A. M., a Texan force was seen advancing on their flank, whereupon Lynde's Adjutant remarked, "They have nothing to fear from us." Our men were halted, so many of them, at least, as had not already halted of their own accord; and the officers held a long council of war. Many privates of the command likewise took counsel, and decided to fight. Just then, Capt. Gibbs appeared from the officers' council, and ordered a retreat upon the camp, saying, "We will fight them there." Arrived at the camp, our soldiers were ordered to lay down their arms, and informed, "You are turned over as prisoners of war." The subordinate officers disclaimed any responsibility for this disgraceful surrender, laying the blame wholly upon Lynde. Our men were paroled, and permitted, as prisoners, to pursue their course northward, after listening to a speech from Col. Baylor, of their captors, intended to win their good-will.

Their sufferings, on that forlorn march to Albuquerque and Fort Wise, were protracted and terrible; some becoming deranged from the agony of their thirst; some seeking to quench it by opening their veins, and drinking their own blood. Maj. Lynde, instead of being court-martialed and shot, was simply dropped from the rolls of the army, his dismissal to date from his surrender;* and Capt. A. H. Plummer, his commissary, who held $17,000 in drafts, which he might at any moment have destroyed, but which were handed over to and used by the Rebels, was sentenced by court-martial to be reprimanded in general orders, and suspended from duty for six months!

New Mexico, thus shamefully bereft, at a blow, of half her defenders, was now reckoned an easy prey to the gathering forces of the Rebellion. Her Mexican population, ignorant, timid, and superstitious, had been attached to the Union by conquest, scarcely fifteen years before, and had, meantime, been mainly under the training of Democratic officials of strong pro-Slavery sympathies, who had induced her Territorial Legislature, some two years before, to pass an act recognizing Slavery as legally existing among them, and providing stringent safeguards for its protection and security—an act which was still unrepealed. Her Democratic officials had not yet been

* July 24, 1861.

* July 27, 1861.

replaced by appointees of President Lincoln. Her Delegate in Congress, Miguel A. Otero, had issued [10] and circulated an address to her people, intended to disaffect them toward the Union, and incite them to favor the Rebellion; but her Democratic Governor, Abraham Rencher, though a North Carolinian, upon receiving news of Lynde's surrender, issued a proclamation calling out the entire militia force of the Territory, to act as a home guard; which call, though it added inconsiderably to the effective force of her defenders, was calculated to exert a wholesome influence upon public opinion, and keep restless spirits out of mischief. Col. E. R. S. Canby, who had succeeded to the command of the Department, was a loyal and capable soldier, and was surrounded, for the most part, by good and true men. When the new Governor, Henry Connolly, met [11] the Territorial Legislature, a very wholesome and earnest loyalty was found well-nigh universal, so that the Governor's cautious recommendation that the act for the protection of slave property be modified, as needlessly severe and rigorous, was promptly responded to by an almost unanimous repeal of the entire act, leaving the statute-book of New Mexico clean of all complicity with the chattelizing of man.

Meantime, Col. Canby was quietly proceeding with the organization of his militia and other forces for the inevitable contest, crippled throughout by the want of money, munitions, and supplies of all kinds. Even directions and orders, so plentifully bestowed on most subordinates, were not vouchsafed him from Washington, where the absorption of all energies in the more immediate and momentous struggle on the Potomac and the Missouri, denied him even an answer to his frequent and importunate requisitions and representations. An urgent appeal, however, to the Governor of the adjacent Territory of Colorado, had procured him thence a regiment of volunteers, who, though falling far enough short of the efficiency of trained soldiers, were worth five to ten times their number of his New Mexican levies. Making the best use possible of his scanty or indifferent materials, he was probably about half ready to take the field when apprised that the Texans were upon him.

Gen. H. F. Sibley had encountered similar difficulties, save in the qualities of his men, in organizing and arming, in north-western Texas, the "Sibley Brigade," designed for the conquest of New Mexico. His funds were scanty, and the credit of his Government quite as low as that depended on by Canby; but the settled, productive districts of Texas were not very remote nor inaccessible, while Canby's soldiers were for weeks on short allowance, simply because provisions for their comfortable subsistence were not to be had in New Mexico, nor nearer than Missouri, then a revolutionary volcano, where production had nearly ceased. Two insignificant collisions had taken place near Fort Craig.[12] In the earlier, a company of New Mexican volunteers, Capt. Mink, were routed and pursued by a party of Texans, who, in their turn, were beaten and chased away, with considerable loss, by about 100 regulars from the fort.

[10] Feb. 15, 1861. [11] Dec. 2, 1861. [12] In October, 1861.

The surviving Texans escaped to Mesilla; and Canby occupied the frontier posts so far down as Fort Staunton, leaving Fort Fillmore still in the hands of the Texans.

Gen. Sibley, who had hoped to advance in the Autumn of 1861, was still at Fort Bliss, within the limits of Texas, on the 1st of January, 1862; but moved forward, a few days thereafter, with 2,300 men, many of them trained to efficiency in the Mexican War and in successive expeditions against Apaches and other savages, wherein they had made the name of "Texan Rangers" a sound of terror to their foes. For Canby's regulars and American volunteers, they had some little respect—for his five or six thousand New Mexicans, none at all. Advancing confidently, but slowly, by way of Fort Thorn, he found[13] Canby in force at Fort Craig, which he confronted about the middle of February. A careful reconnoissance convinced him that it was madness, with his light field-guns, to undertake a siege; while his offer of battle in the open plain, just outside the range of the guns of the fort, was wisely declined. He would not retreat, and could not afford to remain, consuming his scanty supplies; while to pass the fort without a contest, leaving a superior force undemoralized in his rear, was an experiment full of hazard; he therefore resolved to force a battle, and, with that view, forded the Rio Grande to its east bank, passed the fort at a distance of a mile and a half, and encamped nearly opposite, in a position of much strength, but entirely destitute of water, losing 100 of the mules of his baggage-train during the night, by their breaking away, in the frenzy of their thirst, from the weary and sleepy guards appointed to herd them. He was thus compelled to abandon a part of his wagons and baggage next morning, as he started for the river, the smallness of his force not permitting him to divide it in the presence of a capable and vigilant enemy.

When his advance, 250 strong, under Maj. Pyron, reached, at VALVERDE, a point, at 8 A. M., where the river bottom was accessible, fully seven miles from the fort, they found themselves confronted by a portion of our regular cavalry, Lt.-Col. Roberts, with two most efficient batteries, Capt. McRae and Lt. Hall, supported by a large force of regular and volunteer infantry. Our batteries opening upon him, Pyron, greatly outnumbered, recoiled, with some loss, and our troops exultingly crossed the river to the east bank, where a thick wood covered a concentration of the enemy's entire force. The day wore on, with more noise than execution, until nearly 2 P. M., when Sibley, who had risen from a sick bed that morning, was compelled to dismount and quit the field, turning over the command-in-chief to Col. Thomas Green, of the 5th Texas, whose regiment had meantime been ordered to the front. The battle was continued, mainly with artillery, wherein the Federal superiority, both in guns and in service, was decided, so that the Texans were losing the most men in spite of their comparatively sheltered position. To protract the fight in this manner was to expose his men to constant decimation without a chance of success.

[13] Feb. 19, 1862.

Canby, who had reached the field at 1 P. M., considered the day his own, and was about to order a general advance, when he found himself anticipated by Green, at whose command his men, armed mainly with revolvers, burst from the wooded cover and leaped over the line of low sand-hills behind which they had lain, and made a desperate rush upon McRae's battery confronting them. Volley after volley of grape and canister was poured through their ranks, cutting them down by scores, but not for an instant checking their advance. They were 1,000 when they started; a few minutes later, they were but 900; but the battery was taken; while McRae, choosing death rather than flight, Lieut. Michler, and most of their men, lay dead beside their guns. Our supporting infantry, twice or thrice the Texans in number, and including more than man for man of regulars, shamefully withstood every entreaty to charge. They lay groveling in the sand in the rear of the battery, until the Texans came so near as to make their revolvers dangerous, when the whole herd ran madly down to and across the river, save those who were overtaken by a cowardly death on the way. The Colorado volunteers vied with the regulars in this infamous flight.

Simultaneously with this charge in front, Maj. Raguet, commanding the Texas left, charged our right at the head of his cavalry; but the disparity of numbers was so great that he was easily repulsed. The defeat of our center, however, soon altered the situation; our admirable guns being quickly turned upon this portion of the field, along with those of the Texans, when a few volleys of small-arms, and the charging shout of the victors, sufficed to complete the disaster. No part of our army seems to have stopped to breathe until safe under the walls of the fort. Six excellent guns, with their entire equipage, and many small-arms, were among the trophies secured by the victors. The losses of men were about equal—60 killed and 140 wounded on either side. But among the Confederate dead or severely wounded in the decisive charge, were Lt.-Col. Sutton, Maj. Lockridge, Capts. Lang and Heurel, and several lieutenants. Col. W. L. Robards and Maj. Raguet were also wounded, though not mortally. The celerity of the flight precluded the taking of more than half-a-dozen prisoners, among them Capt. Rossel, of the regulars, captured while crossing the river.

Fort Craig was still invulnerable; though a flag of truce, dispatched by Canby as he reached its gates, was fondly mistaken for a time by the Texans as bearing a proposition to surrender. It covered an invitation to a truce for the burial of the dead and proper care of the wounded, to which two days were given by both armies; when a Rebel council of war decided that an assault was not justifiable, but that they might now safely leave Canby to his meditations, and push on up the river into the heart of the Territory. They did so, as they anticipated, without further opposition from the force they had so signally beaten. Leaving their wounded at Socorro, 30 miles on the way, they advanced to Albuquerque, 50 miles further, which fell without resistance, and where their scanty stock of provisions was considerably replenished.

At Cubero, 60 miles westward, they obtained more provisions and some ammunition. Still advancing on Santa Fé, the Confederates encountered,[14] at Cañon Glorietta, or Apache Pass, 15 miles from Santa Fé, near Fort Union, a new Federal force of 1,300, composed partly of regulars, but mainly of green Colorado volunteers, the whole commanded by Col. John P. Slough. The Rebel force actually present, under Col. W. R. Scurry,[15] was decidedly inferior in numbers,[16] but in nothing else. The narrowness of the cañon precluded all flanking, enabling the Rebels to span it with a line of infantry, which instantly charged, with the Texan yell, revolver and knife in either hand. Our forces scarcely waited to be in danger before breaking and flying in the wildest confusion. In a few moments, not a man of them remained in sight of the Rebels.

Scurry halted, re-formed his men, brought up his guns, and fired a few shots to ascertain the position (if position they still had) of his adversaries, and then ordered Maj. Shropshire, with his right, and Maj. Raguet, with his left, to charge with cavalry and develop the new Federal line, while he would lead forward the center at the first sound of their guns. Delay ensuing, he moved to the right to ascertain its cause, and found that Shropshire had been killed. Immediately taking command of that wing, he advanced and attacked—the left opening fire, and the center advancing, as he did so. Three batteries of 8 guns each opened a deadly fire of grape, canister, and shell, as they came within range, tearing through their ranks, but not stopping their advance. A short but desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensued, our infantry interposing to protect their guns, which were saved and brought off, with most of our wagons. But our infantry soon gave way, and the Texan victory was complete. Their loss was reported by Scurry as 36 killed and 60 wounded; but among the former were Majors Shropshire and Raguet, Capt. Buckholt, and Lt. Mills. During the fight, which lasted from noon until about 4 P. M., Maj. Chivington, of Colorado, with four companies, gained the rear of the Rebel position, and destroyed a part of their train, also a cannon, which he spiked; when, learning that Slough was defeated, he decamped. Our total loss was reported at 23 killed and 50 wounded; while in a skirmish with Pyron's cavalry, the morning before, Slough took 57 prisoners, with a loss of only 15.

Sibley entered Santa Fé in triumph soon afterward, meeting no further resistance. He collected there all that remained of his little army, and confiscated to its use whatever of provisions and clothing, of wagons and animals, he could lay hands on. But he found the population, with few exceptions, indifferent or hostile, the resources of food and forage extremely limited, and his hold upon the country bounded by the range of his guns. Never had heroic valor been persistently evinced to less purpose. Before he had rested a month, he found himself compelled to evacuate his hard-won conquest, and retreat

[14] March 24.

[15] Representative from Texas in the XXXIIId Congress.

[16] Col. Scurry, in his official report, declares that he had but 600 men present fit for duty.

by forced marches to Albuquerque, his depot, which Canby, advancing from Fort Craig, was seriously threatening. He reached it in time to save his supplies, but only to realize more completely the impossibility of attaching New Mexico to the Confederacy, or even of remaining in it. He evacuated it on the 12th of April, moving down both banks of the river to Los Lunal, thence to Peralto on the east side, where he found Canby looking for him. Some fighting at long range ensued, with no serious results; but Sibley, largely outnumbered, crossed the river during the night, and pursued his retreat down the west bank next morning, Canby moving almost parallel with him on the east. The two armies encamped at evening in plain sight of each other.

Sibley, in his weakened condition, evidently did not like this proximity. "In order," as he says in his report, "to avoid the contingency of another general action in our then crippled condition," he set his forces silently in motion soon after nightfall, not down the river, but over the trackless mountains, through a desolate, waterless waste, abandoning most of his wagons, but packing seven days' provisions on mules, and thus giving his adversary the slip. Dragging his cannon by hand up and down the sides of most rugged mountains, he was ten days in making his way to a point on the river below, where supplies had been ordered to meet him, leaving his sick and wounded in hospitals at Santa Fé, Albuquerque, and Socorro, to fare as they might. He naïvely reports that "sufficient funds in Confederate paper was provided them to meet every want, *if it be negotiated;*" and honors the brothers Raphael and Manuel Armijo—wealthy native merchants—who, on his arrival at Albuquerque, had boldly avowed their sympathy with the Confederate cause, and placed stores containing $200,000 worth of goods at his disposal. He states that, when he evacuated Albuquerque, they abandoned luxurious homes to identify their future fortunes with those of the Southern Confederacy, and considerately adds, "I trust they will not be forgotten in the final settlement."

In closing, Gen. Sibley expresses the unflattering conviction that, "except for its political geographical position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood expended in its conquest;" and intimates that his soldiers would decidedly object to returning to that inhospitable, undesirable country. These and kindred considerations had induced his return to Fort Bliss, Texas, and now impelled him to meditate a movement without orders still further down the country.

Col. Canby wisely declined to run a race of starvation across those desolate mountains, in the rear of the flying foe, but returned to Santa Fé, whence his order, of even date[1] with Sibley's official report, claims that the latter had been "compelled to abandon a country he had entered to conquer and occupy, leaving behind him, in dead and wounded, and in sick and prisoners, one-half of his original force."

[1] May 4, 1862.

II.

MISSOURI—ARKANSAS.

Gen. Sterling Price was a good deal less indignant than any Unionist at the unaccountable desertion[1] of south-western Missouri by the new Union commander, directly on the heels of Fremont's triumphant and unresisted advance, when assured that his scouts were not mistaken in reporting the evacuation of Springfield and retreat to Rolla, by an army which he would not have dared to attack. He gradually retraced his steps from the Arkansas border, entering Springfield in triumph, and subsequently advancing to Osceola, on the Osage, thence pushing forward his forces unresisted over the greater part of southern and western Missouri, occupying in force Lexington and other points on the great river, where Slavery and Rebellion were strong, and subsisting his army on the State from which they might and should have been excluded. The village of Warsaw was burned,[2] and Platte City partially so,[3] by Rebel incendiaries or guerrillas; and there were insignificant combats at Salem,[4] Rogers' Mill,[5] near Glasgow, Potosi, Lexington, Mount Zion,[6] near Sturgeon, and some other points, at which the preponderance of advantage was generally on the side of the Unionists. Even in North Missouri, nearly a hundred miles of the railroad crossing that section was disabled and in good part destroyed[7] by a concerted night foray of guerrillas. Gen. Halleck thereupon issued an order, threatening to shoot any Rebel caught bridge-burning within the Union lines—a threat which the guerrillas habitually defied, and President Lincoln declined to make good.

Gen. John Pope, commanding the district of Central Missouri, having collected and equipped an adequate force, at length demonstrated[8] against the Rebels occupying Lexington, under Rains and Stein, compelling them to abandon the line of the Missouri, and retreat southward. Having, by forced marches and his strength in cavalry, gained a position between them and their base at Osceola, he forced them to a hurried flight, with the loss of nearly 300 prisoners and most of their baggage, including 70 wagons laden with clothing and supplies for Price, who lay at Osceola with 8,000 men. Meantime, a detachment of Pope's forces, under Col. Jeff. C. Davis, surprised[9] a Rebel camp at Milford, not far from Warrensburg, and compelled its surrender at discretion. Three colonels, 17 captains, over 1,000 prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, 1,000 horses, and an abundance of tents, baggage, and supplies, were among the trophies of this easy triumph. Pope's losses in these operations scarcely exceeded 100 men; while his prisoners alone were said to be 2,500. Among them was Col. Magoffin, brother of the late Governor of Kentucky.

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[1] Nov. 2–15, 1861. See Vol. I., pages 593–4.
[2] Nov. 19, 1861.
[3] Dec. 16.
[4] Dec. 3.
[5] Dec. 7.
[6] Dec. 28.
[7] Dec. 20.
[8] Dec. 15.
[9] Dec. 18.

Price, thus roughly handled before he had been able to concentrate his forces, did not choose to risk a general engagement. He retreated rapidly through Springfield and Cassville, closely pursued, and fighting at intervals, until he had crossed the Arkansas line, forming a junction, soon afterward, near Boston Mountains, with Gen. Ben McCulloch, commanding a division of Texas and Arkansas Confederates, thus raising his entire force to a number fully equal with that which had so keenly pursued him, which was now commanded by Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, of Iowa, and which, after continuing the pursuit down to Fayetteville, Arkansas, had retraced its steps to and halted at Sugar creek, not far over the State line. Meantime, Price was joined [10] and backed by Earl Van Dorn, late a captain [11] of U. S. regulars, now Confederate major-general, commanding the Trans-Mississippi department, and by Gen. Albert Pike, of Arkansas, heading a considerable brigade of Indians, swelling the numbers of the Rebels to about 20,000.

Van Dorn promptly resolved to give battle, and to fight it in such manner that the defeat of the Unionists should involve their destruction. Advancing rapidly from his camp at Cross Hollows, covering Fayetteville, he struck at [12] the division of Gen. Franz Sigel, holding Bentonville, the extreme advance of the Union position, 8 or 10 miles southwest from Gen. Curtis's center, near Mottsville, on the direct road from Fayetteville to Springfield. This attempt to isolate, overwhelm, and crush Sigel was baffled by the coolness and skill of that general. Sending his train ahead under escort, he covered its retreat with his best battery and infantry, planting his guns on each favorable position, and pouring grape and shell into the pursuing masses, until their advance was arrested and disorganized, when he would limber up and fall back to the next elevation or turn in the road, where he would renew the dispensation of grape with like results, then concede another half-mile, and repeat the operation. Thus fighting and falling back, he wore out the day and the distance, repelling his foes, who at times enveloped his flanks as well as his rear, with a loss of less than 100 men, a good part of these from the 2d Missouri, Col. Schaefer, who, mistaking an order, had left Bentonville considerably in advance, and who fell into an ambuscade by the way. Before 4 P. M., Sigel was met by reenforcements sent him by Gen. Curtis, when the pursuit was arrested, and he deliberately encamped near Leetown, across Sugar creek, and in close proximity to General Curtis's center position. PEA RIDGE is the designation of the elevated table-land, broken by ravines, and filling a large bend of Sugar creek, on which the ensuing battle was fought.

Gen. Curtis, knowing himself largely outnumbered by the motley host collected to overwhelm him, had chosen a very strong position on which to concentrate his retreating force, provided the Rebels would attack it in front, as he expected. The country being generally wooded, he had obstructed most of the lateral roads with fallen trees; while his artillery and infantry, well posted and

[10] March 3, 1862. [11] See page 18. [12] March 6.

strongly intrenched, were prepared to give the foe the warmest kind of reception as he advanced against them up the main road, leading from Texas through Fayetteville northward to Keytesville and Springfield. But Van Dorn perceived neither the necessity nor the wisdom of running into such a trap. Advancing from Fayetteville obliquely by way of Bentonville, and chasing Sigel off the direct road from the latter to Keytesville upon the cross-road that passes through the little village of Leetown and intersects the Fayetteville road at Elkhorn Tavern, he diligently improved the night following Sigel's retreat in placing his entire army along the road from Bentonville toward Keytesville, on the flank and in the rear of his foe; so that all Curtis's elaborate preparations to receive him on the Fayetteville road went for nothing.

Curtis woke late on the morning of the 7th to a realizing sense of his critical condition, with a far more numerous foe practically between him and his resources, rendering retreat ruinous, and compelling him to fight the Rebels on the ground they had chosen, which proffered him no advantage, and with which their guides were far more familiar than his. But every moment's delay must necessarily be improved by Van Dorn in making matters worse; so Curtis promptly changed front to rear; making the first and second divisions, under Sigel and Asboth, his left, the third, under Jeff. C. Davis, his center, and the fourth, Col. Carr, his right. The line thus formed stretched about three miles, from Sugar creek, through Leetown, to Elkhorn Tavern; of the Rebel line confronting it, Price, with his Missourians, formed the right; McIntosh was in the center, and McCulloch on the left. The dispositions being made, at 10½ o'clock, Osterhaus was directed by Curtis to advance, supporting his cavalry and light artillery, and open the ball; while, at nearly the same moment, McCulloch fell with overwhelming force upon Carr's division at and near Elkhorn Tavern. A broad, deep ravine, known as Cross-Timber Hollow, but termed in some reports Big Sugar creek, rendered almost impassable by a windfall of heavy timber, crossed the battle-field, severing the lines of either army, but especially those of the Rebels.

Osterhaus advanced with great gallantry from Leetown nearly to the Bentonville road, on which he found the enemy moving rapidly in great force toward Elkhorn Tavern, where McCulloch's attack upon Carr was already in progress. Assailed in turn by greatly superior numbers, he was soon driven back in disorder, with the loss of his battery. Col. Davis, who had been ordered by Curtis to support Carr, was now directed to advance through Leetown to the rescue of Osterhaus, which he did with such vigor and determination that, though largely outnumbered and repeatedly compelled to recoil, his division held the ground assigned them, losing two guns of Davidson's battery by the sudden advance of the enemy when their horses were disabled, but regaining them by a desperate charge of the 18th Indiana, which, with the 22d, was honorably conspicuous throughout the day. Col. Hendricks, of the 22d, was killed while leading a charge of his regiment. Night closed on this division,



sinking weary but undaunted on the field it had so nobly won—a field reddened by the blood of many of their foes, including Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh, both mortally wounded.

Carr was so fearfully overmatched throughout the day that, though always presenting a bold front to the enemy, he was compelled to give ground, sending repeated and urgent representations to Gen. Curtis that he could hold out but little longer unless rëenforced. Curtis sent him from time to time a battalion or a few light guns, with orders to persevere; and at length, at 2 P. M., finding his left wholly unassailed, ordered Gen. Asboth to move to the right by the Fayetteville road to Elkhorn Tavern, to support Carr, while Gen. Sigel should rëenforce Davis at Leetown, pushing on to Elkhorn if not needed in the center.

Gen. Curtis, with Asboth's division, reached Elkhorn at 5 P. M. He found Carr still fiercely fighting, having received three or four shots, one of which inflicted a severe wound. Many of his field officers had fallen, with about one-fourth of his entire command. He had been seven hours under fire, during which he had been forced back about half a mile. As Curtis came up, he saw the 4th Iowa falling back in perfect order, dressing on their colors as if on parade, and ordered it to face about. Col. Dodge explained that it was entirely out of ammunition, and was only retiring to refill its cartridge-boxes. Curtis ordered a bayonet-charge, and the regiment at once moved steadily back to its former position.

Meantime, Gen. Asboth had planted his artillery in the road and opened a heavy fire on the Rebel masses just at hand, while, of his infantry, the 2d Missouri plunged into the fight. The fire on both sides was close and deadly. Gen. Asboth was

severely wounded, Gen. Curtis's orderly was hit, and one of his body-guard fell dead. As the shades of night fell, a messenger from Sigel gave tidings that he was coming up on the left, and would soon open fire. Asboth's batteries fell back, being out of ammunition, and the Rebels were enabled to fire the last shot. A little after dark, both armies sank down on the battle-field, and slept amid the dead and the dying.

Curtis, finding that Van Dorn had concentrated all his forces on this point, directed Davis to withdraw all his reserve from the center, and move forward to the ground on Carr's left, which was effected by midnight. Sigel, though he had reported himself just at hand at dark, was obliged to make a detour, and did not reach headquarters till 2 A. M.

Van Dorn slept that night at the Elkhorn Tavern, from which he had dislodged Davis by such desperate efforts.[13] He had thus far been fighting a part of our forces with all of his own, and had only gained ground where his preponderance of numbers was overwhelming. Curtis reports his entire command in Arkansas at 10,500, cavalry and infantry—of whom 250 were absent after forage throughout the battle—and 48 pieces of artillery. He estimates the Rebel force in battle at 30,000, including 5,000 Indians.[14] Pollard says, "Van Dorn's whole force was about 16,000 men." But now our whole army was in hand, while at least a third of it had not yet fired a shot. Not a man in our ranks doubted that our victory must be speedy as well as decisive.

The sun rose; Gen. Curtis awaited the completion of his line of battle by Asboth's and Sigel's divisions getting into position; but no shot was fired by the enemy. At length, Curtis ordered Col. Davis, in our center, to begin the day's work. He was instantly replied to from new batteries and lines which the Rebels had prepared during the night, some of the batteries raking our right wing so that it was constrained to fall back a little, but without slackening its fire. Asboth's and Sigel's divisions were soon in position, completing our line of battle a little to the rear of the first, but without a break, and much of it on open ground, our left wing extended so that it could not be flanked. Gen. Curtis ordered his right to advance to the positions held the night before, and, finding himself an elevation on the extreme right, considerably in advance, which commanded the enemy's center and left, here posted the Dubuque battery, directing the right wing to advance to its support, while Capt. Hayden opened from it a most galling fire. Returning to the center, he directed the 1st Iowa battery, Capt. David, to take position in an open field and commence operations; and so battery after battery opened

[13] Pollard says, "We had taken during the day 7 cannon and about 200 prisoners."

[14] The *Richmond Whig* of April 9th, 1862, has a Rebel letter from one present to Hon. G. G. Vest, which says:

"When the enemy left Cove creek, which is south of Boston Mountain, Gens. Price, McCulloch, Pike, and McIntosh seemed to think—at least camp-talk amongst officers high in command so represented—that our united forces would carry into action nearly 30,000 men, more frequently estimated at 35,000 than a lower figure. I believe Gen. Van Dorn was confident that not a man less than 25,000 were panting to follow his victorious plume to a field where prouder honors awaited them than any he had yet gathered."

fire, the infantry moving steadily to their support, while the left wing was pushed rapidly forward, climbing a low cliff from which the Rebels had been driven by our guns, and crowding them back into the deep ravines of Cross-Timber Hollow. The 36th Illinois was prominent in this movement; while the 12th Missouri, pushing into the enemy's lines, captured a flag and two guns.

The flight of the Rebels was so sudden and swift, and the ravines wherein they disappeared so impracticable for cavalry, that our commanders were for some time at fault in the pursuit. Gen. Sigel pushed north on the Keytesville road, where but few of them had gone; and it was not till afternoon that Gen. Curtis ascertained that, after entering the Hollow, the main Rebel force had turned to the right, following obscure ravines which led into the Huntsville road, on which they escaped. Col. Bussey, with our cavalry and howitzers, followed them beyond Bentonville.[18]

Gen. Curtis reports his entire loss in the battle at 1,351, of whom 701 —more than half—were of Col. Carr's division. The Rebel loss can hardly have been less; since, in addition to Gens. Ben McCulloch and McIntosh killed, Gens. Price and Slack were wounded.

The victory at Pea Ridge was unmistakably ours, but the trophies were not abundant. No cannon, nor caissons, nor prisoners of any account, save a few too severely wounded to hobble off, were taken; and, though a letter to *The New York Herald*, written from the battle-field on the 9th, speaks of "a considerable quantity of wagons, supplies, etc., a load of powder, and nearly a thousand stand of arms," as captured by Sigel during his pursuit of the fugitives upon the Keytesville road, they do not figure in either of Sigel's official reports of the battle, nor yet in those of Curtis. The beaten Confederates, fleeing with celerity in different directions and by many paths, finally came together in the direction of Bentonville, some 8 miles from the Elkhorn Tavern, whence Van Dorn dispatched a flag of truce to Curtis, soliciting an arrangement for burying the dead, which was accorded.

Pollard makes a scarcity of ammunition a main reason for Van Dorn's retreat, and it is probable that neither army was well supplied with cartridges at the close of this protracted though desultory struggle. He adds that "Gen. Curtis was forced to fall back into Missouri," and that the "total abandonment of their enterprise of subjugation in Arkansas is the most conclusive evidence in the world that the Federals were worsted by Gen. Van Dorn;" but fails to

[18] Pollard says:

"About 9½ o'clock, Van Dorn had completed his arrangements to withdraw his forces. Finding that his right wing was much disorganized, and that the batteries were, one after another, retiring from the field, with every shot expended, he had determined to withdraw his forces in the direction of their supplies. This was accomplished with almost perfect success. The ambulances, crowded with the wounded, were sent in advance; a portion of McCulloch's division was placed in position to follow; while Gen. Van Dorn so disposed of his remaining force as best to deceive the enemy as to his intention, and to hold him in check while executing it. An attempt was made by the enemy to follow the retreating column. It was effectually checked, however; and, about 2 P.M., the Confederates encamped about six miles from the field of battle, all the artillery and baggage joining the army in safety. They brought away from the field of battle 300 prisoners, 4 cannon, and 3 baggage-wagons."

mention the fact that the Confederate army was also compelled to fall back to a region less wasted and exhausted than that which for many miles surrounded the well-fought field of Pea Ridge.

As this was the only important battle in which 'Indians' in considerable numbers took part, and as they were all found fighting—or, more strictly, yelling—on the side of the Confederacy, a few words of explanation may be pertinent.

We have seen [15] that the important aboriginal tribes known to us as Creeks and Cherokees, holding from time immemorial extensive and desirable territories, mainly within the States of North Carolina and Georgia, but extending also into Tennessee and Alabama, were constrained to surrender those lands to the lust of the neighboring Whites, and migrate across the Mississippi, at the instance of the State authorities, resisted, in obedience to treaties, by President John Quincy Adams, and succumbed to, in defiance of treaties and repeated judgments of the Supreme Court, by President Andrew Jackson. They were located, with some smaller tribes, in a region lying directly westward of Arkansas and north of the Red river, to which the name of Indian Territory was given, and which, lying between the 34th and 37th parallels of North latitude, and well watered by the Arkansas and several affluents of that and of Red river, was probably as genial and inviting as any new region to which they could have been transferred. Yet, though their removal had been effected nearly a quarter of a century, it is certain that the mass of the Indians there collected still regarded with just indignation the wrongs they had experienced, remembering fondly the pleasant streams and valleys of the lower Alleghanies, from which they had been forcibly and wrongfully expelled. But their Chiefs had been early corrupted in their old homes, by the example and practice among their White neighbors of slaveholding—a practice novel indeed, but eminently congenial to the natural indolence and pride of the savage character. They, consequently, adhered to it in their new location; and, since to hold slaves was a proof of wealth and importance, nearly every one who by any means obtained property, exchanged a part of it for one or more negroes; who, if they did not by labor increase his wealth, were certain, by flattery and servility, to magnify his conscious importance. Thus thoroughly saturated with the virus of slaveholding, the most civilized Indian tribes fell an easy prey to the arts of the Confederate emissaries. The agents through whom they received their annuities and transacted most of their business with the Federal Government, had nearly always been Democratic politicians—of course, pro-Slavery, and generally Southern—and for the last eight years emphatically so. These agents had little difficulty, at the outset of the Rebellion, in persuading their Chiefs that the old Union was irrecoverably destroyed; that it was scarcely probable that an effort would be made to restore it; and that, at all events, their interests and their safety dictated an alliance with that Confederacy which was

[15] See Vol. I., pages 102–6.

their immediate neighbor, and of which the conservation and perpetuity of slaveholding was the most cherished idea. Some of those Chiefs have since insisted that they were deceived by the Confederate emissaries, and especially by Gen. Albert Pike, chief Commissioner for Indian Affairs of the Confederacy, who had led them to confound that concern with the Union. What is certain is, that, directly after tidings reached them of the battles of Bull Run and Wilson's creek—the latter reported to them from that side as a complete discomfiture of the North, which view the undoubted death of Lyon and abandonment of Springfield tended strongly to corroborate—the Chiefs of most of the tribes very generally entered into a close offensive and defensive alliance with the Confederacy; even so cautious and politic a diplomatist as John Ross throwing his weight into that scale. It is said that, after the death of Lyon, Ben McCulloch's brigade of Texans was marched back to the Indian border, and that the Creeks and Cherokees were impressively required to decide quickly between the North and the South; else, betwixt Texas on the one side and Arkansas on the other, a force of 20,000 Confederates would speedily ravage and lay waste their country. They decided accordingly. Yet a very large minority of both Creeks and Cherokees rallied around the Chief Opothleyolo, made head against the current, and stood firm for the Union. Assembling near the Creek Agency, they tore down the Rebel flag there flying and replanted the Stars and Stripes; and a letter[17] from Col. McIntosh to the *True Democrat*[18] called loudly for reenforcements to the Rebel array in the Indian Territory, and expressed apprehension that the Northern party might prove the stronger. A battle between the antagonistic Indian forces took place Dec. 9th, 1861, on Bushy creek, near the Verdigris river, 180 miles west of Fort Smith, the Confederates being led by Col. Cooper, the Unionists by Opothleyolo. The result was not decisive, but the advantage appears to have been with the Rebel party, the Unionists being constrained soon after to make their way northward to Kansas, where they received the supplies they so much needed, and where a treaty of close alliance was negotiated[19] between Opothleyolo and his followers on one side, and Col. Dole, U. S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on the other.

The Rebels were thus left in undisputed possession of the Indian Territory, from which they collected the four or five thousand warriors who appeared at Pea Ridge; but, though the ground was mainly broken and wooded, affording every facility for irregular warfare, they do not seem to have proved of much account, save in the consumption of rations and massacre of the Union wounded, of whom at least a score fell victims to their barbarities. Their war-whoop was overborne by the roar of our heavy guns; they were displeased with the frequent falling on their heads of great branches and tops of the trees behind which they had sought shelter; and, in fact, the whole conduct of the battle on our part was, to their apprehension, disgusting. The amount of effort and of profanity expended

[17] Oct. 17, 1861. [18] Little Rock, Arkansas. [19] At Leavenworth, Feb. 1, 1862.

by their White officers in trying to keep them in line at the front, probably overbalanced the total value of their services; so that, if they chose to depart for their homes soon after the close of the battle, it is not probable that any strenuous efforts were made to detain them."[20]

Gen. Curtis, after resting and refitting his army, finding no enemy in its vicinity, again put his column in motion, proceeding S. S. E. through north-western Arkansas to Batesville,[21] on White river, near which point he had expected to meet gunboats with supplies from below. He found the river, however, at an unusually low stage for the season—barely four feet; while the gunboats required six or seven; beside which, the Mound City, which attempted the ascent, had been resisted and blown up in a fight with the Rebel battery at St. Charles some days before. Being compelled, therefore, to depend for all his supplies on wagon-trains from Rolla, Mo., now several hundred miles distant, he did not feel strong enough to advance on Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, nearly 100 miles S. S. W. from his present position. Having halted seven weeks, wholly unmolested, at Batesville, he again set forth,[22] crossing the Big Black by a pontoon-bridge, and pursuing a southerly course through a generally swampy, wooded, and thinly settled country, where none but negroes made any professions of Unionism, and, being joined at Jacksonport[23] by Gen. C. C. Washburne, with the 3d Wisconsin cavalry, which had come through from Springfield alone and unassailed, proceeded to Augusta, where he took leave[24] of the White, and, assuming a generally S. W. direction, took his way across the cypress swamps and canebrakes of the Cache, where his advance (the 33d Illinois, Col. Hovey), which had been struggling over roads heavily obstructed by fallen trees, was attacked[25] by some 1,500 Rebel cavalry, mainly Texans, led by Gen. Albert Rust, who held him in check for an hour, until he was joined by the 1st Indiana cavalry, Lt.-Col. Wood, with two howitzers, when an impetuous charge was made by the Indianians, whereby the enemy were routed and put to flight. The bodies of 110 dead Rebels were buried by our soldiers, whose loss was but 8 killed and 45 wounded, including Maj. Glendennin, who led the charge, receiving a shot in the breast, which proved mortal. The Rebels were satisfied with this experiment, and gave no further trouble.

Gen. Curtis again struck[26] White river at Clarendon, just below the mouth of the Cache, only to learn, with intense chagrin, that Col. Fitch,

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[20] Pollard says:

"'The Indian regiments, under Gen. Pike, had not come up in time to take any important part in the battle. Some of the red men behaved well, and a portion of them assisted in taking a battery; but they were difficult to manage in the deafening roar of artillery, to which they were unaccustomed, and were naturally amazed at the sight of guns that ran on wheels. They knew what to do with the rifle; they were accustomed to the sounds of battle as loud as their own war-whoop; and the amazement of these simple children of the forest may be imagined at the sight of such roaring, deafening, crashing monsters as 12-pounders running around on wheels. Gen. Van Dorn, in his official report of the battle, does not mention that any assistance was derived from the Indians—an ally that had, perhaps, cost us much more trouble, expense, and annoyance than their services in modern warfare could, under any circumstances, be worth."

[21] Arriving there May 6. [22] June 24.
[23] June 25. [24] July 4. [25] July 7. [26] July 9.

with the expected gunboats and transports, had gone down the river barely 24 hours previous. Being short of provisions, in a thoroughly inhospitable country, he had no choice but to make his way to the most accessible point on the Mississippi. This was Helena, 65 miles S. E., which was made[27] by Gen. Washburne, with 2,500 cavalry and 5 howitzers, in a march of 24 hours, the infantry coming through during the two following days, bringing about half a regiment of white Arkansas volunteers, with a large number of negroes, who, having been employed to block the roads in our front by felling trees across them, were entitled to liberty and protection under the regnant military policy. A single train of 40 wagons, laden with supplies, being wholly unguarded, was captured by Rebel guerrillas in Missouri, within 30 miles of Rolla, its starting-point.

Gen. John M. Schofield had at an early day[28] been placed by Gen. Halleck in command of all the Missouri militia—a force then visible only to the eye of faith. By the middle of April following, he had an array of 13,800 men in the field, mainly cavalry; to which was intrusted the defense of the State, while our other troops were drawn away to Arkansas and the Tennessee. Gen. Curtis's movements eastward toward the Mississippi opened the State to incursions from the Rebels, still in force in western Arkansas; while considerble numbers of Price's men were clandestinely sent home to enlist recruits and organize guerrilla bands for activity during the summer. Schofield persisted in enrolling and organizing militia until he had 50,900 men on his lists, of whom about 30,000 were armed. Upon full consideration, he decided to enroll only loyal men, since passive were often converted into active Rebels by a requirement to serve in the Union forces. He had 20,000 men ready for service, when, late in July, 1862, the tidings of McClellan's disastrous failure before Richmond combined with other influences to fill the interior of the State with formidable bands of Rebel partisans. Of these, Col. Porter's, two or three thousand strong, was attacked[29] at Kirksville, Adair County, by Col. John McNeil, with 1,000 cavalry and a battery of 6 guns, and, after a desperate fight of four hours, utterly defeated, with a loss of 180 killed and 500 wounded. Several wagon-loads of arms were among the spoils of victory, and Porter's force was by this defeat practically destroyed. McNeil's loss was reported at 28 killed and 60 wounded.

Four days thereafter, Col. Poindexter's band of about 1,200 Rebels was attacked, while crossing the Chariton river, by Col. Odin Guitar, 9th militia cavalry, 600 men, with 2 guns, and thoroughly routed; many of the Rebels being driven into the river and drowned. "Many horses and arms, and all their spare ammunition and other supplies, were captured."[30] Poindexter, with what remained of his force, fled northward to join Porter; but was intercepted and driven back by another Union force under Gen. Ben. Loan, and again struck by Guitar; who, in a running fight of nearly 48 hours,

[27] July 11. [28] Nov. 27, 1861. [29] Aug 6, 1862. [30] Gen. Schofield's official report.

killed, captured, or dispersed his entire command. Poindexter, after wandering alone through the woods for several days, was made a prisoner; and Porter, driven back upon McNeil by the same movement of Gen. Loan, was compelled to disperse his band to save it from destruction. This was the last appearance of the Rebels in formidable force northward of the Missouri river; though small bands of guerrillas continued to plunder and murder there, as elsewhere, for more than a year.

Independence, on the western border of the State, was about this time attacked[21] by a Rebel band of 500 to 800, under Col. Hughes; and its garrison, 312 men of the 7th Missouri cavalry, was surrendered by Lt.-Col. Buel, after a short resistance. Gen. Coffey, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry from Arkansas, early in August, invaded south-western Missouri, and, avoiding Springfield, moved rapidly northward. Col. Clark Wright, 6th Missouri cavalry, was sent with 1,200 men in pursuit; Gen. Totten being directed by Schofield to strike the band which had just captured Independence, before it could be joined by Coffey; while Gen. Blunt, commanding in Arkansas, was requested to send a force from Fort Scott, to cöoperate in cutting off Coffey's retreat; and Col. Fitz-Henry Warren, 1st Iowa cavalry, was dispatched from Clinton with 1,500 men to effect a junction with Maj. Foster; who, with the 7th militia cavalry, 800 strong, had been pushed out from Lexington by Totten, in quest of Hughes.

These combinations upon our side failed most signally. Coffey and Hughes united their forces and fought Maj. Foster at Lone Jack, Jackson county, wounded and defeated him, with the loss of his two guns, and compelled him to fall back to Lexington, upon which place Coffey was advancing with an army now augmented to 4,500 men; when, finding that Gen. Blunt was in strong force, threatening his line of retreat, while Loan's and Wright's and other commands were concentrating upon him from every direction, he relinquished the hope of capturing Lexington and relieving the Rebels north of the river, and turned to fly. Eluding Gen. Blunt in the night, he was hotly pursued to the Arkansas line, but escaped without serious disaster.

Gen. Schofield was soon after[22] superseded in the command of the department, by Gen. Curtis, but immediately placed at the head of the forces confronting the enemy in the south-west, where the Rebels, now led by Gen. T. C. Hindman,[23] were threatening a fresh invasion. Setting forward from Springfield[24] to Sarcoxie to reconnoiter the enemy's position, Gen. Salomon's advance had been overwhelmed at Newtonia by a large body of Rebel cavalry. Salomon had thereupon moved forward to their support, and renewed the battle at noon; fighting until sunset without serious loss, ultimately retiring in good order from the field. He estimated his strength at 4,500, and the enemy's in his front at 7,000. Gen. Schofield, being rëenforced by Gen. Blunt from Arkansas, found himself at the head of 10,000 men; while the Rebels at Newtonia were estimated at 13,000 to 20,000. He resolved to advance that night and attack at daylight next morning; Gen. Blunt approach-

[21] Aug. 11. [22] Sept. 24. [23] Late M. C. from Arkansas. [24] Oct. 1.

ing Newtonia from the north and west, and Gen. Totten from the east. He found, on coming up, that the enemy had sent their baggage to the rear, and were preparing to retreat. Immediately charging with cavalry and artillery, the Rebels fled without resistance, and were chased 30 miles into Arkansas. It appeared that, though in great numbers, they were badly armed, many of them not at all; having been sorely disappointed by the capture of a vessel laden with arms for their use on the Mississippi some time previously. Schofield pressed on[26] to the old battle-ground of Pea Ridge, only to find the enemy's forces divided: a part, under Cooper, having moved westward toward Maysville, with intent to operate on our communications with Fort Scott, while the main body had retreated south-westerly toward Huntsville, leaving two or three thousand cavalry in our front to screen these movements. Gen. Blunt was thereupon sent after Cooper; and, after a hard night's march, found him in camp near Maysville, and at once attacked, capturing his 4 guns and completely routing his command. The Rebels fled in disorder across the Arkansas to Fort Gibson. Their loss in material would have been greater had they had more to lose.

Gen. Schofield, with the residue of his army, made a forced march over White River Mountains, to a point 8 miles west of Huntsville, where Rains had encamped the day before. His advance was next morning pushed forward into Huntsville, whence a few Rebel cavalry fled at his approach. He here learned that Rains was retreating across the mountains to Ozark, resolved not to fight until reënforcements should arrive, and that further pursuit would be useless; so he retraced his steps, via Bentonville, to Cross Hollows and Osage Springs, sending Gen. Herron, with the 1st Iowa and 7th militia cavalry, about 1,000 in all, to attack in the rear some 3,000 or 4,000 Rebel cavalry who were encamped on White river, 8 miles from Fayetteville; while Gen. Totten, advancing via Fayetteville, was to assail them in front. Gen. Herron reached their camp at early dawn,[27] and immediately attacked with such vigor that the Rebels, though in superior numbers, fled rapidly into the mountains, with the loss of their camp equipage. Gen. Totten did not arrive till after they had vanished. Gen. Schofield found no further enemies within striking distance, until compelled by sickness to resign his command,[27] leaving Missouri substantially pacified.

But Gen. Hindman, commanding the Confederate forces in Arkansas, was not disposed to rest satisfied with such a conclusion of the campaign. Having collected, by concentration and conscription, a force estimated by our officers in his front at 25,000 to 30,000 men—while he officially reports that, for want of stores, etc., he was able to take on this expedition but 9,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and his artillery—he crossed the Arkansas river at or near Van Buren, and advanced upon our scattered and numerically far inferior division, which was watching him from the neighborhood of the last conflict. It was now December; but the weather was clear and dry, and the days bright and warm, though the nights were

[26] Oct. 17. [26] Oct. 28. [27] Nov. 20.

chilly; while the roads were in good condition. Gen. Blunt, commanding the 1st division, in good part of Kansas troops, numbering about 5,000 men, was at Cane Hill, or Booneborough, some 10 miles north-west of Van Buren, and 18 south-west of Fayetteville, when he was apprised of this advance,[38] with one of his three brigades (Gen. Salomon's), protecting his trains at Rhea's Mills, 8 miles north. Determined not to be driven out of Arkansas, he telegraphed in various directions for Gen. Herron, commanding the 2d and 3d divisions, now in Missouri, and left subject to his orders by Gen. Schofield's departure; and attempted, by showing a bold front and directing his cavalry to skirmish sharply with the Rebel vanguard, to delay Hindman's advance until Herron could reach him. Blunt's dispatch found[39] that able and earnest leader at Wilson's creek, some 10 miles south of Springfield, but with most of his command from 10 to 20 miles nearer the Arkansas line. Within three hours, his divisions were in motion southerly, making marches of fully 20 miles per day, with all their guns and trains. Having reached Elkhorn,[40] he dispatched Col. Wickersham, with his 3,000 cavalry, to the more immediate relief of Blunt; and pushing on to Fayetteville, marching all night, he entered that place at 4 A. M., on Sunday morning, Dec. 7th. Impressed with the peril of Blunt, he rested his men but an hour or so before putting his column again in motion, and had proceeded but 5 or 6 miles when his advance was met by the 1st Arkansas and 7th Missouri (Union) cavalry, being a part of those he had dispatched from Elkhorn to the aid of Blunt, who had just before been attacked and thrown into great disorder by Marmaduke's Rebel cavalry, forming the vanguard of Hindman's army.

Gen. Blunt had been skirmishing for the last two days with what he supposed the advance of the enemy's main body; but learned, at 8 P. M. of the 6th, that Hindman had turned his left and interposed between him and all of Herron's infantry and artillery. Col. Wickersham, with 4 cavalry regiments, reported to Blunt at Cane Hill two hours afterward, with tidings that Herron would be at Fayetteville early next morning.

Blunt now attempted to warn Herron of his danger, but it was too late; his messengers were intercepted by Marmaduke's cavalry. Hindman was probably reaching for Blunt's trains at Rhea's Mills, when, to their mutual astonishment, he locked horns with Herron on Illinois creek, near the settlement known as PRAIRIE GROVE.

Herron, divested of his cavalry, had but about 4,000 men in hand, and ought to have stood on the defensive,[41] availing himself of every advantage of position and shelter.

[38] Dec. 2. [39] Dec. 3. [40] On the evening of the 5th.

[41] Gen. Herron, in a private letter to a friend at Dubuque, Iowa, dated Dec. 16, says:

"For four miles, we fought their cavalry, driving them back to Illinois creek, where I found their whole force strongly posted on a long ridge, with magnificent positions for batteries. For one mile in front, it was clear ground, and my road lay right in the center of their line. From a prisoner taken, I learned that Hindman was on the ridge, with his whole force, and intended to whip me out before Blunt could get up; in other words, to take us one at a time. The case looked tough, with Blunt ten miles away, and 25,000 men between us; but I saw at a glance there were just two things that could be done; namely, fight them without delay, and depend on the chance of Blunt's hearing me

Anxious, however, for Blunt's safety, and apprehending that he might be at that moment enveloped by an overwhelming Rebel force, he drove the Rebel cavalry impetuously across the creek, only to find their infantry and artillery strongly posted on a high, wooded ridge, three-quarters of a mile distant; their numbers concealed by the timber and thick underbrush. Sending across a light battery, which was instantly driven back, he, while still threatening a fresh advance on the road, cut a path to the creek, half a mile farther down, and pushed across a battery at a point which enabled it to draw the fire of the Rebel artillery. This movement, being unsuspected and unperceived by the enemy, was entirely successful; and, before the Rebels had recovered from their surprise and confusion, Herron had pushed three full batteries, backed by three good regiments of infantry, across the regular ford. These batteries were so excellent and so admirably served that they had silenced, in one hour's firing, their Rebel antagonists. Ours were thereupon advanced across an open field, firing volleys of grape and canister, until within a hundred yards of the ridge held by the Rebels, when the 20th Wisconsin and 19th Iowa infantry were ordered to charge the Rebel battery in their front. They did so most gallantly, hurling back its supports and taking the battery; but were unable to hold it, and compelled to fall back. Their charge was at once returned with interest by the Rebel infantry, intent on the capture of our three batteries, and rushing up to within a hundred yards of the guns, when they were likewise repulsed with great slaughter. A fresh brigade, consisting of the 26th Indiana and 37th Illinois infantry, being now brought up from the right to the relief of our exhausted center, Col. Houston ordered and led a charge against the same Rebel battery which had been fruitlessly charged already. Again it was taken, and again the captors were compelled to abandon it by the overwhelming fire of infantry concentrated upon them.

Thus the battle stood, still desperately contested, neither lost nor won, when, at 2½ P. M., Herron heard the welcome music of a battery opening at some distance on his right, and was soon assured that Blunt's division was on hand.

Blunt had that morning sent Col. Wickersham, with his cavalry, in advance, followed by Gen. Salomon's infantry brigade, with directions to move rapidly on the Fayetteville road, and form a junction, if possible, with Herron. Three miles north of Cane Hill, however, Wickersham had taken the left-hand road to Rhea's Mills, instead of the right, leading directly to Fayetteville; and Blunt, on reaching the fork, had followed, deeming it imprudent to dislocate his command. Coming up at length with Wickersham, he ordered him to face toward Fayetteville, and endeavor to reach Herron. Wickersham had barely started, when, a little after noon, the boom of artillery was heard in the north-east, and, leaving Gen. Salomon's brigade to guard his trains at Rhea's Mills, Blunt set forward, over a blind, hilly road, with his two others, in the direction of the fire.

At 1:45 P. M., Gen. Blunt, in ad-

and coming up, or retreat and lose my whole train. It required no time to make a decision.",

vance of his division, came into full view of the field where the battle was fiercely raging. The Rebels were very strongly posted on high, rolling ground, covered by timber, and only approached from the north over large, open fields, which afforded no cover, save that a part of them bore a crop of ripe corn. Blunt's eccentric advance had brought him in front of the enemy's left, where they had been massing a large force for the purpose of flanking Herron's position. The flankers found an enemy much nearer than they expected, and were at once hotly engaged with Blunt's division. Its three batteries, firing shell and case-shot at short range, soon proved an overmatch for the two Rebel batteries opposed to them, driving them and their supports back into the woods; where they were charged by Col. Weer, leading the 10th, 13th, and part of the 2d and 11th Kansas and 20th Iowa, and a musketry fight of three hours was maintained with equal energy by the contending hosts. Meantime, our batteries were advanced at various points and served with rare efficiency; Lieut. Tenney, with six 10-pound Parrotts, repelling with shell and canister, while unsupported, a formidable infantry attack. Here fell the Rebel Gen. Stein, of Missouri. A battery of 10 guns, well supported, opening upon Tenney, he in ten minutes silenced its clamor, dismounting two of the guns, and driving off the residue. An attempt to capture Rabb's and Hopkins's batteries, which were supported by the 11th Kansas, Lt.-Col. Moonlight, was defeated with fearful slaughter.

As darkness came on, the firing gradually slackened and ceased; the Rebels recoiling into their woody covert, our soldiers sleeping on their arms in the open field where they had so bravely struggled, expecting to renew the combat at daylight. Meanwhile, our wounded were all cared for, the trains of the whole army sent to Fayetteville; and Gen. Salomon's brigade, relieved from the duty of guarding them, ordered to the field; ammunition brought up and distributed, and everything made ready for proceeding to business at dawn; but, just before daylight, Gen. Blunt received a flag of truce from Hindman, asking a personal interview with reference to the burial of the dead and relief of the wounded. Blunt met Hindman accordingly, and was soon satisfied that the meeting so solicited was but a trick; that Hindman had no force present or near but his staff-escort, and a party left to gather up his wounded; that the bulk of his army had commenced retreating several hours before.

Our loss in this battle was 167 killed, 798 wounded, and 183 missing—total, 1,148. Most of the missing were captured in Marmaduke's initial attack on our cavalry, and were exchanged directly afterward. Of our loss, no less than 953 fell on Herron's command of hardly more than 4,000 men. Lt.-Col. McFarland, who led the 19th Iowa in its first charge, was killed; as was Maj. Burdett, of the 7th Missouri cavalry. Lt.-Col. Black, 37th Illinois, and Maj. Thompson, 20th Iowa, were among the wounded. The Rebel loss[42] must have been greater, because

[42] Gen. Blunt, in his official report, says: "The enemy's loss in killed and wounded can not fall short of 3,000, and will probably much exceed that number, as many of them, not se-

of our superiority in artillery, with which the principal execution was done. Hindman's official report makes it, 164 killed, 817 wounded, 336 missing—total, 1,317; and claims to have taken 275 prisoners, 5 flags, 23 wagons, and over 500 small arms.

III.

KENTUCKY—TENNESSEE—ALABAMA.

The river Tennessee, taking rise in the rugged valleys of south-western Virginia, between the Alleghany and the Cumberland ranges of mountains, but drawing tribute also from western North Carolina and northern Georgia, traverses East Tennessee in a generally W. S. W. direction, entering Alabama at its N. E. corner; and, after a detour of some 300 miles, through the northern part of that State, passes out at its N. W. corner; reëntering Tennessee, and, passing again through that State in a course due north, and forming the boundary between what are designated respectively West and Middle Tennessee, thence flowing N. N. W. till it falls into the Ohio scarcely 70 miles above the mouth of that river, whereof it is the largest tributary, draining an area of over 40,000 square miles. Very rarely frozen, it is usually navigable, save in dry summers, from its mouth to the Muscle Shoals, toward the lower end of its course through Alabama, and thence by smaller boats at high stages of water some 500 miles, to Knoxville, the capital of East Tennessee. The Cumberland, draining the opposite slope of the Cumberland Mountains, takes its rise in the heart of eastern Kentucky, and, pursuing a similar but shorter course, runs W. S. W. into Middle Tennessee, which it traverses very much as the Tennessee does northern Alabama, passing Nashville, its capital, bending N. W. into Kentucky some 20 miles eastward of the latter river,

verely wounded, were taken to Van Buren. Their loss in killed upon the ground will reach 1,000; the greater number of whom have been buried by my command."

Pollard, on the other hand, says of this battle:

"Our whole line of infantry were in close conflict nearly the whole day with the enemy, who were attempting, with their force of 18,000 men, to drive us from our position. In every instance, they were repulsed, and finally driven back from the field; Gen. Hindman driving them to within 8 miles of Fayetteville; when our forces fell back to their supply dépôt, between Cane Hill and Van Buren. We captured 300 prisoners, and vast quantities of stores. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was about 1,000; the Confederate loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, about 300."

Gen. Blunt further says of this Pollard victory:

"Their transportation had been left south of the mountains, and their retreat thereby made unincumbered and stealthy. I am assured by my own men who were prisoners with them, as well as by deserters from their ranks, that they tore up the blankets of their men to muffle the wheels of their artillery."

Gen. Herron, in a private letter, dated Dec. 15th, says:

"The loss of the enemy is terrific. After their burial-parties had been on the ground for three days, we had to turn in and bury 300 for them. The country for 25 miles around is full of their wounded. We have, as captures, 4 caissons full of ammunition, and about 300 stand of arms. Hindman had prepared himself, and risked all on this fight. His movements were shrewdly managed; and nothing but desperately hard fighting ever carried us through."

and pursuing a generally parallel course to that stream, to its own reception by the Ohio, and being navigable for 250 miles by large steamboats, save in seasons of summer drouth, and by boats of 500 tuns for some 300 miles further. These two—the only rivers, save the Mississippi, navigable southward from the border of the Free into the Slave States—were obviously regarded on both sides, in view of the notorious impracticability of Southern roads in Winter and Spring, as the natural routes of advance for our Western armies collected and drilled on and near the Ohio during the Autumn of 1861 and the Winter following.

The close of 1861 left Gen. Humphrey Marshall, commanding the Confederate forces in south-eastern Kentucky, intrenched at Paintville, Johnson county, intent on gathering supplies and recruiting. Col. James A. Garfield, of Ohio, commanding a Union brigade consisting of the 42d Ohio, 14th Kentucky, and a squadron of Ohio cavalry, moved up the Big Sandy early in 1862, occupying Paintville[1] without resistance, and pushing on to Prestonburg, Floyd county; near which town, at the forks of Middle creek, he encountered Marshall, whom he put to flight with little loss on either side. Garfield reported his full strength in this engagement at 1,800, and estimated that of Marshall at 2,500. Marshall was obliged to retreat into Virginia.

Cumberland Gap was abandoned without resistance to the Unionists next month;[2] and Gen. Garfield, with 600 men, made a rapid excursion[3] to Pound Gap, where he surprised a Rebel camp, capturing 300 rifles, destroying the camp equipage, and returning to Pikeville without loss.

Gen. Zollicoffer, at the close of 1861, held a position on the Cumberland, near the head of steamboat navigation on that sinuous stream, which may be regarded as the right of the Rebel army covering Tennessee and holding a small part of southern Kentucky. His force did not exceed 5,000 men; but even this was with great difficulty meagerly subsisted by inexorable foraging on that thinly settled and poorly cultivated region. His principal camp was at Mill Spring, in Wayne county, on the south side of the river; but, finding himself unmolested, he established himself on the opposite bank, in a substantial earthwork, which he named Camp Beach Grove. He had one small steamboat, which had run up with munitions from Nashville, and was employed in gathering supplies for his hungry men; but the advance of a Union detachment to Columbia, on his left, had rendered his navigation of the river below him precarious, if not entirely obstructed it. On his right front, Gen. Schoepf, with a force of 8,000 men, occupied Somerset; but was content to occupy it, without attempting or desiring to make trouble. But Gen. George H. Thomas, having been ordered[4] by Gen. Buell to take command in this quarter, had scarcely reached Logan's Cross-Roads[5] when Maj.-Gen. George B. Crittenden, who had recently joined Zollicoffer and superseded him in command, finding himself nearly destitute of subsistence, and apprehending an attack in over-

[1] Jan. 7, 1862. [2] About Feb. 22. [3] March 16. [4] Dec. 29, 1861. [5] Jan. 17, 1862.

whelming strength from all our forces in that part of Kentucky, resolved to anticipate it;[6] and, at midnight after the next day,[7] advanced with his entire available force, consisting of six Tennessee, one Alabama, and one Mississippi regiments of infantry, six cannon, and two battalions of cavalry, to strike and surprise the three or four Union regiments which he was assured were alone posted between him and Somerset. He struck them as he had expected, but did not surprise them; Gen. Thomas having taken the precaution to send out strong pickets of infantry on the roads leading toward the enemy, with a picket of cavalry still farther in advance. These were encountered by Crittenden's vanguard before daylight;[8] but, after firing, retired slowly and in good order, and reported to Col. M. D. Manson, commanding the advance brigade, who in ten minutes had his two regiments—10th Indiana and 4th Kentucky, Col. S. S. Fry—in readiness; and the Rebels, in that hour of darkness, necessarily proceeded with caution, doubling themselves as they advanced. Thomas was of course at the front, having ordered up his remaining regiments, within ten minutes afterward.

The charge of the Rebels was desperate, and the battle raged with great fury for nearly two hours, during which the muskets of the combatants were often fired through the same fence. Barely five Union regiments in all—the 10th Indiana, 2d Minnesota, 9th Ohio, 4th Kentucky, and 1st Kentucky cavalry, with Kinney's battery—were seriously engaged; but the 12th Kentucky, and two or three Tennessee regiments, reached the field just as the day was won by a charge of the 9th Ohio on our left flank with fixed bayonets, supported by a galling fire from the 2d Minnesota in front, under which the Rebels gave way and fled, scarcely halting until they reached their intrenched camp by the river; leaving one gun on the battle-field and another by the way.

In the heat of the battle, when the combatants were scarcely separated by an open space, Gen. Zollicoffer was shot by Col. Fry, and fell dead on the field, where his body was left by his followers. Col. Fry's horse was shot dead directly afterward. Col. Robert L. McCook, 9th Ohio, was wounded in the leg, and also had his horse shot. The Rebels lost 192 killed, 62 wounded and captured, besides those carried off by them, and 89 taken unhurt. Our loss was 39 killed, and 207 wounded.

It rained, as usual, and the roads were horrible; but the victors, considerably rëenforced, were, before 4 P. M., in front of the intrenchments at Camp Beech Grove, within which the flying Rebels had taken refuge an hour or two before. Shelling was immediately commenced on our side, feebly responded to on the other; and this continued until 7 at night, when our soldiers desisted and lay down to rest. Gen. Schoepf's brigade came up that night, and were so disposed by Gen. Thomas as to make sure of the capture of

[6] A Rebel letter to the *Louisville* (Nashville) *Courier*, says:

"The enemy in front occupied Somerset with several regiments, and Columbia with an equal force. On the 17th and 18th, it rained so much that Fishing creek could not be crossed; and so the Somerset force of several thousand could not join the force from Columbia before the 20th."

[7] Jan. 18–19. [8] Sunday, Jan. 19.



MILL SPRING.

the enemy. At daylight, their little steamer was seen lying in the river, and was quickly set on fire by our shells; cutting off, as was fondly calculated, all chance of farther Rebel retreat. Fire was then opened on their intrenchments, but there was no response; and it was soon discovered that, taking advantage of their little boat, they had silently escaped across the river during the night, leaving 10 more guns,[9] with caissons, and many small arms, 1,200 or 1,500 horses and mules, with tents, blankets, and all the material of an army, behind them.

The Rebel engineers had con-

[9] A Rebel letter to the *Memphis Avalanche*, says 11 guns were spiked and thrown into the river.

structed—mainly by slave labor—at a point some 80 or 90 miles up the Tennessee and Cumberland, where those rivers first approach within 10 or 12 miles of each other, a few miles south of the Kentucky line, and north of the Louisville and Memphis Railroad, two strong and spacious works; FORT HENRY, commanding the Tennessee from its eastern bank, and FORT DONELSON, controlling the passage of the Cumberland from the west, a little below the Tennessee village of Dover. A dirt road connected the two forts, whereof the garrisons were expected to support each other if assailed. Fort Henry, situated on a point or bend of the river, and scarcely above its surface when in flood, menaced the approach by water for a mile on either hand, but was overlooked by three points[10] within cannon-shot on either bank of the river. It covered two or three acres of ground, mounted 17 large guns, 11 of them bearing upon any vessels approaching from below, with a spacious intrenched camp in its rear, and a wide abatis encircling all. It was defended by Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, of Kentucky, with 2,600 men.

To Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, of Illinois, was assigned the task of its reduction, with the powerful aid of Commodore A. H. Foote and his fleet of seven gunboats, four of them partially iron-clad. Leaving Cairo[11] with some 15,000 men on steam transports, he moved up the Ohio to the mouth of the Tennessee, then ascended that stream to within ten miles of Fort Henry, where his transports halted,[12] while Com. Foote, with his gunboats, proceeded cautiously up the river, shelling the woods on either side to discover any masked batteries that might there be planted. Having pushed this reconnoissance far enough to receive a 32-pound ball through the unprotected side of one of his boats, Gen. Grant decided that the proper landing-place for the troops was about four miles below the fort, where he and they were debarked[13] accordingly. The next day was spent in preparations, and the next appointed for the attack: Gen. Grant directing the main body of his forces, under Gen. John A. McClernand, to move diagonally across the country and seize the road leading from the fort to Donelson and Dover, while Gen. C. F. Smith, with his brigade, advanced along the west bank of the river, and Com. Foote, with his gunboats, moved slowly up and attacked the fort from the water.

Com. Foote formed his vessels in two lines: the iron-clads Cincinnati (flag-ship), Essex, Carondelet, and St. Louis, in front, while the old wooden Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington, formed a second line some distance astern, and out of the range of the enemy's fire, throwing shell over the iron-clads into and about the fort. Thus advancing slowly and firing deliberately, the iron-clads steadily neared the fort, using only their bow-guns, because unwilling to expose their weak, unsheltered sides to the heavy guns of the fort, one of them having a caliber of 128 and another of 60 pounds, and but 12 of ours in all of our front line being available. For a moment only was there hesitation in the attack; when, after an

[10] So says Gen. Tilghman's official report. [11] Feb. 2, 1862. [12] Feb. 4-5. [13] Feb. 4.



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

hour's mutual cannonade, a 24-pound shot from the fort pierced the Essex at an unguarded spot, and, tearing through her thick oak planking as though it had been cheese, penetrated her starboard boiler, instantly filling her from stem to stern with burning steam, killing both her pilots at their post of duty, and severely scalding Capt. W. D. Porter and nearly 40 of his gunners and crew. Thus completely disabled, the Essex drifted out of the action, to the great joy of the Rebels, who for a moment thought the victory their own; but her consorts kept on firing and nearing for twenty minutes more, when they were within 600 yards of the Rebel guns, whereof all but four had by this time been silenced: one having burst, disabling every man who served it, while the vent of the great 10-inch columbiad had been closed, rendering it useless; while our fire at short range grew hotter and hotter.

Gen. McClernand, as Com. Foote had apprehended, had not yet worked his way through the miry woods and over the difficult trails he was obliged to traverse in order to reach and occupy the main road from Henry to Donelson. Had he been directed to start at 6 instead of 11 that morning, he would probably have intercepted and captured Tilghman's entire force. As it was, the latter says he ordered all but the hundred or so inside the fort, and employed in working its guns, to take the road to Donelson, under Col. Heiman, his second in command; and that order was obeyed with great promptness and celerity. Tilghman remained himself with the handful in the fort; and, at 1:45 P. M., seeing further defense alike impotent and hopeless, and being urged by his officers to surrender, he, intending to negotiate for terms, raised a flag of truce, which, being unperceived, amid the dense smoke, had no effect on the fire of the fleet. Five minutes later, by the advice of his officers, he, having ceased firing, lowered his flag, thereby surrender-

ing at discretion.[14] Our loss in this conflict, in addition to that on the Essex, was 1 killed and 9 wounded on the Cincinnati; none on our other vessels. Gen. Tilghman says our total casualties were reported to him at 73, while his own were 21. Com. Foote reports his captures at 60 or 70 men, besides the General and his staff, and a hospital-ship containing 60 invalids, with barracks, tents, &c., sufficient for 15,000 men.[15]

Fort Donelson—two miles below Dover, where the Cumberland makes a short bend westward from its northerly course—was a much larger and stronger work than Fort Henry, covering a level plateau of nearly a hundred acres, which surmounts the steep bluff, 100 feet high, with two strong water batteries on the bank at its base, of 9 and 3 guns respectively, one of them a 10-inch columbiad, three 64-pounders, and the rest 32-pounders; all protected by very heavy earthworks, and all bearing on the approach up the river. The fort itself had but 8 heavy guns mounted in addition to the field batteries of its garrison. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow[16] had been in command there[17] until the arrival[18] of Gen. John B. Floyd,[19] when the number of its defenders had been swelled by successive reenforcements to about 15,000[20] men. Most of them were Tennesseans, with about 2,000 Mississippians, 1,200 Virginians, 1,000 Kentuckians, and a thin regiment each from Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. The fort was commanded by two or three points farther inland, within cannon-shot; the country rolling to the bluffs of the Tennessee: some of the hills midway having an elevation of about 300 feet. Deep ravines, with steep, rocky sides, especially near the bluffs of the Cumberland, separated these hills, and, with the tall, dense, primitive forests generally prevailing, afforded admirable positions for defensive warfare. A heavy and difficult abâtis in good part surrounded the fortress landward, rendering assault at many points all but impracticable.

Gen. Grant, bringing Smith's division across the Tennessee, and sending an officer down that river to turn back all vessels ascending it with troops or supplies, crossed from Fort Henry[21] to the neighborhood of Donelson, gradually extending his lines[22] so as to invest the Rebel stronghold nearly from river to river, by a line some three miles long, and 100 to 300 rods distant from the Rebel rifle-pits and batteries, which formed an irregular crescent, encircling their fort at a distance of one

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[14] Gen. Grant's official dispatch says: "In a little over one hour, all the batteries were silenced." Com. Foote says: "The Rebel flag was hauled down after a very severe and closely contested action of one hour and fifteen minutes." Gen. Tilghman says he surrendered "after an engagement of *two* hours and ten minutes." The time probably seemed longer on that side than on ours.

[15] Tilghman says he surrendered 66 beside his staff (11), and 16 on the hospital-boat; and adds that his escaping force was overtaken, some three miles from Fort Henry, by our cavalry, who were easily repulsed, but who picked up about 20 of his stragglers, while several of his field-guns were lost on the way, owing to poor teams and bad roads.

[16] Of Nashville, Tennessee. [17] Since Jan. 18.

[18] Feb. 13. [19] Of Virginia.

[20] The *Richmond Dispatch* has a letter from one of the officers, dated Augusta, Ga., Feb. 22, who says: "Our troops number about 18,000." The *Nashville Patriot*, of about Feb. 19, gives a list of the regiments present, with the strength of each, which foots up 13,829, and is evidently incomplete. [21] Feb. 12. [22] Feb. 13.

or two miles. Skirmishing by sharp-shooters on both sides was maintained with spirit throughout the day, mainly from behind the trees of the great forest, which at most points covered our army and the space between the hostile lines. The weather was thus far like a clear, bright, Northern October, and our men in the highest spirits.

Com. Foote now arrived[33] with his gunboats—four iron-clad, and two wooden—and it was determined that he should attempt to silence and carry the water batteries. He did so at 3 P. M. next day, steadily advancing with his iron-clads to within 400 yards of the Rebels' great guns; when, by an hour's desperate fighting, he had driven most of the enemy's gunners from their batteries, and seemed on the point of complete success. Just here, however, the wheel of his flag-ship St. Louis and the tiller of its consort, the Louisville, were shot away, rendering both boats unmanageable, and causing them to drift helplessly down the river. All his iron-clads had endured serious damage: the St. Louis having received 59 shots, and each of the others about half so many, with an aggregate loss of 54 killed and wounded. Of his twelve guns, one had burst, while the enemy had brought over 20—most of them very heavy—to bear upon him from Donelson, as well as the water batteries, to which the gunners returned on observing his predicament, and again poured in their hottest fire. Com. Foote, perceiving victory hopeless, gave up the contest, and retired with his boats down the river, badly crippled.

Gen. Grant decided to complete the investment of the fort, at least on that side, while he fortified his weak points, and awaited the return of the gunboats in fighting condition. Floyd, however, not concurring in that view of the matter, decided to assume at once a vigorous offensive, while his men were elated with their defeat of the gunboats. Massing[34] heavily on his extreme left, commanded by Pillow, and ordering Buckner,[35] in the center, to attack likewise, he made a desperate effort to beat back our investing and augmenting forces, and open for his army a line of retreat up river toward Nashville. The attack of Pillow on our right, held by Gen. McClernand, was impetuous, daring, and persistent. After two hours' desperate fighting, McClernand was worsted and fell back on our center, sending urgently for reënforcements, but still contesting every inch of ground. Two or three of his regiments were badly broken, and several more reported out of ammunition; which should not have been, since it was not yet noon. Our men, however, had the bad habit generally of using ammunition wastefully, loading and firing as fast as possible, even when there was not one chance in a thousand of hitting an enemy. The Rebels usually economized their cartridges, firing only when they could do so with effect.

Pillow, still successful and slowly advancing, about noon joined hands with Buckner in the center, and took command of their united forces, when a charge was made by Forrest's cavalry on our infantry supporting a

[33] Evening of the 13th.

[34] At daylight on the morning of the 15th.

[35] Gen. Simon B. Buckner, of Kentucky; formerly commander of her State Guard.

battery of six pieces, which was taken.[26]

Gen. Grant—not expecting this striking proof of Rebel vitality—was some miles distant on a gunboat, conferring with Com. Foote, when McClernand's cry for assistance reached headquarters. Gen. Lew. Wallace, commanding our center, ordered Col. Cruft, with his first brigade, to the rescue. Cruft, misdirected by his guide, took a wrong road; but it led him nevertheless into the fight, and served to draw off some Rebel attention from McClernand's overmatched column. Meantime, Col. Thayer,[27] commanding his 3d brigade, was ordered by Wallace to the further support of McClernand; and his fresh troops, admirably handled, uniting with Cruft's, succeeded in stopping and turning back the Rebel advance.

Gen. Grant reached the scene of conflict about 3 P. M., and, after a survey of the ground, ordered a general advance; Gen. Lew. Wallace leading the attack on the enemy's left, while Gen. C. F. Smith, on our left, should charge his right. This combined effort proved entirely successful. Wallace recovered all the ground lost during the day, resting at 5 P. M. within 150 yards of the intrenchments whence Buckner had sallied, only to return baffled at night; while Gen. Smith's charge on our left, magnificently led by him against breastworks whereof the defense had doubtless been weakened to strengthen Pillow's effort, succeeded with little loss. The 2d Iowa went into them on a run, closely followed by the 7th and 14th, with the 25th Indiana, cutting down or chasing off their defenders; and the position thus gained was soon made secure against any effort to retake it. So closed the work of that bloody day.

Since the siege began, the weather had suddenly changed to cold, with a light snow, followed by a piercing N. W. wind, rendering the sufferings on either side fearful and almost universal. Our men were without tents, and at many points without fires; while the Rebels, worse clad and little better sheltered, shivered in their fireless trenches through weary day and sleepless night. Hundreds on either side were frost-bitten; and it is said that quite a number of the wounded, left uncared for by the shifting tide of battle, were actually frozen to death.

The night following the conflict just described was one of anxiety and trouble on the part of the Rebels. Gen. Grant's force had been increased by the arrival of transport after transport, until it must have amounted to 30,000, if not nearer 40,000 men, and was magnified by their apprehensions to 50,000.[28] The effort to cut their way out through our right had been gallantly made, and had signally failed. Their outnumbered, roughly handled force, had endured 84 hours of alternate fighting and watching, while suffering all the hardships of a Winter campaign, and were so outworn as to

[26] Col. Hanson, 2d Kentucky, and Col. Cook, 32d Tennessee, as well as Maj. Brown, 20th Mississippi, officially report that, after Buckner's defeat of McClernand, on the morning of the 15th, there was no obstacle to the escape of their entire force southward or up the Cumberland. Col. Hanson says the way of escape remained open till they were ordered back to the trenches, late in the afternoon.

[27] John M., 1st Nebraska.

[28] "Eighty-three regiments," says one of their reports.

fall asleep standing in line of battle, when actually under fire. The position gained by Smith would enable him to take other of their intrenchments in reverse, or to advance under cover of a ridge directly upon their most important battery and field-work. Buckner declared that his post would certainly be attacked in the morning, and that he could not hold it half an hour; he thought they might yet fight their way out, with a loss of three-fourths of their number, but did not deem it right to sacrifice so large a proportion. These representations being undisputed, a surrender became inevitable. Yet Floyd, the sunset of whose career as Secretary of War had not appeared brilliant at the North, at once protested that *he* would never surrender. Buckner—who, for obvious reasons, was scarcely more popular with Kentucky Unionists than was Floyd with those of the Free States—presented no such obstacle. Floyd, therefore, turned the command over to Pillow, who passed it to Buckner, whose late superiors now devoted their attention to the means of escape. Two Rebel steamboats having arrived a little before daylight from above, Floyd filled them with his soldiers, especially those of his own brigade, and, a little before sunrise, cast off and steamed up the river, leaving the residue to their fate.[29] Col. Forrest, with some 800 cavalry, escaped by the road up the immediate bank of the river, which was partly overflowed, and therefore deemed impracticable for infantry, but which Forrest's troopers appear to have traversed without difficulty or loss.

During the night, a negro had escaped from the Rebel lines, and given our leaders their first clear information of the straits of the enemy. Gen. Grant was therefore not surprised at receiving, about daylight, the following overture:

"HEADQUARTERS FORT DONELSON,
"Feb. 16, 1862.

"SIR: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces at this post under my command. In that view, I suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER,
"Brig.-Gen. C. S. Army.

"To Brig.-Gen. U. S. GRANT, commanding U. S. forces near Fort Donelson."

The reply was hardly so diplomatic, but quite lucid—as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ON THE FIELD,
"FORT DONELSON, Feb. 16, 1862.

"To Gen. S. B. BUCKNER:

"SIR: Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and the appointment of commissioners to settle on the terms of capitulation, is just received.

"No terms, except unconditional and immediate surrender, can be accepted.

"I propose to move immediately on your works.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT,
"Brig.-General Commanding."

Gen. Buckner's response closed the correspondence thus:

"HEADQUARTERS DOVER (TENN.),
"Feb. 16, 1862.

"Brig.-Gen. U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army:

"SIR: The distribution of the forces under my command incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

"I am, sir, your servant,
"S. B. BUCKNER,
"Brig.-General C. S. Army."

[29] Maj. W. M. Brown, 20th Miss., in his official report, says one of the boats did not appear to have over 50 men on board, and that Floyd took away about 1,500; but this is probably an under-estimate. As all would naturally wish to go, it is probable that all went who could.

The Rebel loss by this conflict and capitulation must have been fully 10,000 men, including 2,000 killed and wounded,[20] to say nothing of arms and munitions. Our loss in killed and wounded was probably the larger.[21]

The blow so well struck at Donelson was swiftly followed by important successes throughout Kentucky and in Tennessee.

Gen. Don Carlos Buell had, at the then recent partition of departments, been assigned[22] to that of the Ohio, including; besides three Free States, Tennessee, and all of Kentucky east of the Cumberland, with his headquarters at Louisville; where he still remained when his advance, consisting of some 16,000 men, led by Gen. O. M. Mitchel, moved,[23] simultaneously with Gen. Grant's demonstration on Donelson, upon Bowling Green, the Rebel stronghold in Kentucky, where Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston had succeeded to the command, while Gen. Beauregard had been sent him from the east as a reenforcement. But Johnston's force, enormously and purposely magnified by current report, had never amounted to 25,000 effectives, and had ere this in good part been sent to the defense of Donelson, until it had been reduced to about 7,000 or 8,000 men. As Mitchel advanced across Green river from his camp at Bacon creek, Johnston commenced his retreat on Nashville; so that, when Mitchel had reached[24] the north bank of Barren river, and looked across into Bowling Green, sending over Col. Turchin's brigade during the night, at a ferry a mile and a half below, he found the railroad dépôt on fire, with 7 locomotives, and a large amount of corn and other provisions, with the bridges of course destroyed, and the last of the Rebel army, consisting of Texas Rangers, just moving off on a railroad train, which had been retained for the purpose. The river, being wide and at a high stage, could not here be crossed till next day; so that Mitchel's forced march of 42 miles in 37 hours, clearing his road of trees which had been felled across it, was rewarded by very moderate captures, including a brass 6-pounder, and some $5,000 worth of commissary stores; but it was

[20] Gen. Pillow, in his supplemental report, says:

"We sent up from Dover, 1,134 wounded. A Federal surgeon's certificate, which I have seen, says that there were about 400 Confederate prisoners wounded in hospital at Paducah, making 1,534 wounded. I was satisfied the killed would increase the number to 2,000."

Pollard gives what he terms a correct list, by regiments, of the Confederate prisoners taken at Fort Donelson, footing up 5,079; but he evidently does not include in this total the wounded, of whom many must have been left on the field or in the hospital at the fort, as he says: "The village of Dover, which was within our lines, contained in every room in every house sick, wounded, or dead men. Bloody rags were everywhere, and a door could not be opened without hearing groans." And in his list of regiments we do not find the 20th Mississippi, whose commander, Maj. W. M. Brown, officially reports that he surrendered 454; nor the 32d Tennessee, Col. Cook, who reports that he surrendered 538.

Gen. Grant's report makes his captures 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, at least 40 pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

[21] Gen. Grant, speaking of the battle of the 15th, says: "Our loss can not fall far short of 1,200 killed, wounded, and missing," including 250 taken prisoners. The reports of Col. Cruft, Gen. W. H. L. Wallace, and Col. Lauman, show an aggregate loss of 1,306 in their three brigades, clearly indicating that Gen. Grant underestimated his casualties.

[22] Nov. 9, 1861. [23] Feb. 11, 1862. [24] Feb. 14,

computed that the Rebels had been compelled to destroy not less than half a million dollars' worth of munitions, including many arms. Large quantities of provisions and other stores, industriously collected throughout the preceding Fall and Winter, had been removed to Nashville during the last three or four days.

Nashville had been electrified, during the 15th (Saturday), with a telegraphic dispatch from Dover, announcing a Rebel victory; somewhat tempered by reports from Bowling Green that Johnston would be obliged to evacuate that post. Next morning, however, came news of the capture of Donelson, with most of its defenders; and along with it a first installment of Johnston's army retreating from dismantled Bowling Green. The general astonishment was only equaled by the general consternation. Churches were closed, or failed to open; there were hurried consultations and whispered adieus in every quarter, whence bank directors rushed to impel specie and other valuables toward the cars, soon to bear them to Chattanooga, to Columbia, and other points of comparative safety. Gov. Harris and his Legislature, with the State archives and treasure, betook themselves swiftly to Memphis; while Confederate officers devoted their attention to moving as rapidly as possible, the vast stores of provisions and munitions here accumulated. Two fine gunboats, being built at the river-side, were prepared for instant conflagration; and the magnificent and costly railroad and wire suspension-bridges over the Cumberland were likewise made ready for speedy destruction—a fate which overtook them two or three days later. A fortification had in the mean time been commenced on the Cumberland, four miles below the city, calculated to dispute and prevent the passage of our gunboats; but this was soon abandoned upon information that Gen. Johnston had decided not to fight for Nashville, but to continue his retreat; which he did, unassailed, to Corinth, Miss., south of the Tennessee river, and nearly 300 miles from Bowling Green. Six weeks were consumed in that retreat; which, with a green and undisciplined army, was probably quite as disastrous as a battle.[35]

Directly after the capture of Fort Henry, Commander Phelps, with the

[35] "An Impressed New-Yorker," in his narrative of personal adventures, entitled "Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army," says:

"The army was not far from 60,000 strong, after Gen. George B. Crittenden's forces were added to it at Murfreesboro'. The season of the year was the worst possible in that latitude. Rain fell—sometimes sleet—four days out of the seven. The roads were bad enough at best; but, under such a tramping of horses and cutting of wheels as the march produced, soon became horrible. About 100 regiments were numbered in the army. The full complement of wagons to each regiment (24), would give above 2,000 wagons. Imagine such a train of heavily loaded wagons passing along a single mud road, accompanied by 55,000 infantry and 5,000 horsemen, in the midst of rain and sleet, day after day, camping at night in wet fields, or dripping woods, without sufficient food adapted to their wants, and often without any tents; the men lying down in their wet clothes, and rising chilled through and through. And let this continue for six weeks of incessant retreat, and you get a feeble glimpse of what we endured. The army suffered great loss from sickness, and some from desertion; some regiments leaving Bowling Green with six or seven hundred men, and reaching Corinth with but half of this number. The towns through which we passed were left full of sick men; and many were sent off to hospitals at some distance from our route."

Pollard makes Johnston's army at Murfreesboro' but 17,000.

wooden gunboats Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington, steamed up the Tennessee to Florence, Ala., at the foot of the Muscle Shoals, where he captured two steamboats, and constrained the Rebels to burn six others; he having burnt the railroad bridge near Benton on the way. The wholly unexpected appearance of the National flag in North Alabama, where slaves were comparatively few, and at least three-fourths of the people had stubbornly opposed Secession, was a welcome spectacle to thousands, and was greeted with enthusiastic demonstrations of loyalty.

Com. Foote, with the gunboats Conestoga and Cairo, moved up[36] the Cumberland from Donelson, three days after its surrender. At Clarksville, he found the railroad bridge destroyed; while the wealthier citizens had generally fled, and he encountered no resistance. As it would have been absurd to attack a city like Nashville with such a force, he now returned to Cairo for additional boats; while Gen. Smith, with the advance of our victorious army, marched up to Clarksville; whence Lieut. Bryant, of the Cairo, followed by 7 transports, conveying the brigade of Gen. Nelson, moved up the river to Nashville, where they arrived on the 24th, but found no enemy prepared to resist them. In fact, the city had virtually surrendered already to the 4th Ohio cavalry, Col. John Kennett, being the advance of Buell's army. Col. Kennett had reached Edgefield Junction, 8 or 10 miles from Nashville, and thence sent forward a detachment, under Maj. H. C. Rodgers, who occupied without resistance the village of Edgefield, opposite Nashville, on the Cumberland, and communicated with Mayor Cheatham, who surrendered the city to Col. Kennett on his arrival, which was before that of Gen. Nelson's command. A small squad of the 4th Ohio crossed over into the city and returned, their orders not contemplating its occupation; but the battery of the regiment had been planted where it commanded the heart of the city, and a reasonable fear of shells impelled Mayor Cheatham to proffer and hasten a surrender, by which he agreed to protect and preserve the public property in Nashville until it could be regularly turned over to the use of the United States.

But, in fact, the spoils of victory had already been clutched by the Nashville mob; so that, while the Rebel loss was enormous,[37] the positive Union gain was inconsiderable.

[36] Feb. 19.

[37] Pollard says:

"Gen. Johnston had moved the main body of his command to Murfreesboro'—a rear-guard being left in Nashville under Gen. Floyd, who had arrived from Donelson, to secure the stores and provisions. In the first wild excitement of the panic, the store-houses had been thrown open to the poor. They were besieged by a mob ravenous for spoils, and who had to be dispersed from the commissariat by jets of water from a steam fire-engine. Women and children, even, were seen scudding through the streets under loads of greasy pork, which they had taken as prizes from the store-houses. It is believed that hundreds of families, among the lower orders of the population, secured and secreted Government stores enough to open respectable groceries. It was with the greatest difficulty that Gen. Floyd could restore order and get his martial law into any thing like an effective system. Blacks and Whites had to be chased and captured and forced to help the movement of Government stores. One man, who, after a long chase, was captured, offered fight, and was in consequence shot and badly wounded. Not less than one million of dollars in stores was lost through the acts of the cowardly and ravenous mob of Nashville. Gen. Floyd and Col. Forrest exhibited extraordinary energy and efficiency in getting off Government stores. Col. Forrest remained in the city about 24 hours, with only 40 men, after the arrival of the enemy at Edgefield."

Gen. Buell soon afterward reached Nashville, and established there his headquarters, while his army was quartered around the city. Col. Stanley Matthews, 51st Ohio, was appointed Provost-Marshal, and soon restored the city to order; discovering and reclaiming a considerable amount of Rebel stores which had been appropriated to private use. The bridges and roads northward were speedily repaired, and railroad connection with Louisville reopened. The wealthier classes had in great part left, or remained sullenly disloyal; but among the mechanics and laboring poor a good degree of Union feeling was soon developed.

By the Union successes recorded in this chapter, the Rebel stronghold at Columbus, Ky., commanding the navigation of the Mississippi, had been rendered untenable. It was held by Maj.-Gen. Polk, Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, who had expended a vast amount of labor in strengthening its defenses, while the adjacent country had been nearly divested of food and forage to replenish its stores. Its garrison had been reported at 20,000 men; but had been reduced by successive detachments to 2,000 or 3,000. Com. Foote, on returning from Clarksville to Cairo, speedily collected a flotilla of six gunboats, apparently for service at Nashville; but, when all was ready, dropped down the Mississippi, followed by three transports, conveying some 2,000 or 3,000 soldiers, under Gen. W. T. Sherman, while a supporting force moved overland from Paducah.[38] Arriving opposite Columbus, he learned that the last of the Rebels had left some hours before, after burning 18,000 bushels of corn, 5,000 tons of hay, their cavalry stables, and much other property; while many of their heavy guns, which they were unable to take away, had been rolled off the bluff, here 150 feet high, into the river. The 2d Illinois cavalry, Col. Hogg, from Paducah, had entered and taken possession the evening before. A massive chain, intended to bar the descent of the Mississippi, had here been stretched across the great river, but to no purpose; the Missouri end being loose, and buried in the mud of the river-bed.

Island No. 10 lies in a sharp bend in the Mississippi, 45 miles below Columbus, and a few miles above New Madrid on the Missouri bank. This island had been strongly fortified, its works well supplied with powerful guns and ammunition, under the direction of Gen. Beauregard, so that it was confidently counted on to stop the progress of the Union armies down the river. Gen. Pope with a land force of nearly 40,000 men, had previously marched down the Missouri shore of the river, reaching and investing New Madrid, March 3. Finding it defended by stout earthworks, mounting 20 heavy guns, with six strongly armed gunboats anchored along the shore to aid in holding it, he sent back to Cairo for siege-guns; while he intrenched three regiments and a battery under Col. Plummer, 11th Missouri, at Point Pleasant, ten miles below, so as to command the passage of the river directly in the rear of No. 10. The Rebel gunboats attempted to dislodge Col. Plummer, but without

[38] March 4.

success. Pope's siege-guns arrived at sunset on the 12th, and, before morning, had been planted within half a mile of the enemy's main work, so as to open fire at daylight, just 34 hours after their embarkation at Cairo. The Rebel garrison had meantime been swelled to 9,000 infantry, under Maj.-Gen. McCown, and nine gunboats directed by Com. Hollins, on which our fire was mainly concentrated. A heavy cannonade from both sides was kept up throughout the day, with little damage to the Unionists, who, driving in the Rebel pickets, steadily pushed forward their trenches.

A violent thunder-storm raged through most of the following night; and at daylight it was discovered that the Rebels had left, taking very little with them. Thirty-three cannon, several thousand small arms, with ammunition, tents, cartridges, wagons, &c., were abandoned by the fugitives, with scarcely an attempt even to destroy them. Our loss during the siege was barely 51 killed and wounded.

Com. Foote, with his gunboats, had moved down from Columbus early in March, opening on the Rebel works at No. 10 on the 15th. Two days later, a general attack was made, with five gunboats and four mortar-boats; but, though maintained for nine hours, it did very little damage. Beauregard telegraphed to Richmond [39] that our vessels had thrown 3,000 shells, expended 50 tons of powder, and had killed but one of his men, without damaging his batteries. He soon left for Corinth,[40] ceding the command at No. 10 to



MAP SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ISLAND NO. 10, NEW MADRID, TIPTONVILLE, ETC.

Brig.-Gen. Makall, who assumed it in a bombastic proclamation. Meantime, Gen. Pope's engineers were quietly engaged in cutting a canal, 12 miles long, across the Missouri peninsula, opposite No. 10, through which steamboats and barges were safely transferred to the river below the Rebel stronghold; while two of our heavier gunboats succeeded in passing the island [41] in a heavy fog. Gen. Pope, thus relieved from all peril from the Rebel flotilla, pushed a division [42] across the river toward the rear of the remaining Rebel stronghold, and was preparing to follow with the rest of his army, when the Rebels under McCown, sinking their gunboat Grampus, and six transports, abandoned No. 10 to its fate, and escaped eastward, leaving Makall to be driven back upon the swamps, and forced to surrender some thousands of men, several gun-

[39] April 1.
[40] April 5.
[41] The Carondelet, April 4, and the Pittsburg, April 6.
[42] April 7.

boats, and more than a hundred cannon."[45]

Com. Foote, having refitted, moved down[46] the river in order of battle, followed by transports conveying part of Gen. Pope's army; finding his way first impeded at Fort Pillow, or Wright, situated on the first Chickasaw Bluffs, near the Islands Nos. 33 and 34, about 70 miles above Memphis. Landing his mortars on the Arkansas bank, he commenced[46] a bombardment of the fort at a distance of three-fourths of a mile, and was replied to with energy and accuracy. The high stage of the river prevented cooperation by our army; so the cannonade was kept up for two weeks with spirit on both sides, but with little effect.

A powerful ram having been received by the Rebels from below, they resolved to test its efficiency; and accordingly made an attack on our fleet,[46] the ram leading, backed by three gunboats, and making a rush at the Cincinnati, whose rapid broadsides at short range made no impression on her assailant's iron mail. The boats collided with a fearful crash, instantly followed by a broadside from the Cincinnati and a volley of musketry; directly after which, Commander Stembel fired his pistol at the head of the Confederate pilot, killing him instantly. The pilot's mate thereupon shot the Commander through his shoulder and neck, disabling but not killing him. The Cincinnati, though crippled and sinking, was able to withdraw from the fight, and was run upon a shoal, where she sank; while the Mallory, which had attempted to crush her, was herself caught by the St. Louis, cut into and sunk, most of her crew going down with her. One of the Confederate gunboats had ere this been burnt; another had her boiler exploded by a shot; while the rest were so crippled as to render them nearly ineffective; so they gave up the fight and drifted down the river, under cover of the smoke, to the protection of their batteries. The Cincinnati was our only vessel that had suffered, and she had but 4 wounded.

A month later,[47] Fort Pillow was evacuated, as was Fort Randolph, twelve miles below. Some damaged guns were left in them, but nothing of much value. Com. Davis dropped down next day to within gun-shot of Memphis, where he came to anchor; and next morning, with five gunboats and four rams, slowly approached the city. Soon, a Rebel fleet of eight gunboats was seen approaching in order of battle, opening fire when within three-fourths of a mile. The Union ram, Queen of the West, soon struck the Rebel gunboat, Gen. Price, crushing in her wheel-house, and causing her to leak so badly that she was headed at once for the Arkansas shore. The Rebel gunboat, Beauregard, now made at the Queen, which attempted to strike her; but the shock was skillfully evaded by the Beauregard's pilot, who struck the Queen aft so heavily as to disable her. The Union ram

[45] Gen. Pope, in his official report, says:

"Three Generals, 273 field and company officers, 6,700 prisoners, 123 pieces of heavy artillery—all of the very best character, and of the latest patterns—7,000 stand of small arms, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons and harness, &c., are among the spoils."

[46] April 12. [46] April 17.
[46] May 4. [47] June 4.

Monarch thereupon made at the Beauregard, and struck her heavily on the bow, causing her to fill rapidly and sink, while the Monarch took the Queen in tow and drew her out of peril. Com. Davis's flag-boat, the Benton, threw a 50-pound ball from a rifled Parrott into the Rebel gunboat Gen. Lovell, striking her aft, just above the water-line, and tearing a great hole, into which the water rushed in a torrent. In four minutes, she had sunk in 75 feet of water, carrying down a part of her crew. There remained but four of the Rebel boats; and these, which had been for some time drifting, though firing, now turned their bows toward the Arkansas shore, which the Jeff. Thompson soon reached, when her officers and crew leaped off and ran into the woods, while a shell exploding on her deck, set her on fire, and she was burned down to the water. The crew of the Gen. Bragg and the Sumter escaped in like manner; while the swifter Gen. Van Dorn fled down the river. The battle had lasted a little over an hour, and its result was most decisive. No man was killed on board our fleet. Memphis, whose population had all been interested spectators of the combat, surrendered immediately.

An expedition, comprising four gunboats and a steam transport, conveying the 46th Indiana, Col. Fitch, was soon dispatched up the Arkansas and White rivers, to open communication with Gen. Curtis, known to be approaching from the West. Reaching St. Charles, the Mound City, then in advance, was fired on from two concealed batteries, and replied, while our troops were landed below to take those batteries in the rear. A ball, from a siege-gun on the bluff, pierced the side of the Mound City, and passed through her steam-drum, filling the vessel instantly with the scalding vapor. Of the 175 persons on board, barely 23 escaped injury. Many jumped overboard, frantic with pain, and were drowned; while the boats sent from the Conestoga to their relief, were fired on by the Rebels with grape and canister, killing most of our scalded and frantic fugitives. In a few minutes, Col. Fitch had carried the works by a charge, capturing 9 guns and about 30 prisoners, including Col. Frye, the commandant. The expedition failed to effect its purpose.

The triumphant Union fleet soon proceeded down the river, encountering no serious obstacle till near Vicksburg,[48] where it communicated with Com. Farragut, whose fleet from the Gulf lay below this natural stronghold, accompanied by Gen. Williams, with four regiments of infantry. The Rebel fortifications were bombarded[49] for several hours, without result; but Lt.-Col. Ellet, with two rams, went that day up the Yazoo river, to capture three Rebel gunboats, which, on his approach, were set on fire and impelled down the current, with intent to envelop our vessels in the flames. The Rebel boats were destroyed.

The siege of Vicksburg was continued by our fleet, and a determined attack made on it July 1, but defeated. The Rebel ram Arkansas came down[50] the Yazoo, ran through the astonished Union fleet, and took

[48] June 24. [49] June 26. [50] July 15.

refuge under the batteries of Vicksburg, unharmed. Repeated attempts to destroy or sink her[51] were defeated by the shore batteries; and, on the 24th, the siege was raised; Com. Farragut, with Gen. Williams, returning down the river; while Com. Davis, with his fleet, steamed up to the mouth of the Yazoo, thus abandoning, for the time, the rëopening of the Mississippi.

Gen. Grant's victorious army, after a brief rest at Fort Donelson, recrossed, considerably strengthened, to the Tennessee, just above Fort Henry, where several gunboats and a large number of transports, passing down the Cumberland into the Ohio, and thence into the Tennessee, took up our soldiers by regiments and started with them on a new movement up the Tennessee. General Charles F. Smith had been designated by Gen. Halleck to direct this movement, but was soon disabled by the sickness of which he died not long after reaching Savannah, Tenn., and Gen. Grant was thus restored to chief command. The rendezvous of the expedition was at a little place called Danville, where the railroad from Memphis to Clarkesville and Louisville crosses the river. The gunboats Tyler and Lexington had already made a reconnoissance up the Tennessee, meeting their first resistance at Pittsburg Landing, an insignificant two-house nucleus of a prospective village, 8 miles above Savannah and 20 miles N.N.E. of Corinth, Miss., at the junction of the Memphis and Charleston with the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The country hence to Corinth is rolling, and generally wooded. Two or three miles southward is Shiloh Church, and some ten miles farther is the road-crossing known as Monterey, where there were half-a-dozen houses. The region is thinly and recently settled; still mainly covered by the primitive forest; gently rolling, and traversed by a number of inconsiderable creeks, making eastward and northward, to be lost in the Tennessee.

At Pittsburg Landing, the Tyler found a Rebel battery of six guns, which it silenced, after a mutual cannonade of two hours; returning thence to Danville and reporting. The movement of the army southward on transports was continued—the 46th Ohio, Col. Worthington, leading, on the transport B. J. Adams—so far as Savannah, where it was landed,[52] and proceeded to take military possession. All the transports, 69 in number, conveying nearly 40,000 men, were soon debarking the army, with its material, at and near this place, whence Gen. Lew. Wallace's division was dispatched[53] to Purdy, a station 16 miles W.S.W., where the railroad was destroyed. Gen. Sherman's first division was next[54] conveyed up the river to Tyler's Landing, just across the Mississippi State line; whence the 6th Ohio cavalry was dispatched to Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston road, some miles eastward of Corinth, which was likewise destroyed without resistance. The expedition then returned unmolested to Savannah.

These easy successes, and the fact that no enemy came near or seemed to meditate annoyance, must have imbued our leading officers with a

[51] July 15–22. [52] March 10. [53] March 12. [54] March 14.

contempt for the power or the prowess of their enemy; since our regiments, as they arrived, were mainly debarked at Pittsburg Landing, on the side of the Tennessee nearest to and within easy striking distance of the Rebel headquarters at Corinth. One of the six divisions, under Gen. Lew. Wallace, was encamped nearly opposite Savannah; the other five were thrown out in a semicircle southward of Pittsburg Landing, with a front like a Methodist camp-meeting, straggling from Lick creek on the south or left, to Snake creek on the north or right, a distance of some three or four miles. Gen. Prentiss's division was encamped across the direct road to Corinth, with Gen. McClernand's behind his right, and Gen. Sherman's still further to the right, with Shiloh church in his front, on a road leading also, but more circuitously, to Corinth. Gen. Hurlbut's division lay in the rear of Gen. Prentiss. Gen. Smith's division, commanded, because of Smith's sickness, by Gen. W. H. L. Wallace, was on the left of and behind McClernand, with its right near Pittsburg Landing and its front somewhat protected by the ravines of two rivulets running into Snake creek.

Though the vicinity of the enemy was notorious, not an intrenchment nor defense of any kind, not even an abatis, here so easily made, covered and protected our front; no reconnoitering parties were thrown forward to watch for and report an advance of the enemy; and even the pickets were scarcely a musket-shot from the tents of our foremost regiments; some of which, it was asserted, had not even been provided with ammunition, though it was known that the woods, scarcely a mile away, had suddenly been found swarming with Rebel scouts and sharp-shooters in such strength as to forbid observation on our part."[55] Low but ominous whispers and meaning glances of exultation among the Rebel civilians in our rear had already given indications that a blow was about to be struck; and alarmed Unionists had sought the tents of our Generals with monitions of danger, which were received with sneering intimations that every one should stick to his trade. Gen. Grant was at Savannah, superintending the reception of supplies. Such was the condition of our forces on Saturday evening, April 5th.

Albert Sidney Johnston was probably the ablest commander at any time engaged in the Rebel service. He had braved unpopularity and reproach from the herd of chimney-corner critics who supposed it the duty of a General to run his head against every stone-wall within reach, by refusing to fight losing battles for Bowling Green and Nashville, and had thus brought off his army intact and undemoralized; retreating across the Tennessee and into a region at once undevastated and unappalled by war, full of resources, wherein devotion to the Union had been utterly suppressed, if not eradicated, and whence, by a net-work of railroads and tele-

[55] "Agate" [Whitelaw Reid], of the *Cincinnati Gazette*, in his report of the battle, says:

"We had lain three weeks at Pittsburg Landing, within 20 miles of the Rebels, that were likely to attack us in superior numbers, without throwing up a single breastwork or preparing a single protection for a battery, and with the brigades of one division [Sherman's] stretched from extreme right to extreme left of our line, while four other divisions had been crowded in between, as they arrived."

graphs, he communicated easily with Richmond, and with every portion of the Cotton States. The recent evacuation of Columbus by Polk was probably ordered by him, in obedience to his policy of concentrating around Corinth the greatest possible force, with intent to rush upon and overwhelm the Union army, so carelessly encamped just before him on the hither bank of the Tennessee. Having a spy in nearly every dwelling in southern Tennessee, he was doubtless aware that the command of that army had just been turned over by Gen. C. F. Smith, an experienced and capable soldier, to Gen. Grant, so recently from civil life; and he had no doubt of his ability to accomplish its destruction. Calling urgently upon the Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana, for all the troops they could spare or raise, and being strongly rëenforced by Gen. Braxton Bragg, with a drilled corps from Mobile and Pensacola,[56] he had, by the 1st of April, collected an army of about 50,000.[57] Moving silently out from Corinth, in light marching order and without tents, at 3 A. M., on the 3d, the advance of his infantry preceded and masked by cavalry, he confidently expected to attack in full force on the morning of the 5th; but a heavy rain on the 4th so deepened the mire of the narrow, wretched roads, that his army was by that time but fairly concentrated at Monterey, thence moving with the utmost caution until within three and a half miles of our pickets, where, unable to advance farther without braving discovery, he halted for the night.[58] Here, with double guards along his front, instructed to shoot any man who, upon whatever pretext, should attempt to pass, a council of war was held at 8 P. M., and every preparation made for a stealthy and desperate assault at daybreak; while the soldiers, forbidden to make fires, sank on the cold, damp ground, under the open sky, and shivered through a part of the night. Each Colonel had orders to have his regiment under arms and ready to move by 3 A. M.

At early dawn, the advance was resumed in line of battle: Maj.-Gen. Hardee, with the 3d corps, in front, with the 2d, and strongest, under Gen. Bragg, 500 yards behind him; the 1st, under Gen. Polk, half a mile in the rear of this, with the reserve,

[56] About this time abandoned by the Rebels.

[57] Beauregard, in his field return of the 'Army of the Mississippi,' before and after the battle of Shiloh, makes his effective total, before battle, 40,355 men, of whom 4,382 were cavalry, which he says was useless and could not operate at all, the battle-field being so thickly wooded. But this return includes none of his troops left to guard his base at Corinth, or his trains in the rear of the battle-field, and conceals the fact that his cavalry were usefully employed in guarding, on their way to Corinth, his prisoners as well as his wounded. Beside, when he comes to sum up his losses, he states the loss of his cavalry at 301—rather inexplicable, if that cavalry was useless and unemployed.

[58] "An Impressed New-Yorker," who was then serving on Beauregard's staff, in his "Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army," says:

"While it is no part of my duty, in this narrative, to criticise military movements, and especially those of the Union forces, I may state that the total absence of cavalry pickets from Gen. Grant's army was a matter of perfect amazement to the Rebel officers. There were absolutely none on Grant's left, where Gen. Breckinridge's division was meeting him; so that we were able to come up within hearing of their drums entirely unperceived. The Southern Generals always kept cavalry pickets out for miles, even when no enemy was supposed to be within a day's march of them. The infantry pickets of Grant's forces were not above three-fourths of a mile from his advance camps, and they were too few to make any resistance."

under Gen. John C. Breckinridge, closely following. This order, however, was soon sacrificed to the exigencies of the contest.

Rumors of a Rebel advance, and the capture of some of our officers thereby, had reached our camps on Friday;[59] and an Ohio brigade had been sent out to reconnoiter, which had a brush with a smaller Rebel force, and pushed it back to a battery which was found in position near our lines. Gen. Lew. Wallace's division was thereupon ordered out, and advanced to Adamsville, on the road to Purdy; but, meeting no opponent, after passing a night in drenching rain, it returned to its camp. On Saturday, there was firing along our front, which ought to have incited inquiry, if not alarm, but did not.

As day broke,[60] our pickets in Prentiss's front came rushing into camp, barely in advance of the pursuing Rebels, whose shells were tearing through our tents a moment afterward. Some of our men were dressing; others washing or cooking; a few eating their breakfasts; many, especially officers, had not yet risen. The next instant, magnificent lines of battle poured out of the woods in front of our camps, and at double-quick rushed in upon our bewildered, half-dressed, and not yet half-formed men, firing deadly volleys at close range, then springing upon the helpless, coatless, musketless mob with the bayonet. Some fell as they ran; others as they emerged from their tents, or as they strove to buckle on their accouterments; some tried to surrender; but the Rebels could not stop then to take prisoners. Some of these were found, though disabled, still alive, when we recovered those tents next evening.

Thus was Prentiss's division routed before it had time to form in line of battle; and Hildebrand's brigade, on Sherman's right, was demolished with equal expedition, in spite of Sherman's best exertions. His efforts and influence, backed by the most reckless self-exposure, held his remaining brigades, under Buckland and McDowell, steady for a time; but these were soon compelled to fall back behind the next ravine, leaving their camps, with all their tents and tent equipage, to the enemy.

McClernand's division, comprising 10 regiments and 4 batteries, had been astonished with the rest, but not yet directly assailed. Moving up, at 7 A. M., to the support of Sherman, it found his division mostly gone or going; its best officers killed or wounded, its batteries either captured or badly cut up. Buckland's brigade, which had gone after Hildebrand's, forming our extreme right on the front, had fallen back to avoid certain destruction. To all practical intents, and in spite of its leader's desperate and untiring exertions, Sherman's division was out of the fight by 8 o'clock that ominous morning. It seemed a miracle that their commander, always in the hottest of the Rebel fire, escaped with a single musket-ball through his hand.

Prentiss formed his division as quickly as possible, and not far in the rear of their camps, where his men faced to the front and fought stubbornly for a time; but they had been strangely drawn up in an open field, leaving to the enemy the cover of a dense scrub-oak thicket in our

[59] April 4.

[60] On Sunday, April 6.



PITTSBURG LANDING.

Explanations.

A Positions of Maj.-Gen. Grant's forces on the morning of April 6th.

B Positions of Grant, with the divisions of Nelson and Crittenden, on the evening of April 6th.

C Positions of Grant and Buell on the morning of April 7th.

D Positions of Grant and Buell on the evening of April 7th.

E Reserve Artillery.

front, whence they could pour volley after volley in comparative security. Soon, our men were flanked on either side, and fell back, perceiving that they were squandering their lives to no purpose. Thus the division lost all coherence and efficiency; its leader became separated from a large portion of his command; and by 10 o'clock it had been virtually demolished. Prentiss himself, with three regiments, held an unassailed position until, having long since become completely surrounded, he was finally obliged to surrender;[61] when over 2,000 of our men in one body were

[61] This did not occur till about 4 P. M.; but he had long before ceased to form a part of our line of battle, the Rebels having flanked and passed on beyond him.

hurried to the Rebel rear as prisoners, and soon started on the road to Corinth.

McClernand for a while stood firm; but the defection of Sherman's division on one side, and Prentiss's on the other, left the Rebels free to hurl themselves against him in tremendous force. Two green regiments, the 15th and 16th Iowa, which he now brought to the front under a heavy fire, gave way at once in disorder. Changing his front to meet the Rebel onset, he faced along the Corinth road and planted his batteries to command it; so that the Rebels were for a time foiled in their efforts to advance; and an effort to come in on his rear, over ground abandoned by Sherman's division, was handsomely repulsed, with heavy mutual loss, by Dresser's rifled battery.

But one division could not sustain the weight of more than half the Rebel army, admirably handled, and constantly advancing fresh regiments to replace those already blown or too badly cut up. After repulsing several determined attacks, sometimes advancing a little, but generally giving ground, and losing three Colonels of the line and three officers of his staff, with at least half the effective force of his batteries, McClernand, by 11 A. M., found himself pushed back, with Hurlbut's fresh division on his left, and the *débris* of Sherman's on his right.

Meantime, a brigade of Sherman's division, under Col. David Stuart, which had been oddly posted on our extreme left, holding what was known as the Hamburg road, had been suddenly shelled from the opposite bluffs of Lick creek, by a force which the next instant peppered them with grape, and the next rushed across the creek and began pouring in sharp volleys of musketry, while the Rebel batteries, firing over the heads of their infantry, soon made our position untenable. Stuart fell back to the next ridge; and, finding the Rebels who had followed Prentiss beginning to come in on his right, sent to Gen. W. H. L. Wallace for assistance. Gen. McArthur's brigade was promptly dispatched to Stuart's support; but, bearing too much to the right, was soon sharply engaged with the pursuers of Prentiss. Falling back to a good position, he held it, though wounded, until Wallace came to his aid; but Stuart, receiving no direct support, was driven back from one ridge to another, until by noon, himself wounded, several of his officers fallen, and his command sadly shattered, he fell in behind McArthur to rëorganize. And thus, of our six divisions, three had been thoroughly routed before mid-day.

Gen. Grant had arrived on the battle-field about 8 A. M.; but, early as was the hour, his army was already beaten. As this, however, is a circumstance of which he is not easily convinced, it did not seem to make as vivid an impression on him as on others. Sending word to Lew. Wallace to hasten up with his division on our right, he devoted his personal attention to reforming his shattered brigades, rëestablishing his silenced batteries, and forming new lines of defense to replace those so suddenly demolished. Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions were still intact; while of the others the better but not the larger part of those not already disabled fell into line on their flanks, or just behind them.

Hurlbut held the direct road to Corinth, with woods at his back and open fields commanded by his batteries in his front; and here he stood, fighting a more numerous, equally gallant, and victory-flushed enemy, for more than five hours. Here he was thrice charged in full force, and thrice he repulsed the foe with terrible slaughter. The close ranks which rushed upon him were first plowed through and through with grape, then, as they came nearer, with more deadly musketry; until the shouted orders, entreaties, menaces, of frantic officers no longer availed, and the long lines sank back defeated to the shelter in their rear. Here fell, at 2½ o'clock, Albert Sidney Johnston, the Rebel commander-in-chief, struck in the thigh by a fragment of shell, but sitting silently on his horse for some minutes, and only taken off to die. Beauregard at once assumed command; but the death of Johnston was concealed, so far as possible, until his army had returned to Corinth. An hour later, Hurlbut's division, worn out by incessant fighting against fresh regiments, fell back nearly half a mile, to a position about that distance from the Landing.

W. H. L. Wallace's division was in like manner exposed to and attacked by the exultant Rebels about 10 A. M.; and for six hours was hotly engaged, with scarcely an intermission. Four times was it charged along its whole line; and every charge was repulsed with heavy slaughter. Once or twice, our men pursued their retreating foes; but the disparity of numbers was too great, and they were soon pushed back to their lines. They were still fighting as eagerly and confidently as ever, when Hurlbut's retreat compelled them to fall back also, or be flanked and surrounded as Prentiss had been. Just now, their leader fell, mortally wounded; closing in death a day's work which had won for him the admiration of all beholders and the lasting gratitude of his country. The division fell back into line with Hurlbut's new position; losing of its batteries but a single gun, whereof the carriage had been disabled.

Lew. Wallace was at Crump's Landing, with his force extended on the road to Purdy, when he received, at 11½ A. M., Grant's order to bring his division into the fight. He had been anxiously awaiting that order, listening to the sound of the mutual cannonade since morning; and his column was instantly put in motion. Snake creek, with steep banks and swampy bottom, was in his way; but his men were eager for the fray, and were soon making good time in the direction indicated. But he was met, near the creek, by messengers from Grant with tidings that our advanced divisions had been overpowered and beaten back; so that the road on which he was hastening would now lead him directly into the midst of the enemy, who could easily envelop him with thrice his numbers. He thereupon turned abruptly to the left, moving down the west bank of Snake creek to the river road, which follows the windings of the Tennessee bottom, and crosses the creek at its mouth, close by Pittsburg Landing. This countermarch delayed his junction with our sorely-pressed combatants until after nightfall; and thus 11 regiments of our infantry, 2 batteries, and 2 battalions of cavalry, remained useless throughout that day's bloody struggle.

At 4½ P. M., our surprised but otherwise over-matched army, apart from Lew. Wallace's division, had been crowded back into a semicircle of three or four hundred acres immediately around, but rather to the left of the Landing. It could retreat no farther. A deep, rapid river in its rear could only be crossed with the loss of half its remaining men [62] and every thing beside. Of its five divisions, two had been beaten back; the other three utterly routed. Our artillery was half lost or disabled; our field-hospitals overflowing; our tents and camp-equipage mainly in the hands of the enemy; our losses in men enormous; and those who had not fallen were in good part disheartened; not less than 5,000 men in uniform, possibly twice that number—to say nothing of sutlers, commissaries, and the usual rabble of camp-followers—were huddled under the bank of the river, not all of them privates, but all repeating the stereotyped excuse, "Our regiment is all cut to pieces," and resisting every entreaty of their more zealous officers to bring them again into line.

But the Rebels, whose losses had also been heavy, fearing a trap, hesitated for a few minutes to follow W. H. L. Wallace's division, as it recoiled from the position it had so long and so stoutly defended. Those moments were incalculably precious, and were thoroughly improved. Col. J. D. Webster, chief of staff to Gen. Grant, a believer in artillery, improved the opportunity to collect our remaining guns—22 only—and plant them on the bluff in a semicircle, commanding the roads whereby the Rebels must approach. Gunners proving scarce, Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of the 1st Missouri artillery, volunteered in that capacity, and proved himself a workman who needed not to be ashamed. There was rare virtue inherent in those 22 guns, and men around them who knew how to evoke it.

It was hardly 6 o'clock when the Rebel batteries, once more in position, opened, at a distance of a few hundred yards, on our last possible holding-ground. Our next recoil must be over the bank, into the hideous, helpless massacre of a grander Ball's Bluff. Promptly and most efficiently, Webster's guns make reply. Soon, the Rebel infantry was seen crowding up to their guns, opening fire at rather long range, to find our shattered battalions reformed and giving abundant answer. At this moment, the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, which had all day been chafing at their impotence, opened on our left, firing up a deep ravine that seemed to have been cut through the bluff on purpose. Seven-inch shell and 64-pound shot were hurled by them diagonally across the new Rebel front, decidedly interfering with the regularity of its formation, and preventing that final rush upon our guns and the supporting infantry whose success would have perfected their triumph. So, far into the evening of that busy, lurid Sabbath, our

[62] Among the apocryphal anecdotes in circulation, one represents Gen. Buell as remonstrating, two or three days afterward, against the soldiership which placed Grant's army on the south rather than on the north bank of the Tennessee. "Where was your line of retreat?" asked Buell. "Oh, across the river," responded Grant. "But you could not have ferried over more than 10,000 men," persisted Buell. "Well, there would not have been more than that," replied Grant. Temerity was then so rare among our Generals that it seemed a virtue.

batteries and boats kept up their thunders, fairly silencing the Rebel guns, and compelling their infantry to take post farther and farther back, in order to be out of the reach of our shells; and all through the night, at intervals of 10 to 15 minutes, the gunboats continued to send their compliments into the Rebel lines, as if the pouring rain which fell at midnight might not suffice to break the slumbers of the weary thousands who had lain down on their arms wherever night found them, to gather strength and refreshment for the inevitable struggle of the morrow.

Before seeking his couch in the little church at Shiloh, the surviving Rebel leader dispatched a messenger to Corinth with this exhilarating dispatch for Richmond:

"BATTLE-FIELD OF SHILOH,
"Via Corinth and Chattanooga,
"April 6th, 1862.

"Gen. S. COOPER, Adjutant-General:

"We have this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittsburg; and, after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks to Almighty God, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position.

"The loss on both sides is heavy, including our commander-in-chief, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the fight.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD,
"General Commanding."

Maj.-Gen. Buell's long-expected 'Army of the Ohio' had been delayed on its march from Nashville, repairing roads and rebuilding the bridge over Duck river at Columbia; which place Gen. B. himself left with his rear division on the 2d of April; reaching Savannah with his advance division, Gen. Nelson's, on the evening of the 5th: the remaining divisions were strung along the road from Columbia at intervals of six miles. A halt to rest on reaching the Tennessee was generally expected; but, on the morning of the 6th, ominous and persistent reports of musketry as well as cannon in the direction of Pittsburg Landing dispelled this illusion. Buell hastened to Gen. Grant's headquarters, only to learn that he had just started on a steamboat for the Landing; having left orders for Gen. Nelson, with Buell's advance, to push on up the right bank of the river, leaving his cannon, because of the badness of the roads, to be taken by steamboats.

Though it was still believed at Savannah that there was nothing going on above more serious than an affair of outposts, Gen. Buell sent orders to his rear divisions to hurry forward, and, taking a steamboat, proceeded to the Landing; where the multiplicity and constant increase of stragglers soon convinced him that the matter in hand was urgent and important.[*] Finding Gen. Grant at the Landing, he requested the dis-

[*] His official report says:

"As we proceeded up the river, groups of soldiers were seen on the west bank; and it soon became evident that they were stragglers from the engaged army. The groups increased in size and frequency, until, as we approached the Landing, they numbered whole companies, and almost regiments; and at the Landing the banks swarmed with a confused mass of men of various regiments. There could not have been less than 4,000 or 5,000. Late in the day, it became much greater. Finding Gen. Grant at the Landing, I requested him to send steamers to Savannah to bring up Gen. Crittenden's division which had arrived during the morning, and then went ashore with him. The throng of disorganized and demoralized troops increased continually by fresh fugitives from the battle, which steadily drew nearer the Landing; and with these were intermingled great numbers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to the river. With few exceptions, all efforts to form the troops and move them forward to the fight utterly failed. In the mean time, the enemy had made such progress against our troops, that his artillery and musketry began to play into the

patch of steamers to Savannah, for Gen. Crittenden's, his 2d division, while he landed to take part in the fray.

Gen. Nelson, starting at 1:30, arrived at 5 P. M. opposite the Landing with his leading (Col. Ammen's) brigade, which was immediately crossed and formed in line, under a fire of Rebel artillery, on the right of Webster's guns. Ammen's men were just able to put in an appearance before dark, firing a few volleys and repulsing a Rebel charge on their guns at 6½ P. M., when the enemy desisted and withdrew. By 7, the whole division was over, and soon in position; lying down on their arms, under orders from Buell to advance and attack at early daylight; which were implicitly obeyed.

Crittenden's division reached Savannah at nightfall of Sunday, and was forwarded by steamboats directly to the Landing; where it was rapidly debarked and formed on the right of Nelson.

Buell's next division, Gen. A. McD. McCook, was 12 miles from Savannah when it received orders, which it made haste to obey, arriving at Savannah at 7 to 8 P. M.; but, finding there no boats ready for its service, McCook routed up the captains of the boats lying at the dock, and embarked Rousseau's brigade, with which he reached the Landing at 5½ A. M.; his other brigades, Cols. Gibson and Kirk, arriving some time later, on boats which had been pressed into service as they successively reached Savannah. The residue of Buell's army was too far behind on the Columbia road to be even hoped for. Two brigades of Wood's division arrived, however, just at the close of the battle.

The fighting reopened along the whole line at daylight of the 7th, and under conditions bravely altered from those of the day preceding. The arrival of part of Buell's and all Lew. Wallace's commands had brought to the field not less than 25,000 troops; fresh, so far as fighting was concerned, for this day's action; while Beauregard, whose men, throughout the 6th, had been on foot 16 hours, and fighting most of the time had barely 3,000 left of his reserve wherewith to match them. His force had been fearfully reduced by the casualties of battle, and scarcely less by skulking, or scattering in quest of plunder—faults common to all raw troops, but of which he complains in his report as though they were novel and amazing.[*] He had hitherto been buoyed up, or at least had buoyed up the spirits of his soldiers, by expectations and assurances that Gens. Price and Van Dorn, with some 30,000 men from across the Mississippi, were close at hand, and would reach him in time for this day's battle. But they did not come, and Buell did. The hot fire of musketry and artillery poured in upon

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vital spot of the position, and some persons were killed on the bank, at the very Landing."

[*] He says:

"From this agreeable duty [of praising the meritorious], I turn to one in the highest degree unpleasant—one due, however, to the brave men under me, as a contrast to the behavior of most of the army who fought so heroically. I allude to the fact that some officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, abandoned their colors, early in the first day, to pillage the captured encampments; others retired shamefully from the field on both days, while the thunder of cannon and the roar and rattle of musketry told them that their brothers were being slaughtered by the fresh legions of the enemy."

his entire front before sunrise, gave him ample assurance of this; while his soldiers, exhausted and stiffened by yesterday's protracted efforts, and chilled, like ours, by the rain of the intervening night, stood to their arms firmly, but without alacrity or enthusiasm.

Nelson had quietly aroused his men at 4 A. M.; and he advanced in parade order at 5½; soon concentrating upon himself the fire of half the Rebel army. Not having received his artillery, his infantry, annoyed by two Rebel batteries, began, at 7½, to give ground; when, on applying to Gen. Buell, the battery of Capt. Mendenhall, and at 9 that of Capt. Terrill—both regulars—were sent to his support, and the Rebel batteries in front thereby silenced. Meantime, the Rebel concentration upon this division was continued; but its behavior was splendid, especially that of Ammen's brigade, admirably handled by its chief; while that of Hagen, on the right, maintained its position with equal gallantry. The loss by this division of 739 out of 4,541—more than half of it in Hagen's brigade—attests the tenacity of the Rebel resistance this day.

Crittenden's and McCook's divisions were engaged later, but not less earnestly. Advancing across a ravine, McCook's right and center were immediately attacked in force; but the steady valor of Rousseau's brigade prevailed, and their assailants, recoiling, were pursued nearly a mile; when they were rëenforced and rallied among the tents whence McClernand's left had been so hurriedly driven the previous morning. Two of his guns, being now turned against us by the enemy, were finally captured by a charge of Col. Buckley's 5th Kentucky; while McClernand's headquarters were retaken by Rousseau, who, impetuously pursuing across a level field, opened too wide a gap between his right and Gen. Crittenden's division, which was filled by Col. Willich's regiment advancing, under a deadly fire of shell, shot, and musketry, to its support; rushing up for a bayonet-charge to within 200 yards of the enemy's line, when the latter gave way, and the regiment was deployed in line of battle to give them a hastening volley. Disordered by bad management, which brought its skirmishers under a fire of our own regiments on either side, Col. Willich's 32d Indiana hastily fell back; but was soon reformed and deployed, advancing with the entire division until the retreat of the enemy was decided.

Lew. Wallace, on our extreme right, with Sherman and McClernand between him and Buell's divisions, had likewise opened fire at daylight, dismounting a gun of the Rebel battery before him. Throwing forward his right, by Gen. Grant's personal direction, until his line, which had been parallel, formed a right angle with the river, he advanced *en échelon*, preceded by skirmishers, across a ravine to the opposite bluff, where he waited for Sherman to come up; and meantime, finding his right secured by a swamp, attempted to turn the enemy's left, which was thereupon heavily rëenforced, being effectively cannonaded by the batteries of Thompson and Thurber. An attempt was made to capture Thurber's battery by a dash of cavalry, which was easily defeated by the skirmishers of the 8th Missouri;

when the battery was charged by infantry; who were easily repelled by Col. Morgan L. Smith's brigade.

Meantime, Gen. Sherman, who had waited for the sound of Buell's guns upon the main Corinth road, advanced at 8 A. M., steadily and slowly, under fire, until he reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of McClernand's abandoned camps, and saw Willich's regiment, on his right, fighting gallantly for the possession of a point of timber some 500 yards east of Shiloh church. Hence the Rebel army could be seen re-forming its lines to the southward, with a battery by the church, and another near the Hamburg road, pouring grape and canister into any column of our troops that advanced upon that green point of timber whence Willich's regiment had just been repulsed, but into which one of McCook's brigades (Rousseau's) was now advancing. Directing the fire of two 24-pound howitzers of McAllister's battery upon the Rebel guns, Sherman formed his two brigades (David Stuart's, now commanded by Col. T. Kilby Smith, and Col. Buckland's) to advance in line with Rousseau; which they did superbly, sweeping every thing before them. At 4 P. M., our soldiers held the original front line whence we had been so hurriedly driven 34 hours before; and the whole Rebel army was retreating, unpursued, on Corinth."[*] Gen. Sherman, with two brigades and the cavalry, went out a few miles next morning on the Corinth road, and had a smart skirmish with a small Rebel force, mainly of cavalry, which he repulsed, destroying a camp, and capturing a hospital, wherein he found 280 Confederate and 50 Union wounded; returning with the former to his camp near Shiloh next morning.

Beauregard, in his official report, states that his effective force had now been reduced, "from exhaustion and other causes, from 40,000 to less than 20,000 men;" and adds:

"Hour by hour opposed to an enemy constantly rëenforced, our ranks were perceptibly thinned under the increasing, withering fire of the enemy; and, by 12 M. [of the second day], 18 hours of hard fighting had sensibly exhausted a large number; my last reserves had necessarily been disposed of; and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh rëenforcements after each repulse; accordingly, about 1 P. M., I determined to withdraw from so unequal a conflict; securing such of the results of the victory of the day before as were practicable."

This is pretty fair, but not strictly accordant with the dispatch which

[*] "An Impressed New-Yorker" says:

"No heroism of officers or men could avail to stay the advance of the Federal troops. At 3 P. M., the Confederates decided on a retreat to Corinth; and Gen. Breckinridge, strengthened by three regiments of cavalry—Forrest's, Adams's, and the Texas Rangers, raising his effective force to 12,000 men—received orders to protect the rear. By 4 P. M., the Confederates were in full retreat. The main body of the army passed silently and swiftly along the road toward Corinth; our division bringing up the rear, determined to make a desperate stand if pursued. At this time, the Union forces might have closed in upon our retreating columns and cut off Breckinridge's division, and perhaps captured it. A Federal battery threw some shells, as a feeler, across the road on which we were retreating, between our division and the main body; but no reply was made to them, as this would have betrayed our position. We passed on with little opposition or loss, and by 5 o'clock had reached a point one and a half miles nearer Corinth than the point of attack Sabbath morning. Up to this time, the pursuit seemed feeble, and the Confederates were surprised that the victorious Federals made no more of their advantage. Nor is it yet understood why the pursuit was not pressed. A rapid and persistent pursuit would have created a complete rout of the now broken, weary, and dispirited Rebels. Two hours more of such fighting as Buell's fresh men could have made would have demoralized and destroyed Beauregard's army. For some reason, this was not done; and night closed the battle."

he, after sending back from Monterey a request to Gen. Grant for permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field under a flag of truce to bury his dead, and being answered that, owing to the warmth of the weather, they had already been buried, transmitted to Richmond, namely:

"CORINTH, Tuesday, April 8th, 1862.
"To the Secretary of War, Richmond:
"We have gained a great and glorious victory. Eight to ten thousand prisoners, and 36 pieces of cannon.[66] Buell reënforced Grant, and we retired to our intrenchments at Corinth, which we can hold. Loss heavy on both sides. BEAUREGARD."

Beauregard officially reports his loss in this battle at 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, 957 missing: total, 10,699, or a little more than one-fourth of the admitted strength of his army.[67] Gen. Grant, writing on the 9th, gives his losses approximately at 1,500 killed and 3,500 wounded, and says nothing of a loss of prisoners, of whom about 2,200 effectives were marched off the field with Prentiss, with possibly 200 or 300 more of our wounded of Sunday. A later and more circumstantial statement summed up our losses as 1,735 killed, 7,882 wounded, 3,956 prisoners; total, 13,573. Recurring to the reports of subordinates—all we have—we find their losses stated as follows:

	Killed.	Wound'd.	Missing.	Total.
3d Division—Gen. W. H. L. Wallace (2 regt's not reported)...	226	1,083	1,164	2,423
4th Division—Gen. Hurlbut...	313	1,449	223	1,985
5th Division—Gen. Sherman...	313	1,275	441	2,034
Buell's army.....	266	1,816	88	2,167
Total.....	1,123	5,573	1,916	8,609

Add to these our loss in prisoners,

[66] These cannon were unquestionably taken on Sunday; but how many of them were retained on Monday and carried off in the retreat, does not appear. It is not probable that Beauregard returned to Corinth with so many or so effective guns as he had taken thence when he advanced.

[67] Beauregard's official report enumerates, among the casualties on his side, in addition to the loss of their commander-in-chief, Albert S. Johnston, that Hon. Geo. W. Johnson, "Provisional Governor of Kentucky," was killed on Monday, having had his horse shot under him on Sunday; Brig.-Gen. Gladding, of Withers's corps, was mortally wounded; that Gen. Bragg had two horses shot under him; Gen. Hardee was slightly wounded, his coat cut with balls, and his horse disabled; that Gen. Breckinridge was twice struck by spent balls; that Gen. Cheatham was slightly wounded and had three horses shot under him; that Brig.-Gens. Clark, Bowen, and B. R. Johnson were severely wounded; and that Gen. Hindman had his horse shot under him and was severely injured by his fall. [He was hoisted ten feet into the air by the explosion of a shell, which tore his horse to shreds, and was himself supposed to be killed; but he rose at once to his feet and called for another horse.] Several Colonels were killed, and many more severely wounded; among them, Henry W. Allen, 4th Louisiana, who was chosen next Rebel Governor of the State, and whose official report of the second day's fight contains the following:

"Having suffered from loss of blood and intense pain, I placed the regiment under the command of Lt.-Col. S. E. Hunter, and rode over to the hospital to get relief. After having my wound dressed, I was about lying down, in order to take a little rest, when a general stampede began of wagons, ambulances, and men. I mounted my horse immediately, and rode after the disgraceful refugees. I succeeded in putting a stop to the stampede, and placed cavalry in the rear, with orders to cut down all who attempted to pass. Here I met an aid of Gen. Bragg, who ordered me to rally all the stragglers and form them in line. This I did. After forming a battalion, Lieut.-Col. Barrow, commanding the 11th Louisiana, came to me with the remnant of his regiment, and placed himself and regiment under my command. This force, together with the remnants of two Alabama and one Tennessee regiment, made a large body of men, who stood firm in front of the hospitals, ready to receive the advancing column of the enemy.

"While rallying the stragglers, I came across two batteries that had lost all their commissioned officers. These I took possession of, sent for ammunition, supplied them with men from my command, and sent one of them to Gen. Beauregard. This battery fired the last shots against the enemy. The other battery, and the forces under my command, held their position in the very face of the enemy, until ordered to be retired by command of Gen. Bragg."

and the killed and wounded in Prentiss's, McClernand's, and Lew. Wallace's divisions—the latter known to be very light—and our actual losses in these two days' desperate conflict can hardly have been less than 15,000 men; and it is probable that Beauregard's, including the skulkers who here saw enough of fighting and never rejoined their regiments, was barely, if any thing, less than this."[68]

The victory was clearly ours; for we had the field and the dead; but the losses were fairly equalized, while the Rebels had the spoil of our camps —though they could carry off but little of it—and the prisoners.

Maj. Gen. Halleck, commanding the Department of the Mississippi, left St. Louis directly after receiving news of the Shiloh battles,[69] and reached Pittsburg Landing by steamboat two or three days thereafter. Meantime, and for weeks following, no attempt was made against the Rebel army at Corinth; and, though Gen. Pope arrived from Missouri on the 22d, with a rëenforcement of 25,000 men, even Monterey was not occupied by us till the 1st of May, when Gen. Halleck's army had been increased by accessions from various quarters to a little over 100,000 men. All this time, and afterward, Gen. Beauregard industriously strengthened his works, covering Corinth with an irregular semicircle of intrenchments, 15 miles long, and well-mounted with artillery; destroying the roads and bridges beyond, and blocking the approaches with abatis. Gen. Halleck saw fit not to flank these formidable defenses, but to overcome them by regular and necessarily slow approaches, involving constant and mutual artillery practice and picket fighting, with very little loss; three weeks of which brought our nearest batteries within three miles of Corinth.[70] A reconnoissance under Gen. Paine to Farmington,[71] five miles N. W. of Corinth, had brought on a skirmish, in which he took 200 prisoners, striking the Charleston and Memphis Railroad at Glendale, three miles farther, and partially destroying it; while the Ohio road was in like manner broken at Purdy.

Col. Elliott, with two regiments of cavalry, was dispatched on the night of the 27th to flank Corinth and cut the railroad south of it, so as to intercept the enemy's supplies. He

[68] "An Impressed New-Yorker," writing of the retreat from this Rebel *victory*, says:

"I made a detour from the road on which the army was retreating, that I might travel faster and get ahead of the main body. In this ride of twelve miles alongside of the routed army, I saw more of human agony and woe than I trust I will ever again be called to witness. The retreating host wound along a narrow and almost impassable road, extending some seven or eight miles in length. Here was a long line of wagons loaded with wounded, piled in like bags of grain, groaning and cursing; while the mules plunged on in mud and water belly-deep, the water sometimes coming into the wagons. Next came a straggling regiment of infantry, pressing on past the train of wagons; then a stretcher borne upon the shoulders of four men, carrying a wounded officer; then soldiers staggering along, with an arm broken and hanging down, or other fearful wounds, which were enough to destroy life. And, to add to the horrors of the scene, the elements of heaven marshaled their forces—a fitting accompaniment of the tempest of human desolation and passion which was raging. A cold, drizzling rain commenced about nightfall, and soon came harder and faster, then turned to pitiless, blinding hail. This storm raged with unrelenting violence for three hours. I passed long wagon-trains filled with wounded and dying soldiers, without even a blanket to shield them from the driving sleet and hail, which fell in stones as large as partridge-eggs, until it lay on the ground two inches deep.

"Some 300 men died during that awful retreat, and their bodies were thrown out to make room for others who, although wounded, had struggled on through the storm, hoping to find shelter, rest, and medical care."

[69] April 19, 1862. [70] May 21. [71] May 21.

struck it on the 30th, at Booneville, 24 miles from Corinth, in the midst of an unexpected retreat of the Rebel army, which had commenced on the 26th. Beauregard had held Corinth so long as possible against Halleck's overwhelming force, and had commenced its evacuation by sending off a part of his sick and wounded. Elliott captured 20 cars, laden with small arms, ammunition, stores, baggage, &c., with some hundreds of Confederate sick, whom he paroled, burning the engine and trains. The evacuation was completed during the night of the 29th; the Rebel musketry-firing having ceased at 9 A. M. of the preceding day. Explosions and fires during the night gave plain intimations of the enemy's departure; so that some of our officers in the advance rode safely into town at 6½ next morning, and reported no enemy present. Piles of provisions were found in flames, and one full warehouse undamaged; but never a gun. Beauregard retreated to Tupelo, pursued by Gen. Pope so far as Baldwin and Guntown, but without material results. Our army was disposed along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad; which, by the falling of the Tennessee to a Summer stage, had become its line of supply.

Gen. O. M. Mitchel, with a division of Buell's army, had left Nashville simultaneously with his commander, but by a more easterly route, advancing through Murfreesboro', Shelbyville, Fayetteville, to Huntsville, Ala., which he surprised at daylight,[73] capturing 17 locomotives and a large number of passenger and freight-cars, beside a train which he had taken, with 159 prisoners, two hours before. Thus provided, he had uncontested possession of 100 miles of the Memphis and Charleston road before night, or from Stevenson on the east to Decatur on the west; seizing five more locomotives at Stevenson, and pushing on so far west as Tuscumbia, whence he sent an expedition so far south as Russelville, Ala., capturing and appropriating Confederate property on all hands, without the loss of a life. He took[73] Bridgeport, Ala., with a force of five regiments, by striking rapidly and attacking from a quarter whence he was not looked for, driving out a force nearly equal in number to his own, with a loss of 72 killed and wounded, 350 prisoners, and 2 guns; while his own loss was inconsiderable. He was soon compelled, by the gathering of Rebel forces around him, to abandon Tuscumbia and all south of the Tennessee, burning the railroad bridges at Decatur and Bridgeport, but holding firmly and peaceably all of Alabama north of that river. Had he been even moderately reënforced, he would have struck and probably could have destroyed the great Rebel armories and founderies in Georgia, or have captured Chattanooga; which was assailed,[74] under his orders, by Gen. Negley, who was driven off by a Rebel force under Gen. E. Kirby Smith. Mitchel's activity and energy poorly qualified him for a subordinate position under Buell; so he was transferred, in June, to the command at Port Royal, S. C., where he died.[75] Gen. Halleck was likewise summoned[76] from the West to serve as General-in-Chief at Washington, leaving Gen. Grant in command at Corinth.

[73] April 9. [73] April 29. [74] June 6. [75] Oct. 20. [76] July 23.

IV.

BURNSIDE IN NORTH CAROLINA.

Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside and Com. L. M. Goldsborough led an expedition, which had in good part been fitted out in New York, and which left Fortress Monroe at the opening of the year;[1] and, doubling Cape Henry, moved southward to Hatteras Inlet, whose defenses had been quietly held by our troops since their capture by Gen. Butler and Com. Stringham five months before.[2] The naval part of this expedition consisted of 31 steam gunboats, mounting 94 guns; the military of about 11,500 men, mainly from New England, organized in three brigades, under Gens. Foster, Reno, and Parke, and embarked with their material on some 30 to 40 steam transports. The van of the expedition reached the entrance of the Inlet on the 13th; when it was found that, though care had been taken to select or obtain gunboats of such draft as could readily be worked over the bar at high water, yet a large proportion of the transports, through the incompetence or dishonesty of those employed to procure them, were of such draft as rendered them totally unfit for this service. Of these, the propeller City of New York, 600 tons, heavily laden with rifles, ammunition, tents, bedding, and forage, and drawing 16 feet water, when the greatest depth attainable on the bar was but 13, grounded, of course, in attempting to pass it;[3] when the sea broke completely over her stern, every breaker lifting her, and causing her, as it subsided, to settle still deeper in the sand, until she became a perfect wreck—her masts and smoke-stack cut away, her crew, with life-preservers tied about them, lashed to the rigging to save themselves from being washed overboard by each succeeding billow; and at last, after an endurance of 12 to 15 hours, the raging sea began to lift the deck from the hull with every surge. Ere this, her fires had been extinguished, her boats, all but one, filled or stove, and her men utterly exhausted by long fasting and exposure to the cold waves which broke over them continually; while no attention was paid from the fleet to their signal of distress, or even their hail to the S. R. Spaulding, which passed out to sea. At length, two mechanics, W. H. and Charles A. Beach, of Newark, N. J., launched the yawl, and, aided by engineer Wm. Miller, steward Geo. Mason, and Hugh McCabe, fireman, pulled successfully through the surf, over the bar, to the fleet, whence boats were at once dispatched to take off the remainder of the crew, who were speedily rescued. The vessel and cargo were totally lost; as were the steam gunboat Zouave, the transports Louisiana and Pocahontas, and two or three others. Col. J. W. Allen and Surgeon S. F. Weller, 9th New Jersey, were drowned[4] by the upsetting of their small boat in the breakers, as they returned to the transport Ann E. Thompson from reporting the arrival of their regiment to Gen. Burn-

[1] Jan. 11–12, 1862. [2] See Vol. I., p. 599. [3] Jan. 13. [4] Jan. 15.

side. The National loss in precious time, as well as life and property, by the villainy which palmed off on the Government vessels totally unfit for this service, can hardly be overestimated. Two or three weeks of desperately hard work were expended on getting over such of the craft as were not wrecked; giving the alarmed Rebels the amplest time to concentrate and fortify.

At length, every thing being in readiness, our fleet moved slowly up Pamlico and Croatan Sounds;[5] the gunboats in advance and on the flanks of the transports, formed in three columns, each headed by its flag-ship, every large steamer having one or two schooners in tow, with the spaces between the columns kept carefully clear, and all moving at the regulated pace of four miles per hour. The fleet consisted in all of 65 vessels, covering a space about two miles square; some 50 transports, mainly schooners, having been left at the Inlet. The day was beautiful; the distance made about 28 miles, when they halted, near sunset, still 10 miles from the southern point of Roanoke Island, and lay undisturbed through the bright, moonlit night.

At 8 A. M., the signal to weigh anchor was given. At 11, progress was arrested, near the south point, by a storm; and the fleet again lay at anchor till next morning, when, at 10 A. M., the order was given to move forward, and the gunboats led the way through the narrow passage known as Roanoke Inlet, into Croatan Sound, driving 7 Rebel gunboats before them. At noon, our gunboats were under fire of the chief Rebel battery on the Island, known as Fort Bartow, when the Rebel gunboats halted and added their fire to that of the fort. A line of piles driven across the channel was evidently expected to obstruct our advance, but proved inadequate. Soon, our soldier-crowded transports were seen swarming through the Inlet, and preparations were made for landing at Ashby's Harbor, two miles below the fort, which had now been set on fire by our shells. The flames were soon checked, however, and the cannonade on both sides continued; while the Rebel gunboats, which had retreated up the Sound, again appeared and engaged our fleet, till the Curlew, their flag-ship, was struck by a 100-pound shell from the Southfield, and soon enveloped in flames. The firing was continued on both sides till night, without serious loss in men on either. The Rebel barracks in the rear of the fort were destroyed by fire, and their remaining gunboats compelled to withdraw from the contest. All our transports had passed through the Inlet and anchored by 4 P. M., when debarkation commenced under the fire of our gunboats; and 7,500 men were ashore, and most of them in bivouac, before 11 P. M.

The Rebel forces in that region were commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry A. Wise,[6] whose headquarters were at Nag's Head, across Roanoke Sound, and whose forces numbered from 3,000 to 4,000; but hardly 1,000 of them were on the Island prior to the approach of our fleet, when rëenforcements were hurried over, raising the number of its defenders to about 3,000. Col. Shaw, 8th North Carolina, was in immediate command. Fort Bartow, other-

[5] February 5.

[6] Ex-Governor of Virginia.

wise Pork Point battery, was a substantial earthwork, strengthened by abatis and a moat, and mounting 10 guns; battery Huger, on Weir's Point, farther north, had likewise 10 guns; battery Blanchard, midway, but 4. The swampy nature of the approaches, covered with thickets of shrubs and bushes, was counted on to bar access to Fort Bartow, save by a causeway road completely commanded by its fire.

After crouching through a rainy night, some of them in miry bogs, our soldiers were formed and led on at an early hour of the morning.[1] A large portion of the Rebel force was deployed as skirmishers, and contested our floundering advance through the bog with spirit and effect until near 10 A. M., when our leading regiments were close under the fire of the fort. They had by this time found it impossible to obey the orders which



ROANOKE ISLAND.

[1] Saturday, February 8.

directed them to flank the enemy on either side of the swamp—the abatis proving at most places impassable; and it was resolved to charge over the causeway directly in front. This was done by the 9th New York (Zouaves), Col. Rush C. Hawkins, the 51st, Col. Edward Ferrero, the 23d Massachusetts, Col. John Kurtz, and 21st, Lt.-Col. A. C. Maggi. The 25th and 27th Massachusetts, and 10th Connecticut, Col. Russell, were honorably distinguished in the attack. Col. R. was killed; as was Lt.-Col. Viguier de Monteuil, 53d New York, who was serving as a volunteer with Hawkins's Zouaves. Lying down to receive a fire of grape from the Rebel batteries, part of the 51st New York, with Hawkins's Zouaves and the 21st Massachusetts, instantly rose and rushed over the Rebel breastworks, chasing out their defenders and following them in their retreat; securing, by their impetuosity, the capture of the larger number, as no time was given for their escape from the Island. Their loss in killed and wounded was but 55; but among the former were Capt. O. J. Wise, son of the General, and other valuable officers; while their loss in prisoners was not far from 2,700, including Cols. Shaw and Jordan, Lt.-Cols. Fowle and Price, Majors Hill, Yates, and Williamson. Our loss in the bombardment and assault was about 50 killed and 250 wounded. All the cannon, small arms, munitions, provisions, etc., on the Island, were among the spoils of victory.

Com. Rowan, with 14 gunboats, was dispatched next evening up Albemarle Sound and Pasquotank river in pursuit of the Rebel gunboats. He found them, 7 in number, at Elizabeth City; where, after a smart fight, they were set on fire by their crews and abandoned. One of them was captured, the others destroyed. The city itself was likewise set on fire, and in good part destroyed. Four of the gunboats were sent thence to Edenton, on the west end of Albemarle Sound, where eight cannon and a schooner were destroyed, and two schooners, with 4,000 bushels of corn, captured.

Com. Rowan's flotilla next moved[1] five miles up the Chowan river to Winton, Hereford county, upon assurances that its citizens wished to return to and be protected by the Union. Their reception was even warmer than they had expected. On reaching the town, they were saluted by a hailstorm of bullets, which constrained them to fall down the river for the night; returning next morning, the village was shelled by them until abandoned, and then burnt.

Gen. Burnside next concentrated his forces at Hatteras Inlet, for an attack on NEWBERN, at the junction of the Neuse and Trent rivers, near Pamlico Sound, and the most important seaport of North Carolina. Com. Goldsborough having been relieved, Commander Rowan directed the fleet. Leaving Hatteras in the morning,[2] the expedition came to about sunset at Slocum's creek, on the south side of the river, 18 miles below Newbern, where a landing was effected next morning, and the troops pushed forward, so fast as ready, to within a mile and a half of the Rebel defenses; the gunboats moving up the river in advance of the troops, and shelling the road

[1] Feb. 19.

[2] March 12.

whereon they marched. No resistance was encountered by land; but the fleet found the channel of the Neuse obstructed, half way up, by 24 vessels sunk in the channel, several torpedoes, and a number of iron-pointed spars firmly planted in the bed and inclined down stream, under water, after the manner of the snags of the Mississippi. These obstructions were speedily removed or surmounted; while two or three batteries along the bank were successively silenced by a few shots from our flagship Delaware. The fleet halted for the night nearly abreast of the army; which had had a hard day's work, dragging its guns through the deep clay of the roads, sodden with several days' rain; and the men sank on the ground at night around their pitch-pine fires to enjoy a drenching from the freshly pouring skies.

A dense fog covered land and water next morning,[*] as our fleet, having safely passed the obstructions, steamed up past Forts Thompson and Ellis; which, after firing a few shots, were hastily evacuated, a shell from one of the gunboats having exploded the magazine of the latter. Fort Lane, the last and strongest defense of Newbern on the water, was more carefully approached, in expectation of a sanguinary struggle; but it had by this time been likewise evacuated, in deference to the successes of our army; and our fleet steamed directly up to the wharves, shelling the dépôt and track whereby the Rebels were escaping from the city.

The Rebel defenses consisted of a well constructed breastwork, running a mile and a half from the Neuse across the railroad to an impenetrable swamp which connects Newbern with Morehead City, with a battery of 13 heavy guns next the river, several redoubts, all of them well mounted, 3 batteries of field artillery, and 8 regiments of infantry, numbering about 5,000 men, commanded by Gen. Louis O'B. Branch. Our guns were few and light, because of the difficulty of landing and dragging heavier.



NEWBERN.

Gen. Burnside was on the alert at 6 A. M., and by 7 had his forces in motion. Moving up to within short range of the enemy's intrenchments, his men were formed in order of battle, and opened fire along their entire front; the ground being swampy on the left, and elsewhere cut up by

[*] Sunday, March 14.

gullies and ravines which opened toward the enemy, affording no protection from his fire. The naval battery was in our center, Gen. Reno's brigade on the right, Gen. Parke's in the center, and Gen. Foster's on the left; and the regiments most effective at Roanoke were all honorably distinguished here, as were the 4th and 5th Rhode Island, the 8th and 11th Connecticut, 9th New Jersey, and 51st Pennsylvania. There was, of course, a great disparity of numbers —probably three to one—but this was in effect a contest wherein infantry were required to charge and carry strong intrenchments, well provided with artillery. The loss was naturally much the greater on our side. After an hour's sharp fighting, the 21st Massachusetts, Col. Clark, accompanied by Gen. Reno, was ordered forward on a double-quick, and went over the Rebel breastworks. It was immediately charged by two Rebel regiments, and repulsed; when Capt. Fraser, being wounded, was taken prisoner, but soon captured his guard and escaped. The 4th Rhode Island, disliking its position in front of a Rebel battery of 5 guns, well backed by a fire from rifle-pits, next attempted a charge, and carried the battery at double-quick; finding an entrance between a brick-yard and the parapet. Once inside, the Colonel formed his right wing in line, and charged down upon the guns at full speed, capturing the entire battery, routing its supports, and planting his flag on the parapet. The 5th Rhode Island and 8th and 11th Connecticut immediately rushing up, our triumph at that point was secure.

Gen. Reno, on our right, seeing that he was losing heavily from the Rebel battery in his front, called up his reserve regiment, the 51st Pennsylvania, Col. Hartranft, and ordered a charge, in which the 21st and 24th Massachusetts, 51st New York, and 9th New Jersey participated. Its success was complete; and the whole line of Rebel works was very soon in our hands.

The enemy were now in full flight; and Gen. Burnside ordered an advance on their track, which was led by Gen. Foster; but the speed of the fugitives was inimitable, and, when our van reached the bank of the Trent, opposite Newbern, they found that city on fire in seven different places; the splendid railroad bridge over the Trent a sheet of flame, having been fired by a scow-load of turpentine, drifted against it; and the Rebel troops, with all the locomotives and cars in and about Newbern, on their way inland toward Goldsboro'. The wind suddenly lulling, the fires were soon extinguished by sailors from our fleet; but the railroad bridge, market-house, and about a dozen other structures, were burned. Our captures at the Rebel intrenchments and in the city included 69 cannon, two steamboats, large quantities of munitions and stores, with some 500 prisoners. Our total loss was about 100 killed and 500 wounded: the former including Lt.-Col. Henry Merritt, 23d Massachusetts, Adjt. Frazer A. Stearns, of the 21st, Maj. Charles W. Le Gendre and Capt. D. R. Johnson, of the 51st, and Capt. Charles Tillinghast, of the 4th Rhode Island. The Rebel loss, beside prisoners, hardly exceeded 200, including Maj. Carmichael, killed, and Col. Avery, captured.

Gen. Burnside, having undisturbed

possession of Newbern, sent Gen. Parke[11] with his brigade, 3,500 strong, southwestward to the coast, where he occupied[12] Morehead City without resistance; as also the more important village of Beaufort, across the inlet known as Newport river; and proceeded to invest FORT MACON, a regular fortress of great cost and strength, seized by Gov. Ellis before the secession of the State.[13] This work stands on an island, or rather ocean sand-bank, whence it looks off on the broad Atlantic, and commands the entrance to the Newport river. It is approached from the land with much difficulty, but was soon invested, and a regular siege commenced,[14] its pickets driven in, and a good position for siege-guns obtained within fair distance, while the fleet menaced it on the side of the ocean. All being at length in readiness, fire was opened[15] from a breaching battery at 1,100 feet distance, with flanking mortars behind sand-banks at 1,400 yards; the fleet also, consisting of three gunboats and a bark, steamed around in a circle, after the fashion inaugurated by Dupont at Port Royal, and fired as they severally came opposite the fort, until the roughness of the sea compelled them to desist. The land batteries were kept at work until late in the afternoon; when, 7 of the garrison being killed, 18 wounded, and most of the available guns dismounted, Col. White raised the white flag, and next morning surrendered his garrison of 500 men, with the fort and all it contained. Fort Macon was among the first of the important fortresses of the old Union, which, having been seized by the Rebels, was repossessed by the Republic.

Meantime, Washington, Plymouth, and some other towns on the coast, were quietly occupied by our forces, which ascended the Chowan river without serious resistance so far as Wilton.

Gen. Reno was dispatched by Gen. Burnside from Newbern to Roanoke Island, whence his brigade was conveyed up Albemarle Sound to within three miles of Elizabeth City, where it was disembarked during the night[16] and pushed northward, with intent to intercept a Rebel force known to be about leaving Elizabeth City for Norfolk; but Col. Hawkins of the 9th New York (Zouaves), who had the advance, mistook his road, and marched ten miles out of the way; so that, on retracing his steps, and gaining the right road, his men were intensely fatigued, and he in the rear of the main column. The anticipated surprise proved a failure; and, at a point nearly 20 miles inland, within a mile and a half of SOUTH MILLS, our weary, overmarched men, who had been nearly 24 hours on their feet, were confronted by a less numerous Rebel force, very strongly posted in woods flanked by swamps, and with a large clearing in their front; upon entering which, they were saluted by a fire of grape, well supported by musketry, whereby a gallant but rashly ordered charge of the Zouaves was repulsed with considerable loss. The position was soon flanked by our superior numbers, and the Rebels compelled to draw off, leaving nothing on the field but a very few dead and

[11] March 20. [12] March 23. [13] See Vol. I., p. 411. [14] April 11. [15] April 25. [16] April 19.

wounded. We lost 15 killed, including Adjutant Gadsden, of the Zouaves, and 98 wounded, which was probably more than the loss of the Rebels. Gen. Reno gave his men six hours' much needed rest on the battle-field, and then returned to his boats, being under peremptory orders to do so. He was obliged to leave behind 14 of his more severely wounded. As Camden Court House was the only village traversed by Gen. Reno on his advance, this engagement has been sometimes designated the battle of Camden.

By this time, Burnside's division, which had at no time exceeded 15,000 men, had become so widely dispersed, and had so many important points to guard, that its offensive efficiency was destroyed; and very little more of moment occurred in his department, until he was ordered by telegraph from Washington[17] to hasten with all the force he could collect to Fortress Monroe, where he arrived three days afterward.

Gen. Foster was left in command of the department of North Carolina, with a force barely sufficient to hold the important positions left him by Gen. Burnside, until late in the Autumn, when, having been considerably rëenforced by new regiments, mainly from Massachusetts, he resolved to assume the offensive. He led one expedition from Washington,[18] through Williamston to Hamilton, on the Roanoke, where he expected to find and destroy some iron-clads in process of construction; but there were none. Pushing thence inland,[19] in the direction of Tarboro', he advanced to within ten miles of that place, expecting to surround and capture three Rebel regiments who had there been stationed; but by this time a far superior Rebel force had, by means of telegraphs and railroads, been concentrated at that point, and he wisely retreated without molestation or loss, other than that inflicted by the rain, sleet, and deep mud through which the retreat was effected. The liberation of several hundred slaves was the chief result of this expedition.

A few weeks later, Gen. Foster, with a considerably larger force—all that he could collect—set out from Newbern[20] on a march directly inland, intending to reach and destroy the important railroad junction at Goldsboro'. He encountered no impediments, save from trees felled across the road, until he reached South-west creek, where the bridge had been destroyed, and a regiment was found posted on the opposite bank, supporting three pieces of artillery. These were driven off by a charge of the 9th New Jersey, and 1 gun captured; when, after two or three more skirmishes, Foster advanced[21] to within a mile of Kinston; where he encountered a considerable Rebel force under Gen. Evans, strongly posted between the Neuse and a deep swamp, whence they were driven after a short but sharp fight, and the bridge over the Neuse saved, though it had been fired by the fugitives, of whom 400 were taken prisoners. Evans fled through and abandoned the town; but reformed two miles beyond it, and continued his retreat, before Foster could bring his artillery over the injured bridge and attack him.

Gen. Foster, having bewildered the

[17] July 4, 1862. [18] Nov. 3. [19] Nov. 6. [20] Dec. 11. [21] Sunday, 14th.

enemy by feints in different directions, advanced[22] directly on Goldsboro'; but did not reach that point, because of a concentration in his front of more than double his force, under Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith,[23] with regiments drawn from Petersburg on the one hand, and Wilmington on the other; but the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad bridge over the Neuse was fired by Lt. Geo. W. Graham, 23d New York battery, after several who attempted the daring feat had been picked off by the Rebel sharpshooters. The bridge being destroyed, Gen. Foster commenced a rapid retreat on Newbern, which he effected without difficulty. His total loss in this expedition was 90 killed, (including Col. Gray, 96th New York, while charging at the head of his regiment at Kinston bridge), 478 wounded, and 9 missing. Smith's official report admits a Rebel loss of 71 killed, 268 wounded, and about 400 missing. Gen. Foster paroled 496 prisoners. Thus closed the year 1862 in North Carolina.

V.

NEW ORLEANS AND THE GULF.

Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, having, after the capture[1] of Fort Hatteras, returned to the North to find himself an officer without soldiers or employment, sought and obtained permission from the War Department to raise, in the New England States, six regiments of volunteers for special and confidential service. This undertaking involved fitful collisions with the general efforts then being made by the authorities of all the States to raise troops for service under Gen. McClellan; and Gen. B. was peculiarly unfortunate in thus colliding with Gov. Andrew, of Massachusetts, from which State he naturally expected the larger number of his troops. But his indefatigable energy and activity at length triumphed over all impediments; he having meantime been appointed, in facilitation of his enterprise, commander of a new military department composed of the six New England States, with his headquarters at Boston. When his 6,000 men had been fully raised, and part of them dispatched, under Gen. J. W. Phelps, to Ship Island, he was stopped for a season by the lowering aspects of our relations with England, consequent on the seizure of Mason and Slidell; whose ultimate surrender he profoundly deprecated, believing that a war waged against us by Great Britain would double our effective military strength, while paralyzing that of the Rebellion, by the spectacle of hostilities waged against us in our extremity by that nation, which very many, alike in the North and in the South, regarded as our hereditary foe. The substitution[2] of Mr. Edwin M. Stanton for Gen. Simon Cameron, as head of the War Department, caused some further delay, during which an order was once issued to send Gen. Butler's troops from Fortress Monroe to Port Royal; but it was, on his re-

[22] Dec. 17. [23] Formerly of New York. [1] Aug. 29, 1861. See Vol. I., pp. 599–600. [2] Jan. 13, 1862.

monstrance, annulled before it had been acted on.

Ship Island is one of quite a number of inconsiderable sand-bars which barely rise above the level of the Gulf between the mouths of the Mississippi and the Bay of Mobile. It is accounted 7 miles long by three-fourths of a mile in width, though its size, as well as its shape, is usually altered by each violent inland-driving storm. It has a good harbor at its western end, with groves of pine and stunted oak at the far east; while fresh water is obtained in plenty by sinking a barrel in the sand. Oysters and fish abound in the encircling waters; while the climate in Winter is soft, sunny, and tropical. New Orleans bears 65 miles W. S. W.; the mouth of Mobile Bay 50 miles E. N. E.; the mouths of the Mississippi from 90 to 110 S. S. W.; while Biloxi, on the Mississippi coast, is but 10 miles due north. Here Gen. Phelps and his brigade, having landed early in December, spent the Winter in very necessary drilling; the General having signalized his advent by issuing[3] an elaborate proclamation to the loyal citizens of the Southwest, declaring Slavery incompatible with free institutions and free labor, and its overthrow the end and aim of our Government—a declaration most unlikely to increase the number of *White* loyal citizens at that time and in that quarter, while pretty certain to be carefully kept from the knowledge of most others. Its first result was a feeling of amazement and dissatisfaction among a part of Gen. Phelps's subordinates; while a single copy, taken to the Mississippi shore, and dispensed to the first comer, was there eagerly diffused and employed to arouse and embitter hostility to the Union.

Mobile had been generally guessed the object of Gen. Butler's mysterious expedition, whose destination was not absolutely fixed even in the councils of its authors. An effort to reannex Texas had been considered, if not actually contemplated. It was finally decided, in a conference between Secretary Stanton and Gen. Butler, that a resolute attempt should be made on New Orleans; and though Gen. McClellan, when requested to give his opinion of the feasibility of the enterprise, reported that it could not be prudently undertaken with a less force than 50,000 men, while all that could be spared to Gen. Butler was 15,000, President Lincoln, after hearing all sides, gave judgment for the prosecution. A fortnight later, Gen. Butler went home to superintend the embarkation of the residue of his New England troops, 8,500 in number, 2,200 being already on ship-board, beside 2,000, under Phelps, at the Island. Three excellent Western regiments were finally spared him from Baltimore by Gen. McClellan, swelling his force on paper to 14,400 infantry, 580 artillery, 275 cavalry; total, 15,255 men, to which it was calculated that Key West might temporarily add two regiments, and Fort Pickens another, raising the aggregate to nearly 18,000. It in fact amounted, when collected at Ship Island, to 13,700.

Gen. Butler set out from Hampton Roads,[4] in the steamship Mississippi, with his staff, his wife, and 1,400 men. The next night, the ship barely escaped wreck on a shoal off Hatteras Inlet; and the next day was

[3] Dec. 4, 1861.

[4] Feb. 25, 1862, 9 P. M.

run hard upon the rocks five miles from land, off Cape Fear, while going at full speed. Her Captain, bewildered, gave the order to let go the bow anchor, when she instantly drove upon its fluke, piercing her forward compartments and letting in a deluge of water. An hour later, she was hard and fast upon Frying Pan Shoals, one compartment filled to the water-line, and her forward berths afloat, her Captain manifestly incompetent, and now nearly distracted. The coast in sight was strongly held by the enemy, whose horse patrol could be descried from the ship; and any Confederate cruiser, darting out from Cape Fear river, would have found the steamship and all on board an easy prey. An ordinary squall would very soon have broken up the vessel and strewed her wreck along the sands.

Toward noon, a steamer hove in sight, which, cautiously approaching, proved to be the U. S. gunboat Mount Vernon, of the squadron blockading Wilmington. Her commander, O. S. Glisson, came on board, and placed his vessel at the service of Gen. Butler. A hawser from the Mount Vernon was attached to the Mississippi, and many fruitless attempts made to drag her off. Three hundred of the soldiers were transferred to the Mount Vernon; shells were thrown overboard; and every device known to nautical experience tried to move the imperiled ship—all in vain. As the sun went down, the wind rose, and the waves swelled, till the huge ship began to roll and beat upon the rocks, the danger of wreck constantly increasing. At length, just after 7 P. M., and when the tide was within an hour of flood, she moved forward a few feet and was fairly afloat; slowly following the piloting Mount Vernon—the lead for a whole hour showing but six inches of water under her keel. At midnight, both came to anchor in the Cape Fear, and were next morning, which was calm, on their way to Port Royal, where the Mississippi was unladen and repaired; but was run aground again while moving down to the mouth of the harbor. The Captain was now deposed, Acting-Master Sturgis, of the Mount Vernon, appointed to his place; the troops once more debarked, and the ship pulled into deep water by the help of all the tugs in port. She again put to sea March 13th, having been eleven days in the port; and seven more brought her safely in sight of Ship Island; where so heavy a gale was blowing that landing troops was for two days impossible. It was the 25th of March when—30 days from Hampton Roads—they were debarked on that desolate sand-bank; where Gen. Butler was soon deep in consultation with Captains Farragut and Bailey, of the Navy, as well as with his military associates. Of these, Lt. Godfrey Weitzel, who had for two years been stationed at Fort St. Philip, and who had traversed all the adjacent country, duck-shooting, was able to give the fullest and most valuable information. Gen. Butler made him his chief engineer.

It was decided that the first attack on the forts defending the passage of the Mississippi below New Orleans should be made by the fleet; Capt. Porter, with his 21 bomb-schooners, anchoring below them and bombarding them till they should be reduced,

or his ammunition nearly exhausted. Capt. Farragut, with his larger and stronger vessels, would remain just out of fire as a reserve, awaiting the issue of the bombardment. That failing, he should attempt with his steamers to run by the forts. If he succeeded in this, he would try to clear the river of the enemy's fleet, isolate the forts, and push on so far as circumstances should dictate. Gen. Butler, so soon as Capt. Farragut had passed, was to land his troops from their transports in the rear of Fort St. Philip, and attempt to carry it by assault; while the enemy, supposing the swamps in that quarter impassable, should be entirely absorbed in his contest with the fleet. The forts being thus reduced, the whole expedition would advance upon the city, in such manner as should then seem expedient. Gen. Butler engaged to have 6,000 men embarked on transports and ready for service in seven days; Capt. Farragut sailing at once for the mouths of the river, to prepare his fleet for action.

The troops were formed into three brigades, under Gens. Phelps and Williams, and Col. Shepley; 100 carpenters detailed to make scaling-ladders; 100 boatmen to manage the 30 boats which were to make their way through the reedy creeks and marshes to the rear of Fort St. Philip. On the sixth day, 7 regiments and 2 batteries were embarked, awaiting the word to move from Capt. Farragut; but high winds and low tides obstructed the movements of the fleet; several of the larger vessels being many days in getting over the bar; so that Gen. Butler was obliged to disembark his troops and wear out another fortnight as patiently as he might.

Meantime, the Rebels alongshore, who had by this time become satisfied that New Orleans was aimed at, resorted to the expedients which had proved effective with most of our commanders up to that time, and which stood them in good stead with several for many months afterward. Having been compelled nearly to depete the Gulf region of soldiers in order to make head against Grant and Buell on the Tennessee, they supplied their places with imaginary regiments and batteries* in generous

*The New Orleans journals, frequently brought over from Biloxi, bristled with such awe-inspiring paragraphs as the following:

"The Mississippi is fortified so as to be impassable for any hostile fleet or flotilla. Forts Jackson and St. Philip are armed with 170 heavy guns (63-pounders, rifled by Barkley Britton, and received from England). The navigation of the river is stopped by a dam about a quarter of a mile from the above forts. No flotilla on earth could force that dam in less than two hours; during which it would be within short and cross range of 170 guns of the heaviest caliber, many of which would be served with red-hot shot; numerous furnaces for which have been erected in every fort and battery.

"In a day or two, we shall have ready two iron-cased floating batteries. The plates are 4½ inches thick, of the best hammered iron, received from England and France. Each iron-cased battery will mount twenty 68-pounders, placed so as to skim the water, and strike the enemy's hull between wind and water. We have an abundant supply of incendiary shells, cupola furnaces for molten iron, congreve rockets, and fire-ships.

"Between New Orleans and the forts, there is a constant succession of earthworks. At the Plain of Chalmette, near Janin's property, there are redoubts, armed with rifled cannon which have been found to be effective at five miles' range. A ditch 30 feet wide and 20 deep extends from the Mississippi to La Ciprione. In Forts St. Philip and Jackson, there are 3,000 men; of whom a goodly portion are experienced artillery-men and gunners who have served in the navy.

"At New Orleans itself, we have 32,000 infantry, and as many more quartered in the immediate neighborhood. In discipline and drill, they are far superior to the Yankees. We have two very able and active Generals, who possess our entire confidence—Gen. Mansfield Lovell and Brig.-Gen. Ruggles. For Commodore, we have old Hollins—a Nelson in his way."—*N. O. Picayune*, April 5, 1862.

profusion; but these were not the forces required to paralyze such commanders as Butler and Farragut. At length,[6] the joyful tidings reached the former from the latter that his fleet was all over the bar, reloaded, and ready for action; and that he hoped to move up the river next day. Two days later, Gen. Butler, with his 8,000 troops, was at the mouth of the river.

New Orleans, situated on the left bank of the Mississippi, 100 miles above its mouths, with the large sheet of water known as Lake Pontchartrain closely approaching it on the north, and the smaller Lake Borgne some 20 miles distant on the east, was by far the largest and most important city of the Confederacy, with a population of 170,000, and the greatest export trade, just prior to the war, of any city in the world. Unable to perceive the wisdom of expatriating those magnificent feeders of its commerce, the Missouri, the Ohio, and the upper Mississippi, a majority of its people had opposed Secession, until the carefully nursed tempest of pro-Slavery folly, fury, fanaticism, and ruffianism, stifled all outspoken dissent, about the time the war was formally opened by the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter. Thenceforward, New Orleans became the virtual heart of the Confederacy; and its immense wealth of coin and produce was lavished in all directions in support of the military operations directed from Richmond. Regiment after regiment of Louisianians and foreign residents were raised and equipped here; but most of them had, when the hour of peril came, been drafted off, from time to time, to meet pressing exigencies on the Potomac and higher Mississippi, or the Tennessee; so that but about 3,000 of these, neither well armed, well drilled, nor particularly well affected to the cause, remained to dispute the advance of the Yankee invaders.

Gen. David E. Twiggs had been rewarded for his stupendous treachery to the Union in Texas, by the command of the Confederate defenses of New Orleans, until stern experience proved him as incapable, superannuated, and inefficient, as even our own Scott. At length, on a plea of declining health, he was sent home to die; and Gen. Mansfield Lovell, who had abandoned a lucrative office under the Democratic municipality of New York to take service with the Confederates, was appointed his successor.

On assuming command,[7] Lovell found the defenses of the great slave-mart more pretentious than formidable. The variety of water approaches by Lakes Pontchartrain and Borgne, and the Bayous Barataria and La Fourche, all needed defenses against an enemy of preponderant naval force; while even the Mississippi required fortifying and watching above as well as below, to render the city entirely safe. Artillery by parks was indispensable; and a good many guns had been supplied from the plunder of the Norfolk Navy Yard, and elsewhere; but most of them were old, of moderate caliber, unrifled, and every way unsuited to the requirements of modern warfare. He telegraphed to Richmond, to Mobile, and other points, for heavier and better cannon; but obtained very

[6] April 15, 1862.

[7] Oct. 18, 1861.



NEW ORLEANS AND ITS APPROACHES.

few, mainly from Pensacola, when that place was abandoned; and had just begun to cast new ones, adapted to his needs, as also to provide himself with iron-clads, when confronted by a military necessity for leaving that part of the country.

Lovell, knowing far better than our commanders the essential weakness of his position, and early warned of his danger by the gathering of our forces on Ship Island, seems to have exerted himself to the utmost. He had fortified and guarded all the land approaches to the city; so that, though Gen. Butler's army, had it advanced otherwise than by the Mississippi, would probably have carried it, the cost in time, effort, and blood, would doubtless have been far greater than that actually incurred. But the operations of Farragut, in and about the passes, gave unmistakable indications of the real point of danger; so that the Rebel General's forces and means of annoyance were mainly concentrated in and around Forts Jackson and St. Philip, which, from opposite banks, command the passage of the river, 75 miles below New Orleans. Beside these respectable and regularly constructed fortresses of brick and earth, abundantly supplied with smooth-bore 24 and 32-pounders, and a few better guns, Lovell and his naval compatriots, after blocking up most of the water approaches to New Orleans from the Gulf with strongly-braced piles, green live-oaks, and other obstructions, and

calling[8] on the Governor of Louisiana for 10,000 militia—receiving for answer that there were but 6,000, of whom half had just been sent to Tennessee, upon the requisition of Gen. Beauregard—and placing his department under martial law,[9] turned their attention almost entirely to the lower Mississippi. It was high time.

A great raft, or boom, composed of cypress-trees 40 feet long and 4 to 5 feet through, standing 3 feet apart, and fastened to two great 2½-inch chain-cables, had been stretched across the river just under the guns of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and made fast to large trees, immense anchors, timbers, &c., imbedded as firmly as possible; but the annual flood in the Mississippi, which commences early in the year, had, by the first of March, brought its surface considerably above the country outside of its levees, and piled against the obstructions a large amount of drift-wood; softening the earth and strengthening the current, until the anchors and other hold-fasts gave way, and the raft, with its chains snapped and its timbers swept down stream, ceased to be an impediment. But for the delays and disappointments which so sorely taxed Gen. Butler's patience, it is likely that our fleet would have found this their most formidable antagonist. Lovell at once sent down Col. Higgins to repair it, clothed with the amplest powers; but the Father of Waters refused to recognize them. A new obstruction was patched up, composed of parts of the old raft, with schooners anchored in the interstices, and all fastened together with such chains as could be procured; but the net result was more formidable in appearance than in reality. And still the river kept on rising, until nearly all the adjacent country was submerged, becoming temporarily a part of the Gulf of Mexico. Even the parade-plain and casemates of Fort Jackson were from 3 to 18 inches under water, and its magazines were only kept dry by incessant pumping.

Hollins had been superseded as naval commandant by Commodore Whittle, whose fleet consisted of the new iron-clad Louisiana, mounting 16 guns, many of them large and excellent, with Hollins's ram Manassas, and 13 gunboats—that is, commercial steamboats, impressed or lent for this service, and armed and manned as well as might be—with a number of old sailing craft fitted up as fire-ships, and very dangerous to wooden vessels attacking from below, by reason of the uniform strength of the current.

Gen. J. K. Duncan, who had been appointed by Lovell to the command of the coast defenses, and had thereupon repaired[10] to Fort Jackson, had been working the garrisons of both forts night and day, covering their main magazines with sand-bags; which had been barely completed when our fleet hove in sight. Two gunboats had appeared, reconnoitering, four days before.

Our naval force consisted of 47 armed vessels, 8 of them large and powerful steam sloops-of-war; 17 heavily armed steam gunboats, 2 sailing sloops-of-war, and 21 mortar-schooners, each throwing a 215-pound shell. The steam sloops carried from 9 to 28 guns; the gunboats, 5 to 6 guns

[8] Feb. 25, 1862. [9] March 15, 1862. [10] March 27.

each; the whole number of guns and mortars was 310, many of them very heavy and very good. Capt. Farragut, our commander, had passed 52 of his 63 years in the navy, having been a midshipman in the war of 1812; a Tennessean, his loyalty was of that stern and sterling quality whereof the best examples were furnished by the South. His time, and that of his officers, had for weeks been well spent in providing and preparing every thing likely to be required in the intended combat; so that when, on the day after our fleet reached the vicinity of the forts,[11] and before it had opened fire, a Rebel flat-boat, piled with wood saturated with tar and turpentine, and then cut adrift, came rushing down the heady current—a crackling, roaring, flaming volcano—into the midst of our thickly clustering vessels, a few shells were thrown into it from the gunboat Mississippi, without the designed effect of exploding and sinking it; when a row-boat from the Iroquois quietly tackled it, fixed three grappling-irons in its bow, and towed it obliquely to the river bank, where it was permitted to burn itself harmlessly away, while the fleet proceeded with its preparations for the morrow's bombardment. Axes, ropes, fire-buckets, and whatever else might be needed, were placed exactly where they would be at hand when wanted, and every thing made ready for business.

At daylight next morning, each of the small steamers took four of the schooners in tow and drew them slowly up the river, their decks and yards covered with great branches of trees, whose green foliage rendered them undistinguishable, save by close observation, from the dense woods that skirted the river. Fourteen of them were ranged in line close under the wooded bank, over which they were to throw their shells into Fort Jackson, at distances of two to three miles. Six were stationed near the farther or eastern bank, in full view of both forts, but within range only



FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP.

Explanations.—A, B, C, D, &c., are points on the left bank, and 1, 2, 3, 4, &c., points on the right bank of the river, selected for placing the gunboats and mortars in position. The position of the mortar-boats on the 18th was as follows: 6 mortars on the left bank, between G and J, 3,900 to 4,500 yards from Fort Jackson; 14 mortars on the right bank, from 1 to 5, distant 2,880 to 3,190 yards from Fort Jackson. On the 19th, they were all on the right bank, 3,010 to 4,100 yards from Fort Jackson, and remained nearly in the same position through the 20th and 21st. The large steamers and gunboats were placed from ½ to 1½ miles below the mortar-boats. On the first day, the small steam sloops and gunboats went up to abreast of the smoke-stack, where they engaged the forts and the enemy's steamers.

[11] April 17.

of Jackson, distant 2½ to three miles; all were under orders to concentrate their fire on Fort Jackson, that being the larger and more important work, whose fall necessarily involved that of Fort St. Philip.

At 9 A. M., before our mortar vessels were ready, Fort Jackson opened fire; but her balls struck the water 100 yards short of our gunboat Owasco, which held the advance, and which was first to reply. Capt. Porter, who commanded the mortar fleet, watched through his glass the effect of our very deliberate fire, constantly giving new directions, founded on his observations, as to the elevation of pieces, length of fuse, and weight of charge. By 10 A. M., both parties had closed their experiments, and were firing steadily and heartily, though as yet with little visible effect, save that the fish in the river, stunned and killed by the tremendous concussions, had begun to float past our anchored vessels. Soon, three more rafts are seen sweeping down from the new barrier of chains and hulks, and, as they approach, are dealt with as their predecessor had been, without interrupting the fire of our guns. At 4 P. M., Gen. Butler's little dispatch steamer Saxon arrived, with news that the army was below, ready and waiting for service, and that the Monitor had disabled the Merrimac in Hampton Roads. At 5, flames were seen bursting from Fort Jackson, whose fire slackened; and it was manifest that its wooden interior had been ignited, like that of Fort Sumter in the initial bombardment of the war. The Rebel forts ceased firing, as our boats did, an hour later, and the night passed silently; the flames in Fort Jackson not being extinguished till 2 next morning. But its batteries opened as lively as ever at sunrise, and at 11:30 one of their rifled bolts crashed through one of our schooners, sinking her in 20 minutes; while the Oneida, in our advance, was twice hit in the afternoon, two of her gun-carriages smashed, and 9 of her men wounded. The fort had evidently suffered by the day's work; but the fathomless mud of the Mississippi seemed exactly constituted to absorb our shells, with the least possible harm to all around. Gen. Butler and staff arrived during that afternoon, and went up in a small boat to take a look at the chain; which, it had begun by this time to be understood, was badly in the way, and must be subjected to an operation.

The bombardment having been continued through a third day without encouraging result, Capt. Farragut called a council of captains in the cabin of his flag-ship Hartford, and, having heard all opinions, decided on an attempt to force a passage by the forts. To this end, it was essential that the cable should first be broken; and to Capt. Bell, with the gunboats Pinola and Itasca, supported by the Iroquois, Kennebec, and Winona, was assigned the conduct of this critical undertaking; which, the night being dark, it was determined to attempt forthwith; and, at 10 P. M., the Pinola and Itasca had set out on their perilous errand; Capt. Porter, so soon as they were out of range of his guns, opening upon Fort Jackson a tremendous fire from all his mortar-schooners, under which the Pinola ran up toward the cable near the western shore, directly under the guns of the

fort; and, nearing one of the hulks, Mr. Krœhl, the inventor of a new and powerful petard, threw it on board; but it failed to explode, because the Pinola, having stopped her engine a moment too soon, was whirled away on the rushing current, snapping the wire hitherto connected with the petard. The wind blowing fiercely from the north, it was half an hour before the Pinola was again minding her helm, with her bow toward the chain.

Meanwhile, the Itasca, Captain Caldwell, had steamed up to the chain-supporting hulk next in order eastward, and, making fast to its side, her men, who had boarded the hulk, were studying in the darkness the economy of the cable. A rocket thrown up from Fort Jackson favored them with a fitful, transient light, to which a cannonade, instantly opened on them from both forts, seemed to add very little; but they steadily went on with their business; and in half an hour the great chain, vigorously plied with sledge and chisel, had been cut; the cables by which the hulk was anchored had been slipped; and now the hulk, still chained to the nearer shore, was swept resistlessly round by flood and wind until it grounded in the mud of the bank, pulling the lashed Itasca along with it, and driving her fast aground directly in the range of both forts. By this time, however, the Pinola was ready to come to her rescue; and, after an hour of earnest tugging, and parting two 5-inch hawsers, she finally grappled her with an 11-inch cable, and, by help of steam and current, dragged her again into deep water and down into the kindly darkness; each vessel entirely unharmed: and the opening thus made in the barrier was speedily and constantly enlarged by the current, so that a boat's crew from the Itasca, pulling up in the thick darkness two nights later, found nothing to obstruct the upward passage of our fleet. A new and grander fire-raft was sent down two hours after the chains were broken, only to be caught and served as her predecessors had been.

The bombardment was continued two days farther; in part, because two of our gunboats had been so much injured as to require assistance for their rapid repair. The morning of the 24th was fixed on for the grand attempt, of which the Rebel officers somehow had an intimation; so that, throughout the preceding day, the forts were silently preparing for the eventful hour at hand, while our bombardment was little more than a formality. Meantime, Duncan reported from Fort Jackson that he had suffered very little, though 25,000 13-inch shells had been fired at him, whereof 1,000 had fallen within the fort. (We had actually fired 5,000 only.) "God is certainly protecting us," was his assurance.

Farragut's arrangements for passing the forts were completed at sunset.[13] The mortar-boats, retaining their stations, were to cover the advance with their utmost possible fire. Six small steamers—the Harriet Lane, Westfield, Owasco, Clinton, Miami, and Jackson, the last towing the Portsmouth—were to engage the water battery below Fort Jackson, but not attempt to pass. Capt. Farragut himself, with his

[13] April 23.

three largest ships—the Hartford, Richmond, and Brooklyn—was to keep near the western bank, fighting Fort Jackson; while Capt. Bailey, with the Cayuga, Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, Katahdin, Kineo, and Wissahickon, was to hug the eastern bank, exchanging compliments with Fort St. Philip. Capt. Bell, with the third division—consisting of the Scioto, Iroquois, Pinola, Winona, Itasca, and Kennebec—was to keep the middle of the river, and, disregarding the forts, to attack and vanquish the Rebel fleet in waiting above. Lieut. Weitzel had wisely suggested that, as the guns of the forts had been fired at a high elevation in order to reach their remote assailants, and as the vessels would naturally be expected to keep the middle of the river, the Rebel gunners would be pretty sure to fire over them if they kept close to the respective shores. All being ready, Gen. Butler and his staff went on board the Saxon; every naval officer was at his post; and the silence was only broken by an occasional fire from the mortar-sloops. At 11 P. M., a signal from the Itasca announced that the opening in the cable was still unclosed. The night was dark and heavy; the moon—what there was of it—would rise at 3 A. M.

At 1,[18] all hands were called, steam got up, the last preparations made, and at 2 the signal to weigh anchor was given from the flag-ship. Half an hour later, Farragut's division was ready. Capt. Bailey, a little slower, was farther away; it was 3½ before the latter was fairly abreast of Farragut, when each division moved silently up stream. The current was so swift, the night so heavy, that the fleet advanced but four miles per hour.

The silence was broken by our mortars, whose gunners, prepared for the rapidest possible fire, at once filled the air with their shells, and roared out to the Rebels their warning that the hour had come. As our ships in their three lines closely followed each other, Capt. Bailey, in the Cayuga, was first observed and opened upon by both forts as he was passing through the breach in the barrier. He did not choose to give better direction to the enemy's fire by replying; and, though their balls were abundant, they mainly passed over and around him. Approaching Fort St. Philip, he ran close under her guns, giving her broadsides of grape and canister as he passed; the Pensacola, Mississippi, and Varuna, pressing closely in his wake, followed his commendable example. All of his division passed the forts essentially uninjured.

Capt. Bell's division was less fortunate. The Pinola, Scioto, and Iroquois, ran the gauntlet of the forts unharmed; but the Itasca, when directly opposite St. Philip, received a volley of balls, one of which pierced her boiler and compelled her to drift down the river. The Winona recoiled from that fire, and failed to pass. The Kennebec was caught in the cable; and, when liberated, lost her way in the dense smoke; finally returning to her former anchorage below the forts.

Capt. Farragut, in the fore rigging of the Hartford, anxiously watching every visible movement through his night-glass, had advanced within a

[18] April 24.

mile and a quarter of Fort Jackson, when he was opened upon from that Fort and repeatedly struck. Still steaming directly for the fort, and replying only from his two forecastle guns, when within half a mile he sheered and gave them broadsides of grape and canister, which soon drove every man from their barbette guns; but those in the casemates rendered full and quick returns for every volley received. The Richmond, closely following, hurled grape and canister in profusion. The Brooklyn, bringing up the rear, ran over one of the hulks which had upheld the chain, during a hot fire from Fort St. Philip. Hardly had she been freed from the hulk and her head turned up stream, when the ram Manassas came butting into her starboard gangway, first opening her iron trap-door at ten feet distance and firing at the smoke-stack of the Brooklyn a heavy bolt, which was caught and stopped by the sand-bags protecting her steam-drum. A guard of chain armor, which had been woven over her sides, shielded her from destruction by the ram, which soon slid off and disappeared in the darkness. A few minutes later, while still under a raking fire from Fort Jackson, the Brooklyn was attacked by a large Rebel steamer, to which she gave a broadside at 50 yards, setting it instantly on fire and putting an end to its career. Still groping onward in the thick darkness, Capt. Craven soon found himself abreast of Fort St. Philip, and so near that his leadsman reported 13 feet of water. Bringing all his guns to bear for a few moments, he poured in grape and canister so that the fort was completely silenced, and her garrison were seen by our men in the tops of the Brooklyn, by the fitful flashes of their bursting shrapnel, running like sheep to their coverts. Thus passing the upper fort, Capt. Craven engaged several of the Rebel gunboats, at 60 to 100 yards. He was an hour and a half under fire, lost 8 killed and 26 wounded, while his ship was badly cut up by shot and shell; but she bore her full part in the attack on the Rebel batteries below New Orleans next morning.

The Cayuga, having saluted and passed Fort St. Philip at short range, still pushing on, encountered, when just out of fire of the fort, the entire Rebel flotilla, consisting of 18 gunboats, including the Manassas and Louisiana. For a moment, her doom seemed certain, as no supporting ship was to be seen. By skillful steering, however, Capt. Bailey avoided all their attempts to butt and board, and had already forced three of the less formidable to surrender, when the Varuna and Oneida were seen coming to the rescue. At early dawn, perceiving a Rebel camp on the right bank of the river, Capt. Bailey anchored close beside it, and ordered the Rebels to pile their arms on the bank and come on board as prisoners, which was obeyed. The captives proved to be the Chalmette regiment, Col. Sysmanski. Their flag, tents, and camp equipage, formed a part of the spoils.

The Varuna, having safely passed the forts, found herself "amid a nest of Rebel steamers,"[14] into which she plunged, firing broadsides at each as she passed it, exploding the boiler of the first, which appeared to be

[14] Commander Bogga's official report.

crowded with troops; when it drifted ashore, a wreck. Three other vessels, one of them a gunboat, were likewise driven ashore and blown up. At 6 A. M., the Morgan, partially iron-clad, commanded by Beverly Kennon (late of our navy), attacked the Varuna, giving her a raking fire along the port gangway, which killed 4 and wounded 9 of her crew, then butted her on the quarter and again on the starboard side, but without sinking or disabling her. Meanwhile, the Varuna had planted three 8-inch shells in her assailant, abaft her armor, with several shot from one of our rifled guns; when she drifted out of the fight, partially disabled. Ere this time, another Rebel iron-clad, with a beak under water, had struck the Varuna in the port gangway, doing considerable damage, while our shot glanced harmlessly from the armor of the Rebel boat. The enemy then backed off for another blow, and struck again in the same place, crushing in the Varuna's side; but she being under full headway, her enemy's beak for a moment stuck fast in her side, and the ram was drawn around nearly beside our steamer, which was thereby enabled to plow her with five 8-inch shells abaft her armor. This finished her performance, and she drifted ashore, a burning wreck; while the Varuna, now in a sinking condition, was run into the bank by her commander, her anchor let go, and her bow made fast to the trees; her guns all the time at work crippling the Morgan, which was making feeble efforts to get up steam. When the water had risen over his gun-trucks, Commander Boggs turned his attention to getting the wounded and crew out of his vessel. The Oneida, seeing her sinking, had rushed to her assistance; but Boggs waved her on to the Morgan, which, already in flames, surrendered; she had lost over 50 of her crew killed and wounded, and was set on fire by her commander, who left his wounded to the flames. Fifteen minutes after she struck, the Varuna was on the bottom, with only her top-gallant forecastle out of water. Her crew gained the shore, losing every thing but the clothes they stood in.

Our loss in this desperate fight, not including 6 or 7 previously disabled on the mortar-boats, was reported as only 30 killed and 119 wounded; the fleet surgeon adding that several vessels had not yet made their official return. The Brooklyn, Pensacola, and Iroquois, had suffered most severely.

Gen. Lovell, who had witnessed the combat of our fleet with his forts and flotilla, and its triumph, hastened up to the city on horseback, narrowly escaping capture on the way, and gave orders to Gen. Smith, in command of the land defenses, to make all possible resistance at the earthworks below the town; but the high stage of water, causing the guns of our vessels to command the earthworks, rendered them untenable by infantry. An attempt was made to raise 1,000 desperate volunteers who would undertake to board and carry our vessels by assault; but only 100 could be found. In short, New Orleans was lost when our fleet had passed the forts; and all her intelligent Rebels knew it.

Gen. Lovell, after consultation with the municipal authorities, began

at once to send off his munitions and provisions by steamboat and railroad, while the greater part of his conscripted militia disbanded and dispersed. What was left worth taking was sent off to Camp Moore, 78 miles above, on the Jackson Railroad.

The Rebel flotilla having been mainly destroyed, Capt. Farragut, with his nine vessels that had safely run the gauntlet of Rebel forts, fireships, rams, and gunboats, while steaming slowly and cautiously up the river, had not yet reached New Orleans when he was met by ample evidence that the city was virtually in his hands. Cotton-loaded and other valuable ships came floating down the river wrapped in flames, the mute but vivid witnesses of the enemy's despair. "I never witnessed such Vandalism in my life," he reports, "as the destruction of property: all the shipping, steamboats, &c., were set on fire and consumed."

On reaching[15] the English Turn, six or seven miles below the city, he descried the new earthworks on both banks, known as the Chalmette batteries; when, forming his fleet in two lines, and allotting to each its proper work, he moved on. The Cayuga, not having observed the signal for close order, was considerably in advance, and so for 20 minutes exposed alone to the fire of the Rebel batteries. But the Hartford now came up, dispensing liberal broadsides of shell, shrapnel, and grape, the first of which drove the Rebels on the right bank from their guns; while the fire of the Pensacola, the Brooklyn, and the residue of the fleet, which came up in quick succession, very soon silenced the remaining forts, and set their gunners in rapid motion toward places of greater safety. No further obstacles nor perils but those presented by burning steamers, cotton-ships, rafts, &c., were encountered until, at 1 P. M., the squadron anchored, during a violent thunderstorm, in front of New Orleans, whose levee for miles afforded a magnificent but melancholy spectacle of burning cotton, sugar, and other staples of South-western commerce; while the river in front was so full of burning ships that great vigilance and skill were required to avoid them.[16]

There was no attempt at resistance, but on shore anarchy and impotent

[15] At 10:30 A. M. on the 25th.

[16] Pollard says:

"No sooner had the Federal fleet turned the point, and come within sight of the city, than the work of destruction of property commenced. Vast columns of smoke ascended to the sky, darkening the face of heaven and obscuring the noon-day sun; for five miles along the levee, fierce flames darted through the lurid atmosphere, their baleful glare struggling in rivalry with the sunlight; great ships and steamers, wrapped in fire, floated down the river, threatening the Federal vessels with destruction by their fiery contact. In front of the various presses, and at other points along the levee, the cotton had been piled up and submitted to the torch. It was burned by order of the Governor of Louisiana and of the military commander of the Confederate States. Fifteen thousand bales were consumed; the value of which would have been about a million and a half of dollars. The tobacco stored in the city, being all held by foreign residents on foreign account, was not destroyed. The specie of the banks, to the amount of twelve or fifteen millions, was removed from the city and placed in a secure place; so were nearly all the stores and movable property of the Confederate States. But other materials were embraced in the awful conflagration. About a dozen large river steamboats, twelve or fifteen ships, some of them laden with cotton, a great floating battery, several unfinished gunboats, the immense ram, the Mississippi, and the docks on the other side of the river, were all embraced in the fiery sacrifice. The Mississippi was an iron-clad frigate, a superior vessel of her class, and accounted to be by far the most important naval structure the Confederate Government had yet undertaken."

rage strove for the mastery. As our squadron neared the levee, our sailors gave a cheer, to which some few in the adjacent crowd responded, provoking thereby pistol-shots from the irate Rebels surrounding them. After a brief delay, Capt. Bailey was sent ashore to demand the surrender of the city; when the valorous mob received him with groans, hootings, and threats of violence, which did not prevent his proceeding, under the escort of more considerate citizens, to the Mayor's office; the mob that followed him contenting itself with assaults on such citizens as were suspected of Unionism. On reaching the City Hall, he made his demand, requiring that the Federal flag be displayed from the public edifices; to which the Mayor responded, disclaiming any authority to comply. A messenger was thereupon sent to Gen. Lovell, who informed Capt. Bailey that he had already evacuated the city, which he now formally turned over to the municipal authorities, leaving them to act as they should see fit. Capt. Bailey now returned to the fleet to await such action; and the Mayor, refusing to haul down the State flag from the City Hall, sent to the Common Council, which was in session, a message recommending that an answer be returned to Capt. Farragut, stating that the city, being incapable of offering further resistance, yielded to physical force alone, without giving up its allegiance to the Confederate Government, while it had no authority over the Custom-House, Post-Office, and Mint, and would do nothing with regard to them. This undignified and ridiculous betrayal of spite and chagrin was reiterated by the Mayor in a letter[11] to Capt. Farragut, which was tersely and fitly

[11] "MAYOR'S OFFICE, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS,
"CITY HALL, April 26, 1862.

"*Flag-Officer* D. G. FARRAGUT, *United States flag-ship Hartford:*

"SIR—In pursuance of a resolution which we thought proper to take, out of regard for the lives of the women and children who still crowd the metropolis, General Lovell has evacuated it with his troops, and restored back to me the administration of its government and the custody of its honor. I have, in council with the City Fathers, considered the demand you made of me yesterday of an unconditional surrender of the city, coupled with a requisition to hoist the flag of the United States on the public edifices, and haul down the flag that still floats upon the breeze from the dome of this Hall. It becomes my duty to transmit to you an answer which is the universal sentiment of my constituents no less than the promptings of my own heart on this sad and solemn occasion. The city is without the means of defense; and is utterly destitute of the force and material that might enable it to resist an overpowering armament displayed in sight of it.

"I am no military man, and possess no authority beyond that of executing the municipal laws of the city of New Orleans. It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to lead an army in the field, if I had one at command; and I know still less how to surrender an undefended place, held, as this is, at the mercy of your gunners and your mortars. To surrender such a place were an idle and unmeaning ceremony. The city is yours by the power of brutal force, not by my choice or the consent of its inhabitants. It is for you to determine what will be the fate that awaits us here. As to hoisting any flag not of our own adoption and allegiance, let me say to you that the man lives not in our midst whose hand and heart would not be paralyzed at the mere thought of such an act; nor could I find in my entire constituency so desperate and wretched a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspirations.

"Sir, you have manifested sentiments which would become one engaged in a better cause than that to which you have devoted your sword. I doubt not that they spring from a noble though deluded nature; and I know how to appreciate the emotions which inspired them. You have a gallant people to administrate during your occupancy of this city—a people sensitive to all that can in the least affect their dignity and self-respect. Pray, Sir, do not fail to regard their susceptibilities. The obligations which I shall assume in their name shall be religiously complied with. You may trust their honor, though you might not count on their submission to unmerited wrong.

"In conclusion, I beg you to understand that the people of New Orleans, while unable to re-

answered."[18] The malevolent folly of the municipal authorities served only to expose their city to destruction. A force landed from the Pensacola had hoisted, unopposed, a Federal flag over the Mint, and left it there unguarded. Ere it had thus remained many hours, a number of young Rebels mounted to the dome, tore it down, and dragged it through the streets. It would have been entirely justifiable and proper on the part of Farragut to have required of the authorities its immediate and respectful replacement, on penalty of the destruction of their city; but he forbore; and, even when he required them, two days afterward, to take down the flag of Louisiana, still floating over the City Hall, the Mayor positively refused. Capt. F. finally closed[19] the absurd altercation by sending a force from his ships to take down the flag: a vast crowd looking sullenly on, or giving vent to their wrath only in idle curses. They failed to comprehend their position; but they respected the two brass howitzers, well manned and supported, which stood in front of the City Hall while the operation was quietly and thoroughly performed.

Capt. Farragut had not waited to obtain formal possession of the city before moving up[20] to the two forts at Carrollton, eight miles above, where he was surprised to find the gun-carriages on fire and the guns spiked. The works were formidable, but constructed to resist an advance from above; so that, being taken in reverse, they had been adjudged indefensible.

Gen. Butler, having witnessed from

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sist your force, do not allow themselves to be insulted by the interference of such as have rendered themselves odious and contemptible by their dastardly desertion of our cause in the mighty struggle in which we are engaged, or such as might remind them too forcibly that they are the conquered and you the conquerors. Peace and order may be preserved without resort to measures which I could not at this moment prevent. Your occupying the city does not transfer allegiance from the government of their choice to one which they have deliberately repudiated; and they yield the obedience which the conqueror is entitled to extort from the conquered.

Respectfully,
"JOHN T. MONROE, Mayor."

[18] "U. S. FLAG-SHIP HARTFORD, at anchor off the City of New Orleans,
"April 28, 1862.

"*To His Honor the Mayor and City Council of the City of New Orleans:*

"Your communication of the 26th inst. has been received, together with that of the City Council.

"I deeply regret to see, both by their contents and the continued display of the flag of Louisiana on the Court-House, a determination on the part of the city authorities not to haul it down. Moreover, when my officers and men were sent on shore to communicate with the authorities, and to hoist the United States flag on the Custom-House, with the strictest order not to use their arms unless assailed, they were insulted in the grossest manner, and the flag which had been hoisted by my orders on the Mint was pulled down and dragged through the streets. All of which goes to show that the fire of this fleet may be drawn upon the city at any moment; and in such an event the levee would, in all probability, be cut by the shells, and an amount of distress ensue to the innocent population which I have hitherto endeavored to assure you that I desire by all means to avoid.

"The election, therefore, is with you. But it becomes my duty to notify you to remove the women and children from the city within 48 hours, if I rightly understand your determination.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
(Signed) "D. G. FARRAGUT,
"Flag-Officer Western Gulf Blockading Squadron."

It seems incredible, yet it is a fact, that Monroe sent a rejoinder to this letter; in which, amid bombastic and turgid babble about flagrant violation of those courtesies which prevail between belligerents, and shells tearing up the graves of those who are so dear to them, he whimpered out: "Our women and children cannot escape from your shells, if it be your pleasure to murder them on a question of *mere etiquette*." Even Pollard barely represses his disgust at the silly repetitions and vanity of literary style protruded by this Bobadil of a Mayor.

[19] May 1. [20] Afternoon of April 26.

the Saxon the success of Farragut's attempt to pass the Rebel forts and barrier and destroy their fleet forbidding approach to New Orleans, made haste to join his land forces below, and to conduct them, under Weitzel's piloting, through the shallow bays and bayous in the rear of Fort St. Philip, landing them from his row-boats on the first firm ground that he reached above the fort; thence occupying the levee and throwing a detachment across the river so as completely to isolate both forts and their garrisons. While he was effecting this, Commander Porter, with his mortar-fleet below, resumed and continued the bombardment, sending up[21] a flag of truce to demand a surrender, which was refused; but, next day, 250 of the garrison of Fort Jackson, having heard, or inferred from the blackened fragments floating down the river, that New Orleans was captured, refused to fight longer, and, spiking the guns on the upper side of the fort, sallied out and surrendered themselves to Gen. Butler's pickets. Lt.-Col. Higgins, who commanded the forts, seeing that all was lost, now made haste to accept the favorable terms of capitulation previously offered by Commander Porter, before the latter should be made aware of Butler's position above and the mutiny and surrender of half the garrison. While the terms of capitulation were being reduced to writing, the Confederate naval officers just above the forts towed their ram Louisiana out into the current, set her on fire and abandoned her, with all her guns shotted, expecting her to drift down upon and explode in the midst of Porter's fleet; but, just as she was abreast of Fort St. Philip, she blew up and sunk, injuring no one but a Rebel soldier in the fort, who was killed by a fragment. Of the three remaining Rebel steamers, one had been scuttled; the others surrendered without resistance: their officers, with those of the Louisiana, being sent North as close prisoners, because of their attempt to destroy our fleet while a capitulation was in progress. Commander Porter turned the forts and their contents immediately over to Gen. Phelps,[22] and they were very soon being repaired and fitted for effective service; while Gen. Butler, leaving Gen. Williams in command there, and having easily reduced Forts Pike and Wood, at the entrance of Lake Pontchartrain, brought his steamers around into the Mississippi, and, taking on board 2,000 of his men, moved up to the city and took possession—Capt. Farragut very gladly relinquishing to him the difficult and disagreeable duty of bandying words with its spiteful, shuffling authorities, and dealing with its ferocious and ruffianly mob, who would have taken exquisite pleasure in making mince-meat of either of them.

In the conferences which ensued between the commanding General

[21] April 27.

[22] The Rebel loss by the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip was reported by them at 11 killed and 39 wounded. The prisoners taken by us at the surrender were 393. This does not include about 300 captured with the last of their gunboats, nor the Chalmette regiment encamped on the levee, which surrendered to Capt. Bailey. Our total loss of men in the bombardment, running the batteries, destruction of the Rebel fleet, and capture of the city, was but 40 killed and 177 wounded.

and the municipality, Mayor Monroe was counseled and prompted by Hon. Pierre Soulé, a gentleman whose ability and tact shone forth in striking contrast with the pitiable exhibition previously made of himself by the Mayor. In fact, if Soulé had had 10 or 15 good regiments and as many batteries at his back, he might have argued Butler out of New Orleans. A wide diversity as to premises rendered the progress and results of these discussions quite unsatisfactory to the weaker party. In the contemplation of Gen. Butler, New Orleans was a city of the United States, wherein Rebellion had been temporarily dominant, but which had now been restored to its rightful and lawful allegiance, and wherein no authority must be asserted, no flag displayed, but those of the Union. Soulé, Monroe, and the mob, could not see the matter in that light; but insisted on regarding our forces as intruders, who ought in simple decency to abscond; but who, since they refused to do this, should in all things consult the feelings and tastes of the patriotic and indomitable Southrons, who, from behind their barricades of women and children, delighted in hallooing, wherever Butler appeared or was expected, "Where 's old cock-eye?" "Let me see the damned rascal!" "I see the damned old villain," &c., &c., interspersed with "Hurrah for Jeff. Davis!" "Hurrah for Beauregard!" "Go home, you damned Yankees!" &c., &c. It was amid a tempest of such outcries from the throats of 50,000 venomous Rebels, that the General, after vainly endeavoring to comply with a popular demand for "Picayune Butler," which none of his bands were able to play, and after having waited upon Capt. Farragut and heard his account of all that had occurred since our fleet first appeared before the city, ordered the immediate debarkation of his troops, which began at 4 o'clock that afternoon:[28] the crowd requiring to be slowly pressed back with the bayonet to obtain space on which our regiments were thus enabled successively to land and form; Gen. Butler and his staff—no horses having yet been landed—marching on foot at the head of the 31st Massachusetts and 4th Wisconsin to the music of the "Star-Spangled Banner," variegated by nowise complimentary observations from the mob, along the levee to Poydras street, thence through St. Charles street and Canal street, to the vast, unfinished Custom-House, where our artillery was duly posted and the men fitly quartered; while the General and his staff returned to his steamboat, and the 12th Connecticut, Col. Deming, bivouacked on the levee by its side.

That evening, Gen. Butler finished his proclamation and sent it to the office of *The True Delta* to be printed, only to learn that the application was too late. Next morning, it was renewed, and plumply refused by the proprietor. Two hours later, a file of soldiers drew up before the building, when half a dozen of their number entered the printing office and proceeded inoffensively to print the obnoxious paper. *The True Delta* of next day commenting rebelliously on this performance, Gen. Butler suppressed it till further orders: which brought the concern to reason. The

[28] May 1.

next day, its publication was resumed; and on the 6th the proclamation duly appeared in its columns.

The great St. Charles Hotel having been suddenly closed, Gen. Butler reopened and made it his headquarters, summoning the Mayor and Council to meet him there at 2 P. M. next day, which they did; and, after considerable debate, were satisfied, first, that Gen. Butler was master of the situation; secondly, that he intended to remain so; thirdly, that any who should undertake to dispute or defy his authority would certainly get into trouble; and fourthly, that the mob, though it might hoot and howl with impunity, must stop short of actual violence and mutiny, or their streets would be swept by grape and their gutters run red with blood. It took some time to impress these truths clearly on the average Rebel mind; but the work was effectively done; and New Orleans ultimately confessed that she had not before in a generation been nearly so clean, so quiet, so orderly, so free from robbery, violence, outrage, and murder, as she was under the rule of 'Beast Butler' in the year of grace 1862.

Two conspicuous instances out of many must here serve as examples of his dealings with the spirit of treason.

The women of New Orleans—that portion of them who arrogated to themselves the designation of ladies, with a large majority of their sisters throughout the Confederacy—had ere this become most impassioned Rebels. The aristocratic instinct being stronger in women than in men, Slavery, though it debauched the men and degraded the women of the South, had come to be regarded by the latter—that is, by those of the ruling caste—as their patent of nobility; and they clung to it, and stood ready to sacrifice and dare for it, as aristocrats are always ready to 'stand by their order.' They talked loudly of shedding their blood, if need be, for the Confederacy; they acted so as to insure the shedding in that behalf of the blood of their male relatives and neighbors. To proclaim a rigid non-intercourse with all young men who did not promptly enlist in the Confederate armies, and to exhort, entreat, and finally insult, those who hesitated to do so, was a very common exhibition of Southern female patriotism. To treat our officers and soldiers at all times, and under all circumstances, with indications of hatred, contempt, disgust, and loathing, was their still more natural and general practice. The display of a miniature Secession flag on their persons was a harmless, inoffensive exhibition of their feelings which was never objected to on our side. To vacate a church-pew, quit a street-car, or other public vehicle, upon the entrance of one of our officers, was admissible; to strum "The Bonny Blue Flag" on the piano whenever a Union officer entered the house, or a Union platoon marched by, could be endured; but when ladies, by breeding or brevet, saw fit to take several reefs in their respective noses, to make an ostentatious display of drawing aside their dresses, to oblique into the middle of the street and then back again, in order to avoid the possibility of contact with a passing officer, or being overshadowed by the American flag; still more, when, to contemptuous and insulting gestures, they added oppro-

brious and venomous language, they passed the limits of any indulgence which may properly be accorded to even feminine malignity. In New Orleans, the climax of these cowardly insults was only reached when something dressed like a lady saw fit to spit in the faces of two officers quietly passing along the street. It was this experiment on his forbearance which decided Gen. Butler to issue his famous Order No. 28. It reads as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, NEW ORLEANS, May 15, 1862.
"GENERAL ORDER No. 28:

"As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subjected to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter, when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.

"By command of Maj.-Gen. BUTLER.
"GEO. C. STRONG, A. A. G., Chief of Staff."

This order was subjected to the worst possible construction, first by Mayor Monroe and his secret prompters; next by the Rebel Governor of Louisiana and the Secessionists generally; and so on, until Lord Palmerston, in the British House of Commons, took occasion to be astonished, to blush, and to proclaim his "deepest indignation" at the tenor of that order; *Punch* eagerly echoing his perversions. Gen. Butler was finally constrained, after too long enduring his palterings and equivocations, to send Mayor Monroe to prison, abolish his municipality, banish Pierre Soulé, and appoint Col. G. F. Shepley military commandant, to the signal improvement of the government of New Orleans and the peace and security of its inhabitants; and all that need be added in explanation or in defense of the hated order is this: that no soldier under Gen. Butler's command ever acted upon the vile construction of that order which his enemies set up; and no woman in New Orleans ever pretended that she was anywise abused or insulted because thereof; while its success in arresting the scandalous behavior at which it aimed was immediate and complete.

The other case, wherein Gen. Butler especially displeased his enemies and those of his country, was that of Wm. B. Mumford, a New Orleans gambler, who had led the Rebel mob who tore down our National flag from the roof of the Mint, where it had been hoisted by our sailors detailed for that duty by Capt. Morris, of the Pensacola, on the 27th, after Lovell had evacuated the city, and its Mayor and Common Council had officially declared themselves incapable of making any resistance, and that, yielding to physical force alone, they would make none, to the forces of the United States. The outrage thus committed by Mumford and his backers, furtive and riotous as it was, drew a shot from the howitzers in the main-top of the Pensacola, and might have provoked and justified the destruction of the city by our fleet; since the authorities did not disclaim, while the mob vociferously applauded and adopted it. So *The Picayune* of next morning eulogized its gallantry and patriotism, and proclaimed it an act of the city, and a proof of her "unflinching determination to sustain to the uttermost the righteous cause for which she has done so much and made such sacri-

fices." The city having been completely occupied, and the National authority rëestablished, Gen. Butler caused Mumford to be arrested, tried, and, he being convicted and sentenced to death by hanging, that sentence was duly executed,[24] in the face of all New Orleans anxiously looking on, and in defiance of the confident prediction of the Rebels that Butler would not dare to do it. *They* did not dare; *he* did. And his hold on the city was firmer and safer from that moment.

About the same time,[25] he pardoned and set at liberty six humbler Rebels, who, having been captured and paroled at the surrender of the forts, had been induced secretly to rëenlist in the Rebel service, conspiring to force or evade our pickets and hasten to join Beauregard's army in Mississippi. Their guilt was undoubted; their crime one that military law sternly punishes with death.

The occupation of New Orleans, its defenses and approaches, having been completed and assured, Commander Porter, with a part of our fleet, returned to Ship Island; a part was stationed near New Orleans to assist in its defense; and the residue, under Capt. Craven, steamed up the river to extend our sway in that direction. Baton Rouge, the State capital, was captured without resistance.[26] The Mayor refusing to surrender, Commander Palmer, of the Iroquois, landed and took possession of the U. S. Arsenal. Capt. Farragut arrived soon afterward, and took measures to render our possession permanent. Natchez was in like manner given up to the Iroquois;[27] but, as the Confederates had not occupied it as a military post, it was left unmolested.

The advance of our squadron, under Commander S. P. Lee, encountered no opposition until it reached Vicksburg,[28] whence a summons to surrender was answered with defiance. Our force was inadequate to attack until the arrival, a few days later, of Capt. Farragut, accompanied by 4,000 soldiers under Gen. Thomas Williams. Vicksburg is naturally so strong, and was so firmly held, that it was not until after still further rëenforcements had come up, including Commander Porter's mortar fleet, that a bombardment was opened.[29] Not much impression was made on the elevated and formidable Rebel batteries by our fire; but, at 3 A. M. of the 28th, Capt. Farragut, in the Hartford, with six more of his vessels, passed Vicksburg triumphantly, with a total loss of 15 killed and 30 wounded, and exchanged cheers above with Capt. Davis's fleet of mortar and gun-boats, which had fought their way down from Cairo. Still, our forces were not strong enough for assault, and the bombardment remained ineffective; while Gen. Williams, who, on his way up from Baton Rouge, had been fired on from Grand Gulf, and had burned that village in retaliation, was losing men daily by sickness, which ultimately reduced his effective force by more than half. He had undertaken to cut a canal, or water-course, across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, and had gathered some 1,200 negroes from the adjacent plantations to assist in the work; but it did not succeed. The soil to be ex-

[24] June 7. [25] May 31. [26] May 7. [27] May 12. [28] May 18. [29] Night of June 26.

cavated was an exceedingly tenacious clay, in good part covered with large trees. The strong current obstinately kept to the old channel, and could not be attracted to the right bank. An expedition, started[30] to go up the Yazoo, having unexpectedly encountered, near the mouth of that river, and been worsted by, the Rebel ram Arkansas,[31] Capt. Farragut, having no prospect of further usefulness above, determined to repass the frowning batteries, cutting out and destroying the Arkansas by the way. He succeeded in running by Vicksburg with little loss; but his designs upon the Arkansas were baffled by darkness. A few days later, Commander Porter, with the iron-clad Essex, and Lt.-Col. Ellet, with the ram Queen of the West, made[32] another attempt to cut out the Arkansas, which was likewise defeated.

The village of Donaldsonville, which had the bad habit of firing upon our weaker steamers, as they passed up or down the river, was bombarded therefor by Capt. Farragut, and partially destroyed. As the river was now falling fast, threatening to greatly impair the efficiency of our fleet, the siege of Vicksburg was abandoned, under instructions from Washington, and Capt. Farragut dropped down the river, reaching New Orleans on the 28th, with the greater part of his fleet.

Gen. Williams, with his soldiers, debarked on the way at Baton Rouge; he resuming command of that post. Rumors of a meditated attack in force by the enemy were soon current; and hence the General had, on the afternoon[33] prior to its occurrence, warned his subordinates to be ready and watchful, so as not to be surprised next morning. The Rebels had been assured by their spies that our men were mostly sick in hospital, which was measurably true; but regiments that numbered but 150 on parade, counted 500 on the battle-field.

The Rebel force had been organized for this effort at Tangipahoa, 60 miles north-eastward, and 78 N. N.W. of New Orleans. It consisted of 13 regiments, and must have considerably outnumbered ours, which was composed of nine thinned regiments in all. Each side, in its account of the action, made its own force 2,500, and that of its adversary twice or thrice as great. The Rebels were commanded in chief by Maj.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge, with Brig.-Gen. Daniel Ruggles[34] leading their left wing, and Brig.-Gen. Charles Clarke their right. The attack was made at daylight,[35] simultaneously and vigorously, by the entire Rebel force, on the two roads which lead from the south-west into Baton Rouge; and, as but three of our regiments—the 14th Maine, 21st Indiana, and 6th Wisconsin—were immediately engaged, these were soon compelled to fall back, barely saving their batteries, whereof two were for a few moments in the hands of the Rebels. A dense fog precluded a clear comprehension on our side of the position, and caused the 7th Vermont to fire into the 21st Indiana, mistaking it for a Rebel regiment. Our lines were formed nearly two miles back from the river, where our

[30] July 15. [31] See page 58. [32] July 22. [33] Aug. 4. [34] From Massachusetts; formerly Lt.-Col. of the 5th Regular Infantry. [35] Aug. 5.

gunboats could give them little support; but, as the famous Rebel ram Arkansas, hitherto so successful, was counted on as a part of the attacking force, supported by two improvised gunboats, and as our front was wooded, with a cross-road and open fields just beyond it, Gen. Williams may fairly be supposed to have understood his business. The battle raged fiercely for two hours, during which the Rebel right was advanced across the lateral road, driving back the 14th Maine, pillaging and burning its camp; and, while four successive assaults were unsuccessfully made on our front, Gen. Clarke made a resolute effort to flank our left and establish himself in its rear. Gen. Williams, anticipating this movement, had placed a battery, supported by two regiments, to resist it; and the Rebels were repulsed with considerable loss. Meanwhile, the 21st Indiana, posted at the crossing of the roads—whose Colonel, suffering from wounds previously received, had twice essayed to join it, and each time fallen from his horse—had lost its Lt.-Col., Keith, Maj. Hayes, and Adj. Latham—the two former severely wounded, the latter killed—when Gen. Williams, seeing Latham fall, exclaimed, "Indianians! your field-officers are all killed: I will lead you!" and was that moment shot through the breast and fell dead; the command devolving on Col. T. W. Cahill, 9th Connecticut.

But the battle was already won. The Rebel attack had exhausted its vitality without achieving any decided success; while the Arkansas, from which so much had been expected, had failed to come to time. Leaving Vicksburg,[26] she had steamed leisurely down the river until within 15 miles of Baton Rouge, where her starboard engine broke down; and it had been but partially repaired when the sound of his guns announced to her the opening of Breckinridge's attack. Coming down to within five miles of the city, she was cleared for action; when her engine again broke down, and she drifted ashore on the right bank of the river. Her tenders, the Music and the Webb, were of no account without her; and now her strong armament of six 8-inch and four 50-pound guns, with 180 men, could not be brought into action; and our gunboats, the Kineo and Katahdin below, and Essex, Cayuga, and Sumter above Baton Rouge, were enabled to devote their attention to the Rebels on land; firing over the heads of our soldiers at the enemy, nearly two miles distant. It is not probable that their shells did any great harm to the Rebels, and they certainly annoyed and imperiled our own men; but they served Breckinridge as an excuse for ordering a retreat, which a part of his men had already begun. By 10 A. M., his forces were all on the back track, having lost some 300 to 400 men, including Gen. Clarke, mortally wounded and left a prisoner; Cols. Allen, Boyd, and Jones, of Louisiana; Cols. A. P. Thompson and T. H. Hunt, of Kentucky; Col. J. W. Robertson, of Alabama, and other valuable officers. On our side, beside Gen. Williams, and the entire staff of the 21st Indiana, we lost Col. Roberts, of the 7th Vermont; Maj. Bickmore and Adj. Metcalfe, of the 14th Maine; Capt. Eugene Kelty, 30th Massachusetts,

[26] At 2 A. M., Aug. 3.

and from 200 to 300 others. We took about 100 prisoners, half of them wounded. Neither party had more cannon at the close than at the beginning of the battle; but the Rebels boasted that they had destroyed Federal munitions and camp equipage of very considerable value.

Next morning, Commander Porter, with the Essex, 7 guns and 40 men, accompanied by the Cayuga and Sumter, moved up in quest of the Arkansas, whose two consorts had already fled up the river. The ram at first made for the Essex, intending to run her down; but her remaining engine soon gave out, and she was headed toward the river bank, the Essex pursuing and shelling her; the Arkansas replying feebly from her stern. When the Essex had approached within 400 yards, Lt. Stevens, of the ram, set her on fire and abandoned her, escaping with his crew to the shore. The Essex continued to shell her for an hour; when her magazine was fired and she blew up.

Commander Porter, having remained at Baton Rouge until it was evacuated by our troops—who were concentrated to repel a threatened attack on New Orleans—returned up the river[37] to reconnoiter Rebel batteries that were said to be in progress at Port Hudson. Ascending thence to coal at Bayou Sara, his boat's crew was there fired upon by guerrillas, whereupon some buildings were burned in retaliation; and, the firing being repeated a few days afterward, the remaining structures were in like manner destroyed. A boat's crew from the Essex was sent ashore, some days later, at Natchez, to procure ice for our sick sailors, and was unexpectedly attacked by some 200 armed civilians, who killed or wounded 7 of her crew. Porter thereupon opened fire on the town, bombarding it for an hour, and setting a number of its houses on fire, when the Mayor surrendered. On her way down the river, the Essex had a smart engagement with the rising batteries at Port Hudson.[38]

Gen. Butler's preparations having rendered the retaking of New Orleans hopeless, the meditated attack on it was abandoned, and the forces collected for that purpose transferred to other service. An incursion into the rich district known as Lafourche, lying south-west of New Orleans, between that city and the Gulf, was thereupon projected, and General—late Lieut.—Weitzel, was sent with a brigade of infantry and the requisite artillery and cavalry, to reëstablish there the authority of the Union. This was a section of great wealth: its industry being devoted mainly to the production of sugar from cane, its population more than half slaves; and its Whites, being entirely slaveholders and their dependents, had ere this been brought to at least a semblance of unanimity in support of the Rebel cause; but their military strength, always moderate, had in good part been drafted away for service elsewhere; so that Gen. Weitzel, with little difficulty and great expedition, made himself master of the entire region,[39] after two or three collisions, in which he sustained little loss. But the wealthy Whites generally fled from their homes at his approach; while the negroes, joyfully hailing him as their liberator,

[37] August 23. [38] Sept. 7. [39] Oct. 22–29.

speedily filled his camps with crowds of men, women, and children, destitute of food, and fearing to go outside of his lines lest they should be reduced again to Slavery. Gen. Butler, after anxious consideration, felt obliged to subject the whole district to sequestration, in order to secure the cutting and grinding of the cane, so as to save the remaining inhabitants from death by famine. Maj. Bell, Lt.-Col. Kinsman, and Capt. Fuller, were appointed a commission, who were to take charge of all personal property, and either apply it to the use of the army or transport it to New Orleans and there sell it to the highest bidders, dispensing to loyal citizens and neutral foreigners their just share of the proceeds, and applying the residue to the uses of the Federal service in this military department. Thus were the negroes employed, paid, and subsisted, the crops saved, and a large sum turned over to the support of our armies, while the number of White loyalists in Lafourche was rapidly and largely increased. Two Congressional districts having thus been recovered, Messrs. Benjamin F. Flanders and Michael Hahn were elected* therefrom to the Federal House of Representatives: the former receiving 2,370 votes, to 173 for others, and the latter 2,581, which was 144 more than were cast against him. The voting was confined to electors under the laws of Louisiana who had taken the Federal oath of allegiance since the repossession of New Orleans; and the aggregate poll in that city outnumbered, it was stated, its total vote for Secession by about 1,000. When Gen. Butler first reached that city, there were not a hundred persons in Louisiana outside of our army and fleet who would have dared take the oath, however willing to do so.

Toward the end of November, Gen. Butler's spies brought him information from the nearest Rebel camps that he had been superseded in his command, and that Gen. N. P. Banks either was or soon would be on his way to relieve him. Some days before information of the purposed change reached our side, Secessionists in New Orleans were offering to bet a hundred to ten that Gen. Butler would be recalled before New Year's. The fact was known to Jefferson Davis before it was to Gen. Banks—long before it was communicated from Washington to Gen. Butler. It is probable that the French Minister, whose Government had not been pleased with Gen. Butler's management in New Orleans, was the immediate source of Rebel assurance on this point. Gen. Banks's assignment to the Department of the Gulf is dated November 9th, but was not made known to him till some weeks afterward.

Gen. Banks reached New Orleans Dec. 14th, was received with every honor, and on the 16th formally assumed the high trust to which he had been appointed. On the 23d, Gen. Butler took personal leave of his many friends, and next day issued his farewell address to the people of New Orleans; leaving for New York, via Havana, by that day's boat. He was not then aware that he had been honored, the day previous, by a proclamation from Jefferson Davis, declaring him a felon, outlaw, and common enemy of mankind, and

* Early in December.

directing any Confederate officer who should capture him to hang him without trial immediately; and further directing that all commissioned officers in his command be regarded as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and each of them, whenever captured, reserved for execution."[41] Mr. Richard Yeadon, of Charleston, S. C., backed this proclamation by an offer[42] of $10,000 reward, payable in Confederate currency, for the capture and delivery of the said Benjamin F. Butler, dead or alive, to any proper Confederate authority.

Gen. Butler had taken 13,700 soldiers from the North for the capture of New Orleans. He had received no rëenforcements since; and he now turned over to his successor 17,800 drilled and disciplined men, including three regiments and two batteries of negroes. He sent home to the treasury the sum of $345,000; expended $525,000 in feeding the poor of New Orleans; and turned over about $200,000 to the Commissary and Quartermaster of his successor. He had collected, by taxation, assessments, fines, forfeitures, and confiscations, an aggregate of $1,088,000, which he had faithfully applied to the public service. He had, of course, made himself very unpopular with the wealthy Rebels, whom he had, in proportion to their several volunteer contributions of money in aid of the Rebel cause, assessed for the support of the New Orleans poor, deprived of employment by the war; and he was especially detested by that large body of influential foreigners who, having freely devoted their efforts and their means to the support of the Rebellion, were neither regarded nor treated by him as though they had been honestly neutral in the contest. In his farewell address to the people of New Orleans, he forcibly says:

"I saw that this Rebellion was a war of the aristocrats against the middling men—of the rich against the poor; a war of the land-owner against the laborer; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the hands of the few against the many; and I found no conclusion to it, save in the subjugation of the few and the disenthrallment of the many. I, therefore, felt no hesitation in taking the substance of the wealthy, who had caused the war, to feed the innocent poor, who had suffered by the war. And I shall now leave you with the proud consciousness that I carry with me the blessings of the humble and loyal, under the roof of the cottage and in the cabin of the slave; and so am quite content to incur the sneers of the *salon* or the curses of the rich."

[41] Mr. Davis's proclamation recites the hanging of Mumford; the neglect of our Government to explain or disavow that act; the imprisonment of non-combatants; Butler's woman order aforesaid; his sequestration of estates in western Louisiana; and the inciting to insurrection and arming of slaves on our side, as his justifications for proclaiming—

"First. That all commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler be declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, reserved for execution.

"Second. That the private soldiers and non-commissioned officers in the army of said Butler be considered as only the instruments used for the commission of crimes perpetrated by his orders, and not as free agents; that they, therefore, be treated, when captured as prisoners of war, with kindness and humanity, and be sent home on the usual parole that they will in no manner aid or serve the United States in any capacity during the continuance of this war, unless duly exchanged.

"Third. That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States.

"Fourth. That the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States, when found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of this Confederacy.

[Signed and sealed at Richmond, Dec. 23, 1862.]

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

[42] Jan. 1, 1863.

VI.

VIRGINIA—McCLELLAN'S ADVANCE.

THE rooted inaction of the Army of the Potomac,[1] with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad obstructed and broken up on its right, and the navigation of the Potomac precluded[2] by Rebel batteries on its left, was stubbornly maintained, in spite of fitful, delusive promises of movement, throughout the Winter of 1861–2. Gen. McClellan, who, from his comfortable house in Washington, issued orders to all the military forces of our country, retained likewise the immediate and especial command of this grand army of 200,000 men, apparently fatigued by the necessity of framing excuse after excuse for its inaction,[3] though the most of it remained under tents, exposed to the vicissitudes of a Winter which—though it had been remarkably dry and fine, with the roads in admirable condition, until Christmas—became stormy and inhospitable soon afterward; so that the since famous Stonewall Jackson, who, for eminent ser-

[1] See Vol. I., p. 627–9.

[2] Capt. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as early as July 1st, 1861, notified the War Department that the Potomac would "soon be closed by the batteries of the Rebels;" and Secretary Welles reiterated the warning on the 20th of August.

"In October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged the matter upon the consideration of the War Department. * * * representing that the question was simply: Would the Army cooperate with the Navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed?"

McClellan at last agreed to spare 4,000 men for the cooperative measure; but, when Capt. Craven assembled his flotilla at the appointed time and place, the troops were not on hand. The General's excuse was that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed at Matthias Point—the place agreed upon. Upon Capt. Fox's assurance that the Navy Department would attend to the landing of the troops, he (McClellan) agreed that they should be sent on the following night. Again the flotilla was in readiness; again the troops were missing. No troops were then, nor ever, sent down for that purpose; the only reason elicited from McClellan being that he feared it might bring on a general engagement. Capt. Craven indignantly threw up his command on the Potomac, and applied to be sent to sea—not wishing to lose his own reputation, on account of non-cooperation on the part of the army.

(The foregoing note is condensed from the first Report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.)

[3] Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers to the Army of the Potomac, in a report to Gen. McClellan at the close of the Peninsula campaign, says:

"One of the prominent among the causes of ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, Rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months, the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of siege, by a greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men.

"In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk could and should have been taken. The navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture, the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do.

"Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it has been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true policy was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammeled liberty of action while they were possessed."

vices in the battle of Bull Run, had, in September, been promoted to a Major-Generalship, and assigned to command at Winchester, and who had led[4] a strong force westward, expecting to surprise and capture our detachments holding Bath and Romney, though he succeeded in taking both those places, driving out their garrisons, capturing a few prisoners, and destroying at Romney very considerable supplies, yet his unsheltered troops suffered so severely from storm and frost, while so many of his horses were disabled by falling on the icy roads, that his losses probably exceeded the damage inflicted on us; and his blow was fairly countered by Gen. F. W. Lander, who led 4,000 men southward from the Potomac,[5] and, bridging the Great Cacapon in the night, made a dash at Blooming Gap, which he surprised, killing 13 and capturing 75 Rebels, including 17 officers, with a loss of 2 men and 6 horses.

Gen. Simon Cameron had been succeeded[6] by Hon. Edwin M. Stanton—an eminent lawyer, without pretensions to military knowledge, and of limited experience in public affairs, but evincing a rough energy and zeal for decisive efforts, which the country hailed as of auspicious augury. Two weeks later,[7] a War Order was issued by the President, commanding a general advance upon the enemy from every quarter on the 22d of February proximo, and declaring that "the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order." Four days later, a 'Special War Order No. 1' was likewise issued to Gen. McClellan, commanding him, on or before the 22d prox. aforesaid, to impel "all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac," "for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction." Though these orders are signed Abraham Lincoln, they doubtless received their initial impulse from the new Secretary of War, who had already urged Gen. McClellan to take immediate steps to "secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and free the banks of the lower Potomac from the Rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels."[8] Gen. M. had been previously urged by the President to organize his army into four or five distinct corps, under Generals of his own choice; which he had declined, and still declined, to do; alleging that he wished first to test his officers in active service as division commanders, so that he "might be able to decide from actual trial who were best fitted to exercise those important commands." At length,[9] the President issued 'General War Order No. 2,' directing the organization of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, to be commanded by Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes respectively, beside the forces to be left for the defense of Washington under Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth, who should also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia, and a fifth, composed of the forces on the upper Potomac, to

[4] Jan. 1, 1862. [5] Feb. 13. [6] Jan. 13. [7] Jan. 27. [8] Gen. McClellan's Report. [9] March 8.

be commanded by Gen. Nath'l P. Banks. Gen. McClellan, "in compliance with the President's War Order No. 2," made this disposition.[10]

Gen. McClellan's original plan contemplated an advance on Richmond by way of the lower Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and making a secondary base of West Point, at the head of York river; and this would seem, whether regarded abstractly or in the light of subsequent experience, to be far preferable to the route on which he ultimately decided, having its base at Fortress Monroe; but either of these, and indeed any approach to Richmond otherwise than from the north, was exposed to the serious if not fatal objection that it involved a division and dispersion of our forces, or left the National metropolis, with its enormous dépôts of arms, munitions, and provisions, to say nothing of its edifices and archives, at the mercy of the Rebels, who could hardly fail to rush upon, sack, and burn it, if our grand army were transferred bodily to the base of the Virginian Peninsula. The President, therefore, before giving his assent to Gen. McClellan's project, addressed to him the following letter:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
"February 3, 1862.

"MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

"If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

"1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of *time* and *money* than mine?

"2d. Wherein is a victory *more certain* by your plan than mine?

"3d. Wherein is a victory *more valuable* by your plan than mine?

"4th. In fact, would it not be *less* valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

"5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

"Yours, truly,
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

These inquiries seem not to have been directly answered; but, in a long letter of even date, to the Secretary of War, Gen. McClellan urges the strength of the Rebel position at and around Manassas Junction; the reported fact that the fords of the Occoquan were watched by the Rebels and defended by concealed batteries on the heights in their rear, which were being strengthened by additional intrenchments; that, during our advance from the Accotink to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangster's, and Union Mills; that it would not do to divide our army by leaving a portion in front of Centerville while the rest crosses the Occoquan; that the roads in this quarter were liable, for some time yet, to be obstructed by rains and snow, so that "it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the march;" and that—

"Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true; but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's

[10] March 13.

main army; for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to fight us again out of the range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there; for he would destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise impede our progress, through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be; and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theater of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive measures, at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared."

On the other hand, Gen. McClellan urged in favor of an advance by the route he preferred, that—

"It affords the shortest possible land-route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East.

"The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.

"The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is *very* unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the Spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He *must* do this; for, should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the Rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks.

"Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fortress Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet.

"During the whole movement, our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play."

He further urged, in favor of a landing at Urbana, that—

"This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reënforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the cooperation of the navy, cross the James and show ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us; for his position would be untenable with us on the southern bank of the river. Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fortress Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security—although with less celerity and brilliancy of results—up the Peninsula."

The President deferred to these urgent representations, though they involved the necessity of a long delay and a heavy expense in procuring transportation by water for so great an army. The duty of obtaining the requisite vessels was devolved on John Tucker, Assistant-Secretary of War; who, on the 5th of April, reported that he had chartered therefor 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges, and that these had—within 37 days from the time he first received the order, and most of it within 30 days—transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington, to Fortress Monroe, 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, and 74 ambulances, beside pontoon-bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for such an army; with a total loss of 9 barges and 8 mules: the former having been driven ashore in a gale when within a few miles of Fortress Monroe. He

APPROACHES TO RICHMOND.

NOTE.—The above map does not pretend to trace the various wagon roads that traverse south-eastern Virginia, and thus may be deemed imperfect; but any map that purported to give such roads, would be more likely to deceive than to enlighten. There are different views as to what constitutes a road—the Virginia estimate being remarkably liberal. Roads abound and radiate in every direction throughout this region: but nine-tenths of them range, save in the dryer portions of Summer and Fall, from very bad to impassable.

adds that the change which had meantime been made from Urbana to Fortress Monroe, as the point of debarkation, had caused delay in the movement.

The force of Gen. McClellan's objections to the advance desired and at first commanded by President Lincoln, depends entirely on the correctness of his estimate of the Rebel numbers in his front. He estimated throughout that these ranged from 80,000 to 120,000 men, with over 300 cannon.[11] On the other hand, those who were eager for a direct and decisive blow, insisted, from first to last, that the Rebel army at no time exceeded 60,000 in number, and was oftener below 50,000.[12]

Gen. Beauregard had relinquished[13] the command of the Army of Virginia, to take direction in the West, and been succeeded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, who soon commenced a quiet and careful evacuation of his Winter camps, which he completed on the 8th of March; retiring southward behind the Rapidan, leaving nothing of the least value to our service. So admirably was this usually perilous movement conducted, or so worthless was McClellan's observation and secret service, that no hint of it appears to have reached our General until the day after its completion.[14] He then ordered an advance of our grand army upon Centerville and Manassas, as transports had not yet been provided for their passage down the Potomac and Chesapeake, and with a view of giving them, he says, "an opportunity to gain some experience on the march and bivouac, preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other 'impedimenta,' which accumulate so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality." His cavalry advance, Col. Averill, reached the enemy's deserted lines at Centerville at noon next day. Of course, no enemy was found there, nor nearer than Warrenton Junction; where Gen. Stoneman, with our cavalry, discovered them in force on the 14th, and returned without attacking them. The main body of our army had commenced its return to the Potomac on the 11th; on which day the President issued 'War Order No. 3,' relieving Gen. McClellan from the

[11] He states in his official Report that the chief of his secret service corps, Mr. E. J. Allen, reported, on the 8th of March, that the forces of the Rebel Army of the Potomac at that date were as follows:

At Manassas, Centerville, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, and vicinity	80,000 men.
At Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicinity	18,000 "
At Leesburg and vicinity	4,500 "
In the Shenandoah Valley	13,000 "
Total number	115,500 "

[12] The writer visited, early in January, Gen. Wadsworth, in his camp near Ball's Cross-Roads; when, on this point, Gen. W. said: "I see and examine all deserters and contrabands who reach us from the Rebel camps in our front; and their testimony convinces me that they have but fifty or sixty regiments in all—certainly not over 50,000 men." This, of course, did not include outlying detachments, whether at and toward Winchester or below the Occoquan.

Most Rebel writers who touch this point, and British officers who served with or visited the Rebel army during the ensuing campaign, were unanimous in making their total effective force during that Winter less than 50,000.

[13] Jan. 30.

[14] Pollard says:

"For the space of three weeks before the army left its intrenchments at Manassas, preparations were being made for falling back to the line of the Rappahannock, by the quiet and gradual removal of the vast accumulations of army stores; and, with such consummate address was this managed, that our own troops had no idea of what was intended until the march was taken up. The first intimation the enemy had of the evacuation of Manassas was the smoke of the soldiers' huts that had been fired by our army."



THE MONITOR AT WORK ON THE MERRIMAC (OR VIRGINIA).

command of all military departments but that of the Potomac; extending Gen. Halleck's department in the West so as to include all the Mississippi Valley northward of the Gulf States and west of a north and south line drawn through Knoxville, Tenn.; and creating a new 'Mountain Department,' consisting of the country between McClellan's and Halleck's, to be commanded by Gen. Fremont.

Undoubtedly, this order indicated a diminution, if not absolute failure, of the President's confidence in his senior General; and, while it is very obvious that the commander of a great army operating from the Peninsula against Richmond could not properly and safely direct the movements of other armies, scattered all over the country, and with which his telegraphic communications would probably be often interrrupted, it is certain that all our movements should have been directed by a common head, responsible for the proper distribution and concentration of our forces. A Secretary of War, however able and fit, is perplexed by duties and anxieties too multifarious and distracting to permit of his serving to advantage as Generalissimo.

Two days later, at a council of corps commanders at Fairfax Court House, it was decided—for reasons not given and not apparent—to debark our army at Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers, instead of Urbana or Mob Jack Bay—a most unfortunate decision, though materially qualified by the following provisos:

"1st. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralized.

"2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

"3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on York river.

"4th. That the forces to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

"If the foregoing can not be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment; and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.)

"N. B. That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)"

This decision, being communicated to the War Department, was promptly responded to as follows:

"War Department, March 13, 1862.
"To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan:

"The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

"1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"2d. Leave Washington entirely secure.

"3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by *some* route.

"Edwin M. Stanton,
"Secretary of War."

Gen. McClellan hereupon ordered Gen. Banks, with his corps, to move both his divisions down from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas; there to intrench and rebuild the railroads and bridges, "occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction, or Warrenton itself, and also some little

more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria Railway," leaving but two regiments of cavalry to "occupy Winchester and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley."

Gen. Banks had already thrown across the Potomac, at Harper's Ferry,[14] the 28th Pennsylvania, Col. Geary, following himself,[15] taking possession of Bolivar and Loudon Heights, Leesburg, Charlestown,[16] and Martinsburg,[17] and pushing back the Rebels to Winchester, which Stonewall Jackson evacuated[18] without a struggle. Gen. Shields, commanding Lander's division,[19] pursued Jackson to Newmarket,[20] where he found him strongly posted and ready for action. He thereupon fell back rapidly to Winchester, pursued by Jackson's cavalry, under Turner Ashby. Gen. Banks, having dispatched one division toward Centerville,[21] Jackson's spies assured him that Shields had but four regiments left, and might easily be captured or routed; so Ashby drove in our pickets and pressed hard upon Shields, who kept the larger part of his force concealed until Jackson was induced to advance in force and attack. In the slight skirmish which occurred,[22] Gen. Shields was struck by a fragment of shell which broke his arm, and so injured his shoulder and side that he fought next day's battle in bed. Jackson had 10 regiments of infantry, all Virginians, but reports their aggregate strength at only 3,087 men, with 27 guns and 290 cavalry.[24]

Gen. Shields had 6,000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 guns, well posted some three miles south of Winchester, and half a mile north of the little village of KERNSTOWN, covering the three principal roads which enter Winchester from the south-east, south, and south-west.

Gen. Banks had remained with Shields until about 10 A. M.;[25] when, a careful reconnoissance having discovered no enemy in front but Ashby's cavalry, he concluded that Jackson was too weak or too cautious to risk an attack, and departed for Washington via Harper's Ferry. Before noon, however, Shields was advised by Col. Kimball, on his left, that a Rebel battery had opened on his position, and appeared to be supported by a considerable force of infantry. Thereupon, Sullivan's brigade was pushed forward to support Kimball, and our artillery opened simultaneously with one or two more Rebel batteries; but at such distance as to do little harm. Soon, a still larger force of all arms was developed by Jackson on his right, and an effort made to turn our left, which was gallantly resisted and foiled by Sullivan's brigade, supporting Jenks's artillery. Jackson then reënforced heavily his left, sending two additional batteries and his reserve to support the movement; when Shields ordered up Tyler's brigade of 4 regiments to the support of Col. Kimball, commanding that wing, whereby the Rebels were outnumbered and hurled back upon their main body,

[14] Feb. 24. [15] Feb. 26. [17] Feb. 28.
[18] March 3. [19] March 11.
[20] Gen. F. W. Lander, one of the bravest and best of our early commanders, had died March 2d, of congestion of the brain, caused by hardship, exposure, and anxiety.
[21] March 19. [22] March 22.
[23] About sunset, March 22.
[24] Pollard says the Confederate forces amounted to 6,000 men, with Capt. McLaughlin's battery and Col. Ashby's cavalry.
[25] Sunday, March 23.

strongly posted behind a high and solid stone wall, crossing a hill, where a desperate stand was made by Jackson's famous 'Stonewall Brigade,' and others, whose fire was for a few minutes rapid and deadly; but their position was soon flanked and carried by our eager, determined advance, and they retreated in disorder, leaving 2 guns, 4 caissons, and many small arms. Night now fell, and saved them, doubtless, from a heavier loss. Our men secured their prisoners, cared for their wounded—those of the Rebels having mostly been carried off by them prior to their retreat—and sank down to rest on the battle-field. The Rebels retreated a few miles, rapidly but in good order, ere they, too, rested for the night.

Jackson attributes his defeat in part to Gen. R. B. Garnett's error of judgment in repeatedly ordering his men to retreat, when he should have held on and fought. It seems clear, however, that the capital mistake was his own in fighting at all, when his total force, according to his own estimate, was less than 5,000 men, and he estimates our infantry on the field at over 11,000. He makes his loss 80 killed, 342 wounded, and 269 missing, mainly prisoners; total, 691; while Shields claims 300 prisoners, and estimates the Rebel loss in killed and wounded at 1,000 to 1,500.[36] Our own loss in this engagement was 103 killed, including Col. Murray, of the 84th Pennsylvania; 441 wounded, and 24 missing.

Gen. Shields, well aware that heavy rēenforcements for Jackson were at hand, immediately sent an express after Williams's division—by this time well on its way to Harper's Ferry—desiring its immediate return; but Gen. Banks, hearing of the battle by telegraph from Winchester, had already stopped at Harper's Ferry and anticipated this order; himself rejoining Shields early next day, and resuming command. He pursued Jackson vigorously up the Valley to Woodstock, but was unable to bring him to bay.

We have seen that Gen. McClellan's council of corps commanders decided, on the 13th of March, to abandon his original plan of debarking at Urbana, on the Rappahannock, and advancing thence on Richmond by West Point, at the head of York river, making this a secondary base. This most unfortunate decision is rendered unaccountable by a destructive if not disastrous naval collision which had just occurred in Hampton Roads, and of which the results were well known to the council.

Of our naval officers' most calamitous, cowardly, disgraceful desertion of and flight from the Norfolk Navy Yard and Arsenal at the beginning of the struggle, the revolting particulars have already been given.[37] Among the vessels there abandoned to the Rebels, after being fired, was the first-class 40-gun steam-frigate Merrimac, which, by Capt. McCauley's orders, had been scuttled and partly sunk, so that only her rig-

[36] Shields's official report says:

"The enemy's loss is more difficult to ascertain than our own. Two hundred and seventy were found dead on the battle-field; 40 were buried by the inhabitants of the adjacent village; and, by a calculation made by the number of graves found on both sides of the Valley road between here and Strasburg, their loss in killed must have been about 500, and in wounded 1,000."

[37] See Vol. I, p. 473–7.

ging and upper works were burned; her hull being saved by a speedy submersion. Having thus fallen an easy prey to the Rebels, she was adopted by them as the basis of an iron-clad, whereof Lieut. John M. Brooke furnished the original plan, which Chief Engineer Williamson and Naval Constructor Porter, together with Lt. Brooke, ultimately fashioned into the terrible engine of destruction known to us as the Merrimac, but designated by her rebuilders the Virginia. Messrs. Brooke, Williamson, and Porter, were all graduates from our navy, as was Commodore Franklin Buchanan, who became her commander. In preparing her for her new service, the hull of the Merrimac was cut down nearly to the water's edge, after she had been plugged, pumped out, and raised; when a sloping roof of heavy timber, strongly and thoroughly plated with railroad iron, rose from two feet below the water-line to about ten feet above: the ends and sides being alike and thoroughly shielded. A light bulwark, or false bow, was added, designed to divide the water, and serve as a tank to regulate the vessel's draft; and beyond this projected a strong iron beak. Being thus rendered thoroughly shot-proof, she was armed with 10 heavy and most effective guns; and so, having been largely refitted from the spoils of the deserted Navy Yard, became at once the cheapest and most formidable naval engine of destruction that the world had ever seen. Whether she had or had not the ability to live in an open, turbulent sea, was left undecided by her brief but memorable career.

A little before noon, on Saturday, March 8th, a strange craft was descried from our vessels off Newport News, coming down the Elizabeth river from Norfolk, past Craney Island, attended by two unremarkable steam gunboats. Two other Rebel gunboats, which had, evidently by preconcert, dropped down the James from Richmond, had been discovered at anchor off Smithfield Point, some 12 miles distant, about three hours before. The nondescript and her tenders gradually approached our war-ships awaiting her, and, passing across the bow of the Congress frigate, bore down on the Cumberland, in utter disdain of her rapid and well aimed but utterly ineffective shots, which glanced as harmless from the iron shield of the foe as though they had been peas. Not a gun was fired by the mysterious and terrible stranger until she struck the Cumberland with full force under her starboard fore-channels, at the same moment delivering a most destructive fire; while her blow had opened such a chasm in the bow of the Cumberland that her forward magazine was drowned in 30 minutes. Still, her fire was kept up until, at 3:35 P. M., the water had risen to the main hatchway, and the ship canted to port; when, giving a parting fire, Lt. Morris ordered every man to jump overboard and save himself if possible. The dead, and sick, and severely wounded, were unavoidably left in her bay and on her decks, to the number of at least 100; and she sank to the bottom in 54-feet water, with her flag still flying from her topmast.

Meanwhile, the Congress—which had exchanged broadsides with the Merrimac as she passed—was attacked

by the Rebel gunboats, and was battling them to the best of her ability, until, seeing the fate of the Cumberland, she set her jib and topsail, and, with the assistance of the gunboat Zouave, ran aground not far from our batteries at Newport News, where she was soon again assailed by the Merrimac, which, taking position about 150 yards from her stern, raked her fore and aft with shell, while one of the smaller steamers from Norfolk kept up a fire on her starboard quarter; while the Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson—Rebel steamers from up the James—likewise poured in their broadsides with precision and effect. The hapless Congress could only reply from her two stern guns, whereof one was soon dismounted and the other had its muzzle knocked off. Her commander, Lt. Joseph B. Smith, Acting-Master Thomas Moore, and Pilot William Rhodes, with nearly half her crew, having been killed or wounded, the ship on fire in several places, without a gun that could be brought to bear on her destroyers, Lt. Pendergrast, on whom the command had devolved, at 4:30 P. M. hauled down our flag. She was soon boarded by an officer from the Merrimac, who took her in charge, but left shortly afterward; when a small Rebel tug came alongside and demanded that her crew should get out of the ship, as her captors intended to burn her immediately. But our soldiers on shore, who had *not* surrendered, and who regarded the Congress as now a Rebel vessel, opened so brisk a fire upon her that the tug and her crew suddenly departed; when the Merrimac again opened on the luckless craft, though she had a white flag flying to intimate her surrender. Having fired several shells into her, the Merrimac left her to engage the Minnesota, giving opportunity for her crew to escape to the shore in small boats, with their wounded. About dark, the Merrimac returned and poured hot shot into the deserted hulk, until she was set on fire and utterly destroyed, her guns going off as they became heated —a shell from one of them striking a sloop at anchor at Newport News, and blowing her up. At midnight, the fire had reached her magazines, containing five tuns of powder, and she blew up with a tremendous explosion. Of her crew of 434 men, 218 answered to their names at roll-call at Newport News next morning.

Capt. John Marston, of the steamship Roanoke, whereof the machinery was disabled, being off Fortress Monroe, was in command of our fleet, when, at 1 P. M., one of his look-out vessels reported by signal that the enemy was coming. Signaling the steam-frigate Minnesota to get under way, and slipping his cable, he had the Roanoke taken in tow by two tugs, and started for the scene of action; but, before he reached it, he had the mortification of seeing the Minnesota hard aground. Continuing on his course, but unable to make tolerable headway, he came in sight of the Cumberland, only to find her virtually destroyed; having soon after the further mortification of seeing the Congress haul down her flag. Continuing to stand on, he was soon himself aground astern, in 3½ fathoms, and was obliged to be hauled off by one of his tugs; when he decided to come to the relief of the stranded Minnesota, hoping with assistance to

pull her off; but found himself unable to do so. Meantime, at 5 P. M., the frigate St. Lawrence, towed by the Cambridge, passed them, and soon also grounded, but was hauled off by the Cambridge, when she returned to the harbor of the fort.

The Minnesota, Capt. Van Brunt, having, in passing Sewell's Point, received and returned a fire from the Rebel battery, which crippled her mainmast, had approached within a mile and a half of Newport News, when she grounded, with an ebbing tide, and was still hard at work trying to get off, when, at 4 P. M., the Merrimac, Jamestown, and Patrick Henry, having finished their work at the News, bore down upon her. The shallowness of the water forbade the Merrimac to come within a mile of her, from which distance she fired for the next two or three hours, but once hulling the Minnesota by a shot through her bow. The Jamestown and the Patrick Henry, taking position on the port bow and stern of the Minnesota, where only her heavy pivot-gun could be brought to bear upon them, kept up a vigorous and effective fire on her, by which several of her crew were killed and wounded; but they finally desisted and retired, one of them apparently crippled. At 7 P. M., the Merrimac hauled off also, and all three steamed toward Norfolk, leaving the Minnesota deeply imbedded, by the fire of her broadside guns, in the mud-bank on which she rested; so that it was impossible, even at high tide, by the help of steam-tugs and hawsers, with all hands at work through the night, to haul her off.

The prospect for the coming day was dark enough, until, at 10 P. M., the new iron-clad Monitor, 2 guns, Lt. John L. Worden, reached Fortress Monroe on her trial trip from New York, and was immediately dispatched to the aid of the Minnesota, reporting to Capt. Van Brunt at 2 A. M.[*] Though but a pigmy beside the Merrimac, and an entire novelty for either land or water—"a cheese-box on a raft"—the previous day's sore experience of the might and invulnerability of iron-clads insured her a hearty welcome. Never had there been a more signal example of the value of a friend in need.

At 6 A. M., the Rebel flotilla reäppeared, and the drums of the Minnesota beat to quarters. But the enemy ran past, as if heading for Fortress Monroe, and came around in the channel by which the Minnesota had reached her uncomfortable position. Again all hands were called to quarters, and the Minnesota, opening with her stern guns, signaled the Monitor to attack, when the undaunted little cheese-box steamed down upon the Rebel Apollyon and laid herself alongside, directly between the Minnesota and her assailant. Gun after gun from the Monitor, responded to with whole broadsides from the Merrimac, seemed to produce no more impression than a hailstorm on a mountain-cliff; until, tired of thus wasting their ammunition, they commenced maneuvering for the better position. In this, the Monitor, being lighter and far more manageable than her foe, had decidedly the advantage; and the Merrimac, disgusted, renewed her attentions to the Minnesota, disregarding a broadside which would have sunk

[*] Sunday, March 9.

any unplated ship on the globe, and put a shell from her rifled bow-gun through the Minnesota's side, which tore four of her rooms into one and set her on fire; but the flames were promptly extinguished. The Merrimac's next shot pierced the boiler of the tug-boat Dragon, which was made fast to the port side of the Minnesota, to be ready to assist in towing her off; killing or badly wounding 7 of her crew and setting her on fire. By this time, the Minnesota was raining iron upon her assailant; at least 50 solid shot from her great guns having struck the Rebel's side without apparent effect. Now the little Monitor again interposed between the larger combatants, compelling the Merrimac to change her position; in doing which she grounded; and again a broadside was poured upon her at close range from all the guns of the Minnesota that could be brought to bear. The Merrimac was soon afloat once more, and stood down the bay, chased by the Monitor; when suddenly the former turned and ran full speed into her pursuer, giving her a tremendous shock, but inflicting no serious damage. The Rebel's prow grated over the deck of the Monitor; and was badly cut by it; so that she was not inclined to repeat the experiment. The Monitor soon afterward stood down the Roads toward Fortress Monroe; but the Merrimac and her tenders did not see fit to pursue her, nor even to renew the attack on the now exposed Minnesota; on the contrary, they gave up the fight, which they were destined never to renew, and steamed back to Norfolk. The Minnesota, despite persistent efforts, was not fairly afloat until 2 o'clock next morning.

In this memorable fight, the turret of the Monitor was struck by Rebel bolts nine times, her side armor eight times, her deck thrice, and her pilot-house twice—the last being her only vulnerable point. One of these bolts struck her pilot-house squarely in front of the peep-hole through which Lt. Worden was watching his enemy, knocking off some cement into his face with such force as utterly to blind him for some days, and permanently to destroy his left eye. Three men standing in the turret when it was struck were knocked down, one of them being Chief Engineer Alban C. Stimers, who managed the revolving of the turret. The Merrimac had her prow twisted in her collision with the Monitor, her anchor and flag-staff shot away, her smoke-stack and steam-pipe riddled, 2 of her crew killed and 8 wounded, including her commander, Buchanan. The Patrick Henry was disabled by a shot through one of her boilers, by which 4 of her crew were killed and 3 wounded. The other Rebel gunboats reported an aggregate loss of only 6 men.

The Merrimac was undoubtedly disabled[29] in this two-days' conflict, or she would not have closed it as she did, or would have renewed it directly afterward.

Our total loss by this raid, beside the frigates Cumberland and Congress, with all their armament, the tug Dragon, and the serious damage inflicted on the Minnesota, can hardly have fallen short of 400 men, includ-

[29] A letter from Petersburg, March 10, to the *Raleigh Standard*, says: "The Merrimac lost her enormous iron beak in the plunge at the Ericsson, and damaged her machinery, and is leaking a little." It was probably this leak which constrained her to abandon the fight as she did.

ing 23 taken from the Congress and carried off by the gunboat Beaufort.

Gen. McClellan left Washington on the 1st of April, arriving next day at Fortress Monroe. Of his army, 58,000 men and 100 guns were there before him, and nearly as many more on the way. Gen. Wool's force, holding the Fortress, is not included in these numbers.

Gen. J. B. Magruder, at Yorktown, watched this ominous gathering in his front at the head of a Rebel force officially reported by him at 11,000 in all: 6,000 being required to garrison Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island; leaving but 5,000 available for the defense of a line of 13 miles. Gen. McClellan says his information placed Magruder's command at 15,000 to 20,000 men, aside from Gen. Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated by him at 20,000. Feeling the importance of dealing decisively with Magruder before he could be rëenforced by Johnston, McClellan ordered an advance on the morning of the 4th; and, before evening of the next day, Gen. Heintzelman, in front of Yorktown, and Gen. Keyes, before Winn's Mill,[30] on the Warwick, were brought to a halt by the fire of Rebel batteries.[31] Gen. McClellan had been misled with regard to the topography of the country as well as the number of his foes. On his map, the Warwick was traced as heading in or very near Skiff's creek, directly up the Peninsula from its mouth, some six or eight miles west of Yorktown; whereas it actually heads within a mile of that post, running diagonally and crookedly nearly across the Peninsula, while it was in good part navigable by Rebel gunboats. His false information regarding it was furnished, he states, by Gen. Wool's topographical engineers; though there must have been a hundred negroes about the Fortress, each of whom could and gladly would have corrected it. Our ships of war —what the Merrimac had left of them—were intently watching for

[30] Called by Gen. McClellan, Lee's Mill.

[31] Pollard says:

"General Magruder, the hero of Bethel, and a commander who was capable of much greater achievements, was left to confront the growing forces on the Peninsula, which daily menaced him, with an army of 7,500 men, while the great bulk of the Confederate forces were still in motion in the neighborhood of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and he had no assurance of rëenforcements. The force of the enemy was ten times his own; they had commenced a daily cannonading upon his lines; and a council of general officers was convened, to consult whether the little army of 7,500 men should maintain its position in the face of tenfold odds, or retire before the enemy. The opinion of the council was unanimous for the latter alternative, with the exception of one officer, who declared that every man should die in the intrenchments before the little army should fall back. 'By G—, it shall be so!' was the sudden exclamation of Gen. Magruder, in sympathy with the gallant suggestion. The resolution demonstrated a remarkable heroism and spirit. Our little force was adroitly extended over a distance of several miles, reaching from Mulberry Island to Gloucester Point, a regiment being posted here and there, in every gap plainly open to observation, and on other portions of the line the men being posted at long intervals, to give the appearance of numbers to the enemy. Had the weakness of Gen. Magruder at this time been known to the enemy, he might have suffered the consequences of his devoted and self-sacrificing courage; but, as it was, he held his lines on the Peninsula until they were rëenforced by the most considerable portion of Gen. Johnston's forces, and made the situation of a contest upon which the attention of the public was unanimously fixed as the most decisive of the war."

Col. Fremantle, of the British Coldstream Guards, in his "Three Months in the Southern States," says:

"He [Magruder] told me the different dodges he resorted to to blind and deceive McClellan as to his strength; and he spoke of the intense relief and amusement with which he at length saw that General, with his magnificent army, *begin to break ground before miserable earthworks defended only by* 8,000 *men*."



M'CLELLAN BEFORE YORKTOWN.

the rëappearance down the Elizabeth of that marine monster and her three satellite gunboats; and Com. Goldsborough did not feel justified in detaching a part of them to reduce the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. The Commodore does not seem to have been asked to clear the Warwick river of Rebel gunboats —if, indeed, any were there. Magruder seems wholly unconscious of ever having had any naval assistance.

McClellan felt of the Rebel lines at different points, but did not, though aware that time was precious, and that a few days might greatly increase the number of his foes, venture to order a determined assault."[*] On the contrary, he sat down before Magruder's lines, began to throw up earthworks, and sent orders to Washington for siege-guns. Pressing too close to Yorktown, the besiegers were repulsed by a sudden charge of two battalions under Col. Ward. On the 16th, a reconnoissance in force by the 2d division of the 4th corps, Gen. W. F. Smith, was made at Dam

[*] Magruder says:

"On every portion of my lines, he attacked us with a furious cannonading and musketry, which was responded to with effect by our batteries and troops of the line. His skirmishers were also well thrown forward on this and the succeeding day, and energetically felt our whole line; but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. Thus, with 5,000 men, exclusive of the garrisons, we stopped and held in check over 100,000 of the enemy. Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy. The men slept in the trenches and under arms; but, to my utter surprise, he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault."

No. 1, on the Warwick, which was to have been converted into a real attack if successful at the outset. Though gallantly made, it failed; our advance being driven back across the stream with the loss of 100 men. The Rebels lost about 75 men, including Col. R. M. McKinney, 15th North Carolina, killed.

Gen. McClellan had been thirty days in front of Yorktown, and was intending to open the siege in due form by the fire of breaching batteries on the morning of May 6th; but he found, two days earlier, that Magruder had abandoned his works, including Yorktown, during the preceding night, retreating up the Peninsula.[33]

The pursuit of the flying Rebels was prompt and energetic. It was led by Gen. George D. Stoneman, with 4 regiments and a squadron of cavalry, and 4 batteries of horse-artillery, followed, on the Yorktown road to Williamsburg, by Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, and on the Winn's Mill road by those of W. F. Smith, Couch, and Casey. Gen. McClellan remained at Yorktown to supervise the embarkation of Gen. Franklin's and other troops for West Point.

Fort Magruder, just in front of Williamsburg, at the junction of several roads, commanded, with its 13 adjuncts, substantially all the roads leading farther up the Peninsula. Though not calculated to stand a siege, it was a large and strong earthwork, with a wet ditch nine feet wide. Here Stoneman was stopped by a sharp and accurate cannonading, which compelled him to recoil and await the arrival of infantry. Gen. Sumner, with Smith's division, came up at 5:30 P. M. A heavy rain soon set in, and continued through the night, making the roads nearly impassable. The several commands, marching on different roads, had interfered with and obstructed each other's progress at the junction of those roads as they concentered upon Williamsburg. Gen. Hooker, advancing[34] on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, was stopped, five or six miles out, by finding Gen. Smith's division in his way, and compelled to wait some hours. Impatient at this delay, he sought and obtained of Gen. Heintzelman permission to move over to the Hampton road on his left, on

[33] Gen. John G. Barnard, Gen. McClellan's chief engineer through the Peninsula campaign, in a report to his commander at the close of that campaign, says:

"At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula, the Rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge; and reduced by sickness, loss in battle, expirations of period of service, etc.; while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this Rebellion, so nearly throttled. How, then, happened it, that the day of the initiation of the campaign of this magnificent Army of the Potomac was the day of the resuscitation of the Rebel cause, which seemed to grow *pari passu* with the slow progress of its operations?

"However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly *did* suggest it), my opinion *now* is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held in strong force when our army appeared before them; and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the *morale*, were on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded. But, if we had failed, it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would be more demoralizing than the labors of a siege.

"Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of Warwick. We lost few men by the siege; but disease took a fearful hold of the army; and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired their *morale*. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy, we have tasted to our heart's content."

[34] May 4.

which he advanced through the rain and deep mud and the dense darkness till nearly midnight, when his troops were halted in the road, and rested as they might until dawn; then they pressed on until, emerging from a forest, they came in sight, about 5:30 A. M., of the Rebel works before Williamsburg; Fort Magruder in the center, at the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton roads, with its cordon of 13 redoubts, extending clear across the Peninsula, hence widening quite rapidly and permanently just above the town. The ground had of course been chosen to give the greatest advantage to its defenders: the forest felled for a breadth of nearly half a mile, to obstruct the advance of our infantry; while a belt of open, level land, 600 or 700 yards wide, dotted all over with rifle-pits, intervened between this tangled abatis and the fort and redoubts. Williamsburg lay in plain sight of Hooker's position, two miles distant. After a careful survey of the ground, knowing that there were 30,000 of our troops within two miles, and the main body of our army within twelve, Hooker decided to attack, in order to hold the Rebel force engaged until the rest of our army could come up. Accordingly, sending the 1st Massachusetts into the felled timber on the left, and the 2d New Hampshire into that on the right, with directions to skirmish up to the further edge of the abatis, and ordering the 11th Massachusetts and 26th Pennsylvania to form on the right of the 2d New Hampshire and advance as skirmishers until they reached the Yorktown road, he threw forward into the cleared field on the right of the road, barely 700 yards from Fort Magruder, Webber's battery, which at once drew the fire of the Rebel batteries, whereby 4 of his cannoniers were shot down and the rest driven off before we had fired a gun; but their places were soon supplied, and Bramhall's battery brought into action on the right of Webber's; when, between them, Fort Magruder was silenced before 9 A. M. Patterson's brigade, composed of the 6th, 7th, and 8th New Jersey, was formed behind these batteries as their support, and was soon desperately engaged with the Rebel infantry and sharp-shooters, who were found uncomfortably numerous; so that the 1st Massachusetts, 72d and 70th New York were sent to their aid, and, though fighting gallantly, found themselves still overmatched. Meanwhile, our skirmishers on the right having reached the Yorktown road, the 11th Massachusetts and 26th Pennsylvania were sent down that road to press the enemy and establish a connection with Heintzelman's corps, supposed to be established upon it; Hooker, at 11:20 A. M., sending a pressing message to Heintzelman for assistance, and not finding him. By 1 P. M., Hooker had sent in the 73d and 74th New York, his last regiments; and, though his force was fighting gallantly, with varying success, he was losing men fast, yet making no headway. Three times he had repulsed Rebel charges upon his center, each made with fresh troops in increasing numbers and with more resolute purpose. Soon, word came from the regiments thus engaged that their ammunition was giving out, while no supply-train had yet come up; and it was found necessary to glean the cartridges

from the boxes of our fallen heroes, while our most advanced regiments were drawn back to a position whence they could guard our left, yet form a portion of our front.

Gen. Longstreet's division of the Rebel main army—which army, under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston as commander-in-chief, had hastened ere this to the defense of Richmond from the side of the Peninsula—had passed through Williamsburg on the retreat, when it was recalled to aid in the defense.[*] Having now arrived on the field, a fresh attempt was made to drive in our left, which, after a protracted struggle, was repulsed with mutual slaughter; but a simultaneous attack on our front, from the direction of Fort Magruder, was successful to the extent of capturing 4 of our guns and making 200 or 300 prisoners.

Thus, for nine hours,—from 7:30 A. M. to 4:30 P. M.,—Hooker's single division was pitted against substantially the whole Rebel army, with every advantage of a chosen and skillfully fortified position on their side. No division ever fought better; and, though its General estimates the Rebel killed as double his own, he is doubtless mistaken.

Gen. Heintzelman and staff, but no troops, had arrived early in the afternoon. At 4:30 P. M., Gen. Kearny arrived, with his division, and pressed to the front; allowing Hooker's thinned regiments to withdraw from the fight and be held as a reserve. Kearny, under Gen. Heintzelman's orders, at once deployed Berry's brigade to the left of the Williamsburg road, and Birney's to the right, leading forward two companies of the 2d Michigan to beat back the enemy's skirmishers, now annoying our batteries; while Maj. Wainwright, Hooker's chief of artillery, collected his gunners and rëopened a fire from his remaining pieces; whereupon the 5th New Jersey, though fearfully cut up, rallied promptly to their support. Our musketry fire was renewed along the whole line, and our regiments began to gain ground.

Finding that the heavy timber in his front defied all direct approach, Gen. Kearny ordered Col. Hobart Ward, with the 38th New York, to charge down the road and take the rifle-pits on the center of the abatis by their flank; which was gallantly done, the regiment losing 9 of its 19 officers during the brief hour of its engagement. The success of its charge not being perfect, the left wing of Col. Riley's 40th New York (Mozart) charged up to the open space, and, taking the rifle-pits in reverse, drove out their occupants and held the ground. By this time, Gen. Jameson had brought up the rear brigade of the division; whereby, under a severe fire, a second line was established, and two columns of regiments made disposable for further operations, when thick darkness closed in, and our soldiers rested, in rain and mire, on the field they had barely won.

Gen. Heintzelman, who had at Yorktown been charged by Gen.

[*] Gen. McClellan, in his report, says:

"It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us here with only a portion of his army. When our cavalry first appeared, there was nothing but the enemy's rear-guard in Williamsburg: although troops were brought back during the night and the next day, to hold the works as long as possible, in order to gain time for the trains, etc., already well on their way to Richmond, to make their escape."

McClellan with the direction of the pursuit, had this day been superseded by an order which placed Gen. Sumner in command at the front. To Sumner, accordingly, Hooker had sent, at different times throughout the afternoon, pressing applications for aid, but had received none; and Hooker says in his report:

"History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night unaided, in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades with arms in their hands. Nevertheless, it is true."

Gen. Sumner explains that, before these applications reached him, he had dispatched Gen. Hancock, with his brigade, to the extreme right; so that he had but about 3,000 infantry left, while cavalry was useless in that wooded and unknown region; hence, he was unable to give the assistance required.

Gen. Hancock duly accomplished the flanking movement assigned him, and, by a brilliant bayonet charge, carried the Rebel works on our right, with a loss of less than 50 men.[*] Soon, Gen. McClellan—after whom the Prince De Joinville and Gov. Sprague, of Rhode Island, had ridden post haste to Yorktown, where he was superintending the dispatching of Franklin's division to West Point—was induced, after some delay, to ride to the front, reaching Hancock's position about 5 P. M. Before dark, several other divisions had arrived on the ground; that of Gen. Couch, or a part of it, in season to claim the honor of having been engaged in the battle.

Gen. McClellan, at 10 P. M., dispatched to Washington the following account of this bloody affair, which proves that he was still quite in the dark respecting it:

"After arranging for movement up York river, I was urgently sent for here. I find Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, *probably greater, a good deal, than my own*, and very strongly intrenched. Hancock has taken two redoubts, and repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge with the bayonet, taking one Colonel and 150 prisoners, killing at least two Colonels and as many Lt.-Colonels, and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme. I do not know our exact loss, but fear Hooker has lost considerably on our left. I learn from prisoners that they intend disputing every step to Richmond. I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan. *My entire force is*, undoubtedly, *considerably inferior to that of the Rebels*, who still fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal."

Had he supposed that the Rebels were at that moment evacuating Williamsburg in such haste as to leave all their severely wounded, 700 or 800 in number, to become prison-

[*] Gen. McClellan, in his Report, says that he first heard, at 1 P. M., that every thing was not progressing favorably, when:

"Completing the necessary arrangements, I returned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of some fourteen miles, through roads much obstructed by troops and wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5 P M., in time to take a rapid survey of the ground. I soon learned that there was no direct communication between our center and the left under Gen. Heintzelman. The center was chiefly in the nearer edge of the woods situated between us and the enemy. As heavy firing was heard in the direction of Gen. Hancock's command, I immediately ordered Gen. Smith to proceed with his two remaining brigades to support that part of the line. Gen. Naglee, with his brigade, received similar orders. I then directed our center to advance to the further edge of the woods mentioned above, which was done, and attempted to open communication with Gen. Heintzelman, but was prevented by the marshy state of the ground in the direction in which the attempt was made. Before Gens. Smith and Naglee could reach the field of Gen. Hancock's operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset, and then turned upon them: after some terrific volleys of musketry, he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men; he himself losing only 31 men."

ers, he must have written a very different dispatch; and it is not probable that they would have carried off, over the drenched and miry roads, more cannon than they could boast on the morning before the battle."[37]

Gen. Hooker reports a loss in this engagement of 338 killed, 902 wounded, and 335 missing, who of course were prisoners. Gen. McClellan makes our total loss during the day 456 killed, 1,400 wounded, and 372 missing; total, 2,228.[38] Many of those prisoners, knowing that we had an overwhelming force just at hand, confidently looked for recapture during the night, and were sorely chagrined to find themselves deliberately marching toward a Rebel prison next day.

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While the battle at Williamsburg was raging, Gen. Franklin's division, which had been kept on board the transports which brought it from Alexandria two or three weeks before, had been preparing to move from Yorktown up York river to West Point; where its 1st brigade, under Gen. Newton, landed unopposed next day.[39] It debarked on a spacious, open plain on the west side of the York and its south-western affluent, the Pamunkey; no enemy appearing till next day. Meantime, Gen. Dana had arrived with a part of Gen. Sedgwick's division, but not debarked. Our gunboats took quiet possession of the little village at the Point, and hoisted our flag over it; no white man appearing to greet their arrival. During the night, one of our vedettes was shot through the heart, from the wood that fringed the plain whereon our troops were en-

[37] On waking, next morning, to find the Rebels vanished and his forces in quiet possession of Williamsburg, Gen. McClellan forwarded the following more cheerful dispatches:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"WILLIAMSBURG, VA., May 6.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

"I have the pleasure to announce the occupation of this place as the result of the hard-fought action of yesterday. The effect of Hancock's brilliant engagement yesterday afternoon was to turn the left of their line of works. He was strongly reënforced, and the enemy abandoned the entire position during the night, leaving all his sick and wounded in our hands. His loss yesterday was very severe. We have some 300 uninjured prisoners, and more than a thousand wounded. Their loss in killed is heavy. The victory is complete.

"I have sent cavalry in pursuit; but the roads are in such condition that I cannot move artillery nor supplies. I shall therefore push the other movement most energetically. The conduct of our men has been excellent, with scarcely an exception. The enemy's works are very extensive and exceedingly strong, both in respect to their position and the works themselves. Our loss was heavy in Hooker's division, but very little on other parts of the field. Hancock's success was gained with a loss of not over 20 killed and wounded. Weather good to-day, but great difficulty in getting up food on account of the roads. Very few wagons have yet come up. Am I authorized to follow the example of other Generals, and direct names of battles to be placed on the colors of regiments? We have other battles to fight before reaching Richmond.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
"Maj.-Gen. Commanding."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"WILLIAMSBURG, May 6.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

"Every hour proves our victory more complete. The enemy's loss is great, especially in officers. I have just heard of five more of their guns captured. Prisoners are constantly arriving.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
"Maj.-Gen. Commanding."

[38] No official account of the Rebel losses in this engagement is at hand; but the *Richmond Dispatch* of May 8th has a bulletin, professedly based on an official dispatch from Gen. Johnston, which, claiming 11 cannon and 623 prisoners captured, admits a Rebel loss of but 220; yet names Gen. Anderson, of North Carolina, Col. Mott, of Mississippi, Col. Ward, 4th Florida, and Col. Wm. H. Palmer, 1st Virginia, as among the killed; and Gen. Early, Gen. Rains, Col. Kemper, 7th Virginia, Col. Corse, 17th Virginia, and Col. Garland, of Lynchburg, as wounded; adding: "The 1st Virginia was badly cut up. Out of 200 men in the fight, some 80 or 90 are reported killed or wounded. Col. Kemper's regiment suffered terribly, though we have no account of the extent of the casualties." These items indicate a total loss of certainly not less than 1,000.

[39] May 6.

camped, though no hostile force had appeared. Next morning, however, a regiment or two of the enemy was descried and shelled from our gunboats; whereupon Gen. Dana, by order of Gen. Slocum, hastened the landing of his men and horses; while the 16th, 31st, and 32d New York, with the 95th and 96th Pennsylvania, were pushed forward into the woods in our front, with orders to drive out the few Rebel scouts who were supposed to be skulking there. They soon found themselves engaged with a far larger force than they had expected, whereof Gen. Whiting's Texan division and Wade Hampton's South Carolina Legion formed a part; and who, with every advantage of position and knowledge of the ground, drove our men out in haste and disorder. Twice the attempt was renewed, with similar results; but at length, our batteries having been landed and posted, they, with the aid of the gunboats, easily silenced the single Rebel battery of small howitzers, which, from an elevated clearing in the woods, had assisted to repel the advance of our infantry; and now that infantry pushed once more into the woods, and found no enemy to contest their possession. We lost in this affair 194 men, mainly of the 31st and 32d New York, including two Captains and two Lieutenants; while the Rebel loss was trifling.

Gen. Stoneman, with the advance of our main army, moved from Williamsburg on the 8th to open communication with Gen. Franklin, followed by Smith's division on the direct road to Richmond. Rain fell frequently; the roads were horrible; so that Gen. McClellan's headquarters only reached White House on the 16th, Tunstall's Station on the 19th, and Coal Harbor on the 22d. Our advanced light troops had reached the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge two days before.

The movement of our grand army up the Peninsula, in connection with Burnside's successes and captures in North Carolina,[40] had rendered the possession of Norfolk by the Rebels no longer tenable. To hold it by any force less than an army would be simply exposing that force to capture or destruction at the pleasure of our strategists. Gen. Wool, commanding at Fortress Monroe, having organized an expedition designed to reduce that important city, led it thither on the 10th; finding the bridge over Tanner's creek on fire, but no enemy to dispute possession of Norfolk, which was quietly surrendered by its Mayor. The Navy Yard and Portsmouth were in like manner repossessed; the Rebels, ere they left, destroying every thing that would burn, partially blowing up the Dry Dock, and completely destroying their famous ironclad known to us as the Merrimac.[41] They left about 200 cannon, including 39 of large caliber at Craney Island, and those in the Sewell's Point batteries, which, though spiked, were valuable; 29 pieces were found mounted on strong earthworks two miles from Norfolk, but deserted. In fact, it had been decided, at a council held at Norfolk some days before, that no attempt should be made to defend that city. The Merrimac, though she never fully recovered from the effects of her strug-

[40] See pages 73–81.

[41] May 11, 5 A. M.


EDWIN D. MORGAN GOV. OF N.Y.
WILLIAM SPRAGUE GOV. OF R.I.
WM. A. BUCKINGHAM GOV. OF CONN.
OLIVER P. MORTON GOV. OF IND.
RICHARD YATES GOV. OF ILL.
JOHN BROUGH GOV. OF OHIO
JOHN A. ANDREW GOV. OF MASS.
ANDREW G. CURTIN GOV. OF PA.
SAMUEL CONY GOV. OF ME.
A. J. FLETCHER GOV. OF MO.
AUSTIN BLAIR GOV. OF MICH.
CHARLES S. OLDEN GOV. OF N.J.
A. W. RANDALL GOV. OF WIS.

EMINENT LOYAL GOVERNORS

gle with the Monitor, had come down the river and shown fight when our vessels first undertook to shell out the Rebel batteries at Sewell's Point, three days before her self-destruction.[42] Two unfinished iron-clads were among the vessels fired by the Rebels ere they left.

The serious difference between the Administration and Gen. McClellan respecting the strength of his army, and the detachment therefrom of McDowell's and other forces for service elsewhere, now demands our deliberate consideration. Gen. McClellan, upon first assuming command[43] of the Army of the Potomac, had addressed to the President a memorandum, wherein, in addition to the armies required to make "a strong movement on the Mississippi," to drive the Rebels "out of Missouri," to hold Kentucky, and sustain "a movement through that State into Eastern Tennessee," to guard securely the passes into Western Virginia, "to protect and reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad," to "garrison Baltimore and Fortress Monroe," and leave 20,000 "for the defense of Washington," he required for his "main army of operations" 225,000 infantry, 25,500 cavalry, 7,500 engineer troops, and 15,000 artillery men, with 600 field guns; in all, 273,000 men. Even this mighty army was deemed by him insufficient, unless aided by a strong naval force."[44]

Nearly three months later, in a letter to the Secretary of War, he so modified this demand as to evince a willingness to begin offensive operations with a total effective force on the Potomac and in Maryland—but not including the garrison of Fortress Monroe—of 208,000 men and 488 guns; but to secure this, he calculated, would require an aggregate of 240,000 men on his muster-rolls, including the sick and absent, while he had but 168,318, with 228 field guns, present, and 6 more batteries on the way from New York. Thus his army, which by December 1st had been swelled nearly to 200,000, and for the three months succeeding

[42] Com. Tatnall, in his official report of the loss of the Merrimac, lays the blame entirely on his pilots, who on the 7th assured him that they could take her to within 40 miles of Richmond if her draft were lessened to 18 feet; but, after five or six hours had been devoted to this work, and she had thus been disabled for action, they, for the first time, declared that, as the winds had for two days been westerly, the water in the James was too low, so that she could not now be run above the Jamestown flats, up to which point each shore was occupied by our armies. He had now no alternative but to fire her, land his crew, and make the best of his way to Suffolk. A Court of Inquiry, presided over by Capt. French Forrest, after an investigation protracted from May 22d to June 11th, decided that her destruction was unnecessary, and that she might, after being lightened to a draft of 20 feet 6 inches, have been taken up James river to Hog Island. Part of the blame, however, was laid on the hasty retreat from Norfolk of the military under Gen. Huger.

[43] August 4, 1861.

[44] He says:

"Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of, from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force, to protect the movements of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diversions, and rendering it necessary to detach largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast, at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also cooperate with the main army, in its efforts to seize the important sea-board towns of the Rebels."—*McClellan's Official Memorandum.*




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EMINENT LOYAL GOVERNORS!

averaged about 220,000 men,[46] was at no time large enough, according to his computation, to justify a determined offensive, since he persisted in computing the Rebel army confronting him at no less than "150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched."[47]

Now, the movement first contemplated, by way of the Rappahannock and Urbana—still more, that ultimately decided on by way of Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula—involved a division of this army, and the reservation of a considerable part of it for the protection of Washington, as also the securing of Maryland and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from desolating raids down the Shenandoah Valley. President Lincoln had reluctantly given his assent to this circumlittoral advance, on these expressed conditions:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
"March 8, 1862.

"PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3:

"*Ordered*, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

"That no more than two army corps (about 50,000 troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved *en route* for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

"That any movement as aforesaid, *en route* for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant; and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.

"*Ordered*, That the army and navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General*."

Gen. McClellan's chief of spies had by this time reduced the force of the Rebels in Northern Virginia[48] to 115,500 men, with 300 field and 26 to 30 siege-guns—quite a formidable army, if its leader should conclude, after Gen. McClellan's embarking the bulk of his forces for Fortress Monroe, to make a rush upon Washington from behind the Rappahannock. Five days later, Secretary Stanton wrote, as we have already seen, to Gen. McClellan, that the President made no objection to his plan of operations, provided he would—

"1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"2d. Leave Washington entirely secure.

"3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac—choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by *some* route."

Just before starting for the Peninsula, Gen. McClellan received, "with surprise," the following note, involving a subtraction, he estimates, of 10,000 troops from the force which he expected to have transferred to the Peninsula:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
"March 31, 1862.

"Major-General MCCLELLAN:

"MY DEAR SIR: This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont; and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even

[46] Dec. 1, 198,213; Jan. 1, 219,707; Feb. 1, 222,196; March 1, 221,987.

[47] Letter to the Secretary of War.

[48] Report to McClellan, March 8.

beyond the mere acknowledgment that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases. Yours, very truly,

"A. LINCOLN."

Stonewall Jackson's advance to and fight at Winchester, indicating further pugnacity in that quarter, were soon found to interfere with Gen. McClellan's order[48] to Gen. Banks to move his division down to Manassas, leaving only two regiments of cavalry to "occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley."

Gen. McClellan, on embarking, calculated that he left behind, including Blenker's division, ordered to Fremont, and not including McDowell's corps, which he intended should follow him, no less than 75,000 men. But, as Blenker's division was known to be ordered to Fremont, in West Virginia, they are improperly included. Even excluding these, he computes the whole number available for the defense of Washington, including 35,467 under Banks in the Valley of the Shenandoah, at 67,428 men, with 85 pieces of light artillery. Yet he had barely departed when Gens. Hitchcock and L. Thomas, who had been instructed to investigate the matter, reported,[49] "that the requirement of the President, that this city [Washington] shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." Gen. Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, and as brave a man as ever lived, submitted to the War Department a statement that the entire force left under his command for the defense of Washington amounted to 20,477, of whom 19,022 were present for duty; nearly all of them new and imperfectly disciplined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition; 2 heavy artillery and 1 infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months for artillery service, had been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac; while he was at this time under orders from McClellan to detail 3 regiments to join divisions on their way to the Peninsula, and another for service at Budd's Ferry; while a further order directed him to send 4,000 men to Manassas and Warrenton to relieve Gen. Sumner, so as to enable him to embark for Yorktown. Upon the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, the President gave orders[50] that either McDowell's or Sumner's corps should remain in front of Washington until otherwise directed.

Gen. McClellan, from his camp in front of Yorktown, remonstrated;[51] saying:

"I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but, whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you cannot leave me the whole of the 1st corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division."

Two days later, he telegraphed to the War Department that:

"It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands—probably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position."

In a dispatch of even date to the President, he says:

"Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my

[48] March 16. [49] April 2 [50] April 3. [51] April 5.

entire force for duty amounts to only about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully cooperated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time, only 53,000 men have joined me; but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation."

The President responded by this letter:

"WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

"Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN:

"MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here; and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly, not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted, and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of *all* the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but, when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask: Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

"As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you, is with you by this time; and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by reenforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to *you* that you strike a blow. *I* am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note—is now noting—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act.

"Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN."

The President's question as to the grave discrepancy between the 85,000 men, admitted to be with or on their way to him by Gen. M., and the 108,000 asserted by Secretary Stanton, was never answered, and probably could not be; since an official return of the number of his army April 30th, while it was still before Yorktown, makes its aggregate 130,378, whereof 112,392 were present and fit for duty; Franklin's division of 12,448 men having in the mean time been sent to him.

But, on another point, military men are not likely to agree with the President. Gen. Wool's command may very probably have been doing just

what an equal number of McClellan's troops must have done "if that command was away;" but it is by no means the same thing to a commander in the field to have 10,000 men holding an important post in his rear, but wholly independent of his authority, and having them subject implicitly to his orders. Gen. McClellan was therefore manifestly right in not regarding Gen. Wool's 10,000 as equivalent to a rëenforcement of his army by that number; and the order which detached this division from his command has not been justified. True, he had more men than he needed, had he possessed the ability and the nerve to use them."[82] But a General, in such a position as his then was, should either be fully trusted or superseded.

Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat[83] by Shields at Kernstown, had retreated up the Valley, pursued by Gen. Banks, to the vicinity of Harrisonburg. Jackson, after holding some days a strong position near Mount Jackson, crossed[84] the South Fork of the Shenandoah and took position in Elk Run Valley; but he was soon startled by tidings that Gen. Milroy, with the advance of Gen. Schenck's division of Fremont's West Virginia force, was threatening Staunton from the direction of Monterey. As a junction of Fremont's and Banks's commands would have involved the fall of Staunton, and the complete possession of the Valley by our troops, Jackson resolved to prevent it by striking a swift and hard blow at Fremont's advance. Leaving Ewell, whose division had recently joined him from Gordonsville, to observe and check Banks, Jackson moved rapidly to Staunton, being rëenforced by the division of Gen. Edward Johnson, which he dispatched[85] in advance of his own, against Milroy; who, being decidedly overmatched, retreated westwardly across Shenandoah Mountain, concentrating his command at McDowell, and sending

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[82] When he had fairly set down before Yorktown, he telegraphed to Washington as follows:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
"April 10.

"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

"The reconnoissance to-day proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions, under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment, I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs in this view. I have determined on the point of attack, and am at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries.

"G. B. McClellan, Maj.-General."

The prompt response was as follows:

"War Department, April 11, 1862.

"Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, *Commanding Army of Potomac, Fortress Monroe, Virginia:*

"By direction of the President, Franklin's division has been ordered to march back to Alexandria and immediately embark for Fort Monroe.

"L. Thomas, Adjutant-General."

Which McClellan thus acknowledged:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
"*Near Yorktown*, April 12—12 M.

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

"Your dispatch received. I thank you most sincerely for the rëenforcements sent to me. Franklin will attack on the other side. The moment I hear from him, I will state point of rendezvous. I am confident as to results now.

"G. B. McClellan, Maj.-General."

All this promise ended in no performance. Gloucester was not attacked. Franklin's division was not even debarked, but lay idle more than a fortnight in the transports which brought it to the Peninsula, until Magruder saw fit to evacuate Yorktown.

[83] March 23. [84] April 19.

[85] May 7.

to Schenck for assistance. Schenck was at Franklin, 34 miles north, which distance he traversed, with his brigade, in 23 hours, joining Milroy at 10 A. M. of the 8th; but he brought only three regiments, reduced by details to less than 2,000 men; while Milroy's force was but very little stronger. Jackson's column was considerably the larger, though it is stated that but six regiments were actually engaged in the fight.

The Rebels advanced to and posted themselves on the top of a ridge in the Bull Pasture Mountain, where it is traversed by the Staunton turnpike, a mile or two west of McDowell. Schenck saw that Milroy's position was untenable, being commanded by hights in several directions; but he could not safely abandon it in broad daylight, and so decided to remain. Some desultory skirmishing and cannonading followed; until, at 3 P. M., upon information that the Rebels were trying to plant a battery on the mountain, where it would command our whole encampment, Schenck directed Milroy, with the 3d Virginia, 25th, 32d, and 82d Ohio, numbering a little over 2,000 men, to advance and feel of the enemy. Led by Col. N. C. McLean, of the 75th Ohio, they charged up the mountain with great gallantry, defying the fire of a superior force, whose heads only were visible, and were engaged at close range for an hour and a half, during which an attempt was made to turn the Rebel right, but repulsed. The fight did not wholly cease till 8 P. M., when our men were withdrawn by order, bringing in their dead and wounded, taking 4 prisoners and reporting but 3 missing. Our total loss in this well contested action was 256, including 145 slightly wounded. Gen. Jackson's report admits a loss on his part of 461—71 killed, including 3 Colonels and 2 Majors, and 390 wounded, among whom was Gen. Johnson. Our troops retreated to Franklin during the night, carrying off their wounded, but burning a part of their stores.

Jackson pursued next day toward Franklin, but did not see fit to attack. Returning to McDowell,[56] he recrossed the Shenandoah Mountain to Lebanon White Sulphur Springs; where he gave his troops a brief rest, and then resumed[57] his march to Harrisonburg, having ascertained that Banks had fallen back to Strasburg. Being joined near Newmarket by Ewell's division, he moved via Luray upon Front Royal, keeping his advance carefully masked by Ashby's cavalry, so that he swooped down[58] almost unannounced on our small force holding that position, under Col. John R. Kenly, who nevertheless made a spirited resistance, but was soon driven out with loss by the enemy's overwhelming numbers. Kenly, after abandoning the town, attempted to make a stand on a ridge scarcely a mile in its rear; but, his force being hardly a tenth of that assailing him, he was soon compelled to retreat across the river, after destroying his camp and stores. He tried to burn the bridge over the North Fork of the Shenandoah, but the Rebels were upon him and extinguished the flames. A few miles farther on, he was overtaken by the Rebel cavalry under Ashby and Flournoy, and a fight ensued, in

[56] May 14. [57] May 17. [58] May 23.

which Col. K. was severely wounded, his train captured, and his command nearly destroyed. Fully 700 prisoners, a section of rifled 10-pounders, and a large amount of stores, were among the trophies of this Rebel triumph. Our men fought nobly; but they were 900 against 8,000.

Gen. Banks remained quiet and unsuspecting at Strasburg, with no enemy in his front, and no sign of danger, until the evening of the 23d, when he was astounded by tidings of Kenly's disaster, and assurances that the Rebels, 15,000 to 20,000 strong, were pressing forward to Winchester, directly in his rear. Shields's division having been sent, by order from Washington, to the Rappahannock, he had hardly 5,000 men at hand, with perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 more scattered through the Valley in his rear. Jackson's force must have exceeded 20,000 men.[*] Banks had, on the first tidings of trouble at Front Royal, dispatched a small force to the aid of Kenly; but this was now recalled, and our trains sent forward on the road to Winchester, escorted by Gen. Hatch, with our cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery. At 9 A. M.[**] our column was in motion, and had hardly proceeded three miles when it was apprised that the train had been attacked, and that the Rebels held the road at Middletown—a report soon confirmed by a disorderly rush of fugitives and wagons to the rear. The column was thereupon reorganized, with the train in the rear; and, on reaching Middletown, Col. D. Donnelly, commanding the vanguard, encountered a small force of Rebels, who were easily repulsed and driven back on the road to Front Royal. Col. Brodhead, 1st Michigan cavalry, now took the advance, and soon reported the road clear to Winchester. Before all our army had passed, the Rebels advanced on the Front Royal road in such force as to occupy Middletown, compelling our rear-guard to fall back to Strasburg, making a circuit thence to the north, whereby the 1st Vermont, Col. Tompkins, was enabled to rejoin Banks at Winchester in season for the fight of next morning; while the 5th New York, Col. De Forrest, made its way through the mountains to the Potomac, bringing in a train of 32 wagons and many stragglers. There was some fighting with our rear-guard at Strasburg, and again at Newtown, eight miles from Winchester; but our men retreated with moderate loss, and our infantry and artillery were again concentrated at Winchester by midnight. Here they were allowed a rest of two or three hours, broken at brief intervals by the rattle of mus-

[*] Lt.-Gen. Jackson, in his official report, says:

"My command at this time embraced Ashby's cavalry; the 1st brigade, under Gen. Winder; the 2d brigade, Col. Campbell commanding; 3d brigade, Col. Fulkerson commanding; the troops recently under command of Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson; and the division of Gen. Ewell, comprising the brigades of Gens. Elzey, Taylor, Trimble, and the Maryland Line, consisting of the 1st Maryland regiment and Brockenbrough's battery, under Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Stewart, and the 2d and 6th Virginia cavalry, under Col. Flournoy."

On our side, Brig.-Gen. Gordon, in his official report, says:

"From the testimony of our signal officers, and from a fair estimate of the number in Rebel lines drawn up on the hights, from fugitives and deserters, the number of regiments in the Rebel army opposite Winchester was 28, being Ewell's division, Jackson's and Johnson's forces; the whole being commanded by Gen. Jackson. These regiments were full, and could not have numbered less than 22,000 men, with a corresponding proportion of artillery."

[**] May 24.

ketry, as the Rebels closed around them, their artillery opening at daylight."[61]

Banks had now less than 7,000 men,[62] opposed to more than 20,000, flushed with victory, and confident that the day would witness the capture or destruction of our little army. Col. Geo. H. Gordon commanded our right; Col. Dudley Donnelly our left. Gen. Hatch, who had been cut off at Middletown, had just rejoined with his cavalry. Facing the enemy boldly, our men held their ground for five hours, inflicting and suffering considerable loss; until, Jackson's entire army having by this time been brought up, it was manifest that further resistance was madness, and could only result in our destruction. Our trains being by this time well on the road, the order to retreat was given, and our line of battle, under a withering fire of musketry from left, right, and center, broke into column of march and moved rapidly through Winchester, amid the deafening yells of their exulting pursuers, which were echoed with delirious frenzy by the Winchester Rebels.[63] The 2d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Andrews, which, with the 3d Wisconsin, Col. Ruger, formed our rear-guard, halted, undismayed by the hideous din, in a street of the town, to re-form its line, and then resumed its rapid but steady march, sharply followed, but not seriously annoyed, by the eager foe. Our troops moved in three parallel columns, each protected by an efficient rear-guard, and reached Martinsburg, 22 miles distant, in the course of the afternoon. Here a halt of two and a half hours was taken, to rest and refresh; our rear-guard leaving that town at 7 P. M., and reaching the Potomac, opposite Williamsport, 12 miles farther, in the course of the evening.

Gen. Geo. H. Stewart, with the Rebel cavalry, pursued so far as Martinsburg; but Jackson halted his infantry not far beyond Winchester; though he sent a brigade, three days later,[64] to Charlestown, driving out a small Union force which held that place, and pursuing it to Halltown, which was occupied next day by the main body of his army.

Gen. Banks admits a loss, in his hurried retreat for 53 miles, of 38 killed, 155 wounded, and 711 missing; total, 904; with 55 out of 500 wagons, and no guns. This of course does not include the losses by Col. Kenly's rout at Front Royal, nor the sick and wounded left in hospitals at Strasburg and Winchester. We lost also a large amount of quartermaster and commissary stores, most of which were destroyed. Jackson admits a total loss, including that at Front Royal, of 68 killed and 329 wounded; and claims to have captured 2 guns, 9,354 small arms, and about 3,050 prisoners, including 750 sick and wounded, whom he paroled and left in the hospitals when he retreated,

[61] May 25.

[62] Gen. Banks's official report says:

"'My own command consisted of 2 brigades of less than 4,000 men, all told, with 900 cavalry, 10 Parrott guns, and one battery of 6-pounders, smooth-bore cannon. To this should be added the 10th Maine regiment of infantry, and 5 companies of Maryland cavalry, stationed at Winchester, which were engaged in the action.'"

[63] Gen. Gordon, in his official report, says:

"My retreating column suffered serious loss in the streets of Winchester: males and females vied with each other in increasing the number of their victims by firing from the houses, throwing hand-grenades, hot water, and missiles of every description."

Yet Winchester was not burned when we retook it.

[64] May 28.

sending some 2,300 up the Valley. He attributes his failure to crush Banks entirely to the misconduct of Ashby's cavalry, who stopped to pillage our abandoned wagons between Middletown and Newtown, and could not thereafter be brought to the front till too late."

Jackson, after menacing Harper's Ferry,[66] which was held by Gen. Rufus Saxton, called in his detachments and commenced a rapid retreat.[67] It was high time. Gen. Shields, whose division had been detached from Banks, and marched over a hundred miles to join McDowell at Fredericksburg, to replace the division of Gen. Franklin—already sent to McClellan—and enable McDowell to move directly on Richmond, was now ordered[68] from Washington to postpone this movement, and push 20,000 men rapidly to the Shenandoah, along the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Gen. Fremont, who had concentrated his little army at Franklin, Pendleton county, 24 miles north of Monterey, was likewise ordered[69] by telegraph from Washington to hasten across the main range of the Alleghanies to Harrisonburg, hardly 50 miles distant, and thus intercept the retreat of Jackson up the valley, and cöoperate with McDowell and Shields to crush him.

There is a direct road from Franklin to Harrisonburg, not absolutely impassable by an army, though it crosses four distinct ranges of steep mountains; but Gen. Fremont's trains were at Moorefield, 40 miles north by east, and to attempt crossing without them was to doom his army to starvation, there being little for man or beast to eat in those wild mountains. He therefore decided to go by Moorefield, which compelled him to go 20 miles farther northeast, to Wardensville, in order to find a practicable route across the mountains. Stripping his army as

[66] Speaking of our retreat from Winchester, he says:

"The Federal forces, upon falling back into the town, preserved their organization remarkably well. In passing through its streets, however, they were thrown into confusion; and, shortly after debouching into the plain and turnpike to Martinsburg, and after being fired upon by our artillery, they presented the aspect of a mass of disordered fugitives. Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory."

[67] May 29 [68] May 30.

[69] Gen. McDowell, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, states that Shields's division, 11,000 strong, raising his entire force—not including Franklin's division, already sent to McClellan—to 41,000 men, joined him at or near Fredericksburg either on the 22d or 23d of May, but in want of artillery ammunition: that which they had having just been condemned at Catlett's Station, and the new supply ordered from the Washington arsenal having got aground on the flats of the Potomac and thus been delayed. On Saturday, the 24th, the President and Secretary of War came down to confer with him, and found him not yet ready for the contemplated advance on Richmond, but that he would be that afternoon, and that Shields's division could go on Sunday. He [McDowell] added, that he had once before moved on Sunday—alluding to the battle of Bull Run—and had been very much condemned for it all over the country, but that he was ready to do so again. The President therefore suggested that he might get a "good ready," and start on Monday, which was agreed on. Messrs. Lincoln and Stanton returned to Washington that night, and "had hardly left before a telegram came announcing this raid of Jackson up [down] the Shenandoah Valley." This was soon followed by an order to send a division up after Jackson. McDowell adds: "I did so, although I replied that it was a crushing blow to us all." The President ordered another brigade to move up there, and then another brigade, and then another regiment. Two divisions were thus sent before McDowell, whose heart was set on the Richmond movement, followed himself.

[70] May 24.

naked as possible, he left Franklin next morning,[70] the soldiers discarding even their knapsacks, but taking five days' rations of hard bread; and thus, through constant rain, and over mountain roads that could be made barely passable, he crossed the Alleghanies and descended into the Valley, reaching and occupying Strasburg on the evening of June 1st, just in time to be too late to head Jackson, who had retreated through that place a few hours before. Next morning, Gen. Bayard,[71] with the cavalry advance of Shields's division, reached that point.

Shields, however, pushed up the South Fork of the Shenandoah, on the other side of Massanutten Mountain, expecting to head Jackson at some point farther south; while Fremont followed him directly down the North Fork, by Woodstock and Mount Jackson, to Harrisonburg. The advance of each was greatly embarrassed by the many streams which make their way down from the mountains into either branch of the Shenandoah, and which were now swollen to raging torrents by the incessant rains; Jackson of course burning or breaking down the bridges as he passed them, and sending cavalry across to destroy the more important of those in front of Shields. Passing through Harrisonburg,[72] Jackson diverged from the great road leading southwardly to Staunton, moving south-easterly, with intent to cross the South Fork at Port Republic. His rear was bravely and ably protected by the 2d and 6th Virginia cavalry, Gen. Turner Ashby, who that day repulsed a spirited charge of our cavalry in advance, capturing Col. Percy Wyndham and 63 men. Being still sharply pressed, Ashby called for an infantry support; when the brigade of Gen. Geo. H. Stewart was promptly ordered up, and was soon hotly engaged with the Pennsylvania Bucktails, whose commander, Lt.-Col. Kane, was wounded and taken prisoner. The Rebel loss in this affair was numerically less than ours, being but 20 killed and 50 wounded; but among the killed was Ashby himself, whose loss was at least equal to that of a regiment. Always fighting at the head of his men, with the most reckless self-exposure, his fate was merely a question of time. For outpost and skirmishing service, he left no equal behind him in either army.

Being now within a few miles of Port Republic, where his trains and artillery must be taken over a

[70] May 25.

[71] Gen. McDowell, in his testimony aforesaid, blames Gen. Ord, commanding one of his divisions, for lack of energy in pushing it on from Front Royal to Strasburg, and adds, that he sent forward Gen. Shields from Front Royal with express orders "to go on the direct road to Strasburg, and not cross the North Fork of the Shenandoah until near that place." He adds:

"After some time in getting Ord's, or rather Ricketts's, division together, I started out to the front. I met one of Gen. Shields's aids-de-camp coming in from Front Royal, and asked him how far out he had met Gen. Shields. He said he had not met him at all. I told him he had started to go out, and he said he must have lost his way. Without stopping to see what had become of him, I took Bayard's cavalry brigade, the only one ready to move, and sent it forward by the direct road to Strasburg. I then went to see where Gen. Shields was, and found him over on the road toward Winchester. He had sent his troops on that road, instead of on the one I had ordered him to send them on. He said that he had received information from his aid-de-camp that Jackson had fallen back, and he had sent his troops this way. When I got up there, they were coming in. Well, it was too late to get ahead of Jackson then."

[72] June 5.

wooden bridge across the larger of the two streams into which the south branch again forks at this place, and over the other and smaller branch by a ford, Jackson was obliged to turn and fight in order to gain time. Accordingly, Maj.-Gen. Ewell, with the rear division of his army, halted[73] near Union Church, and took up a strong position along a ridge which here crosses the road, with his flanks well protected by timber. He had but 5,000 men directly in hand; but the residue of Jackson's army was between him and Port Republic, 4 or 5 miles distant, ready to be sent up as required.

Fremont pushed out of Harrisonburg at 6 o'clock next morning,[74] and before 9 his advance was engaged near a little hamlet known as Cross-Keys, some seven miles on. Ewell's three brigades, under Trimble, Elzey, and Stewart, ranged from right to left, with his artillery in the center. Gen. Dick Taylor, with a Louisiana, and Col. Patton, with a Virginia brigade, came to his aid when wanted.

Gen. Fremont's order of battle, a mile and a half long, was formed with the 32d, 55th, 73d, 75th, and 82d Ohio, under Brig.-Gen. Schenck, on the right, and the 2d, 3d, and 5th Virginia, with the 25th Ohio, under Gen. Milroy, in the center, with the 8th, 41st, and 45th New York, and 27th Pennsylvania, and what were left of the Bucktails, under Gen. Stahl, on the left, supported by Gen. Bohlen's brigade; while the remainder of Blenker's division was held in reserve. Col. Cluseret, with the 60th Ohio, 8th Virginia, and Garibaldi Guards, had held the advance through the morning, but had now fallen in between Schenck and Milroy. Thus formed, our army advanced steadily and successfully, under a storm of shot and shell, losing heavily in men, but constantly gaining ground, until after 3 o'clock; when Stahl's brigade, having passed through the wood in its front to a clover-field, which gradually ascended to another wood filled with Rebels beyond, encountered a murderous fire, by which its ranks were fearfully thinned and its progress arrested. Two of Bohlen's regiments were ordered up to its support; but, before they could arrive, the brigade had recoiled; understanding, it was said, that they were to give place to Bohlen's men, instead of being sustained by them. Up to this moment, Schenck, on our right, had been making slow but steady progress; but he now halted by order, and finally receded for a mile, finding that Milroy had moved toward the left, and that he must follow or be isolated. Two hours later, the Rebels cannonaded him in his new position, but were easily and quickly driven off by his batteries.

Our total loss in this indecisive action was 664, two-thirds of it in Stahl's brigade; and our troops slept on the battle-field, expecting to renew the fight next morning. Gen. Ewell's report admits a total loss on their side of 329; but among their severely wounded were Gens. Elzey and Stewart. During the night, Ewell silently moved off, carrying away all but his mortally wounded.

Jackson had turned aside from his direct line of retreat, because he found that, with an army nearly or

[73] June 7. [74] June 8.

quite equal to his own pressing closely on his rear, he must sometimes turn and fight, and thus permit the other hostile army, advancing on his flank, to gain on him. He was at Port Republic during the conflict at Cross-Keys, preparing to cross, and watching for Shields, whose column, though delayed by burnt bridges and swollen streams, had reached Conrad's Store, only 15 miles distant, and whose advance of cavalry and artillery, under Col. Carroll, appeared that day.[75]

Carroll had been told that Jackson's train was parked near Port Republic, with a drove of beef cattle; the whole guarded by some 200 or 300 cavalry; and he dashed into the village with his troopers and two guns, expecting to cross the bridge and make an easy capture of the aforesaid train and cattle. Had he comprehended the situation, he might have burned the bridge, and thereby exposed the enemy to serious loss, if not utter destruction. But Jackson was already there, with 2 infantry brigades and 3 batteries; by the fire of which Carroll was driven out in 20 minutes, falling back two miles and a half, upon Gen. Tyler's brigade of infantry, 2,000 strong.

Tyler, who, on hearing of trouble ahead, had been rapidly hurrying to the rescue, ought now to have retreated also; instead of which, he sent his men to bivouac, and went forward with Carroll to reconnoiter. His vedettes, at 4 A. M.,[76] reported that there had been no advance of the enemy across the bridge during the night, and that only their pickets were visible. Returning to his camp, Tyler received and replied to a dispatch from Shields; but, before finishing his answer, he was apprised that the Rebels were in his front, endeavoring to outflank his left.

The struggle that ensued was short: the Rebel attack being resisted with great gallantry by our men; but they were 3,000 at most, while their assailants were 8,000, with more behind them. We were even successful at first over Winder on our right; but to no purpose, since the odds against us were constantly increasing; and, at length, Dick Taylor's Louisiana brigade, which had flanked our left by an unobserved advance through the forest, made so sudden and overwhelming a dash at Col. Candy's battery on our left, that it was captured; its horses having been killed or disabled. Exasperated rather than dismayed by this loss, Col. Candy, with the 5th and 7th Ohio, made a spirited counter-charge, and retook his battery; but was unable, for lack of horses, to bring it off,[77] though he drove back the Rebel infantry and artillery, and actually captured one of their guns, which, with 67 prisoners, was brought off in our retreat, which was admirably covered by Col. Carroll. The Rebels pursued about 5 miles, capturing 450 prisoners and about 800 muskets. Disastrous as was its result, there is no battle whereof the soldiers of the Union have more reason to be proud than that of Port Republic.

Fremont awoke that morning to find his enemy vanished, and to follow on his track to Port Republic; arriving just in time to find the last Rebel safely across the river and the

[75] June 8. [76] June 9.

[77] Jackson's official report says: "Three times was this battery lost and won, in the desperate and determined efforts to capture and recover it."

bridge in flames. Some of Jackson's officers had been obliged to abandon their horses in order to make good their escape.

Gen. Jackson makes his total loss in these engagements, 133 killed, 929 wounded, and 34 missing—in all, 1,096; or, since he left Winchester, 1,167, with 1 gun; while he had captured, including wounded in hospital, 975 men and 7 guns. Considering the perils he braved, and the odds which ought to have been, but were not, brought to bear against him, his campaign was one of the most brilliant of the war, and stamps him a true military genius."[18]

Both Fremont and Shields, being recalled by orders from Washington, here relinquished the pursuit and slowly retired; while Jackson, master of the situation, recrossed the South Fork on the 12th, and encamped at Weyer's Cave; whence he was summoned on the 17th, with the bulk of his army, to Richmond.

On the same day[19] with Jackson's demolition of Kenly at Front Royal, Gen. Heth, with 3 regiments of Virginia Rebels, attacked at Lewisburg, in West Virginia, the 36th and 44th Ohio, Col. Geo. Crook, by whom he was quickly routed, though Heth seems to have had decidedly the advantage in numbers. Before our artillery could be brought into position, the Rebels were broken and flying, with a loss of 4 guns, 300 muskets, and 100 prisoners. Our loss was 11 killed and 52 wounded, including Col. Crook in the foot. The Rebel loss is stated at 50 killed and 75 wounded, part of whom were doubtless included in the prisoners. Heth burnt the bridge over the Greenbrier, three miles distant, and thus arrested the pursuit.

VII.

McCLELLAN BEFORE RICHMOND.

THE capture of Norfolk and the destruction of the Merrimac, alias Virginia, having opened James river to our navy, Commander John Rodgers, in the steamer Galena, backed by the Monitor, Aroostook, Port Royal, and Naugatuck, moved up that river unimpeded, save by the shallows on which they repeatedly grounded, to within eight miles of Richmond, where he found[1] the channel thoroughly obstructed by two separate barriers of piles and vessels, the banks lined with sharp-shooters in rifle-pits, and a battery of heavy guns mounted on Drewry's Bluff,[2] 200 feet above the surface of the water. The river was here so narrow as to compel him to come to anchor; which he did very near the lower barrier, and within

[18] Confidential letters, unpublished, from Lee and Jackson to Johnson and Ewell, show that the movement was suggested, and in fact directed, from Richmond: Jackson and Ewell being ordered to combine their forces and strike a blow at Banks or at McDowell, as circumstances should render advisable. The detachment of Shields from Banks, and sending the former to McDowell at Fredericksburg, in order to enable the latter to advance to the aid of McClellan before Richmond, determined the direction of the blow.

[19] May 23.

[1] May 15—7 A. M.

[2] Called 'Fort Darling' in some of our reports.

600 yards of the Rebel guns. He at once opened fire on the battery, and maintained a most unequal contest for 3½ hours; when, having exhausted his ammunition, he desisted and fell down the river. The Galena had 13 men killed and 11 wounded; the Naugatuck 2, and the Port Royal 1 wounded. The bursting of a 100-pound Parrott on the Naugatuck threatened a more serious disaster. Capt. Farrand, commanding the Rebel battery, reports his loss at 7 killed and 8 wounded.

The first collision on the Chickahominy between the advance of Gen. McClellan's army and the Rebels occurred[3] near New Bridge; where the 4th Michigan, Col. Woodbury, waded the stream and assailed and drove off a superior Rebel force, losing but 8 men in all, and taking 37 prisoners, of whom 15 were wounded.

Directly afterward, Gen. Fitz-John Porter, commanding the 5th corps, on our right, was ordered by Gen. McClellan to advance from New Bridge, via Mechanicsville, to Hanover Court House, in order to facilitate and render secure Gen. McDowell's expected junction from Fredericksburg. Starting at 3 A. M.,[4] in a pouring rain, our cavalry advance, under Gen. W. H. Emory, had reached at noon a point two miles southward of the Court House, where the road forks to Ashland, and where the enemy were found in position to bar our further progress. The 25th New York and Berdan's sharp-shooters speedily coming up, they were deployed by Gen. Emory, with a section of Benson's battery, and thus advanced slowly toward the enemy until rëenforced by Gen. D. C. Butterfield, with four regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed; one of his guns being captured by Col. Lansing's 17th New York. The cavalry, Benson's battery, and Gen. Morell's infantry and artillery, keenly pursued the fugitives; while Martindale's brigade, with a section of artillery, advanced on the Ashland road, pushing back the enemy in his front, until ordered to rëform his brigade and move up the railroad to the Court House. One regiment having taken that course, Gen. Martindale was left with but two and a half regiments and one section of Martin's battery, when he was attacked by a superior force and compelled to maintain the unequal contest for an hour.

Meantime, Gen. Porter, at the Court House, learning that his rear was thus attacked, faced his whole column about and moved rapidly to the rescue, sending the 13th and 14th New York, with Griffin's battery, directly to Martindale's assistance, pushing the 9th Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania through the woods on the right (west) to take the enemy in flank; while Butterfield, with the 83d Pennsylvania and 16th Michigan, hastened through the woods still farther to the right, and completed the rout of the enemy. The 13th New York, of Col. G. K. Warren's brigade, which, having been delayed repairing bridges, had not hitherto been in action, now came up on our left; and, the odds being too palpable, the Confederates made a rapid retreat. Their loss is stated by Gen. McClellan at some 200 killed, 730

[3] May 24. [4] May 27

prisoners, including wounded, one 12-pound howitzer, many small arms, two railroad trains, and their camp at Hanover Court House captured and destroyed. We lost 53 killed and 344 wounded. The Rebel force thus defeated consisted of Gen. L. O'B. Branch's division of North Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed by Gen. McClellan to be 9,000 strong.

The Chickahominy, opposite Richmond, 20 to 30 miles from its mouth, is a sluggish, oozy mill-stream, three to four rods wide, often fordable, but traversing a swampy, miry bottom, generally wooded, half a mile to a mile wide, bordered by low, irregular bluffs. All the bridges by which it was previously crossed were of course destroyed in their retreat by the Rebels; but Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, of Casey's division, Keyes's (4th) corps, leading our advance on the left, crossed it near Bottom's Bridge[5] without difficulty, wholly unopposed; followed by the rest of the corps three days later, the bridge having meantime been rebuilt. During the three following days,[6] Naglee made a spirited reconnoissance toward Richmond, and to within two miles of the James, on our left; Couch's division took up,[7] by order, a position some miles in advance, at a place known as the SEVEN PINES, on the direct road from Bottom's Bridge to Richmond; which he proceeded hastily to fortify with abatis, rifle-pits, etc., and by building and arming a small redoubt. Meantime, the remaining division (Casey's) of Keyes's corps was advanced to and encamped about the station known as FAIR OAKS, on the Richmond and York River Railroad, to the right and rather in advance of Couch's position. Heintzelman's (3d) corps had crossed after Keyes's, and been stationed in his rear, but rather to the left, so as to observe the roads debouching on that side from White Oak Swamp, whereby we might be unexpectedly assailed in flank. Sumner's corps was still north of the Chickahominy, some miles higher up, ready to cross at command. Gen. McClellan was with Fitz-John Porter's and Franklin's corps, at and near New Bridge, nearly 10 miles above Bottom's Bridge. Heintzelman, as senior Major-General, was in command on the left until Sumner appeared.

The enemy being seen in force barely a mile from our front, Casey's pickets were posted some half a mile in advance of his line. It rained heavily throughout the night of May 30, swelling the Chickahominy to an extraordinary height, flooding its miry bottom, and setting afloat several of our new-made bridges. Gen. Jo. Johnston, who commanded the Rebel army, saw his opportunity, and resolved to profit by it. The roads of all that region center on Richmond, radiating thence like the folds of a fan, and affording a considerable advantage in manœuvering to the combatant who holds the city. Informed by his scouts of the numbers and isolated position of Keyes's corps, Johnston resolved to assail and crush it before it could be adequately rëenforced. To this end, he directed Maj.-Gen. Longstreet, with his own and Gen. D. H. Hill's division, the latter in advance, to push out by the Williamsburg road and

[5] May 20. [6] May 24, 25, 26. [7] May 28.

attack our position in front, while Gen. Huger's, on his right, was to move down the Charles City road and come in on our left flank; and Gen. Gustavus W. Smith was to move out on the New Bridge road to Old Tavern, taking thence the Nine-mile road to Fair Oaks Station, and so come in on our right. The entire Rebel army defending Richmond—some 40,000 to 50,000 strong—was either engaged in or supporting this movement, with Jefferson Davis, Gen. Lee, and other magnates, observing, directing, animating, and giving counsel.



SEVEN PINES.

The attacking columns were to move at day-break;[8] but the tremendous rains of the preceding afternoon and night had so flooded the earth as to render the moving of artillery exceedingly difficult; the infantry often wading through mud and water two or three feet deep. Huger's flank movement had not yet culminated, when Hill, who had for some time waited impatiently in our immediate front, gave, at 1 P. M., the signal to his division to advance and attack.

Casey's division was surprised as well as largely outnumbered. Having been scarcely two days in this position, their defensive works were

[8] May 31.

not of much account; and even their commander did not consider the matter serious until a vedette reported the enemy advancing in force, about the same moment that two shells came hissing over their heads; when, dropping the axes and spades wherewith they were felling trees for abatis and digging rifle-pits, our soldiers at the front hurriedly stood to their arms as our pickets came running in.

Gen. Casey promptly sent forward Spratt's battery of 4 3-inch rifled guns to a position in front of his rifle-pits, and ordered up Gen. Naglee's infantry brigade, consisting of the 56th and 100th New York, 11th Maine, and 104th Pennsylvania, to its support; while he disposed his 7 remaining regiments and 3 batteries on either side of a small redoubt, which he had hastily constructed, expecting to hold his ground until the arrival of rëenforcements; and ordered his artillery to open on the advancing enemy.

But the odds were too great. The three brigades of Rhodes, Garland, and Anderson, were immediately in his front; while that of Rains, by a flank movement, was coming in on his left. The 104th Pennsylvania, which he had sent forward to the support of his pickets, came rushing back in confusion, and went to the rear in disorder, having lost heavily by the Rebel fire; and, though musketry and artillery were doing fearful execution on either side, it was plain that we must soon be overwhelmed.

Seeing that the enemy were closing in on him on both wings, Gen. Casey ordered Gen. Naglee, with what remained of his brigade, to charge bayonets and drive them back; which was done, but under a musketry fire that mowed down our men by hundreds. Here fell Col. James M. Brown, of the 100th New York, and Col. Davis, of the 104th Pennsylvania, whose Major also was mortally wounded; and, our flanks being again enveloped, Rains having gained the rear of our redoubt, and firing thence on the flank of our infantry, Casey's division was driven back in disorderly retreat upon Couch, with the loss of 6 guns. Col. G. D. Bailey, Major Van Valkenburg, and Adjt. Ramsey, of the 1st New York artillery, were killed, while endeavoring to save the guns in the redoubt; which were the next moment seized by Rhodes, and turned upon our flying columns. To the credit of this shattered division be it recorded, that, under a fearful enfilading fire from Rains, in addition to that thundered on their rear from Rhodes, they brought off three-fourths of our guns.

The storm of battle now fell upon the 93d Pennsylvania, Col. McCarter, 55th New York, Lt.-Col. Thourot, 23d Pennsylvania, Col. Neill, and 61st, Col. Rippey, of Couch's division, who were sent forward by Keyes to the relief of Casey, on the right, where they fought gallantly and lost heavily. The 7th Massachusetts, Col. Russell, and 62d New York, Col. J. L. Riker, were afterward sent to rëenforce them; but were pressed back upon Fair Oaks by the enemy's overpowering advance, and there, uniting with the 1st U. S. Chasseurs, Col. John Cochrane, and 31st Pennsylvania, Col. Williams, held their ground until the advance of Gen. Sumner's corps, which had with great difficulty made

its way across the swollen Chickahominy, checked the Rebel advance in that direction.

Brig.-Gen. Peck, who held the left of Couch's position, had been divested of most of his regiments aforesaid, which were successively ordered up to the front by Couch or Keyes, until, at 4½ P. M., he led the 102d Pennsylvania, Col. Rowley, and 93d, Col. McCarter, to the aid of our crumbling right, and was for half an hour sharply engaged with the triumphant enemy near Seven Pines, losing some ground, but encamping very near his field of conflict.

Heintzelman was promptly summoned to the aid of Couch; but there was an unaccounted-for delay in the reception of the message, and some of his regiments did not rush to the front quite so impetuously as a good portion of Couch's, especially the 55th New York (De Trobriand's Frenchmen), made tracks for the rear. It was a quarter past 3 o'clock before Heintzelman came fairly into the fight; Jamison's Maine and Berry's Michigan brigades eagerly pushing to the front.

On the Rebel left, Gen. Smith's attack was delayed by Johnston, who was there in person, until 4 P. M., listening for the sound of Longstreet's musketry, which, for some atmospheric reason, he failed to hear. It was now too late for complete success, though his men fought desperately. The Richmond and York River Railroad, near its crossing of the Nine-mile road, runs for a considerable distance on an embankment 4 or 5 feet high, forming an effective breastwork, behind which our men held stubbornly and fought gallantly.

Gen. Abercrombie, with five regiments, was at Fair Oaks (the crossing aforesaid), instructed to hold the position at all hazards. Here fell Gen. C. Devens, severely wounded; while of the 61st Pennsylvania, Col. Rippey, Lt.-Col. Spear, and Maj. Smith fell dead, and 27 of the line officers were either killed or wounded; and near this point, at sunset, Gen. Jo. Johnston, the Rebel Commander-in-chief, was struck in the side by a shell and badly wounded, breaking two ribs in falling from his horse, so that he was disabled for service for several months. Gen. G. W. Smith succeeded him in command; but he was very soon disabled by a paralytic stroke, and removed from the field. One of the last Rebel charges on this part of the field was led by Jefferson Davis in person.

Hearing vaguely of trouble on the left, McClellan, still at New Bridge, had ordered Sumner, who had Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions, to cross to the relief of Couch; and Sedgwick, with the advance, reached the field on our right an hour and a half before sunset, just as the triumphant Rebels had turned Couch's left, interposing between him and Heintzelman (who, in coming up, had swayed to the right), with intent to sever and defeat our two corps on the south of the Chickahominy. But Sedgwick, advancing rapidly, interposed at the critical moment, and, forming in line of battle in the edge of a wood, with a large open field in his front, commenced a fire of canister from his 24 guns on the head of the enemy's advancing column, which staggered it; and then, moving forward his whole division in line of battle, he completely

swept the field, recovering much of the ground that had been lost. At nightfall, Richardson's division, having also crossed over, came up on the left of Sedgwick, connecting with Birney's brigade of Heintzelman's corps on his left; thus making all secure in that quarter.

At 6 P. M., Abercrombie, farther to our right, still desperately fighting, had been compelled to give ground, and seemed about to be enveloped by an overwhelming force; when the long-expected succor arrived. Gorman's brigade, leading Sedgwick's division, deployed into line of battle along the crest of a hill in the rear of Fair Oaks, and advanced down a gentle slope to the field where Col. Cochrane's U. S. Chasseurs and Neill's 23d Pennsylvania were fighting against heavy odds. At this moment, a furious enfilading fire of musketry was received on our right, indicating an effort to turn us on that flank, and repeat the sharp lesson of Casey's disaster. Gen. Sedgwick instantly directed Gen. Burns to deploy the 69th and 72d Pennsylvania to the right, himself holding the 71st and 106th in support of Gorman. The Rebels attacked with great fury, stampeding two or three battery teams, so that for a moment our lines seemed to waver; but Burns's calm, full-voiced order, "Steady, men, steady!" evoked a thundering cheer, followed by volley after volley of musketry, under which the enemy advanced steadily, and were charging Kirby's battery, when he poured into their close ranks a murderous fire of canister, which sent them rapidly to the woods in their rear.

Meanwhile, Dana's brigade had come into line on Gorman's left, and the Rebels renewed, as darkness fell, their attempt to outflank our right, extending their left farther and farther; but in vain. Gens. Sumner, Sedgwick, Dana, whose horse was killed under him, Burns, and Gorman, each exerted himself to the utmost to animate and encourage their men. Dana's wing was gradually advanced as the Rebels extended their left, and the battle swayed more and more to our right, until our line was nearly at right angles with that on which we had been fighting two hours before. And thus the fight raged on until after 8 o'clock; when the Rebels desisted and fell back, leaving us in undisputed possession of the ground whereon the final struggle was made.*

Sumner's heavier artillery had been left stalled in the swamps of the Chickahominy, as his infantry hur-

* Gen. McClellan, in his elaborate report on this campaign, after relating Gen. Sumner's arrival on the battle-field, with Sedgwick's division, says:

"The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Col. Sully) was immediately deployed to the right of Couch to protect the flank, and the rest of the division formed in line of battle; Kirby's battery near the center, in an angle of the woods. One of Gen. Couch's regiments was sent to open communication with Gen. Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made, than the enemy came on in strong force, and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was repulsed with great loss, by the steady fire of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time, Gen. Sumner ordered five regiments (the 34th New York, Col. Smith, 82d New York, Lt.-Col. Hudson, 15th Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Kimball, 20th Massachusetts, Col. Lee, 7th Michigan, Maj. Richardson, the three former of Gen. Gorman's brigade, the two latter of Gen. Dana's brigade) to advance and charge with bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops, springing over two fences which were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines, and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day."

ried forward to the battle. It was extricated during the night, brought forward, and properly posted by morning; when Gen. McClellan also had arrived; but, alas! without the corps of Fitz-John Porter and Franklin, which, could they but have come up on the New Bridge road during the night, might have converted Casey's demolition into a Rebel overthrow. It does not appear that even an attempt was made to bring them forward.[10]

In the morning,[11] McClellan awaited an attack, which he says was made at 6 A. M., on the left of Sumner's corps, by Gen. Pickett, supported by Gen. Roger A. Pryor's brigade of Huger's division; to which French's brigade, on our side, stood opposed. The fight between them was noisy, but not very bloody: due caution and

[10] Gen. McClellan, in his report, states that the still rising Chickahominy floated the log-way approaches to Gen. Sumner's brigade, after that officer had crossed his corps, so as to render them impassable; hence he [McClellan] was obliged to send his horse around by Bottom's Bridge, six miles below, in returning to his headquarters. He adds:

"The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries established upon commanding hights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured.

"The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks, for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville, and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy, down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three (23) miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days; by which time the enemy would have been secure within his intrenchments around Richmond."

It is hard for non-military readers to appreciate admiringly the Generalship which confessedly exposes one wing of an army for two days to the entire force of its adversary, without assistance in any form from the other. If there be any military reason why Gen. McClellan should have thrown two corps across the Chickahominy on his left, within a few miles of Richmond, without simultaneously, or for five days thereafter, pushing over his right also, and seizing the commanding hights which were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, no indications of them appear in his report; which, with reference to following up our advantage of the 1st, naively says:

"An advance involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy would have exposed each to defeat in detail."

That Gen. McClellan greatly over-estimated the strength of the Rebel batteries and their supports opposite Fitz-John Porter and Franklin, and the difficulty of crossing there, is made plain by his dispatch, four days later, to the War Department, as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"NEW BRIDGE, June 5, 1862.

"Rained most of the night; has now ceased, but is not clear. The river still very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in *statu quo*. With great difficulty, a division of infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops on the other side, should the enemy renew attack. I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here. G. B. McCLELLAN,
"*Major-General Commanding.*
"Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*"

Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, in his report of the campaign, says:

"The repulse of the Rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We now *know* the state of disorganization and dismay in which the Rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious at that time that, when the Rebels struck the blow at our left wing, they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their *whole* force; and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We should have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths."

[11] June 1.

distance being maintained on either side. Mahone's brigade was brought up to the aid of Pryor, and Howard's to that of French; and finally Meagher's Irish regiments went to the front, and a desultory conflict was maintained for some two or three hours, during which Gen. Howard lost his arm and had two of his staff wounded. The Rebels at length desisted, and retreated unpursued. Their reports assert that they made no attack, but only repelled one.

The Rebels remained through the day in quiet possession of Couch's and Casey's camps, sending off muskets, tents, and camp equipage to Richmond; following themselves after nightfall. Johnston says that Smith did not renew his attack on our right, because of his discovery of strong intrenchments in that quarter, which he had not seen the night before. It is certain that he was not disturbed by any demonstration on our part, and retired wholly unmolested. Ten days later, we had not recovered the ground held by Casey's advance on the morning of May 31.

Johnston reports the loss in Smith's division at 1,233, and in Longstreet's[12] at "about" 3,000; total, 4,233; saying nothing of any loss sustained by Huger. Among his killed were Gen. Robert Hatton, of Tenn.; Cols. Lomax, 3d Ala., Jones, 12th Ala., Giles, 5th S. C., and Lightfoot, 22d N. C.; while, beside himself, Gens. Rhodes and Garland, with Cols. Goodwin, 9th Va., and Wade Hampton, S. C., were wounded. He also lost Gen. Pettigrew and Col. C. Davis, of S. C., and Col. Long, taken prisoners. He claims to have taken 10 guns, 6,000 muskets, and "several hundred" prisoners—an expression which the number of our wounded who fell into his hands must have fully justified. He probably took few others, and no officer of distinction.

Gen. McClellan reports our total loss at 5,739,[13] whereof 890 were killed, 3,627 wounded, and 1,222 missing: some of these probably dead, and others left on the field wounded, to fall into the hands of the enemy. Among our killed were Col. G. D. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkenburg, and Adjt. Ramsey, of the 1st N. Y. artillery; Cols. J. L. Riker, 62d, and James M. Brown, 100th N. Y., Rippey, 61st, and Miller, 81st Pa. Among our wounded were Gens. Naglee, Pa., Devens, Mass., O. O. Howard, Maine, and Wessells; Col. E. E. Cross, 5th N. H., and many other valuable officers.

Considering that the bulk of the loss on either side fell on regiments which together brought less than 15,000 men into the field, the admitted loss is quite heavy. Keyes's corps numbered about 12,000 men present; of whom 4,000 were dead or wounded before 5 P. M. of the 31st. Perhaps as many had fled to the rear; yet Gen. McClellan's dispatch to the War Department, written so late as noon of the second day, in saying that "Casey's division gave way unaccountably and discreditably," is indiscriminate and unjust. A green division of less than 7,000

[12] Gen. McClellan says that Hill estimates his loss at 2,500, and adds this number to the above total, making in all 6,733: but it is evident that Johnston includes Hill's loss in that of Longstreet, who was in command of both divisions.

[13] But in a confidential dispatch of June 4th, to the War Department, he says: "The losses in the battles of the 31st and 1st will amount to 7,000." Though this may have been an estimate merely, it was very near the truth.

men could not fairly be expected to arrest and repel a determined advance of the entire Rebel army, whereof two choice divisions, numbering 15,000 men, were hurled directly upon them. That some of our men behaved badly is true; but the responsibility of their failure rests on the Generals by whom they were badly handled. They were sent up by brigades to confront Rebel divisions, and thus beaten in detail; and, when at last the time came for fighting with the advantage of numbers on our side, the directing, impelling will was absent.

Gen. Hooker, next morning,[14] by Heintzelman's order, made a reconnoissance in force, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, unresisted save by pickets. Gen. McClellan, on learning this movement, ordered Hooker to be recalled to and take position at Fair Oaks. The General commanding wrote this day to the Secretary of War:

"The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning; but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe. But the *morale* of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete; and all credit is due to the gallantry of our officers and men."

The President, on hearing of this bloody battle, placed the disposable troops at Fortress Monroe at the service of Gen. McClellan, sent five new regiments from Baltimore by water to his aid, and notified him that McCall's division of McDowell's corps should follow as speedily as might be. Gen. McClellan responded:[15]

"I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward rëenforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day; driving off the Rebel pickets, and securing a very advantageous position."

He soon afterward[16] telegraphed:

"I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery—almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state. We have another rain-storm on our hands. I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal. In view of these circumstances, I present for your consideration the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army, to strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military principles to strengthen this army. And, even although the rëenforcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements. I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decided results. I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry."

Secretary Stanton promptly responded:[17]

"Your dispatch of 8:30, yesterday, has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the Government. Your suggestions will be immediately communicated to Gen. Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. At last ad-

[14] June 2. [15] June 7. [16] June 10. [17] June 11.

vice, he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchel against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding immediate attention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's forces is with him at Okolona. McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible.

"Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was badly handled. It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies.

"Be assured, General, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and, whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms."

Gen. McCall's division arrived by water during the two following days;[18] on the last of which, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry and 4 guns, attacked and dispersed two squadrons of the 5th U. S. cavalry, Capt. Royall, near Hanover Old Church; thence proceeding to make a rapid circuit of our grand army, via Tunstall's Station, seizing and burning two schooners laden with forage, and 14 wagons; capturing and taking off 165 prisoners, 260 mules and horses; halting three hours to rest at Talleysville, in the rear of our army; resuming his march at midnight; crossing the Chickahominy near Long Bridge, by hastily improvised bridges, next forenoon; and reaching Richmond unassailed next morning. This was the first of the notable cavalry raids of the war, tempting to many imitations, some of them brilliant in design and execution; some of them damaging to the adverse party; others disastrous to their executors; but, on the whole, involving a squandering of horse-flesh and an amount of useless devastation which rendered them decidedly unprofitable, and hardly reconcilable with the legitimate ends of warfare.

Gen. McClellan, at midnight on the 14th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP LINCOLN, June 14, 1862.

"All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time, I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage.

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival.

"That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

"If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results.

"The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but Gen. McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained; you know that I have none.

"The indications are, from our balloon reconnoissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily in-

[18] June 12–13.

creasing in numbers, and determined to fight desperately."

On the 20th, he telegraphed to the President:

"By to-morrow night, the defensive works, covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy, should be completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority of numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action, and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen disaster."

At this time, his returns to the Adjutant-General's office give the following as the strength of his army on the Peninsula: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick, and in arrest, 12,225; absent, 29,511—total, 156,838.

Stonewall Jackson, having done us all the mischief he could in the Valley, arrested McDowell's overland march to join McClellan, and sent 40,000 or 50,000 of our men on all manner of wild-goose chases, was now on his way in full force to Richmond; hence, misleading reports of his movements were artfully circulated among our commanders. Gen. McClellan telegraphed[19] to the War Department that he had information from deserters that troops had left Richmond to rëenforce Jackson, and that they were probably not less than 10,000 men. To this the President responded, that he had similar information from Gen. King at Fredericksburg; and added: "If this is true, it is as good as a rëenforcement to you." McClellan on that day telegraphed to the President:

"A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to rëenforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow, we shall fight the Rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

To-morrow and to-morrow passed, and still our army did not advance; until, on the 24th, a young man of suspicious character was brought in by Gen. McClellan's scouts from the direction of Hanover Court House, who, after some prevarication, confessed himself a deserter from Jackson's command, which he had left near Gordonsville on the 21st, moving along the Virginia Central Railroad to Frederickshall, with intent to turn our right and attack our rear on the 28th. To McClellan's dispatch announcing this capture, and asking information of Jackson's position and movements, Secretary Stanton replied[20] as follows:

"We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement, that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place 10,000 Rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his dépôts. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days, the evidence is strong that, for some purpose, the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge on the subject.

"A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th inst., stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington

[19] June 18.

[20] June 25.

and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that, while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here."

That day, having his bridges completed, Gen. McClellan ordered an advance of his picket-line on the left, preparatory to a general forward movement; and, during the day, Heintzelman's corps, with part of Keyes's and Sumner's, were pushed forward,[21] he reports, through a swampy wood, though smartly resisted, with a loss on our side of 51 killed, 401 wounded, and 64 missing: total, 516. Returning from overlooking this affair, Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong rëenforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of rëenforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a General can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command; and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But, if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence, confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for rëenforcements."

The President responded as follows:—

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

"Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying. The later one, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of to whom the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue—ungenerously I think—to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted—I shall omit—no opportunity to send you rëenforcements whenever I can."

Gen. Robert E. Lee, having succeeded to the chief command of the Rebel army, had, in counsel with the master spirits of the Rebellion, at length resolved on striking a decisive blow. To this end, rëenforcements had been quietly called in from all available quarters, swelling the Rebel Army of Virginia, including Jack-

[21] But Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright, of Huger's division, who opposed this movement, reports that he had 3,000 men in all, resisting not less than 8,000 or 10,000 on our side; and adds:

"The object of the enemy was to drive us back from our picket-line, occupy it himself, and thereby enable him to advance his works several hundred yards nearer our lines. In this, he completely failed; and, although Gen. McClellan at night telegraphed, over his own signature, to the War office in Washington, that he had accomplished his object, had driven me back for more than a mile, had silenced my batteries, and occupied our camps, *there is not one word of truth in the whole statement.* When the fight ceased at dark, I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning; and which I continued to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th."

son's corps, summoned from the Valley, to not far from 70,000 men. In order to mask this concentration, Whiting's division, consisting of Hood's Texas brigade and his own, had been sent off from Richmond to Jackson; to whom also the brigade of Lawton had been ordered up from the South. When all things were ripe, Jackson moved, by order, rapidly and secretly from the Valley to Ashland, facing our extreme right, whence he was directed to advance[22] so as to flank our right, holding Mechanicsville. Moving on at 3 next morning,[23] he was directed to connect with Gen. Branch, immediately south of the Chickahominy, who was to cross that stream and advance on Mechanicsville; while Gen. A. P. Hill, lower down, was to cross near Meadow Bridge so soon as Branch's movement was discovered, and move directly upon Mechanicsville, where on the Rebel batteries on the southern bluffs of the Chickahominy were to open; Longstreet's division following in support of Hill, while D. H. Hill's in like manner supported Jackson; thus only Huger's and Magruder's divisions were left in front of our left and center, immediately before Richmond.

Jackson was unable to reach Ashland quite so soon as had been anticipated; so that A. P. Hill did not cross the stream to attack us till 3 P. M.[24] His advance had been discovered three hours before; so that our pickets were called in before it, and the regiment and battery holding Mechanicsville fell back, fighting, on a strong position across Beaver Dam creek. Here Gen. McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves, which had recently been sent down to reënforce McClellan, and had never till now been in action, were strongly posted on advantageous ground, supported by Morell's division and Sykes's regulars, the whole forming Fitz-John Porter's corps of about 27,000 men.



MECHANICSVILLE.

Advancing rapidly and resolutely, in the face of a destructive fire, which they could not effectively return, the leading brigades of A. P. Hill's, and ultimately of D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions, attacked our position and attempted to turn our left, but were repulsed with fearful carnage. Jackson being vainly expected to arrive and assail our right, it was not turned; and night fell on a decided and animating success of our mainly green soldiers, though the fighting did not cease till after dark, and the Rebels remained in force not far from our front. Our total loss in

[22] June 25. [23] June 26. [24] June 26.

this affair had been less than 400; while that of the Rebels must have been many times larger; and when, near the close of the battle, fresh troops came up to relieve the exulting Reserves, they refused to give place, but, replenishing their ammunition, lay down on their arms to await the encounter of the morrow.

Before daylight,[25] however, an order from Gen. McClellan (who had learned, meantime, that Jackson was approaching) directed the evacuation of their strong position, and a retreat to GAINES's MILL—an order easy of execution had it arrived three or four hours earlier, but very difficult now, as the Rebel attack was renewed a few minutes afterward. The Rebels were repulsed, however, though our men were retiring at the time; Meade's, Griffin's, Reynolds's, and Morell's commands moving steadily off the field as if on parade; our dead all buried, our wounded and arms brought away, with the loss of no caisson, hardly of a musket, by a little after 7 A. M.; leaving the Rebels unaware for the moment that there was no longer an enemy before them. Before noon, each regiment and battery had taken up the new position assigned it, at Gaines's Mill, and was ready to receive the now eagerly advancing Rebels. Meantime, our trains and siege-guns had, by order, been sent off across the Chickahominy during the night.

Gen. McClellan had been[26] with Fitz-John Porter, behind the Mechanicsville defenses, at 10 P. M.—an hour after the triumphant and sanguinary repulse of their assailants. Four hours later, he sent orders for their prompt evacuation. This he must have done under the correct impression that they were about to be overwhelmingly assailed in front by the Hills and Longstreet, and in flank by the yet fresh division of Jackson. In other words, it was now plain that the Rebel chiefs had resolved to precipitate the bulk of their force on our right wing, crushing it back on our center by the sheer momentum of their columns.

This striking a great army on one end, and rolling it up on itself in inextricable confusion, carnage, and rout, is no novelty in warfare. The Allied Emperors tried it on Napoleon at Austerlitz; *our* strategists attempted it on the Rebels at first Bull Run. It is a critical manœuver; but likely to succeed, *provided* your antagonist passively awaits its consummation. ("Hunting the tiger, gentlemen," explained the returned East Indian to his associates at the United Service Club, "is capital sport—capital—unless the tiger turns to hunt *you*; when it becomes rather too exciting.")

Gen. McClellan, as usual, believed the Rebels were assailing or threatening him with twice as many men as they had, supposing them to have 175,000 to 200,000 troops in his front; when they never, from the beginning to the end of the war, had so many as 100,000 effectives concentrated in a single army, or within a day's march. Even had he been outnumbered, as he supposed, by a Rebel force on either flank nearly or quite equal to his whole army, he should have quietly and rapidly concentrated, and struck one of those assailants before it could be supported by the other. Had he chosen thus to rush upon Richmond, on the morning

[25] June 27. [26] June 26.

of the 26th, directing Porter to make as imposing a demonstration and detain the enemy as long as he could, then to withdraw across the Chickahominy with the least possible loss, burn the bridges, and defend the passage till night-fall, he might have gone right over the 25,000 Rebels between him and Richmond, taken that city, and then turned in overwhelming force on the 50,000 Rebels in his rear, pressing Porter. But, deceived and faint-hearted, he stood perplexed and hesitating between the real and overwhelming attack on his right and the imposing but hollow succession of feints and alarms on his left, letting two-thirds of Lee's entire force crush one-third of his own, while 60,000 good men and true stood idle between the Chickahominy and Richmond, watching and guarding against 25,000 Rebels. Only Slocum's division of Sumner's corps was seasonably sent to the aid of Porter, raising his total force to barely 35,000 men, who were to resist the desperate efforts of 50,000 Rebels, directed by Lee, and led on to assault our position by Longstreet, the Hills, Stonewall Jackson, and Ewell.

Though the Rebels had quickly discerned and sharply pursued our withdrawal from the Mechanicsville defenses, arriving in front of our new position soon after noon,[27] it was 2 P. M. before A. P. Hill, who had been awaiting Jackson's arrival, advanced and opened the battle. The Rebels were received with heroic bravery by Sykes's regulars, who confronted them, by whose fire they were staggered and temporarily repulsed. Meantime, Longstreet, who had been ordered to make a feint on our left, had perceived the necessity of converting that feint into a determined attack; but, before his dispositions had been completed, Jackson arrived and formed his division on Longstreet's left; while D. H. Hill, on the extreme Rebel left, had forced his way through a swamp and some abatis, driving out our skirmishers; and now Ewell came into action on Jackson's right, and two of Jackson's brigades were sent to the relief of A. P. Hill, who was being worsted. Lee's whole force being thus brought into action, a general advance from left to right was ordered and made, under a terrific fire of cannon and musketry from both sides.

Porter had a strong position, on ground rising gradually from the ravine of an inconsiderable stream, screened in part by trees and underbrush, with Morell's and Sykes's divisions in front, and McCall's forming a second line behind them; and his cavalry, under P. St. George Cooke, in the valley of the Chickahominy, watching for a Rebel advance in that quarter. The siege-guns of Porter's corps, which had been withdrawn across the Chickahominy during the night, were planted in battery on the right bank of that stream, so as to check the advance of the Rebel right, and prevent their turning our left. Porter was unaccountably in want of axes, wherewith to cover his front and right with abatis; his request for them to Gen. Barnard not reaching McClellan till too late. When he next called, they were furnished, but *without helves;* and, while these were being supplied, the opportunity for using axes was

[27] June 27.

lost. His first call on McClellan for rëenforcements likewise miscarried. His next was made at 2 P. M.; when Slocum's division, of the 6th corps, was ordered to his support, arriving on the field at 3:30, after our position had been assailed in force at every point, and after McCall's division had been ordered up to support our sorely pressed front. So urgent and instant was the pressure, that Slocum's division had to be divided and sent by brigades, and even regiments, to the points where the need of aid seemed greatest; Bartlett's brigade going to the help of Sykes on our right, while a portion of Newton's was sent in between Morell and Sykes.



GAINES'S MILL.

Morell's Div.	A Butterfield's	Brigade.
	B Martindale's	"
	C Griffin's	"
Sykes's Div.	D G. S. Warren's	"
	E H. Chapman's	"
	F I. T. Buchanan's	"
McCall's Div.	K Meade's	"
	L Seymour's	"
	M Reynolds's	"
	N Cavalry.	
Art. Reserve.	O Robertson's Battery.	
	P Tidball's "	

Bartlett's brigade of Slocum's division. Franklin's corps in reserve; Taylor's and Newton's brigades being distributed on weak points of the line.

First line was held as shown, from noon to 3 P. M., when the Reserves were moved up to sustain it. Gen. Slocum's division arrived about 3½ P. M. The whole line retired to the high ground in the rear about 7 P. M.

Gen. Reynolds, with one brigade of McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves, having reached the front and repelled the enemy immediately before him, hearing the noise of a terrific contest on his left, moved immediately to the point where his assistance seemed necessary. And thus the battle raged for hours; repeated charges on our lines being repulsed; but fresh brigades advancing promptly to replace those which had been hurled back, until our wasted regiments, having exhausted their ammunition, were obliged to retire and replenish it.

At 5 P. M., Porter, though he had

lost little ground, telegraphed again to McClellan that his position was critical, when French's and Meagher's brigades of the 2d corps were ordered to cross to his support. They moved promptly and rapidly; but, before they could reach the field, the Rebels, rallying all their forces, just at sunset, for a last desperate effort, had stormed our intrenchments both on the left and on the right, and driven back their defenders with mutual carnage, capturing several of our guns.

Porter, seeing his infantry beaten, now called into action all his reserved and remaining artillery, and thus bringing at once about 80 guns into action, was covering the retreat of his infantry and dealing fearful retribution on their assailants, whose advance was suddenly checked; when Gen. Cooke, without orders, undertook to charge, with a battalion of cavalry, the right flank of the Rebels advancing on our left, and still covered in good part by woods. This charge being met by a withering fire of musketry, amidst the roar of a hundred belching cannon, resulted in instant rout: the frightened horses, whether with or without the consent of their riders, wheeling abruptly and crashing through our batteries; leading our gunners to suppose, for the moment, that they were charged by regiments of Rebel horse. "To this alone," says Fitz-John Porter, in his report, "is to be attributed our failure to hold the field, and to bring off all our guns and wounded."

In another moment, the cheering shouts of French's and Meagher's men were heard, as they advanced rapidly to the front. Rallying behind these two fresh brigades, our wearied, decimated regiments advanced up the hill down which they had recently been driven, ready to meet a fresh attack, had one been attempted. But the enemy, perceiving that they were confronted by fresh combatants, and not knowing our force, halted for the night on the field they had so hardly won.

During that night, our forces were by order withdrawn, unmolested, across the Chickahominy, losing three guns, that were run off a bridge into the stream, in addition to 19 that they had left on the battle-field.

Our loss in this action, though not specifically reported, probably exceeded 6,000 killed and wounded: among the former were Cols. Samuel W. Black, 62d Pa., McLean, of the 83d, Gove, of the 22d Mass., Maj. N. B. Rossell, 3d regular infantry, and many other brave and valuable officers. The 11th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. Gallagher, and 4th N. J., Col. Simpson, while enveloped in the smoke of battle, having too long maintained their position in the farthest front, found themselves at last completely enveloped by overwhelming forces of the enemy, and compelled to surrender; and Gen. John F. Reynolds, of the 1st brigade of Reserves, with his Adjutant, Capt. Charles Kingsbury, were taken prisoners just at dark, riding into a Rebel regiment, which they supposed to be one of their own. Altogether, our losses in this desperate action were hardly less than 8,000 men; those of the Rebels being probably about two-thirds as many.[28]

[28] Gen. Jackson officially reports the losses of his corps in this battle at 589 killed, 2,671 wounded, and 24 missing: total, 3,284. The other division and corps commanders make no

Gen. McClellan, during and after the close of the eventful 27th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"June 27—10 A. M.

"The night passed quietly. During it, we brought all wagons, heavy guns, &c., to this side, and at daybreak drew in McCall's division about three miles. This change of position was beautifully executed, under a sharp fire, with but little loss. The troops on the other side are now well in hand, and the whole army so concentrated that it can take advantage of the first mistake made by the enemy. White House yet undisturbed. Success of yesterday complete."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"June 27—12 M.

"My change of position on the other side just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and two divisions. Expect attack also on this side."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"SAVAGE'S STATION,
"June 28, 1862—12:20 A. M.

"I now know the whole history of the day. On this side of the river—the right bank—we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank, our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers soon after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men; those battalions which fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. I again repeat, that I am not responsible for this; and I say it with the earnestness of a General who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large rëenforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely rëiterated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not, and can not, hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night—I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen.
"To Hon. E. M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War."

To these reproachful missives, the President thus responded:

"WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.

"Save your army at all events. Will send rëenforcements as fast as we can. Of course, they can not reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed rëenforcements; I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago, you notified us that rëenforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case; and neither you nor the Government that is to blame.

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separate report of their losses in this action. Gen. C. M. Wilcox, 4th brigade, Longstreet's division, states his losses at 584, out of a total of 1,850. Among the Rebel killed were Cols. J. J. Woodward, 10th Ala.; S. T. Hale, 11th Ala.; John Marshall, 4th Texas; among the severely wounded, Cols. Rainey, 1st Texas, and Robinson, 5th Texas.

"Please tell at once the present condition or aspect of things."

Gen. McClellan's army had now been concentrated by the enemy in a very strong position, between the Chickahominy on one side, and our General's elaborate and powerful works facing Richmond on the other. It was still more than 100,000 strong; while, save in his imagination, there were not nearly so many armed Rebels within a circuit of 50 miles. Properly handled, it was abundantly able and willing to meet and beat Lee's entire forces in fair battle; or it might have taken Richmond and the Rebel works below it,[20] on the James; thus reopening its communications and receiving fresh supplies by that river, most efficiently patroled by our gunboats. One thing it could not do without invoking disaster, and that was to remain cooped up in its intrenchments; since Porter's defeat and retreat across the Chickahominy had severed its communication with its base of supplies at West Point; Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with the Rebel cavalry, supported by Ewell's infantry, striking and destroying the York River Railroad and severing the telegraph line at Dispatch Station next morning,[20] and pushing thence down the road toward White House, meeting no serious opposition, but resting at Tunstall's Station for the night, which our force holding White House devoted to the destruction of the vast aggregate of munitions and provisions there stored. Nine large loaded barges, 5 locomotives, with great numbers of tents, wagons, cars, &c., were involved in this general destruction; while our cavalry, under Stoneman and Emory, fled down the Peninsula, leaving large quantities of forage and provisions to fall into the hands of the enemy. Stuart arrived next morning,[21] and found nothing prepared to dispute possession with him but a gunboat, which very soon crowded on all steam and hurried off in quest of safety.

McClellan decided not to fight, but to fly. Assembling his corps commanders on the evening after Porter's defeat, he told them that he had determined on a flank movement through White Oak Swamp to the James; Gen. Keyes, with his corps, being directed to move at once across the Swamp in the advance, so as to seize and hold the debouches of the roads on the James river side of the Swamp, thus covering the passage of the other troops and trains. Our commander, during the night, removed his headquarters to Savage's Station, thence to superintend the movement of the corps and trains.

[20] Gen. Magruder, in his official report of his participation in the memorable Seven Days' struggle, says

"From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side of the Chickahominy and destroyed the bridges, to the moment of his evacuation—that is, from Friday night until Sunday morning—I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy; the bridges had been all destroyed; but one was rebuilt, the New Bridge, which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from Golding's; and there were but 25,000 men between his army of 100,000 and Richmond.

"Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest Captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond; and consequently the city might have been his reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent."

[20] June 28. [21] June 29.

The immense amounts of provisions, munitions, and supplies of all kinds that could not be removed, were consigned to destruction; while 2,500 wounded, who were unable to walk, and for whom no ambulances could be afforded, were left in hospital, with surgeons and attendants, to fall into the hands of the enemy.

Lee was evidently puzzled with regard to McClellan's intentions, not believing that he could abandon his position and the siege without a battle. He sent Ewell's infantry, as well as some cavalry, down the left bank of the Chickahominy, to watch the roads leading down the Peninsula; but, receiving no advices from Huger and Magruder, still between our army and Richmond, of any movement of our trains or forces toward the James, did not divine that movement till late in the afternoon."[32] No serious attack or forward movement was made by the enemy during that day; though in the morning, perceiving that Gen. Franklin's corps were being withdrawn from their front at Golding's farm, opposite Woodbury's Bridge, the Rebels opened on them from Garrett's and Gaines's Hill, and soon advanced two Georgia regiments to assault our works; but they were easily repulsed by the 23d New York and 49th Pennsylvania, with a section of Mott's battery.

McCall's weakened division was ordered to follow Porter across the Swamp during the ensuing night,[33] while Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division were directed to take up a line of advance stretching eastward from Keyes's old intrenchments, and covering Savage's Station, which was held by Slocum's division. This position they were to hold until dark,[34] so as to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then fall back on the roads leading through the Swamp.

Our line of movement—that is, of retreat—being now fully comprehended by the enemy, Lee ordered Longstreet and A. P. Hill to recross the Chickahominy at New Bridge and pursue and attack our rear; Jackson moving down on their left, but between them and the Chickahominy; while Magruder and Huger, advancing from before Richmond on the Williamsburg and Charles City roads respectively, were to strike us in flank.

Magruder, on the Williamsburg road, came in sight of our rear, near Savage's Station, about noon; but, finding the business serious, halted and sent to Huger for rëenforcements. Meantime, an attack in light force had been made, at 9 A. M.,[35] on Gen. Sumner's front; but it was easily repulsed; and Gen. Slocum, pursuant to order, had fallen back from Savage's Station, and was crossing White Oak Swamp. At 4 P. M., Magruder attacked in full force; and, though Gen. Heintzelman, under a misapprehension of orders, had posted his corps so far in the rear as to leave a gap of three-fourths of a mile between Sumner and Franklin, Magruder's attack was gallantly repelled by Gen. Burns's brigade, supported by those of Brooks and Hancock, rëenforced by two lines of reserves, and finally by the 69th New York; Hazzard's, Pettit's, Osborn's, and Bramhall's batteries playing a most effective

[32] June 28. [33] Of June 28. [34] Of the 29th. [35] June 29.

part in this struggle. By 9 P. M., the enemy had recoiled, without having gained the least advantage; and our soldiers fell back, by order, upon White Oak Swamp: Gen. French's brigade, forming our rear-guard, being in motion by midnight; crossing and destroying White Oak Swamp Bridge at 5 A. M. next morning."[28]

Jackson, who had been delayed by the necessity of rebuilding the Grapevine Bridge over the Chickahominy, reached Savage's Station early this morning, and was ordered, with Longstreet and A. P. Hill, to follow immediately on the track of our army, while Huger, supported by Magruder, pushed down on our right.

McClellan, with perhaps a third of our army, had already emerged from the Swamp, upon the high, open ground near MALVERN HILL; while Gen. Holmes, who had just brought part of a Rebel division across from the south side of James river to Richmond, moved down upon the river road, reenforced by Gen. Wise, with part of his brigade. Coming in sight of our advance near Malvern, he was about to open with his artillery, when he found that we were far too strong for him, and recoiled, awaiting the advance of Magruder to his aid.

Jackson was to have deflected toward the Chickahominy, so as to gain our right flank and rear; but his advance was checked by the destruction of the bridge in his front; and on reaching, at noon, White Oak Swamp Bridge, he was confronted by Gen. Franklin, with Smith's division of his own corps, and Richardson's, of Sumner's, and Naglee's brigade, by which all his efforts to cross during the day and evening were repelled and baffled. A heavy fire of artillery, directed by Capt. Ayres, was maintained throughout that day and evening; Capt. Hazzard's battery being badly cut up and its commander mortally wounded; but, though the enemy replied with equal spirit, and inflicted as well as suffered much loss, our position was too strong to be carried by assault; and every attempt of the Rebels to cross the marsh and creek—the bridge having been destroyed—was worsted. During the night, our troops retired by order, leaving 350 sick and wounded, and some disabled guns, to fall an easy prey to the enemy, as he advanced unopposed next morning.

But the main conflict of the day occurred at the crossing of the creek some two miles farther up, or to the right of Jackson, where Lee in person, with Jefferson Davis, accompanied Longstreet's advance, at the head of his own and A. P. Hill's divisions; encountering no resistance until noon, when their advance descried our rear-guard, strongly posted upon the road leading from New Market to Long Bridge, and having a small branch of the White Oak Swamp creek in their front. Seeing that we were in force, Longstreet waited till 3 P. M. for the coming up of Huger, who was some 3 or 4 miles distant, on his right, or Jackson, who was still nearer, on his left; but, as neither arrived, he at length ordered his batteries to open and his infantry to charge, under cover of a shower of shells.

McCall, with his Pennsylvania Reserves, which hard fighting had

[28] June 30.

reduced from 10,000 to 6,000 strong, was immediately in their front, and his men for a time held their ground gallantly; but days of fighting, succeeded by nights of marching—always, alas! in the wrong direction—had told upon the spirits as well as the numbers of these green troops, so suddenly transformed into veterans; while the flushed and confident enemy who assailed them were twice if not thrice their number. An attempt to crush their left by the Rebels was met by a charge of the 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th regiments, led by Col. Simmons, of the 5th, which hurled the enemy back to the woods in their rear, leaving about 200 prisoners in our hands, who were triumphantly marched off the field. But here Simmons fell, mortally wounded; while hundreds of his soldiers strewed the field; and the charging column, broken as it entered the woods, was unable to rëform under the murderous fire of the enemy's infantry and artillery, and fell back in disorder to the woods behind its original position, which they held until night put an end to the contest.

A succession of desperate struggles ensued: the Rebels rushing forward in charge after charge to capture our guns, which poured volleys of grape and canister, at short range, into their close masses, sweeping them down by hundreds and forcing them to recoil in dismay; when our supporting regiments would pour a leaden hail of musketry upon the flanks of the baffled column, hurling it back in confusion to the sheltering forest. Thus, for two hours, the desperate conflict raged; until Kerns's battery, having fired its last charge, was, by McCall's order, withdrawn from the field, and Col. Roberts's infantry, having just repulsed a Rebel charge, was charged again on its left flank and driven from the field by a fresh force, which, rushing furiously on Cooper's battery, drove off the gunners and captured the guns. A counter-charge was instantly made by the 9th, with parts of other regiments; and, after a desperate but brief struggle, the battery was recovered, and the standard of the 10th Alabama taken. The Reserves still held the field, and not one of their guns had been lost, when, between sunset and dark, Meagher's Irish brigade, of Hooker's division, came up on our left, and, charging desperately across the open field, drove the Rebels back again into the woods.

McCall's right, under Gen. Meade, had been likewise engaged with overwhelming numbers, by whom a final charge was made, just at dark, for the possession of Randall's battery; which was carried at the point of the bayonet, though at a fearful cost. Gens. McCall and Meade instantly rallied their infantry for its recapture, and a hand-to-hand struggle of unsurpassed ferocity ensued, wherein the Reserves were overpowered and driven back, though the Rebels had suffered [37] too severely to pursue

[37] Brig.-Gen. Roger A. Pryor, 5th brigade of Longstreet's corps, says:

"About 4 o'clock, I received an order from Maj.-Gen. Longstreet to go into the fight. At once, I moved in line toward the field; but the wood and other obstructions forced me to form column and send my regiments in successively. Arriving on the field, I discovered that the brigade on my right had been repulsed, and that my command were exposed to a destructive fire on the flank as well as in front. Nevertheless, they stood their ground, and sustained the unequal combat until rëenforced by the brigade of Gen. Gregg. We did not return to our original position until the enemy had abandoned the field and surrendered his artillery into our possession.

them. Even the guns, so severely contested, were not held by them; the cheers of a New Jersey brigade, advancing in the dusk to the relief of McCall, impelling them to fall back in haste to the woods. In this closing struggle, Gen. Meade was severely wounded in the arm and hip; Gen. McCall, who had lost all his brigadiers, riding forward a short distance to reconnoiter the apparently deserted field, was suddenly confronted by the leveled muskets of Rebel infantry, and compelled to yield himself a prisoner; and when Gen. Seymour, who had succeeded to the command, withdrew by order, at 11 P. M., to share in or cover the general retreat, the batteries of the division, their horses long since killed, their men worn out with desperate fighting, were left on the hard-fought field, where nearly one-fourth of the division had been killed or wounded.

The noise of this vehement struggle had brought Hooker, from our left, and Burns's brigade, and Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, from Slocum's division, to the aid of McCall; so that we were doubtless in force to have won the battle just after we had lost it, had any daylight remained. Gen. Sumner, speaking from hear-say, thus mistakenly reports it:

"The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About three o'clock P. M., the action commenced; and, after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field."

Heintzelman, who was present after the battle, also very mistakenly reports that McCall was not attacked till 5 P. M., and that in less than an hour his division gave way; adding:

"General Hooker, being on his left, by moving to his right, repulsed the Rebels in the handsomest manner, with great slaughter. Gen. Sumner, who was with Gen. Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on Gen. Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss."

Lee, more plausibly though not quite fairly, says:

"The superiority of numbers and advantage of position were on the side of the enemy. The battle raged furiously until 9 P. M. By that time, the enemy had been driven with great slaughter from every position but one, which he maintained until he was enabled to withdraw under cover of darkness. At the close of the struggle, nearly the entire field remained in our possession, covered with the enemy's dead and wounded. Many prisoners, including a General of division, were captured; and several batteries, with some thousands of small arms, taken. Could the other commands have cooperated in the action, the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy. After the engagement, Magruder was recalled to relieve the troops of Longstreet and Hill. His men, much fatigued by their long, hot march, arrived during the night."

Fitz-John Porter, having been misled as well as delayed in his passage through the Swamp, had only reached MALVERN HILL at 9 A. M.,[38] when he proceeded to post his troops, as they arrived, so as to command

In this engagement, my loss was uncommonly heavy in officers as well as men. The 14th Alabama, bearing the brunt of the struggle, was nearly annihilated. I crossed the Chickahominy on the 26th, with 1,400 men. In the fights that followed, I suffered a loss of 849 killed and wounded, and 11 missing."

Col. J. B. Strange, commanding 3d brigade, 2d division of Longstreet's corps, in his report of this fight, says:

"The brigade carried into action 723 muskets; and of this small number the loss was 228, including 4 officers killed and 13 wounded."

Gen. C. M. Wilcox reports the loss of his Alabama brigade in this battle at 471. Among the Rebel wounded were Brig.-Gens. Anderson and Featherston. It is probable that the respective losses here were about equal.

[38] June 30.

all the approaches, but especially those from Richmond and the Swamp. The last of our trains and our reserve artillery reached him about 4 P. M. of this day; about the time that Holmes's force, moving down the James, appeared on our left flank (our army having here faced about), and opened a fire of artillery on Warren's brigade, on our extreme left. He was at once astonished by a concentrated fire from 30 guns, and recoiled in haste, abandoning two of his cannon.

The rear of our wasted, wayworn army reached the position assigned it, upon and around Malvern Hill, during the next forenoon,[39] closely pursued by the converging columns of the Rebels. The anxious days and sleepless nights of the preceding week; the constant and resolute efforts required to force their 40 miles of guns and trains over the narrow, wretched roads which traverse White Oak Swamp; their ignorance of the locality and exposure to be ambushed and assailed at every turn, rendered this retreat an ordeal for our men long to be remembered.[40] Gen. McClellan had reached Malvern the preceding day. Early this morning, leaving Gen. Barnard with directions for posting the troops as they arrived, he had gone down the river on the gunboat Galena from Haxall's, to select a position whereon his retreat should definitively terminate.

Jackson's corps, consisting of his own, with Whiting's, D. H. Hill's, and Ewell's divisions, came in the Rebel advance down the Quaker Road, whereon our army had mainly emerged from the Swamp; while Magruder, with most of Huger's division, advancing on the direct roads from Richmond, menaced and soon assailed our left. Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions, having had the heaviest of the fighting thus far, and been badly cut up, were held in reserve by Lee in the rear of Jackson, and were not brought into action. It is none the less true, how-

[39] July 1.

[40] Mr. Samuel Wilkeson, who shared in this experience, wrote of it as follows to *The New York Tribune*:

"Huddled among the wagons were 10,000 stragglers—for the credit of the nation be it said that four-fifths of them were wounded, sick, or utterly exhausted, and could not have stirred but for dread of the tobacco warehouses of the South. The confusion of this herd of men and mules, wagons and wounded, men on horses, men on foot, men by the road-side, men perched on wagons, men searching for water, men famishing for food, men lame and bleeding, men with ghostly eyes, looking out between bloody bandages, that hid the face—turn to some vivid account of the most pitiful part of Napoleon's retreat from Russia, and fill out the picture—the grim, gaunt, bloody picture of war in its most terrible features.

"It was determined to move on during the night. The distance to Turkey Island Bridge, the point on James river which was to be reached, by the direct road was six miles. But those vast numbers could not move over one narrow road in days; hence every by-road, no matter how circuitous, had been searched out by questioning prisoners and by cavalry excursions. Every one was filled by one of the advancing columns. The whole front was in motion by seven P. M., Gen. Keyes in command of the advance.

"I rode with Gen. Howe's brigade of Couch's division, taking a wagon-track through dense woods and precipitous ravines winding sinuously far around to the left, and striking the river some distance below Turkey Island. Commencing at dusk, the march continued until daylight. The night was dark and fearful. Heavy thunder rolled in turn along each point of the heavens, and dark clouds overspread the entire canopy. We were forbidden to speak aloud; and, lest the light of a cigar should present a target for an ambushed rifle, we were cautioned not to smoke. Ten miles of weary marching, with frequent halts, as some one of the hundred vehicles of the artillery train, in our center, by a slight deviation, crashed against a tree, wore away the hours to dawn, when we debouched into a magnificent wheat-field, and the smoke-stack of the Galena was in sight. Xenophon's remnant of the Ten Thousand, shouting, 'The sea! the sea!' were not more glad than we."

ever, that the entire Army of Virginia was present, engaged in or supporting the attack, and animated by a sanguine confidence that its results could differ only in being more decisive from those of the recent bloody conflicts. But much time was consumed in getting into position and bringing up the artillery necessary to respond to our heavy and well-placed batteries, so as to cover the advance of assaulting columns of infantry.

Jackson, at 3 P. M., pushed forward D. H. Hill's division on his right, and Whiting's on his left, with part of Ewell's in the center, holding his own division in reserve; Huger simultaneously advancing on their right, with Magruder's three divisions on his right, under general orders to break our lines by a concentric fire of artillery, and then "charge with a yell" on our entire front with columns of infantry, which, however torn and thinned by our fire, should rush right over our defenses, as they did in the final assault at Gaines's Mill, and drive our fugitive army into the James far more hurriedly than Porter's wing had been driven across the Chickahominy.

The infantry attack, after a brief cannonade, was made accordingly, and for the most part with great intrepidity; and, though the carnage was fearful, some ground was gained by Magruder on our left, where Kershaw's and Semmes's brigades, of McLaws's division, charged through a dense wood, nearly up to our guns; as did those of Wright, Mahone, and Anderson, still farther to their right, and Barksdale, nearer to the center; while D. H. Hill, with Jackson's foremost division, charged on Couch's and Griffin's divisions, holding our advance on the right. Being unsupported, however, by the general advance which had been ordered, Hill was hurled back with heavy loss, though Ewell's and Jackson's own divisions had meantime been sent forward to his aid; as A. P. Hill's division was brought up by Longstreet to the aid of Magruder.



MALVERN HILL.

Explanations.

A	Warren's	brigade	Porter's corps.
B	Buchanan's	"	
C	Chapman's	"	
D	Griffin's	"	
E	Martindale's	"	
F	Butterfield's	"	
G	Couch's	div	Keyes's corps.
H	Casey's	"	
I	Kearny's	div.	Heintzelman's corps.
J	Hooker's	"	
K	Sedgwick's	div.	Sumner's corps.
L	Richardson's	"	
M	Smith's	div.	Franklin's corps.
N	Slocum's	"	
O	McCall's	div.	
P	Cavalry.		

Porter, with Sykes's and Morell's divisions, held our left, with Couch's

division next, then Kearny and Hooker, forming Heintzelman's corps; next to these, Sedgwick and Richardson, under Sumner; with Smith and Slocum, under Franklin, on our right; while McCall's shattered Pennsylvania Reserves and our cavalry were posted in the rear, near the river. Batteries above batteries, along the brow of the hill, rendered the attack little less than madness, on any other presumption than that our men were cowards, who, if resolutely charged, would inevitably run. Apart from the great strength of our position, we had more men than the Rebels, and many more and heavier guns; and then the battle opened too late in the day to justify a rational hope of success: the main assault being made, after a very considerable pause for preparation, so late as 6 P. M.; yet it was made with such desperation—the sheltering woods enabling the Rebels to form their columns of assault within a few hundred yards of our batteries, emerging on a full run, and rushing upon our lines in utter recklessness of their withering fire—that Sickles's brigade of Hooker's division, and Meagher's, of Richardson's division, were ordered up to the support of Porter and Couch, who held our right front, which Jackson was charging; but not one of our guns was even temporarily captured or seriously imperiled throughout the fight, wherein the losses of the Rebels must have been at least treble our own.[41] Darkness closed this one-sided carnage; though our guns were not all silent till 9 o'clock, when the Rebels on our front had been fairly driven out of range; though on our left they sunk to rest in ravines and hollows somewhat in advance of the ground they had held when their artillery first opened. And still, as throughout the struggle, our gunboats continued to throw their great missiles clear over the left of our position, into the fields and woods occupied by the enemy, probably doing little positive execution, since that enemy was not in sight, but adding materially to the discomforts of his position. Gen. McClellan, who had been down to Harrison's Bar in the Galena, in the morning, landed toward night, and was on the field during the last desperate charge of the enemy.[42]

[41] Jackson reports the loss of his corps (comprising his own, Ewell's, Whiting's, and D. H. Hill's divisions) in this fight: 377 killed, 1,746 wounded, 39 missing; total, 2,162. Magruder thinks his loss will not exceed 2,900 killed and wounded, out of 26,000 or 28,000 under his orders. Brig.-Gen. Ransom reports the losses in his brigade at 499, out of 3,000. Brig.-Gen. Mahone, of Huger's division, reports a total loss of 321, out of 1,226. Gen. A. R. Wright reports the loss of his already weakened brigade, in this fight, at 362. D. R. Jones reports the losses in his division at 833. Among the wounded in this fight were Brig.-Gen. Jones, Va.; Col. Ransom, 35th N. C., severely; and Col. Ramseur, 49th N. C.

Brig.-Gen. J. R. Trimble, of Ewell's division, giving an account of the conduct of his brigade in this battle, says:

"The next morning, by dawn, I went off to ask for orders; when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder; thousands of straggling men asking every passer-by for their regiment; ambulances, wagons, and artillery, obstructing every road; and altogether, in a drenching rain, presenting a scene of the most woeful and disheartening confusion."

[42] There has been much unseemly controversy respecting McClellan's being or not being on a gunboat during this action; the interest thereof being heightened by this passage in Gen. M.'s testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"*Question:* Were you down to the river, or on board the gunboats during any part of that day, between the time you left the field and your return to it?

"*Answer:* I do not remember; it is possible I may have been, as my camp was directly on the river."

Our victorious army began at once to evacuate, by order,[*] the strong position wherein they had just achieved so decided and bloody a success, leaving their dead unburied and many of their wounded to fall into the hands of the enemy; making a hurried and disorderly[**] night-march, over roads badly overcrowded, to the next position selected by their commander, at Harrison's Bar, seven miles down the James. The movement was covered by Keyes's corps, with the cavalry, which did not leave Malvern till after daylight of the 2d. The last of our wagons was not in place at the new position till the evening of the 3d, when the rear-guard moved into camp, and the army was at rest. A small Rebel force had followed our rear-guard, and this day threw a few shells; but was soon driven off by the response of our batteries and gunboats.

Gen. McClellan reports the aggregate losses of his army in the Seven Days' fighting and retreating, from

The following extract from the Diary of Dr. R. E. Van Grieson, then Surgeon of the gunboat Galena, of which the accuracy is not disputed, seems to embody all the essential facts:

"U. S. STEAMER GALENA, July 1, 1862.

"9 A. M. McClellan has just come on board again.

"10 A. M. Under way down the river, taking McClellan with us; who, being considerably fatigued, has gone into the cabin for a little sleep. About noon, we came to Harrison's Bar.

"12:30 P. M. Tug came alongside, and took McClellan and Franklin to the encampment. In about an hour, McClellan returned, when we started up the river. As we pass on up, we can hear heavy firing. After passing Carter's Landing, it increases to a perfect roar. McClellan, though quietly smoking a cigar on the quarter-deck, seems a little anxious, and looks now and then inquiringly at the signal officer, who is receiving a message from shore. After a while, the signal officer reports 'Heavy firing near Porter's Division.' Next came a message demanding his presence on shore. A boat is manned, and McClellan left. The firing still continues—nearer and louder than before. About 6 P. M., we ran a little farther up, and threw in a few shell with good effect.

"9 P. M. The firing has about ceased. News on shore—'Slaughter immense'—'Enemy in full retreat.'

"10 P. M. McClellan has just returned with Gen. Marcy. Mac says 'They took one gun from us yesterday; but to-day we have taken many of their guns and colors.'

"'Yes,' said Marcy, 'we whipped them like the devil to-day.'

"12 M. From what I can gather from the conversation of McClellan, we may expect to see the major part of the army at Harrison's Landing to-morrow."

Gen. McClellan, in his report, says:

"I left Haxall's for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Capt. Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its dépôts. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced; and, after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity."

The Rebels made no attack on our right, and it was at no time in action.

[*] Even Fitz-John Porter's devotion to his chief was temporarily shaken by this order, which elicited his most indignant protest.

[**] Gen. Hooker, when examined before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, testified with regard to this affair as follows:

"*Ques.:* Were you in the battle of Malvern?

"*Answer:* Yes, sir; and at that place we won a great victory.

"*Q.:* Could you have gone into Richmond after that fight?

"*A.:* I have no doubt we could. The day before, I had had a fight at Glendale; and, under the orders, I had to leave my wounded behind me, and I left two surgeons to take care of them. The enemy, in coming to Malvern, had to march right by my hospital. My surgeons afterward reported to me that, about 3 P. M. on the day of the battle of Malvern, the enemy commenced falling back, and kept it up all night; that they were totally demoralized, many of the men going off into the woods and trying to conceal themselves from their officers; and that they were two days collecting their forces together.

"*Q.:* Had the defeat of the enemy at Malvern been followed up by our whole force, what would have been the probable result?

"*A.:* Richmond would have been ours beyond a doubt.

"*Q.:* Instead of that, you fell back to Harrison's Landing?

"*A.:* Yes, sir. We were ordered to retreat; and it was like the retreat of a whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep; everybody on the road at the same time; and a few shots from the Rebels would have panic-stricken the whole command."

Mechanicsville to Harrison's Bar, at 1,582 killed, 7,709 wounded, and 5,958 missing; total, 15,249." This may or may not include those abandoned to the enemy in hospitals, most of whom are probably numbered among the wounded. Lee's report does not state the amount of his losses, but says it is contained in "the accompanying tables;" which the Confederate authorities did not see fit to print with his report. He sums up his trophies as follows:

"The siege of Richmond was raised; and the object of a campaign which had been prosecuted, after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, and upwards of 35,000 stand of small arms, were captured. The stores and supplies of every description, which fell into our hands, were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field; while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled."

The "inaction" thus vaunted was mutual. Lee did not see fit to repeat at Harrison's Bar his costly experiment at Malvern; but, after scrutinizing our hastily constructed defenses, and guessing at the numbers and spirit of the men behind them, withdrew [46] to Richmond, leaving but a brigade of cavalry to watch and report any fresh evidences of activity on our side. None being afforded, he sent Gen. French, with 43 guns, to approach Harrison's Bar stealthily on the south side of the river, during the night," and open a fire on our camps and vessels, whereby we had 10 killed and 15 wounded, with some little damage to tents, &c. French desisted after half an hour's firing, or so soon as our guns were brought to bear upon him, and decamped before daylight. Gen. McClellan thereupon occupied and fortified Coggin's Point, on that side of the river; and was no farther molested.



POSITION AT HARRISON'S LANDING.

Even if we raise our actual losses of men in the Seven Days' to 20,000, it is doubtful that they much, if at all, exceeded those of the Rebels, whose

[46] *List of killed, wounded and missing in the Army of the Potomac, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.*

	Killed.	*Wound'd.*	*Miss'g.*	*Total.*
1. McCall's division	258	1,940	1,581	3,074
2. Sumner's corps	187	1,076	848	2,111
3. Heintzelman's "	189	1,051	833	2,073
4. Keyes' "	69	507	201	777
5. Porter's corps	620	2,460	1,198	4,278
6. Franklin's "	245	1,813	1,179	2,737
Engineers	—	2	21	23
Cavalry	19	60	97	176
Total	1,583	7,709	5,958	15,249

[46] July 8. [47] July 31.

reckless attacks on our strong positions at Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Glendale, and Malvern, being stoutly resisted, must have cost them very dearly. The official reports of two corps commanders show an aggregate of 9,336 killed, wounded, and missing;[48] while other[49] subordinate reports indicate heavy losses in other divisions. On the whole, it is fair to estimate our total loss at 15,000 killed and wounded, and 5,000 unwounded prisoners; and the Rebel as at least equal to ours, minus the prisoners and the guns.

Gen. McClellan had telegraphed the President from Haxall's, on the morning of this battle, that: "My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops." Next day (2d), he telegraphed from Harrison's Bar that, "As usual, we had a severe battle yesterday, and beat the enemy badly; the men fighting even better than before." Next day (3d), he telegraphed again to the Secretary of War that he presumed he had not over "50,000 men left with their colors;" and that, "To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this Rebellion, reënforcements should be sent to me rather much over than less than 100,000 men." The President had advised him, the day before, that there were, in all, east of the Alleghanies, less than 75,000 men not already on the James, including those under Gen. Wool at Fortress Monroe; so that to send him even 50,000 was impossible.

The President went down[50] to the Army at Harrison's Bar, and found 86,000 men there. As 160,000 had gone into that Army on the Peninsula, he wrote for an account of the residue. Gen. M. replied[51] that his force then "present for duty" numbered 88,665; absent by authority, 34,472; absent without authority, 3,778; sick, 16,619; present and absent, 144,407. Of those absent by authority, he says that one-half were probably fit for duty; but, having got away on sick leave or otherwise, had failed to return. The Adjutant-General's office reported (July 20th) Gen. McClellan's army as numbering —Present for duty, 101,691; on special duty, sick, or in arrest, 17,828; absent, 38,795; total, 158,314. This does not include Gen. Wool's nor Gen. Burnside's force, then at or near Fortress Monroe.

Upon a suggestion[52] from Gen. Halleck at Washington that deserters had reported the Rebels moving southward of the James, leaving but a small force in Richmond, Gen. McClellan ordered Gen. Hooker, with his own division and Pleasan-

[48]

	Killed.	*Woun'd.*	*Miss'g.*	*Total.*
Jackson's	966	4,417	63	5,446
A. P. Hill's	619	3,271	—	3,890
Total	1,585	7,688	63	9,336

[49] Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ripley, Rebel chief of artillery, reports that his brigade entered into these fights 2,366 strong, including pioneers and ambulance corps, of whom 889 fell at Malvern, and 3 out of 4 Colonels were killed. Brig.-Gen. Garland reports his loss in all the battles at 192 killed, 637 wounded, 15 missing; total, 844. Howell Cobb reports that his brigade, of Magruder's division, went into battle at Savage's Station 2,700 strong; whereof but 1,500 appeared on the battle-field of Malvern, where nearly 500 of them were killed and wounded. Among the Rebel officers killed during the Seven Days were Gen. Griffith, Miss.; Cols. C. C. Pegues, 5th Ala., Allen, 2d Va., Fulkerson, commanding Texas brigade, and Lt.-Col. Faison, 3d N. C.

[50] July 7. [51] July 15. [52] July 30.

ton's cavalry, to advance upon and seize Malvern Hill. Through the incompetency of his guides, Hooker's first attempt miscarried; but it was renewed the next night,[83] and, notwithstanding the ample notice of it given to the enemy, proved an easy success; Hooker driving the Rebels from Malvern with a loss of barely 14, and taking 100 prisoners; Col. Averill, with part of Pleasanton's cavalry, pushing north to White Oak Swamp Bridge, driving thence the 10th Virginia cavalry and capturing 28 men and horses. This advance, promptly and vigorously followed up in force, would doubtless have placed McClellan in Richmond forthwith.

But Gen. M. had already received an order[84] directing a withdrawal of his army by water to Acquia creek, to support a fresh demonstration on Richmond from the Rappahannock; which order he began[85] most reluctantly to obey; of course, recalling Gen. Hooker from Malvern. He was now eager to resume the offensive with far smaller rëenforcements than he had recently pronounced indispensable, and suggested that, in addition to Burnside's men, they might be spared him from Pope's army on the Rappahannock and from the West. Gen. Halleck—assuming the correctness of McClellan's own mistaken assumption as to the strength of the Rebel Army of Virginia—replied[86] with crushing cogency as follows:

"Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case.

"You and your officers at our interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large rëenforcements from the South. Gen. Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are about thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect; neither can rëenforce the other in case of such an attack.

"If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to rëenforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water—say Fredericksburg—where the two armies can be united. * * *

"But, you will reply, why not rëenforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview, that you required 80,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have some chance of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely rëenforced.

"If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized; which would require several weeks.

"To keep your army in its present position until it could be so rëenforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and, even after you receive the rëenforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond.

"It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time—perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.

"This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean

[83] August 4–5. [84] On the 4th, dated 3d. [85] August 7. [86] August 6.

time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

"In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers—indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me—are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment."

Gen. McClellan forthwith commenced embarking his sick and five of his batteries, which had been assigned to Burnside; who, having been ordered on the 1st to Acquia creek, had immediately rëembarked his men, reaching his destination on the 3d, and promptly sending back his vessels to McClellan, who had been invested with complete control over the immense fleet of transports then in the Potomac, Hampton Roads, and the James. The latter commenced as if expecting to embark his entire force, including even the cavalry, at Harrison's Bar; but repeated and urgent messages from Washington, announcing[87] that the Rebels were crossing the Rapidan in force, and pressing Pope, soon impelled him to move the bulk of his troops by land to Fortress Monroe; the two leading corps (Porter's and Heintzelman's), preceded by Averill's cavalry, taking that road on the 14th, crossing the Chickahominy by a pontoon-bridge at Barrett's Ferry and at Jones's Bridge; and Gen. M., with the rear-guard, breaking camp and following the army on the 16th; crossing and removing the pontoon-bridge on the morning of the 18th. The retreat was covered by Gen. Pleasanton with the remaining cavalry.

Gen. Porter was under orders to halt the advance at Williamsburg until the crossing was complete; but, intercepting there a letter which apprised him that the enemy were concentrating rapidly on Pope, with intent to crush him before he could be rëenforced, he took the responsibility of pressing on to Newport News, which he reached on the 18th, having marched 60 miles in three days; and on the 20th his corps had embarked and was on its way to Acquia creek. On that day, the last of the army had reached its prescribed points of embarkation at Yorktown, Newport News, and Fortress Monroe.[88] Heintzelman embarked at Yorktown on the 21st; Franklin at Fortress Monroe on the 22d; Keyes had been left at Yorktown to cover the embarkation, should any

[87] August 10.

[88] Gen. Victor Le Duc, who entered the service as Captain and A. Q. M., and who acted as Division Quartermaster throughout the retreat from before Richmond, and thence to Fortress Monroe, being promoted for eminent efficiency to be a Corps Quartermaster thereafter, thus sums up, in his private diary, under date of Sept. 1st–8th, 1862, the results of his experience and observation:

"I am confident that there has been gross mismanagement in this whole affair. With all the resources that Government places in the hands of officers, the Army of the Potomac should have been transferred from the Peninsula to Acquia creek or Alexandria and landed, and in as good condition as when they embarked, all within two weeks. Each corps as a unit should have been embarked and landed by itself, and its transportation have accompanied it; and, with the two wharves at Newport News, inconvenient as they are, three days and nights was ample time in which to put the transportation on shipboard; three days more would have been occupied in discharging it off and setting it up, and one day in transitu—seven days. Three corps could have shipped at the same time—one at Fortress Monroe, one at Newport News, and one at Yorktown. It has taken, in fact, nearly one month; and will be an entire month before all have arrived."

This view assumes that sufficient transportation was always in readiness exactly where and when it was required; which is unproved.

Rebel force be sent down the Peninsula on the track of our army; but there was none, and our retreat was entirely unmolested—the attention and forces of the enemy being now absorbingly devoted to Pope. Gen. McClellan and staff embarked at Fortress Monroe on the 23d, and reported at Acquia creek next day; coming up to Alexandria, by Gen. Halleck's request, on the 26th.

Thus ended the unfortunate Peninsular campaign of the magnificent Army of the Potomac. Its unsuccess was due to the fact that the enemy nearly always chose the time and place of combat; and, though uniformly inferior in aggregate numbers, usually contrived to bring the larger force into action—fighting two-thirds to three-fourths of his entire strength against one-fourth to one-half of ours. Our commander, incessantly calling urgently for rëenforcements, never brought into action nearly all he already had, save that at Malvern the enemy forced a conflict before our army could again be scattered, and thus incurred a stinging repulse, though a large portion of our men were, even then, not enabled to fire a shot. Never before did an army so constantly, pressingly need to be rëenforced—not by a corps, but by a leader; not by men, but by a man.

VIII.

GEN. POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

Gen. John Pope, having been summoned from the West for the purpose, was selected by the President, after consultation with Gen. Scott, for the command of a force to be designated the Army of Virginia, and to consist of all the troops then covering Washington or holding the lower end of the Shenandoah Valley. This army was to be composed of three corps, under Maj.-Gens. Fremont, Banks, and McDowell respectively; but Gen. Fremont was relieved, at his own request, from serving under one whom he regarded as his junior, and the command of his corps assigned to Gen. Sigel. The entire strength of this newly organized army was nearly 50,000 men, scattered from Fredericksburg. to Winchester, of whom 40,000 might be considered disposable. To Gen. Pope was assigned the duty of covering Washington and protecting Maryland, with its great railroad, while threatening Richmond from the north. He had at first intended and expected to advance to the neighborhood of Richmond, and there unite in the operations of McClellan against that city. But he was appointed on the very day[1] when Lee's designs against McClellan's right wing were developed at Mechanicsville; and, before he could concentrate his army, the retreat through White Oak Swamp to Harrison's Landing, by exposing his meditated advance, unaided, to a succession of blows from the entire Rebel Army of Virginia, rendered

[1] July 26.

such a movement simple madness. In order, however, to effect at least a diversion in favor of McClellan's worsted army, and to enable it to abandon the Peninsula without further loss, he drew Sigel from Middletown, via Front Royal, to Sperryville, on one of the sources of the Rappahannock, near the Blue Ridge; while Banks, following nearly the same route from the Valley, came in a few miles farther east; and Ricketts's division of Gen. McDowell's corps advanced south-westwardly from Manassas Junction to a point a little eastward of Banks. Pope wrote to Gen. McClellan, then on the Peninsula, a letter proposing hearty cöoperation and soliciting suggestions, which elicited but a vague and by no means cordial response.[3] He had doubtless suggested to the President the appointment of a common military superior; whereupon Maj.-Gen. Halleck was relieved of his command in the West and called[4] to Washington as General-in-Chief, assuming command July 23d.

Before quitting Washington[4] for the field, Pope had ordered Gen. King, at Fredericksburg, to push forward detachments of his cavalry to the Virginia Central Railroad and break it up at several points, so as to impede the enemy's communication between Richmond and the Valley; which was effected. He had likewise directed Gen. Banks to advance an infantry brigade, with all his cavalry, to Culpepper Court House, thence pushing forward cavalry so as to threaten Gordonsville. The advance to Culpepper having been unresisted, Banks was next ordered[5] to send Hatch, with all his cavalry, to capture Gordonsville, destroy the railroad for 10 or 15 miles east of it, and thence push a detachment as far as Charlottesville, burning bridges and breaking up railroads as far as possible; but Hatch, taking along infantry, artillery, and heavy trains, was so impeded by bad roads that he had only reached Madison Court House on the 17th—a day after Ewell, with a division of Lee's army

[3] McClellan and his lieutenants had of course read and resented Pope's address to his army on taking the field, which they, not unreasonably, interpreted as reflecting on their strategy, though Pope disclaims such an application. Its text is as follows:

"WASHINGTON, July 14, 1862.

"*To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia:*

"By special assignment of the President of the United States, I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants; in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and to the purpose.

"I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies—from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when found—whose policy has been attack, and not defense.

"In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so; and that speedily.

"I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you.

"Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you.

"I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them—of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas.

"The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy.

"Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear.

"Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.

JOHN POPE,
"Maj.-Gen. Commanding."

[3] July 11. [4] July 29. [5] July 14.

THE AREA OF POPE'S VIRGINIA AND OF MCCLELLAN'S MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

from Richmond, had reached Gordonsville, rendering its capture by cavalry impossible. Pope at once ordered Hatch, through Banks, to move westwardly across the Blue Ridge from Madison, with 1,500 to 2,000 picked men, and swoop down upon and destroy the railroad westward of that barrier. Hatch commenced this movement; but, soon becoming discouraged, gave it up, and returned, via Sperryville, to Madison. Pope thereupon relieved him from command, appointing Gen. Buford, chief of artillery to Banks's corps, in his stead.

At length, Pope, having joined his army, ordered[6] Banks to move forward to Hazel Run, while Gen. McDowell, with Ricketts's division, advanced from Waterloo Bridge to Culpepper, which Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps had already occupied for several days. Buford, with his cavalry, held Madison C. H., picketing the upper fords of the Rapidan, and as low down as Barnett's Ford; while Bayard was posted on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, near the Rapidan river, picketing the fords from Barnett's as low down as Raccoon Ford. The enemy crossing a considerable force in the vicinity of the junction of Buford's and Bayard's pickets, both Generals reported their advance; but it was some days before it was determined whether they were intending to advance in force on Madison C. H., or toward Culpepper C. H. On the 8th, the Rebels pressed Bayard's pickets, and his force fell back toward Culpepper C. H., followed by the enemy.

Pope, under instructions to preserve his communications with Gen. King at Fredericksburg, ordered[7] a concentration of his infantry and artillery upon Culpepper, his headquarters, and pushed forward Crawford's brigade toward Cedar (or rather Slaughter's) Mountain: an eminence commanding a wide prospect to the south and east, and which should have been occupied and fortified by our forces some days before.

Banks, by order, advanced promptly from Hazel Run to Culpepper; but Sigel, still at Sperryville, instead of moving at once, sent to ascertain by which route he should come; thus losing several hours, and arriving too late to be of use. Gen. Banks, by order, moved forward next morning[8] toward Cedar Mountain, supporting, with the rest of his corps, the advance of Gen. Crawford, under verbal orders from Pope, which were reduced to writing by his Adjutant, in these words:

"CULPEPPER, Aug. 9th—9:45 A. M.
"From Col. Lewis Marshall: Gen. Banks will move to the front immediately, assume command of all the forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as soon as he approaches, and be reënforced from here."

Calling on Pope as he left Culpepper, Banks asked if there were further orders, and was referred to Gen. Roberts, Pope's chief of staff, who was to accompany him and indicate the line he was to occupy; which he took: Roberts saying to him repeatedly before he left, "There must be no backing out *this* day;" words needing no interpretation, and hardly such as should be addressed by a Brigadier to a Major-General commanding a corps.

[6] August 7. [7] August 8. [8] August 9.

Stonewall Jackson, with his own division, following Ewell's, had reached Gordonsville July 19th, and, sending thence for reënforcements, had received A. P. Hill's division, increasing his force to some 25,000 men; with which he advanced,[9] driving back our cavalry and reaching Slaughter's or Cedar Mountain this day.[10] From the splendid outlook afforded by this mountain, he saw his opportunity, and resolved to profit by it. Pushing forward Ewell's division on the Culpepper road, and thence to the right along the western slope of the mountain, but keeping it thoroughly covered by woods which concealed its numbers, he advanced four guns to the front, and opened fire upon Crawford's batteries; his own division, under Winder, being thrown out to the left as it arrived, still under cover of the woods. Ewell's batteries were successfully posted at the foot of the mountain, some 200 feet above the valley, whence their fire was far more effective than ours. Meantime, Hill's division was arriving, and being sent in to the support of whatever portion of the Rebel line was weakest, until not less than 20,000 veterans, with every advantage of position and shelter, formed the Rebel line of battle; against which Banks's 6,000 or 8,000



CEDAR MOUNTAIN.

Explanations:

A Position of Gen. Banks's corps both before and after his advance upon the enemy, on the afternoon of Aug. 9.

B Farthest advance of Gen. Banks's corps, and place of severest fighting.

b Position of Rebel troops corresponding with position B.

a Farthest advance of Rebels in the afternoon, from which point they were driven evening of Aug. 9.

[9] August 7.

[10] August 9.

advanced, at 5 P. M., across open fields and up gentle acclivities, thoroughly swept by the Rebel cannon and musketry.

Had victory been possible, they would have won it. Early's brigade of Ewell's division held the road, and was so desperately charged in front and on its right flank, that it held its ground only by the opportune arrival of Thomas's brigade of Hill's division; while the left of Jackson's division, under Taliaferro, was so assailed in flank and rear that one brigade was routed and the whole flank gave way, as did also Early's. But the odds were too heavy; and, though our men proved themselves heroes, they could not defeat three times their number, holding the foot of a mountain and covered by woods. The best blood of the Union was poured out like water, but in vain. Gen. Geary, who, with five Ohio regiments and the 28th Pennsylvania, made the most desperate charge of the day, was himself wounded, with most of his officers. Gen. Crawford's brigade came out of the fight a mere skeleton. The 109th Pennsylvania, 102d New York, and several other regiments, left half their number dead or wounded on that fatal field. Gens. Augur and Carroll were severely wounded; as were Cols. Donnelly, 46th Pa., Creighton, 7th Ohio, and Majors Savage, 2d Mass., Armstrong, 5th Ohio, and Pelouze, Banks's Adjutant. Gen. Prince was taken prisoner after dark, by accident, while passing from one part of his command to another. Our loss in killed and wounded could hardly have been less than 2,000 men. We were not so much beaten as fairly crowded off the field; where Jackson claims to have taken 400 prisoners, 1 gun, and 5,302 small arms, with a loss on his part of 223 killed, including Gen. C. S. Winder, 2 Lt.-Colonels, and a Major; with 1,060 wounded: among them Cols. Williams and Sheffield, 3 Majors, and 31 missing; total, 1,314.

Gen. Pope had remained throughout the day at Culpepper, neither desiring nor expecting a serious engagement, and assured from time to time that only skirmishing was going on at the front; until the continuous roar of cannon assured him, soon after 5 o'clock, that the matter was grave. Ordering forward Ricketts's division, he arrived with it on the field just before dark, and directed Banks to draw in his right wing upon his center, so as to give room for Ricketts to come into the fight; but the Rebels, though victorious, advanced with great caution, and, finding themselves confronted by fresh batteries, recoiled, after a sharp artillery duel, and took shelter in the woods. Ricketts's guns continued vocal until midnight; but of course to little purpose. Meantime, Sigel's corps began to arrive, and was sent to the front abreast of Ricketts's; Banks's corps being withdrawn two miles to the rear to rest and rëorganize.

But there was no more fighting. Jackson clung to his mountain and his woods till the night of the 11th; when, aware that King's division had just come up from Fredericksburg, and that Pope was about to strike at his communications, and thus compel him to fight on equal terms, he, leaving a part of his dead unburied, retreated rapidly across the Rapidan. Our cavalry pursued him to that

stream, picking up a number of stragglers.

Gen. Reno, with 8,000 of Burnside's corps, having joined [11] him, Gen. Pope advanced his infantry to Robertson's river and Raccoon Ford, with his center at and around Cedar Mountain, and began again to operate with his cavalry on the enemy's communications, until satisfied that the whole Rebel Army of Virginia was rapidly assembling to overwhelm him; one of his cavalry expeditions having captured J. E. B. Stuart's Adjutant, bearing a letter from Gen. Lee,[12] at Gordonsville, which clearly indicated that purpose. Holding his advanced position to the last, so as to afford time for the arrival of McClellan's army, he commenced [13] a retreat across the Rappahannock, which was effected in two days without loss; and, though the Rebels, of course, followed sharply with their cavalry, reaching the river on the morning of the 20th, they found the fords so guarded and fortified that they could not be forced without heavy loss; so, after three days of skirmishing and artillery-firing at Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Station, they commenced a movement up the stream, with intent to turn our right.

Pope, still under orders to maintain his communications with Fredericksburg, was unable to extend his right farther without too much weakening his center, and telegraphed again and again to Washington that he must be rëenforced or retreat. He was assured, on the 21st, that, if he could hold on two days longer, he should be so amply strengthened as to enable him to assume the offensive; yet, on the 25th, barely 7,000 men had reached him. He had resolved to recross the Rappahannock on the night of the 22d, and fall upon the flank and rear of the long Rebel column constantly passing up the river; but, during that night, a heavy rain set in, which, before morning, had drowned all the fords and carried away the bridges in his front, rendering his meditated blow impossible.

During that night, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry and 2 guns, having crossed the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and Hart's Mill during the preceding day, pushed on unobserved to Warrenton, surprised Gen. Pope's headquarters-train near Catlett's Station, during the intense rain and darkness; capturing Pope's field Quartermaster and his dispatch-book, with a quantity of uniforms and personal baggage, burning the wagons, and trying to burn the railroad bridge over Cedar Run; but the tremendous rain then falling defeated this design. Stuart claims to have reached the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs, on his return next day, with 300 prisoners and many horses, here crossing unharmed, after a night's bivouac and a little skirmishing. Pope's actual headquarters during this raid were near Rappahannock Station; but our army trains were parked around Catlett's, and guarded by 1,500 infantry and five companies of cavalry; so that Stuart's cheap success inflicted on us more disgrace than injury—a disgrace which the intense darkness and pouring rain explain, but do not excuse.

Still, the enemy confronting us in ample force at Rappahannock Sta-

[11] August 14. [12] Dated August 15. [13] August 18.

tion, Sulphur Springs, and Waterloo Bridge, kept moving heavy columns up their side of the river, with evident intent to flank and fall upon our right; and Pope, facing along the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, resolved there to give battle. Meantime, Heintzelman's long-expected corps from McClellan's army had reached Warrenton Junction,[14] and Porter had reported from the neighborhood of Bealton Station; while Sturgis, Cox, and Franklin, were telegraphed from Washington to be just at hand. Pope, therefore, believed, and had a right to believe, that he was to be supported, in the struggle now imminent, by 40,000 to 50,000 veterans from the Army of the Potomac, and had made dispositions and given orders accordingly. He requested Gen. Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to Gainesville; and sent orders to Manassas Junction that the first division which reached that point from Alexandria should halt and take post in the works at that place, pushing forward its cavalry toward Thoroughfare Gap to watch the enemy's movements in that quarter; while Gen. Sturgis, commanding at Alexandria, had already been directed[15] by him to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's, personally superintending the execution of this order.

Sigel, who had slowly moved up the Rappahannock, and encountered[16] a Rebel force at Great Run, two miles below the Sulphur Springs, had easily driven it, but not till it had had time to destroy certain bridges; and the great flood then prevailing compelled him to halt and rebuild them before advancing. Supported by Gens. Reno and Banks, he crossed Great Run next morning[17] and occupied Sulphur Springs under a heavy fire of artillery from the Rebel batteries over the Rappahannock, rebuilding the Sulphur Springs bridge, and pushing forward in the direction of Waterloo Bridge, which was occupied by Gen. Buford's cavalry at noon of that day; Sigel's advance, under Milroy, arriving late in the afternoon: when our army may be said to have been concentrated, facing to the west, with Sigel's corps and Buford's cavalry near the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge, with Banks's behind it; Reno's farther east, and very near Sulphur Springs; McDowell, with Ricketts's and King's divisions, at Warrenton; Heintzelman behind him at Warrenton Junction, where Sturgis and Cox were hourly looked for; while Franklin was expected to come in on his right, and Porter to push forward and join Reno. But unsuccessful fighting and constant marching had by this time reduced Sigel's corps to 9,000 effectives; Banks's to 5,000; McDowell's, including Reynolds's division, to 15,500; and Reno's to 7,000; to which add 4,000 thoroughly used-up cavalry, and Pope's army proper could bring into action hardly 40,000 men. Add to these the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, just arrived from McClellan's army, and it might be said that his whole command numbered nearly 60,000; but Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junction by railroad, without artillery or wagons, with only four rounds of ammunition to the man, and without horses even for his field

[14] August 25. [15] August 22. [16] August 23. [17] August 24.

officers; while Porter, at Warrenton Junction, had a very small supply of provisions and barely 40 rounds of cartridges per man.

Lee, who had by this time nearly his whole army on the Rappahannock, had abandoned the idea of forcing a passage of that river, in favor of an effort, by a long flank movement, to turn our right. To this end, Jackson was directed to take the advance, cross above Waterloo, and move around our army so as to strike the railroad in its rear; while Longstreet, following, was to menace our front and fix Pope's attention until Jackson's hazardous movement should be accomplished.

Jackson moved rapidly across[18] the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill, four miles above Waterloo, and encamped that night at Salem, behind the Bull Run Mountains, between Thoroughfare and Manassas Gaps. Starting early next morning, he passed through Thoroughfare Gap and moved south-easterly by Gainesville, where he was joined by Stuart with two cavalry brigades; striking before dark[19] the Alexandria Railroad at Bristow Station, thus placing himself directly between Pope's far superior force and his base at Alexandria or Washington; having encountered no resistance. In fact, Pope seems to have been completely deceived,[20] with his cavalry still watching for a Rebel advance from the Rappahannock; as two trains of cars, moving northward from Warrenton, arrived at Bristow soon after Jackson, to whom they fell an easy prey.

So far, Jackson's success had been without flaw; but his position was critical, and there was obviously no time to be lost. Weary and footsore as were his men, he at once dispatched Gen. Trimble, with the 21st North Carolina and 21st Georgia infantry, under Stuart—who took part of his cavalry—with orders to strike Manassas Junction, seven miles farther north, carry it at all hazards, and capture the large amount of stores there collected. Stuart moved slowly, because of the darkness of the night, as well as the weariness of his command; but, sending Col. Wickham, with the 4th Virginia cavalry, to the rear of the Junction, he charged and carried it with his infantry before midnight, capturing 8 guns, 300 prisoners, 175 horses, 200 new tents, 10 locomotives, 7 trains loaded with provisions and munitions, and immense quantities of quartermaster and commissary stores. Our forces, consisting of the 11th New York battery and 4 or 5 companies of infantry, seem to have been taken by surprise; which is the more unaccountable since a train, which had barely escaped capture at Bristow, had, some hours before, run by the Junction at full speed, rushing into a down train loaded with soldiers, which was standing on the track at Bull Run bridge, four miles east of Manassas, completely demolishing 5 freight cars, killing 3 sol-

[18] Aug. 25. [19] Aug. 26.

[20] Gen. Banks, from his position near the Rappahannock, reported to Pope at 11:25 A. M. on the 25th, that his Aid, Col. Clark, in charge of the Signal Corps, had observed a general movement of the Rebel army to the west and north. Banks adds: "It seems to be apparent that the enemy is threatening, or moving up *the Valley of the Shenandoah*, via Front Royal, with designs upon the Potomac—possibly beyond." Pope, at Warrenton Junction, at 9:30 that night, sent to McDowell at Warrenton, that, "I believe the whole force of the enemy has marched *for the Shenandoah Valley*, by way of Luray and Front Royal."

diers, and severely wounding others; the conductor and engineer of the fugitive train being themselves badly injured. A surprise at the Junction, whereby 4 of our guns were taken at the first dash of the Rebel cavalry, and an immense amount of property lost, which a well-officered regiment might have saved, could never have occurred in any service but ours.

Col. Scammon, with the 11th and 12th Ohio, of Gen. Cox's division, recently from West Virginia, was stationed at Union Mills, across Bull Run, whither a few of our routed handful at Manassas escaped, giving the alarm. He at once ordered an advance upon the Junction, which brought on, at daylight,[21] a conflict; wherein our men were worsted and driven back across Bull Run Bridge, which Scammon attempted to hold; but by noon he was fairly beaten off, retreating up the railroad toward Alexandria; while part of the Rebel cavalry, justly elated with their triumph, pushed across and raided, burnt, and destroyed at will, at Fairfax, and on to Burke's Station.

Meantime, Brig.-Gen. George W. Taylor, with the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th New Jersey infantry, of Franklin's division, had been sent forward by rail from Alexandria, and, debarking near Centerville, pushed eagerly forward to regain the lost fight; but by this time Jackson, who was quite aware that moments were precious, had brought up from Bristow his own and A. P. Hill's divisions, comprising 10 brigades and 12 batteries: by which Taylor was quickly routed, himself losing a leg in the encounter; the Rebels remaining completely masters of the situation.

Pope, considerably astonished, began by this time to have a realizing sense of his condition. He had this morning[22] ordered McDowell, with Sigel and Reynolds, to move rapidly on Gainesville, so as to reach it that night; while Reno, followed by Kearny's division of Heintzelman's corps, was directed to move on parallel roads to Greenwich, and thence communicate at once with McDowell, supporting him if required. Pope himself, with Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, moved directly up the railroad toward Manassas, ordering Porter to remain at Warrenton Junction until Banks should arrive from Fayetteville, when he should march forthwith on Gainesville, where a battle was anticipated. The trains were instructed to keep in the rear of Hooker, protected by the corps behind him from attack.

Approaching Bristow Station that afternoon, Hooker encountered the division of Ewell, which had been left there by Jackson on his advance to Manassas; when a sharp fight occurred, in which Ewell was overpowered and driven, with a loss of some 300 on each side; Ewell losing a part of his baggage, but burning the bridge and thoroughly destroying the railroad. He of course fell back on Jackson at Manassas; while Hooker, from want of ammunition, was unable vigorously to pursue him.

Jackson, justly afraid of being assailed by Pope's entire army, was forced to evacuate Manassas, moving westward, in order to unite more readily with Longstreet, then known to be approaching; and compelled to burn some thousands of barrels of

[21] Aug. 27.

[22] August 27.

flour, beef, pork, and bacon, whereof the Rebel army stood in greater need than did ours. McDowell, Kearny, and Reno reached, during the night, the positions assigned them by Pope.

Longstreet had only started the day before from the south side of the Rappahannock, opposite Warrenton Springs, and had not yet entered Thoroughfare Gap. Could McDowell but block it effectually with a few regiments and batteries, while the rest of our army was hurled upon Jackson, our triumph must be certain and decisive. Hence Pope, about dark, sent back explicit orders to Porter, at Warrenton Junction, to move forward at 1 A. M.,[32] and report to headquarters at Bristow, 10 miles distant, during the night or early next morning. This order Porter failed to obey; not moving till after daylight, and not reaching Bristow till 10½ A. M.

McDowell was likewise ordered, at 9 P. M.,[34] to press forward, at the very earliest dawn, toward Manassas Junction, resting his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, while Reno advanced simultaneously from Greenwich upon Manassas, and Kearny upon Bristow. Kearny reached Bristow at 8 A. M.,[35] with Reno on his left, and was immediately pushed forward, followed by Hooker, on the track of Ewell. McDowell gave orders for the required movement at 2 A. M.; but Sigel, who held his advance, had not fairly cleared Gainesville at 7½ A. M.

Meantime, Jackson, who was not easily caught napping, had commenced his evacuation of Manassas at 3 A. M., moving viâ Centerville; and thus escaping the destruction which probably awaited him had he persisted in seeking a more immediate junction with Longstreet's advance. Pope reached Manassas, with Kearny's division and Reno's corps, about noon; Jackson having left with his rear-guard an hour earlier. Pope immediately pushed forward all his forces in hand upon Centerville, ordered Porter to come up at once to Manassas, and McDowell to advance toward Centerville. Meanwhile, McDowell, unordered, had detached Ricketts's division and sent it toward Thoroughfare Gap; so that it was no longer available for the directed movement on Centerville.

Late in the afternoon, Kearny occupied Centerville; Jackson's rear-guard retreating by Sudley Springs; while part of his force took the Warrenton turnpike toward Gainesville, impeding our advance on both roads by destroying the bridges over Bull Run and Cub Run. At 6 P. M., Jackson's advance, now moving toward Thoroughfare Gap, encountered King's division of McDowell's corps, and a sanguinary combat ensued, which was terminated by darkness, the advantage being on the side of the Rebels. The loss on both sides was heavy; and among the Rebel wounded were Maj.-Gen. Ewell and Brig.-Gen. Taliaferro; the former severely.

Pope, still at Centerville, was apprised of this collision at 10 P. M., and then felt that he had Jackson sure. Sending orders to McDowell and King to hold their ground at all hazards, and directing Kearny to push forward at 1 A. M.[36] from Centerville, along the Warrenton turnpike, and to hug Jackson close, so as to prevent his retreating northward

[32] August 28. [34] August 27. [35] August 28. [36] August 29.

toward Leesburg; and to Porter, whom he supposed to be now at Manassas Junction, to move upon Centerville at dawn, he confidently expected to have Jackson inclosed and early in the morning assailed by 25,000 on either side, who were to crush him before Longstreet could possibly arrive.

But he was reckoning without his host—or rather, without the other one. Gen. Longstreet's advance had reached Thoroughfare Gap at 3 P. M.,[27] and passed through it; but encountered on this side a superior force, strongly posted, by which it was easily repulsed. As there was no time to be lost, Gen. D. R. Jones, with two brigades, was sent in at once; while Hood, with two others, following a mountain foot-path, attempted to turn our right; and Wilcox, with two more, making a circuit through Hopewell Gap, three miles north, was to come in on our rear.

Ricketts's single division was of course unable to stand against Longstreet's heavy corps, and was driven off with loss, commencing its retreat just at dark. Longstreet's whole force was pushed rapidly through the pass, and, early next day,[28] its van was in Gainesville, pressing on to the rescue of Jackson, its steps quickened by the roar of cannon, and meeting no resistance to the desired concentration; McDowell and King having got out of the way during the night, retreating on Manassas Junction. When Longstreet, before noon, came rapidly into action on the right of Jackson, already hotly engaged, the Rebel army was once more reünited, and felt itself invincible.

Pope, apprised, just before morning, of King's abandonment of the Gainesville road, had sent orders to Sigel, at Groveton, to advance and attack vigorously at daylight, supported by Reynolds; while Heintzelman, with Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, was to push forward from Centerville toward Gainesville; Reno following, with orders to attack promptly and vigorously. Fitz-John Porter, with his own corps and King's division, was to move from Manassas upon the Gainesville road with all speed, with intent to turn Jackson's flank at the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike.

Sigel, who was nearest the enemy, with the division of Schurz forming his right, that of Schenck his left, and the brigade of Milroy between them, advanced, by order, at 5 A. M., and was fully engaged before 7; gaining ground by hard fighting till half past 10, when Milroy and Schurz had advanced a mile, and Schenck two miles, though obstinately resisted by the enemy. But the Rebel strength in their front was constantly increasing, and now assumed the offensive, hurling heavy masses of infantry against our right; which held its ground firmly by the aid of its batteries, but not without heavy loss.

Schenck, being now ordered by Sigel to strike the Rebel assailants in flank and rear, was soon briskly engaged; the enemy attempting to flank him in turn. At this moment, Gen. Kearny's division of Heintzelman's corps arrived on the field, by the Sudley Springs road, and went in on Sigel's right; while Reno, coming up by the Gainesville turnpike, supported our center; and Reynolds,

[27] August 28. [28] August 29.

PLAN OF SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, INCLUDING THE MORE IMPORTANT POSITIONS OCCUPIED FROM AUGUST 27 TO SEPTEMBER 1.

Explanations.

AA—(arrow-heads)—indicate the route pursued by Jackson's forces, viz.: to Manassas Junction, Aug. 27; via Centerville to Groveton and Sudley Springs on the 28th, and on the 1st of September to near Germantown.

The position of Hooker's and Ewell's forces in their engagement on the 27th, near Bristow, is shown; while the position of the commands of McDowell and Sigel, at Gainesville, and Reno and Kearny, at Greenwich, as held that night, are also shown, being indicated by the respective initials, viz.:

M—McDowell.	S—Sigel.
R—Reno.	K—Kearny.

The positions of Gens. McDowell and Sigel were somewhat farther advanced toward Centerville, at the time of their collision with Jackson's advance on the 28th.

A, B, C, represent the lines formed by the commands of Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reynolds, afterward reenforced by McDowell and Reno, and confronted by Jackson (*a*, *b*, *c*), who was afterward reenforced by Longstreet, Aug. 29.

The same position substantially, but extending farther to the left, was held on the 30th, by Heintzelman, Reno, Porter, Sigel, and Reynolds (named in order from right to left), supported by McDowell.

No attempt is made to represent the changes of position which occurred during the two days of severe fighting.

The position of the several commands at Centerville on the 31st August, and near Germantown on the 1st September, are indicated by initials, where the full name does not occur, viz.:

P—Porter.	H—Heintzelman.
F—Franklin.	S—Sigel.
R—Reno.	M—McDowell.

with the Pennsylvania Reserves, came into position, at noon, on our extreme left. About 2 P. M., Gen. Hooker, with Heintzelman's remaining division, came down the Sudley Springs road on our extreme right; and his troops immediately went in to the aid of the wasted and hungry commands of Schurz and Milroy, who were thus enabled to refill their cartridge boxes and obtain some much needed food and rest.

The fighting thence till 4 P. M. was desultory—a succession of heavy skirmishes from point to point along the front; either General being intent on his approaching rëenforcements, and trusting to time as his friend. At 4½, McDowell being announced as at hand, Pope sent a peremptory order to Porter to go into action on the enemy's right, turning it if possible; and, an hour later, presuming this order obeyed, directed Heintzelman and Reno to attack the enemy in front; which order was gallantly obeyed."[29]

And now, though Fitz-John Porter was still missing, and King's division did not reach the field till near sunset, our army was for once superior in numbers; Kearny's and Hooker's fresh regiments pressing forward and crowding back the enemy's left, which had been skillfully disposed for a good part of the day behind the embankment of an abandoned railroad, which served most effectively as a breast-work. At 5 P. M., Kearny, bringing up nearly his entire division, and changing his front to the left, advanced by order, charged the enemy's left and swept back his first line, rolling it up on his center and right. King's division was sent into the fight about sunset, and advanced considerably beyond our general line of battle; but, soon finding itself confronted by a heavier force of the enemy, was brought to a stand. Meantime, Hood charged in turn, with a fresh division of Longstreet's corps, which had marched through the Gap that day and been sent by Lee to the relief of Jackson, now clearly outnumbered. Hood's famous Texas brigade and that of Law rushed forward with great intrepidity, repulsing Kearny's most advanced regiments, taking 1 gun, 4 flags, and 100 prisoners. Darkness arrested the conflict, either army resting on the field of battle; but Pope, with some reason, claiming the advantage, in that he held some ground which had been wrested from the enemy during the day. The losses on either side were probably not far from 7,000 men.

But Pope was really beaten, though he did not yet know it. His aim had been to overwhelm Jackson before Lee, with Longstreet, could come to his assistance; and in this he had conspicuously failed. Had his entire army been in hand and in line of battle by 9 o'clock that morning, his success would have been certain and easy; but, dropping in by brigades and divisions throughout the day, and Porter not even getting into action at all,[30] he had barely held his

[29] Pope, in his official report, says:

"In this attack, Grover's brigade of Hooker's division was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet-charge, breaking two of the enemy's lines, and penetrating to the third before it could be checked."

[30] Pope, in his official report, says:

"About 8 P. M., the greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army. Nothing was heard of Gen. Porter up to that time; and his forces took no part whatever in the action; but were suffered by him to lie idle on their

own; and now his opportunity had vanished. Longstreet's corps had been arriving throughout the day, and was now all present—much of it perfectly fresh, so far as fighting was concerned, and ready for most effective service on the morrow.

Pope, so often disappointed and baffled, found his fighting force reduced by casualties and by straggling, on the morning of that eventful morrow, to about 40,000 men.[31] These had had a surfeit of marching and fighting, with very little eating, for the two preceding days; while his artillery and cavalry horses had been ten days in harness, and two days without food. To his appeal of the 28th to Gen. Halleck for rations, for forage, and fresh horses, he had that morning at daylight[32] received an answer from Gen. Franklin, written by direction of Gen. McClellan, and dated 8 P. M. of the 29th, informing him that rations would be loaded in the available wagons and cars at Alexandria *so soon as he would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains.* If cavalry had been ever so necessary to the guarding of railroad trains, he had probably not then a regiment that could have gone to Alexandria and back within 48 hours. He had received no reënforcements or supplies since the 26th, and had no assurance that any were on the way. To retreat was difficult; to stand still and famish unadvisable; so he ordered Porter, supported by King, to advance down the Warrenton turnpike and attack; while Heintzelman and Reno, supported by Ricketts's division, were to assail and turn the enemy's left.

Porter's attack was feeble; and not unreasonably so, since he encountered the enemy in greatly superior numbers, and was speedily thrown

arms, within sight and sound of the battle during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that, if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently reënforced to have made an effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given Gen. Porter an order to march toward the enemy, in a particular direction, to send him in addition specific orders to attack; it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe—in fact, I am positive—that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, Gen. Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that, if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet; and that the army of Gen. Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character."

[31] In his official report, he says:

"At that time, my effective force, greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing, and broken-down men, during the severe operations of the two or three days and nights previous; the sharp actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th, were estimated by me and others as follows: McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, 12,000 men; Sigel's corps, 7,000; Reno's corps, 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, 7,000; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about 12,000 men, including the brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis's division, and the only portion that ever joined me. But of this force the brigades of Piatt and Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about 5,000 men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th for Centerville, and were not available for operations on that day. This reduced Porter's effective force in the field to about 7,000 men; which gave me a total force of 40,000 men. Banks's corps, about 5,000 strong, was at Bristow Station, in charge of the railroad trains, and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army, still at that place."

[32] Aug. 30

back in confusion; the Confederates pursuing eagerly and joining battle along the entire front, but struggling especially to overwhelm and turn our left, where Schenck, Milroy, and Reynolds, soon rëenforced by Ricketts, maintained the unequal contest throughout the afternoon; while Porter's weakened corps was rallied, reformed, and pushed up to their support; rendering good service, especially the brigade of regulars under Col. Buchanan. Gen. Tower led his brigade, of Ricketts's division, into action, in support of Reynolds, with eminent skill and gallantry; its conduct being such as to elicit enthusiastic cheers from our entire left wing. Reno's corps, also, being withdrawn from our right center, was thrown into action on our left, and displayed conspicuous gallantry.

But the fates were against us. The enemy was aware of his advantage, and resolved to press it to the utmost. Our attack on his left, under Jackson, for a time promised success; until our advancing troops were mowed down by the cross-fire of 4 batteries from Longstreet's left, which decimated and drove them back in confusion. Jackson, seeing them recoil, immediately ordered an advance; which Longstreet supported by pushing forward his whole command against our center and left. Hood's two brigades again led the charge, followed by the divisions of Evans, R. H. Anderson, and Wilcox, sustained by those of Kemper and D. R. Jones; the Rebel artillery doing fearful execution on our disordered and recoiling infantry. At dark, our left had been forced back considerably, but still stood firm and unbroken, and still covered the turnpike which was our only safe line of retreat. At 8 P. M., Pope sent written instructions to his corps commanders to withdraw deliberately toward Centerville, designating the route of each, and the position he was to take; while Reno was ordered to cover the retreat; which was made slowly, quietly, and in good order: no pursuit across Bull Run being attempted.[33]

Franklin's corps, from McClellan's army, reported 8,000 strong, was, unknown to Pope, throughout this mournful day, a little east of Centerville.[34] Pope reached that point between 9 and 10 P. M., and at once made his dispositions for resisting a Rebel attack. But none was attempted. Sumner, as well as Franklin, from McClellan's army, joined him here, raising his total force to fully 60,000 men; which was probably more than the enemy could now bring against him.

Pope evidently expected to be at-

[33] Lee, in his official report, says:

"The obscurity of night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning; when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position of Centerville, about four miles beyond Bull Run. The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during the night, threatened to render Bull Run impassable, and impeded our movements. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the attention of the enemy, and cover the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded; while Jackson proceeded by Sudley's Ford to the Little River turnpike, to turn the enemy's right and intercept his retreat to Washington. Jackson's progress was retarded by the inclemency of the weather and the fatigue of his troops; who, in addition to their arduous marches, had fought three severe engagements in as many days. He reached Little River turnpike in the evening, and the next day, September 1st, advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court House."

[34] Pope, in his official report, says:

"About 6 P. M., I heard *accidentally* that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centerville, and 12 miles in our rear, and that it was only about 8,000 strong."

tacked next morning in this strong position; but Lee, not unmindful of the still recent and sore experience of Malvern Heights, was too good a General to repeat his own blunders. Aware that a demoralized army under an inapt commander may be most safely and surely assailed on its flank and rear—by blows that threaten to cut off its line of supply and retreat—he started Jackson northward, with his own and Ewell's divisions, at an early hour next morning,[35] with instructions to turn and assail our right. Crossing Bull Run at Sudley Ford, Jackson took a country road thence to Little River turnpike, on which, turning sharply to the right, he moved down toward Fairfax C. H.; and, toward evening of the next day,[36] when nearing the little village of Germantown, a mile or two from Fairfax C. H., he found his advance resisted. Pope, not even threatened with a front attack, had ere this suspected the Rebels of a fresh attempt to flank his right, and had directed Gen. Sumner to push forward two brigades toward the turnpike, while Gen. Hooker was that afternoon dispatched to Fairfax C. H. to support the movement.

Skirmishing commenced at 5 P. M. Gen. Reno, near Chantilly, with the remains of two divisions, poorly supplied with ammunition, found himself confronted by Jackson's far superior numbers, but composed wholly of infantry; the rapidity of his march having left his artillery behind on the road. Gen. Isaac J. Stevens, commanding Reno's 2d or left division, at once ordered a charge, and was shot dead while leading it, by a bullet through his head. His command thereupon fell back in disorder, uncovering the flank of Reno's other division, which thereupon fell back also.

Gen. Phil. Kearny, with his division of Heintzelman's corps, now advanced and renewed the action, in the midst of a thunder-storm so furious that ammunition could with great difficulty be kept serviceable; while the roar of cannon was utterly unheard at Centerville, barely three miles distant. Riding forward too recklessly, Kearny, about sunset, was shot dead, when almost within the Rebel lines, and the command of his division devolved on Gen. Birney, who promptly ordered a bayonet-charge by his own brigade, consisting of the 1st, 38th, and 40th New York. The order was executed by Col. Egan with great gallantry, and the enemy's advance driven back considerably; Gen. Birney holding the field of conflict through the night, burying our dead and removing our wounded. Our total loss here cannot have exceeded 500 men; but among them were Gens. Kearny and Stevens, and Maj. Tilden, 38th New York, who fell in the closing bayonet-charge.

Jackson's flanking movement and attack, though wisely conceived and vigorously made, had failed to achieve any material results. His report claims no prisoners nor arms captured.[37]

Pope's retreat from Centerville

[35] August 31. [36] Sept. 1.

[37] He says:

"Early next morning, Sept. 1st, we moved forward; and, late in the evening, after reaching Ox Hill, came in contact with the enemy, who were in position on our right and front, covering his line of retreat from Centerville to Fairfax Court House. Our line of battle was formed—Gen. Hill's division on the right; Ewell's division, Gen. Lawton commanding, in

had in effect commenced on the 1st, when he found himself flanked by Jackson; and was continued throughout that and the following day, without further annoyance from the enemy, until his whole army was drawn back within the intrenchments which, along the south bank of the Potomac, cover the approaches to Washington; when he resigned his command, and was succeeded by Gen. McClellan.

Gen. Lee officially claims to have captured, during his campaign against Pope, more than 7,000 prisoners, beside 2,000 of our wounded left in his hands, with 30 pieces of artillery, and 20,000 small arms; while our losses of railroad cars, munitions, tents, and camp equipage, must have been immense. Lee's Medical Director makes the Rebel losses in the two days' fighting on Manassas Plains, 1,090 killed, 6,154 wounded: total, 7,244. Longstreet reports his losses from the 23d to the 30th of August, inclusive, at 4,725. A. P. Hill reports the losses in his division, from the 24th to the 31st, at 1,548. Probably the entire Rebel loss from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly did not fall short of 15,000 men; while Pope's, if we include that by stragglers who never rejoined their regiments, must have been fully double that number. Among our killed, beside those already named, were Cols. Fletcher Webster, son of the great Daniel, Roberts, 1st Mich., O'Connor, 2d Wisc., Koltes, 73d Pa., commanding a brigade, Cantwell, 82d Ohio, and Brown, 20th Ind. Among our wounded on the 30th, were Maj.-Gen. Robert C. Schenck and Col. Hardin, of the Pa. Reserves. Among the Rebels wounded in these fights, were Brig.-Gens. Field and Trimble, and Cols. Forno and Baylor, commanding brigades.

How far Pope's disasters are justly attributable to his own incapacity, and how far to the failure or withholding of support on which he had a right to calculate, it is time now to consider. In his report, he says:

"It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the Army of the Potomac, to state precisely what forces of that army came under my command, and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, about 2,500, joined me on the 23d of August, at Rappahannock Station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about 18,000 strong, joined me on the 26th and and 27th of August, at Warrenton Junction. The Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after they had reported to me. Porter's corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays, and frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever except in

the center, and Jackson's division, Gen. Starke commanding, on the left—all on the right of the turnpike road. Artillery was posted on an eminence to the left of the road. The brigades of Branch and Field, Col. Brockenbrough commanding the latter, were sent forward to feel and engage the enemy. A cold and drenching thunder-shower swept over the field at this time, striking directly into the faces of our troops. These two brigades gallantly engaged the enemy; but so severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch's brigade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back. The brigades of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender were then thrown into the fight. Soon, a portion of Ewell's division became engaged. The conflict now raged with great fury; the enemy obstinately and desperately contesting the ground until their Gens. Kearny and Stevens fell in front of Thomas's brigade; after which, they retired from the field. By the following morning, the Federal army had entirely disappeared from our view; and it soon appeared, by a report from Gen. Stuart, that it had passed Fairfax Court House and had moved in the direction of Washington city."

the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in that campaign. By the time the corps of Franklin and Sumner, 19,000 strong, joined me at Centerville, the original Army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman, and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had been engaged, and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required, and should have had, some days of rest to put them into anything like condition to perform their duties in the field."

Gen. McClellan, we have seen, was ordered on the 3d of August to withdraw his army from the Peninsula. He hesitated, and remonstrated; but the orders were reiterated more peremptorily; and he left Harrison's Bar with his rear-guard on the 16th of August. Having embarked and dispatched his corps successively at and near Fortress Monroe, he left that post on the 23d, arriving at Acquia creek on the 24th, removing to Alexandria on the 27th; on which day Halleck telegraphed him:

"Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as far as possible, by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centerville."

To this, he replied, at 10:20 A. M.:

"I have sent orders to Franklin to *prepare* to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation."

At 1:15 P. M., he again telegraphed Gen. Halleck as follows:

"Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connexion with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the Valley?"

Half an hour later, he telegraphed:

"I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible; but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry."

An hour later, he telegraphed again:

"I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac.

"I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark."

At 6 P. M., he telegraphed again:

"I have just received the copy of a dispatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 A. M., this morning, in which he says: 'All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right at Gainesville.'

"I now have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, about 2,800 of Gen. Tyler's brigade, and Col. Tyler's 1st Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defense of Washington.

"If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate.

"In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order Gen. Casey to hold his men for [from] Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them off till further orders."

At 4:40 P. M. next day, Aug. 28th, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck:

"Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be held at any

cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a good corps of troops there. It is the key to Washington, which connot be seriously menaced so long as it is held."

At 4:45 P. M., he telegraphed again:

"Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aids to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler; but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field; and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out."

To these dispatches, Gen. Halleck, at 8:40 P. M., responded as follows:

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

At 10:30 of the following day[28]—the day of Pope's first indecisive battle at Gainesville or Groveton—McClellan telegraphed to Gen. Halleck as follows:

"Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving Gen. Cox to Upton's Hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon, however. Detailed last night two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Acquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived; have but three squadrons. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much, if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Dranesville?"

At noon, he telegraphed again:

"Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation. Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown?

"Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?"

Gen. McClellan had already directed Franklin to halt his command near Anandale; and, at 1 P. M. this day, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck as follows:

"I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who, I really think, ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond Anandale?"

Halleck, at 3 P. M., replied:

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going farther. Otherwise, he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people *must* move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses."

Fifteen minutes before, McClellan had telegraphed the President as follows:

"I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: 1st. To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; 2d. To *leave Pope to get out of his scrape*, and at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe.

"No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish

[28] August 29.

to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer."

To which the President, at 4:10 P. M., responded as follows:

"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative—to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope'—is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels.

"A. LINCOLN."

But McClellan had already not only arrested Franklin's march at Anandale, but sent Sumner's corps northward toward Arlington and Chain Bridge, instead of toward the enemy. At 7:50 P. M., Halleck telegraphed him thus:

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps *must* push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas."

McClellan, at 8 P. M., telegraphed to Halleck:

"It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 P. M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow."

At 10 P. M., Gen. McClellan telegraphed again:

"Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope by advancing, as soon as possible, and, at the same time, cover the transit of Pope's supplies. Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with the least possible delay."

Gen. Halleck, at 9:40 A. M. on the fatal 30th, telegraphed McClellan:

"I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department would have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly."

At 11 A. M., McClellan responded:

"Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?"

To which Halleck, at 12:20 P. M., responded as follows:

"I think Couch should land at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives."

Franklin's and Sumner's corps were now actually pushed forward, and found Pope without difficulty, defeated and driven back on Centerville. Had they been there two days earlier, and had Porter now and then condescended to obey an order, that defeat might have been transformed into a victory. It seems clear that neither McClellan, nor any of his devoted lieutenants, was anxious that victory, under such auspices, should be achieved. Pope's appointment to the command, and his address to his army on opening the campaign,[*] had been understood by them as reflecting on the strategy of the Peninsular campaign; and this was their mode of resenting the indignity.

[*] See page 173.

IX.

'MY MARYLAND'—LEE'S INVASION.

GEN. McCLELLAN had already[1] been verbally charged with the command of the defenses of Washington; and was, upon fuller advices of Pope's disasters, invested[2] by the President and Gen. Halleck with the entire control, not only of those fortifications, but of "all the troops for the defense of the capital," in obedience to the imperious demand of a large majority of the surviving officers and soldiers. Pope's original army had in great part been demolished; while that brought from the Peninsula by McClellan had been taught to attribute the general ill-fortune not to the tardiness and heartlessness wherewith Pope had been rëenforced and supported by their leaders, but to his own incapacity, presumption, and folly. McClellan at once ordered a concentration of his forces within the defenses of Washington; where they were soon prepared to resist the enemy, but whither Lee had no idea of following them. Having been joined[3] by D. H. Hill's fresh division, from Richmond, he sent that division at once in the van of his army to Leesburg; thence crossing the Potomac and moving on Frederick. Jackson followed with a heavy corps, consisting of A. P. Hill's, Ewell's, and his own divisions, embracing 14 brigades, crossing[4] at White's Ford and moving on Frederick, which was occupied on the 6th, without resistance. Gen. Lee, with the rest of his army, rapidly followed, concentrating at Frederick; whence he issued the following seductive address:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, NEAR FREDERICK, Sept. 8, 1862.

"*To the People of Maryland:*

"It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.

"The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties, and reduced to the condition of a conquered province.

"Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned, upon no charge, and contrary to all the forms of law.

"A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a venerable and illustrious Marylander,[5] to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt.

"The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your Legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed; words have been declared offenses by an arbitrary decree of the Federal Executive; and citizens ordered to be tried by military commissions for what they may dare to speak.

"Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such a Government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the independence and sovereignty of your State.

"In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled.

"This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. No restraint upon your free will is intended—no intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. We know no enemies

[1] Sept. 1. [2] Sept. 2. [3] Sept. 2. [4] Sept. 5. [5] Roger B. Taney, to wit.

among you, and will protect all of you in every opinion.

"It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.

"R. E. LEE, General Commanding."

The fond expectations which had prompted this address were never realized. The Marylanders had no gluttonous appetite for fighting on the side of the Union; still less for risking their lives in support of the Confederacy. All who were inclined to fighting on that side had found their way into the Rebel lines long before; there being little difficulty in stealing across the Potomac, and none at all in crossing by night to Virginia from the intensely disloyal, slaveholding counties of south-western Maryland. In vain was Gen. Bradley T. Johnson—who had left Frederick at the outset of the war to serve in the Rebel army—made Provost-Marshal of that town, recruiting offices opened, and all manner of solicitations to enlistment set forth. The number of recruits won to the Rebel standard while it floated over Maryland probably just about equaled its loss by deserters—say from 200 to 300.

The conduct of the Rebel soldiery was in the main exemplary. Hungry, ragged, and shoeless, as they often were, they rarely entered a house except by order, and never abused women; but cattle, horses, and everything that might contribute to the subsistence or efficiency of an army, were seized by wholesale, not only for present use, but thousands of animals were driven across the Potomac to replenish their wasted and inadequate resources.

Gen. McClellan was early apprised[6] of the disappearance of the Rebels from his front, and soon advised that they were crossing into Maryland. His several corps were accordingly brought across the Potomac and posted on the north of Washington; which city he left[7] in command of Gen. Banks, making his headquarters that night with the 6th corps, at Rockville. He moved slowly, because uncertain, as were his superiors, that the Rebel movement across the Potomac was not a feint. But his advance, after a brisk skirmish, on the 12th entered Frederick, which the Rebels had evacuated, moving westward, during the two preceding days, and through which his main body passed next day. Here he was so lucky as to obtain a copy of Lee's general order, only four days old, developing his prospective movements, as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, September 9, 1862.

"The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's command will form the advance; and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.

"Gen. Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

"Gen. McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

"Gen. Walker, with his division, after

[6] Sept. 3.

[7] Sept. 7.

accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning; Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with Gen. McLaws and Gen. Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.

"Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance and supply trains, &c., will precede Gen. Hill.

"Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Gens. Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

"The commands of Gens. Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

"Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, &c.

"By command of Gen. R. E. Lee.

"R. H. Chilton,

"Assistant Adjutant-General.

"Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, Com'ding Div."

McClellan had thus, by a rare stroke of good fortune, become possessed of his adversary's designs, when it was too late to change them, and when it could not be known to that adversary, at least until developed by counteracting movements, that he had this knowledge, and was acting upon it. Lee had ventured the hazardous maneuver of dividing his army in a hostile country, and placing a considerable and treacherous, though fordable, river between its parts, while an enemy superior in numbers to the whole of it hung closely upon its rear. Such strategy must have been dictated by an ineffable contempt either for the capacity of his antagonist or for the most obvious rules of war.

The order above given rendered it clear not only that Harper's Ferry was Lee's object, and that Jackson's corps and Walker's division were ere this across the Potomac in eager quest of it, but that only McLaws's corps—20,000 men at the utmost—was now between our whole army and the coveted prize. Our corps happened then to be mainly concentrated around Frederick; but Franklin's division—nearly 17,000 strong—was some miles southward, and thus nearer to Harper's Ferry, and in front of McLaws. Had McClellan instantly put his whole army in motion, marching by the left flank on parallel roads leading directly toward the Potomac and the Ferry, and sending orders to Franklin to advance and either force his way to the Ferry or engage whomsoever might attempt to resist him, assured that corps after corps would follow swiftly his advance and second his attacks, McLaws must have been utterly crushed before sunset of the 14th, and Harper's Ferry relieved by midnight at farthest. That, instead of this, McClellan should have advanced his main body on the road tending rather north of west, through Turner's Gap to Boonsborough and Hagerstown, rather than on roads leading to Crampton's Gap and to the Potomac, is unexplained and inexplicable.

The 'South Mountain' range of hills, which stretch north-eastwardly from the Potomac across Maryland, are a modified continuation of Virginia's 'Blue Ridge,' as the less considerable Catoctin range, near Frederick, are an extension of the 'Bull Run' range. Between them is the valley of Catoctin creek, some ten miles wide at the Potomac, but nar-

rowing to a point at its head. Several roads cross both ranges; the best being the National Road from Baltimore through Frederick and Middletown (the chief village of the Catoctin Valley), to Hagerstown and Cumberland.

Lee, having divided his army in order to swoop down on Harper's Ferry, was compelled by McClellan's quickened and assured pursuit, based on the captured order aforesaid, to fight all our army with half of his own—reversing the strategy usual in this quarter; for, if McClellan's advance were not impeded, Harper's Ferry would be relieved. So, Gen. Pleasanton, leading our cavalry advance on the road to Hagerstown, encountered some resistance[8] at the crossing of Catoctin creek in Middletown; but, skirmishing occasionally with Stuart's cavalry, pressed on, backed by Cox's division of Burnside's corps, to find the enemy in force before TURNER'S GAP of South Mountain, a few miles beyond.

This gap is about 400 feet high; the crests on either side rising some 600 feet higher; the old Hagerstown and Sharpsburg roads, half a mile to a mile distant, on either side, rising higher than the National Road, and materially increasing the difficulty of holding the pass against a largely superior force.

Lee, in his eagerness to grasp the prize whereon he was intent, and in his confident assurance that McClellan would continue the cautious and hesitating movement of six or seven miles a day by which he had hitherto advanced from Washington, had pushed Longstreet forward on Jackson's track to Hagerstown,[9] whence six of his brigades, under Anderson, had been sent to cooperate with McLaws against Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. This left only D. H. Hill's division of five brigades to hold Turner's Gap and the adjacent passes, with such help as might be afforded by Stuart's cavalry; Stuart having reported to Hill, on the 13th, that only two brigades were pursuing them. He was undeceived, however, when, at 7 A. M. next morning, Cox's division of Burnside's corps advanced up the turnpike from Middletown, preceded by Pleasanton's cavalry and a battery, and opened on that defending the Gap; while by far the larger portion of the Army of the Potomac could be seen, by the aid of a good field-glass, from a favorable position on the mountain, either advancing across the valley or winding down the opposite heights into it.

Hill reports his division as but 5,000 strong; and even this small force had been somewhat dispersed in pursuance of the orders of Lee and the erroneous information of Stuart. The brigade of Gen. Garland, which was first pushed forward to meet our advance, was instantly and badly cut up, its commander being killed; when it retired in disorder, and was replaced by that of Anderson, supported by those of Rhodes and Ripley, who held the pass firmly for hours against the most gallant efforts of Cox's Ohio regiments. But, meanwhile, our superior numbers, backed by desperate fighting, enabled us steadily to gain ground on either side, until the crest of the heights on the left of the pass was fairly ours, though one of our batteries had

[8] Sept. 13.

[9] Sept. 11.

meantime been all but lost; its gunners having been shot down or driven off, and its guns saved from capture only by a determined charge of the 23d Ohio, 100th Pennsylvania, and 45th New York.



SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

The rattle of musketry ceased at noon, and for two hours only the roar of cannon was heard; the combatants on either side awaiting the arrival of rëenforcements. Hitherto, only Reno's division on our side, and Hill's on that of the Rebels, had been engaged. But, at 2 P. M., Hooker's corps came up on our side, and took the old Hagerstown road, leading away from the turnpike on our right, with intent to flank and crush the Rebel left. At 3 P. M., our line of battle was formed, with Ricketts's division on the right; King's, commanded by Hatch, in the center, with its right resting on the turnpike, and Reno's on the left; and a general advance commenced, under a heavy fire of artillery.

Meantime, Hill had sent pressing messages to Longstreet, at Hagerstown, for help; and two brigades had already arrived; as Longstreet himself, with seven more brigades, did very soon afterward; raising the Rebel force in action thereafter to some 25,000 or 30,000 men. Longstreet, ranking Hill, of course took command; little to the satisfaction of Hill, who evidently thinks *he* could have done much better.[19]

The enemy's advantage in position was still very great, every movement on our part being plainly visible to them; while we could know nothing of their positions nor their strength, except from their fire and its effect. Our men were constantly struggling up rocky steeps, mainly wooded, where every wall, or fence, or inequality of ground, favors the combatants who stand on the defensive. The disparity in numbers between those actually engaged was not very great—possibly three to two—but then, our men were inspirited by the

[19] Hill, in his official report, says:

"Maj.-Gen. Longstreet came up about 4 o'clock, with the commands of Brig.-Gens. Evans and D. R. Jones. I had now become familiar with the ground and knew all the vital points; and, had these troops reported to me, the result might have been different. As it was, they took wrong positions: and, in their exhausted condition after a long march, they were broken and scattered."

consciousness that a great army stood behind them.

Still, the ground was stubbornly contested, foot by foot; Gen. Hatch, commanding the 1st division, being disabled by a wound, and succeeded by Gen. A. Doubleday. Col. Wainwright, 76th New York, who now took command of Doubleday's brigade, was likewise wounded. But Hooker steadily advanced; and had fairly flanked and worsted the Rebel left, when darkness put an end to the fray.

The struggle on our left commenced later, and was signalized by similar gallantry on both sides; but numbers prevailed over desperation, and the Rebels were steadily forced back until the crest of the mountain was won. Here fell, about sunset, Maj.-Gen. Jesse L. Reno, mortally wounded by a musket-ball, while, at the head of his division, he was watching through a glass the enemy's movements.

Gen. Meade, with the Pennsylvania Reserves, had followed Hooker from Catoctin creek up the old Hagerstown road, so far as Mount Tabor church. He went into action on the right of Hatch's division, and was soon heavily engaged; his brigades being admirably handled by Gen. Seymour and Cols. Magilton and Gallagher, the last of whom was wounded. It had not fully reached the summit in its front, when darkness arrested the conflict. Gen. Duryea's brigade of Ricketts's division, which had been ordered to its support, was just then coming into action.

Our advance up the turnpike in the center, being contingent on success at either side, was made last, by Gibbon's brigade of Hatch's, and Hartsuff's of Ricketts's division; the artillery fighting its way up the road, with the infantry supporting on either side. The struggle here was obstinate, and protracted till 9 o'clock, when Gibbon's brigade had nearly reached the top of the pass, and had exhausted every cartridge; suffering, of course, severely. At midnight, it was relieved by Gorman's brigade of Sumner's corps, which, with Williams's, had reached the foot of the mountain a little after dark. Richardson's division had also arrived, and taken position in the rear of Hooker; while Sykes's division of regulars and the artillery reserve had halted for the night at Middletown; so that McClellan had most of his army in hand, ready to renew the action next morning.

But Lee, who was also present, and whose end had been secured by the precious hours here gained for his Harper's Ferry operations, withdrew his forces during the night; so that, when our skirmishers advanced next morning, they encountered only the dead and the desperately wounded."[11]

[11] Gen. McClellan sent four successive dispatches to Gen. Halleck concerning this affair; whereof the following is the latest and most erroneous:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"BOLIVAR, Sept. 15—10 A. M.

"To H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

"Information this moment received completely confirms the rout and demoralization of the Rebel army. Gen. Lee is reported wounded and Garland killed. Gen. Hooker alone has over a thousand more prisoners; 700 having been sent to Frederick. It is stated that Lee gives his loss as *fifteen thousand*. We are following as rapidly as the men can move.

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major-Gen."

McClellan seems here to suppose that he had fought and beaten the main body of the Rebel army; yet how *could* he think so with Lee's order of the 9th before him?

McClellan states his losses in this affair at 312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 missing: total, 1,568; claims about 1,500 prisoners—no guns—and says: "The loss to the enemy in killed was much greater than our own, and probably also in wounded." This is hardly credible; since the Rebels fought with every advantage of position and shelter, and were nowhere so driven as to lose heavily by a fire upon huddled, disorganized masses, when retreating in disorder."[12]

Maj.-Gen. Franklin, with the 6th corps, composed of his own, Couch's, and Sykes's divisions, forming the left wing of McClellan's army, had advanced cautiously up the north bank of the Potomac, through Tenallytown, Darnestown, and Poolesville—his right passing through Rockville—until McClellan's discovery that Lee had divided his army in order to clutch Harper's Ferry induced a general quickening of movement on our side. Still advancing, he approached, at noon on the 14th, the pass through CRAMPTON'S GAP in the South Mountain, just beyond Burkettsville, several miles southwestward of that at which Burnside, leading our main advance, had, some hours earlier, found his march obstructed by Hill. Before him was Howell Cobb, with two or three brigades of McLaws's division, whereof the larger portion was some miles farther on, operating against Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. The Gap afforded good positions for defense; but the disparity of numbers was decisive; and Cobb—who, of course, had orders to hold on at any cost—was finally driven out, after a smart contest of four or five hours, wherein his force was badly cut up. Our loss here was 115 killed and 418 wounded; our trophies, 400 prisoners, one gun, and 700 small arms. Could Franklin but have realized how precious were the moments, he was still in time to have relieved Harper's Ferry; whence, following up his advantage with moderate vigor, he was but six miles distant when it surrendered at 8 next morning.

Stonewall Jackson, leaving Frederick on the 10th, had pushed swiftly through Middletown and Boonsborough to Williamsport, where he recrossed the Potomac next day; striking thence at Martinsburg, which was held by Gen. Julius White, with some 2,000 Unionists. But White, warned of Jackson's approach in overwhelming strength, fled during the night of the 11th to Harper's Ferry; where he found Col. D. S. Miles, of Bull Run dishonor, in command of some 10,000 men, partly withdrawn from Winchester and other points up the Valley, but in good part composed of green regiments, hastily levied on tidings of the Chickahominy disasters, and officered by local politicians, who had never yet seen a shot fired at a line of armed men. White ranked Miles, and should have taken command; but he waived his right in deference to Miles's experience as an old army officer, and offered to serve under him; which was accepted.

Jackson, who had cheaply acquired

[12] Hill says that Gen. Rhodes, commanding one of his brigades, estimates his loss at 422 out of 1,200 taken into action. Col. Gayle, 12th Alabama, was among his killed; and Col. O'Neal, 24th, and Lt.-Col. Pickens, 12th Alabama, were severely wounded.

a good supply of provisions and munitions at Martinsburg, did not allow himself to be detained by them; but, hurrying on, was before Harper's Ferry at 11 A. M. of the 13th. Waiting only to ascertain that McLaws, who was to cöoperate on the other side of the Potomac, and Walker, who was dispatched simultaneously from Frederick, with orders to cross the Potomac at Point of Rocks and come up on the south, so as to shut in and assail our garrison from that side of the Shenandoah, were already in position, he ordered A. P. Hill, with his division, to move down the north bank of the Shenandoah into Harper's Ferry; while Lawton, with Ewell's, and J. R. Jones, with Jackson's own division, were to advance upon and threaten the beleaguered Unionists farther and farther to their right.

Harper's Ferry is little more than a deep ravine or gorge, commanded on three sides by steep mountains, and of course defensible only from one or more of these. A commander who was neither a fool nor a traitor, seeing enemies swarming against him from every side, would either have evacuated in haste, and tried to make his way out of the trap, or concentrated his force on one of the adjacent heights, and here held out, until time had been afforded for his relief. Miles did neither. He posted[13] the 32d Ohio, Col. T. H. Ford, on Maryland Heights; where they were rëenforced[14] by the 39th and 126th New York, and next day by the 115th New York and part of a Maryland regiment. Ford's requisition for axes and spades was not filled; and the only 10 axes that could be obtained were used in constructing[15] a slight breastwork of trees near the crest, with an abatis in its front; where McLaws's advance appeared and commenced skirmishing the same day.



HARPER'S FERRY.

An attack in force was made, early next morning,[16] and was repulsed; but was followed at 9 o'clock by another and more determined, when—Col. E. Sherrill, 126th New York, being severely wounded—his regiment broke and fled in utter rout, and the remaining regiments soon followed the example, alleging an order to retreat from Maj. Hewitt, who denied having given it. Our men were rallied after running a short distance, and rëoccupied part of the ground they had so culpably abandoned, but did not regain their breastwork; and of course left the enemy in a commanding position. At 2 o'clock next morning,[17] Ford, without being further assailed, abandoned the Heights, so far as we still retained them, spiking his guns: 4 of which, at a later hour in the morning, were brought off by four companies, under Maj. Wood, who went over on a reconnoissance and encountered no opposition.

McLaws, with his own and Anderson's divisions, leaving Frederick on the 10th, had entered Pleasant Valley,

[13] Sept. 5. [14] Sept. 12. [15] Sept. 12. [16] Sept. 13. [17] Sept. 14.

via Burkettsville, on the 11th; and, perceiving at once that Maryland Heights was the key of the position, had sent[18] Kershaw, with his own and Barksdale's brigades, up a rugged mountain road, impracticable for artillery, to the crest of the Elk Mountains, two or three miles northward of Maryland Heights, with orders to follow along that crest, and so approach and carry our position; while Wright's brigade, with 2 guns, was to take post on the southern face of South Mountain, and so command all the approaches along the Potomac. Meanwhile, McLaws, with the rest of his force, save the brigades holding Crampton's Gap, moved down Pleasant Valley to the river.

Kershaw advanced according to order, through dense woods and over very rough ground, until he encountered and worsted Ford's command on the Heights, as we have seen; while Wright and Anderson took, unopposed, the positions assigned them, and McLaws advanced to Sandy Hook, barring all egress from Harper's Ferry down the Potomac.

The morning of the 14th was spent by McLaws in cutting a road practicable for artillery to the crest of Maryland Heights, whence fire was opened from 4 guns at 2 P. M.; not only shelling our forces at the Ferry, but commanding our position on Bolivar Heights, beyond it. Before night, Walker's guns opened likewise from Loudon Heights, and Jackson's batteries were playing from several points, some of them enfilading our batteries on Bolivar Heights; while shots from others reached our helpless and huddled men in their rear. During the night, Col. Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, ferried 10 of Ewell's guns across the Shenandoah, and established them where they could take in reverse our best intrenchments on Bolivar Heights; soon compelling their evacuation and our retreat to an inferior position, considerably nearer the Ferry, and of course more exposed to and commanded by McLaws's guns on Maryland Heights.

At 9 P. M.,[19] our cavalry, some 2,000 strong, under Col. Davis, 12th Illinois, made their escape from the Ferry, across the pontoon-bridge, to the Maryland bank; passing up the Potomac unassailed, through a region swarming with enemies, to the mouth of the Antietam, thence striking northward across Maryland, reaching Greencastle, Pa., next morning; having captured by the way the ammunition train of Gen. Longstreet, consisting of 50 to 60 wagons. Miles assented to this escape; but refused permission to infantry officers who asked leave to cut their way out: saying he was ordered to hold the Ferry to the last extremity.

Next morning at daybreak,[20] the Rebel batteries reopened from seven commanding points, directing their fire principally at our batteries on Bolivar Heights. At 7 A. M., Miles stated to Gen. White that a surrender was inevitable, his artillery ammunition being all but exhausted; when the brigade commanders were called together and assented. A white flag was thereupon raised; but the Rebels, not perceiving it, continued their fire some 30 to 40 minutes, whereby Miles was mortally wounded. Jackson was just impelling a general infantry attack, when informed that the

[18] Sept. 12. [19] Sept. 14. [20] Sept. 15.

white flag had been raised on the defenses. At 8 A. M., a capitulation was agreed to, under which 11,583 men were passed over to the enemy —about half of them New Yorkers; the residue mainly from Ohio and Maryland. Nearly all were raw levies; some of them militia, called out for three months. Among the spoils were 73 guns, ranging from excellent to worthless; 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and a large quantity of tents and camp-equipage. Of horses, provisions, and munitions, the captures were of small account.

Jackson, whose appreciation of the value of time was unsurpassed, did not wait to receive the surrender; but, leaving that duty to Hill, hurried off the mass of his followers to rejoin Gen. Lee; and, by marching day and night, reached the Antietam next morning.[21]

It is impossible to resist the conclusion that Miles, in this affair, acted the part of a traitor. He had been ordered, one month before his surrender, to fortify Maryland Heights; which he totally neglected to do. He refused or neglected to send the axes and spades required by Col. Ford, giving no reason therefor. He paroled, on the 13th, 16 Rebel prisoners, authorizing them to pass out of our lines into those of the enemy; thus giving the Rebel commanders the fullest knowledge of all wherewith ours should have wished to keep them ignorant. Another Rebel, an officer named Rouse, who had been captured and had escaped, being retaken, was allowed a private interview by Miles, and thereupon paroled to go without our lines. He, still under parole, appeared in arms at the head of his men, among the first to enter our lines after the surrender.

As to Gen. McClellan, his most glaring fault in the premises would seem to have been his designation[22] of Col. Miles, after his shameful behavior at Bull Run, to the command of a post so important as Harper's Ferry. It is easy now to reproach him with the slowness of his advance from Washington to Frederick; but it must be borne in mind that his force consisted of the remains of two beaten armies—his own and Pope's —not so much strengthened as swelled by raw troops, hastily levied for an emergency; while opposed to him was an army of veterans, inferior indeed in numbers, but boasting of a succession of victories from first Bull Run onward, and proudly regarding itself as invincible. Perplexed as to Lee's intentions, and hampered by the necessity of covering at once Washington and Baltimore, McClellan moved slowly, indeed; but only a great military genius, or a rash, headstrong fool, would have ventured to do otherwise. After he learned at Frederick that Lee had divided his army, in his eagerness to clutch the tempting prize, McClellan blundered sadly in not hurling his army at once on McLaws, and thus cutting his way swiftly to the Ferry; yet, with all his mistakes, he moved vigorously enough to have seasonably relieved Miles, had that officer evinced loyalty and decent fitness for his position, or had Ford defended Maryland Heights with vigor and tenacity.

Halleck's insisting that Harper's Ferry should be held, after he knew

[21] Sept. 16.

[22] March 29.

that the Rebel army had crossed into Maryland, is one of those puzzles so frequently exhibited in the strategy of that Generalissimo, which must find their solution in some higher, subtler, and more leisurely existence.

Gen. McClellan, at 3 A. M. of the 15th, was aware—for he telegraphed to Halleck—that he had been fighting the forces of D. H. Hill and Longstreet; that they had disappeared from his front; and that Franklin had likewise been completely successful at Crampton's Gap, on his left. He says in this dispatch: "The enemy disappeared during the night; our troops are now advancing in pursuit." At 8 A. M., he telegraphed again—still from Bolivar, at the foot of Turner's Gap:

"I have just learned from Gen. Hooker, in the advance—who states that the information is perfectly reliable—that the enemy is making for the river in a perfect panic; and Gen. Lee last night stated publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying every thing forward to endeavor to press their retreat to the utmost."

Had even the last sentence of this dispatch been literally true, Lee's destruction was imminent and certain.

It was now too late to save Harper's Ferry—for it had this moment fallen—but not too late to superbly avenge it. With Lee's order in his hand, McClellan must have known that the forces from which he and Franklin had just wrested the passes of the South Mountain were all that Lee had to depend upon, save those which he had detached and sent—mainly by long circuits—to reduce Harper's Ferry, and which must now be mainly on the other side of the Potomac. Precious hours had been lost by massing on his right instead of his left, and fighting for Turner's Gap, when he should only by a feint have kept as many Rebels there as possible, while he poured the great body of his army, in overwhelming strength and with the utmost celerity, through Crampton's Gap, crushing McLaws and relieving Harper's Ferry. But there was still time, if not to retrieve the error, at least to amend it. Our soldiers, flushed with unwonted victory, and full in the faith that they had just wrested two strong mountain-passes from the entire Rebel army, were ready for any effort, any peril. To press forward with the utmost rapidity, and so relieve Harper's Ferry, if that might still be, but at all events to crush that portion of the Rebel army still north of the Potomac, if it should stand at bay, and rout and shatter it should it attempt to ford the river; at the very worst, to interpose between it and the other half, under Jackson and Walker, should it attempt to escape westward by Hagerstown and Williamsport, and thus be in position to assail and overwhelm either half before it could unite with the other, was the course which seems to have been as obvious to McClellan as it must be to every one else.

The advance was again led by Gen. Pleasanton's cavalry, who overtook at Boonsborough the Rebel cavalry rear-guard, charged it with spirit, and routed it, capturing 250 prisoners and 2 guns. Richardson's division, of Sumner's corps, followed; pressing eagerly on that afternoon;[22] and, after a march of 10 or 12 miles,

[22] Sept. 15.

descried the Rebels posted in force across ANTIETAM CREEK, in front of the little village of SHARPSBURG. Richardson halted and deployed on the right of the road from Keedysville to Sharpsburg; Sykes, with his division of regulars, following closely after, came up and deployed on the left of that road. Gen. McClellan himself, with three corps in all, came up during the evening.

Lee had of course chosen a strong position; but delay could only serve to strengthen it, while giving opportunity for the arrival of Jackson, Walker, and McLaws, from Harper's Ferry; which McClellan now knew had fallen that morning: Franklin having apprised him of the hour when the sound of guns from that quarter ceased. Had McClellan then resolved to attack at daylight next morning,[24] he might before noon have hurled 60,000 gallant troops against not more than half their number of Rebels; for, though Jackson arrived with his overmarched men that morning, he left A. P. Hill behind at the Ferry, while McLaws, still confronting Franklin in Pleasant Valley, was obliged to cross the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and recross it at Shepherdstown, in order to come up at all; and did not arrive until the morning of the 17th. Walker, clearing Loudon Heights and crossing the Shenandoah on the 15th, had followed Jackson during the night, and arrived at Shepherdstown early on the morning of the 16th; crossing and reporting to Lee at Sharpsburg by noon.[25]

Lee, aware that every hour's delay was an inestimable advantage to him, made as great a display of force as possible throughout the 15th and 16th, though he thereby exposed his infantry—it seemed wantonly—to the fire of our artillery. But, on the morning of the 17th, when our columns advanced to the attack, and the battle began in earnest, his whole army, save A. P. Hill's division, being on hand, the regiments and brigades hitherto so ostentatiously paraded seemed to have sunk into the earth; and nothing but grim and frowning batteries were seen covering each hill-crest and trained on every stretch of open ground whereby our soldiers might attempt to scale those rugged steeps.

The struggle was inaugurated on the afternoon of the 16th, by our old familiar maneuver: Hooker, on our right, being directed to flank and beat the enemy's left, backed by Sumner, Franklin, and Mansfield, who were to come into action successively, somewhat nearer the enemy's center. It would have been a serious objection, ten hours before, to this strategy, that it tended, even if successful, to concentrate the enemy, by driving him back on his divisions arriving or expected from Har-

[24] Sept. 16.

[25] McClellan, in his report, says:

"It had been hoped to engage the enemy during the 15th;" but, "after a rapid examination of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed the placing of the batteries in position in the center, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not all in their positions until the next morning after sunrise."

George W. Smalley, correspondent of *The Tribune*, writes from the battle-field on the 17th as follows:

"After the brilliant victory near Middletown, Gen. McClellan pushed forward his army rapidly, and reached Keedysville with three corps on Monday night. On the day following, the two armies faced each other idly until night."



ANTIETAM.

per's Ferry, rather than to interpose between him and them.

Hooker moved at 4 P. M.; and, making a long detour, crossed the Antietam out of sight and range of the Rebel batteries. Turning at length sharply to the left, he came to an open field, with woods in front and on either side, whence our skirmishers were saluted by scattering shots, followed by volleys of musketry from the left and front. Here Hooker —reconnoitering in the advance, as usual—halted and formed his lines; Ricketts's division on the left; Meade, with the Pennsylvania Reserves, in the center; while Doubleday, on the right, planting his guns on a hill, opened at once on a Rebel battery that had begun to enfilade our cen-

ter. By this time, it was dark, and the firing soon ceased; the hostile infantry lying down for the night at points within half musket-shot of each other.

At daylight next morning,[36] the battle was commenced in earnest: the left of Meade's and the right of Ricketts's line becoming engaged at nearly the same moment, the former with artillery, the latter with infantry; while a battery was pushed forward beyond the woods directly in Hooker's front, across a plowed field, to the edge of a corn-field beyond it, destined before night to be soaked with blood.

Hood's thin division, which had confronted us at evening, had been withdrawn during the night, and replaced by Lawton's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell's division, under Lawton, with Jackson's own division, under D. R. Jones, on its left, supported by the remaining brigades of Ewell. Jackson was in chief command on this wing, and here was substantially his old corps around him. Against these iron soldiers, Hooker's corps hurled itself, and, being superior in numbers, compelled them to give ground; but not until Jones and Lawton had been wounded, with many more field officers, and Starke, who succeeded Jones in command, killed. Early, who succeeded Lawton, was ordered by Jackson to replace Jackson's own division, which had suffered so severely and was so nearly out of ammunition that it had to be temporarily withdrawn from the combat. By this time, Ricketts and Meade had pushed the Rebel line back across the corn-field and the road, into the woods beyond, and was following with eager, exulting cheers.

But Hood's division, somewhat refreshed, had by this time returned to the front, backed by the brigades of Ripley, Colquitt, Garland (now under Col. McRae), and D. R. Jones, by whom the equilibrium of the fight was restored; our men being hurled back by terrible volleys from the woods, followed by a charge across the corn-field in heavy force. Hooker called up his nearest brigade; but it was not strong enough, and he sent at once to Doubleday: "Give me your best brigade instantly!" That brigade came down the hill on our right at double-quick, and was led by Hartsuff into the corn-field, and steadily up the slope beyond it, forming on the crest of the ridge, under a hurricane of shot and shell, and firing steadily and rapidly at the Rebel masses just before them. They held their position half an hour, unsupported, though many fell; among them their leader, Hartsuff, wounded severely; until for a second time the enemy was driven out of the corn-field into the woods.

Meantime, both sides were strengthening this wing. Ricketts's division, having attempted to advance and failed, had fallen back. Part of Mansfield's corps had gone in to their aid, and been driven back likewise, with their General mortally wounded. Doubleday's guns were still busy on our extreme right, and had silenced a Rebel battery which for half an hour had enfiladed Hooker's center. Ricketts sent word that he could not advance, but could hold his ground. Hooker, with Crawford's and Gordon's fresh brigades of

[36] Sept. 17.

Mansfield's corps, came up to his support, determined again to advance and carry the woods to the right of and beyond the corn-field. Going forward to reconnoiter on foot, Hooker satisfied himself as to the nature of the ground, returned and remounted amid a shower of Rebel bullets, which he had all the morning disregarded; but the next moment a musket-ball went through his foot, inflicting a severe and intensely painful wound; which compelled him, after giving his orders fully and deliberately, to leave the field at 9 A. M. Sumner, arriving at this moment, assumed command, sending forward Sedgwick's division of his own corps to support Crawford and Gordon; while Richardson and French, with his two remaining divisions, went forward farther to the left; Sedgwick again advancing in line through the corn-field already won and lost.

But by this time McLaws—who, by marching all night, had reached Shepherdstown from Harper's Ferry that morning, and instantly crossed—had been sent forward by Lee to the aid of Jackson; while Walker's division had been hurried across from their as yet unassailed right. Again Hood's brigade was withdrawn from the front, while the fresh forces under Walker and McLaws advanced with desperate energy, seconded by Early on their left. Sedgwick was thrice badly wounded, and compelled to retire; Gens. Dana and Crawford were likewise wounded. The 34th New York—which had broken at a critical moment, while attempting a maneuver under a terrible fire—was nearly cut to pieces; and the 15th Massachusetts, which went into action 600 strong, was speedily reduced to 134. Gen. Howard, who took command of Sedgwick's division, was unable to restore its formation, and Sumner himself had no better success. Again the center of our right gave back, and the corn-field was retaken by the enemy.

But the attempt of the Rebels to advance beyond it, under the fire of our batteries, was repelled with heavy loss on their part; Col. Manning, who led Walker's own brigade, being severely wounded, and his brigade driven back. Doubleday, on our farther right, held firmly; and it seemed settled that, while either party could repel a charge on this part of the line, neither could afford to make one.

But now Franklin had come up with his fresh corps, and formed on the left; Slocum, commanding one of his divisions, was sent forward toward the center; while Smith, with the other, was ordered to retake the ground that had been so long and so hotly contested.

It was no sooner said than done. Smith's regiments, cheering, went forward on a run, swept through the corn-field and the woods, cleared them in ten minutes, and held them. Their rush was so sudden and unexpected that their loss was comparatively small; and the ground thus retaken was not again lost.

Nearer the center, French's division of Sumner's corps had attempted to carry the line of heights whereon the Rebels were posted, and had made some progress, repulsing a countercharge and capturing a number of prisoners, with some flags. Attempts successively to turn his right and then his left were foiled; but, after a bloody combat of four

hours, French paused, considerably in advance of the position on which the fight had commenced, but without having carried the heights.

Richardson's division of Sumner's corps advanced on the left of French, crossing the Antietam at 9½ A. M., and going steadily forward under a heavy artillery fire, half way up from the creek to Sharpsburg, over very rugged ground, much of it covered with growing corn, and intersected by stone walls, which afforded every advantage to the defensive. The musketry fire on both sides was severe; but our men steadily gained ground; Caldwell's and Meagher's (Irish) brigade vieing with each other in steadiness and gallantry. Here Col. Francis C. Barlow, of Caldwell's brigade, signalized himself by seizing an opportunity to advance the 61st and 64th New York on the left, and take in flank a Rebel force, which, sheltered by a sunken road, was attempting to enfilade our line, capturing over 300 prisoners and 3 flags.

The left of this division being now well advanced, the enemy, maneuvering behind a ridge, attempted to take it in flank and rear, but was signally defeated; the 5th New Hampshire and the 81st Pennsylvania facing to the left and meeting their charge by a countercharge, which was entirely successful. Some prisoners and the colors of the 4th North Carolina remained in our hands. The enemy next assailed the right of this division; but Col. Barlow, again advancing his two New York regiments, aided by Kimball's brigade on the right, easily repulsed it. Next, a charge was made directly on Richardson's front, which was defeated as before, and our line still farther advanced as far as Dr. Piper's house, very near to Sharpsburg, and about the center of the Rebel army at the beginning of the battle. Here artillery was brought up—this division having thus far fought without it—and, while personally directing the fire of Capt. Graham's battery, 1st U. S. Artillery, Richardson fell mortally wounded, and was succeeded by Hancock. Gen. Meagher had fallen some time before: the command of his brigade devolving on Col. Burke, of the 63d New York. One or two more attempts or menaces were made on this part of our line, but not in great force; and, though its advance was drawn back a little to avoid an enfilading fire from Rebel batteries, to which it could not respond, it held its well advanced position when night closed the battle.

Porter's corps, in our center, holding the roads from Sharpsburg to Middletown and Boonsborough, remained unengaged, east of the Antietam, until late in the afternoon; when two brigades of it were sent by McClellan to support our right; while six battalions of Sykes's regulars were thrown across the bridge on the main road to repel Rebel sharp-shooters, who were annoying Pleasanton's horse-batteries at that point. Warren's brigade was detached and sent to the right and rear of Burnside, leaving but little over 3,000 men with Porter.

Burnside's corps held our extreme left, opposite the lowest of the three bridges crossing the Antietam. He was ordered, at 8 A. M., to cross this one, which was held by Gen. R. Toombs, with the 2d and 20th Georgia, backed by some sharp-shooters and

the batteries of Gen. D. R. Jones, on Longstreet's right wing. Several feeble attempts to execute this order having been successively repulsed, Burnside was further ordered to carry not only the bridge but the heights beyond, and advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg; but it was not till 1 P. M. that the bridge was actually taken, by a charge of the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania; the enemy making no serious resistance, and retreating to the heights as our troops came over in force. More hours passed idly; and it was after 3 P. M. before Burnside, under peremptory orders, charged up the heights, carrying them handsomely; some of his troops reaching even the outskirts of Sharpsburg.

It was an easy but a short-lived triumph; for, thus far, Lee had been able to spare but about 3,000 men, under D. R. Jones, to hold this flank of his position. Had this success been obtained hours earlier, it might have proved decisive. The Rebel forces throughout the greater part of the day had abundant occupation on our right, so that Lee was unable to spare sufficient troops to resist a determined advance by our left; but now, just as victory seemed to smile upon our arms, A. P. Hill's division —which had only been ordered from Harper's Ferry that morning, and started at 7½ o'clock—came on the ground, and, covered by a heavy fire of artillery, charged our extreme left, when disordered by charging and fighting, and drove it back in still greater confusion. Gen. Rodman, who commanded it, was mortally wounded; and the enemy, rallying with spirit and redoubling the fire of his artillery, charged in front and flank, and drove our men in confusion down the hill toward the Antietam, pursuing until checked by the fire of our batteries across the river. Gen. L. O'B. Branch, of N. C., was killed in this charge. Our reserves on the left bank now advancing, while our batteries redoubled their fire, the Rebels wisely desisted, without attempting to carry the bridge, and retired to their lines on the heights, as darkness put an end to the fray.

Jackson, during the afternoon, had been ordered by Lee to turn our right and attack it in flank and rear; but, on reconnoitering for this purpose, he found our line extended nearly to the Potomac, and so strongly defended with artillery that to carry it was impossible; so he declined to make the attempt.[17]

So closed, indecisively, the bloodiest day that America ever saw.

Gen. McClellan states his strength —no doubt truly—in this battle at 87,164, including 4,320 cavalry, which was of small account on such ground and in such a struggle. General Couch's division, 5,000 strong, had been sent away toward Harper's Ferry—evidently through some misapprehension—and only arrived at a late hour next morning;" as did Humphrey's division of raw recruits, which had left Frederick—23 miles distant—at 4½ P. M. of the sanguinary 17th.

McClellan estimates Lee's strength at 97,445, including 6,000 artillery (400 guns), 6,400 cavalry, and making Jackson's corps number 24,778 —all far too high. Lee says he had "under 40,000 men;" which probably includes neither cavalry nor A. P. Hill's division; and perhaps not

[17] Sept. 18.

McLaws's. *The Richmond Enquirer* of the 23d (four days after the battle) says it has "authentic particulars" of the battle; and that "the ball was opened on Tuesday evening about 6 o'clock, by all of our available force, 60,000 strong, commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee in person." And this seems to be the more probable aggregate.

Pollard, in his "Southern History of the War," says of this battle: "It was fought for half the day with 45,000 men on the Confederate side; and for the remaining half with no more than an aggregate of 70,000 men."

Gen. McClellan makes his entire loss in this battle 12,469: 2,010 killed, 9,416 wounded, and 1,043 missing; and says his army counted and buried "about 2,700" of the enemy, beside those buried by themselves: whence he estimates their total loss as "much greater" than ours. As the Rebels fought mainly on the defensive, under shelter of woods, and on ground commanded by their artillery, this might seem improbable. But Lee (writing his report on the 6th of March following) is silent as to his losses, while the account of them given as complete in the official publication of "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Virginia, from June, 1862, to Dec. 13th, 1862," is palpably and purposely an under-statement. That account makes the total Rebel loss in the Maryland battles only 10,291: viz., killed, 1,567; wounded, 8,724; and says nothing of missing; while McClellan gives details of considerable captures on several occasions, and sums up as follows:

"Thirteen guns, 39 colors, upward of 15,000 stand of small arms, and more than 6,000 prisoners, were the trophies which attest the success of our arms in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam. Not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles."

And the reports of Lee's corps or division commanders give the following aggregates:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Longstreet's	964	5,234	1,310	7,508
Jackson's	351	2,080	57	2,488
D. H. Hill's	464	1,852	925	3,241
A. P. Hill's[39]	63	233	—	346
Total	1,842	9,399	2,292	13,583

D. H. Hill reports 3,241 disabled, including 4 Colonels, out of less than 5,000; and Lawton's brigade lost 554 out of 1,150.

Among the Rebel killed were Maj.-Gen. Starke, of Miss., Brig.-Gens. L. O'B. Branch, of N. C., and G. B. Anderson; Cols. Douglass (commanding Lawton's brigade), Liddell, 11th Miss., Tew, 2d N. C., Barnes, 12th S. C., Mulligan, 15th Ga., Barclay, 23d do., and Smith, 27th do. Among their wounded were Maj.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Brig.-Gens. Lawton, Rhodes, Ripley, Armistead, Gregg, of S. C., R. Toombs and Wright, of Ga.

Lee, of course, did not care to renew the battle on the morrow of such a day; and McClellan, though reënforced that morning by about 14,000 men, stood still also. He says he purposed to renew the combat the next morning;[40] but, when his cavalry advance reached the river, they discovered that Lee had quietly moved off across the Potomac during the night, leaving us only his dead and some 2,000 of his desperately wounded.

Lee having posted 8 batteries on the Virginia bluffs of the Potomac, supported by 600 infantry under Pen-

[39] Jackson expressly states that A. P. Hill's losses were not included in his return. [40] Sept. 19.

dleton, to cover his crossing, Gen. Porter, at dark,[30] sent across Gen. Griffin, with his own and Barnes's brigades, to carry them. This was gallantly done, under the fire of those batteries, and 4 guns taken; but a reconnoissance in force, made by part of Porter's division next morning,[31] was ambushed by A. P. Hill, a mile from the ford, and driven pell-mell into the river, with considerable loss, after a brief struggle; the Rebels taking 200 prisoners. They held that bank thenceforth unmolested until next day, and then quietly disappeared.

Lee moved westward, with the bulk of his army, to the Opequan creek, near Martinsburg; his cavalry, under Stuart, recrossing the Potomac to Williamsport, whence he escaped on the approach of Gen. Couch's division. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was now pretty thoroughly destroyed for some distance by the Rebels—neither for the first nor the last time. Gen. McClellan sent forward Gen. Williams on his left to retake Maryland Heights, which he did[32] without opposition; as Gen. Sumner, two days later, occupied Harper's Ferry.

Lee soon retired to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester; whence, seeing that he was not pursued nor imperiled by McClellan, he dispatched[33] Stuart, with 1,800 cavalry, on a bold raid into Pennsylvania. Crossing the Potomac above Williamsport, Stuart pushed on rapidly to Chambersburg, where he destroyed a large amount of supplies; and, retiring as hurriedly as he came, he made a second circuit of McClellan's army, recrossing without loss into Virginia at White's Ford, below Harper's Ferry. McClellan, hearing he had gone on this raid, felt entirely confident that he could not escape destruction, and made extensive preparations to insure it; but his plans were foiled by lack of energy and zeal. Stuart paroled at Chambersburg 275 sick and wounded, whom he found there in hospital; burned the railroad dépôt, machine-shops, and several trains of loaded cars, destroying 5,000 muskets and large amounts of army clothing. Perhaps these paid the Rebels for their inevitable waste of horse-flesh, and perhaps not.

Here ensued a renewal of the old game of cross-purposes—McClellan calling loudly and frequently for re-enforcements, horses, clothing, shoes, and supplies of all kinds, which were readily promised, but not always so promptly supplied; Halleck sending orders to advance, which were not obeyed with alacrity, if at all. A distemper among the horses threw 4,000 out of service, in addition to the heavy losses by Rebel bullets and by over-work. Halleck states that McClellan's army had 31,000 horses on the 14th of October; McClellan responds that 10,980 were required to move ten days' provisions for that army, now swelled to 110,000 men, beside 12,000 teamsters, &c.; and that, after picketing the line of the Potomac, he had not 1,000 desirable cavalry. His entire cavalry force was 5,046; his artillery horses, 6,836; he needed 17,832 animals to draw his forage; so that he was still 10,000 short of the number actually required for an advance.

At length, Gen. McClellan crossed

[30] Sept. 19. [31] Sept. 20. [32] Sept. 20. [33] Oct. 10.

the Potomac, between the 26th of October and the 2d of November; and, moving unopposed down the east side of the Blue Ridge (Lee's army being still in the Valley, but moving parallel with ours), occupied Snicker's Gap and Manassas; and had advanced to Warrenton, when he was relieved from command,[24] directed to turn it over to Gen. Burnside, and report by letter from Trenton, N. J.; which he proceeded forthwith to do. Thus ended his active participation in the war.

X.

TENNESSEE—KENTUCKY—MISSISSIPPI.

BUELL—BRAGG—ROSECRANS—GRANT—VAN DORN.

THE comatose condition into which the war on the Tennessee had fallen, after the removal of Mitchel to the South, was fitfully broken by patterings of Rebel enterprise far in the rear of our main army. While Buell, at or near Huntsville, Ala., was deliberately reorganizing and disciplining his forces, schooling them to an unwonted deference for Rebel rights of property—especially of property in men—guerrilla raids and attacks became increasingly and disagreeably frequent throughout Kentucky and Tennessee—the Confederate leaders, especially those of cavalry regiments, on finding that they were not needed in our front, transferring their assiduous and vehement attentions to our flanks and rear. The names of Forrest and John Morgan began to be decidedly notorious. Horse-stealing—in fact, stealing in general—in the name and behalf of Liberty and Patriotism, is apt to increase in popularity so long as it is practiced with impunity; and the horses of Kentucky are eminently calculated to inflame the love of country glowing in the breast of every cavalier. Burning bridges, and clutching whatever property could be made useful in war, had been for some time current; when at length a bolder blow was struck in the capture[1] of Lebanon, Ky. [not Tenn.], and almost simultaneously of Murfreesboro', Tenn., which Forrest surprised; making prisoners of Brig.-Gens. Duffield and Crittenden, of Ind., with the 9th Michigan, 3d Minnesota, 4 companies of the 4th Ky. cavalry, and 3 companies of the 7th Pa. cavalry, after a spirited but brief resistance. Henderson, Ky., on the Ohio, was likewise seized by a guerrilla band, who clutched a large amount of hospital stores; and, being piloted across by some Indiana traitors, captured a hospital also at Newburg, Ind., and paroled its helpless inmates. Col. John Morgan likewise captured[2] Cynthiana, in north-eastern Kentucky; but was run off directly by a superior cavalry force under Gen. Green Clay Smith. Morgan claims in his report to have captured and paroled 1,200 Union soldiers during this raid, with a total loss of but 90 of his men. Large quan-

[24] Nov. 7. [1] July 5, 1862. [2] July 2.

tities of plunder were thus obtained, while property of much greater value was destroyed; and enough recruits were doubtless gathered to offset the waste of war. Still, military operations, without a base and without regular supplies, seldom produce substantial, enduring results; and the Confederate guerrillas either soon abandoned Kentucky or concealed themselves and lay quiet therein. The leaders, with most of their followers, retired into Tennessee, where they captured Clarksville[3] and possessed themselves of ample military stores; and a sharp cavalry fight at Gallatin resulted in a Union defeat, with a loss of 30 killed, 50 wounded, and 75 prisoners.

Gen. Buell had left Corinth in June, moving eastward, as if intent on Chattanooga; but Gen. Bragg—who had succeeded to the chief command of the Rebels confronting him—had thereupon moved more rapidly, on parallel roads, from Tupelo, Miss., through northern Alabama and Georgia, to Chattanooga, which he reached ahead of Buell's vanguard. Bragg's army had been swelled by conscription to some 45,000 men, organized in three corps, under Hardee, Bishop Polk, and Kirby Smith respectively, whereof the last was sent to Knoxville, while the two former sufficed to hold Chattanooga against any effort which Buell was likely to make.

McClellan's Richmond campaign having proved abortive, while conscription had largely replenished the Rebel ranks, Bragg was impelled to try a bold stroke for the recovery of Tennessee and the 'liberation' of Kentucky. As with Lee's kindred advance into Maryland, the increasing scarcity of food was the more immediate, while fond expectations of a general rising in support of the Confederate cause, afforded the remoter incitement to this step. Louisville, with its immense resources, was the immediate object of this gigantic raid, though Cincinnati was thought to be also within its purview. Crossing[4] the Tennessee at Harrison, a few miles above Chattanooga, with 36 regiments of infantry, 5 of cavalry, and 40 guns, Bragg traversed the rugged mountain ridges which hem in the Sequatchie Valley, passing through Dunlap,[5] Pikeville,[6] Crossville,[7] masking his movement by a feint with cavalry on McMinnville, but rapidly withdrawing this when its purpose was accomplished, and pressing hurriedly northward, to Kentucky; which he entered on the 5th.

Kirby Smith, with his division, from Knoxville, advanced by Jacksonborough[8] across the Cumberland range, through Big Creek Gap, moving as rapidly as possible, with a very light train; his men subsisting mainly on green corn—which is scarce enough in that poor, thinly-peopled region—his hungry, foot-sore, dusty followers buoyed up with the assurance of plenty and comfort ahead. His cavalry advance, 900 strong, under Col. J. S. Scott, moving[9] from Kingston, Tenn., passed through Montgomery and Jamestown, Tenn., and Monticello and Somerset, Ky., to London, where it surprised[10] and routed a battalion of Union cavalry, inflicting a loss of 30 killed and wounded and 111 prisoners; thence pushing on, making additional captures by the

[3] Aug. 19. [4] Aug. 24. [5] Aug. 27. [6] Aug. 30. [7] Sept. 1. [8] Aug. 22. [9] Aug. 13. [10] Aug. 17.

way, to Richmond, Ky.; thence falling back to rejoin Smith, who had not yet come up.

The Cumberland Mountains are a broad range of table-land, some 2,000 feet in average height, descending sharply to the upper waters of the Tennessee and Cumberland on either hand, and pierced by a single considerable pass—the Cumberland Gap—which had been for some time quietly held by a Union force under Gen. Geo. W. Morgan; who, on learning that he had thus been flanked, blew up his works and commenced[11] a precipitate race for the Ohio, which he in due time reached, having been constantly harassed, for most of the way, by John Morgan with 700 Rebel cavalry.

Moving rapidly northward, Smith found himself confronted[12] at RICHMOND, Ky., by a green Union force, nearly equal in numbers to his own, under command of Brig.-Gen. M. D. Manson, who immediately pushed forward to engage him, taking position on a range of hills, a mile or two south of the town, which was otherwise indefensible. Here he had a smart skirmish with the Rebel advance, and drove it back; which prompted him to quit his strong position for one still farther advanced, at Rogersville, where his men slept on their arms that night. Next morning, he advanced half a mile farther, and here engaged Smith's entire command, with no chance of success. His force was quite equal in numbers and in guns to Smith's, but in nothing else. He attempted to flank the Rebel right, but was defeated with loss by Col. Preston Smith's brigade; when his right was successfully turned by the Rebel left, Gen. T. J. Churchill, and routed in a daring charge; whereupon our whole line gave way and retreated. The Rebel Gen. Pat. Cleburne, afterward so distinguished, was here badly wounded in the face, and succeeded in his command by Col. Smith.

Gen. Cruft, with the 95th Ohio, had reached the field just before, and shared in this defeat; but he had three more regiments coming up as our line gave way. Using two of these as a rear-guard, Manson attempted to halt and rëform just beyond Rogersville; but soon saw that this would not answer, and again retired to the position wherefrom he had commenced the fight the evening before, and which he ought not to have left. Here, at 12½ P. M., he received, just as the battle was rëcommencing, an order from Gen. Nelson, who was coming up, to retreat on Lancaster, if menaced by the enemy in force—an order which came entirely too late: the exultant Rebels being close upon him, and opening fire along their whole line within five minutes afterward.

The fight beyond Rogersville had been maintained through three hours; here an hour sufficed to end it. Again our right was charged and routed, compelling a general retreat; and again—having been driven back to his camp—Manson was trying to rëform and make head, when, Gen. Nelson having reached the ground, the command was turned over to him, and another stand made near the town and cemetery, which was converted into a total rout in less than half an hour; Gen. Nelson being here wounded, as Cols. Link,

[11] Aug. 17.

[12] Aug. 29.

12th Indiana, McMillan, 95th Ohio, and other valuable officers, had already been. Lt.-Col. Topping and Maj. Conkling, 71st Indiana, had been killed.

The rout was now total and complete; and, to make the most of it, Smith had, hours before, sent Scott, with his cavalry, around to our rear, with instructions to prepare for and intercept the expected fugitives. Manson, who had resumed command when Nelson fell, had formed a new rear-guard, which was keeping the Rebel pursuit within bounds; when, four miles from Richmond, the fleeing rabble were halted by a body of Rebel horse. Manson, hurrying up, attempted to form a vanguard; but only 100 responded to his call, who were speedily cut up by a fire from a force of Rebels hidden in a cornfield on the left of the road, whereby Lt.-Col. Wolfe and 41 others were killed or wounded. The road was here choked with wounded horses and other *débris* of a shattered army; it was growing dusk (7 P. M.), and the remains of our thoroughly beaten force scattered through the fields; every one attempting to save himself as he could. Gen. Manson, with other officers, attempting escape by flight, was fired on by a squadron of Scott's cavalry; his horse, mortally wounded, fell on him, injuring him severely, and he was taken prisoner; as were many if not most of his compatriots in disaster.

Manson's report says that his entire force this day "did not exceed 6,500," of whom not over 2,500 were engaged at once—a sad commentary on his generalship—and he adds: "The enemy say they had 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 15 guns" —which they don't. He estimates his loss at 200 killed, 700 wounded, and 2,000 prisoners. Kirby Smith, on the contrary, makes our force fully 10,000—his own but 5,000; and states his total loss at 400, and ours at 1,000 killed and wounded, 5,000 prisoners, 9 guns, 10,000 small arms, and large spoil of munitions and provisions. It is quite probable that his story, though exaggerated, is nearer the truth than Manson's.

Smith set forward directly[13] for Lexington, which he entered in triumph three days afterward, amid the frantic acclamations of the numerous Rebel sympathizers of that intensely pro-Slavery region. He moved on through Paris to Cynthiana, within striking distance of either Cincinnati or Louisville, which seemed for a few days to lie at his mercy; though considerable numbers, mainly of militia and very green volunteers, had been hastily gathered for the defense of the former, and were busily employed in erecting defenses covering the Kentucky approaches to that city, at some distance back from the Ohio.

Gen. Bragg had now completely flanked Buell's left, and passed behind him, without a struggle and without loss, keeping well eastward of Nashville, and advancing by Carthage, Tenn., and Glasgow, Ky.; first striking the Louisville and Nashville Railroad—which was our main line of supply and rëenforcement—after he entered Kentucky.[14] His advance, under Gen. J. R. Chalmers, first encountered[15] a considerable force at MUNFORDSVILLE, where the railroad crosses Green river, and where Col.

[13] Sept. 1. [14] Sept. 5. [15] Sept. 13.

J. T. Wilder, with about 2,100 men, had assumed command five days before, by order of Gen. J. T. Boyle, commanding in Kentucky, and had hastily thrown up fortifications, with intent to dispute the passage of the river. Chalmers had already sent a mounted force to the north of Munfordsville, by which a first demand for surrender was made at 8 P. M. The demand being repelled, an assault was made at daylight next morning, but speedily repulsed with loss. At 9 A. M., Wilder was reënforced by six companies of the 50th Indiana, Col. C. L. Dunham, who, being his senior, after hesitating, assumed command; but was superseded soon afterward by an order from Boyle, and Wilder restored.

The Rebels, after their first repulse, kept mainly out of sight, knowing that their ultimate success was inevitable, and allowed two more regiments and six guns to make their way into the town; assured that all who were there would soon fall into their hands. At length, at 9½ A. M. on Tuesday,[16] Bragg, having brought up his main body and surrounded the place with not less than 25,000 men, renewed the attack. Advancing cautiously, keeping his men well covered, but crowding up on the weak and exposed points of our defenses in such numbers as absolutely to compel the gradual contraction of our lines, he, about sunset, sent in a flag of truce, demanding a surrender. As Buell was not at hand, nor likely to be, and as there was no hope of relief from any quarter, and no adequate reason for sacrificing the lives of his men, Wilder, at 2 A. M. next day," after the fullest consultation with his officers, surrendered; being allowed to march out with drums beating and colors flying, take four days' rations, and set forth immediately, under parole, for Louisville. He says in his report that his entire loss was 37 killed and wounded, "while the enemy admit a loss of 714 on Sunday alone." Bragg, on the contrary, says, "Our [Rebel] loss was about 50 killed and wounded;" and claims 4,000 prisoners and as many muskets, beside guns and munitions.

Bragg now issued the following address to the people of Kentucky, which, read backward, will indicate the objects and motives of his invasion:

"GLASGOW, KY., Sept. 18, 1862.

"KENTUCKIANS: I have entered your State with the Confederate Army of the West, and offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler. We come, not as conquerors or despoilers, but to restore to you the liberties of which you have been deprived by a cruel and relentless foe. We come to guarantee to all the sanctity of their homes and altars; to punish with a rod of iron the despoilers of your peace, and to avenge the cowardly insults to your women. With all non-combatants, the past shall be forgotten. Needful supplies must be had for my army; but they shall be paid for at fair and remunerating prices.

"Believing that the heart of Kentucky is with us in our great struggle for Constitutional Freedom, we have transferred from our own soil to yours, not a band of marauders, but a powerful and well-disciplined army. Your gallant Buckner leads the van. Marshall is on the right; while Breckinridge, dear to us as to you, is advancing with Kentucky's valiant sons, to receive the honor and applause due to their heroism. The strong hands which in part have sent Shiloh down to history, and the nerved arms which have kept at bay from our own homes the boastful army of the enemy, are here to assist, to sustain, to liberate you. Will you remain indifferent to our call? or will you not rather vindicate the fair fame of your once free and envied State? We believe that you will; and that the memory

[16] Sept. 16.

[17] Sept. 17.

of your gallant dead who fell at Shiloh, their faces turned homeward, will rouse you to a manly effort for yourselves and posterity.

"Kentuckians! we have come with joyous hopes. Let us not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer Federal rule, show it by your frowns, and we shall return whence we came. If you choose rather to come within the folds of our brotherhood, then cheer us with the smiles of your women, and lend your willing hands to secure you in your heritage of liberty.

"Women of Kentucky! your persecutions and heroic bearing have reached our ear. Banish henceforth, forever, from your minds the fear of loathsome prisons or insulting visitations. Let your enthusiasm have free rein. Buckle on the armor of your kindred, your husbands, sons, and brothers, and scoff with shame him who would prove recreant in his duty to you, his country, and his God.

"BRAXTON BRAGG,
"Gen. Commanding."

It was not the fault of the General commanding that his army must necessarily have subsisted on the region of Kentucky it traversed; but, when it is considered that he swept off in his retreat all the abundant horses and cattle that came within his reach, with whatever else he could carry, and that he did not and could not pay for any thing, it seems that the mockery of his promise of payment might wisely have been forborne.

From Munfordsville, Bragg continued his unresisted march northward, through Bardstown, to Frankfort,[18] the State capital, where Smith had preceded him, and where Richard Hawes,[19] a weak old man, was inaugurated[20] "Provisional Governor of Kentucky." "This ceremony," says Pollard, "was scarcely more than a pretentious farce: hardly was it completed when the Yankees threatened Frankfort; and the newly installed Governor had to flee from their approach."

Gen. Buell, after leaving Nashville[21] strongly garrisoned, had marched directly for Louisville, 170 miles; where his army arrived between the 25th and 29th. It had by this time been swelled by reënforcements, mainly raw, to nearly 100,000 men; but it was not, in his judgment, yet in condition to fight Bragg's far inferior numbers. Hence, time was taken to reorganize and supply it; while the Rebel cavalry galloped at will over the plenteous central districts of the State, collecting large quantities of cattle and hogs not only, but of serviceable fabrics and other manufactures as well. Buell's delays, synchronizing with McClellan's last, were so distasteful at Washington, that an order relieving him from command was issued; but its execution was suspended on the emphatic remonstrance of his subordinate commanders. The hint being a pretty strong one, Buell set his face toward the enemy;[22] moving in five columns: his left on Frankfort, his right on Shepardsville, intending to concentrate on Bardstown, where Bragg, with his main body, was supposed to be; skirmishing by the way with small parties of Rebel cavalry and artillery. Thus advancing steadily, though not rapidly, he passed through Bardstown, and thence to Springfield,[23] 62 miles from Louisville; Bragg slowly retreating before him, harassing rather than resisting his advance, so as to gain time for the escape of his now immense trains, consisting mainly of captured Federal army wagons, heavily laden with the spoils of Kentucky. Here Buell

[18] Oct 1. [19] Formerly a member of Congress. [20] Oct. 4. [21] Sept. 15. [22] Oct. 1. [23] Oct. 6.

learned that Kirby Smith had crossed the Kentucky, and that Bragg was moving to concentrate his forces either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. His own movement was therefore directed toward Perryville; three miles in front of which, moving with his 3d or central corps, he encountered, on the afternoon of the 7th, a considerable Rebel force, drawn up in order of battle; but which his advance pressed back a mile or so without much fighting; when he, expecting a battle, sent orders to McCook and Crittenden, commanding his flank corps, to advance on his right and left at 3 next morning.

McCook did not receive the order till 2½ A. M., and he marched at 5; but Crittenden, unable to find water for his corps at the place where Buell had expected it to encamp for the night, had moved off the road in quest of it, and was six miles farther away than he otherwise would have been; so that the order to advance was not duly received, and his arrival at Perryville was delayed several hours.

A great drouth then prevailing in Kentucky, causing severe privation and suffering to men and animals, the fight commenced early next morning, by an attempt of the enemy to repel the brigade of Col. D. McCook, which had been pushed forward by Buell on his immediate front to cover some hollows in the bed of Doctor's creek, whence a little bad water was obtained. This attempt was defeated by sending up the divisions of Gens. Mitchell and Sheridan, to hold the ground until our two flank corps should arrive; which the left, Gen. A. D. McCook, did between 10 and 11 A. M.; and the batteries of his advance division were sharply engaged with the enemy not long afterward.

Bragg was present in person; but his forces were commanded more immediately by Maj.-Gen. Bishop Polk, who had in hand five divisions—two under Hardee, and those of Patton Anderson, Cheatham, and Buckner—that of Withers having been sent by Bragg, the day before, to support Smith, who was retreating farther to the east, and was deemed in danger of being enveloped and cut off. Bragg gives no other reason for fighting before concentrating his entire command than that the enemy were pressing heavily on his rear; but it is clear that he had deliberately resolved to turn and fight at Perryville.

Maj.-Gen. McCook, having reached the position assigned him with but two of his three divisions—that of Gen. Sill having been detached and sent to Frankfort—had directed the posting of his troops and formation of his line of battle—Gen. Rousseau's division on the right, in line with the left of Gilbert's corps, and Gen. Jackson's on the left, near the little hamlet of Maxwell, on the Harrodsburg road—rode off and reported in person to Gen. Buell, 2½ miles distant, in the rear of his right; and received verbal orders to make a reconnoissance in front of his position to Chaplin creek. Returning to his command, and finding nothing in progress but mutual artillery practice, to little purpose, he ordered his batteries to save their ammunition, while he made the directed reconnoissance; at the same time advancing his skirmishers and extending his

left, in order to obtain a more advantageous position, and enable his men to procure from the creek the water for which they were suffering. So much being accomplished, and no enemy in sight save some cavalry on the bluffs across the creek, he proceeded, at 1½ P. M., to the left of his line; in no apprehension of an attack until he should see fit to make one.



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.

He was grievously mistaken. Hardly had he been half an hour away from his front, when his left, composed mainly of green soldiers, under a brave but inexperienced commander, and not fully formed in order of battle, was suddenly and vehemently assailed in front and flank by rapidly charging masses of infantry and artillery, hitherto concealed in woods and hollows, but which seemed as if magically evoked from the earth.

Cheatham's division, which had been silently moved from the Rebel left to their right, led this assault, responding with terrific yells and more hurried step to the fire of our batteries, until within short musket-range, when, at their very first volley, Maj.-Gen. James S. Jackson[24] fell dead. His fall disorganized the raw and over-matched brigade of Gen. Terrill, which he was desperately exerting himself to steady, and it gave way in utter panic; Gen. Terrill himself following his chief's example and sharing his fate not long afterward; as did, at a later hour, Col. George Webster, 98th Ohio, commanding a brigade.

Terrill's brigade being thus instantaneously routed, with the loss of Parsons's battery, the whole force of the Rebel charge fell upon Rousseau, who was ready to receive it. An attempt to flank and crush his left was promptly met by new dispositions: Starkweather's brigade, with Stone's and Bush's batteries, being faced to that flank, and receiving the enemy with volley after volley, which tore his ranks and arrested his momentum for two or three hours, until our ammunition was exhausted, and Bush's battery had lost 35 horses; when our guns were drawn back a short distance, and our infantry retired to replenish their cartridge-boxes; then resuming their position in line.

Rousseau's center and right were held respectively by the brigades of

[24] Union Member of Congress from the IId district of Kentucky; elected in 1861, by 9,281 votes, to 3,364 for Bunch, "State Rights," i. e., semi-Rebel.

Harris and Lytle, who fought bravely, but lost ground, in consequence of the disaster on our farther left. Finally, a desperate charge was made upon Lytle's front and right, favored by irregularities of ground, which covered and concealed it, and his brigade was hurled back; Lytle himself falling at this moment, and, believing his wound mortal, refusing to be carried off the field.

The charging Rebels now struck the left flank of Gilbert's corps, held by R. B. Mitchell and Sheridan, which had been for some little time engaged along its front. The key of its position was held—and of course well held—by Brig.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, who had been engaged in the morning, but had driven the enemy back out of sight, after a short but sharp contest, and had just repelled another assault on his front; advancing his line as his assailants retired, and then turning his guns upon the force which had just driven Rousseau's right. And now Gen. Mitchell pushed forward the 31st brigade, Col. Carlin, on Sheridan's right, and charged at double-quick, breaking and driving the enemy into and through Perryville, to the protection of two batteries on the bluffs beyond, capturing 15 heavily laden ammunition wagons, 2 caissons with their horses, and a train-guard of 140; retiring amid the Rebel confusion to this side of the town, and thence opening fire with his battery as darkness came on.

Meantime, the 30th brigade, Col. Gooding, which had been sent by Gilbert to the aid of McCook, had formed on our extreme left, confronting the division of the Rebel Gen. Wood, and here fought desperately for two hours against superior numbers. A lull occurring in the fusillade, Gooding rode forward, about dark, to ascertain the Rebel position; when his horse was shot under him and he made prisoner. His brigade then fell back, having lost 549 men out of 1,423; taking position in line with McCook. There was some random artillery firing afterward; but darkness substantially closed the battle.

Gen. Buell did not learn until 4 P. M. that any serious conflict was in progress. He now heard with astonishment from McCook that he had been two hours hotly engaged; that both the right and the left of his corps were turned, or being turned; and that he was severely pressed on every hand. Reënforcements were immediately ordered to McCook from the center, and orders sent to Crittenden—who was advancing with our right division—to push forward and attack the enemy's left; but Crittenden's advance only reached the field at nightfall, when a single brigade (Wagner's) went into action on the right of Mitchell's division, just before the battle was terminated by darkness.

At 6 A. M. next day,[*] Gilbert's corps advanced by order to assail the Rebel front, while Crittenden struck hard on his left flank; but they found no enemy to dispute their progress. Bragg had decamped during the night, marching on Harrodsburg; where he was joined by Kirby Smith and Withers; retreating thence southward by Bryantsville to Camp Dick Robinson, near Danville.

Bragg admits a total loss in this

[*] Oct. 9.

battle of not less than 2,500; including Brig.-Gens. Wood, Cleburne, and Brown, wounded; and claims to have driven us two miles, captured 15 guns, 400 prisoners, and inflicted a total loss of 4,000. Buell's report admits a loss on our part of 4,348—916 killed, 2,943 wounded, and 489 missing; but as to guns, he concedes a loss of but ten, whereof all but two were left on the ground, with more than 1,000 of their wounded, by the Rebels.

Gen. Buell officially reports his effective force which advanced on Perryville at 58,000; whereof 22,000 were raw troops, who had received little or no instruction. He estimates the Rebel army in Kentucky at 55,000 to 65,000 men; but of this aggregate not more than two-thirds were present. As the fighting of all but the raw troops in this battle, on our side, was remarkably good, that of the Rebels present must have been still better, since they inflicted the greater loss, gained the more ground, and captured some cannon; yet it is plain that Bragg obtained here all the fighting he was anxious for; since he abandoned some 1,200 of his sick and wounded at Harrodsburg, and 25,000 barrels of pork, with other stores, at various points; making no stand even at Camp Dick Robinson—a very strong position, behind the perpendicular bluffs of Dick's river—but retreated precipitately by Crab Orchard, Mount Vernon, London, and Barboursville, to Cumberland Gap, and thus into East Tennessee; burning even large quantities of cloths and other precious goods, for which transportation over the rough mountain roads necessarily traversed was not to be had.

The retreat was conducted by Bishop Polk, and covered by Wheeler's cavalry. And, though Kentucky was minus many thousands of animals, with other spoils of all kinds, by reason of this gigantic raid, it is not probable, in view of the inevitable suffering and loss of animals on their long, hurried, famished flight through the rugged, sterile, thinly peopled mountain region, that all the Rebels took back into East Tennessee was equal in value to the outfit with which they had set forth on this adventure.

Sill's division—which had followed Kirby Smith from Frankfort, and had had a little fight with his rear-guard near Lawrenceburg—reached Perryville at nightfall on the 11th; up to which time Buell had made no decided advance. Pushing forward a strong reconnoissance next day to Dick's river, he found no enemy this side; and he learned at Danville, two days later, that Bragg was in full retreat. He sent forward in pursuit at midnight Wood's division, followed by the rest of Crittenden's and then by McCook's corps, while Gilbert's marched on the Lancaster road to the left. Wood struck the Rebel rear-guard next morning at Stanford, but to little purpose; the enemy retiring when assailed in force, felling trees across the road behind him, and consuming all the forage of the region he traversed, rendering extended pursuit impossible. McCook's and Gilbert's divisions were halted at Crab Orchard; while Crittenden kept on to London, whence he was recalled by Buell; farther pursuit being evidently useless. The Government, deeply dissatisfied with this impotent conclusion of the campaign, now re-

lieved[36] Buell from command, appointing Maj.-Gen. Rosecrans in his stead.

If the disappointment on our side at the escape of Bragg with his plunder was great, the chagrin of the Rebels was even greater. They had so loudly and boastingly proclaimed that they entered Kentucky to stay, that they had incited their partisans throughout the State to compromise themselves by demonstrations which were now shown to have been rash and useless; so that thousands of the more prominent were impelled to fly with Bragg, who embarrassed his march and devoured his scanty supplies, yet were of no value to the cause when they had together entered—not in triumph—their beloved Dixie. Bragg's invasion had demonstrated afresh the antagonism of at least two-thirds of the Kentuckians to the Rebellion—a demonstration more conclusive than that uniformly afforded by her elections, because there could now be no pretense that the people were overawed or their verdict corrupted. For weeks, a gallant, formidable, triumphant Rebel army had held undisputed possession of the heart of the State; its cavalry had traversed two-thirds of it, affording opportunity and solicitation to all who were inclined to enter the Confederate service; their cause had enjoyed the prestige of several brilliant and profitable successes, while the Union forces everywhere fled before them, or made a stand only to be routed; yet the number of recruits to their standard was confessedly moderate. Excepting in a few of the rich slaveholding counties around Lexington, and in that south-western portion of the State which Bragg failed to reach, those in sympathy with the Rebellion were everywhere a decided and in many counties an inconsiderable minority."[37]

The transfer of Gen. Halleck to Washington had left Gen. Grant in command of the district of West Tennessee, with his headquarters at Jackson or at Bolivar, while Gen. Rosecrans was left in command in northern Mississippi and Alabama, when Gen. Buell, taking[38] two of his divisions, moved northward in pursuit of Bragg. Rosecrans was at Tuscumbia when advised,[39] by telegram from Gen. Grant, that a considerable Rebel force was moving northward between them, and that its cavalry had already attacked Bolivar, and cut the line of railroad between that post and Jackson. Hereupon, leaving Iuka in charge of Col. R. C. Murphy, 8th Wisconsin, Rosecrans moved eastward with Stanley's division to his old encampment at Clear creek, seven miles from Corinth. Murphy precipitately abandoned his post on the approach of the Rebel cavalry, allowing a large amount of stores, with 680 barrels of flour, to fall into the hands of the enemy. A reconnoissance in

[36] Oct. 30.

[37] Pollard says:

"It is to be admitted that the South was bitterly disappointed in the manifestations of public sentiment in Kentucky; that the exhibitions of sympathy in this State were meager and sentimental, and amounted to but little practical aid of our cause. Indeed, no subject was at once more dispiriting and perplexing to the South than the cautious and unmanly reception given to our armies both in Kentucky and Maryland. The references we have made to the sentiment of each of these States leaves but little room to doubt the general conclusion, that the dread of Yankee vengeance and love of property were too powerful to make them take risks against these in favor of a cause for which their people had a mere preference, without any attachments to it higher than those of selfish calculation."

[38] Aug. 20.

[39] About Sept. 1.



IUKA.

force, under Col. Mower, having satisfied Rosecrans that the Rebel army under Gen. Price now occupied Iuka, he so advised Gen. Grant; who thereupon resolved on a combined attack, sending down Gen. Ord, with some 5,000 men, to Burnsville, seven miles west of Iuka, and following from Bolivar with such troops as could be spared to rëenforce him. Ord was to move on Iuka from the north; while Rosecrans, with Stanley's, was to rejoin his remaining division, under Hamilton, at Jacinto, nine miles south of Burnsville, thence advancing on Price from the south. This concentration was duly effected;[20] and Gen. Grant, who had now reached Burnsville, was advised that Rosecrans would attack Iuka, 19½ miles from Jacinto, between 2½ and 4½ P. M. next day.

Rosecrans moved accordingly, at 3 A. M.,[21] in light marching order, duly advising Gen. Grant; and was within 7½ miles of Iuka at noon, having been driving in the enemy's skirmishers for the last two miles. Disappointed in hearing no guns from Ord's column, he did not choose to push his four brigades against the more numerous army in their front on separate roads, which precluded their reciprocal support, but advanced slowly—Hamilton's division in front—up to a point two miles from Iuka, where a cross-road connected that from Jacinto, on which he was moving, with the road leading south-eastward from Iuka to Fulton; where,

[20] Sept. 18.

[21] Sept. 19.

at 4 P. M., the Rebels were found drawn up in force, holding a strong position along a deep ravine crossing the main road, and behind the crest of a hill. Here our skirmishers were driven back on the head of the column in advance, which was suddenly saluted with a heavy fire of musketry, grape, canister, and shell, under which the 11th Ohio battery was with difficulty brought into position, with the 5th Iowa, Col. Matthias, and 26th Missouri, Col. Boomer, supporting it; the 48th Indiana, Col. Eddy, posted a little in advance of the battery, on the left of the road, holding their ground under a terrible fire; while the 4th Minnesota, Capt. Le Gro, and 16th Iowa, Col. Chambers, were hurried up to their support. The nature of the ground forbidding any extension of our front, the battle was thus maintained by a single brigade, against at least three times their numbers, until Col. Eddy was killed; when the remnant of his regiment was hurled back in disorder and our advanced battery clutched by the Rebels; but not till its every horse had been disabled and every officer killed or wounded. A charge was instantly made to recover it, and the guns were repeatedly taken and retaken; but they were finally dragged off the field by the Rebels, only to be abandoned in their flight from Iuka.

Stanley's division had meantime come up, pushing forward the 11th Missouri to the front; where, uniting with the 5th Iowa and 26th Missouri, it first checked the Rebel advance and then drove it back to the shelter of the ravine; while Col. Perczel, with the 10th Iowa and a section of Immell's battery, repulsed a Rebel attempt to turn our left. Col. Boomer fell, severely wounded, and darkness at length closed the battle: our men lying down on their arms, expecting to renew the struggle next morning; Gen. Stanley himself being at the front, along with Brig.-Gen. Sullivan and Col. J. B. Sanborn, who had bravely and skillfully directed the movements of Hamilton's two brigades; but not a regiment of Stanley's division, save the 11th Missouri, had been enabled to participate in the action; and not a shot had been fired from the direction whence Ord's advance had been confidently expected—the excuse for this being that Ord had only expected to attack after hearing the sound of Rosecrans's guns; and these a high wind from the north-west prevented his hearing at all.

Ord had been watching a Rebel demonstration from the south and west upon Corinth—which proved a mere feint—but had returned to Burnsville at 4 P. M.,[22] when he was directed by Grant to move his entire force—which had been swelled by the arrival of Ross's division—to within four miles of Iuka, and there await the sound of Rosecrans's guns. Ross, in his advance, reported to him a dense smoke arising from the direction of Iuka; whence he inferred that Price was burning his stores and preparing to retreat. Next morning, hearing guns in his front, Ord moved rapidly into Iuka, but found no enemy there; Price having retreated on the Fulton road during the night. Ord, leaving Crocker's brigade to garrison Iuka, returned directly, by order, to Corinth; while Rosecrans—having first sent Stan-

[22] Sept. 19.

ley's division into Iuka and found it abandoned—turned on the trail of the Rebels, and followed until night; but found they had too much start to be overtaken.

Hamilton reports that, in this affair of Iuka, not more than 2,800 men on our side were actually engaged, against a Rebel force of 11,000, holding a chosen and very strong position. Rosecrans reports our total loss in this battle at 782—144 killed, 598 wounded, and 40 missing; and that we buried on the field 265 Rebels, while 120 more died in hospital of wounds here received; 342 more were left wounded in hospital by the Rebels, and 361 were made prisoners. He estimates that they carried off 350 more of their less severely wounded; making their total loss 1,438. He states that he captured 1,629 stand of arms, 13,000 rounds of ammunition, beside large quantities of equipments and stores. Pollard says that the Rebel loss "was probably 800 in killed and wounded."

Price retreated to Ripley, Miss., where he united with a still stronger Rebel force, under Van Dorn, who had been menacing Corinth during the conflict at Iuka, but had retreated after its close, and who now assumed command, and, marching northward, struck the Memphis Railroad at Pocahontas, considerably westward of Corinth, thence pushing [33] rapidly down the road to Chewalla, with intent to surprise, or at least storm, Corinth next day. Rosecrans—who had received [34] his promotion to a Major-Generalship directly after the affair at Iuka—had been left in chief command at Corinth by Grant, who had returned to his own headquarters at Jackson, withdrawing Ord's division to Bolivar. Rosecrans had in and about Corinth not far from 20,000 men—too few to man the extensive works constructed around it by Beauregard, when he held that position against Halleck's besieging army. Realizing this, Rosecrans had hastily constructed an inner line of fortifications, covering Corinth, especially toward the west, at distances of a mile or so from the center of the village. Promptly advised by his cavalry of the formidable Rebel movement northward, until it struck the line of his communications with Grant, he supposed its object to be Bolivar or Jackson, and that only a feint would be made on Corinth; but he was prepared for any emergency, having his forces well in hand and thrown out westward, into and beyond Beauregard's fortifications already mentioned. Hamilton held the right, with Davies in the center, and McKean on the left; while three regiments, under Col. Oliver, were thrown out in advance on the Chewalla road, down which the Rebels were advancing.

Van Dorn moved at an early hour, and, forming in order of battle at a distance from our outworks, his right, under Gen. Mansfield Lovell, encountered, at 7½ A. M.,[35] our left advance, under Col. Oliver, holding a hill which afforded a strong position, and a broad and extensive view of the country beyond it. He had orders to hold it pretty firmly, so as to compel the enemy to develop his strength.

Rosecrans, still distrusting that this attack was more than a feint, de-

[33] Oct. 2. [34] Sept. 20. [35] Oct. 3.



CORINTH.

signed to cover a movement on Bolivar and Jackson, at 9 o'clock sent Gen. McArthur to the front, who reported widespread but slack skirmishing, and said the hill was of great value to test the strength of our assailants. McArthur, finding himself hotly assailed, called up four more regiments from McKean's division, and continued what by this time had become a serious engagement, until a determined Rebel charge, interposing between his right and the left of Gen. Davies, forced him rapidly back from the hill, with the loss of 2 heavy guns; thus compelling a slight recoil of Davies also.

By 1 P. M., it had become evident that the attack was no feint, but meant the capture of Corinth, with its immense stores; and that success was to be struggled for right here. Accordingly, McKean's division, on our left, was drawn back to the ridge next beyond our inner intrenchments, and ordered to close with his right on Davies's left; Hamilton's division was moved down until its left touched Davies's right; while Stanley, moving northward and eastward, was to stand in close *échelon* with McKean, but nearer Corinth. These dispositions had scarcely been completed, under a most determined pressure on our center by the Rebels, which compelled Davies to give ground and call upon Stanley for aid, when night compelled a pause in the engagement; Col. Mower, with one of Stanley's brigades, having just come into the fight; while Hamilton, working his way through an impracticable thicket, was just swinging in on the enemy's left. Van Dorn, supposing Corinth virtually his own, sent off to Richmond an electrifying

dispatch, claiming a great victory, and rested for the night on his laurels.

At 3 A. M.,[36] the fight was reopened by the fire of a Rebel battery which had been planted during the night in front and but 200 yards distant from Fort Robinett, in our center, covering the road W.N.W. from Corinth to Chewalla. Shell were thrown into Corinth, exploding in streets and houses, and causing a sudden stampede of teamsters, sutlers, and non-combatants generally. No reply was made by our batteries till fair daylight; when Capt. Williams opened from Fort Williams with his 20-pound Parrotts, and in three minutes silenced the unseasonable disturber; two of whose guns were dragged off, while the third, being deserted, was taken and brought within our lines. By this time, the skirmishers of both sides had wormed their way into the swampy thickets separating the hostile forces; and their shots, at first scattering, came thicker and faster. Occasionally, there would be a lull in this fusillade, swiftly followed by considerable volleys. Batteries on both sides now came into full play, and shells were falling and bursting everywhere; but no Rebel masses, nor even lines of infantry, were visible; until suddenly, about 9½ A. M., a vast column of gleaming bayonets flashed out from the woods east of the railroad, and moved sternly up the Bolivar road. Says the witnessing correspondent of the *Cincinnati Commercial:*

"A prodigious mass, with gleaming bayonets, suddenly loomed out, dark and threatening, on the east of the railroad, moving sternly up the Bolivar road in column by divisions. Directly, it opened out in the shape of a monstrous wedge, and drove forward impetuously toward the heart of Corinth. It was a splendid target for our batteries, and it was soon perforated. Hideous gaps were rent in it, but those massive lines were closed almost as soon as they were torn open. At this period, the skillful management of Gen. Rosecrans began to develop. It was discovered that the enemy had been enticed to attack precisely at the point where the artillery could sweep them with direct, cross, and enfilading fire. He had prepared for such an occasion. Our shell swept through the mass with awful effect; but the brave Rebels pressed onward inflexibly. Directly, the wedge opened and spread out magnificently, right and left, like great wings, seeming to swoop over the whole field before them. But there was a fearful march in front. A broad, turfy glacis, sloping upward at an angle of thirty degrees to a crest fringed with determined, disciplined soldiers, and clad with terrible batteries, frowned upon them. There were a few obstructions—fallen timber—which disordered their lines a little. But every break was instantly welded. Our whole line opened fire; but the enemy, seemingly insensible to fear, or infuriated by passion, bent their necks downward and marched steadily to death, *with their faces averted like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail.* The Yates and Burgess sharp-shooters, lying snugly behind their rude breastworks, poured in a destructive fire; but it seemed no more effectual than if they had been firing potato-balls, excepting that somebody was killed. The enemy still pressed onward undismayed. At last, they reached the crest of the hill in front and to the right of Fort Richardson, and Gen. Davies's division gave way. It began to fall back in disorder. Gen. Rosecrans, who had been watching the conflict with eagle eye, and who is described as having expressed his delight at the trap into which Gen. Price was blindly plunging, discovered the break, and dashed to the front, inflamed with indignation. He rallied the men by his splendid example in the thickest of the fight. Before the line was demoralized, he succeeded in restoring it, and the men, brave when bravely led, fought again. But it had yielded much space; and the loss of Fort Richardson was certain. Price's right moved swiftly to the headquarters of Gen. Rosecrans, took possession of it, and posted themselves under cover of the portico of the house, and behind its corners, whence they opened fire upon our troops on the opposite side of the public square. Seven Rebels were killed within the little inclosure in

[36] Saturday, Oct. 4.

front of the General's cottage. The structure is a sort of sieve now—bullets have punctured it so well. But the desperadoes got no farther into town.

"Battle was raging about Fort Richardson. Gallant Richardson, for whom it was named, fought his battery well. Had his supports fought as his artillerymen did, the record would have been different. The Rebels gained the crest of the hill, swarmed around the little redoubt, and were swept away from it as a breath will dissipate smoke. Again they swarmed like infuriated tigers. At last, a desperate dash, with a yell. Richardson goes down to rise no more. His supports are not on hand. The foe shouts triumphantly and seizes the guns. The horses are fifty yards down the hill toward Corinth. A score of Rebels seize them. The 56th Illinois suddenly rises from cover in the ravine. One terrible volley, and there are sixteen dead artillery horses and a dozen dead Rebels. Illinois shouts, charges up the hill, across the plateau into the battery. The Rebels fly out through embrasures and around the wings. The 56th yells again and pursues.

"The Rebels do not stop. Hamilton's veterans, meantime, have been working quietly—no lung-work, but gun-work enough. A steady stream of fire tore the Rebel ranks to pieces. When Davies broke, it was necessary for all to fall back. Gen. Rosecrans thought it well enough to get Price in deeply. A Rebel soldier says Van Dorn sat on his horse grimly and saw it all. 'That's Rosecrans's trick,' said he; 'he's got Price where he must suffer.' Maybe this is one of the apocrypha of battle. A Rebel soldier says it's truth. But Hamilton's division receded under orders—at backward step; slowly, grimly, face to the foe, and firing. But when the 56th Illinois charged, this was changed. Davies's misfortune had been remedied. The whole line advanced. The Rebel host was broken. A destroying Nemesis pursued them. Arms were flung away wildly. They ran to the woods. They fled into the forests. Oh! what a shout of triumph and what a gleaming line of steel followed them. It is strange, but true. Our men do not often shout before battle. Heavens! what thunder there is in their throats after victory! 'They' report that such a shout was never before heard in Corinth. Price's *once* 'invincible' now invisible legions were broken, demoralized, fugitive, and remorselessly pursued down the hill, into the swamps, through the thickets, into the forests. Newly disturbed earth shows where they fell, and how very often.

"Gen. Van Dorn's attack was to have been simultaneous with that of Price. The Generals had arranged to carry Corinth by one grand assault. In their reconnoissance Friday evening, they had found no fort where Fort Richardson was, and they overlooked Fort Robinett. Ugly obstacles. When they drove their wedge toward Corinth, one flange on the Bolivar road, the other on a branch of the Chewalla, they intended both wings should extend together. Topographical and artificial obstructions interrupted Van Dorn. He was obliged to sweep over a rugged ravine, through dense thickets, up hill, over a heavy abatis, with his left; it was necessary for his center to dip down hill under the fire of Fort Williams, Capt. Gau's siege-guns in the rear of the town, and under heavy musketry, while his right had to girdle a ridge and move over almost insurmountable abatis under a point-blank fire of both Fort Williams and Fort Robinett, supported by a splendid division of veteran troops. The latter fort had 10-pounder Parrotts, three of them—the former 30-pounder Parrotts, which devour men. It was a task to be accomplished, or a terrible failure to be recorded. Price had comparatively plain sailing, and lost no time. Van Dorn was seven or eight minutes behind time. During that precious seven minutes, Price was overwhelmed, and Van Dorn was left with a feat of desperation to be accomplished. He tried it audaciously. His men obeyed magnificently. Evidently, he relied chiefly on Texas and Mississippi; for the troops of those States were in front. The wings were sorely distressed in the entanglement on either side. Two girdles of bristling steel glistened on the waist of the ridge. Two brigades, one supporting the front at close distance, moved up solidly toward the face of the fort. The Parrotts of both redoubts were pouring shot, and shell, and grape, and canister, into them from the moment of command—'Forward—Charge!' shouted clearly from the brave Col. Rogers (acting Brigadier) of Texas. They tell me it was a noble exhibition of desperate daring. At every discharge, great gaps were cut through their ranks. No faltering, but the ranks were closed, and they moved steadily to the front, bending their heads to the storm. Dozens were slaughtered while thrusting themselves through the rugged timber, but no man wavered. Onward, onward, steady and unyielding as fate, their General in front. At last, they reach the ditch. It is an awful moment. They pause to take breath for a surge—a fatal pause. Texas Rogers, with the Rebel flag in his left, revolver in his right, advanced firing, leaped the ditch, scaled the parapet, waved his banner aloft, and tumbled headlong into the ditch. A patriot's bullet had killed him in the moment of triumph. Five Texans

who followed pitched forward through the embrasures like logs, and fell into the fort.

"But we anticipate. Remember that the two redoubts are on the same ridge: Fort Williams commanding Fort Robinett, which is in front. Had the Rebels taken the latter, the guns of the former would have destroyed them. They were separated by a space not exceeding one hundred and fifty yards. The Ohio brigade, commanded by Col. Fuller, was formed behind the ridge, on the right of the redoubts. The left of the 63d Ohio rested on Fort Robinett, its right joining the left of the 27th Ohio; the 39th was behind the 27th, supporting it; the right of the 43d joined the left of the 63d, forming a right angle with it, and extending to Fort Williams, behind the crest of the ridge. The 11th Missouri, Col. Mower (U. S. A.), was formed behind the 63d Ohio, its left in the angle, and the regiment faced obliquely to the right of the 63d. The positions of these gallant regiments should be described, because their actions are memorable.

"Col. Fuller, perfectly collected, required his brigade to lie flat on their faces when not engaged. While the enemy was steadily approaching, he warned them to wait till they could see the whites of their eyes, then fire coolly. It was at the moment the Texan Rogers was flaunting his flag on our parapet, that the 63d was ordered to fire. Dead Capt. McFadden gave the first command of his life to fire on the field of battle, and he fell mortally wounded. There were only 250 of the 63d in the conflict; but their volley was fearful. It is said fifty Rebels fell at once. Six volleys were fired, and the Rebels were gone. The 63d again lay down. Directly, the supporting brigade of the Rebels advanced. The 63d was ordered to make a half left wheel to sweep the front of the redoubt, and the maneuver was handsomely executed. The 11th Missouri moved on the left into line into the vacant space; the 43d moved by the right of companies to the left, and the 27th half-faced to the left. Suddenly, the enemy appeared; and a furious storm of lead and grape was launched at them. The 63d fired five or six volleys, and the Rebels rushed upon them. A terrific hand-to-hand combat ensued. The rage of the combatants was furious and the uproar hideous. It lasted hardly a minute, but the carnage was dreadful. Bayonets were used, muskets clubbed, and men were felled with brawny fists. Our noble fellows were victors, but at sickening cost. Of the 250 of the splendid 63d, 125 lay there on the field, wounded, dead, or dying. The last final struggle terminated with a howl of rage and dismay. The foe flung away their arms and fled like frightened stags to the abatis and forests. The batteries were still vomiting destruction. With the enemy plunging in upon him, brave Robinett, with his faithful gunners of the 1st United States Artillery, had double-shotted his guns and belched death upon the infuriate enemy; and now he sent the iron hail after the fugitives with relentless fury. The abatis was full of them, but they were subdued. Directly, they began to wave their handkerchiefs upon sticks in token of submission, shouting to spare them 'for Gŏd's sake.' Over two hundred of them were taken within an area of a hundred yards, and more than two hundred of them fell in that frightful assault upon Fort Robinett. Fifty-six dead Rebels were heaped up together in front of that redoubt, most of whom were of the 2d Texas and 4th Mississippi. They were buried in one pit; but their brave General sleeps alone: our own noble fellows testifying their respect by rounding his grave smoothly and marking his resting-place.

"A great shout went up all over Corinth. The battle was a shock. It really began at half-past 9 o'clock, and pursuit was commenced at 11 o'clock. The pursuit of the beaten foe was terrible. Sheets of flame blazed through the forest. Huge trunks were shattered by crashing shells. You may track the flying conflict for miles by scarified trees, broken branches, twisted gun-barrels and shattered stocks, blood-stained garments and mats of human hair, which lie on the ground where men died; hillocks which mark ditches where dead Rebels were covered, and smoothly rounded graves where slaughtered patriots were tenderly buried."

Gen. Rosecrans's official report says:

"When Price's left bore down on our center in gallant style, their force was so overpowering that our wearied and jaded troops yielded and fell back, scattering among the houses. I had the personal mortification of witnessing this untoward and untimely stampede.

"Riddled and scattered, the ragged head of Price's right storming columns advanced to near the house, north side of the square, in front of Gen. Halleck's former headquarters; when it was greeted by a storm of grape from a section of Immell's battery, soon rēenforced by the 10th Ohio, which sent them whirling back, pursued by the 5th Minnesota, which advanced on them from their position near the dépôt.

"Gen. Sullivan was ordered and promptly advanced to support Gen. Davies's center. His right rallied and retook battery Powell, into which a few of the storming column had penetrated; while Hamilton, having played upon the Rebels on his right, over

the open space effectively swept by his artillery, advanced on them, and they fled. The battle was over on the right.

"During all this, the skirmishers of the left were moving in our front. A line of battle was formed on the ridge. About twenty minutes after the attack on the right, the enemy advanced in four columns on battery Robinett, and were treated to grape and canister until within fifty yards; when the Ohio brigade arose and gave them a murderous fire of musketry, before which they reeled and fell back to the woods. They, however, gallantly rĕformed and advanced again to the charge, led by Col. Rogers, of the 2d Texas. This time, they reached the edge of the ditch; but the deadly musketry fire of the Ohio brigade again broke them; and, at the word charge, the 11th Missouri and 27th Ohio sprang up and forward at them, chasing their broken fragments back to the woods. Thus by noon ended the battle of the 4th of October."

In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he says:

"Between 8½ and 4 o'clock A. M., the enemy opened his batteries furiously from a point in front of battery Robinett; but in the course of an hour he was silenced and driven from his position. Our troops, thus aroused from their brief rest, which could scarcely be called slumber, nerved themselves for the coming fight; the brunt of which came on about 10 o'clock, when, the enemy charging our right center, Davies's division gave way, but speedily rallied, and, with the aid of Hamilton's division and a cross-fire from battery Robinett, poured in a fire so destructive that the enemy were thrown into confusion and finally driven from this part of the field; at the same time, he also charged battery Robinett; but was thoroughly repulsed, after two or three efforts, and retired to the woods. With our inferior numbers of exhausted troops, we stood on the defensive, sending skirmishers to the front and expecting another charge from the enemy, till about 3 o'clock P. M.; when, finding that their skirmishers yielded to ours, we began to push them, and by 4 o'clock became satisfied that they intended to retire from our immediate front; but so superior was their strength that I could not believe they would altogether abandon the operation. By 6 P. M., our skirmishers had pushed theirs back five miles."

Our soldiers, having now been marching and fighting some 48 hours, with very little rest, Gen. Rosecrans ordered all but those on the skirmish line to lie down, while five days' rations should be issued to them, and that they should start in pursuit of the enemy early next morning; but, just before sunset, Gen. McPherson arrived, with five fresh regiments from Gen. Grant, and was given the advance on the trail of the flying enemy, whom he followed 15 miles next day;[37] having a skirmish with his rear-guard that night.

Meantime, another division, which Gen. Grant had pushed forward from Bolivar, at 3 A. M. of the eventful 4th, under Gen. Hurlbut, to the relief of Corinth, had struck the head of the enemy's retreating forces and skirmished with it considerably during the afternoon. Hurlbut was joined and ranked, next morning, by Ord. The Rebel advance, having crossed the Hatchie river at Davis's bridge, were encountered by Ord and driven back so precipitately that they were unable to burn the bridge, losing 2 batteries and 300 prisoners. Ord, being in inferior numbers, did not pursue across the river, but gathered up 900 small arms which the Rebels had thrown away. He reports that his losses in killed and wounded during that day's pursuit were several hundreds—probably exceeding those of the enemy, who fought only under dense cover, with every advantage of ground, compelling our men to advance across open fields and up hills against them. Gen. Veatch was among our wounded.

Van Dorn crossed the Hatchie that night at Crumm's Mill, 12 miles farther south, burning the bridge behind him. McPherson rebuilt the

[37] Oct. 5.

bridge and crossed next day;[38] continuing the pursuit to Ripley, followed by Rosecrans with most of his army, gathering up deserters and stragglers by the way. Rosecrans was anxiously eager to continue the pursuit, and telegraphed to Grant for permission to do so,[39] believing the Rebel army utterly demoralized and incapable of resistance; but he was directed to desist and return to Corinth. Nine days after his return, he was relieved from his command at Corinth, and ordered to report at Cincinnati; where he found a dispatch directing him to supersede Gen. Buell in command of the Army of the Ohio and Department of the Cumberland, including all of Tennessee east of the Tennessee river.

Gen. Rosecrans reports his total loss at Corinth and in the pursuit at 2,359—315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 missing; and says that the Rebel loss in killed alone was 1,423, with 2,248 prisoners.[40] He estimated their loss in wounded at 5,692. He says the prisoners represented 53 regiments of infantry, 16 of cavalry, 13 batteries, and 7 battalions; and that their numbers engaged were nearly double his own,[41] which he makes less than 20,000 in all.[42] Among his trophies were 14 flags, 2 guns, 3,300 small arms, &c.; while the Rebels, in their retreat, blew up many ammunition and other wagons, and left the ground strewn with tents, accouterments, &c. Among our killed were Gen. Pleasant A. Hackleman,[43] Col. Thomas Kilby Smith, 43d Ohio, and Cols. Thrush, Baker, and Miles; while Gen. Richard J. Oglesby,[44] Adjt.-Gen. Clark, of Rosecrans's staff, and Col. Mower, 11th Missouri, were among the severely wounded. On the Rebel side, Acting Brigadiers Rogers, Johnston, and Martin were killed, and Cols. Pritchard, Daily, and McClain were wounded.

[38] Oct. 6.

[39] He gives these reasons for his eagerness, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"Mississippi was in our hands. The enemy had concentrated all his available force for an offensive movement, had been thoroughly beaten at Corinth, and had then retreated, blowing up his ammunition wagons and caissons; their men throwing away their camp and garrison equipage in the flight. The weather was cool; the roads were dry, and likely to be so for a month to come. Corn was ripe, and, as yet, untouched. We had 3,000,000 of rations in Corinth, and ammunition for six months. There was but one bridge injured on the Mobile and Ohio road; and it could be put in running order by a regiment in half a day. The enemy were so alarmed that, when Hamilton sent a reconnoissance to Blackland, they vacated Tupelo, burning even the bacon which they could not take away on the first train. I had eighty wagon-loads of assorted rations which had reached me that night at Ripley, and had ordered the 30,000 from Chewalla to Hurlbut."

[40] Pollard—who rarely or never finds the Rebel losses the greater—says:

"Our loss in all the three days' engagements was probably quite double that of the enemy. In killed and wounded, it exceeded 3,000; and it was estimated, beside, that we had left more than 1,500 prisoners in the hands of the enemy."

[41] He says, in his official report:

"We fought the combined Rebel force of Mississippi, commanded by Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villipigue, and Rust in person; numbering, according to their own authority, 38,000 men."

[42] He says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"Our own force in the fight was about 15,700 infantry and artillery, and about 2,500 effective cavalry."

[43] Repeatedly a Whig candidate for Congress in the Franklin district, Indiana.

[44] Since elected Governor of Illinois.

XI.

SLAVERY IN THE WAR—EMANCIPATION.

THE Federal Constitution was framed in General Convention, and carried in the several State Conventions, by the aid of adroit and politic evasions and reserves on the part of its framers and champions. The existing necessity for a stronger central authority, which had been developed during the painful experiences of our preceding years of independence, were most keenly felt by the mercantile and mechanical or manufacturing classes, who were consequently zealous advocates of a "more perfect Union." The rural districts, on the other hand, were far less seriously affected by commercial embarrassment and currency dilapidation, and were naturally jealous of a distant and unfamiliar power. Hence the reticence, if not ambiguity, of the text with regard to what has recently been termed "cöercion," or the right of the Federal Government to subdue by arms the forcible resistance of a State, or of several States, to its legitimate authority—a reticence which was imitated by the most prominent advocates of ratification, whether in *The Federalist* or in the several State Conventions. So with regard to Slavery as well. It is plain that the General Convention would have utterly and instantly prohibited the Foreign Slave-Trade, but for the proclaimed fact that this would insure the rejection of their handiwork by the still slave-hungry States of South Carolina and Georgia, if not of North Carolina also; though Virginia was among the most earnest advocates of the prohibition. Hence, when the State Conventions were assembled to ratify or reject it, with such eminent Revolutionary patriots as Patrick Henry, John Hancock, Samuel Adams, George Clinton, and Luther Martin, leading in the opposition, the clauses affecting Slavery were vigilantly, and not unsuccessfully, scrutinized for grounds of attack—the provision concerning the African Slave-Trade being assailed in some States from the side of Slavery, in others from that of anti-Slavery, with vigor and effect. In the North, these assaults were parried by pointing to the power conferred on Congress to abolish the traffic after twenty years, as so much clear gain: to reject the Constitution would not arrest the traffic now, but *would* destroy the power to prohibit it hereafter. On the other hand, the Federalists in the Southern Conventions met their adversaries by pointing to the privilege secured to the slaveholders of hunting their fugitive chattels in other States than their own—a privilege hitherto non-existent—and asked them what was to be gained by rejecting that. In fact, the Constitution was essentially a matter of compromise and mutual concession—a proceeding wherein Thrift is apt to gain at the cost of Principle. Perhaps the majority in no State obtained exactly what they wanted, but were satisfied that, on the whole, they were better with the Constitution than without it.

Patrick Henry alone, in opposing

ratification, assailed the Constitution as a measure of thorough, undisguised, all-absorbing consolidation, and, though himself a professed contemner of Slavery, sought to arouse the fears of the Virginia slaveholders as follows:

"Among ten thousand implied powers which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of your slaves, if they please; and this must and will be done by men, a majority of whom have not a common interest with you. They will, therefore, have no feeling of your interests. It has been repeatedly said here, that the great object of a National Government was national defense. That power, which is said to be intended for security and safety, may be rendered detestable and oppressive. If they give power to the General Government to provide for the general defense, the means must be commensurate to the end. All the means in the possession of the people must be given to the Government which is intrusted with the public defense. In this State, there are 236,000 Blacks; and there are many in several other States: but there are few or none in the Northern States; and yet, if the Northern States shall be of opinion that our slaves are numberless, they may call forth every national resource. May Congress not say *that every Black man must fight?* Did we not see a little of this last war? We were not so hard pushed as to make emancipation general; but acts of Assembly passed, that every slave who would go to the army should be free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event about: Slavery is detested; we feel its fatal effects; we deplore it with all the pity of humanity. Let all these considerations, at some future period, press with full force on the minds of Congress—let that urbanity, which I trust will distinguish America, and the necessity of national defense—let all these things operate on their minds: they will search that paper, and see if they have the power of manumission. And have they not, Sir? Have they not power to provide for the general defense and welfare? May they not think that these call for the abolition of Slavery? May they not pronounce all slaves free? and will they not be warranted by that power? There is no ambiguous implication or logical deduction. The paper speaks to the point. They have the power, in clear, unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it. As much as I deplore Slavery, I see that prudence forbids its abolition. I deny that the General Government ought to set them free, because a decided majority of the States have not the ties of sympathy and fellow-feeling for those whose interest would be affected by their emancipation. The majority of Congress is to the North, and the slaves are to the South."

Gov. Edmund Randolph—who became Washington's Attorney-General—answered Mr. Henry: denying most strenuously that there is any power of abolition given to Congress by the Constitution; but not alluding to what Henry had urged with regard to the War power and the right of Congress to summon every slave to the military defense of the country. Nor does this view of the subject appear to have attracted much attention elsewhere—at least, it does not appear to have been anywhere controverted.[1]

In 1836,[2] Mr. John Quincy Adams, having been required to vote Yea or Nay, in the House, on a proposition reported by Mr. H. L. Pinckney, of South Carolina, in these words—

"*Resolved*, That Congress possesses no constitutional power to interfere *in any way* with the institution of Slavery in any of the States of this confederacy"—

voted Nay, in company with but eight others; and, obtaining the floor in Committee soon afterward, on a proposition that rations be distributed from the public stores to citizens of Georgia and Alabama who have been driven from their homes by Indian

[1] In closing the argument in favor of ratifying the Federal Constitution, Mr. Zachariah Johnson said:

"They tell us that they see a progressive danger of bringing about emancipation. The principle has begun since the Revolution. Let us do what we will, it will come around. Slavery has been the foundation of that impiety and dissipation, which have been so much disseminated among our countrymen. If it were totally abolished, it would do much good."

[2] May 25.

depredations, proceeded to show that such distribution (which he advocated) was justifiable only under the constitutional power of Congress "to promote the general welfare," which Southern statesmen habitually repudiated, or under the still more sweeping War power. In the course of his argument, he said:

"Sir, in the authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the United States to *declare war*, all the powers incidental to war are, by necessary implication, conferred upon the *Government* of the United States. Now, the powers incidental to war are derived, not from their internal municipal source, *but from the laws and usages of nations.* * * * There are, then, Mr. Chairman, in the authority of Congress and of the Executive, two classes of powers, altogether different in their nature, and often incompatible with each other—the War power and the Peace power. The Peace power is limited by regulations, and restricted by provisions, prescribed within the Constitution itself. The War power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, of property, and of life. This, Sir, is the power which authorizes you to pass the resolution now before you; and, in my opinion, there is no other. * * * There are, indeed, powers of Peace conferred upon Congress which also come within the scope and jurisdiction of the laws of nations; such as the negotiation of treaties of amity and commerce; the interchange of public ministers and consuls; and all the personal and social intercourse between the individual inhabitants of the United States and foreign nations, and the Indian tribes, which require the interposition of any law. But the powers of War are all regulated by the laws of nations, and are subject to no other limitation. * * * It was upon this principle that I voted *against* the resolution reported by the Slavery Committee, 'that Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere, *in any way*, with the institution of Slavery in any of the States of this confederacy;' to which resolution most of those with whom I usually concur, and even my own colleagues in this House, gave their assent. I do not admit that there is, even among the Peace powers of Congress, no such authority; but in *war*, there are many ways by which Congress not only have the authority, *but are bound, to interfere with the institution of Slavery in the States.* The existing law prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States from foreign countries is itself an interference with the institution of Slavery in the States. It was so considered by the founders of the Constitution of the United States, in which it was stipulated that Congress should not interfere, in that way, with the institution, prior to the year 1808.

"During the war with Great Britain, the military and naval commanders of that nation issued proclamations inviting the slaves to repair to their standard, with promises of freedom and of settlement in some of the British colonial establishments. This, surely, was an interference with the institution of Slavery in the States. By the treaty of peace, Great Britain stipulated to evacuate all the forts and places in the United States, without carrying away any slaves. If the Government of the United States had no power to interfere, *in any way*, with the institution of Slavery in the States, they would not have had the authority to require this stipulation. It is well known that this engagement was not fulfilled by the British naval and military commanders; that, on the contrary, they *did* carry away all the slaves whom they had induced to join them; and that the British Government inflexibly refused to restore any of them to their masters; that a claim of indemnity was consequently instituted in behalf of the owners of the slaves, and was successfully maintained. All that series of transactions was an interference by Congress with the institution of Slavery in the States in one way—in the way of protection and support. It was by the institution of Slavery alone that the restitution of slaves, enticed by proclamations into the British service, could be claimed as *property*. But for the institution of Slavery, the British commanders could neither have allured them to their standard, nor restored them, otherwise than as liberated prisoners of war. But for the institution of Slavery, there could have been no stipulation that they should not be carried away as property, nor any claim of indemnity for the violation of that engagement.

"But the War power of Congress over the institution of Slavery in the States is yet far more extensive. Suppose the case of a servile war, complicated, to some extent—as it is even now—with an Indian war; suppose Congress were called to raise armies, to supply money from the whole Union to suppress a servile insurrection: would they have no authority to interfere with the institution of Slavery? The issue of a servile war may be disastrous; it may become necessary for the master of the slave to recognize his emancipation by a

treaty of peace: can it, for an instant, be pretended that Congress, in such a contingency, would have no authority to interfere with the institution of Slavery, *in any way*, in the States? Why, it would be equivalent to saying that Congress has no constitutional authority to make peace."

Mr. Adams proceeded to show that Texas was then [prior to her annexation] the arena of a war concerning Slavery—a war based on an effort to rëestablish Slavery where it had been abolished by Mexico; and that our country was powerfully incited to take part directly therein, on the side of Slavery; and might yet be impelled to do so. In view of this probability, he asked—

"Do you imagine that while, in the very nature of things, your own Southern and South-western States must be the battle-field upon which the last great conflict must be fought between Slavery and Emancipation—do you imagine that your Congress will have no constitutional authority to interfere with the institution of Slavery *in any way*, in the States of this confederacy? Sir, they must and will interfere with it—perhaps to sustain it by war; perhaps to abolish it by treaties of peace: and they will not only possess the constitutional power so to interfere, but they will be bound in duty to do it, by the express provisions of the Constitution itself. From the instant that your slaveholding States become the theater of war—civil, servile, or foreign—from that instant, the War powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of Slavery in every way by which it can be interfered with, from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or destroyed, to the cession of the State burdened with Slavery to a foriegn power."

In 1842,[1] when the prospective annexation of Texas, and a consequent war with Mexico, first loomed above the horizon, Mr. Adams returned to the subject; and, with reference to certain anti-Slavery resolves recently offered by Mr Giddings, of Ohio, and the action of the House thereupon, said:

"What I am now to say, I say with great reluctance and with great pain. I am well aware that it is touching upon a sore place; and I would gladly get over it if I could. It has been my effort, so far as was in my power, to avoid any allusion whatever to that question which the gentleman from Virginia tells us that the most lamb-like disposition in the South never can approach without anger and indignation. Sir, that is my sorrow. I admit that the fact is so. We can not touch that subject without raising, throughout the whole South, a mass of violence and passion, with which one might as well reason as with a hurricane. That, I know, is the fact in the South; and that is the fact in this House. And it is the reason why members coming from a Free State are silenced as soon as they rise on this floor; why they are pronounced out of order; made to sit down; and, if they proceed, are censured and expelled. But in behalf of the South and of Southern institutions, a man may get up in this House and expatiate for weeks together. On this point, I do complain; and I must say I have been rather disappointed that I have not been put down already, as speaking out of order. What I say is involuntary, because the subject has been brought into the House from another quarter, as the gentleman himself admits. I would leave that institution to the exclusive consideration and management of the States more peculiarly interested in it, just so long as they can keep it within their own bounds. So far, I admit that Congress has no power to meddle with it. So long as they do not step out of their own bounds, and do not put the question to the people of the United States, whose peace, welfare, and happiness, are all at stake, so long I will agree to leave them to themselves. But when a member from a Free State brings forward certain resolutions, for which, instead of reasoning to disprove his positions, you vote a censure upon him—and that without hearing—it is quite another affair. At the time this was done, I said that, so far as I could understand the resolutions proposed by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Giddings], there were some of them for which I was ready to vote, and some which I must vote against; and I will now tell this House, my constituents, and the world of mankind, that the resolution against which I would have voted was that in which he declares that what are called the Slave States have the exclusive right of consultation on the subject of Slavery. For that resolution, I never would vote; because I believe that it is not just, and does not contain constitutional doctrine. I believe that, so long as the Slave States are able to sustain their institutions, without going abroad or calling upon other parts of

[1] April 15.

the Union to aid them or act on the subject, so long I will consent never to interfere. I have said this; and I repeat it: but, if they come to the Free States and say to them, 'You must help us to keep down our slaves; you must aid us in an insurrection and a civil war;' then I say that, with that call, comes a full and plenary power to this House and to the Senate over the whole subject. It is a War power. I say it is a War power; and when your country is actually in war, whether it be a war of invasion or a war of insurrection, Congress has power to carry on the war, and must carry it on according to the laws of war; and, by the laws of war, an invaded country has all its laws and municipal institutions swept by the board, and martial law takes the place of them.

"This power in Congress has, perhaps, never been called into exercise under the present Constitution of the United States. But, when the laws of war are in force, what, I ask, is one of those laws? It is this: that when a country is invaded, and two hostile armies are set in martial array, the commanders of both armies have power to emancipate all the slaves in the invaded territory. Nor is this a mere theoretic statement. The history of South America shows that the doctrine has been carried into practical execution within the last thirty years. Slavery was abolished in Colombia, first by the Spanish General Murillo; and, secondly, by the American General Bolivar. It was abolished by virtue of a military command, given at the head of the army; and its abolition continues to be law to this day. It was abolished by the laws of war, and not by municipal enactments. The power was exercised by military commanders, under instructions, of course, from their respective Governments.

"And here I recur again to the example of Gen. Jackson. What are you now about in Congress? You are about passing a grant to refund to Gen. Jackson the amount of a certain fine imposed upon him by a judge under the laws of the State of Louisiana. You are going to refund him the money, with interest; and this you are going to do, because the imposition of the fine was unjust. And why was it unjust? Because Gen. Jackson was acting under the laws of war; and because, the moment you place a military commander in a district which is the theater of war, the laws of war apply to that district. * * * I might furnish a thousand proofs to show that the pretensions of gentlemen to the sanctity of their municipal institutions, under a state of actual invasion and of actual war, whether servile, civil, or foreign, is wholly unfounded; and that the laws of war do, in all such cases, take precedence. I lay this down as the law of nations. I say that the military authority takes, for the time, the place of all municipal institutions, and of Slavery among the rest; and that, under that state of things, so far from its being true that the States where Slavery exists have the exclusive management of the subject, not only the President of the United States, but the commander of the army, has power to order the universal emancipation of the slaves. I have given here more in detail a principle which I have asserted on this floor before now, and of which I have no more doubt than that you, Sir, occupy that chair. I give it in its development, in order that any gentleman from any part of the Union may, if he think proper, deny the truth of the position, and may maintain his denial—not by indignation, not by passion and fury, but by sound and sober reasoning from the laws of nations and the laws of war. And, if my position can be answered, and refuted, I shall receive the refutation with pleasure; I shall be glad to listen to reason, aside, as I say, from indignation and passion. And if, by the force of reasoning, my understanding can be convinced, I here pledge myself to recant what I have asserted.

"Let my position be answered; let me be told, let my constituents be told, let the people of my State be told—a State whose soil tolerates not the foot of a slave—that they are bound by the Constitution to a long and toilsome march under burning Summer suns and a deadly Southern clime, for the suppression of a servile war; that they are bound to leave their bodies to rot upon the sands of Carolina—to leave their wives widows and their children orphans—that those who can not march are bound to pour out their treasure, while their sons or brothers are pouring out their blood, to suppress a servile, combined with a civil or a foreign war; and yet that there exists no power, beyond the limits of the Slave State where such war is raging, to emancipate the slaves! I say, let this be proved—I am open to conviction; but, till that conviction comes, I put it forth not as a dictate of feeling, but as a settled maxim of the laws of nations, that in such a case the military supersedes the civil power; and on this account I should have been obliged to vote, as I have said, against one of the resolutions of my excellent friend from Ohio [Mr. Giddings], or should at least have required that it be amended in conformity with the Constitution of the United States."

Hon. Joshua R. Giddings, while a member of the House of Representatives, thirteen years prior to the appearance of Mr. Lincoln's Procla-

mation of Freedom, in reply to slaveholding threats of a dissolution of the Union, said:

"When that contest shall come; when the thunder shall roll and the lightnings flash; when the slaves of the South shall rise in the spirit of Freedom, actuated by the soul-stirring emotion that they are *men*, destined to immortality, entitled to the rights which God bestowed upon them; when the masters shall turn pale and tremble; when their dwellings shall smoke, and dismay sit on each countenance; then, Sir, I do not say we will laugh at your calamity, and mock when your fear cometh, but I do say, *the lover of our race will then stand forth and exert the legitimate powers of this Government of freedom.* We shall then have *constitutional power to act for the good of our country, and to do justice to the slave.* WE WILL THEN STRIKE OFF THE SHACKLES FROM HIS LIMBS. The Government will then have power to *act between Slavery and Freedom; and it can best make peace by giving liberty to the slaves.* And let me tell you, Mr. Speaker, *that time hastens;* the President is exerting a power that will hurry it on; and I shall hail it as the approaching dawn of that Millennium which I know must come upon the earth."

Our great Civil War was opened on the part of the Union, not only with an anxious desire, but with a general expectation, that it would be prosecuted to a successful issue without seriously disturbing the foundations and buttresses of Slavery.

Mr. Lincoln's solicitude on this head, as evinced in his Inaugural Address,[4] was deepened by the dubious, vacillating attitude of the Border Slave States, especially of his native Kentucky, which he was particularly anxious to attach firmly to the cause of the Union, while she seemed frantically wedded to Slavery.

Gov. Seward, in his elaborate initial dispatch[5] to Mr. Dayton, our new Minister to the Court of France, approaching the topic of Slavery with unfeigned reluctance, in a paper designed to modify the ideas and influence the action of a foreign Government—indeed, of all foreign governments—argued that the Rebellion had no pretext that did not grow out of Slavery, and that it was causeless, objectless, irrational, even in view of Slavery, because of the "incontestable" fact set forth by him, as follows:

"Moral and physical causes have determined inflexibly the character of each one of the Territories over which the dispute has arisen; and both parties, after the election [of Lincoln to the Presidency], harmoniously agreed on all the Federal laws required for their organization. The Territories will remain in all respects the same, whether the revolution shall succeed or fail. The condition of Slavery in the several States will remain just the same, whether it succeed or fail. There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected States are to be conquered by the United States, if the revolution fail; but the rights of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will remain subject to the same laws and forms of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail. In the one case, the States would be federally connected with the new confederacy; in the other, they would, as now, be members of the United States; but their constitutions and laws, customs, habits, and institutions, will in either case remain the same."

Our regular Army officers, educated at West Point in a faith that identified devotion to Slavery with loyalty to the Federal Constitution and Government, were of course imbued with a like spirit. Gen. McDowell, in his General Order[6] governing the first advance from the Potomac into Virginia, was as profoundly silent respecting Slavery and slaves as if the latter had no modern existence; while Gen. McClellan, on making a like advance into Western Virginia, issued[7] an address to the people thereof, wherein he said:

[4] Vol I., pp. 422–6. [5] Dated April 22, 1861. [6] June 20. See Vol. I., pp. 534–5. [7] May 26.

"I have ordered troops to cross the river. They come as your friends and your brothers—as enemies only to armed Rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families, and your property, are safe under our protection. All your rights shall be religiously respected.

"Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly—not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part."

Those volunteer officers, however, who had not been blessed with a West Point training, did not always view the matter in precisely this light. Directly after[8] Gen. Butler's accession to command at Fortress Monroe, three negro slaves came within his lines from the Rebel lines adjacent; stating that they were held as property by Col. Mallory, of the Confederate forces in his front, who was about to send them to the North Carolina seaboard, to work on the Rebel fortifications there in progress, intended to bar that coast against our arms. Gen. Butler heard their story, was satisfied of its truth, and said: "These men are *contraband of war:*[9] set them at work." He was, very soon afterward, invited to a conference by Maj. Carey, commanding opposite; and accordingly met the Major (in whom he recognized an old political compatriot) a mile from the fort. Maj. Carey, as agent of his absent friend Mallory, demanded a return of those negroes; which Gen. Butler courteously but firmly declined; and, after due debate, the conference terminated fruitlessly. Very naturally, the transit of negroes from Slavery to Fortress Monroe was thenceforth almost continuous.

Gen. Butler wrote[10] forthwith to Lt.-Gen. Scott, soliciting advice and direction. In this letter, he said:

"Since I wrote my last, the question in regard to slave property is becoming one of very serious magnitude. The inhabitants of Virginia are using their negroes in the batteries, and are preparing to send their women and children south. The escapes from them are very numerous; and a squad has come in this morning," and my pickets are bringing in their women and children. Of course, these can not be dealt with upon the theory on which I designed to treat the services of able-bodied men and women who might come within my lines, and of which I gave you a detailed account in my last dispatch.

"I am in the utmost doubt what to do with this species of property. Up to this time, I have had come within my lines men and women, with their children—entire families—each family belonging to the same owner. I have, therefore, determined to employ—as I can do very profitably—the able-bodied persons in the party, issuing proper food for the support of all; charging against their services the expense of care and sustenance of the non-laborers; keeping a strict and accurate account, as well of the services as of the expenditures, having the worth of the services and the cost of the expenditure determined by a board of survey hereafter to be detailed. I know of no other manner in which to dispose of this subject, and the questions connected therewith. As a matter of property, to the insurgents it will be of very great moment—the number that I now have amounting, as I am informed, to what in good times would be of the value of $60,000.

"Twelve of these negroes, I am informed, have escaped from the erection of the batteries on Sewell's Point, which fired upon my expedition as it passed by out of range. As a means of offense, therefore, in the ene-

[8] May 22, 1861.

[9] "In this matter, he [Gen. Butler] has struck this Southern Insurrection in a place which is as vulnerable as the heel of Achilles; and we dare say that, in receiving and seizing the slaves of Rebels as contraband of war, this Southern Confederacy will be substantially suppressed with the pacification of Virginia."—*N. Y. Herald*, May 31, 1861.

[10] May 27, 1861.

[11] "These fugitive slaves, at this rate, will soon prove more powerful in suffocating this Southern White insurrection than all the armies of Gen. Scott. This man Butler, in this thing, has proved himself the greatest lawyer we have between a pair of epaulets."—*N. Y. Herald*, June 28, 1861.

my's hands, these negroes, when able-bodied, are of great importance. Without them, the batteries could not have been erected; at least, for many weeks. As a military question, it would seem to be a measure of necessity, and deprives their masters of their services.

"How can this be done? As a political question, and a question of humanity, can I receive the services of a father and a mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect, I have no doubt; of the political one, I have no right to judge. I therefore submit all this to your better judgment; and, as these questions have a political aspect, I have ventured—and I trust I am not wrong in so doing—to duplicate the parts of my dispatch relating to this subject, and forward them to the Secretary of War. Your obedient servant,

"BENJ. F. BUTLER.

"Lt.-General SCOTT."

He was answered by the head of the War Department as follows:

"SIR:—Your action in respect to the negroes who came within your lines, from the service of the Rebels, is approved. The Department is sensible of the embarrassments which must surround officers conducting military operations in a State, by the laws of which Slavery is sanctioned. The Government can not recognize the rejection by any State of its Federal obligations, resting upon itself. Among these Federal obligations, however, no one can be more important than that of suppressing and dispersing any combination of the former for the purpose of overthrowing its whole constitutional authority. While, therefore, you will permit no interference, by persons under your command, with the relations of persons held to service under the laws of any State, you will, on the other hand, so long as any State within which your military operations are conducted remains under the control of such armed combinations, refrain from surrendering to alleged masters any persons who come within your lines. You will employ such persons in the services to which they will be best adapted; keeping an account of the labor by them performed, of the value of it, and the expenses of their maintenance. The question of their final disposition will be reserved for future determination.

"SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
"To Maj.-Gen. BUTLER."

Time passed. Bull Run had been fought and lost; the called session of Congress had been held; public opinion on the Slavery question had made very considerable strides; when Gen. Fremont, on assuming civil as well as military control of the State of Missouri, issued the memorable General Order,[13] wherein he proclaimed that "The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use; and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men."

This position was in advance of any that had yet been sanctioned at Washington; and, though it was very generally sustained or acquiesced in by the journals supporting the War, President Lincoln wrote Gen. Fremont that he must withdraw or modify it. This, Gen. F. declined to do, unless openly directed by his superior; hence the following order:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 11, 1861.
"Maj.-Gen. JOHN C. FREMONT:

"SIR:—Yours of the 8th, in answer to mine of the 2d inst., is just received. Assured that you, upon the ground, could better judge of the necessities of your position than I could at this distance, on seeing your proclamation of August 30, I perceived no general objection to it; the particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves, appeared to me to be objectionable in its non-conformity to the Act of Congress, passed the 6th of last August, upon the same subjects; and hence I wrote you expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly. Your answer, just received, expresses the preference on your part that I should make an open order for the modification; which I very cheerfully do. It is, therefore, ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and construed, as to conform with, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the Act of Congress entitled 'An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,'

[13] See it in full, Vol. I., p. 585.

approved August 6, 1861; and that the said act be published at length with this order. Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN."

In view of the sailing from Fortress Monroe of the Port Royal expedition against the Sea Islands and coast of South Carolina, General Instructions were issued[14] to its military chief, whereof the gist is as follows:

"You will, in general, avail yourself of the services of any persons, whether fugitives from labor or not, who may offer them to the National Government; you will employ such persons in such service as they may be fitted for, either as ordinary employés, or, if special circumstances seem to require it, in any other capacity, with such organization, in squads, companies, or otherwise, as you deem most beneficial to the service. *This, however, not to mean a general arming of them for military service.*[15] You will assure all loyal masters that Congress will provide just compensation to them for the loss of the services of the persons so employed. It is believed that the course thus indicated will best secure the substantial rights of loyal masters, and the benefits to the United States of the services of all disposed to support the Government, while it avoids all interference with the social systems or local institutions of every State, beyond that which insurrection makes unavoidable, and which a restoration of peaceful relations to the Union, under the Constitution, will immediately remove.

"SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War."

Gen. T. W. Sherman,[16] having occupied the forts guarding the entrance to Port Royal, and firmly established himself on that and the adjacent islands, issued a proclamation to the people of South Carolina, wherein he said:

"In obedience to the orders of the President of these United States of America, I have landed on your shores with a small force of National troops. The dictates of a duty which, under the Constitution, I owe to a great sovereign State, and to a proud and hospitable people, among whom I have passed some of the pleasantest days of my life, prompt me to proclaim that we have come among you with no feelings of personal animosity; no desire to harm your citizens, destroy your property, or interfere with any of your lawful rights, or your social and local institutions, beyond what the causes herein briefly alluded to may render unavoidable."

All in vain. None of the Whites on the adjacent mainland could be induced even to accept a copy of this document—those who were brought to parley insisting that there were *no* "loyal persons" (in Gen. Sherman's sense)—that is, no loyal Whites—within their knowledge. And no South Carolina journal intimated that Gen. Sherman's virtual pledge not to intermeddle with Slavery rendered his presence on their coast one whit less unwelcome than it would otherwise have been. If any White native of South Carolina came over to us, or evinced a desire to do so, thenceforth till near the end of the Rebellion, his name has not been given to the public.

Maj.-Gen. Wool, who succeeded Gen. Butler in command at Fortress Monroe, issued[17] an order directing that "all colored persons called contrabands" employed by officers or others within his command, must be furnished with subsistence by their employers, and paid, if males, not less than $8; if females, not less than $4 per month; and that "all able-bodied colored persons, not employed as aforesaid," will be immediately put to work in the Engineer's or the Quartermaster's Department. By a subsequent order,[18] he directed that the compensation of 'contrabands' working for the Government should be $5 to $10 per month, with soldiers' rations.

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[13] Oct. 14, 1861.

[14] It is well understood that this sentence was inserted by the President in revising the order.

[16] Not William T., who became so famous, but an old army officer, formerly 5th Artillery.

[17] Oct. 14, 1861. [18] Nov. 1, 1861.

Maj.-Gen. Dix, being about to take possession of the counties of Accomac and Northampton, Va., on the eastern shore of Chesapeake Bay, issued [10] a Proclamation, which says:

"The military forces of the United States are about to enter your counties as a part of the Union. They will go among you as friends, and with the earnest hope that they may not, by your own acts, be forced to become your enemies. They will invade no rights of person or property. On the contrary, your laws, your institutions, your usages, will be scrupulously respected. There need be no fear that the quietude of any fireside will be disturbed, unless the disturbance is caused by yourselves.

"Special directions have been given not to interfere with the condition of any person held to domestic service; and, in order that there may be no ground for mistake or pretext for misrepresentation, commanders of regiments and corps have been instructed not to permit any such persons to come within their lines."

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, soon after succeeding Gen. Fremont in command in Missouri, issued his famous 'Order No. 3,' which sets forth that

"It has been represented that important information, respecting the number and condition of our forces, is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp, or of any forces on the march; and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom."

Gen. Halleck afterward, in a letter to F. P. Blair, explained and justified this order, as follows:

"Order No. 3 was, in my mind, clearly a military necessity. Unauthorized persons, Black or White, free or slave, must be kept out of our camps, unless we are willing to publish to the enemy every thing we do or intend to do. It was a *military*, and not a *political* order.

"I am ready to carry out any lawful instructions in regard to fugitive slaves which my superiors may give me, and to enforce any law which Congress may pass. But I can not make law, and will not violate it. You know my private opinion on the policy of confiscating the slave property of Rebels in arms. If Congress shall pass it, you may be certain that I shall enforce it. Perhaps my policy as to the treatment of Rebels and their property is as well set out in Order No. 13, issued the day your letter was written, as I could now describe it."

That deserters from the enemy, entering the lines or camp of an army in time of war, are "unauthorized persons," is quite obvious; that they very often give false information, and are in fact spies, deserting back again at the first fair opportunity, is well known. Yet no commander prior to Gen. Halleck ever directed deserters to be repelled from his front and thrown back on the enemy; on the contrary, the risks of dissimulation, falsehood, and treachery, are presumed to be far overbalanced by the chance of thus obtaining valuable information and aid. That the *Whites* of Missouri were far more likely than the Blacks to be traitors at heart, and infinitely more apt to steal away to the Rebels with important information, was as palpable as noonday; yet Gen. Halleck's No. 3 repelled Blacks only.

Gen. Halleck's order No. 13 sheds no further light on this subject; but, in a subsequent order,[11] he says:

"It does not belong to the military to decide upon the relation of master and slave. Such questions must be settled by the civil courts. No fugitive slaves will, therefore, be admitted within our lines or camps, except when specially ordered by the General commanding."

Never was a "therefore" more misplaced. How were the persons presenting themselves adjudged to be or known as "fugitive slaves"? Plainly, by the color of their skins, and that only. The sole end of this regulation was the remanding of all slaves to their masters—seven-eighths of whom were most envenomed, im-

[10] Nov. 13, 1861.

[11] Feb. 23, 1862.

placable Rebels—by depriving them of refuge within our lines from those masters' power.

Gen. Cameron, the Secretary of War, had already become an ardent and open convert to the policy of recognizing Slavery as the Union's real assailant, and fighting her accordingly. In his Annual Report[20] to the President of the operations of his Department, he said:

"It has become a grave question for determination what shall be done with the slaves abandoned by their owners on the advance of our troops into Southern territory, as in the Beaufort district of South Carolina. The whole White population therein is six thousand, while the number of negroes exceeds thirty-two thousand. The panic which drove their masters in wild confusion from their homes leaves them in undisputed possession of the soil. Shall they, armed by their masters, be placed in the field to fight against us? or shall their labor be continually employed in reproducing the means for supporting the armies of rebellion?

"The war into which this Government has been forced by rebellious traitors is carried on for the purpose of repossessing the property violently and treacherously seized upon by the enemies of the Government, and to rēestablish the authority and laws of the United States in the places where they are opposed or overthrown by armed insurrection and rebellion. Its purpose is to recover and defend what is justly its own.

"War, even between independent nations, is made to subdue the enemy, and all that belongs to that enemy, by occupying the hostile country, and exercising dominion over all the men and things within its territory. This being true in respect to independent nations at war with each other, it follows that Rebels, who are laboring by force of arms to overthrow a Government, justly bring upon themselves all the consequences of war, and provoke the destruction merited by the worst of crimes. That Government would be false to national trust, and would justly excite the ridicule of the civilized world, that would abstain from the use of any efficient means to preserve its own existence, or to overcome a rebellious and traitorous enemy, by sparing or protecting the property of those who are waging war against it.

"The principal wealth and power of the Rebel States is a peculiar species of property, consisting of the service or labor of African slaves, or the descendants of Africans. This property has been variously estimated at the value of from seven hundred million to one thousand million dollars.

"Why should this property be exempt from the hazards and consequences of a rebellious war?

"It was the boast of the leader of the Rebellion, while he yet had a seat in the Senate of the United States, that the Southern States would be comparatively safe and free from the burdens of war, if it should be brought on by the contemplated Rebellion; and that boast was accompanied by the savage threat that 'Northern towns and cities would become the victims of rapine and military spoil,' and that 'Northern men should smell Southern gunpowder and feel Southern steel.' No one doubts the disposition of the Rebels to carry that threat into execution. The wealth of Northern towns and cities, the produce of Northern farms, Northern workshops and manufactories, would certainly be seized, destroyed, or appropriated as military spoil. No property in the North would be spared from the hands of the Rebels; and their rapine would be defended under the laws of war. While the loyal States thus have all their property and possessions at stake, are the insurgent Rebels to carry on warfare against the Government in peace and security to their own property?

"Reason and justice and self-preservation forbid that such should be the policy of this Government, but demand, on the contrary, that, being forced by traitors and Rebels to the extremity of war, all the rights and powers of war should be exercised to bring it to a speedy end.

"Those who war against the Government justly forfeit all rights of property, privilege, or security, derived from the Constitution and laws, against which they are in armed rebellion; and, as the labor and service of their slaves constitute the chief property of the Rebels, such property should share the common fate of war to which they have devoted the property of loyal citizens.

"While it is plain that the slave property of the South is justly subjected to all the consequences of this rebellious war, and that the Government would be untrue to its trust in not employing all the rights and powers of war to bring it to a speedy close, the details of the plan for doing so, like all

[20] Dec. 1, 1861.

other military measures, must, in a great degree, be left to be determined by particular exigencies. The disposition of other property belonging to the Rebels that becomes subject to our arms is governed by the circumstances of the case. The Government has no power to hold slaves, none to restrain a slave of his liberty, or to exact his service. It has a right, however, to use the voluntary service of slaves liberated by war from their Rebel masters, like any other property of the Rebels, in whatever mode may be most efficient for the defense of the Government, the prosecution of the war, and the suppression of rebellion. It is as clearly a right of the Government to arm slaves when it may become necessary as it is to take gunpowder from the enemy. Whether it is expedient to do so, is purely a military question. The right is unquestionable by the laws of war. The expediency must be determined by circumstances, keeping in view the great object of overcoming the Rebels, reëstablishing the laws, and restoring peace to the nation.

"It is vain and idle for the Government to carry on this war, or hope to maintain its existence against rebellious force, without employing all the rights and powers of war. As has been said, the right to deprive the Rebels of their property in slaves and slave labor is as clear and absolute as the right to take forage from the field, or cotton from the warehouse, or powder and arms from the magazine. To leave the enemy in the possession of such property as forage, and cotton, and military stores, and the means of constantly reproducing them, would be madness. It is, therefore, equal madness to leave them in peaceful and secure possession of slave property, more valuable and efficient to them for war than forage, cotton, and military stores. Such policy would be national suicide. What to do with that species of property is a question that time and circumstances will solve, and need not be anticipated, further than to repeat that they can not be held by the Government as slaves. It would be useless to keep them as prisoners of war; and self-preservation, the highest duty of a Government, or of individuals, demands that they should be disposed of or employed in the most effective manner that will tend most speedily to suppress the insurrection and restore the authority of the Government. If it shall be found that the men who have been held by the Rebels as slaves are capable of bearing arms and performing efficient military service, it is the right, and may become the duty, of this Government to arm and equip them, and employ their services against the Rebels, under proper military regulations, discipline, and command.

"But, in whatever manner they may be used by the Government, it is plain that, once liberated by the rebellious act of their masters, they should never again be restored to bondage. By the master's treason and rebellion, he forfeits all right to the labor and service of his slave; and the slave of the rebellious master, by his service to the Government, becomes justly entitled to freedom and protection.

"The disposition to be made of the slaves of Rebels, after the close of the war, can be safely left to the wisdom and patriotism of Congress. The representatives of the people will unquestionably secure to the loyal slaveholders every right to which they are entitled under the Constitution of the country."

Mr. Lincoln struck out and suppressed this portion of Gen. Cameron's Report, inserting in its stead the following:

"It is already a grave question what shall be done with those slaves who were abandoned by their owners on the advance of our troops into Southern territory, as at Beaufort district, in South Carolina. The number left within our control at that point is very considerable; and similar cases will probably occur. What shall be done with them? Can we afford to send them forward to their masters, to be by them armed against us, or used in producing supplies to sustain the Rebellion? Their labor may be useful to us; withheld from the enemy, it lessens his military resources; and withholding them has no tendency to induce the horrors of insurrection, even in the Rebel communities. They constitute a military resource; and, being such, that they should not be turned over to the enemy is too plain to discuss. Why deprive him of supplies by a blockade, and voluntarily give him men to produce them?

"The disposition to be made of the slaves of Rebels, after the close of the war, can be safely left to the wisdom and patriotism of Congress. The Representatives of the people will unquestionably secure to the loyal slaveholders every right to which they are entitled under the Constitution of the country.

SIMON CAMERON,
"Secretary of War."

The abuse of negroes who had escaped from Rebel masters in Virginia and taken shelter within the lines of the Army of the Potomac, elicited the following:

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
"WASHINGTON, Dec. 4, 1861.

"To Maj.-Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN:

"GENERAL: I am directed by the President to call your attention to the following subject:

"Persons claimed to be held to service or labor under the laws of the State of Virginia, and actually employed in hostile service against the Government of the United States, frequently escape from the lines of the enemy's forces, and are received within the lines of the Army of the Potomac.

"This Department understands that such persons, afterward coming into the city of Washington, are liable to be arrested by the city police, upon the presumption, arising from color, that they are fugitives from service or labor.

"By the 4th section of the Act of Congress approved August 6, 1861, entitled 'An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' such hostile employment is made a full and sufficient answer to any further claim to service or labor. Persons thus employed and escaping are received into the military protection of the United States; and their arrest as fugitives from service or labor should be immediately followed by the military arrest of the parties making the seizure.

"Copies of this communication will be sent to the Mayor of the City of Washington and to the Marshal of the District of Columbia, that any collision between the civil and military authorities may be avoided.

"I am, General, your very obedient,
"WILLIAM H. SEWARD."

Maj.-Gen. Burnside, having established himself on Roanoke Island, issued,[21] conjointly with Com. Goldsborough, a Proclamation, in which he said:

"The Government asks only that its authority may be recognized; and we repeat, in no manner or way does it desire to interfere with your laws, constitutionally established, your institutions of any kind whatever, your property of any sort, or your usages in any respect."

Maj.-Gen. Buell, soon after establishing himself at Nashville, Tenn., thus demonstrated his undoubted devotion to the "constitutional guaranties;" making no distinction between Rebels and loyal citizens:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
"NASHVILLE, March 6, 1862.

"DEAR SIR: I have had the honor to receive your communication of the 1st instant, on the subject of fugitive slaves in the camps of the army.

"It has come to my knowledge that slaves sometimes make their way improperly into our lines; and in some instances they may be enticed there; but I think the number has been magnified by report. Several applications have been made to me by persons whose servants have been found in our camps; and, in every instance that I know of, the master has recovered his servant and taken him away.

"I need hardly remind you that there will always be found some lawless and mischievous persons in every army; but I assure you that the mass of this army is law-abiding, and that it is neither its disposition nor its policy to violate law or the rights of individuals in any particular.

"With great respect, your obedient servant,
D. C. BUELL,
"Brig.-Gen. Commanding Department.
"Hon. J. R. UNDERWOOD, Chairman Military Committee, Frankfort, Ky."

Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding on the Upper Potomac, issued[22] the following order:

"*To Brigade and Regimental Commanders of this Division:*

"Messrs. Nally, Gray, Dunnington, Dent, Adams, Speake, Price, Posey, and Cobey, citizens of Maryland, have negroes supposed to be with some of the regiments of this division: the Brigadier-General commanding directs that they be permitted to visit all the camps of his command, in search of their property; and, if found, that they be allowed to take possession of the same, without any interference whatever. Should any obstacle be thrown in their way by any officer or soldier in the division, he will be at once reported by the regimental commander to these headquarters."

Hereupon, some fifteen mounted civilians rode up to the camp of Brig.-Gen. Sickles's Excelsior Brigade, having just fired two pistol-shots, with evident intent to kill, at a negro running off; and thus created no little excitement among the soldiers; who, though generally enlisted with

[21] Feb. 18, 1862.

[22] March 26, 1862.

strong anti-negro prejudices, quite commonly experienced a gradual change, under the discipline of service at the front, where they found every Black their ready, active, zealous friend, and nearly every slaveholder or overseer their quiet but deadly, implacable foe. Maj. Tolen, commanding the 2d regiment, finding the order to direct the admission of but nine persons, ordered the residue to remain without the lines; and —the repugnance of the soldiers to slave-hunting threatening to break out into open violence—Gen. Sickles, who arrived soon afterward, ordered the nine out of camp likewise; so that the fugitives, if such were there, were not there captured.

In the West, especially within the commands of Gens. Halleck and Buell, slave-hunters fared much better; as one of their number about this time admiringly reported to a Nashville journal, as follows:

"He visited the camp of Gen. McCook, in Maury county, in quest of a fugitive; and that officer, instead of throwing obstacles in the way, afforded him every facility for the successful prosecution of his search. That General treated him in the most courteous and gentlemanly manner; as also did Gen. Johnson and Capt. Blake, the brigade Provost-Marshal. Their conduct toward him was in all respects that of high-toned gentlemen, desirous of discharging their duties promptly and honorably. It is impossible for the army to prevent slaves from following them; but, whenever the fugitives come into the lines of Gen. McCook, they are secured, and a record made of their names and the names of their owners. All the owner has to do is to apply, either in person or through an agent, examine the record, or look at the slaves; and, if he finds any that belong to him, take them away."

In no case does it appear that any of our pro-Slavery commanders ever inquired into or cared for the loyalty of either slaveholders or slave-hunters, nor asked whether the persons claimed as fugitives had given important information, or rendered other service to the cause of the Union.

In the same spirit, Gen. Buell's Provost-Marshal, Dent, at Louisville, Ky., issued an order to his (mounted) provost-guard to flog all Blacks, free or slave, whom they should find in the streets after dark; and for weeks the spectacle was exhibited, to the admiration of the thousands of active and passive Rebels in that city, of this chivalric provost-guard, wearing the national uniform, chasing scores of unquestionably loyal and harmless persons at nightfall through the streets, over the pavements, and down the lanes and alleys, of that city; cutting and slashing them with cowhide and cat, while their screams of fright and agony made merry music for traitors of every degree. Many were lashed unmercifully; but with no obvious advantage to the national cause, nor even to the improvement of the dubious loyalty of those whom the exhibition most delighted and edified.

Gen. Abner Doubleday, being placed in command of the defenses of Washington, answered,[29] through his Adjutant, to an inquiry on the subject, as follows:

"SIR:—I am directed by Gen. Doubleday to say, in answer to your letter of the 2d instant, that all negroes coming into the lines of any of the camps or forts under his command are to be treated as persons, and not as chattels.

"Under no circumstances, has the commander of a fort or camp the power of surrendering persons claimed as fugitive slaves; as it can not be done without determining their character.

"The additional article of war recently passed by Congress positively prohibits this.

"The question has been asked, whether

[29] April 6, 1862.

it would not be better to exclude negroes altogether from the lines. The General is of the opinion that they bring much valuable information, which can not be obtained from any other source. They are acquainted with all the roads, paths, fords, and other natural features, of the country; and they make excellent guides. They also know, and frequently have exposed, the haunts of Secession spies and traitors and the existence of Rebel organizations. They will not, therefore, be excluded"

The following order was issued by a Brigadier in the Department of the Gulf:

"In consequence of the demoralizing and disorganizing tendencies to the troops of harboring runaway negroes, it is hereby ordered that the respective commanders of the camps and garrisons of the several regiments, 2d brigade, turn all such fugitives in their camps or garrisons out beyond the limits of their respective guards and sentinels. By order of

"Brig.-Gen. T. WILLIAMS."

Col. Halbert E. Paine,[94] 4th Wisconsin, declining to obey this order, as "a violation of law for the purpose of returning fugitives to Rebels," was arrested and deprived of his command.

Lt.-Col. D. R. Anthony, 7th Kansas, was likewise arrested and deprived of his command in Tennessee, for issuing[95] an order, which said:

"The impudence and impertinence of the open and armed Rebels, traitors, Secessionists, and Southern-rights men of this section of the State of Tennessee, in arrogantly demanding the right to search our camp for fugitive slaves, has become a nuisance, and will no longer be tolerated. Officers will see that this class of men, who visit our camp for this purpose, are excluded from our lines.

"Should any such person be found within our lines, he will be arrested and sent to headquarters.

"Any officer or soldier of this command, who shall arrest and deliver to his master a fugitive slave, shall be summarily and severely punished, according to the laws relative to such crimes."

Maj.-Gen. David Hunter, having succeeded[96] to command at Hilton Head, issued the following:

"HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE SOUTH,
HILTON HEAD, S. C., May 9, 1862.

"*General Order*, No. 11.

"The three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, comprising the Military Department of the South, having deliberately declared themselves no longer under the United States of America, and having taken up arms against the United States, it becomes a military necessity to declare them under martial law.

"This was accordingly done on the 25th day of April, 1862. Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in these States—Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina—heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free."

This order was rescinded or annulled by President Lincoln, in a Proclamation[97] which recites it and proceeds:

"*And, whereas*, the same is producing some excitement and misunderstanding, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the Government of the United States had no knowledge or belief of an intention on the part of Gen. Hunter to issue such proclamation, nor has it yet any authentic information that the document is genuine: and, further, that neither Gen. Hunter nor any other commander or person has been authorized by the Government of the United States to make proclamation declaring the slaves of any State free; and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void, so far as respects such declaration. I further make known that, whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free; and whether at any time, or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I can not feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field.

"Those are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies or in camps.

"On the sixth day of March last, by a

[94] Elected to the XXXIXth Congress (House) as a Unionist, from the Milwaukee District.

[95] June 18, 1862.

[96] March 31.

[97] May 19.

special Message, I recommended to Congress the adoption of a joint resolution, to be substantially as follows:

"'*Resolved*, That the United States ought to cöoperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of Slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.'

"The resolution, in the language above quoted, was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the Nation to the States and people most interested in the subject-matter. To the people of these States now, I mostly appeal. I do not argue—I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You can not, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times.

"I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above partisan and personal politics.

"This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of Heaven, not rending or wrecking any thing. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past time, as, in the Providence of God, it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it!

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington this 19th day of May, in the year of our Lord 1862, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

"(Signed) ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"By the President:

"W. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

Contrary to a very general impression, Gen. McClellan was among the first not only to perceive, but to assert, that the Rebellion was essentially a slaveholders' enterprise, and that it might be effectively assailed through Slavery. Thus, in his Memorandum privately addressed to the President, Aug. 4th, 1861, when he had but just taken command of the Army of the Potomac, he says:

"In this contest, it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike, to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle [first Bull Run], it is possible that we might have been spared the labor and expense of a great effort; now, we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the Rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class; now it is with a people; our military success can alone restore the former issue."

After suggesting various military movements, including one down the Mississippi, as required to constitute a general advance upon the strongholds of the Rebellion, he proceeds:

"There is another independent movement which has often been suggested, and which has always recommended itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska, through the Indian Territory, upon Red river and western Texas, for the purpose of protecting and developing the latent Union and Free-State sentiment, well known to predominate in western Texas; and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a Free State."

In view of these sensible and pertinent suggestions, it is impossible not to feel that Gen. McClellan's naturally fair though not brilliant mind was subjected, during his long sojourn thereafter in Washington, to sinister political influences and the whispered appeals and tempting suggestions of a selfish and sordid ambition. During that Fall and Winter, his house was thronged with partisans of the extreme "Peace" wing of the Democratic party, who must have held out to him the golden lure of the Presidency as the reward of a forbearing, temporizing, procrastinating policy, which would exhaust the resources and chill the ardor of the

North, in enormous preparations and fruitless undertakings, until the conjoint pressure of Conscription and Taxation, the impossibility of further borrowing, and the heart-sickness of hope deferred, should impel a majority to acquiesce in any adjustment or compromise that would restore Peace to the country. Such seems the only plausible explanation of his timid and dawdling military policy, his habitual doubling or trebling of the Rebel force confronting him, and of the signal incoherence and inconsequence, especially with regard to Slavery and negroes, of the lecture which, directly after his retreat from the Chickahominy to the James had been consummated, he found time to indite—or at least to transcribe and dispatch—to his perplexed and sorely tried superior. It is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VA.,
July 7, 1862.

"MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the Rebel army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our position or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our condition as critical; and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the Rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to conviotions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If Secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

"The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble.

"The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the Rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency.

"This Rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of Slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.

"In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received.

"Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the Rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

"Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon Slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentration of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

"In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

"I may be on the brink of eternity; and, as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and from love for my country.

"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

"Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

"His Excellency A. LINCOLN, President."

If Gen. M. had been asked to reconcile the precepts of this letter regarding Slavery—how "the relations of servitude," for example, could be preserved in a district subject to "military power," without a distinct recognition and support of those "relations" by the military authority there dominant; or in what manner he would have "disorder" repressed, when it was caused by the slave's asserting his right to control his own actions and the master's resisting it—he might have answered ingeniously, but to what purpose? Manifestly, the ruling authority, whether civil or military, must either support the slaveholder's claim of property in and power over his slaves, or it *will* be seriously impaired—nay, utterly defied and overthrown. In "repressing" the "disorder" certain to arise in the premises, the commander must inevitably decide which to support—the master's assertion of authority, or the slave's claim to liberty. "Political rights" can receive "protection" only when it has been determined where the right lies. The "manumission," which Gen. M. foreshadowed in Missouri, West Virginia, and Maryland, was not merely "a question of time." It was a question of power as well; since he plainly contemplated its achievement, not by popular action, but by military force. Paying the "owner" might, indeed, modify his wrath; but could not affect the fundamental question of authority and right.

A letter addressed[28] to the President some weeks after this, entitled "The Prayer of Twenty Millions," and exhorting Mr. Lincoln—not to proclaim all the slaves in our country free, but to execute the laws of the land which operated to free large classes of the slaves of Rebels—concludes as follows:

"On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the Rebellion, and at the same time uphold its inciting cause, are preposterous and futile—that the Rebellion, if crushed out to-morrow, would be renewed within a year if Slavery were left in full vigor—that army officers, who remain to this day devoted to Slavery, can at best be but half-way loyal to the Union—and that every hour of deference to Slavery is an hour of added and deepened peril to the Union. I appeal to the testimony of your Embassadors in Europe. It is freely at your service, not mine. Ask them to tell you candidly whether the seeming subser-

[28] Aug. 19, 1862.

viency of your policy to the slaveholding, Slavery-upholding interest, is not the perplexity, the despair, of statesmen of all parties; and be admonished by the general answer!

"I close as I began, with the statement that what an immense majority of the loyal millions of your countrymen require of you is a frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the land, more especially of the Confiscation Act. That act gives freedom to the slaves of Rebels coming within our lines, or whom those lines may at any time inclose—we ask you to render it due obedience by publicly requiring all your subordinates to recognize and obey it. The Rebels are everywhere using the late anti-negro riots in the North—as they have long used your officers' treatment of negroes in the South—to convince the slaves that they have nothing to hope from a Union success—that we mean in that case to sell them into a bitter bondage to defray the cost of the war. Let them impress this as a truth on the great mass of their ignorant and credulous bondmen, and the Union will never be restored—never. We can not conquer ten millions of people united in solid phalanx against us, powerfully aided by Northern sympathizers and European allies. We must have scouts, guides, spies, cooks, teamsters, diggers, and choppers, from the Blacks of the South—whether we allow them to fight for us or not—or we shall be baffled and repelled. As one of the millions who would gladly have avoided this struggle at any sacrifice but that of principle and honor, but who now feel that the triumph of the Union is indispensable not only to the existence of our country, but to the well-being of mankind, I entreat you to render a hearty and unequivocal obedience to the law of the land. Yours, HORACE GREELEY."

The President—very unexpectedly—replied to this appeal by telegraph: in order, doubtless, to place before the public matter deemed by him important, and which had probably been prepared for issue before the receipt of the letter to which he thus obliquely responded:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Aug. 22, 1862.

"Hon. HORACE GREELEY:

"DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the 19th instant, addressed to myself through *The New York Tribune*.

"If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them.

"If there be any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them.

"If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

"As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it in the shortest way under the Constitution.

"The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save Slavery, I do not agree with them.

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy Slavery, I do not agree with them.

"*My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy Slavery.*

"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it—if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that.

"What I do about Slavery and the Colored Race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union.

"I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause; and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause.

"I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

"I have here stated my purpose according to my views of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free. Yours, A. LINCOLN."

Many others called on or wrote to the President about this time, urging him to action in the spirit of Mr. Greeley's letter. He heard all with courtesy, suggesting objections that were not intended for conclusions, but rather to indicate and enforce the grave importance of the topic, the peril of making a mistake upon it, and the difficulty of reaching the

Blacks with any proffer of Freedom. The slaveholders—especially those in the loyal States—would all hear of it forthwith, and be influenced by it; the slaves in the disloyal States would receive all tidings of it through hostile channels—from those interested in deceiving and misleading them with regard to it. Even if correctly and promptly advised, what could they do? Bayonets glittered on every side; arms were borne by nearly every able-bodied White; while the Blacks could oppose to these but their empty (and shackled) hands. What good, then, could be secured by an Abolition policy? "It is a Pope's bull against the comet," suggested the President. "It will unite the South and divide the North," fiercely clamored the entire Opposition. So the President—habitually cautious, dilatory, reticent—hesitated, and demurred, and resisted—possibly after he had silently resolved that the step must finally be taken.

Mr. Lincoln was soon visited,[29] among others, by a deputation from the various Protestant denominations of Chicago, Illinois, charged with the duty of urging on him the adoption of a more decided and vigorous policy of Emancipation. He listened to the reading of their memorial, and responded in substance as follows:

"The subject is difficult, and good men do not agree. For instance: the other day, four gentlemen of standing and intelligence from New York called as a delegation on business connected with the war; but before leaving two of them earnestly besought me to proclaim general Emancipation; upon which the other two at once attacked them. You know also that the last session of Congress had a decided majority of anti-Slavery men, yet they could not unite on this policy. And the same is true of the religious people. Why, the Rebel soldiers are praying with a great deal more earnestness, I fear, than our own troops, and expecting God to favor their side: for one of our soldiers, who had been taken prisoner, told Senator Wilson a few days since that he met nothing so discouraging as the evident sincerity of those he was among in their prayers. But we will talk over the merits of the case.

"What good would a proclamation of Emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I can not even enforce the Constitution in the Rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual, that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of Rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I can not learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And, suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we feed and care for such a multitude? Gen. Butler wrote me a few days since that he was issuing more rations to the slaves who have rushed to him than to all the White troops under his command. They eat, and that is all; though it is true Gen. Butler is feeding the Whites also by the thousand; for it nearly amounts to a famine there. If, now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces from New Orleans to defend some other point, what is to prevent the masters from reducing the Blacks to Slavery again; for I am told that whenever the Rebels take any Black prisoners, free or slave, they immediately auction them off! They did so with those they took from a boat that was aground in the Tennessee river a few days ago. And then I am very ungenerously attacked for it! For instance, when, after the late battles at and near Bull Run, an expedition went out from Washington, under a flag of truce, to bury the dead and bring in the wounded, and the Rebels seized the Blacks who went along to help, and sent them into Slavery, Horace Greeley said in his paper that the Government would probably do nothing about it. What *could* I do?

"Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire? Understand: I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds; for, as Commander-in-chief of the army and navy

[29] Sept. 13.

in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the Rebellion."

The deputation responded, urging that an Emancipation policy would greatly strengthen us in Europe, and would justify us in appealing to the God of the oppressed and down-trodden for His blessing on our future efforts to crush the Rebellion. The President rejoined:

"I admit that Slavery is at the root of the Rebellion, or at least its *sine quâ non*. The ambition of politicians may have instigated them to act; but they would have been impotent without Slavery as their instrument. I will also concede that Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. Still, some additional strength would be added in that way to the war; and then, unquestionably, it would weaken the Rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could do much with the Blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the Rebels; and, indeed, thus far, we have not had arms enough to equip our White troops. I will mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn and contempt. There are 50,000 bayonets in the Union army from the Border Slave States. It would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the Rebels. I do not think they all would—not so many, indeed, as a year ago, or as six months ago—not so many to-day as yesterday. Every day increases their Union feeling. They are also getting their pride enlisted, and want to beat the Rebels. Let me say one thing more: I think you should admit that we already have an important principle to rally and unite the people, in the fact that constitutional government is at stake. This is a fundamental idea, going down about as deep as any thing."

The deputation again developed and enforced their views; and the President closed the conference with these pregnant words:

"Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and by night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust that, in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views, I have not in any respect injured your feelings."

The deputation had scarcely returned to Chicago and reported to their constituents, when the great body of the President's supporters were electrified, while his opponents in general were only still farther alienated, by the unheralded appearance of the following proclamation:

"I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States, and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.

"That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all Slave States, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of Slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued.

"That, on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the

military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

"That the Executive will, on the 1st day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

"That attention is hereby called to an act of Congress entitled 'An Act to make an additional Article of War,' approved March 13th, 1862; and which act is in the words and figures following:

"'*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the Army of the United States, and shall be obeyed and observed as such:

"'SECTION 1. All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due; and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.

"'SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That this act shall take effect from and after its passage.'

"Also, to the ninth and tenth sections of an act entitled 'An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes,' approved July 16, 1862; and which sections are in the words and figures following:

"'SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*, That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming under the control of the Government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found *on* [or] being within any place occupied by Rebel forces and afterward occupied by forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.

"'SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted*, That no slave escaping into any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, from any other State, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime, or some offense against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms against the United States in the present Rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto; and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall, under any pretense whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service.'

"And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the act and sections above recited.

"And the Executive will in due time recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the Rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the constitutional relation between the United States and their respective States and people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one
[L. S.] thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"By the President:
"WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

It has been alleged that the appearance of this document was hastened by confidential representations from our Embassadors at the Courts of Western Europe, that a recognition of the Confederacy was imminent, and could hardly be averted otherwise than by a policy of Emancipation. The then Attorney-General[39] has been quoted as authority for this statement; but it is still generally regarded as apocryphal. It has been likewise asserted that the President had fully decided on resorting to this policy some weeks before the Proclamation appeared, and that he only withheld it till the military situation should assume a brighter aspect. Remarks made long afterward in Congress render highly

[39] Edward Bates, of Missouri.

probable the assumption that its appearance was somewhat delayed, awaiting the issue of the struggle in Maryland, which terminated with the battle of Antietam.[21]

Whether the open adhesion of the President at last to the policy of Emancipation did or did not contribute to the general defeat of his supporters in the State Elections which soon followed, is still fairly disputable. By those elections, Horatio Seymour was made Governor of New York and Joel Parker of New Jersey: supplanting Governors Morgan and Olden; while Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, also gave Opposition majorities; and Michigan, Wisconsin, and most other Western States, showed a decided falling off in Administration strength. The general result of those elections is summed up in the following table:

	1860—President.		1862—Gov. or Congress.	
States.	Lincoln.	*All others.*	Admin.	*Opp.*
New York....	362,646	312,510	295,897	306,649
New Jersey...	58,324	62,801	46,710	61,307
Pennsylvania..	268,030	208,412	215,616	219,140
Ohio.....	231,610	210,831	178,755	184,382
Indiana.....	139,033	138,110	118,517	128,160
Illinois.....	172,161	160,215	120,116	136,662
Michigan	88,480	64,267	63,716	62,102
Wisconsin	86,110	66,070	66,801	67,985
Iowa....	70,409	57,922	[22]66,014	50,898
Minnesota....	22,069	12,668	15,754	11,442
10 States.....1,498,872		1,290,806	1,192,896	1,228,677

1860—Lincoln's maj.—208,066. 1862—Opp. maj.—35,781.

The Representatives in Congress chosen from these States were politically classified as follows:

	1860.		1862.	
	Repub.	*Dem.*	Admin.	*Opp.*
New York.....	23	10	14	17
New Jersey.....	2	3	1	4
Pennsylvania.....	18	7	12	13
Ohio.....	13	8	5	14
Indiana.....	7	4	4	7
Illinois.....	4	5	5	9
Michigan.....	4	0	5	1
Wisconsin.....	3	0	3	3
Iowa.....	2	0	6	0
Minnesota.....	2	0	2	0
Total, 10 States.....	78	37	57	67

1860—Lincoln maj.—41. 1862—Opposition maj., 10.

Note.—A new apportionment under the Census of 1860 changed materially, between 1860 and 1862, the number of Representatives from several of the States.

There were some counterbalancing changes in the States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, as also in that of California, where the larger share of the Douglas vote of 1860 was in '62 cast for the Union tickets; but it was clear, at the close of the State Elections of that year, that the general ill success of the War for the Union, the wide-spread and increasing repugnance to Conscription, Taxation, a depreciated Currency, and high-priced Fabrics, were arraying Public Sentiment against the further prosecution of the contest. Of course, the Opposition inveighed against the management of the War and of the Finances, the treatment of Gen. McClellan, and the general inefficiency and incapacity of the Administration; but the strength of that Opposition inhered in popular repugnance to the sacrifices exacted by and the perils involved in a prosecution of the struggle, though its most general and taking clamor deprecated only "The perversion of the War for the Union into a War for the Negro." Ignoring the soldiers battling for the Union—of whom at least three-fourths voted Republican at each election wherein they were allowed to vote at all; but who had not yet been enabled to vote in the field, while their absence created a chasm in the Administration vote at home—it is quite probable that, had a popular election been held at any time during the year following the Fourth of July, 1862, on the question of continuing the War or arresting it on the best attainable terms, a majority would have voted for Peace; while it is highly proba-

[21] Fought Sept. 17th—Proclamation of Freedom, dated 22d.

[22] Soldiers' vote: Admn., 14,874; Opp., 4,115. Wisconsin Soldiers' Vote: Admn., 8,373; Opp., 2,046. No other States had yet authorized their soldiers in the field to vote.

ble that a still larger majority would have voted against Emancipation. From an early hour of the struggle, the public mind slowly and steadily gravitated toward the conclusion that the Rebellion was vulnerable only or mainly through Slavery; but that conclusion was scarcely reached by a majority before the occurrence of the New York Riots, in July, 1863. The President, though widely reproached with tardiness and reluctance in taking up the gage plainly thrown down by the Slave Power, was probably ahead of a majority of the people of the loyal States in definitively accepting the issue of Emancipation or Disunion.

Having taken a long step in the right direction, he never retracted nor seemed to regret it; though he sometimes observed that the beneficial results of the Emancipation policy were neither so signal nor so promptly realized as its sanguine promoters had anticipated. Nevertheless, on the day appointed, he issued his absolute Proclamation of Freedom, as follows:

"*Whereas*, on the 22d day of September, in the year of our Lord 1862, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit:

"'That on the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.'

"'That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.'

"Now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following: to wit:

"Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemine, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are, for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

"And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

"And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

"And I further declare and make known that such persons, of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington, this 1st day of January, in the year of our [L. S.] Lord 1863, and of the independence of the United States the 87th.

"By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
"WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

On the abstract question of the right of the Government to proclaim and enforce Emancipation, Edward Everett, in a speech in Faneuil Hall, Boston, October, 1864, forcibly said:

"It is very doubtful whether any act of the Government of the United States was necessary to liberate the slaves in a State which is in rebellion. There is much reason for the opinion that, by the simple act of levying war against the United States, the relation of Slavery was terminated; certainly, so far as concerns the duty of the United States to recognize it, or to refrain from interfering with it. Not being founded on the law of nature, and resting solely on positive local law—and that not of the United States—as soon as it becomes either the motive or pretext of an unjust war against the Union—an efficient instrument in the hands of the Rebels for carrying on the war—a source of military strength to the Rebellion, and of danger to the Government at home and abroad, with the additional certainty that, in any event but its abandonment, it will continue in all future time to work these mischiefs, who can suppose it is the duty of the United States to continue to recognize it? To maintain this would be a contradiction in terms. It would be to recognize a right in a Rebel master to employ his slave in acts of rebellion and treason, and the duty of the slave to aid and abet his master in the commission of the greatest crime known to the law. No such absurdity can be admitted; and any citizen of the United States, from the President down, who should, by any overt act, recognize the duty of a slave to obey a Rebel master in a hostile operation, would himself be giving aid and comfort to the enemy."

XII.

SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION IN CONGRESS.

THE XXXVIIth Congress, as we have seen[1]—while endeavoring to evade or to avert its eyes from the fact that it was Slavery which was waging deadly war on the Union—did yet give fair notice, through the guarded but decisive language of some of the more conservative Republicans, that, if the Rebellion were persisted in, it must inevitably result in the overthrow of Slavery. And the action of that Congress, even at the extra session, evinced a steadily growing consciousness—steadily growing in the legislative as well as the popular[2] mind—that Slavery had closed with the Union in mortal strife—a struggle which both could not survive.[3]

Still, President Lincoln hesitated and held back; anxious that the Union should retain its hold on the Border Slave States, especially on Kentucky; and apparently hoping

[1] Vol. I., pp. 564–8.

[2] On the day after the Bull Run rout, the writer first heard this conviction openly declared. The credit of the avowal belongs to Gen. John Cochrane.

[3] Hon. Elisha R. Potter, of Rhode Island—who may be fairly styled the hereditary chief of the Democratic party of that State—made a speech on the War to the Senate thereof on the 10th of August, 1861. After distributing the blame of inciting the War between the Northern and the Southern 'ultras,' dilating on the resources of the South, and elucidating the no-fighting, anaconda' mode of warfare proposed by Gen. Scott, and apparently acceded to by the Cabinet, he proceeds:

"I have said that the war may assume another aspect, and be a short and bloody one. And to such a war—*an anti-Slavery war*—it seems to me we are *inevitably* drifting. It seems to me hardly in the power of human wisdom to prevent it. We may commence the war without meaning to interfere with Slavery; but let us have one or two battles, and get our blood excited, and we shall not only not restore any more slaves, but shall proclaim freedom wherever we go. And it seems to me almost judicial blindness on the part of the South that they do not see that this must be the inevitable result, if the contest is prolonged."


EMINENT UPHOLDERS OF THE WAR UNION CONGRESS
Engd by H.B. Hall N.Y.

that the alternative of conceded Disunion or constrained Emancipation might yet be avoided. His first Annual Message[4] cautiously avoided the subject; but proposed a systematic colonization—in some territory to be acquired outside of the present limits of our country—of those Blacks who had already, or might thereafter, become free in consequence of the war. He coolly added:

"It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization."

Congress acceded to this, so far as to appropriate $100,000 in aid of the colonization as aforesaid of the freedmen of the District of Columbia; which sum, or most of it, was duly squandered—to the satisfaction of certain speculators, and the intense, protracted misery of a few deluded Blacks, who were taken to a wretched sand-spit, known as Cow Island, on the coast of Hayti, and kept there so long as they could be: and this was the practical finale of the Colonization project.

The XXXVIIth Congress having convened[5] for its second (or first regular) session, Gen. Wilson, of Mass., gave[6] notice in Senate of a bill to punish officers and privates of our armies for arresting, detaining, or delivering persons claimed as fugitive slaves; and Mr. O. Lovejoy, of Ill., simultaneously introduced a bill of like tenor in the House. Mr. Wilson submitted his bill on the 23d; a resolve to the same effect having been submitted by Mr. Sumner six days before; as one of like nature was this day laid before the House by Mr. James F. Wilson, of Iowa. Mr. Wilson, of Mass., soon reported[7] his bill; of which he pressed the consideration ten days afterward; but it was resisted with great ingenuity and earnestness by all the Opposition and by a few of the more conservative Administration Senators. Other bills having obtained precedence in the Senate, Mr. F. P. Blair reported[8] to the House from its Military Committee, an additional Article of War, as follows:

"All officers are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due. Any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service."

This bill was strenuously opposed by Messrs. Mallory and Wickliffe, of Kentucky, as also by Mr. Vallandigham, of Ohio, while ably advocated by Mr. Bingham, of Ohio and passed by a (substantially) party vote: Yeas 83; Nays 44. Having been received by the Senate and referred to its Military Committee, it was duly reported[9] therefrom by Mr. H. Wilson; vehemently opposed by Messrs. Garret Davis, of Ky., Carlile, of Va., Saulsbury, of Del., and supported by Messrs. Wilson, of Mass., Howard, of Michigan, Sherman, of Ohio, McDougall, of Cal., and Anthony, of R. I., and passed:[10] Yeas 29; Nays 9—a party vote, save that Mr. McDougall, of Cal., voted Yea. The bill thus enacted was approved by the President, March 13th, 1862.

Gen. Wilson, upon evidence that the above act was inadequate to restrain the negro-catching propensities of some officers in the service, pro-

[4] Dec. 3, 1861. [5] Dec. 2, 1861. [6] Dec. 4. [7] Jan. 6, 1862. [8] Feb. 25. [9] March 4. [10] March 10.

posed [11] further action to the same end; and the Senate considered [12] his resolution of inquiry. Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, in supporting it, made a statement as follows:

"In the month of February last, an officer of the 3d regiment of Iowa infantry, stationed at a small town in Missouri, succeeded in capturing several Rebel bridge-burners, and some recruiting officers belonging to Price's army. The information that led to their capture was furnished by two or three remarkably shrewd and intelligent slaves, claimed by a Lt.-Colonel in the Rebel army. Shortly afterward, the master dispatched an agent, with instructions to seize the slaves, and convey them within the Rebel lines: whereupon, the Iowa officer seized them, and reported the circumstances to headquarters. The slaves, soon understanding the full import of Gen. Halleck's celebrated Order No. 3, two of them attempted an escape. This was regarded as an unpardonable sin. The Iowa officer was immediately placed under arrest; and a detachment of the Missouri State Militia—men in the pay of this Government, and under the command of Gen. Halleck—were sent in pursuit of the fugitives. The hunt was successful. The slaves were caught, and returned to their traitor master; but not until one of them had been shot by order of the soldier in command of the pursuing party."

Mr. Sumner followed in an able speech in advocacy; but the subject was overlaid by others deemed more urgent; and the bill was not conclusively acted on.

At an early period [13] of the session, Gen. Wilson had proposed a reference of all laws relating to persons of color in the District of Columbia, and to the arrest of fugitives from labor, to the Standing Committee on said District, with instructions that they consider the expediency of a compensated Abolition of Slavery therein; and he soon afterward introduced [14] a bill of like purport; which was read twice and referred [15] to the Committee aforesaid. Mr. Morrill, of Maine, duly reported [16] from said Committee Gen. Wilson's bill; which provided for the Abolition of Slavery in the District, and the payment to the masters from the Treasury of an average compensation of $300 each for the slaves thus manumitted. The bill was so amended as to abolish also the Black Laws of said District. Mr. G. Davis, of Ky., bitterly opposed the bill; proposing so to amend it as to send out of the country all persons freed thereby; which was ardently supported by Mr. Saulsbury, of Del. Mr. Doolittle (Repub.), of Wisc., favored colonizing the freedmen, but moved to add "with their own consent;" which prevailed—Yeas 23; Nays 16—and Mr. Davis's proposition, as thus amended, was lost by a tie vote—19 to 19; and the emancipating bill—after having been ably supported by Messrs. Wilmot, of Pa., Hale, of N. H., Pomeroy, of Kansas (against paying the masters), King, of N. Y., Wilson, of Mass., Harlan, of Iowa, Wilkinson, of Minn., Sumner, of Mass., Fessenden, of Maine, Browning, of Ill., and Morrill, of Maine, and further opposed by Messrs. Wright (Union), of Ind., Willey, of West Va. (who wished the question of Emancipation submitted to a popular vote of the District), Kennedy, of Md., McDougall, of Cal., and Bayard, of Del.—was passed: [17] Yeas 29; Nays 14—as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Anthony, Browning, Chandler, Clark, Collamer, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Grimes, Hale, Harlan, Harris, Howard, Howe, King, Lane, of Ind., Lane, of Kansas, Morrill, Pomeroy, Sherman, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Trumbull, Wade, Wilkinson, Wilmot, and Wilson, of Mass.—29.

NAYS—Messrs. Bayard, Carlile, Davis, Henderson, Kennedy, Latham, McDougall, Nesmith, Powell, Saulsbury, Stark, Willey, Wilson, of Mo., and Wright—14.

[11] April 3. [12] April 14. [13] Dec. 14. [14] Dec. 16. [15] Dec. 22. [16] Feb. 13. [17] April 3.

This bill having reached the House, Mr. Stevens, of Pa., in Committee of the Whole, moved[18] the laying aside successively of each bill preceding it on the calendar, and thus reached this one; which was taken up and debated by Judge Thomas, of Mass., and Mr. Crittenden, of Ky., in opposition. Mr. Stevens tried to close the debate next day, but failed; and the bill was advocated by Messrs. F. P. Blair, of Mo., Bingham, Blake, Riddle, Ashley, and Hutchins, of Ohio, Rollins, of N. H., and Van Horn, of N. Y. Mr. Stevens at length induced the Committee to rise and report the bill; when the measure was further opposed by Messrs. H. B. Wright, of Pa., Wadsworth, Harding, Menzies, and Wickliffe, of Ky., and supported by Messrs. Hickman, of Pa., Train, of Mass., Lovejoy, of Ill., Dunn, of Ind., Cox and Vallandigham, of Ohio; and passed under the Previous Question: Yeas 92; Nays 39. [Messrs. G. H. Browne, of R. I., English, of Conn., Haight and Odell, of N. Y., Sheffield, of R. I., and B. F. Thomas, of Mass., voted Yea with the Republicans; while Messrs. J. B. Blair and Wm. G. Brown, of Va., James S. Rollins, of Mo., and Francis Thomas, of Md., voted Nay with the Democrats and Kentuckians.] The bill, thus passed on the 11th, was signed by the President on the 16th of April, 1862.[19]

President Lincoln made his first overt, yet cautious, demonstration against Slavery as the main cause of our subsisting troubles in a Special Message,[20] which proposed that the Houses of Congress should unite in adopting this joint resolution:

"*Resolved*, That the United States, in order to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolition of Slavery, give to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate it for the inconvenience, public and private, produced by such change of system."

This proposition he commended in these guarded and deferential terms:

"If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is an end of it. But, if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it.

"The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most important means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing Rebellion entertain the hope that this Government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the Slave States north of such part will then say, 'The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the Rebellion; and the initiation of Emancipation deprives them of it, and of all the States initiating it.

"The point is not that all the States tolerating Slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate Emancipation; but, while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed Confederacy. * * * While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to

[18] April 10.

[19] Some of the anomalies of the slaveholding system were brought to light in the execution of this measure. For instance: while it had long been usual for White men to sell their parti-colored children, there were no known precedents for a like thrifty procedure on the part of Blacks; but U. S. Treasurer Spinner was waited on by a District negro (free), who had bought and paid for his (slave) wife, and who required payment not only for her but for their half-dozen children—all his legal and salable chattels—and the claim could not be disallowed.

[20] March 6, 1862.

my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject."

Mr. Stevens, of Pa., having moved and carried a reference of this Message by the House to a Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, and Mr. R. Conkling, of N. Y., having moved[21] the resolve above recommended, a debate sprung up thereon; which is notable only as developing the repugnance of the Unionists of the Border Slave States, with that of the Democrats of all the States, to compensated or any other Emancipation. Messrs. Wadsworth, Mallory, Wickliffe, and Crittenden, of Ky., and Crisfield, of Md., spoke for the former; Messrs. Richardson, of Ill., Voorhees, of Ind., Biddle, of Pa., for the latter. All the Republicans who spoke supported the proposition; though Messrs. Stevens and Hickman, of Pa., characterized it as timid, temporizing, and of small account. It passed the House[22] by 89 Yeas (Republicans, West Virginians, and a few others not strictly partisans) to 31 Nays (including Crisfield, Leary, and Francis Thomas, of Md., with Crittenden, Dunlap, Harding, Wadsworth, and Wickliffe, of Ky.—the rest Democrats).

The resolve having reached the Senate and been duly referred, Mr. Trumbull, of Ill., reported[23] it favorably from the Judiciary Committee; when, on its coming up,[24] it was fiercely assailed by Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, and more temperately opposed by Messrs. Willey, of Va., McDougall and Latham, of Cal., and Powell, of Ky. Mr. Henderson, of Mo., supported it, and thenceforward acted as an emancipationist. Messrs. Sherman, of Ohio, Doolittle, of Wisc., Browning, of Ill., and Morrill, of Maine, also advocated the measure; and it passed[25]—Yeas 32 (including Davis, of Ky., Henderson, of Mo., Thomson [Dem.], of N. J., and Willey, of Va.); Nays—Messrs. Bayard and Saulsbury, of Del., Kennedy, of Md., Carlile, of Va., Powell, of Ky., Wilson, of Mo., Wright, of N. J., Latham, of Cal., Nesmith and Stark, of Oregon. It is noteworthy that a majority of these Nays were the votes of Senators from Border States, to which it proffered compensation for their slaves, all whom have since been freed without compensation. The President of course approved[26] the measure; but no single Slave State ever claimed its benefits; and its only use inhered in its demonstration of the willingness of the Unionists to increase their already heavy burdens to pay for the slaves of the Border States—a willingness which the infatuation of the ruling class in those States rendered abortive, save in its inevitable tendency to soften prejudice and reconcile the minds of loyal slaveholders to a social revolution fast becoming inevitable.

Mr. Wilson, of Mass., having given notice[27] of a joint resolve granting aid to the States of Delaware and Maryland to emancipate their slaves, Mr. Saulsbury, of Del., objected to its consideration; and it lay over. When called up,[28] he declared his inflexible hostility to it, and his purpose to interpose every available obstacle to its passage. It was introduced, however, and had its first reading; but was not again taken up. Soon, however, Mr. White, of Ind.,

[21] Mar. 10. [22] Mar. 11. [23] Mar. 20. [24] Mar. 24. [25] Apr. 2. [26] Apr. 10. [27] Mar. 7, 1862. [28] Mar. 10.

proposed[30] a more comprehensive measure; contemplating the gradual extinguishment, at the National cost, of Slavery in all the Border Slave States, and moved its reference to a Select Committee of nine. Mr. Mallory, of Ky., moved that this proposition do lie on the table; which failed: Yeas 51; Nays 68; and it then prevailed: Yeas 67; Nays 52.

The Committee having been appointed,[31] Mr. White reported[32] therefrom a bill offering $300 per head from the Treasury for the legal emancipation of the slaves of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, or either of them. The bill was committed, but not acted on; having been reported too near the close of the Session. Next winter, Mr. Henderson,[33] in the Senate, and Mr. Noell,[34] in the House, submitted bills of similar tenor, providing for compensated emancipation in Missouri alone. Each encountered a bitter opposition from the Democratic and most of the Border-State Members; but Mr. Noell's finally passed[35] the House—Yeas 73; Nays 46. The Senate acted on Mr. Henderson's bill, which provided only for very Gradual Emancipation—he declaring that if Congress should offer his State $10,000,000 for an act of Immediate Abolition, he would oppose its acceptance. The Senate debated hotly and tediously the rival advantages of Immediate and Gradual Emancipation: the Democrats opposing both, but inclining the scale in favor of the latter; which prevailed—26 to 11—and in this shape the bill passed:[36] Yeas 23; Nays 18. On reaching the House, it was referred—Yeas 81; Nays 51—to the Select Committee aforesaid; which was only enabled to perfect it on the last[37] day of the session; when the House refused—Yeas 63; Nays 57—to suspend the rules in favor of its immediate consideration, which required a vote of two-thirds. So perished the last effort to compensate the loyal States for the Emancipation of their Slaves—the Democrats and all the Border-State members who were not friends of the Administration unanimously resisting it in every shape and to the extent of their power.

We have seen[38] that the XXXVIth Congress, after it had become Republican through the withdrawal of the representatives of the Gulf States, organized the new Territories of Colorado, Nevada, and Dakotah, by acts which maintained a profound silence with regard to Slavery. The hope of thus winning a portion of the slaveholding interest to active loyalty in the approaching struggle having been disappointed, Mr. Arnold, of Ill., submitted[39] to the next House a bill abolishing and prohibiting Slavery in every Territory of the Union; which Mr. Lovejoy, of Ill., duly reported[40] and pressed to a vote; ultimately modifying the bill so as to read as follows:

"An Act to secure freedom to all persons within the Territories of the United States;

"To the end that freedom may be and remain forever the fundamental law of the land in all places whatsoever, so far as it lies within the power or depends upon the action of the Government of the United States to make it so, therefore—

"*Be it enacted*, &c., That Slavery or involuntary servitude, in all cases whatsoever (other than in the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted), shall henceforth cease, and be pro-

[30] April 7. [31] April 14. [32] July 16.
[33] Dec. 19. [34] Dec. 15. [35] Jan. 6, 1863.
[36] Feb. 12, 1863. [37] March 3. [38] Vol. I., p. 388.
[39] March 24, 1862. [40] May 1.

hibited forever, in all the Territories of the United States now existing, or hereafter to be formed or acquired in any way."

No measure of the session was more vehemently opposed, not only by the Democrats without exception, but by the Border-State Unionists with equal zeal and unanimity; even Mr. Fisher, of Del., denouncing it, though he did not vote on the final passage. Mr. Cox, of Ohio, stigmatized it in debate as "a bill for the benefit of Secession and Jeff. Davis." Mr. Crisfield, of Md., characterized it as "a palpable violation of the rights of the States, and an unwarrantable interference with private property—a fraud upon the States which have made cessions of land to this Government, a violation of the Constitution, and a breach of the pledges which brought the dominant [Republican] party into power"—"a usurpation"—"destructive of the good of the country," &c., &c. Judge Thomas, of Mass., held that Congress could not warrantably pass this act without providing compensation for slaveholders in the Territories. Messrs. Bingham, of Ohio, Stevens and Kelley, of Pa., R. Conkling and Diven, of N. Y., Arnold and Lovejoy, of Ill., and others, defended the bill, and it passed,[40] under the Previous Question: Yeas, 85 (all Republicans but Sheffield, of R. I., and Judge Thomas, of Mass.—to meet whose objections the original bill had been modified): Nays, 50: composed of all the Democrats and Border-State Unionists who voted, including Messrs. Calvert, Crisfield, Leary, Francis Thomas, and Webster, of Md., J. B. Blair, Wm. G. Brown, and Segar, of Va., Casey, Crittenden, Dunlap, Grider, Harding, Mallory, Menzies, Wadsworth, and Wickliffe, of Ky., Clements and Maynard, of Tenn., Hall, Noell, and J. S. Phelps, of Mo.—22 of the 50 from Border Slave States.

The bill having reached the Senate, it was reported[41] by Mr. Browning, of Illinois, substituting for the terms above cited the following:

"That, from and after the passage of this act, there shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the Territories of the United States now existing, or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired by the United States, otherwise than in punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

In this shape it passed:[42] Yeas 28 (all Republicans); Nays 10 (all Opposition); and the House concurred[43] in the Senate's amendment—Yeas 72; Nays 38—and the bill, being approved[44] by the President, became henceforth and evermore the law of the land.

The policy of confiscating or emancipating the slaves of those engaged in the Rebellion was very cautiously and timidly approached at the first[45] or extra session of this Congress. Very early in the ensuing session, it was again suggested in the Senate by Mr. Trumbull,[46] of Illinois, and in the House by Mr. Eliot,[47] of Mass.

At the former session, Congress had ventured only to direct the confiscation of the right or property of masters in such slaves as those masters permitted or directed to labor on fortifications or other works designed to aid the Rebellion; but now, a bolder and more sweeping measure was deemed requisite. Mr. Eliot's joint resolve—after disclaiming all right to interfere with the internal affairs and institutions of loyal States in peace—affirmed that the ex-

[40] May 12. [41] May 15. [42] June 9. [43] June 17. [44] June 19.

[45] See Vol. I., chap. XXXIV., particularly page 569–70. [46] Dec. 5, 1861. [47] Dec. 2, 1861.

isting war must be prosecuted according to the laws of war, and

"That, therefore, we do hereby declare that the President, as the Commander-in-chief of our army, and the officers in command under him, have the right to emancipate all persons held as slaves in any military district in a state of insurrection against the National Government; and that we respectfully advise that such order of Emancipation be issued, whenever the same will avail to weaken the power of the Rebels in arms, or to strengthen the military power of the loyal forces."

Mr. Trumbull proposed to enact that the slaves of all persons who shall take up arms against the United States, or in any manner aid or abet the existing Rebellion, shall thereupon be discharged from service or labor, and become thenceforth forever free; any existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.

These propositions, with various modifications, were vehemently discussed in either House, not continuously, but alternately with other measures, nearly to the end of that long and excited session. By friend and foe, they were debated as though their success or failure would decide the issue of Union or Disunion. By all the anti-Republicans, and by some of the more conservative Republicans, they were denounced as utterly, glaringly, in antagonism to the Federal Constitution, and as calculated to extinguish the last vestige of Unionism in the Slave States, but especially in those that had seceded. Said Senator Cowan,[48] of Pennsylvania:

"Pass this bill, and the same messenger who carries it to the South will come back to us with the news of their complete consolidation as one man. We shall then have done that which treason could not do: we ourselves shall then have dissolved the Union; we shall have rent its sacred charter, and extinguished the last vestige of affection for it in the Slave States by our blind and passionate folly."

In the same spirit, but more temperately, the bill was opposed by Messrs. Browning, of Ill., Willey, of Va., Henderson, of Mo., and Collamer, of Vt. (the first and last Republicans; the others very decided Unionists), as well as more unsparingly by Messrs. Garret Davis and Powell, of Ky., Saulsbury, of Del., Carlile, of Va., and others of the Opposition; while it was supported by Messrs. Trumbull, of Ill., Wilson and Sumner, of Mass., Howard, of Mich., Wade and Sherman, of Ohio, Morrill and Fessenden, of Maine, Clark and Hale, of N. H., and nearly all the more decided Republicans. So intense and formidable was the resistance that the Senate at length[49] referred the bill to a Select Committee of seven—Mr. Clark, of N. H., chairman—who duly reported therefrom "A bill to suppress Insurrection, and punish Treason and Rebellion;" which merely authorized the President, at his discretion, to proclaim free all slaves of persons who shall be found in arms against the United States thirty days after the issue of such proclamation. On this bill being taken up,[50] Mr. Davis, of Ky., tried to have it so amended that the said slaves, instead of being freed, should be sold and the proceeds put into the Treasury; but only seven Senators were found sufficiently Democratic to sustain that proposition. He next proposed that no slave should be emancipated under this act, until he should be on his way to be colonized at some point outside of the United States: which proposition received but six votes. Here the Senate bill was dropped, in deference to the action

[48] Elected as a Republican in 1861. [49] May 6, 1862. [50] May 16.

of the House; in which, after a long, arduous, doubtful struggle, during which Mr. Eliot's resolve was referred to the Judiciary Committee and reported against[51] by Mr. Hickman, of Pa., its Chairman—"because the President has all power now"—it had been referred[52] to a Select Committee of seven, whereof Mr. Sedgwick, of N. Y., was Chairman; whence Mr. Eliot, of Mass., reported[53] two bills, one providing for confiscating the property, the other for emancipating the slaves, of persistent Rebels; whereupon debate was renewed and continued for days—every Democrat and nearly every Border-State member resisting Emancipation as ruinous to the National cause. Said Mr. W. S. Holman, of Ind. (one of the most loyal and non-partisan of those elected as Democrats):

"I have supported, Sir, and will still support, every just measure of this Administration to restore the Union. No partisan interest shall control me when the Republic is in danger. I place the interest of my country far above every other interest. I will make any sacrifice to uphold the Government; but I will not be deterred from condemning, at this time, this or any other series of measures—the offspring of misguided zeal and passion, or of want of faith in our people—which tends to defeat the hope of a restoration of the Union. The citizen soldier, stricken down in battle or worn out by the weary march, falls a willing sacrifice for the Constitution of his country, and his dying eyes light up with hope as they catch the gleam of its starry symbol; while we deliberate on measures which would overthrow the one, and blot out the stars from the other."

Said Judge Thomas (Conservative), of Massachusetts:

"That the bills before the House are in violation of the law of nations, and of the Constitution, I can not—I say it with all deference to others—I can not entertain a doubt. My path of duty is plain. The duty of obedience to that Constitution was never more imperative than now. I am not disposed to deny that I have for it a superstitious reverence. I have 'worshiped it from my forefathers.' In the school of rigid discipline by which we were prepared for it, in the struggles out of which it was born, the seven years of bitter conflict, and the seven darker years in which that conflict seemed to be fruitless of good; in the wisdom with which it was constructed and first administered and set in motion; in the beneficent Government it has secured for more than two generations; in the blessed influences it has exerted upon the cause of Freedom and Humanity the world over, I can not fail to recognize the hand of a guiding and loving Providence. But not for the blessed memories of the past only do I cling to it. He must be blinded 'with excess of light,' or with the want of it, who does not see that to this nation, trembling on the verge of dissolution, it is the only possible bond of unity."

Mr. Samuel S. Cox, of Ohio, asked:

"Must these Northern fanatics be sated with negroes, taxes, and blood, with division North and devastation South, and peril to constitutional liberty everywhere, before relief shall come? They will not halt until their darling schemes are consummated. History tells us that such zealots do not and can not go backward."

Said Mr. John Law, of Indiana:

"The man who dreams of closing the present unhappy contest by reconstructing this Union upon any other basis than that prescribed by our fathers, in the compact formed by them, is a madman—ay, worse, a traitor—and should be hung as high as Haman. Sir, pass these acts, confiscate under these bills the property of these men, emancipate their negroes, place arms in the hands of these human gorillas, to murder their masters and violate their wives and daughters, and you will have a war such as was never witnessed in the worst days of the French Revolution, and horrors never exceeded in St. Domingo, for the balance of this century at least."

Mr. Eliot closed the debate[54] in an able speech for the bills; and the Confiscation bill was passed—Yeas 82; Nays 68.

The Emancipation bill was next taken up; when, after rejecting several amendments, the vote was taken on its passage, and it was defeated: Yeas 74 (all Republicans); Nays 78—fifteen members elected as Repub-

[51] March 20, 1862. [52] April 23. [53] April 30. [54] May 26.

licans voting Nay, with all the Democrats and all the Border-State men. The Republicans voting Nay were Messrs. Dawes and Delano, of Mass., Diven, of N. Y., Dunn, of Ind., Fisher, of Del., Horton, of Ohio, Wm. Kellogg, of Ill., Killinger, of Pa., Mitchell, of Ind., Nixon, of N. J., Norton, of Ill., Porter, of Ind., A. H. Rice, of Mass., Stratton, of N. J., and Train, of Mass.

Mr. Porter, of Ind., now moved[56] a reconsideration; which narrowly escaped defeat, on a motion by Mr. Holman that it do lie on the table: Yeas 69; Nays 73. The reconsideration prevailed: Yeas 84; Nays 64: and the bill was recommitted, with instructions to report a substitute already proposed by Mr. P., which prevailed—Yeas 84; Nays 66: and Mr. Eliot again reported[57] a bill emancipating the slaves of certain specified classes of prominent Rebels, and also of all persons who shall continue in armed rebellion sixty days after the President shall have issued his proclamation requiring them to desist therefrom. The bill thus modified passed the House: Yeas 82; Nays 54.

The House Confiscation bill aforesaid was taken up in the Senate;[58] and, after debate, so amended,[59] on motion of Mr. Clark, of N. H., as to recombine Emancipation therewith; when it was passed: Yeas 28; Nays 13. The House non-concurred[60] in this action: Yeas 8; Nays 124; whereupon, the Senate insisted, and asked a committee of conference; which was granted; and the Committee[61] reported a bill which was in substance Mr. Clark's, providing for both Confiscation and Emancipation. Its purport is that all slaves of persons who shall give aid or comfort to the Rebellion, who shall take refuge within the lines of the army; all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them, and coming under the control of the Government; and all slaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied by Rebel forces, and afterward occupied by the forces of the United States—shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be for ever free, and not again held as slaves; that fugitive slaves shall not be surrendered to persons who have given aid and comfort to the Rebellion; that no person engaged in the military or naval service shall surrender fugitive slaves, on pain of being dismissed from the service; that the President may employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the Rebellion, and organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare.

This bill passed the House by the decisive majority of 82 Yeas to 42 Nays; also the Senate, by 27 Yeas to 12 Nays; and, being approved by the President,[62] became the law of the land.

President Lincoln having recommended, in his first Annual Message,[63] the establishment of Diplomatic intercourse with the republics of Hayti and Liberia, Mr. Sumner reported[64] to the Senate, from its Committee on Foreign Relations, a bill for that purpose; which in due time was taken up,[65] supported by its author, opposed[66] by Mr. G. Davis, of Ky., who proclaimed his disgust at the continued "introduction

[56] May 27. [57] June 17. [58] June 23.
[59] June 28. [60] July 3. [61] July 11.
[62] July 17. [63] Dec. 3, 1862. [64] Feb. 4, '63.
[65] April 22. [66] April 24.

of the subject of *slaves* and *Slavery* into this chamber;" though no one but himself had mentioned either in connection with this measure. He drew a ludicrous picture of "a big negro fellow," fantastically arrayed, being presented as Minister from Hayti. Mr. Sumner rejoined; and Mr. Davis's substitute, providing for consular relations only with the republics aforesaid, was voted down—Yeas 8; Nays 31—and then the bill passed: Yeas 32; Nays 7. On reaching the House, it was referred to its Committee on Foreign Affairs; which Committee was discharged[66] from its further consideration, on motion of Mr. Gooch, of Mass., who ably and temperately advocated its passage. Mr. Cox, of Ohio, replied, *à la* Davis; and, after further debate by Messrs. Fessenden, of Maine, Eliot, of Mass., McKnight and Kelley, of Pa., and Maynard, of Tenn., in favor, and Messrs. Biddle, of Pa., and Crittenden, of Ky., in opposition, it was passed—Yeas 86; Nays 37—and, being signed[67] by the President, became the law of the land.

Previous to the triumph of Emancipation in the Federal District, there was no public provision for the education of the Blacks, whether bond or free; and very few, even of the latter, received any schooling whatever. The great obstacle to improvement having been swept away, Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, submitted[68] to the Senate a bill providing for the education of colored children in the city of Washington; prefacing it by a statement that, whereas the number of those children was in 1860 no less than 3,172, and while the Free Blacks of the District were taxed $36,000 per annum, whereof a tenth was appropriated to the support of schools, not one of their children was permitted to enter those schools or to receive any benefit whatever from the money thus wrested from them by law for the education of the children of the Whites, many of whom paid no tax whatever. His bill proposed simply that the city revenue raised for schools by the taxation of Blacks should be devoted to the education of their own children, and not those of the Whites.

This bill having been referred to and reported[69] from the District Committee, it was taken up,[70] on motion of Mr. Grimes; and certain non-essential amendments of the Committee agreed to. Mr. Wilson, of Mass., then moved to add a new section, as follows:

"That all persons of color in the District of Columbia, or within the corporate limits of the cities of Washington and Georgetown, shall be subject and amenable to the same laws and ordinances to which free White persons are or may be subject or amenable; that they shall be tried for any offenses against the laws in the same manner as free White persons are or may be tried for the same offenses; and that, upon being legally convicted of any crime or offense against any law or ordinance, such persons of color shall be liable to such penalty or punishment, and only such, as would be imposed or inflicted upon free White persons for the same crime or offense: and all acts, or parts of acts, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are hereby repealed."

This important amendment prevailed; and the bill, thus improved, passed:[71] Yeas 29; Nays 7. Reaching the House, it was there referred to its District Committee; reported[72] therefrom without amendment, by Mr. Rollins, of N. H., and, on his motion, passed, under the Previous

[66] June 2. [67] June 5. [68] April 29. [69] April 30. [70] May 8. [71] May 9. [72] May 15.

Question, without a call of the Yeas and Nays. It received the President's signature on the 21st. Bills making further and better provision for the education of colored children were matured and enacted in the course of that and the two following sessions.

A treaty between the Great Powers of Western Europe, intended to provide for the more effectual suppression of the African Slave-Trade, was matured and signed at Paris in 1841. It necessarily accorded a qualified reciprocal right to search suspected cruisers to the National vessels of the subscribing parties. Gen. Cass, then our Envoy at Paris, and a prospective candidate for President, resisted and defeated the accession of our Government to this most righteous and necessary increase of power to the international police of the ocean, and earned thereby the qualified approbation of the Slave Power; as was evinced in the Presidential election of 1848. A similar treaty was now negotiated between the United States and Great Britain; and a bill designed to give effect to its provisions was reported[73] to the Senate by Mr. Sumner, considered, and passed:[74] Yeas 34; Nays 4. The House concurred;[75] and the bill became a law.[76]

The first proposition looking to a repeal of the Fugitive Slave act of 1850 by the XXXVIIth Congress was made[77] by Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, to the Senate; whereby it was read twice, referred to the Judiciary Committee, and reported[78] against by Mr. Ten Eyck, of New Jersey. That report killed it. But Mr. Wilmot, of Pa., soon revived[79] the proposition, by a bill which required every person, who should apply for the legal process required for the arrest of a fugitive slave, to take a stringent oath of loyalty. The bill further provided that each alleged fugitive shall have compulsory process against witnesses deemed essential to his defense, and that such witnesses should be sworn and heard, irrespective of their color. Mr. Wade promptly reported[80] this bill; but it shared the fate of its predecessor.

Mr. Wilson, of Mass., proposed[81] to *amend* the bill of 1850 aforesaid, so as to secure to every one claimed as a fugitive slave a trial by jury; which, though once taken up[82]—Yeas 25; Nays 10—failed to command the attention of the Senate.

Soon after the meeting of the next Congress, Mr. Stevens, of Pa., submitted[83] to the House a bill contemplating an absolute repeal, not only of the act of 1850, but also of the Fugitive Slave act of 1793. Messrs. Ashley, of Ohio, and Julian, of Ind., introduced bills of like tenor. Mr. Julian further proposed that the Judiciary Committee be instructed to report a bill to repeal the most obnoxious provisions of the acts in question; but this was, on motion of Mr. Holman, of Ind., laid on the table: Yeas 82; Nays 73.

In the Senate, Mr. Sumner next introduced[84] a bill sweeping away all slave-catching by statute; which was referred to a Select Committee of seven, whereof he was Chairman, which had been raised to consider all propositions affecting Slavery. He

[73] June 12, 1862. [74] June 16. [75] July 7. [76] July 11. [77] Dec. 26, 1861. [78] Feb. 11, 1862. [79] May 23. [80] May 27. [81] May 24. [82] June 10. [83] Dec. 14, 1863. [84] Feb. 8, 1864.

soon reported[65] his bill, with ample reasons for its passage—Mr. Buckalew, of Pa., making a minority report in opposition. Mr. Sumner persistently and successfully pressed the consideration of his bill, offering not to debate it; and, after some discussion, the Senate adopted[66] an amendment proposed by Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, excepting the act of 1793 from the contemplated repeal: Yeas 24; Nays 17. The debate was still further continued; but no final action was had on the bill.

Mr. Morris, of N. Y., reported[67] from the Judiciary Committee a bill repealing all acts and parts of acts contemplating the rendition of fugitive slaves; which was debated with great spirit by a score of members—Messrs. Mallory, of Ky., Cox, of Ohio, and others, opposing it as equivalent to annulling the Constitution. Mr. Mallory observed that the majority had already crushed out the Unionism of the revolted States, and were now extending the process to that of the Border Slave States, and impressively warned the House to forbear. Finally, after having once moved and withdrawn the Previous Question, Mr. Morris moved it again;[68] when it prevailed, and the bill passed under it: Yeas 88; Nays 57.

Mr. Sumner demanded[69] the consideration of this bill in Senate; and it was, after a fiery debate, ordered: Yeas 25; Nays 17. Mr. Johnson, of Md., endeavored to save the act of 1793; but the Senate refused: Yeas 17; Nays 22. The bill, after being laid over one day to enable Mr. Davis, of Ky., to make a speech against it, was passed:[70] Yeas 27; Nays 12—Messrs. Cowan, of Pa., and Van Winkle and Willey, of West Va., voting with the Opposition. The President's signature, five days thereafter, made it a law of the land, abolishing for ever the least creditable and most disagreeable function of the marshals of our Federal Courts.

The District of Columbia had been governed mainly by the laws of the States which ceded it; and those laws were framed in the interest of slave-holding. They presumed every colored person a slave who could not produce White evidence of his freedom; and there had grown up in Washington a practice, highly lucrative to her Federal Marshal, but most disgraceful to the city and Nation, of seizing Blacks on the streets, immuring them in the jail, advertising them, and waiting for masters to appear, prove property, pay charges, and take the human chattels away. Mr. Lincoln's Marshal, Col. Ward H. Lamon, came with him from Illinois, but was a Virginian by birth, and did not revolt at the abundant and profitable custom brought to his shop by the practice just depicted. Gen. Wilson, of Mass., early[71] called the attention of the Senate to this painful subject; saying that he had "visited the jail; and such a scene of degradation and inhumanity he had never witnessed. There were persons almost entirely naked; some of them without a shirt. Some of those persons were free; most of them had run away from disloyal masters, or had been sent there by disloyal persons, for safe keeping until the war is over." He thereupon proposed a discharge by joint resolve of all persons confined in the District jail

[65] Feb. 29. [66] Mar. 19. [67] June 6. [68] June 13. [69] June 21. [70] June 23, 1864. [71] Dec. 4, 1861.

as fugitive slaves. In the debate which ensued, Mr. Wilson stated that the French legation had recently taken to that jail gentlemen who had traversed the world inspecting prisons, with a view to their improvement; and that, after examining this, they observed to the jailer that they had never before seen but one so bad; and that was in Austria. Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, remarked that he believed there was never a jail so bad as this, save the French Bastile, and some of the dungeons of Venice. When he visited it, a few days before, he found among the prisoners a boy who claimed to be free-born, yet who had been confined there thirteen months and four days on suspicion of being a runaway slave. He further stated that Marshal Lamon had forbidden Members of Congress access to the prison without his written permission.

Messrs. Powell, of Kentucky, Pearce, of Maryland, and Carlile, of Virginia, opposed the resolve; but it was warmly supported and passed:[95] Yeas 31; Nays 4.

A similar resolve had already[96] been submitted to the House. No action was taken, however, upon this, nor upon the Senate's kindred measure; because the President, through Secretary Seward, addressed[97] an order to Marshal Lamon, directing him not to receive into custody any persons caught up as fugitives from Slavery, but to discharge, ten days thereafter, all such persons now in his jail. This put a stop to one of the most flagrant and glaring iniquities habitually perpetrated in a Christian and civilized community.

A bill reported[98] by Mr. Sumner, from the Select Committee on Slavery and Freedom, to prohibit the holding of slaves on National vessels, and also the coastwise Slave-Trade, was lost[99]—Yeas 13; Nays 20—but he again moved a prohibition of the coastwise Slave-Trade, and of all laws sanctioning and regulating the same, as an amendment to the Civil Appropriation bill; and it was adopted: Yeas 23; Nays 14. Thus fastened to a necessary measure, the proposition was duly enacted, and received the President's signature on the 2d of July, 1864.

Mr. Sumner proposed[100] another Amendment to this bill, providing that "in the Courts of the United States, there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color." Mr. Buckalew moved to add, "or because he is a party to or interested in the issue tried." This was agreed to; and Mr. Sumner's amendment, thus amended, was adopted: Yeas 22; Nays 16; and the bill passed, as already stated; making it the law of the land that no person shall henceforth be precluded from giving testimony either because of his color or because he is interested in the pending issue.

[95] Jan. 14, 1862. [96] Dec. 9, 1861. [97] Jan. 25, 1862. [98] March 23, 1864. [99] June 24. [100] June 25.

XIII.

ROSECRANS'S WINTER CAMPAIGN.

Gen. Rosecrans, on assuming[1] command of Buell's Army of the Ohio, found it seriously depleted and demoralized by the exhaustive marches and indecisive conflicts of the last six months. With a strength fully adequate to the rout and destruction of all the forces led into Kentucky by Bragg and Kirby Smith, it had seen that State ravaged throughout by that locust horde, which had in due time recrossed the Cumberland Mountains unassailed, returning to East Tennessee as if in triumph. Of the 100,000 men formerly borne on its muster-rolls, he found, on examination, no less than 26,482 "absent by authority"—most, but not nearly all of them, doubtless, in hospitals—sick or wounded; while 6,484 more were "absent *without* authority"—in other words, had deserted. His effective force was thus reduced to about 65,000 men; while his cavalry was so inferior in numbers and efficiency that the troopers of Forrest and John Morgan rode around us at will, striking at posts and supply trains, and compelling enormous and constantly increasing, exhausting details to keep open our communications and preserve our army from starvation.

The railroad from Louisville to Nashville had been reopened to and across Green river; so that, though there was no considerable force of the enemy in its front—Bragg's army being still on its tedious, toilsome, circuitous retreat through East Tennessee—our army was clustered around Bowling Green, whence it could advance only so fast as the repair of its sole line of supply should be perfected. Its designation had been changed to "Fourteenth Army Corps;" the Department having been curtailed, and rechristened that of the Cumberland. It was now organized into three grand divisions: the Right, under Maj.-Gen. McCook, with Brig.-Gens. J. W. Sill, Phil. H. Sheridan, and Col. W. E. Woodruff at the head of its subordinate divisions respectively; the Center, under Maj.-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, with its subordinate divisions led by Maj.-Gen. L. H. Rousseau, Brig.-Gens. Negley, Palmer, Dumont, and Fry; whereof Dumont and Fry were soon relieved, and Palmer transferred to the Left Wing, of which Maj.-Gen. T. L. Crittenden had command, and which consisted of the sub-divisions of Brig.-Gens. T. J. Wood, H. P. Van Cleve, and W. S. Smith. Rosecrans assigned the chief command of his dilapidated cavalry to Maj.-Gen. D. S. Stanley; while Lt.-Col. Julius P. Garesché—an officer of rare capacity and merit—was placed at the head of his staff, with Capt. J. St. Clair Morton as Chief Engineer, and Col. Wm. Truesdail as Chief of Army Police.

The railroad having been rendered serviceable, Rosecrans left[2] Bowling Green by special train for Mitchellsville; where he took horse and proceeded to Nashville, whose garrison,

[1] Oct. 30, 1862.

[2] Nov. 10.

commanded by Gen. Negley, he reviewed next day. His divisions, as they arrived, were thrown out in front of the city, covering the roads leading southward; the command of the Right here devolving on Gen. Jeff. C. Davis; Gen. R. B. Mitchell relieved Negley as commandant at Nashville, enabling him to go to the front; while Dumont's division was merged: a new one being created, and Brig.-Gen. J. J. Reynolds assigned to its command. Until the railroad was fully reopened[3] hence to Louisville, our men only lived from hand to mouth, rendering a farther advance impossible; so that Bragg's army had time to conclude its long march and reappear in our front at MURFREESBOROUGH, before Rosecrans was prepared to assume the offensive.

Meantime, Morgan had been exhibiting his audacity and vigor as a leader of cavalry. Several daring dashes on our supply trains below Mitchellsville had resulted in the capture of a number of our wagons and at least 150 men; Lt. Beals and 20 men of the 4th Michigan cavalry had been picked up[4] near Stone river; but Gen. Stanley, reporting for duty about this time, soon drove the Rebel raiders from our rear; and, in several partisan affairs occurring directly afterward, the advantage was with us—a Texas regiment being chased[5] by Col. L. M. Kennett some 15 miles down the Franklin turnpike; while Brig.-Gen. E. N. Kirk that day drove Wheeler out of Lavergne—Wheeler himself being wounded. Phil. Sheridan, on another road, pressed the enemy back to Nolensville, without loss on our part; and Col. Roberts, 42d Illinois, surprised and captured Capt. Portch and a small squad of Morgan's men; bringing in their arms and horses. A Rebel force having, about this time, dashed across the Cumberland near Hartsville, capturing a forage train and its escort, Major Hill, 2d Indiana, chased the captors 18 miles, recovering all we had lost, and killing some 18 or 20 Rebels—for which he was publicly complimented by Rosecrans; who, finding that some of his soldiers were base enough to surrender wantonly to the enemy, in order to be paroled and sent home, had fifty of the caitiffs dressed up in ridiculous night-caps,[6] and thus paraded, before their jeering comrades, through Nashville, to the music of the Rogue's March; after which, they were forwarded to the parole camp in Indiana. The lesson did not require repetition.

Gen. Thomas having thrown forward on our left a brigade—nearly 2,000 strong—to Hartsville, its command fell to Col. A. B. Moore, 104th Illinois, who allowed himself to be surprised[7] by Morgan, at the head of 1,500 cavalry and mounted infantry, and most disgracefully captured; though the residue of Gen. Dumont's division was at Castilian Springs, only nine miles distant. Moore had neglected to fortify or even intrench himself; his vedettes were surprised and picked up; Morgan advanced on him at 7 A. M., in broad daylight, having previously gained his rear without exciting an alarm; when Moore, who had hastily taken post on a hill, and who soon contrived to evince every species of incapacity, cowardice inclusive, surrendered, and was hurried off with about 1,500

[3] Nov. 26. [4] Nov. 13. [5] Nov. 27. [6] Nov. 28. [7] Dec. 7.

of his men; the residue escaping and giving the alarm at the Springs; whence Col. Harlan's brigade arrived just in time to throw a few shells after the escaping Rebels, scaring them from some of their plunder and taking a few prisoners. Moore's men were first hurried to Murfreesboro', stripped by the way of their blankets and over-coats, and thence marched directly up to our lines to be there exchanged—contrary to the cartel agreed on by the military chiefs of the belligerents. Gen. Rosecrans exchanged them; but gave notice that he would do so no more. In the Hartsville disgrace, some 150 on either side were killed or wounded.[8]

Two days later, Wheeler, with a large force of mounted infantry and cavalry, attacked a brigade of our infantry, under Col. Stanley Matthews, which was foraging between the two armies; but was received with determined spirit, and driven off, with a loss of 100 to our 40. Matthews returned in triumph, bringing in his train; and was publicly thanked by Rosecrans.

Gen. Stanley, having received and distributed among his best horsemen some 2,000 revolving rifles, resolved to test their efficiency. Pushing down the turnpike leading to Franklin, he rode into[9] that town, driving the Rebel vedettes before him, taking a few prisoners, gaining important intelligence, and returning to his camp in triumph.

At length—two months' provisions having been accumulated at Nashville, and a good part of the Rebel cavalry having been dispatched to West Tennessee and to Kentucky, to operate on our lines of supply—Rosecrans determined to advance.

His disposable force had been reduced by details and by casualties to 46,910 men: of whom 41,421 were infantry, 2,223 artillery, and 3,266 cavalry—much of the cavalry very raw. The Right Wing, under McCook, numbered 15,933; the Center, under Thomas, 13,395; the Left, under Crittenden, 13,288; beside Morton's brigade of Engineers, numbering 1,700. This army was essentially weakened by its division—or rather dispersion—into no less than 110 infantry and 10 cavalry regiments; its artillerymen serving no less than 24 batteries, or 150 guns.

Our army, now well concentrated in front of Nashville, commenced its advance at daylight, Dec. 26; Rosecrans and staff riding out of Nashville to join it, several hours afterward. The three grand divisions covered all the roads leading south and south-west from that city. Of course, it rained heavily, as usual when our Generals attempted an important movement in Winter; and McCook, on our right, was soon enveloped in a fog so dense as to bring him to a halt. Within two miles after passing our picket-line, our advance was resisted by heavy bodies of cavalry, well backed by infantry and artillery; who skirmished sharply

[8] Moore says he had but 1,200 men in the fight, and that he "was hemmed in on all sides by an overwhelming force of five or six to one." Bragg says Morgan had "not more than 1,200 *in action*," and that he took "1,800 prisoners," with two guns and 2,000 small arms. *The Rebel Banner* (Murfreesboro', Dec. 11) says: "All told, our forces were about 1,300." Moore says the Rebel loss in killed and wounded was "about 400:" Bragg says their loss in killed and wounded was 125, and *ours* 500. Moore lays his defeat at the door of the 106th Ohio, Col. Taffie, whom he charges with intense cowardice.

[9] Dec. 12.



COM. JOHN A. WINSLOW
MAJ. GEN. CARL SCHURZ
MAJ. GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS
MAJ. GEN. A. PLEASONTON
MAJ. GEN. GORDON GRANGER
MAJ. GEN. P. J. OSTERHAUS
BRIG. GEN. T. F. MEAGHER
MAJ. GEN. J. B. GEEDS
MAJ. GEN. E. R. S. CANBY
Entered according to act of Congress AD 1866 by G. D. Cass & Co. in the Clerks Office of the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut
Eng. by J. C. Buttre, New York
DEFENDERS OF THE UNION

and constantly, taking advantage of the continually increasing roughness of the country, which is in good part heavily wooded with forests of oak and dense thickets of cedar, rendering the movement slow and by no means bloodless. McCook, with our right, rested that night at Nolensville, and the next at Triune; Crittenden, with our left, advanced the first day to Lavergne, and the next to Stewart's creek, where Rosecrans seems to have expected that the Rebels might give him battle. The third day, being Sunday, our troops mainly rested. Next morning, McCook pressed on to Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, six miles from Murfreesboro'; while Crittenden, with Palmer's division in advance, moved on the main Murfreesboro' pike to Stone River; finding the Rebel army in position along the bluffs across that stream. Palmer, observing an apparently retrogade movement on the part of the enemy, erroneously reported to headquarters that they were retreating; and Crittenden was thereupon ordered to push across a division and occupy Murfreesboro'. Harker's brigade was accordingly sent across—the stream being almost everywhere fordable—and drove a Rebel regiment back upon their main body in some confusion; but prisoners thus captured reporting that Breckinridge's entire corps was there present, Crittenden wisely took the responsibility of disobeying Rosecrans's order, and, favored by nightfall, withdrew Harker across the river without serious loss.

Next day,[10] McCook fought his way down nearly to Stone river, somewhat west of Murfreesboro'; and before night our army was nearly all in position along a line stretching irregularly from north to south, a distance of some three or four miles: Crittenden on the left, Thomas in the center, and McCook on the right; and, at 9 P. M., the three met, by invitation, at Rosecrans's headquarters, and received their orders for the morrow.

It being now certain that Bragg had deliberately chosen this as his ground whereon to stand and fight, and that he had concentrated here his forces, while his cavalry so stubbornly contested and impeded our advance, Rosecrans proposed at daylight to throw forward his left and center, crushing Breckinridge, who held the Rebel right, and then, wheeling rapidly, fall with overwhelming force in front and flank on their center, sweeping through Murfreesboro' and gaining the rear of the enemy's center and left, pushing them off their natural line of retreat, and so cutting up and destroying their entire army. In pursuance of this plan, Van Cleve's division, on our extreme left, advanced soon after daylight; Wood's being ready to support and follow him.

Bragg, however, had already decided to fight his own battle, and not Rosecrans's. To this end, he had concentrated heavily on his left, where Hardee was in command, with orders to attack McCook at daylight.[11] Bishop Polk, in his center, strengthened by McCown's division, was directed to second and support Hardee's attack; the two corps moving by a constant right wheel, and crushing back our routed right upon our center, seizing first the Wilkin-

[10] Dec. 30.

[11] Dec. 31.

[illegible] and then the Nashville turnpike: [illegible] between our army and [illegible] supply-trains, whenever they [illegible] have flanked our right and [illegible] our rear.

According to Rosecrans's plan, McCook, however strongly assailed, was to hold his position for three hours, receding if attacked in over-whelming force—very slowly, and [illegible] if possible he had [illegible] there was [illegible] in the calculation [illegible] 7 A. M. Hardee's corps [illegible] McCook's [illegible] Cleburne's [illegible] charging vehemently [illegible] Cheatham's and [illegible] back our [illegible] Of the two [illegible] commanders in Johnson's [illegible] holding our extreme right [illegible] was severely wounded at [illegible] while Gen. Willich had [illegible] and was himself cap-[illegible] So sudden and unexpected [illegible] that a portion of our [illegible] had been unhitched [illegible] The guns of [illegible] were lost.

McCook attempted to reform in [illegible] behind his first position; [illegible] was too thoroughly [illegible] was chased rapidly back [illegible] A large part [illegible] was [illegible] by the Rebel [illegible] account [illegible] of the fight [illegible] remainder of the [illegible] McCook's [illegible] Davis and Sheridan [illegible] had repulsed several resolute attacks on their front, when the disappearance of Johnson's division enabled the Rebels to come in on their flank, compelling them also to give ground; and, though repeated efforts were made by Davis and his subordinates to bring their men again up to the work, their fighting did not amount to much thereafter.

Sheridan's division fought longer and better; but of his brigade commanders, Gen. J. W. Sill was killed early in the day, while leading a successful charge, and Cols. Roberts and Shaeffer at later periods—each falling dead at the head of his brigade, while charging or being charged. This division fought well throughout; but was pushed back nearly or quite to the Nashville turnpike, with the loss of Houghtaling's and a section of Pugh's battery.

By 11 A. M. the day was apparently lost. McCook's corps—a full third of our army—was practically demolished, and the Rebel cavalry in our rear working its wicked will upon our supply trains and stragglers. Nearly half the ground held by our army at daylight had been won by the triumphant enemy, who had now several batteries in position, playing upon our center, where Negley's division of Thomas's corps was desperately engaged, with its ammunition nearly expended, its artillery horses disabled, and a heavy Rebel column pushing in between it and what was left of McCook's corps, with intent to surround and capture it. This compelled Negley to retire; when Gen. Rousseau, pushing up his reserve division to the front, sent Maj. Ring's battalion of regulars to Negley's assistance. The regulars made a most gallant and effective



STONE RIVER, OR MURFREESBORO'.

son and then the Nashville turnpike; interposing between our army and its supply-trains, whenever they should have flanked our right and gained our rear.

According to Rosecrans's plan, McCook, however strongly assailed, was to hold his position for three hours, receding—if attacked in overwhelming force—very slowly, and fighting desperately; which he had undertaken to do. But there was a serious mistake in the calculation. Before 7 A. M., Hardee's corps burst from the thickets in McCook's front and on his right; Cleburne's four brigades charging vehemently its extreme right, Cheatham's and McCown's divisions striking it more directly in front, hurling back our skirmishers at once on our lines, and crumbling these into a fleeing mob within a few minutes. Of the two brigade commanders in Johnson's division, holding our extreme right, Gen. Kirk was severely wounded at the first fire; while Gen. Willich had his horse killed and was himself captured. So sudden and unexpected was the attack, that a portion of our battery horses had been unhitched from the guns and sent off to drink, a few minutes before. The guns, of course, were lost.

McCook attempted to rëform in the woods behind his first position; but his right was too thoroughly routed, and was chased rapidly back toward our center. A large part of this (Johnson's) division was gathered up as prisoners by the Rebel cavalry; the rest was of little account during the remainder of the fight.

McCook's remaining divisions, under Jeff. C. Davis and Sheridan, had repulsed several resolute attacks on their front, when the disappearance of Johnson's division enabled the Rebels to come in on their flank, compelling them also to give ground; and, though repeated efforts were made by Davis and his subordinates to bring their men again up to the work, their fighting did not amount to much thereafter.

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

STONE RIVER, OR MURFREESBORO'.

charge, losing heavily, but rendering admirable service.

The weight of the Rebel attack had by this time fallen wholly on Thomas, commanding our center; Sheridan, entirely out of ammunition, falling still farther to the rear, and the triumphant Rebels pressing on until they had reached a position which gave them a concentric cross-fire at short-range on Negley's and Rousseau's divisions. This compelled Thomas to withdraw them from the cedar woods to more open and favorable ground; his artillery holding a ridge on the right (south) of the Nashville turnpike. In executing this movement, the regulars, Lt.-Col. Shepherd, were brought under a murderous fire, by which they lost 530 men. But the ground now taken was held; our batteries here concentrated, and the Rebels' progress finally arrested; their repeated attempts to advance out of the cedar thicket on our right and front being defeated with great slaughter.

Palmer's division, holding the right of our left wing, had advanced, at 8 A. M., to support Negley's movement, covering his left; but had not proceeded far when Palmer found his safety compromised by a Rebel advance on his rear. Halting Cruft's brigade, and ordering Col. Grose to face to the rear, he opened fire on the Rebels, and quickly repulsed them; while Col. Hazen, falling back a short distance, occupied the crest of a low, wooded hill, between the Nashville turnpike and railroad, and held it firmly until Grose, having driven the enemy from his rear, came up to his assistance; as did two or three other regiments. Again and again was his position assailed; but each attack was repulsed; and the fight closed on this part of the field with our troops entirely successful.

Bragg had brought all his army across the creek to overwhelm our right and center, save that Breckinridge, with his division, remained opposite our left. At 10½ A. M., he, too, received an order to advance and attack; but he had only moved half a mile, when a new order came to detach one or two brigades to the support of Polk, in the center; and he sent two brigades accordingly. He soon received a still further order to advance and attack, and then one to report to Polk with all but Hanson's brigade. Moving his remaining brigades, under Preston and Palmer, by the left flank, he crossed the creek and reported to Polk and Bragg just in season to see the brigades of Jackson and Adams, which he had previously sent, recoil from an assault on our lines; Adams being among the wounded. Breckinridge was now ordered to charge with Preston's and Palmer's brigades, and did so; gaining some ground, but losing considerably, and finally desisting, as night fell, because the position in his front was too strong to be carried by his force. During the night, he was ordered back, with Palmer's brigade, to his old position on the Rebel right.

Gen. Wood, who was in command of our division thus assailed, was wounded in the foot at 10 A. M.; but remained in the saddle till evening, when he turned over his command to Gen. M. S. Hascall. Though he had been obliged, early in the fight, to spare Hascall's and Harker's brigades to the relief of the center and right, he held his ground nobly through the day; his batteries replying forcibly

to those with which the enemy annoyed us from the heights south of the river, and his infantry repelling every charge made by the enemy. Before night, Estep's battery, which, with Cox's, had been splendidly served throughout, had lost so heavily that a detail of infantry was required to aid in working its guns. Bradley's 6th Ohio battery at one time lost two of its guns; but they were subsequently recaptured by the 13th Michigan.

Night fell on our army successful against every attempt which had for some hours been made to drive it; but with little reason for exultation. It had lost, since daylight, including stragglers, at least one-fourth of its numbers, with an equal proportion of its guns. It had lost half the ground on which it was encamped in the morning; and the Rebel cavalry were on its line of communications, making free with its baggage and supplies. Almost any General but Rosecrans would have supposed that there was but one point now to be considered: how to get back to Nashville with the least additional loss. But Rosecrans took stock of his ammunition, and found that there was enough left for another battle; so he resolved to stay. His guns were now well posted, and had the range of the ground in their front; and it had been fairly proved that the enemy could not take them, even with the help of the 28 we had lost. So, giving orders for the issue of all the remaining ammunition, drawing in his left a few rods, so that it might rest advantageously on the creek, and welcoming and posting the brigades of Starkweather and Walker, which had come up as night fell, he lay down with his army to await such a New Year's Day as it should please God to send them. Ammunition being rather scanty, and fresh supplies expected, he proposed to keep the holiday in quiet, unless Bragg should decide otherwise.

On a calm review of this day's desperate and doubtful carnage, there can not be a doubt that the battle was saved after it had been lost; and that the man who saved it was William S. Rosecrans. Thousands had done nobly—Thomas, Sheridan, Wood, Rousseau, Palmer, Van Cleve, and others, eminently so—but the day might have been saved without any of them; while without Rosecrans it must have been lost. It was he who, when apprised too late of the sudden and utter demolition of his right wing, instantly pushed up Rousseau from his center to its relief, and hurried across Van Cleve's and other divisions from the left to stay the tide of Rebel success; it was he who—Van Cleve having just fallen—led the charge by a part of his division, which finally arrested the Rebels and repelled their advance on our right—Rousseau forthwith emulating his example, charging desperately the enemy in his front, and hurling them back into the cedars with fearful loss on both sides, but with prisoners taken by ours only.[13] And when, later in the day, the storm of battle rolled around to

[13] Rousseau, in his official report, says:

"As the enemy emerged from the woods in great force, shouting and cheering, the batteries of Loomis and Guenther, double-shotted with canister, opened upon them. They moved straight ahead for a while; but were finally driven back with immense loss. In a little while, they rallied again, and, as it seemed, with fresh troops, again assailed our position; and were again, after a fierce struggle, driven back.

our center and left, falling heavily on Palmer's and Wood's divisions, Rosecrans was there, directing, encouraging, steadying; though the head of his chief of staff, Garesché, was blown to pieces by a shell while riding by the General's side, and three or four others of his staff or escort were wounded—one of them mortally—and as many more lost their horses. To Garesché, he was deeply attached—they two being Roman Catholics, as were none other of his military family—but he was too intent on his work to seem to heed the fall of his beloved friend; and when another of the staff said to him, "Garesché is dead," "I am *very* sorry," was the quiet response, "but we can not help it." Soon word came (erroneously), "McCook is killed." "We can not help it," was the General's calm reply; "this battle must be won." And it *was* won. Before sunset, the Rebels had tried him on every side, and been beaten back—with fearful carnage, indeed, but no greater on our side than on theirs—their advantage being confined to our loss of guns and prisoners in the morning, consequent on McCook's sudden, overwhelming disaster. In the fighting since 11 o'clock, the carnage had been greater on the side of the Rebels; and they had lost confidence, if not ground. At 9 A. M., they had supposed our army in their hands; at sunset, Bragg had enough to do to save his own. Says Rosecrans, in his official report:

"The day closed, leaving us masters of the original ground on our left, and our line advantageously posted, with open ground in front, swept at all points by our artillery. We had lost heavily in killed and wounded, and a considerable number in stragglers and prisoners; also, 28 pieces of artillery: the horses having been slain, and our troops being unable to withdraw them, by hand, over the rough ground; but the enemy had been roughly handled, and badly damaged at all points, having had no success where we had open ground, and our troops properly posted; none, which did not depend on the original crushing of our right and the superior masses which were, in consequence, brought to bear upon the narrow front of Sheridan's and Negley's divisions, and a part of Palmer's, coupled with the scarcity of ammunition, caused by the circuitous road which the train had taken, and the inconvenience of getting it from a remote distance through the cedars."

Both armies maintained their respective positions throughout the following day.[*] There were artillery duels at intervals, and considerable picket-firing, whereby some casualties were suffered, mainly on our center and left; but nothing like a serious attack: the lines of the two armies confronting each other at close range, alert and vigilant; while brigades and regiments were silently moved from point to point, and rifle-pits and other hasty defenses were constructed on either side, in preparation for the impending struggle. Meantime, some ammunition trains—which the Rebel cavalry had driven from their proper positions in our rear, and compelled to make long

Four deliberate and fiercely sustained assaults were made upon our position, and repulsed. During the last assault, I was informed that our troops were advancing on our right, and saw troops, out of my division, led by Gen. Rosecrans, moving in that direction. I informed Gen. Thomas of the fact, and asked leave to advance my lines. He directed me to do so. We made a charge upon the enemy, and drove him into the woods; my staff and orderlies capturing some 17 prisoners, including a Captain and Lieutenant, who were within 130 yards of the batteries. This ended the fighting of that day: the enemy in immense force hovering in the woods during the night, while we slept on our arms on the field of battle. We occupied this position during the three following days and nights of the fight. Under Gen. Thomas's direction, I had it intrenched by rifle-pits, and believe the enemy could not have taken it at all."

[*] Friday, Jan. 1, 1863.

circuits to rejoin their commands—were brought up and their contents distributed. At night, our men lay down on their arms again, and all was quiet. Hitherto, the weather had been bright and mild; so that there was no suffering save on the part of the wounded.

The quiet remained unbroken till 8 next morning;[14] when the Rebels suddenly opened fire from many batteries which had meantime been stealthily planted in front of our center and left. Hascall's division of Crittenden's corps was exposed to the heaviest of this fire, and suffered severely—Estep's battery being quickly disabled, losing so many horses that its guns were necessarily drawn off by infantry. But Bradley's and other batteries now opened on our side; and, after half an hour's firing, the Rebels ceased as suddenly as they had begun. Our infantry, though losing heavily, did not change its position.

Van Cleve's division, after losing its chief, had been moved back toward our left, Col. Sam. Beatty commanding; and, at daybreak this morning, had in good part been sent across the stream, taking post on the bluff beyond, as if in pursuance of Rosecrans's original purpose to take Murfreesboro' by a determined advance of his left. Throughout the morning, the rest of Van Cleve's infantry, and two or three batteries, followed. The Rebel army having been nearly all moved farther to our right, in executing or in following up the original demonstration on that wing, this movement encountered no opposition; though skirmishing along Beatty's front grew livelier and more determined toward midday; showing that the enemy were gradually creeping up. At noon, a battery opened on our front, while other batteries were seen moving to our left, as if to flank us in that quarter. At 3 P. M., our skirmishers reported that the enemy were throwing down the fences before them, as if making ready to charge; and, before any dispositions could be made to receive them, Breckinridge's entire corps, strengthened by 10 Napoleon 12-pounders, forming three magnificent columns of assault, seemed to emerge from the earth, and, aided by a heavy enfilading fire of Bishop Polk's artillery, toward the center, swept on to the charge.

Their strength was overwhelming; and the fire of our first line, consisting of the 51st Ohio, 8th Kentucky, 35th and 78th Indiana, barely sufficed to check their determined and confident advance. In a few minutes, our men gave way in disorder, sweeping the second line with them, or constraining it to follow their example. The reserve, consisting of the 19th Ohio, 9th and 11th Kentucky, was then sent up, and fought gallantly; but were far too weak, and, being threatened by a movement on their right flank, fell back, fighting, to the river and across it, losing heavily.

But now the solid Rebel masses, formed six deep, eagerly pursuing, came within the range of Crittenden's carefully planted batteries across the stream, and were plowed through and through; while the divisions of Negley and Jeff. C. Davis, with St. Clair Morton's engineers, pressed forward to the rescue. The Rebels were in

[14] Jan. 2.

turn overmatched and hurled back in disorder; losing four of their guns, the flag of the 26th Tennessee, and a considerable body of prisoners. Had not darkness fallen directly, while a heavy rain had set in, Rosecrans would have pursued the fugitives right into Murfreesboro'.[15] As it was, Crittenden's corps and Davis's division both passed over, reoccupied the commanding ground, and, before morning, were solidly intrenched there, ready for whatever emergency.

Another night of anxious watchfulness gave place to a morning[16] of pouring rain, by which the ground was so sodden as to impede the movement of artillery. We were short of ammunition till 10 A. M., when an anxiously expected train was welcomed. Batteries were now constructed on the ground so handsomely gained on our left, by which even Murfreesboro' could be shelled; and Gens. Thomas and Rousseau, who had for days been annoyed by Rebel sharp-shooters from the cedar thickets in their front, obtained permission from Rosecrans to dislodge them by a charge, following a sharp fire of artillery—four regiments entering and soon clearing the woods, capturing 70 or 80 prisoners. No counter-movement being attempted, the fourth day closed peacefully, and was followed by a quiet night.

Quiet on our side only. Bragg had concluded to leave, and commenced the movement, as stealthily as possible, at 11 P. M.; gathering up his men and guns so cautiously that even our pickets were not aware of his Hegira till broad daylight,[17] when too late for effective pursuit; which, in fact, our inferiority in cavalry must at any rate have rendered comparatively fruitless. We do not seem even to have advanced on his track till Monday.[18]

Wheeler's cavalry, after vigorously resisting our advance to Stone river, had been dispatched[19] by Bragg to the rear of our army; capturing Lavergne,[20] taking 700 prisoners, and destroying heavy army trains, with a large amount of stores. Thence hastening to Rock Spring and Nolensville, they made still further captures at each; and, having passed around[21] our army, reached the left flank of Bragg's, just as it commenced its great and successful charge on McCook; guarding that flank, and coming into action as it gained the Nashville turnpike, just north of Overall's creek. Wheeler of course claims the advantage in this fight; but admits that he fell back at the close, numbering Col. Allen and Lt.-Col. Webb among his wounded. Next morning, he went up the turnpike to Lavergne; capturing another train and a gun; regaining, by order, the front during the night; and, being again sent, at 9 P. M., to our rear;

[15] He says, in his report:

"The enemy retreated more rapidly than they had advanced. In twenty minutes, they had lost 2,000 men."

[16] Saturday, Jan. 3. [17] Sunday, Jan. 4.

[18] Rosecrans, in his official report, says he received news on Sunday morning that the enemy had fled from Murfreesboro'; when burial parties were sent out to inter the dead, and the cavalry ordered to reconnoiter. He adds that Thomas, on Monday morning, drove the Rebel rear-guard (cavalry) six or seven miles southward, and that—

"We learned that the enemy's infantry had reached Shelbyville by 12 M. on Sunday; but, owing to the impracticability of bringing up supplies, and the loss of 557 artillery horses, farther pursuit was deemed inadvisable."

[19] Night of Dec. 29–30.

[20] Dec. 30. [21] Dec. 31.

where he, at 2 P. M. next day,[23] had a fight with a heavily guarded ordnance train, which he stopped, and claims to have damaged, but was unable to capture or destroy; returning during the night to Bragg's left flank, and covering his retreat on the 4th and 5th.

On the whole, the enemy's operations in the rear of our army, during this memorable conflict, reflect no credit on the intelligence and energy with which they were resisted. The prisoners—2,000 or more—taken by the Rebels were of course mainly stragglers and fugitives, barely worth paroling; but they figure largely in Wheeler's and in Bragg's reports. And it is not doubtful that Rosecrans's inability to improve his ultimate success was largely owing to the destruction of his trains by these triumphant raiders.

The silver lining to this cloud is a most gallant defense made on the 1st by Col. Innes's 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, only 391 strong, who had taken post on high ground near Lavergne, and formed such a barricade of cedars, &c., as they hurriedly might. Here they were[22] attacked, at 2 P. M., by Wharton's cavalry, whom they successfully resisted and beat off. Wharton's official report is their best eulogium. He was in command of six or eight regiments, and here is his account of this affair:

"A regiment of infantry, under Col. *Dennis*, also was stationed in a cedar-brake, and fortifications, near this point. I caused the battery, under Lt. Pike, who acted with great gallantry, to open on it. The fire, at a range of not more than 400 yards, was kept up for more than an hour; and must have resulted in great damage to the enemy. I caused the enemy to be charged on three sides at the same time, by Cols. Cox and Smith and Lt.-Col. Malone; and the charge was repeated four times; but the enemy was so strongly posted that it was found impossible to dislodge him."

Rosecrans makes his entire force who participated in this struggle 37,977 infantry, 3,200 cavalry, and 2,223 artillery: total, 43,400; and states his losses as follows: killed, 1,533;[24] wounded, 7,245; total, 8,778, or fully 20 per cent. of the number engaged. He adds that his provost-marshal says his loss of prisoners will fall below 2,800. He says nothing of prisoners taken by him, though we certainly did take at least 500, beside wounded. He judges that the Rebels had fifteen per cent. advantage in their choice of ground and knowledge of the country; and says that they had present 132 regiments of infantry and 20 of cavalry, beside 24 smaller organizations of cavalry, 12 battalions of sharp-shooters, and 23 batteries of artillery—all which, he estimates, must have presented an aggregate of fully 62,720 men. He thinks their killed and wounded must have amounted to 14,560 men. If he had only told us how many of them he buried, and how many wounded (or others) fell into his hands, he would have earned our gratitude.

Bragg, *per contra*, says he had but 35,000 men on the field when the fight commenced, of whom but about 30,000 were infantry and artillery; and that he lost of these over 10,000, of whom 9,000 were killed

[22] Jan. 3. [23] Jan. 1.

[24] Among our killed, beside those already mentioned, were Cols. Jones, 24th Ohio, McKee, 3d Ky., Williams, 25th Ill., Harrington, 27th Ill., Stem, 101st Ohio, and Millikin, 3d Ohio cavalry. Among our wounded, beside those already named, were Cols. Forman, 15th Ky., Humphreys, 88th Ind., Alexander, 21st Ill., Hines, 57th Ind., Blake, 40th Ind., and Lt.-Col. Tanner, 22d Ind.

and wounded."[26] He claims to have taken 6,273 prisoners, many of them by the raids of his cavalry on the trains and fugitives between our army and Nashville; and he estimates our losses at 24,000 killed and wounded, with over 30 guns to his 3. He claims to have captured, in addition, 6,000 small arms and much other valuable spoil, beside burning 800 wagons, &c., &c. It seems odd that, after such a fight, he should have retired so hastily as to leave 1,500 of his sick and wounded (Union accounts says 2,600), with 200 medical and other attendants, in his deserted hospitals at Murfreesboro'."[26]

It is a fair presumption that our losses, both in men (prisoners included) and material, were greater than those of the Rebels; and that Rosecrans's army was disabled by those losses for any effective pursuit; but this does not and can not demolish the fact that the battle of Stone river, so gallantly, obstinately, desperately fought, was lost by Bragg and the Rebels, and won by the army of the Cumberland and its heroic commander.

On the day[27] of the great struggle at Stone river, Gen. Forrest, who, with 3,500 cavalry, had been detached[28] by Bragg to operate on our communications in West Tennessee, and who had for two weeks or more been raiding through that section, threatening Jackson, capturing Trenton, Humboldt, Union City, &c., burning bridges, tearing up rails, and paroling captured Federals (over 1,000, according to his reports—700 of them at Trenton alone), was struck on his return at PARKER'S CROSS-ROADS, between Huntingdon and Lexington, and thoroughly routed. He first encountered Col. C. L. Dunham, with a small brigade of 1,600; who had, the day before, been pushed forward from Huntingdon by Gen. J. C. Sullivan, and who was getting the worst of the fight—having been nearly surrounded, his train captured, and he summoned to surrender—when Sullivan came up at double-quick, with the two fresh brigades of Gen. Haynie and Col. Fuller, and rushed upon the astonished Rebels, who fled in utter rout, not attempting to make a stand, nor hardly to fire a shot. Forrest himself narrowly escaped capture; losing 4 guns, over 400 prisoners, including his Adjutant, Strange, two Colonels, many horses, arms, &c., &c. He fled eastward to Clifton, where he recrossed the Tennessee, and thence made his way back to Bragg. He lost in the fight about 50 killed and 150 wounded—the latter being included among the prisoners. Dunham reports his loss at 220: 23 killed, 139 wounded, and 58 missing.

Gen. John H. Morgan, who had been likewise dispatched by Bragg to operate on Rosecrans's communi-

[26] Among his killed were Gens. James E. Rains (Missouri), and Roger W. Hanson (Kentucky); and Cols. Moore, 8th Tenn., Burks, 11th Texas, Fisk, 16th La., Cunningham, 28th Tenn., and Black, 5th Ga. Among his wounded were Gens. James R. Chalmers and D. W. Adams.

[26] He says, in his report, that his men were "greatly exhausted" by the long contest and its privations—as if they were peculiar in that respect—when they had Murfreesboro' just behind them, with their dépôts and hospitals; while our troops had scarcely a roof to their heads—and that—

"The only question with me was, whether the movement should be made at once, or delayed 24 hours to save a few of our wounded. As it was probable that we should lose by exhaustion as many as we should remove of the wounded, my inclination to remain was yielded."

[27] Dec. 31.

[28] Crossing the Tennessee at Clifton, Dec. 13.

cations, simultaneously with Forrest's doings in West Tennessee, passing the left of Rosecrans's army, rode into the heart of Kentucky; and, after inconsiderable skirmishes at Glasgow, Upton, and Nolin,[29] pressed on to Elizabethtown, which he took, after a brief, one-sided conflict, capturing there and at the trestlework on the railroad, five or six miles above, several hundred prisoners, destroying[30] the railroad for miles, with a quantity of army stores. He then raided up to Bardstown, where he turned[31] abruptly southward, being threatened by a far superior force; retreating into Tennessee by Springfield and Campbellsville; having inflicted considerable damage and incurred very little loss.

But his raid was fully countered by one led[32] about the same time by Brig.-Gen. H. Carter (formerly Col. 2d Tennessee) from Winchester, Ky., across the Cumberland, Powell's, and Clinch mountains, through a corner of Lee county, Va., to Blountsville and Zollicoffer (formerly Union Station), East Tennessee, where 150 of the 62d North Carolina, Maj. McDowell, were surprised and captured without a shot, and the railroad bridge, 720 feet long, over the Holston, destroyed, with 700 small arms and much other material of war. Pushing on ten miles, to Clinch's Station, Carter had a little fight, captured 75 prisoners, and destroyed the railroad bridge, 400 feet long, over the Watauga, with a locomotive and several cars; returning thence by Jonesville, Lee county, Va., recrossing the Cumberland range at Hauk's Gap; and, after two or three smart skirmishes, returning in triumph to his old quarters; having lost but 20 men, mainly prisoners—and killed or captured over 500. Having been ridden all but incessantly 690 miles, with very little to eat, many of his horses gave out and were left to die on the return.

Gen. Wheeler, in chief command of Bragg's cavalry, 4,500 strong, with Forrest and Wharton as Brigadiers, passing Rosecrans's army by its right, concentrated his forces at Franklin, and pushed north-westward rapidly to Dover, near the site of old Fort Donelson, which our Generals had seen no reason to repair and occupy. But he found[33] Dover held by Col. A. C. Harding, 83d Illinois, with some 600 men fit for duty; his battery and one or two companies being absent; but Harding proved the man for the exigency. He at once sent across to Fort Henry for assistance, and dispatched a steamboat down the Cumberland for gunboats; at the same time throwing out and deploying his men so as to impede to the utmost the advance of the Rebels, and opening upon them so soon as they came within range, with a 32-pounder and 4 brass guns, which were all he had. Thus fighting with equal energy and judgment, he repelled alternate charges and invitations to surrender until dark, though nearly surrounded and pressed from both sides by his assailants, who, with reason, confidently expected to capture him. In their last charge, the Rebels lost Col. McNairy, of Nashville, who fell while vainly endeavoring to rally his men. No relief arrived from Fort Henry till next morning; but the gunboat

[29] Dec. 24. [30] Dec. 28. [31] Dec. 30. [32] Dec. 20. [33] Feb. 3, 1863.

Fair Play, Lt. Fitch, leading four others, all of them convoying a fleet of transports up the river, had been hailed 24 miles below by Harding's messenger, and incited to make all speed to the rescue. Harding was still holding his ground firmly, though nearly out of ammunition—having lost one of his guns and 45 out of 60 artillery horses—when, at 8 P. M., the Fair Play arrived, and considerably astonished the Rebels by a raking fire along their line. The other gunboats were soon on hand, and doing likewise, but to little purpose; since the Rebels had taken to their heels at the first sound of guns from the water, leaving 150 dead and an equal number of prisoners behind them. Harding estimates their wounded at 400, and makes his own loss 16 killed, 60 wounded, and 50 prisoners. Wheeler, as if satisfied with this experience, returned quietly to Franklin.

Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, with his division of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, under Col. Minty, had been sent[34] westward by Rosecrans, as if to intercept Wheeler on his way southward. He captured 141 of Wheeler's men, including two Colonels; but returned[35] to Murfreesboro' without a fight and without loss.

Gen. P. H. Sheridan next made[36] a similar demonstration southward, nearly to Shelbyville, then turning north-westward to Franklin; having two or three skirmishes with inferior forces, under Forrest and Van Dorn, who fled, losing in all about 100, mainly prisoners; while our loss was 10. Sheridan returned to Murfreesboro' after an absence of ten days.

Meantime, Van Dorn had dealt us a skillful blow at Spring Hill, 10 miles south of Franklin, and 30 from Nashville, whither Col. John Coburn, 33d Indiana, had been dispatched from Franklin, with 2,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and a light battery, simultaneously with Sheridan's advance from Murfreesboro'. Before reaching Spring Hill, his advance was contested; and, on the morning of the next day,[37] he was assailed by a far superior force, by which he was in the course of the day all but surrounded; and, after fighting until his ammunition was exhausted, was compelled to surrender his remaining infantry, 1,306 in number. His cavalry and artillery, having run away in excellent season, escaped with little loss. Van Dorn's force consisted of six brigades of cavalry and mounted infantry.

A fortnight later, Col. A. S. Hall, 105th Ohio, with four regiments, numbering 1,323 men, moved nearly east from Murfreesboro', intending to surprise a Rebel camp at Gainesville; but he missed his aim, and was soon confronted by a regiment of hostile cavalry; before which, Hall slowly withdrew to the little village of Milton, 12 miles north-east of Murfreesboro', taking post on Vaught's Hill, a mile or so distant; where he was assailed[38] by a superior Rebel force, under Gen. Morgan. But his men were skillfully posted, supporting a section of Harris's 19th Indiana battery, which was admirably served, and doubtless contributed very essentially to Morgan's defeat, with a loss of 63 killed and some 200 or 300 wounded, including himself. Hall's entire loss was but 55.

Franklin, being occupied by a

[34] Jan. 31. [35] Feb. 13. [36] March 4. [37] March 5. [38] March 20.

Union force of 4,500 men, under Gen. Gordon Granger, Van Dorn, with a superior force, assailed,[39] with intent to capture it; but was easily beaten off, with a loss of 200 or 300, including 80 prisoners; our loss being 37 only.

A few days later, Maj.-Gen. J. J. Reynolds pushed out,[40] with his division and two brigades of cavalry, to McMinnville; whence he drove out Morgan, taking 130 prisoners, destroying a large amount of Rebel stores, and returning[41] without loss.

Col. Watkins, 6th Kentucky, with 500 cavalry, surprised[42] a Rebel camp on the Carter's creek pike, 8 miles from Franklin; capturing 140 men, 250 horses and mules, and destroying a large amount of camp equipage.

Col. A. D. Streight, 51st Indiana, at the head of 1,800 cavalry, was next dispatched[43] by Rosecrans to the rear of Bragg's army, with instructions to cut the railroads in northwestern Georgia, and destroy generally all dépôts of supplies and manufactories of arms, clothing, &c. Having been taken up the Tennessee on steamboats from Fort Henry to Eastport, Ala., where he was joined by an infantry force under Gen. Dodge, they attacked and captured Tuscumbia, inflicting considerable loss on the Rebels; and, while Gen. Dodge made a sweeping raid through North Alabama, returning ultimately to his headquarters at Corinth, Col. Streight struck for Northern Georgia, expecting to swoop down successively on Rome and Atlanta, destroying there large manufactories, machine-shops, and magazines. He was hardly well on his road, however, before Forrest and Roddy, with a superior force of Rebel cavalry, were after him; following sharply, and easily gaining upon him, through a running fight of over 100 miles; when, his ammunition being exhausted and his men nearly worn out, Streight surrendered, when 15 miles from Rome. His men were treated as other captives and exchanged; while Streight and his officers were retained for a time in close prison, on a demand of Gov. Brown, of Georgia, that they be treated as felons, under a law of that State, which makes the inciting of slaves to rebellion a high crime. The specific charge was that negroes were found among their men in uniform and bearing arms; which was strenuously denied: the few negroes with them being claimed as servants of officers; and the only one who was armed insisting that he was carrying his employer's sword, as an act of duty. After a long confinement, Streight, with 107 other of our officers, escaped[44] from Libby Prison, Richmond: 60 of them, including Streight, making their way to our lines. He estimates his loss in killed and wounded during this raid at 100, including Col. Hathaway, killed; and puts the Rebel loss at five times that number. He surrendered, in all, 1,365 men.

[39] April 10. [40] April 20. [41] April 26. [42] April 27. [43] April 29. [44] Feb. 9, 1864.

XIV.

OPERATIONS AGAINST VICKSBURG.

Vicksburg, on the lower Mississippi, about midway between Cairo and its mouth, was the natural center and chief citadel of the Slaveholders' Confederacy. Located on an almost unique ridge of high, rolling land adjoining the great river, surrounded by the richest and best cultivated Cotton region in America, whereof the slave population considerably outnumbered the free, it had early devoted itself, heart and soul, to the Rebel cause. Its natural strength and importance, as commanding the navigation of the great artery of the South-west, were early appreciated; and it was so fortified and garrisoned as to repel—as we have seen[1]—the efforts of our fleets and expeditions, which, after the fall of New Orleans and that of Memphis, assailed it from below and from above respectively and conjointly. Being the chief outlet for the surplus products of the State of Mississippi, connected with Jackson, its capital, 44 miles east, by a railroad, and thus with all the railroads which traverse the State, as also with the Washita Valley, in northern Louisiana, by a railroad to Monroe, while the Yazoo brought to its doors the commerce of another rich and capacious valley, Vicksburg, with 4,591 inhabitants in 1860, was flourishing signally and growing rapidly until plunged headlong into the vortex of Rebellion and Civil War.

Both parties to the struggle having early recognized its importance—Jefferson Davis, in a speech at Jackson, having in 1862 pronounced it indispensable to the Confederacy that the control of the Mississippi should not be surrendered to Federal power—fresh preparations to "repossess" it were early set on foot among the Union commanders above. Gen. Grant's department of West Tennessee having been so enlarged[2] as to include Mississippi, he at once commenced preparations for an advance; transferring,[3] soon after, his headquarters from Jackson to Lagrange; whence he pushed out[4] Gen. McPherson, with 10,000 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, under Col. Lee, to Lamar, driving back the Rebel cavalry. At length, all things being ready, Grant impelled[5] a movement of his army down the great Southern Railroad from Grand Junction through Holly Springs to Oxford; our cavalry advance, 2,000 strong, being pushed forward to Coffeeville, where it was suddenly confronted and attacked by Van Dorn,[6] with a superior infantry force, by whom it was beaten back three miles, with a loss of 100 men.

Grant was, with his main body, still at Oxford, preparing to move on to Jackson and Vicksburg, when Van Dorn struck[7] a damaging blow at his communications. The railroad having by this time been repaired and operated to Holly Springs, that village had been made our temporary dépôt of arms, provisions, and munitions, which had here been accumu-

[1] See pages 57 and 101. [2] Oct. 16, 1862. [3] Nov. 4. [4] Nov. 8. [5] Nov. 28. [6] Dec. 5. [7] Dec. 20.

lated, while the railroad farther south was being repaired, to such an extent that they were estimated by the enemy as worth at least $4,000,000. The post was in charge of Col. R. C. Murphy, 8th Wisconsin, who had over 1,000 men under his command; while bales of cotton and barrels of flour by thousands proffered the readiest means of barricading its streets and keeping out ten times his force, until it could be reduced by heavy guns and regular approaches, or at least consumed by volleys of shells.

Grant had warned Murphy of his danger the night before, and did not imagine his capture a possibility; but no preparation had been made for resistance, no street barricaded; not even our men posted to resist an assault; when, at daybreak, Van Dorn burst into the town with his wild cavalry, captured the imbecile or traitorous wretch who should have defended it, and burned all but the little plunder his men were able to carry off, including a large hospital full of our sick and wounded soldiers, which his Adjutant had promised to spare. Our cavalry (2d Illinois) refused to surrender, and cut their way out by a resolute charge, in which they lost but 7 men, disabling 30 Rebels. Murphy filled up the measure of his infamy by accepting paroles, with his men; so as to prevent their recapture and relieve the enemy of the trouble of guarding them. The Rebels claim* to have captured and paroled 1,800 men and 150 officers; but this must include the sick and wounded whom they found in the hospital. Two locomotives and 40 or 50 cars were among the property destroyed; the Rebels coming prepared with cans of spirits of turpentine to hasten the conflagration: the burning arsenal blowing up, at 3 P. M., with a concussion which shattered several buildings, while 20 men were wounded by flying balls and shell. The Rebels left at 5, after a stay of ten hours, which they had improved to the utmost: thence proceeding to assail, in rapid succession, Coldwater, Davis's Mill, Middleburg, and Bolivar, farther north; but, though the defenders of each were fewer than Murphy might have rallied to his aid at Holly Springs, each was firmly held, and the raiders easily driven off. Murphy, it need hardly be added, was dismissed from the service in a stinging order† by Gen. Grant—said order "to take effect from Dec. 20th, the date of his cowardly and disgraceful conduct."

Grant had seasonably dispatched 4,000 men by rail to the relief of Holly Springs—or rather, to guard against the possibility of its capture, so vital was its importance; but they were stopped midway by some obstruction on the track, and only arrived two hours after the enemy had departed.

Thus, by the baseness of one miscreant, were not only 2,000 men and

* *Richmond Dispatch*, Jan. 15, 1863.

The enraptured writer elsewhere says:

"The scene was wild, exciting, tumultuous. Yankees running; tents burning; torches flaming; Confederates shouting; guns popping; sabers clanking; Abolitionists begging for mercy; 'Rebels' shouting exultingly; women, *en dishabille*, clapping their hands, frantic with joy, crying, 'Kill them! kill them!'—a heterogeneous mass of excited, frantic, frightened human beings—presented an indescribable picture, adapted to the pencil of Hogarth."

And again:

"The ladies rushed out from the houses, wild with joy, crying out: 'There's some at the Fair Grounds: chase them! kill them! for God's sake!'"

† Dated Holly Springs, Jan. 8.

several millions' worth of property sacrificed, but the fair promise of an important expedition utterly blighted. By the loss of his stores and trains, Grant was completely paralyzed, and compelled to fall back to Grand Junction: thence moving westward to Memphis, so as to descend by the river to Vicksburg.

Gens. A. P. Hovey and C. C. Washburne, with some 3,000 men, had crossed [10] the Mississippi from Helena simultaneously with Grant's advance; taking post near the head of Yazoo Pass, capturing a Rebel camp, and moving down the Coldwater and Tallahatchie rivers, with intent to rëenforce Grant; but this was now frustrated, and their force recalled to the Mississippi.

The day after the Holly Springs disaster, Gen. W. T. Sherman had left Memphis with the Right Wing of the "Army of the Tennessee"—some 30,000 strong—on boats which passed down the Mississippi and 12 miles up the Yazoo to Johnston's Landing, where the troops were debarked," and a general assault was made next day on the well-manned fortifications and batteries which defended Vicksburg on the north. The ground between the Yazoo and the precipitous bluffs whereon the Rebels were fortified, is agreeably (to alligators) diversified by 'swamps,' 'sloughs,' 'lagoons,' and 'bayous;' and is in the main a profound mire, resting on quicksand. 'Chickasaw Bayou,' connecting the two rivers, is its most salient feature; but much of it had been a cedar swamp, or boggy thicket, whereof so much as lay directly in front of the Rebel defenses had been transformed into abatis, covering rifle-pits. Unknown to Sherman, Grant's recoil from Oxford had liberated the Rebel army previously confronting him; which had forthwith been apprised [12] of the cloud gathering on the Mississippi. Gen. Pemberton, who was in chief command at Grenada, had at once faced about; and, three days later, having definite advices that Sherman's gunboats had reached the mouth of the Yazoo, he began to send his men southward by rail; following himself next day. Thus, expeditious as were Sherman's movements, most of the Rebel forces in all that region, except Van Dorn and his cavalry, were on hand to resist him.

Sherman's army was uniquely Western; and, with the West, the rëopening of the Mississippi was an absorbing passion. It was brave, well officered, and ably commanded; while Com. Porter's gunboats were ready to render it every assistance that gunboats could; it encountered none of those unforeseen, fortuitous mischances, against which even Genius is impotent, and Valor fruitless; it fought superbly, and piled the earth with its dead and wounded; yet it failed, simply because such defenses as it was required to assail are, when fairly armed and manned, absolutely impregnable to simple assault. They may be overcome by regular approaches; they may be mastered by the surprise of some unguarded but vital point; they *must* yield at last to famine, if closely and persistently invested; but to hurl column after column of infantry upon them is simple, useless slaughter.

[10] Nov. 20. [11] Dec. 26. [12] Dec. 21.

Yet this nowise impeaches the generalship of Sherman, who could not tell what they were, nor who were behind them, until he had given them a trial.

Let us condense the painful details:

Gen. Sherman was quite aware of the natural strength of the Rebel line of defense, and that the labor of thousands of slaves had for months been devoted to its increase, by the digging of trenches and rifle-pits, the planting of batteries, felling of trees for abatis, &c., &c. But, he reasoned, that line is at least 15 miles long, from Vicksburg to Haines's Bluff; there are but about 15,000 men behind it, which is but 1,000 to the mile; and it must be that a series of vigorous attacks will develop some point whereon an instant and overwhelming superiority of numbers can be made to tell. And so it would, had not the bayous, lagoons, and swamps—but more especially Chickasaw bayou—so protected the entire Rebel front that there were but four points at which it could be reached from the Yazoo; and these were so covered and enfiladed by hostile batteries, rifle-pits, &c., that approach was all but certain destruction. The knowledge of this impregnability was one of the costly lessons of the war.

During the 26th and 27th, our men were debarked without resistance, on the south bank of the Yazoo; and, being formed in four columns, gradually pushed forward, driving back the enemy's pickets, toward the frowning bluffs southward. During the ensuing night, the ground and obstacles in our front were carefully reconnoitered, and found even more difficult than rumor had made them. Chickasaw bayou was conclusively ascertained to be passable but at two points—one a narrow levee; the other a sand-bar—each completely commanded by the enemy's sharp-shooters, who were thoroughly covered by their rifle-pits and other defenses; while batteries, trenches, and rifle-pits rose, tier above tier, up the steep bluffs beyond, which were crowned by still heavier batteries. And Gen. Steele, whose division, except Blair's brigade, had been debarked above the junction of the bayou with the Yazoo and the cypress swamp and slough beyond, on advancing next day,[18] found his progress barred by an impassable swamp, traversed only by a long corduroy causeway, so thoroughly swept and enfiladed by Rebel batteries and rifle-pits that he could hardly hope to take across it half the men who made the attempt; which he properly declined, and was justified by Sherman in so doing.

Meantime, Gen. Geo. W. Morgan's division had advanced, under cover of a dense fog and the fire of its artillery, against the center of the Rebel defenses: reaching the bank of the bayou where it runs nearest to the bluffs, whereby its progress was completely arrested; but it held its ground through the ensuing night.

Gen. Morgan L. Smith's division simultaneously advanced over less favorable ground, considerably to the right; its leader being disabled before noon by a sharp-shooter's bullet through his hip, while reconnoitering; when his command devolved on Gen. David Stuart. A narrow

[18] Dec. 28.

sand-spit crossed the bayou in front of this division; but it was so swept and enfiladed by Rebel batteries and rifle-pits, while a difficult abatis forbade egress therefrom on the enemy's side, that to attempt its passage was certain destruction. Nevertheless, Stuart made his dispositions, and was ready to tempt the desperate hazard so soon as Morgan should do likewise.

Still farther to the right was A. J. Smith's division, whereof Burbridge's brigade arrived about noon on the 27th; having been dispatched[14] from Milliken's Bend by Sherman to break up the (uncompleted) Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad at the Tensas river, burn several long bridges and trestles, and destroy the cotton, corn, &c., there held for the Confederacy—an order which it had thoroughly obeyed. It was now pushed forward to the bayou, with instructions to cannonade the Rebel defenses opposite, while its infantry should hastily construct rafts and cross; A. J. Smith's 2d (Landrum's) brigade holding a key position to the right and rear, having its pickets pushed forward into the abatis in front, with Vicksburg in plain view on its right.

During the ensuing night, Steele's division was reëmbarked and brought around to the right of the junction of the bayou with the Yazoo, so as to connect closely with Morgan's left; and, all being in readiness, Sherman—having heard nothing as yet of the Holly Springs disaster, though disappointed at the lack of cöoperation, or even of tidings, from Grant, being aware that the Rebels in his front were being constantly strengthened, and that time was on the side of his enemy—ordered a general advance and assault.

Morgan, being well forward, was expected to cross the bayou first, and carry the batteries and heights directly before him; but it was noon before he was ready; and, by this time, Frank Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were fully abreast of him and ready to go in; Steele's remaining (Hovey's) brigade being close behind them.

Blair's brigade had been debarked between Morgan's and M. L. Smith's divisions; but, in advancing, it had obliqued to the left, crossing the track of Morgan's division, detaching, by order, two regiments to support his batteries; working its way to the extreme front of Morgan's left, and crossing the Chickasaw bayou in Steele's van, where both banks were covered by tangled abatis, and where the bayou presents a quicksand bed 300 feet wide, containing water 15 feet wide by 3 deep. Through this, Blair led his brigade fairly across, leaving his horse floundering in the quicksand, while he carried two lines of rifle-pits beyond, under a deluge of shot and shell from front and flanks, which struck down a third of his command; among them Col. T. C. Fletcher,[15] 31st Missouri, who, being wounded, fell into the hands of the enemy; while his Lt.-Col., Simpson, was also wounded, and his Major, Jaensen, was killed. Lt.-Col. Dister, 58th Ohio, was also killed here. Col. J. B. Wyman, 13th Illinois, had fallen the day before.

De Courcy's brigade of Morgan's division charged on Blair's right; while Thayer, with the 4th Iowa (his other regiments having been

[14] Dec. 21–22.

[15] Since chosen Governor of Missouri.

misdirected), also shared in the peril and glory of the assault. But what could valor—the valor of half-a-dozen regiments—avail against such impediments? Pemberton had been rëenforced, during the 27th, by three fresh brigades from Grenada; and more were constantly coming in. His rifle-pits were filled with sharp-shooters, whose every bullet drew blood; his gunners had the range of the ford, such as it was, and poured grape and canister into our dauntless but momently decimated heroes, who could not advance, and were stung by the consciousness that they were dying in vain. They fell back, by De Courcy's order, quite as rapidly, though not so proudly, as they had advanced: the 17th and 26th Louisiana, by a charge on their flank, capturing 4 flags, with 332 prisoners, and gathering up 500 small arms.

Morgan, who had endeavored to throw a pontoon across, had ordered Col. Lindsey, with his own, Sheldon's, and two regiments of Thayer's brigade, to advance simultaneously with Blair and De Courcy, and ford the bayou farther to the right; but Lindsey failed to execute the order: reporting the narrow point at which the bayou was here fordable covered by a masked battery.

On our right, the 6th Missouri, in A. J. Smith's advance, likewise went forward at noon, and crossed the bayou on a narrow sand-bar; but they found the bank so steep and so thoroughly swept by the enemy's rifles, that they could not force an ascent, but crouched under the bank, occasionally fired down upon by some eager sharp-shooter, till after dark; when they were withdrawn; having lost but 14 killed and 43 wounded. But Blair's brigade alone lost 636 men this day; Thayer's, 111; Morgan's division, 875; Stuart's brigade, 55: total (including that of the 6th Missouri), 1,734: so that this attempt on Vicksburg can not have cost us less than 2,000 men; while Pemberton reports his casualties at only 63 killed, 134 wounded, and 10 missing: total, 207.

Sherman was baffled, but would not give it up. During the rainy night which followed, our men stood or lay without fire in the swamp bordering the execrated bayou, while their leader visited Admiral Porter on board his flag-boat and concerted new efforts. Next day,[16] he scrutinized his own and his enemy's position, and became satisfied that the Rebel lines could not be broken. But might they not be turned? He proposed to the Admiral a combined demonstration against the batteries on their extreme right, upon Drumgould's Bluff, some miles farther up the Yazoo; the Admiral to approach and bombard them, while 10,000 choice troops should attempt to carry them by assault: the residue of our army distracting the enemy's attention by menacing his front nearer Vicksburg with a fresh attack.

Porter, as ever, lent a prompt and hearty cöoperation; and the troops were accordingly embarked:[17] the gunboats being directed to move at midnight slowly and silently up the Yazoo to Drumgould's Bluff; at 4 A. M., engage and silence the Rebel batteries there; then the troops to disembark, storm the bluff and hold it, while cannonades, attacks, and alarms along the bayou, were to pre-

[16] Dec. 30.

[17] Night of Dec. 31.

vent the sending of Rebel rëenforcements to the vital point. The batteries carried, our whole army was to be hurried thither and solidly established on the bluff; thence taking all the remaining defenses in flank or in reverse, and fighting its way on equal terms along the heights into Vicksburg.

Steele's division and one brigade of M. L. Smith's were accordingly embarked; and Sherman, who had left them at midnight, had, by 4 A. M., every man at his post, listening for the sound of Porter's guns; but no sound came. At daybreak, a line from Steele apprised the General that the fog on the river had been so dense that the Admiral had been unable to move; so that the enterprise must be postponed to the next night. But, when the next night came, it was bright moonlight, rendering the proposed attack quite too hazardous; while each hour's delay must inevitably increase the sad probability that the enemy would divine, or at least suspect, what was meditated, and prepare to render the purposed assault more costly than that of the 29th. The swamp wherein our men were encamped would be drowned by the next heavy rain; there were already ominous rumors afloat, which every thing tended to confirm, that Grant had fallen back, leaving the Rebels free to concentrate 40,000 men at Vicksburg; there was no use in staying: so Sherman resolved to go; and, by sunrise next morning,[18] he had every thing on board, and was on the point of starting for Milliken's Bend; when he was apprised by Admiral Porter that an officer, his senior in rank, had arrived; to whom he accordingly turned over the command.

John A. McClernand, of Illinois, —a "political General," according to the West Point classification—was the coming man. He had been for years a Democratic Representative in Congress of some note, but had hitherto won no distinction in the field. Having been dispatched from Memphis by Gen. Grant to Vicksburg, he, on his arrival, acquiesced in Sherman's decision to return to Milliken's Bend, where he formally assumed[19] command, and at once addressed himself to the execution of a purpose which he had formed while on his way down the river.[20] This was the reduction of Fort Hindman, otherwise known as *The Post of Arkansas*, 50 miles from the Mississippi; where a settlement had been made by the French in 1685, on the first high ground reached in ascending from the great river; eligibly situated in a fertile and productive, though swampy, region, and commanding the navigation of the important river whose name it bears. It had been fortified by the Confederates, having a parapet 18 feet across and a ditch 20 feet wide by 8 deep, with strong casemates, a banquette for infantry, and a cordon of rifle-pits. But its guns were too few and light, and their powder inferior; so that Gen. T J. Churchill, who commanded, had never a chance to hold it, with his garrison of hardly 5,000,[21] against the army that now advanced for its reduction —54 regiments in all—which, though doubtless sadly wasted by the bloody campaigns of 1862, must—to say nothing of the fleet—have numbered more than 20,000 men—probably

[18] Jan. 2, 1863. [19] Jan. 4. [20] Dec. 30. [21] But 3,000 effectives, he reports.

25,000 to 30,000. Directly after assuming command, Gen. McClernand moved up White river 15 miles, to the cut-off; thence across (8 miles) into the Arkansas,[22] and up to Notrib's farm, three miles below the Fort; where his land forces were all debarked by noon of next day; by which time, our gunboats had shelled the enemy's sharp-shooters out of their rifle-pits along the levee, and were soon furiously bombarding the Fort. And now our soldiers, under Gens. Sherman, Morgan, Steele, D. Stuart, A. J. Smith, and Osterhaus, were pushed up to and nearly around the Fort, despite the obstacles presented by bayous and miry swamps; our men lying on their arms that night, without fires or tents, and being in position for a general assault at 10½ next morning.[23] At 1 P. M., the gunboats reopened; and, half an hour later, the brigades of Hovey, Thayer, Giles A. and T. R. Smith, had crossed at double-quick the narrow space of open ground directly in their front, gaining partial shelter in a belt of woods from the heavy Rebel fire which here brought them to a temporary halt; when, supported by Blair's brigade, they charged up to within musket-range of the enemy's defenses, where they again found partial shelter in some ravines, skirted by bushes and fallen timber. Meantime, Gen. Hovey had been wounded by a fragment of shell, and Gen. Thayer had had his horse shot under him; but our gunboats and Gen. Morgan's batteries had covered the advance by a rapid fire, silencing a part of the enemy's artillery; Lt. Webster's and Blount's Parrott guns, with Hoffman's, Wood's, and Barrett's batteries, rendering efficient service; while Gen. A. J. Smith deployed nine regiments of Burbridge's and Landrum's brigades, supported by three more in reserve, and pressed back the Rebel right behind a cluster of cabins near his intrenchments, whence it was dislodged and driven in by a charge of the 23d Wisconsin, Col. Guppy. Following up his advantage, Smith pushed on his division until it was within 200 yards of the Fort, whence he sent McClernand word that he could almost shake hands with the enemy. By this time, Col. Sheldon, of Osterhaus's division, had sent up Cooley's battery on another face to within 200 yards of the enemy's lines, supported by the 118th and 120th Ohio, with the 69th Indiana in reserve; soon clearing the rifle-pits before them; when the 120th Ohio attempted to scale and carry by assault the east face of the Fort, but were stopped short of the fosse by an impassable ravine.

At 3¼ P. M., the guns of the Fort having been silenced by the fire of our far superior artillery, and Sherman's right having been strengthened by three regiments from Smith's division, McClernand ordered a general assault: when our men dashed forward, and—further resistance being hopeless—a white flag was raised from the ramparts, just as the 120th Ohio, leading the 83d Ohio and 16th Indiana, under Gen. Burbridge, were swarming over the intrenchments on the east, barely in advance of Sherman's and Steele's leading regiments on the north and west.

Churchill had received from Lt.-Gen. T. H. Holmes [Little Rock],

[22] Jan. 9.

[23] Jan. 11.

commanding in Arkansas, a telegraphic order to "hold on till help arrived, or *till all are dead*"—a piece of silly gasconade, which had no warrant in the proximity of a relieving force; but which he says he would have obeyed to the letter, had not "several white flags" been raised, "to my great surprise," by the 24th Texas (dismounted) cavalry. He had no right to be surprised, nor even vexed, if it had really been his intention to subject his men to useless butchery. They had fought with signal gallantry and resolution, so long as hope remained; he admits that the "Fort had now been silenced about an hour, most of the field-pieces being disabled;" and that his men had "nothing to rely upon now save their muskets and bayonets," against an enemy whose ample artillery was still efficient, who had mastered their defenses, and whose numbers were several times their own. Yet he says he had still a "great hope" to keep our whole army "in check till night; and then, if reenforcements did not reach me, to cut my way out;" and trusts "that the traitor who raised the white flag"—(he had already stated that there were "several" such)—"will yet be discovered, brought to justice, and suffer the full penalty of the law." Such swagger had for years diffused an impression that the Southrons were less brave than they were proved by the stern ordeal of battle.

Churchill reports his loss at not exceeding 60 killed, and 75 to 80 wounded, and thinks ours was from 1,500 to 2,000. McClernand reports his spoils at "5,000[34] prisoners, 17 guns, 3,000 small arms, beside large quantities of munitions and commissary stores." He makes his losses—killed, 129; wounded, 831; missing, 17: total, 977. Having dismantled the Fort, destroyed whatever was combustible that he could not take away, and forwarded his prisoners to St. Louis, he rëembarked,[35] pursuant to orders from General Grant, and returned to Milliken's Bend; having meantime sent an expedition, under Gen. Gorman and Lt.-Com. Walker, up the White river, which captured Des Arc and Duval's Bluff, without resistance.

Gen. Grant having rëorganized and refitted at Memphis his more immediate command, personally dropped down the Mississippi on a swift steamer and met[36] McClernand, Sherman, and Porter, near the mouth of White river, on their return from their triumphant incursion into Arkansas, accompanying them to Napoleon, where consultations were held, and a plan of action agreed on. McClernand's force moved down the Mississippi next day; somewhat impeded by a violent storm; but reached, on the 21st, Young's Point, nine miles above Vicksburg, on the opposite bank, facing the mouth of the Yazoo. Here was the head of the canal projected and partly opened, months before, by Gen. Williams,[37] intended to secure a passage up and down the Mississippi for our vessels,

[34] *The Missouri Republican* has a letter from an eye-witness, dated Arkansas Post, January 12, who makes them 4,500—all of them, but 1,000, from Texas—and adds:

"Of the entire force garrisoning the Fort, 1,000—mostly Texas cavalry—escaped, taking with them a great portion of the baggage. These effected an exit on the night our forces were surrounding the place, and before it could be fully accomplished."

[35] Jan. 17. [36] Jan. 18. [37] See page 101.

out of the range of the Vicksburg batteries, and perhaps change the main channel of the mighty river so as to leave Vicksburg on a bayou two or three miles back from that channel. Here our men were debarked,[28] and work on the canal recommenced; while Grant's corps was brought down on transports to their aid, and Porter's fleet strengthened by several additional iron-clads and gunboats. Gen. Grant arrived and assumed chief command Feb. 2d.

Williams's engineers had located their embryo canal unwisely. At its head, a strong eddy set the current away from the bank, rendering difficult the coaxing of a large body of water into it if it were completed; while its lower terminus was commanded by the batteries of Vicksburg—a serious drawback upon its prospective usefulness. Still, it was judged expedient to complete this, rather than commence a new one; and the river was rising so fast, under the stimulus of incessant rains (which by no means increased the attractiveness to our soldiers of digging up the mire and tough clay), that it was confidently expected soon to obliterate all traces of our engineering blunders. As there was daily increasing peril that it would drown out our camps, compelling our men to rëembark, the excavated earth was all thrown up on the west side, forming an embankment in front of our camps, between them and Vicksburg. Thus the work was proceeding vigorously and hopefully, when[29] the swelling flood of the Mississippi —now eight feet above the bottom of the canal—broke over the precautionary dam erected across its head, and at once poured in a flood which filled the embryo internal improvement in a few minutes, burying myriads of implements, and constraining the diggers to run for their lives. Several regiments, quartered in exposed positions, were obliged to move their tents and furniture with remarkable celerity; while some companies were isolated from our main body, and had to be ferried across the new lagoon to rejoin it. The embankment of the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad arrested the progress of the inundation northward; and our soldiers stationed below were required to move their tents to the ground above that embankment. And now, after some days' consideration and hesitating effort, it was decided that the canal was an abortion—the Father of Waters having paralyzed it by his veto; while the batteries of Vicksburg frowned grimly, defiantly as ever.

Ere this, Gen. Grant—having more hands than work—had had a channel cut from the Mississippi, some 40 to 50 miles above, into Lake Providence; whence there was a continuous water-way, through bayous Baxter and Macon, into the Tensas, and thus into the Mississippi far below Vicksburg, as also into the Washita and Red rivers; while another side-cut, leaving the great river near Milliken's Bend, communicated, through a net-work of bayous and connecting streams, with the eastern (shorter) branch of the Tensas, and thence, through a similar net-work, regained the lower Mississippi near New Carthage. This one had actually been made so far available, by the help of dredge-boats, that a small

[28] Jan. 22.

[29] March 8.

steamer and several barges had passed through it; when the rapid fall[30] of the river closed it for the season.

A third and more determined effort to flank the defenses of Vicksburg was made on the east side of the Mississippi, by way of the 'Yazoo Pass;' which, leaving the great river a little below Helena, flows through Moon Lake into the Coldwater, and down this stream into the Tallahatchie, which, uniting with the Yallobusha, forms the Yazoo.

Brig.-Gen. L. F. Ross, with a division of Gen. McClernand's corps from Helena, and the 12th and 17th Missouri, of Sherman's corps, headed this expedition, some 5,000 strong, which included the large gunboats Chilicothe and De Kalb, five smaller ones, and eighteen transports, under the command of Lt. Watson Smith. The passage through the levee of the Mississippi having been considerably enlarged, our vessels in succession boldly entered on the narrow, tortuous, but now headlong current, which bore them under a gigantic, overarching forest, into Moon Lake, and thus onward to the Coldwater. So constant and formidable were the obstacles encountered, in the shape of abrupt turns, fallen trees, inadequate depth, and sturdy limbs that swept away smoke-stacks and other standing fixtures, that three days were required for this transit, though the distance was barely twelve miles. Of course, the Rebels, who were fully and constantly posted, did not diminish these impediments, but were prone to aggravate them.

Proceeding[31] down the Coldwater, the obstacles to be overcome were changed rather than diminished. The channel was a little wider, but hardly less crooked, while its current was sluggish; the impulse gained from the Mississippi having been lost by a diffusion of the water over the swamps and bottoms on either side. Two mortar-boats here overtook the flotilla; and the mouth of the Coldwater was at length reached: our vessels having experienced some damage to rudders, wheels, and other works, but having encountered no serious resistance from the enemy; and with no vessel sunk or disabled.

Moving down the Tallahatchie, to a sharp easterly bend ten miles above its junction with the Yallobusha, the expedition was brought[32] to a stand, just above the little village of Greenwood.

Maj.-Gen. W. W. Loring had been dispatched[33] from Jackson to the Yazoo to bar any access by our forces to the valley of that river; and, having hastily studied its configuration and that of its chief tributaries, had chosen this as the point most favorable for resistance. The meeting streams approach within a mile, two or three miles above their junction; receding directly afterward. Loring, with his engineer, Maj. Meriwether, had obstructed the Tallahatchie by a raft,[34] with an old steamboat sunk behind it, and thrown a line of defenses, composed of cotton-bales and earth, across the neck of the peninsula; its best guns,

[30] April 10 to 25. [31] March 2.
[32] March 11. [33] Feb. 17.
[34] Loring reports that this raft had not been completed when our fleet arrived. *The New York Tribune* correspondent with the expedition says Lt. Smith's invincible lack of resolution and energy, and manifest indifference, retarded, by several days, the arrival of our vessels at this point, and was the true cause of our utterly needless failure.

of course, trained upon the approach down the Tallahatchie, which a bend just here rendered as difficult and perilous as could be.



YAZOO REGION.

The Chilicothe, Lt. Foster, first attempted to pass; when the Rebel battery opened, and a 32-pound shell struck her turret, slackening her speed; and she soon backed around the bend until only her bow protruded; when she renewed the cannonade with her heavy bow-guns, and received one or two more shots, which did her no essential harm. An hour of this satisfied her, and she backed completely out of the fight; when the De Kalb came forward and fired away for two hours: then she, too, gave it up; leaving the Rebel works essentially intact.

The next day was devoted by Ross to erecting a land battery in front of the Rebel lines, under cover of woods; Loring withholding his fire on it to economize his scanty ammunition. At 10 next morning,[35] both gunboats renewed the bombardment, aided by our land battery. During the day, one of the Chilicothe's shells tore through the enemy's parapet, knocking out a cotton-bale, and igniting a tub of cartridges beside the Whitworth gun; whereby Lt. Waul, serving it, was wounded, and 15 of his men burned — some of them badly. Other damage was done; but the Rebels worked throughout the ensuing night, repairing and strengthening their works. Our fire was renewed for a short time next day; and the day after was devoted on both sides to fortifying.

Next morning,[36] the attack was renewed with spirit on our side; but the Chilicothe was soon hulled by an 18-pound shot from the enemy's rifled Whitworth gun, which entered one of her port-holes, striking and exploding a shell, whereby 14 men were killed or severely wounded. The Chilicothe then drew out of the fight; and, though it was kept up till sunset by the De Kalb and our land batteries, it was plainly of no use: so Ross, next morning, concluded to give it up, and return by the way he came; which he did unmolested. Brig.-Gen. J. F. Quinby, of McPherson's corps, joined[37] him

[35] March 13. [36] March 16. [37] March 21.

and assumed command on his retreat. Quinby now returned to the ground just abandoned before the defenses; but had scarcely done so when he received[39] an order from Grant to withdraw the expedition; which he forthwith obeyed, returning to the Mississippi unmolested.

Admiral Porter, having reconnoitered the country directly eastward of the Mississippi from Steele's bayou, just above Milliken's Bend, and listened to the testimony of friendly negroes, informed[40] Gen. Grant that a devious route, practicable at that stage of water for lighter iron-clads, might be found or opened thence into the Sunflower, and so into the Yazoo below Yazoo City, but above Haines's Bluff; whereupon, Grant decided to attempt it. Ascending[41] with Porter, in the ram Price, pioneered by several other iron-clads, through Steele's bayou to Black Fork or bayou, which makes across from Steele's into Deer creek, Grant, finding their way constantly impeded by overhanging trees, hurried back to Young's Point for a pioneer corps; but was soon advised by Porter that there was more serious work ahead; when Sherman was sent with a division; most of which was debarked at Eagle Bend, on the Mississippi, and thence marched across to the bayou (Steele's), here but a mile from the river—much of the distance being now under water, and requiring to be bridged or corduroyed before it could be passed. And such was the height of the water in the bayous and streams that our boats could with difficulty be forced through the branches of the trees which thickly overlaced those narrow water-courses; so that they were severally scraped clean of everything above their decks when they had been wearily driven and warped up the bayou and across Little Black Fork into Deer creek, up that stream to Rolling Fork, and across into the Sunflower; down which they floated almost to the Yazoo; where their progress was finally arrested, and vessels and men obliged to retrace their toilsome, devious way to the Mississippi.

Col. C. R. Ellet, commanding the ram Queen of the West, having the gunboat De Soto and a coal-barge in company, ran[42] the Vicksburg batteries without injury, and thence steamed down to the mouth of Red river, thence raiding[43] down the Atchafalaya to Simmsport; thence returning to the Red, and going up that river to a point 15 miles above the mouth of the Black, where he captured the steamboat Era, with 4,500 bushels of corn; thence ascending the Black and Washita to Gordon's Landing, where his treacherous pilot, Garvey, ran the Queen ashore, just as she was opened on from the bank by a Rebel battery, which soon shot away her lever and escape-pipe, then cut in two her steam-pipe, filling her with scalding steam, and compelling Ellet and his crew to abandon her—she being wholly disabled and impotent—escaping on cotton-bales, and reaching the De Soto, which was just below. Going down the river, the De Soto was run into the bank and lost her rudder; when she and her barge were scuttled and burnt; Ellet and his crew taking refuge on the Era, throwing overboard her corn. Con-

[39] March 23. [40] March 14. [41] March 15. [42] Feb. 10. [43] Feb. 12.

tinuing down the river, well aware that the Rebels would soon be after them, the traitor Garvey was installed as pilot, and soon contrived to run the Era hard aground also, just after reaching the Mississippi—she drawing two feet water, and the shallowest of these rivers being now good for at least thirty. Ellet, by the time she was with difficulty got off, appears to have suspected that Rebels were not the safest pilots for National war vessels; though he does not seem to have shot the scoundrel, or done any thing else but intimate that his style of piloting was not approved. Four armed boats were sent down after him, but turned back by their leader, the Webb, unexpectedly meeting our heavy iron-clad Indianola, which they did not choose to encounter; so the Era made her way up to the station just below Vicksburg; receiving, by the way, salutes that meant mischief from Grand Gulf and Warrenton.

The Indianola, Lt.-Com'g. Brown, was one of our finest iron-clads: 174 feet long by 50 broad, with five boilers, seven engines, thoroughly shielded, and armed with two 11-inch and two 9-inch guns. Leaving the mouth of the Yazoo, she had drifted[43] nearly by Vicksburg undiscovered; and the batteries finally opened on her had done her no harm whatever. Keeping on down, she was just in season, as we have seen, to shield Ellet and the Era from probable capture; and she now swept proudly down the river, expecting to drive all before her.

After blockading for some days the mouth of Red river, which she did not enter for want of pilots, she was returning up the Mississippi; and, when nearly opposite Grand Gulf, encountered[44] the Rebel ram Webb, as also the captured Queen of the West (which had somehow been repaired so as to be serviceable), with two other less formidable gunboats, in all mounting ten heavy guns, and manned by several hundred men. These attacked her with such energy and skill, mainly by butting her with their rams, while they danced about her, dodging her shots, that she was soon disabled; having been rammed for the seventh time by the Webb, and now directly in her stern, which was completely stove in. Being in a sinking condition, she was surrendered and immediately run ashore.

Farragut being away on the Gulf coast, the Rebels had now the mastery of the river between Vicksburg and New Orleans—a mastery which they soon lost by a Yankee trick. A worthless coal flat-boat, fitted up, covered, and decorated by Porter, with furnaces of mud and smoke-stacks of pork-barrels, to counterfeit a terrible ram, was let loose[45] by him, unmanned, above Vicksburg; and floated down by the batteries, eliciting and surviving a tremendous cannonade. The Rebels in Vicksburg hastened to give warning of this fearful monster to the Queen, lying under their batteries at Warrenton, eight miles below; whereupon, the Queen fled down the river at her best speed. The Indianola was now undergoing repairs near the point where she was captured; and word was sent from Vicksburg that she must be burned at once to save her from the monster's clutches. A few hours later, when it had been discovered that they had been thrown into

[43] Night of Feb. 13. [44] Feb. 24, 9½ P. M. [45] About Feb. 24.

hysterics by an old coal-boat, fresh word was sent that they had been sold; but, ere this arrived, the Indianola had been blown to splinters—not even her priceless guns having been saved. The Webb now escaped up the Red river; leaving our supremacy on the Mississippi once more undisputed and unbroken.

Admiral Farragut, commanding below Vicksburg, having applied to Admiral Porter for iron-clads and rams to operate against certain small but formidable Rebel iron-clads and rams which held possession of Red river, the rams Switzerland, Col. Chas. R. Ellet, and Lancaster, Lt.-Col. John A. Ellet, were prepared for running the Vicksburg batteries; which they attempted[46] to do; but with ill success. Instead of being started in due season, it was daylight when they came under the Rebel fire; whereby the Lancaster was sunk and the Switzerland badly cut up. The latter succeeded in passing. Of several frailer vessels, which from time to time made the venture, two or three were sunk; the residue mainly went by unscathed.

Months had now flitted since our earlier attempts on Vicksburg—months of fitful but costly effort to reduce that Rebel stronghold, which was only stronger and haughtier than ever. Gen. Grant—long since convinced that it could not be successfully assailed from above, unless we had full control of the Yazoo, for which he had so persistently but vainly struggled—now decided on an entirely new line of operations—turning Vicksburg on the south, and assailing her from the east rather than the west. It was in pursuance of this plan that he had so abruptly ordered a discontinuance of and withdrawal from the various expeditions looking to the control of the valley of the Yazoo, and the capture or destruction of the thirty Rebel steamboats employed on that river or laid up near Yazoo City. All being at length prepared, and the Winter overflow of the Mississippi so far abated that the so-called roads of that region were no longer generally under water, but only beds of the profoundest and softest black mud, Gen. McClernand, with his (13th) corps, was impelled[47] down the west bank of the great river to New Carthage; McPherson following directly with his (17th) corps; each moving no faster than it could be accompanied by its trains. The roads were so inconceivably bad that the advance was inevitably laborious and slow. The river-bank, being higher than the country back of it, the march was mainly along the levee; of course, under constant observation from the Rebel pickets and scouts across the river.

When our van was barely two miles from New Carthage, it was stopped by a break in the levee, through which the waters of the Mississippi were pouring out into the bayou Vidal, forbidding approach to the village, which was temporarily transformed into an island. After boats had been collected to effect a crossing of the upper break, it was found that the process would not only be tedious but would have to be repeated below. Grant now decided to march around the bayou, avoiding New Carthage, and striking

[46] Night of March 24–25.

[47] March 29.

the Mississippi at Perkins's, 12 miles farther, or 35 from his base at Milliken's Bend. And now the lack of transportation on the river below Vicksburg, dictated a still farther march down to Hard Times, opposite, but rather below, Grand Gulf; extending the distance traversed from Milliken's Bend to 70 miles.

Meantime, Commodore Porter, at the suggestion of Gen. Grant, had made preparation for running the batteries of Vicksburg with his iron-clads, followed by three transports; and the experiment was made [48] with fair success. The gunboats Benton, Lafayette, Price, Louisville, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Tuscumbia, and Mound City (all iron-clads but the Price), floated silently down the current, under cover of thick darkness, for nearly an hour; and their crews were beginning to infer that the Rebels had, for some reason, concluded not to assail them; when—just as they were fairly opposite the city—fire was opened on them from the up-stream batteries, and in a moment the whole bluff was ablaze with the flashes, and quaking to the roar, of heavy guns, rising tier above tier along the entire water-front of the city. The fleet promptly responded with grape and shrapnel, firing at the city rather than the batteries, and went by unharmed; opening upon the Warrenton batteries, as it neared them, so furious a cannonade that they scarcely attempted a reply. The passage of the gunboats was thus triumphantly effected; but of the three transports—Forest Queen, Henry Clay, and Silver Wave—which attempted to follow, under cover of the smoke, the first-named was hulled by a shot, and received another through her steam-drum, disabling her; yet she floated out of range, and, being taken in tow by a gunboat, went through without further damage; while the Silver Wave ran the gauntlet entirely unscathed; but the Clay was struck by a shell which set her protecting cotton-bales on fire, just as she had been stopped to prevent a collision with the crippled Queen; when her panic-stricken crew launched her yawl and made for the shore, leaving their vessel to float down the river in flames till she burned to the water's edge and sunk—a total loss. We had one man killed and two wounded by a shell on board the Benton, but lost none beside, on either gunboats or transports.

Gen. Grant now ordered six more transports to be sent down, towing and partially shielded by twelve barges laden with forage. Five of the transports made [49] the venture in safety; but the Tigress received a shot below her water-line which disabled her, so that she drifted helplessly down and sank near the Louisiana bank, some distance below. Of the barges, three, with five of the transports, were soon made ready for further usefulness.

The effective Rebel force in the States bordering on the Mississippi being now mainly engaged in the defense of Vicksburg and the Yazoo valley, Grant had determined to retaliate one of the destructive cavalry raids of Morgan, Forrest, and Van Dorn. To this end, Col. B. H. Grierson, with a cavalry brigade, 1,700 strong, composed of the 6th and 7th Illinois and 2d Iowa, starting [50] from Lagrange, Tennessee, swept rapidly

[48] Night of April 16. [49] Night of April 22. [50] April 17.

southward, through Ripley, New Albany, Pontotoc, Clear Spring, Starkville, Louisville, Decatur, and Newton, Miss.—thus passing behind all the Rebel forces confronting and resisting Grant—until, having passed Jackson, he turned sharply to the right, and made his way W. S. W. through Raleigh, Westville, Hazlehurst, and Gallatin, to Union C. H., back of Natchez; thence zigzagging by Bogue Chito to Greensburg and Clinton, La., and so to Baton Rouge;[81] having traversed more than 600 miles of hostile territory in 16 days; crossing several considerable rivers by ferriage, burning great numbers of railroad bridges, trestles, cars, and dépôts of supplies, having several smart engagements with Rebel forces hastily gathered to obstruct his progress, killing or wounding about 100 of them, beside capturing and paroling over 500 prisoners, and destroying 3,000 stand of arms, at a total cost of 27 men, including Lt.-Col. Blackburn, 7th Illinois. Col. Grierson sent back, after he was fairly on his way, the 2d Iowa, as also 175 of the least effective men of his remaining regiments; so that this brilliant raid was actually made with less than 1,000 men. It was a succession of forced marches, sometimes without rest for 48 hours; often through drenching rain, over long stretches of swamp, so completely submerged that no road could be discerned; so that, in crossing one swamp, eight miles wide, on the Okanoxubee, near Louisville, no less than twenty fine horses were drowned. Grierson proved himself eminently fitted for his place, as did Col. Prince, of the 6th, and Lt.-Col. Loomis, 7th Illinois, and their subordinates. Detachments necessarily made to the right and left to destroy Rebel supplies or mislead pursuers—of whom thousands were sent after him. from Jackson, Vicksburg, and other points—were frequently compelled to ride 60 miles per day of these horrible roads in order to regain the main body—which, during the 28 hours preceding its arrival at Baton Rouge, had marched 76 miles, enjoyed four fights, and forded the Comite river where it was necessary to swim many of the horses. Grierson's conclusion that the Confederacy was a mere shell, which needed but to be fairly pierced to demonstrate its rottenness, was justified by his experience; but a leader less able, alert, wary, untiring, and courageous, would have found that shell far easier to enter than to emerge from.

All being at length ready,[82] Gen. Grant directed a naval attack on the batteries of Grand Gulf; which was gallantly made by Admiral Porter, with his gunboat fleet. But five hours of mutual cannonade, during which our larger boats were often within pistol-shot of the Rebel batteries, brought no decisive advantage to our arms. The enemy's fortifications were strong; many of their guns planted on the bluffs at too great an elevation to be effectively assailed from the water; the hill-sides were lined with rifle-pits; beside which, they had field-guns which could be moved from point to point, and so concentrated wherever they could be most effective to prevent a landing or defeat an assault. After watching the cannonade from a tugboat from 8 A. M. to 1 P. M.,

[81] May 2.

[82] April 29.

Grant decided against its further prosecution; having determined to debark his troops now on shipboard, and march still farther down the Louisiana bank, to a point opposite Rodney; while the gunboats and transports should run the Grand Gulf batteries, as they had run those of Vicksburg and Warrenton, and be ready to cross his army at a point where little resistance was anticipated. Accordingly, at dark, our gunboats again engaged the batteries, while our transports ran by them; receiving but two or three shots, which did them no essential harm.

Finally, having learned from a negro that there was a good road from the little hamlet of Bruinsburg, half way down to Rodney, running back to Port Gibson, in the rear of Grand Gulf, the General decided to cross at this point; and, by daylight next morning,[55] both gunboats and transports were ferrying over the 13th corps; our soldiers, so fast as landed, taking three days' rations in their haversacks, and pushing out on the road to Port Gibson, followed by the 17th corps.

Meantime, Gen. Sherman, with the 15th corps, had been left above Vicksburg, expecting to follow on the track of the 13th and 17th, until he received[54] a letter from Gen. Grant, near Carthage, depicting the badness of the roads, and directing him to remain where he was for the present. Two days later, Grant wrote him that he proposed to attack Grand Gulf next day, and suggesting a simultaneous feint on the Rebel batteries near Haines's Bluff. Sherman accordingly embarked Blair's division on ten steamboats, and proceeded[56] to the mouth of the Yazoo, where he found Capt. Breese, with the iron-clads Black Hawk, Choctaw, and De Kalb, and several wooden boats, all ready, with steam up; and they at once ascended the Yazoo, stopping for the night at the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, and moving up next morning to within range of the Haines's Bluff batteries, which were engaged for four hours by our iron-clads and the Tyler—the enemy replying with spirit; but, though the Tyler was hit once, and the Choctaw repeatedly, none of our men were seriously hurt. Toward evening, Blair's division was debarked in full view of the enemy, and seemingly prepared to assault; our gunboats thereupon renewing their fire and provoking the enemy to reply. Thus the menace of an assault was maintained till after dark; when our troops were quietly rëembarked. Next day, equally threatening demonstrations were made, accompanied by reconnoissances on all sides; meanwhile, orders were received from Grant to desist from the feint and hurry the whole corps forthwith to Grand Gulf.

Sending orders to the divisions of Steele and Tuttle to march southward at once, Sherman kept up the feint till after nightfall; then quietly dropped down the Yazoo to Young's Point; and next morning[56] Blair's division moved up to Milliken's Bend, to remain there as a garrison till relieved by fresh troops from above; while Steele's and Tuttle's hurried down the west bank of the Mississippi to Hard Times, where they were ferried across,[57] and were

[55] April 30. [54] April 26. [56] April 29–10 A. M. [56] May 2. [57] May 6 and 7.

pushed forward 18 miles next day, to Hankinson's Ferry.

Grant's advance, under McClernand, first encountered the enemy [60] when eight miles out from Bruinsburg; but the Rebels were not in force, and fell back unpursued till morning; when McClernand advanced, and, when approaching PORT GIBSON, was resisted with spirit by a Rebel force from Vicksburg, under Maj.-Gen. Bowen; the country being broken into narrow ridges, separated by deep ravines, which afforded great advantage to the defensive. Our superiority in numbers being decisive, however, they were steadily driven; Grant finally sending up J. E. Smith's brigade of McPherson's corps to the support of our left, under Osterhaus; when, late in the afternoon, the enemy was defeated with heavy loss, and pursued toward Port Gibson. Our loss was 130 killed, 718 wounded. We captured 3 guns, 4 flags, and 580 prisoners. Night soon closed in, and our troops slept on their arms till morning; when it was found that the enemy had retreated across Bayou Pierre, burning the bridge behind them, abandoning Port Gibson, and evacuating Grand Gulf, as our army advanced [61] in its rear to Hankinson's Ferry on the Big Black, skirmishing and taking some prisoners, mainly stragglers, but not seriously resisted.

Gen. Grant now rode across to Grand Gulf, with a small escort of cavalry, to make arrangements for changing his base of supplies from Bruinsburg to this point, while his army awaited the arrival of wagons, provisions, and Sherman's corps; meantime, scouts were busy and reconnoissances employed in obtaining information of the enemy.

Grant had expected to remain some time at Grand Gulf, accumulating provisions and munitions, while he sent a corps down the river to cooperate with Gen. Banks in the reduction of Port Hudson; but the information here obtained dictated a change in his plans—Banks not having yet invested Port Hudson. Accordingly, his army was pushed forward [60] on two parallel roads up the left bank of the Big Black: McPherson on that nearest the river; McClernand on the higher, or ridge road; while Sherman's corps, divided, followed on each; all the ferries on the Big Black being watched to guard against a surprise from the enemy, who had taken care to burn the few bridges.

Thus advancing, our army encountered no serious resistance until its van, under McPherson, then moving on Clinton and Jackson, was encountered,[61] near RAYMOND, by two Rebel brigades, under Gen. Gregg, who had taken a good position, with two batteries, commanding the road in our front, having his infantry posted on a range of hills to the right of the road, and in the timber and ravines just in front. The fight here was a short one. The Rebels opened it with great fury, attempting to charge and capture De Golyer's battery, which was in position on our front, but, being repulsed by a terrific fire of grape and canister, they broke and fled precipitately, so that McPherson had scarcely begun the fight when it was ended; the Rebels fleeing at full speed through Raymond, which our troops occupied at 5 P. M. Only Lo-

[60] May 1-2 A. M. [60] May 3. [60] May 7. [61] May 12.



VICKSBURG AND VICINITY.

gan's division, now numbering less than 6,000, was seriously engaged on our side; but Crocker's division came up just after the battle was won by the advance of Stevenson's brigade, and a splendid charge with fixed bayonets by the 8th Illinois, Lt.-Col. Sturgis. The enemy had previously been strongest in the numbers engaged, and had fought stubbornly; charging to turn the left flank of Dennis's brigade, which was in advance, and of which the 20th Ohio, 23d Indiana, and 20th Illinois fought desperately and suffered severely. Our loss in this affair was 69 killed (including Col. Richards, 20th Illinois, who fell at the head of his regiment, and Maj. Kaga, 20th Ohio), 341 wounded, and 32 missing: total 442. The Rebels lost 103 killed, with 720 wounded and prisoners.

We took prisoners from ten different regiments; and Johnston reports that Gregg's force numbered 6,000. Here McPherson and Logan were constantly under fire; the latter having his horse shot twice. McPherson's generalship and dash elicited the admiration of our soldiers.

McPherson pushed on next morning[82] to Clinton, which he entered unopposed at 2 P. M., and commenced tearing up the railroad thence toward JACKSON; Gen. Sherman advancing simultaneously on the direct road from Raymond to Jackson. McPherson's march was resumed at 5 A. M. next day;[83] and, at 9 A. M., when five miles from Jackson, the enemy's pickets were driven in; and, proceeding 2½ miles farther, their main body was encountered in strong force, under Gen. W. H. T. Walker, whose command consisted partly of South Carolina and Georgia troops, which had only arrived the evening before. A tremendous shower occurred while McPherson was making his dispositions, which delayed his attack for an hour and a half. At 11 A. M., the rain having nearly ceased, our soldiers advanced, preceded by a line of skirmishers, who were soon exposed to so heavy a fire that they were recalled to their regiments, when an order to charge was responded to with hearty cheers. Our whole line swept forward in perfect array, driving the enemy out of the ravine which covered their front, and up the hill whereon their batteries were posted; when, without having checked our momentum, they broke and fled precipitately, eagerly followed for a mile and a half, till our infantry was within range of the guns forming the defenses of Jackson; when McMurray's and Dillon's batteries were brought up and poured a deadly fire into the routed masses of the foe. Here our troops were halted and our lines reformed, while skirmishers were thrown out and officers sent forward to reconnoiter: these soon reported the capital of Mississippi evacuated; and, at 4 P. M., the flag of the 59th Indiana was waving over the dome of the State House; Sherman's command about this time entering the city from the south-west.

McPherson's loss in this collision was 37 killed, 228 wounded and missing; while that he inflicted on the enemy amounted, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to 845. Our captures in Jackson included 17 pieces of artillery; while railroads, manufactories, and army stores, were extensively destroyed.

Grant was in Jackson directly after its capture; and, after giving orders to Sherman for the thorough destruction of its railroads, military factories, and stores, directed McPherson to retrace his steps next morning[84] to Clinton, following himself in the afternoon; impelling McClernand's corps westward next morning[85] upon Edwards's Station; while Sherman, having finished his work at Jackson, was ordered to evacuate that city and rejoin him so soon as might be; for Grant had learned in Jackson that Gen. Jo. Johnston, who had just arrived in our front and assumed[86] immediate command of the Rebel forces in this quarter, had ordered Pemberton to march out from Vicksburg and assail our rear: the Rebels routed in Jackson having fled northward from that city, as if intending

[82] May 13. [83] May 14. [84] May 15. [85] May 16. [86] May 13.

to form a junction with Pemberton at some point on the Big Black, above the railroad. It was, therefore, Grant's business and purpose to prevent this conjunction by meeting and beating Pemberton before it could be effected. At 5 A. M.,[67] Grant learned that Pemberton's force consisted of 80 regiments, with 10 batteries of artillery, probably numbering in all about 25,000 men,[68] now eagerly advancing with intent to fall unexpectedly on his rear; and he resolved to anticipate the delivery of this blow. Pushing forward Blair's division toward Edwards's Station, he directed McClernand to follow, with that of Osterhaus; McPherson, with his entire corps, following directly.

Pemberton was in position near Edwards's Station, when he received[69] a dispatch from Johnston suggesting —he says not ordering—a combined attack on McPherson, then at Clinton, and called a council to consider the proposition. After hearing its advice, he decided to attack next morning; but was delayed by the swollen condition of a branch of Baker's creek till afternoon; when he advanced four or five miles, and took up a strong position on CHAMPION HILLS, southward of the railroad, and about midway between Jackson and Vicksburg. Here he received, next morning,[70] a note from Johnston, directing him to move northward, so as to form a junction with his own shattered forces, most of which had so recently been driven out of Jackson. Pemberton thereupon ordered his trains sent back toward the Black, and would have followed with his army, but it was too late; Gen. Hovey's division, of McClernand's corps, being now close upon him, and the rest of McClernand's, followed by McPherson's corps, rapidly coming up.

Gen. Grant now reached the front, and found Hovey's skirmishers close to the enemy's pickets, while his troops were rapidly coming into line, and might, had they been strong enough, have opened the battle at any moment. The enemy in their front held a very strong position on a narrow ridge, with his left resting on a height, where the road toward Vicksburg made a sharp turn to the left, with the crest of the ridge and his left flank covered by a dense forest. McPherson's corps, except Ransom's brigade, soon came up, and was thrown to the right, so as to threaten the enemy's rear. Still, our numbers on the field were inadequate, and Grant forbade an attack until he could hear from McClernand, who was advancing with two divisions, from Bolton Station on our right, but on parallel roads which converged two miles east of Edwards's Station. But, while Grant was thus impatiently listening for the sound of McClernand's guns, and sending him orders to push forward rapidly, the firing between Hovey's and the Rebel skirmishers gradually grew, by 11 A. M., into a battle; and—since a single division could not long resist two or three times its numbers —one brigade and then another of Crocker's division was sent in to Hovey's support; while McPherson's other division, under Logan, was working effectively upon the enemy's left and rear, essentially weakening his efforts in front. McClernand's remaining divisions failed to arrive at the front,

[67] May 16. [68] A Rebel report says 17,500. [69] May 14. [70] May 16.

however, until after the enemy had been driven with heavy loss from the field; Logan's division having penetrated so nearly to the road leading to Vicksburg as to cut off Loring's division from Pemberton, and compel it to retreat deviously southward, evading our left, and narrowly escaping capture, by the sacrifice of all its guns; thus reaching Jackson on the 19th.

The credit of this victory devolves mainly on Hovey and his heroic division, which was for hours closely engaged with superior numbers strongly posted and well covered by the dense forest, who fought gallantly, and repeatedly crowded back our line by the sheer weight of that opposing it. When his infantry had thus been crowded back from the ridge they had carried by desperate fighting, and compelled to abandon 11 Rebel guns they had taken, Hovey massed his artillery, strengthened by Dillon's Wisconsin battery, on elevated ground at his right, and opened on the advancing foe an enfilading fire that arrested and turned them back, under a tempest of cheers from our boys. The loss of this single division was 211 killed, 872 wounded, and 119 missing: total, 1,202—about one-third of its force, and nearly half our entire loss in the battle. But McPherson's corps fought, so far as it had opportunity, with equal gallantry, and was handled with equal skill; Stevenson's brigade making a brilliant charge across ravines, up a hill, and through an open field, capturing seven guns and several hundred prisoners, and thus gaining the road in the Rebel rear, which cut off Loring's retreat, and compelled him to escape as he could.

Before the Rebel defeat was decided, Hovey having repeated his call for reënforcements, Grant ordered McPherson to advance whatever of his corps was still disposable by the left to the enemy's front; and, proceeding himself to observe this movement, he discovered that the Rebels were in full retreat. On reaching the Raymond road, he saw Carr's and then Osterhaus's division of McClernand's corps, well advanced on the left, and ordered them to pursue the enemy with all speed to the Black, and, if possible, across that river. This pursuit continued till after dark; resulting in the capture of a train of cars loaded with provisions and munitions, but very little else;[11] though the Rebels lost considerably in munitions and stores, which they were obliged to abandon to the flames.

Sherman's corps had no part in this engagement, being still on its way from Jackson when it closed; and Ransom's brigade of McPherson's corps only arrived after the enemy had retreated. As but three divisions of McClernand's corps were even constructively present, it is morally certain that this action was fought by fewer men on our side than on that of the Rebels.

Grant reports our loss in this desperate struggle at 426 killed, 1,842 wounded, and 189 missing: total,

[11] Grant evidently blames McClernand for lack of energy in this battle; though he says:

"The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion Hills, or Baker's creek, was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps and Logan's and Quinby's divisions (the latter commanded by Brig-Gen. M. M. Crocker) of McPherson's corps."

2,457. The Rebels lost quite as heavily in killed and wounded, some 2,000 prisoners, 15 or 20 guns, with thousands of small arms, &c. Among their killed was Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, of Maryland.

Next morning,[72] the pursuit being renewed, the enemy were found strongly posted on the Black, with a bold, wooded bluff directly at the water's edge on the west side, while on the east, an open, cultivated bottom, nearly a mile broad, has a bayou of stagnant water, ten to twenty feet wide and two to three feet deep, to the east of it. This had been made to serve as a wet ditch, with a line of rifle-pits behind it; and here Carr's division was stopped two or three hours, until Lawler, commanding his right brigade, discovered a way of approach whereby it could be successfully assaulted, and ordered a charge, which was gallantly made; but the volley which was fired by the enemy at close range as his command rushed across the level, open ground, down to the bayou, taking our column in flank, swept down 150 of our men. None faltered nor turned back, however, nor even stopped to fire till they were all across the bayou; when, pouring in a deadly volley, without waiting to reload, they swept on with fixed bayonets, leaving the Rebels, who had not yet found time to reload, no choice but surrender. Gen. Osterhaus, who with his division had come up on our left, was here wounded by a fragment of shell.

Beside the railroad bridge, Pemberton had constructed an army bridge over the Black, composed mainly of three steamboats; across which, all his men who could reach it fled, leaving 18 guns, 1,500 prisoners, several thousand stand of arms, and large quantities of commissary stores, to fall into the hands of the victors, whose entire loss here was but 29 killed, and 242 wounded. But the bridges were of course burned by the fugitives; and the deep river, with its forest-covered western bluff lined with sharp-shooters, baffled our advance for hours. Our only pontoon train was with Sherman, now on his way to Bridgeport, several miles farther up; and our attempts to force a passage, under cover of a fire of artillery, were baffled until after dark; when the Rebels, aware that they would be flanked if they attempted to remain here, fell back to the friendly shelter of the fortifications of Vicksburg.

Floating bridges having been constructed here and three miles above, during the night, the passage of both McClernand's and McPherson's corps commenced at 8 A. M.;[73] Gen. Sherman crossing simultaneously on his pontoons at Bridgeport, and pressing on to within 3½ miles of Vicksburg; when, turning to the right, he took possession, unopposed, of Walnut Hills and the banks of the Yazoo adjacent. McPherson, striking into Sherman's road, followed it to the point where the latter had obliqued to the Walnut Hills, where he halted for the night; while McClernand, advancing on the direct highway from Jackson nearly to Vicksburg, swayed to the left, so as to cover the roads leading into that city from the south-east; so that by next morning the investment of the doomed city was substantially complete; while

[72] May 17.

[73] May 18.

Porter, who had returned to the Yazoo on the 16th, now rëopened communication hence with Grant and Sherman, sending them much needed provisions, and prëparing to attack the batteries on Haines's Bluff, which the enemy had begun [74] to evacuate, and which, on the appearance of our gunboats, they ran away from, leaving guns, forts, munitions, tents, and equipage of all kinds, to fall into our hands. It would hardly be credited on other testimony than his own," that our Admiral proceeded to destroy this inestimable material of war, with full knowledge that Grant's triumphant army, more especially Sherman's corps, were at hand to defend and utilize it.

The fall of Haines's Bluff completely uncovered Yazoo City, in fact, the whole Yazoo Valley; and Porter at once dispatched Lt. Walker, with five gunboats, up the river. Walker reached Yazoo City at 1 P. M.;" finding the Rebel Navy Yard and vessels in flames, and the city ready to surrender. Among the vessels on the stocks was the ram Republic, 310 feet long by 75 wide; the Mobile, ready for plating, &c., &c. In the Navy Yard, were five saw and planing mills, an extensive machine-shop, beside carpenter and blacksmith shops, &c., &c. All of these that the Rebels had not already fired were burned by Walker, who found 1,500 Rebel sick and wounded in hospital and paroled them. He was ambushed " and fired on by 200 sharp-shooters at Liverpool Landing on his return, with a loss of 1 killed, 9 wounded; but encountered no other resistance.

An immediate assault on the landward defenses of Vicksburg was determined on by Grant, who apprehended an attack on his rear by Johnston, strongly rëenforced from Bragg's army, and who counted much on the demoralization of Pemberton's forces by their succession of defeats and disasters. Accordingly, after some reciprocal cannonading and sharp-shooting, a general assault was ordered at 2 P. M.;" which only resulted in an advance of the front of our several corps to a close proximity to the Rebel defenses. Blair's division of Sherman's corps alone planted its colors on their works; the 13th regulars, of Giles Smith's brigade, doing so at a cost of 77 out of 250 men; its leader, Capt. Washington, being among the mortally wounded. The 83d Indiana, Col. Spooner, and the 127th Illinois, Col. Eldridge, likewise carried the outer slope of the Rebel earthworks, and held their ground till night, firing at any head that appeared above the parapet, but were unable to enter; while the regiments on either side of these, though they gained positions close up to the works, were even less successful. Sherman, seeing that they were here exposed to hourly

[74] On the 17th.

[75] He says, in his dispatch of May 20th to the Secretary of the Navy:

"The works at Haines's Bluff were very formidable. There are 14 of the heaviest kind of mounted 8- and 10-inch and 7½-inch rifled guns, *with ammunition enough to last a long siege.* As the gun-carriages might again fall into the hands of the enemy, *I had them burned, blew up the magazine, and destroyed the works generally.* I also burned up the encampments, which were permanently and remarkably well constructed, looking as though the Rebels intended to stay some time. Their works and encampments covered many acres of ground; and the fortifications and rifle-pits proper of Haines's Bluff extend about a mile and a quarter. Such a net-work of forts I never saw."

[76] May 20. [77] May 23. [78] May 19.

decimation to no purpose, ordered them, after dark, to fall back a short distance to a point where the irregularities of the ground afforded them comparative shelter and safety.

The two following days were devoted to bringing up and distributing provisions—the campaign in Mississippi having thus far been prosecuted on our part with scarcely a day's rations for three days' service: the country traversed being drawn upon for whatever it could afford: while roads were made, cannon planted, &c.; the enemy likewise improving the time to the utmost. And now Gen. Grant ordered a second and more determined assault at all points, to be made simultaneously at 10 A. M."[19]

At the moment named, our soldiers darted from under cover and rushed upon the Rebel works before them—their men all shielded by their breastworks, while ours were necessarily exposed to a close and deadly fire.

Sherman's attack was made by Frank Blair's division, led by the brigade of Gen. Hugh S. Ewing, 30th Ohio, with Giles Smith's and T. Kilby Smith's closely following; sharp-shooters skirmishing in the advance, and a storming party carrying boards and poles wherewith to bridge the ditch—five batteries concentrating their fire on the enemy's bastion constructed to command the approach.

In vain. The storming party had reached the salient of the bastion unassailed, and passed toward the sally-port, when there shot up behind the parapet, a double rank of the enemy, who poured on the head of the column a fire that swept it down in an instant. No troops could or should persist in braving such utter, useless destruction. The rear of the column attempted to rush on; but it was madness; and soon all had sought cover from that deadly fire.

Still, the assault was not abandoned; but, swerving to the left, Ewing's men, in the advance, crossed the ditch on the left face of the bastion, and, climbing up its exterior slope, planted their colors near the top, and burrowed in the earth for shelter from the flanking fire of the enemy; while Giles Smith's brigade, turning down a ravine, found cover, formed line, and threatened the parapet still farther to the left; Kilby Smith deploying his men on the off slope of a spur of hill, and keeping up, with Ewing's, a fire on any head that appeared above the parapet. Our artillery and infantry being still at work, our stormers easily held their ground; and, at length, Giles Smith's and Ransom's brigades attempted to carry the parapet by assault; but were repelled with loss.

Meantime, Steele's division, which had advanced half a mile farther to the right, was fighting desperately to little profit; yet, on the receipt of a dispatch from McClernand to Grant, announcing that his corps had carried three Rebel forts, Sherman ordered Tuttle to renew the assault on his left; and Mower's brigade was sent up where Ewing's had been repulsed. Mower did his best; and the colors of his leading regiment (11th Missouri) were planted beside those of Blair's storming party, and there remained till withdrawn after night-

[19] May 22.

fall; but no substantial success was achieved to balance the heavy loss.

Steele had like ill success in his attack; his men advancing across ravines and gullies to a point between the bastion and the Mississippi; whence they made their way, under a heavy fire, up to the parapet, which they failed to carry, but held possession of the hill-side beneath it till night; when they were withdrawn, like the rest.

The assault by McPherson's corps, in the center, was equally spirited and equally fruitless, save in carnage: our losses being probably tenfold those of the strongly fortified and thoroughly sheltered Rebels. Some ground was here gained in the assault; but it was mainly abandoned after dark.

On our left, McClernand's attack seemed for a time more effective, or, at least, was believed by him to be so. Rushing forward to the assault precisely at 10 A. M., Lawler's and Landrum's brigades had, within 15 minutes, carried the ditch, slope, and bastion, of the fort they confronted, which was entered by Sergeant Griffith and 11 privates of the 22d Iowa; all of whom fell in it but the Sergeant, who brought away 13 Rebels as prisoners. The colors of the 48th Ohio and 77th Illinois were planted on the bastion; and, within the next quarter of an hour, Benton's and Burbridge's brigades, fired by this example, had carried the ditch and slope of another strong earthwork, planting their colors on the slope; while Capt. White, of the Chicago Mercantile Battery, carried forward one of his guns by hand to the ditch, double-shotted it, and fired it into an embrasure, disabling a Rebel gun ready to be fired, and doubtless doing execution among its gunners.

McClernand supposed his assault successful, and reported to Grant that he had carried two of the Rebel forts; and again: "We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand;" at the same time asking for reënforcements. Grant, when he received the first dispatch, immediately ordered the assault on Sherman's front (where he then was) to be renewed; while he started back to his original position with McPherson in the center; which he had not reached when he received from McClernand the further message above cited; whereupon, though distrusting its accuracy, he ordered Quinby's division of McPherson's corps to report to McClernand; whose dispatches he showed to McPherson as an incitement to press the enemy in his front, so as to prevent a concentration against our left.

Nothing came of all this but aggravated losses—mainly on our side. McClernand's taking of the forts was after the well-known similitude of the captured Tartar: his men could get into them at the cost of not coming out again. Two hours later, he wrote again that: "I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts [which was partially true of his dead]; but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment, I am hard pressed." And that was the sum total of our progress in this quarter: the assault of Osterhaus's and Hovey's divisions, farther to our left, having been promptly repulsed by a deadly enfilading fire, which drove them to take shelter

behind a friendly ridge and remain there; while McArthur's division, which had been ordered by Grant to rëenforce McClernand, proved to be some miles distant, so that it did not arrive till next morning; and Quinby's two brigades came up, fully observed by the enemy, who correspondingly shifted their own forces. When these brigades came to hand, it was nearly dark; and Col. Boomer, commanding one of them, was killed as he led his men into action. Finally, at 8 P. M., our men were recalled from the more advanced and imperiled positions they had taken, leaving pickets to hold the ground solidly gained, wherever that was practicable; and our army sank to rest, having lost nearly 3,000 men in this wasteful assault—a third of them, Grant estimates, by reason of McClernand's mistake in supposing and reporting that he had carried two forts by his initial effort.[80]

Grant, in his report, gives the following excellent reasons for ordering this assault:

"I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, rëenforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly to succeed in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways: thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee; and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. It would have saved Government sending large rëenforcements, much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and *would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works.*"

He afterward adds:

"The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization.

"After the failure of the 22d, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now, being fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the 3d of July, when all was about ready for a final assault."

Vicksburg was now completely invested; for Porter's gunboats watched the river above and below to prevent any escape to or succor from the Louisiana side; with 13-inch mortars and 100-pounder rifled Parrotts mounted on rafts, anchored under the high bank, whence, entirely out of harm's way, they could

[80] The diary of a citizen of Vicksburg, who was a resident during the siege, gives the following account of this day's experiences within the city among civilians, who had only to consult their own safety:

"The morning of this day opened in the same manner as the previous one had closed. There had been no lull in the shelling all night; and, as daylight approached, it grew more rapid and furious. Early in the morning, too, the battle began to rage in the rear. A terrible onslaught was made on the center first, and then extended farther to the left, where a terrific struggle took place, resulting in the repulse of the attacking party. Four gunboats also came up to engage the batteries. At this time, the scene presented an awfully sublime and terrific spectacle—three points being attacked at once; to wit, the rifle-pits by the enemy in the rear; the city by the mortars opposite; and the batteries by the gunboats. Such cannonading and shelling has perhaps scarcely ever been equaled; and the city was entirely untenable, though women and children were on the streets. It was not safe from behind or before; and every part of the city was alike within range of the Federal guns. The gunboats withdrew, after a short engagement; but the mortars kept up the shelling, and the armies continued fighting all day. Several desperate charges were made in force against the lines without accomplishing their object. It would require the pen of a poet to depict the awful sublimity of this day's work—the incessant booming of cannon and the banging of small arms, intermingled with the howling of shells, and the whistling of Minié-balls, made the day truly most hideous."

throw shell into the city—some of them having a range of 3½ miles. We still held military possession of the peninsula opposite, which we had vainly tried to coax the Mississippi to cross; and a 3-gun battery on the levee annoyed the Rebel garrison, finally burning up their foundery, wherein they were casting shot and shell. The Cincinnati had been sunk[81] by the Rebel batteries; but there were five large gunboats left—two above and three below the town. And so, keeping a sharp lookout for an attack by Jo. Johnston on his rear, Grant sat down to digging his way into Vicksburg from the east, with a force not very much superior in numbers to that which he had so badly beaten at Champion Hills and the Big Black, and whose capture was now but a question of time. For Pemberton was notoriously short of both provisions[82] and ammunition —42,000 percussion caps having been smuggled in to him after the investment; yet he was ultimately reduced to ten per man. Of his 30,000 men, 6,000 were in hospital, sick or wounded, leaving probably not more than 15,000 thoroughly fit for duty. His hopes of relief were slender; for the Big Black in our rear, with the sharp, wooded ridges among which our besiegers were encamped, afforded strong defensive positions, which were carefully improved. The sheltering woods rendered our camps much cooler than the naked, dusty city; while the deep ravines gave birth to many welcome springs of cool, sparkling water. Thus our soldiers actually improved in health as they dug their way into Vicksburg; so that, while Grant could hardly have put 20,000 men into line of battle the day after the unlucky assault, he had many more effectives a month later; beside which, he had been rëenforced by Lauman's division, and by two others from Memphis, under Gen. C. C. Washburne, one drawn from Missouri, under Gen. F. J. Herron, and two divisions of the 9th corps, under Maj.-Gen. J. G. Parke.

Our first mine was sprung under a principal fort opposite our center, on the 25th, throwing down a part of its face: a bloody struggle following for its possession, in which we but partially succeeded. Three days later, another face of the same fort was blown off; and now the enemy were obliged to recede a little, constructing or strengthening other defenses behind it; and thus the siege went on—the rugged ground rendering tedious approaches unnecessary —and fort after fort being mined, while counter-mines were run by the enemy—the diggers of either army often hearing the sound of each other's picks, which gave token that only a thin screen of earth divided them.

Had it been essential to dig down those serried heights, which constituted the Gibraltar of the Rebellion, the work would doubtless have been done; but Famine mines more surely

[81] May 27.

[82] The diary of John W. Sattenwhite, 6th Missouri (Rebel), who fought throughout the siege, notes, under date of May 26: "We have been on half rations of coarse corn-bread and poor beef for ten days." June 1: "We are now eating bean-bread, and half-rations at that." June 3: "We are now eating half rations: bread, rice, and corn-meal mixed." June 10: "Our beef gave out to-day. We are now drawing one-quarter of a pound of bacon to the man." June 18: "Our rations changed: ½ pound of flour, ½ pound of bacon to the man: quite light."

and rapidly than any engineer. The harassed, shattered garrison could better fight on their ramparts than starve behind them. At length, after 45 days of isolation, Pemberton, hopeless of relief, and at the end of his resources, hung out a white flag [68] in front of Gen. A. J. Smith's division; and our men, sent forward to inquire as to its purport, were informed that Gen. Bowen and Col. Montgomery, of Pemberton's staff, bore a communication from their chief to Gen. Grant. Duly blindfolded, they were taken to Gen. Burbridge's tent, whence their message was communicated to our commander, and proved to be an application for an armistice, with a view to arranging terms of capitulation. Gen. Grant promptly responded, requiring an unconditional surrender; to which Bowen demurred, expressing a wish to converse with Gen. Grant. This was declined; but a willingness avowed to confer with Gen. Pemberton, if he wished, at such time as he should appoint. Pemberton accordingly named 3 P. M. of that day; at which time, the meeting took place: Pemberton being attended by Bowen and Montgomery; Grant by McPherson, Ord, Logan, and A. J. Smith, beside his staff. Pemberton required that his men should be paroled and marched beyond our lines with eight days' rations *drawn from their own stores* [they applied to our commissary for rations next day]; the officers to retain their private property and their body-servants. Grant heard all that they proposed, then broke up the conference, promising to send his answer before night; hostilities to remain suspended meantime. Accordingly, after conferring with his Major-Generals, Grant sent by Gen. Logan and Lt.-Col. Wilson the following letter:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEP'T OF TENNESSEE,
"NEAR VICKSBURG, July 3, 1863.

"Lt.-Gen. J. C. PEMBERTON, commanding Confederate forces, Vicksburg, Miss.:

"GENERAL: In conformity with the agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following propositions for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A. M. to-morrow. As soon as paroles can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines: the officers taking with them their regimental clothing, and staff, field, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them, and thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one. You will be allowed to transport such articles as can not be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and privates, as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles of these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.

"I am, General, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"U. S. GRANT, Major-General."

Pemberton responded as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG,
"July 3, 1863.

"Maj.-Gen. GRANT, com'ding U. S. forces:

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms for the surrender of this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have the honor to submit the following amendments; which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At 10 o'clock to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, and stacking them in front of my pres-

[68] July 3, 8 A. M.

ent lines—after which, you will take possession; officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected.

"I am, General, yours, very respectfully,
"J. C. PEMBERTON, Lt.-General."

Grant rejoined, declining to fetter himself by any stipulations respecting citizens and their effects, and insisting that officers should take but their private baggage and side-arms, with one horse each to mounted officers. Should these terms not be acceded to by 9 A. M., they would be regarded as rejected. Pemberton forthwith acceded; and, at 9 A. M., on the 'Glorious Fourth,' Gen. McPherson rode in to receive the stipulated surrender; meeting Pemberton half a mile within the lines, where they were soon joined by Grant; and all, after a few minutes' parley, rode together into town; while Gen. Logan was ordered to establish a provost-guard. At 11½, the National ensign was hoisted over the Court House, and "Rally round the flag" sung beneath it by a crowd of enthusiastic soldiers, who evidently thought that the National Anniversary needed an extra celebration in that city, whence it had for two years been excluded. By 3 P. M., our possession was complete; our vast fleet of rams, gunboats, transports, &c., stretched along the levee; and the Rebel soldiers, whose arms had been duly stacked in the morning, were looking sharply for the provisions which their own commissariat was unable to supply. After being duly paroled and supplied with three days' rations, they were escorted across the Big Black; thence taking their way to Jackson.

Gen. Grant reports his aggregate losses in this memorable campaign, from the day he landed at Bruinsburg till that of the surrender, at 943 killed, 7,095 wounded, and 537 missing: total, 8,575; of whom 4,236 fell before Vicksburg—most of them in the assault of May 22d. He adds:

"Of the wounded, many were but slightly wounded, and continued on duty; many more required but a few days or weeks for their recovery. Not more than one-half of the wounded were permanently disabled."

Of the enemy's losses, he says:

"The result of this campaign has been the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, among whom were fifteen general officers; at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and Green, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of stragglers, who can never be collected and reorganized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our hands; besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, etc.; and much was destroyed to prevent our capturing it."

Of course, the 37,000 prisoners claimed were not all captured with Vicksburg; but the number there paroled, including the sick and wounded, was reported at 27,000, of whom 15,000 only were fit for duty. This was the heaviest single blow ever given to the muscular resources of the Rebellion; and no other campaign of the war equals in brilliancy of conception and general success in execution that which resulted in the capitulation of Vicksburg.

Gen. Grant was fully aware, throughout the progress of the siege, that Jo. Johnston was behind him, using every exertion to raise an army strong enough to fall upon the besiegers with a rational hope of success. Hardly had the investment been completed, when, upon information that Johnston had crossed the

Big Black, near Canton, he directed[84] Gen. Sherman, with five brigades, to oppose his farther advance. Sherman moved accordingly; and, being afterward rëenforced, constructed a line of defenses from the Yazoo at Haines's Bluff to the Big Black, which could not have been carried even by a considerably larger force, save at a fearful cost. Johnston did not try it; but was operating farther down the Black, with probable intent[85] to cut his way through our left and form a junction with Pemberton south of the city, when the latter, apprehending an assault on the 4th, surrendered his famished forces. That surrender had barely been effected when Gen. Grant impelled all that remained with him of Sherman's and McPherson's corps to rëenforce Sherman on the Big Black; not even allowing the soldiers to enter the stronghold they had so hardly won. By 2 P. M. of the 4th, our columns were in motion; next evening, they had united with Sherman's former command, enabling him to cross the Big Black on the 6th with an army little less than 50,000 strong. His right, under Ord, crossed at the railroad; his center, under Steele, at Messenger's Ford, above; his left, under Parke, still higher up the river; the latter alone encountering no serious resistance. Thus advancing over a region already wasted by war, and now parched to sterility by a fierce drouth, which maddened men and animals with heat and thirst, covering all with blinding dust, our army pressed back Johnston into Jackson, forcing him to take refuge[86] within its intrenchments, wherein he was soon invested;[87] Sherman opening upon the city and its defenders a concentric fire with 100 heavy guns on the 12th; while our cavalry advance on either flank was pushed forward to Pearl river.

Johnston says he had but 24,000 men—sufficient to resist an assault, but not enough to meet Sherman's force in pitched battle with any hope of success. Our guns, planted on the adjacent hills, commanded every part of the town. A gleam of good fortune transiently irradiated his somber prospect; Gen. Lauman, misapprehending an order, having advanced his division so close to the Rebel works that it was uselessly torn to pieces by a fire which in a few moments bereft us of 500 men, of whom 200 were captured, with the colors of the 28th, 41st, and 53d Illinois.

It being evident that to remain was simply to court destruction, Johnston—apprised that heavy trains of ammunition were coming up from Vicksburg to Sherman, who had thus far been constrained to economize his cartridges—having sent away whatever he could—his railroad eastward being still open—evacuated

[84] June 22.

[85] Gen. Hugh S. Ewing reports that he caught, on the 3d, a spy attempting to force his way through his lines into Vicksburg, on the strength of a pass from one of our Generals; who, when searched, was found to have passes also from Rebel Generals, and who was doubtless sent by Johnston to Pemberton with assurances that he would speedily advance to his rescue.

Johnston, in his report, confirms Ewing's suspicions, as follows:

"On the night of the 3d, a messenger was sent to Gen. Pemberton with information that an attempt to create a diversion would be made, to enable him to cut his way out, and that I hoped to attack the enemy about the 7th.

"On the 5th, however, we learned the fall of Vicksburg; and therefore fell back to Jackson."

[86] July 7. [87] July 9–10.

Jackson during the night,[88] hurrying across Pearl river, and burning the bridges behind him; retreating through Brandon to Morton. Sherman did not pursue in force beyond Brandon.; but, having thoroughly broken up the railroads for miles in every direction, and destroyed every thing in Jackson that could be useful to the enemy, fell back by Clinton across the Big Black.[89] Johnston reports his loss in Jackson at 71 killed, 504 wounded, and about 25 missing; but adds: "Desertions during the siege and on the march [retreat] were, I regret to say, frequent."

Having perfected the occupation and insured the retention of Vicksburg, Gen. Grant embarked[90] an expedition, under Gen. F. J. Herron, to move down the river to the aid of Gen. Banks in the siege of Port Hudson; but our men were scarcely on board when tidings of Gardner's surrender caused the order to be countermanded, and Herron directed to proceed instead up the Yazoo. This involved a debarkation and rëembarkation on vessels of lighter draft; which being promptly effected, Herron set forth on his new errand;[91] his transports preceded by the iron-clad De Kalb and two 'tin-clad' [lightly and partially shielded] gunboats, under Captain Walker.

The object of this expedition was the capture of a large fleet of steamboats, which had been run up this river for safety and use, and which had escaped Porter's expedition by running far up one of the branches of the Yazoo—a feat now incapable of repetition, by reason of the general drouth and consequent shallowness of those streams. The 29th North Carolina, Col. Chrisman, with a battery, holding Yazoo City, decamped on the approach of our boats; but the De Kalb was sunk by a torpedo when nearly opposite the city; while the coveted steamboats made off, and but one of them was captured. Herron's cavalry being sent after the fugitives, however, they were all—22 in number—burnt or sunk, either at this time or when Walker was sent back by Com. Porter to bring away the guns, &c., of the De Kalb; so that the Yazoo was thenceforth clear of Rebel vessels. Herron captured and brought away 300 prisoners, 6 heavy guns, 250 small arms, 800 horses, and 2,000 bales of Confederate cotton. He moved[92] across, by order, from Yazoo City to Benton and Canton, in support of Sherman's advance to Jackson; but countermarched immediately,[93] on information of Johnston's flight from Jackson, and, rëembarking, returned[94] to Vicksburg.

While the siege of Vicksburg was in progress, Gen. Grant, compelled to present a bold front at once to Pemberton and to Johnston, had necessarily drawn to himself nearly all the forces in his department, stripping his forts on the river above him so far as was consistent with their safety. MILLIKEN'S BEND had thus been left in charge of Brig.-Gen. E. S. Dennis, with barely 1,061[95] effectives, whereof the 23d Iowa,

[88] July 16–17.
[89] July 25.
[90] July 10–11.
[91] July 12.
[92] July 16–17.
[93] July 18–19.
[94] July 21.

[95] So Gen. Dennis reports. Mr. G. G. Edwards, who was present, reports our numbers as follows: 23d Iowa, 160; 9th La., 500; 11th La. about 600; 1st Miss., 150: total, 1,410.

Col. Glasgow, numbered 160; the residue were negroes, very recently enlisted, and organized as the 9th and 11th Louisiana and 1st Mississippi. Against this post, a Rebel force from the interior of Louisiana, said to consist of six regiments under Gen. Henry McCulloch, numbering 2,000 to 3,000, advanced [96] from Richmond, La., driving in the 9th Louisiana and two companies of cavalry who had been out on a reconnoissance, and pursuing them nearly up to our earthworks at the Bend, where they were stopped by nightfall, and lay on their arms, not doubting that they would go in with a rush next morning.

But, just at dark, a steamboat passed, enabling Dennis to send to Admiral Porter for aid; when the gunboats Choctaw and Lexington were sent down from Helena; the former arriving just as the Rebels, at 3 A. M., advanced to the assault, with cries of "No quarter!" to negroes and officers of negro troops, rushing upon and over our intrenchments, before the green, awkward Blacks had been able to fire more than one or two rounds. A hand-to-hand fight of several minutes, with bayonets and clubbed muskets, ensued; wherein combatants were mutually transfixed and fell dead: the struggle resulting favorably to the Rebels, who had flanked our works and poured in a deadly enfilading fire, which compelled our men to give ground and retire, still fighting, behind the levee. And now the Choctaw opened on the exulting foe with such effect as to compel them also to shrink behind their side of the levee, keeping up a fire, while attempting to outflank our right. Thus the fight was maintained with little loss till noon; when the Rebels, having the worst of it, drew off, under a heavy fire from our troops and gunboats, but without being pursued. Some of the newspaper correspondents state, what Dennis's report conceals, that our Blacks, impelled to charge the Rebels in their flight, were led directly under the fire of our gunboats, by which they were far worse cut up than by the Rebels. Hence, our heavy loss of 127 killed, 287 wounded, beside some 300 missing at the close of the action; most of whom probably turned up afterward. As Dennis estimates the Rebel loss at about 150 killed and 300 wounded, it is probable that the fire of the gunboats, while it frightened only the Rebels, killed more of our men than of theirs.

A Rebel demonstration against Young's Point was made simultaneously with that against Milliken's Bend; but had no result, and was probably intended only to distract attention from the latter. A few shots from gunboats were sufficient to compel a retreat.

HELENA, Arkansas, had been quietly held by our forces since its unresisted occupation by Gen. Washburne,[97] with the cavalry advance of Gen. Curtis's army, and had proved useful as a dépôt of recruits and supplies destined for operations farther south; while its garrison was a constant menace and a source of uneasiness and alarm to the Rebels still holding most of Arkansas; threatening, as it did, the more important points

[96] June 6.

[97] July 11, 1862. See page 35.

therein. Yet it was left unassailed till near the close of the siege of Vicksburg, ere which, Lt.-Gen. Holmes, commanding in Arkansas, had solicited[98] of Lt.-Gen. Kirby Smith, chief of the trans-Mississippi department, permission to attack it; which was readily granted. Meantime, the Confederate Secretary of War had not merely sanctioned the enterprise, but suggested and urged it. Thus authorized and stimulated, Holmes left[99] Little Rock for Clarendon, which he had designated as the rendezvous for his forces. Fagan, with a part of his men, was promptly on hand; but Sterling Price, owing to heavy rains and consequent high water, was unable to arrive till four days afterward.[100] The attempt at surprise was thus baffled; Maj.-Gen. B. M. Prentiss, commanding at Helena, being seasonably aware of his peril, and fully on the alert to repel it. He had 3,800 effectives, behind strong earthworks mounted with serviceable guns, with the main approaches well covered by abatis. The gunboat Tyler, Lt.-Com'g J. M. Pritchett, was on hand, and played a very efficient part in the defense. And, though Helena lies on a flat adjoining the river, its outworks had been judiciously located on the bluffs a mile back, where deep ravines and steep ridges favor the defensive and impede the bringing up of artillery by their assailants. Brig.-Gen. F. Salomon,[101] who had in good part planned and constructed them, was in immediate command of our exterior defenses.

Holmes—who had been grossly deceived both as to the strength of our works and the number of their defenders—had never a reasonable chance of success. His only ground of rational hope was that he might be confronted by a coward, a traitor, or an idiot; and that did not happen to be the case.

Two years of sanguinary conflict had begun to tell on the resources of the Confederates. Here were Price, and Parsons, and Marmaduke, with what the waste of war had left of their Missourians; Holmes had evidently swept Arkansas to swell the brigades of Fagan, McRae, and Walker; yet he reports his total force at 7,646; or about twice the number he vainly struggled to overcome. He needed twice that number to give his attack a fair chance of success.

His dispositions appear to have been judicious; his movements well timed; and his soldiers, in the main, tenacious as well as brave. The Rebels were rarely deficient in a charge; but they often failed where endurance was required. In this instance, beside Sterling Price—eminently loved and trusted by the Missourians—the Rebel Governor of Arkansas, Harris Flanagan, and his Adjutant-General, Col. Gordon Rear, were on the field, acting as volunteer aids to Holmes.

Having arrived within five miles of Helena on the morning of the 3d, with his front well covered by cavalry, who permitted no one to pass them riverward, no matter on what pretext, he rested his men till midnight; when they were moved forward to within a mile or so of the outworks, where they halted till daybreak, and then pushed on.

Price, with the brigades of Par-

[98] June 14, 1863. [99] June 26. [100] June 30. [101] Brother of the then Governor of Wisconsin.

sons and McRae, numbering 3,095, was directed to assault and carry Graveyard hill (Battery C); and he did it, under a tempest of grape, canister, and musketry, repelling its defenders and capturing some of their guns. But he found them shot-wedged or divested of friction-primers, so as to be useless; while his own, necessarily left behind in the charge, were now brought up with difficulty; meantime, our batteries on either hand were playing upon his exposed infantry, who were falling rapidly and uselessly. To escape this fire, hundreds of them pushed forward, without orders or organization — a mere mob — and, being wholly unsupported, were plowed through and through by shot and shell from front and flanks, until the survivors, unable even to flee, were obliged to surrender; few of them escaping. Of his 3,095 men, Price reports a total loss this day of 1,111, or more than a third: 105 killed, 504 wounded, 502 missing.

Fagan had a smaller force—only four infantry regiments—yet was assigned what proved the harder task: to assault and carry the fort on Hindman's hill (Battery D). Leaving his artillery where he first encountered obstructions, he rushed his men up ravines and precipices, over abatis, driving our sharp-shooters out of their rifle-pits, under a heavy, constant, and deadly fire, till no obstacle remained between them and the fort they were ordered to take, just as they were relieved of a heavy enfilading fire by Price's capture of our works on Graveyard hill. This fort, Fagan now attempted to carry by assault; but the utmost efforts of his men, stimulated by the frantic entreaties of their officers, only sufficed to pile the ground with their bleeding bodies. One Arkansas regiment, in attempting to force its way into the fort, lost its Colonel, Lt.-Colonel, and over 100 men, taken prisoners. The remainder were driven back to the last line of rifle-pits, whence Fagan sent for assistance—in vain. Meantime, the guns of the fort kept busily at work; fatigue, thirst, and heat—for the day proved intensely warm—told upon the thinned ranks of the Rebels; yet they held their ground until, at 11 A. M., orders came from Holmes for a general retreat, which were willingly obeyed.

Marmaduke—who had 1,750 men—was ordered to take the fort on Righton hill, on the north, in which he failed; being exposed to a heavy flanking fire from artillery and musketry sheltered behind the levee. He lays the blame of his failure on Walker, who, with a cavalry brigade, was still farther to the north, and who (Marmaduke says) kept about half a mile back—an assertion countenanced by undisputed facts. Very likely, his knowledge that to advance was sheer foolhardiness kept him back. His loss was trifling; that of Marmaduke but 67.

Holmes, in his report, frankly admits his defeat, and makes his loss 173 killed, 687 wounded, 776 missing; total, 1,636—over 20 per cent. of his force. Prentiss makes our prisoners 1,100, and says he buried nearly 300 Rebels; while our loss was less than 250 in all. There was no pursuit by our still inferior force, and no capture of guns; but Helena was thenceforth free from Rebel molestation.

XV.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF—PORT HUDSON—TEXAS.

GALVESTON has one of the very few tolerable harbors which indent the continental shore line of the Mexican Gulf. The sand, everywhere impelled landward by the prevailing winds and currents, and almost everywhere forming a bank or narrow strip of usually dry beach closely skirting the coast, is here broken through by the very considerable waters of the rivers Trinity and San Jacinto, with those of Buffalo bayou, which unitedly form Galveston Bay; and the city of Galveston is built on the sand-spit here called Galveston Island, just south-west of the outlet of the Bay. It is the natural focus of the commerce of the larger, more fertile, more populous half of Texas, and by far the most considerable place in the State; having had, in 1860, regular lines of steamers running to New York, to New Orleans, and to the smaller Texan ports down the coast, with a population of 5,000, a yearly export of nearly half a million bales of cotton, and a very considerable trade. Plunged, with the rest of the State, into the whirlpool of Secession, it had many Unionists among its people, who welcomed the reappearance of the old flag when their city, after being once idly summoned[1] to surrender, was at length occupied,[2] without resistance, by a naval force consisting of four steam gunboats under Commander Renshaw—the Rebel municipal as well as military authorities retiring to the main land.

The possession thus easily acquired was as easily maintained to the close of that year: Gen. Banks, at the request of Renshaw, sending down from New Orleans the 42d Massachusetts, Col. Burrill; whereof three companies, numbering 260 men, were actually debarked,[3] and encamped on the wharf, the residue being still on their way; while our gunboats Westfield, Clifton, Harriet Lane, Owasco, Coryphæus, and Salem (disabled), lay at anchor in the harbor—Renshaw in chief command. Some of these boats had been down the coast during the summer, and exchanged compliments with the Rebel batteries at Corpus Christi[4] and Lavacca,[5] without inflicting or receiving much if any harm. Since then, they had lain quiet in the harbor; their commander maintaining the most intimate and cordial relations with the leading Rebels adjacent, who were in and out of Galveston at their convenience; having a pretty full use of that port without the trouble of defending it.

Maj.-Gen. Magruder having, about this time, succeeded to the chief command in Texas, reports that he found matters along the coast in a very unsatisfactory state—the harbors virtually or actually in Federal possession, from the Sabine to Corpus Christi, and the valley of the Rio Grande almost abandoned. So, after stopping but a day or two in Houston, he went down to Virginia Point, opposite Galveston; thence coolly

[1] May 17, 1862. [2] Oct. 8. [3] Dec. 28. [4] Aug. 16–18. [5] Oct. 31.

passing over to the city by night, with 80 men, supported by some 300 more, coolly inspecting its defenses and military capacities without resistance or demur. Even the long wooden bridge connecting the city with the main land, with the railroad track leading over it to Virginia Point, were neither broken up nor guarded; so that Magruder had the most liberal facilities afforded him for the enterprise he meditated. He decided that, though he could readily seize the old defenses, he could make nothing of them, and that he must operate by steamboats; as he had advices from New Orleans that more Federal troops were coming. So, collecting guns, troops, and volunteers from the adjacent region, and steamboats from all the rivers flowing into the Bay, he prepared for a speedy attack.

His arrangements appear to have been made with judgment as well as energy, and his command of men was virtually unlimited; but his guns (6 siege and 14 field-pieces) were inadequate, and his vessels (three or four ordinary river steamboats, their decks shielded by cotton-bales) glaringly so. It is difficult to resist the impression, on reading his report, not only that Renshaw was a traitor, but that Magruder acted with full knowledge of that fact; since otherwise his enterprise was sheer madness. That the Rebels were preparing to expel us from the city and harbor was perfectly understood in Galveston throughout at least the day[*] previous to the attack. Aside from the "intelligent contraband" usually present and vocal on such occasions, the hush of expectation, broken only by furtive and ominous whispers, gave proof that every Rebel in Galveston anticipated a speedy change of flags. Yet no preparation was made for resistance; no streets were patrolled; no unusual vigilance evinced; even the wooden bridge, two miles long, connecting the island city with the hostile mainland, was neither burnt, taken up, barricaded, nor even observed on our part; so Magruder, unresisted and unchallenged, advanced over it, about midnight, with his forces and guns (the latter on cars), into and through the city, as though he were traversing the streets of Houston, to within two squares of the wharf whereon the Massachusetts men were quartered, posted his guns in the most advantageous positions, unhitched their horses and sent them to a place of safety—the guns having been brought to bear on our vessels, but awaiting the arrival of the boats before opening fire. At 4 A. M., however—the moon having set, obscuring the movements on shore, but leaving our gunboats distinctly visible to the Rebel gunners in the clear star-light—Magruder, unable to wait longer for the fleet, lest he should be overtaken by daybreak, fired the signal-gun himself; while Col. Cook led a storming party of 500, supported by Griffin's battalion and by sharpshooters, to the assault on our Massachusetts men encamped on the wharf.

The assault miscarried. The wharf-planks having been taken up between our men and the land, and piled up to form a rude barricade in their front, it was necessary that the assailants should wade through the water of the bay, carrying scaling-ladders

[*] Dec. 31, 1862.

as well as muskets; while not only were our landsmen by this time wide awake and firing vigorously, but our vessels were dispensing grape and canister with the proverbial generosity of sailors. The water proved deeper than had been calculated; the scaling-ladders were said to be too short; and, after a brief struggle, the stormers recoiled and took shelter behind the nearest buildings; while the guns of our vessels, hardly 300 yards distant, proved too many for the lighter pieces of the hastily constructed Rebel batteries, driving off their gunners and completely silencing their fire. Daybreak was imminent; and it seemed for a moment that victory was alighting on the banners of the Union.

But now two Rebel steamboats appeared, and speedily put a different face on the matter. Ably handled by Commodore (or Major) Leon Smith, heavily barricaded with cotton-bales, and amply manned by volunteers from Sibley's brigade, under Cols. Green and Bagby, they dashed down the harbor—the Bayou City and Neptune rushing from either side on the Harriet Lane, Capt. Wainwright; running into her with all their force, and sweeping her decks with a deadly fire of small arms.

They met no traitors nor cowards among her chief officers. The Neptune was disabled by the Harriet Lane's return blow, sinking soon afterward, in eight feet water; and the Bayou City narrowly escaped a similar fate, barely evading the direct force of the Lane's crashing assault, which swept off her larboard wheelhouse. Meanwhile, Wainwright's heavy guns were crashing through his adversary, whose only cannon, a 68-pounder, had burst at the third discharge, but whose heavy musketry fire was so annoying that it doubtless interfered with the steering of our vessel; so that the Rebel boat, turning once more, drove her prow into the iron wheel of the Lane, fixing it there; when Smith was enabled to board with his more numerous crew, and our overpowered men, after a brief resistance, surrendered; but not till Wainwright had been killed, and Lt.-Com'g Lee mortally wounded. Lee's father was a Rebel Major, engaged in the attack, and one of the first to recognize his dying son.

The Owasco had been coaling below the town, but had got under way soon after the fight commenced; engaging the Rebel batteries until she observed the cotton-boats in conflict with the Harriet Lane; when she steamed up to assist her; grounding repeatedly on the way, owing to the darkness and the narrowness of the channel. Approaching the Lane, she was received with a heavy fire of musketry, while her own 11-inch gun could rarely be brought to bear; so she speedily backed out of the encounter, returning to her fruitless contest with the shore batteries.

The Westfield, Renshaw's flagship, had started to meet the Rebel steamers on the tidings of their approach; but soon got hard and fast aground at high tide, and began signaling for assistance. The Clifton, Lt.-Com'g Law, thereupon went up to her, and began to pull her off; when, upon seeing the flashes of guns from the Rebel batteries, Renshaw ordered her back to the city.

It was now after 7 A. M., and broad day. The Rebels raised a white flag

on the Harriet Lane, and sent a truce-boat to the Clifton, demanding the surrender[7] of our fleet! Law repelled the suggestion, yet accompanied the Rebel officer to Renshaw on the Westfield, who rejected the proposal; ordering our vessels afloat to get out of harm's way so soon as might be, while he, despairing of getting the Westfield off, would blow her up, and escape with his crew on the transports Saxon and Boardman, lying near him. He did blow her up, accordingly; but the explosion must have been premature, since Renshaw himself, with Lt. Zimmerman, Engineer Green, and ten or fifteen of his crew, perished with her.[8] An eye-witness states that all had left her but Renshaw himself when she was fired (it was said by a drunkard) and blew up, killing eight or ten officers and men in the captain's gig beside her.

Meantime, our soldiers, left to their fate, and wholly without artillery, had been summoned by Gen. W. R. Scurry[9] to surrender, and had done so. Two coal-barques—the Cavallo and the Elias Pike—were captured[10] by the Rebel steamboat Carr—one of two or three that came down the bay some time after the Neptune and Bayou City. And Law, considering the Owasco his only efficient vessel, and she not equal in a fight to the Harriet Lane, precipitately abandoned the blockade, running off with the sad remains of our fleet to New Orleans; though hourly expecting a transport down from that city, which would almost inevitably run into the enemy's clutches if not warned of the changed condition of affairs.

Magruder reports his entire loss in this fight at 26 killed, 117 wounded, and the steamer Neptune—her crew and guns being saved. He says he captured (beside the Harriet Lane, with all her armament, the schooner and barques), "350 prisoners, beside officers;" while our losses include the Westfield also, with her splendid battery of eight heavy rifled guns. He came very near entrapping the steamship Cambria,

[7] There are all manner of conflicting statements concerning this truce: each party charging the other with violating it by acting while it lasted as if it had no existence. One Union writer says that the Rebels only demanded that our vessels should quit the harbor within three hours. This would render Renshaw's conduct with regard to his ship less mysterious. *The Houston Telegraph* of Jan. 5 had an account of the whole affair by an eye-witness, who makes the truce a Rebel trick from its inception. He says:

"The propeller Owasco lay in the channel, about three-fourths of a mile from the Bayou City and Harriet Lane. As the Lane was boarded, the Owasco steamed up to within 200 or 300 yards of them, firing into both. The force of the collision drove the Bayou City's stem so far into and under the wheel and gunwale of the Lane that she could not be got out. The Lane was also so careened that her guns could not be worked, and were consequently useless. They both lay, therefore, at the mercy of the Owasco. Herculean efforts were made to extricate them.

"The Owasco, evidently fearing the Lane's guns, withdrew to a position about a mile distant. It became plainly evident that, unless the Bayou City and Harriet Lane could be separated, the enemy could escape if they wished. *To gain time, therefore*, a flag of truce was taken to the Owasco and Clifton, now lying close together, and a demand for a surrender. Time was asked to communicate with Com. Renshaw, who was on the Westfield. A truce of three hours was agreed upon. *During the truce with the vessels*, the unconditional surrender of these [Mass.] men was demanded and complied with."

[8] Magruder, in his official report, unqualifiedly asserts that he had given Renshaw three hours' truce, and that the latter *had agreed to surrender*—which is so irreconcilable with established facts that I can only credit it on the assumption that they had acted in concert throughout.

[9] Formerly representative in Congress from Texas.

[10] Magruder says a schooner also.

which arrived off the bar on the 3d, containing (he says) "E. J. Davis and many other apostate Texans, beside several hundred troops, and 2,500 saddles for the use of native sympathizers." Her captain, however, was seasonably warned to escape. One Galveston Unionist, named Thomas Smith, who was landed from her yawl, he caught, tried, and shot as a deserter from the Rebel service. And that was the sum of his "spoils"—Com. Farragut, soon after, sending vessels to rëestablish the blockade, before the Harriet Lane could be got ready to run out and roam the seas as a Rebel corsair.

But at Sabine Pass, a performance soon after occurred which was scarcely less disgraceful to our arms than this at Galveston. The broad estuary at the mouth of the Sabine was blockaded by the Union gunboat Morning Light, 10 guns, and the schooner Velocity, 3 guns; which were attacked [11] by two Rebel gunboats—Josiah Bell and Uncle Ben—fitted out in the Sabine for the purpose, under command of Major O. M. Watkins, who chased our vessels out to sea and captured them after a very feeble resistance. Watkins reports his captures at "13 guns, 129 prisoners, and $1,000,000 worth of stores."

The blockade of Galveston having barely been rëestablished under Com. Bell, of the Brooklyn, a sail was descried [12] in the south-east; when the gunboat Hatteras, Lt.-Com'g R. G. Blake, was signaled by Bell to overhaul her. The stranger affected to fly; but Blake soon observed that he did not seem in any great hurry. Clearing his decks for action, he stood on; and, when four miles distant, he saw that the chase had ceased to steam and was waiting. Blake, whose guns were short as well as few, ran down to within 75 yards and hailed; when the stranger answered his hail by proclaiming his craft Her Britannic Majesty's ship Vixen. Blake thereupon offered to send a boat aboard; and was proceeding to do so—each of them maneuvering for a better position—when the stranger shouted, "We are the Confederate steamer Alabama," and poured in a broadside; which was promptly returned.

The Alabama being every way the superior vessel, Blake had no hope, save in closing with and boarding her; which he attempted to do; but the Alabama had the advantage in speed as well as force, and easily baffled him. Both vessels were firing every gun that could be brought to bear, and as rapidly as possible, at a distance of but 30 yards—the Alabama having received considerable injury—when two of her shells simultaneously entered the Hatteras at the water-line, exploding and setting her on fire; and a third pierced her cylinder, filling her with scalding steam, crippling her walking-beam, and disabling her engine; while water poured in profusely from the rift in her side, threatening her with speedy destruction. The Alabama now working ahead, beyond the range of the Hatteras's guns, Blake ordered his magazine to be flooded, and fired a lee gun; when the enemy afforded assistance in saving our men—the Hatteras going down ten minutes afterward. Her crew—(118, including six wounded)—were transferred to the conqueror; she having had two killed. The Alabama,

[11] Jan. 21, 1863.

[12] Jan. 11, 3½ P. M.

though considerably cut up, so as to be compelled to run into Kingston, Jamaica, for repairs, had but one man wounded. And no wonder; since the Hatteras's heaviest guns were 32s, while of the Alabama's (9 to our 8), one was an 150-pounder on a pivot, another a 68; and she threw 324 pounds of metal at a broadside to the Hatteras's 94. With such a disparity of force, the result was inevitable.

Gen. N. P. Banks, having assumed [13] command of the Department of the Gulf, found himself at the head of a force about 30,000 strong, which had been officially designated the 'Nineteenth Army Corps.' With this, he was expected, in cöoperation with Grant's efforts up the river, to röopen the Mississippi, expel the Rebels in arms from Louisiana, and take military possession of the Red River country, with a view to the speedy recovery of Texas, whose provisional Governor, Gen. Andrew J. Hamilton, surrounded by hundreds more of Union refugees, was with him at New Orleans, and naturally anxious for an immediate movement upon their State; which they believed ripe for restoration. Their hopes of such a demonstration, however, were soon blasted, as we have seen, by our needless and shameful disasters at Galveston and Sabine Pass. Meantime, Gen. Banks had dispatched [14] Gen. Cuvier Grover, with 10,000 men, to röoccupy Baton Rouge, which had been relinquished to the enemy, and which was now recovered without a struggle.

From New Orleans, a single railroad reaches westward to Brashear City on the Atchafalaya, where that jumble of grand canal, river, sound, and lagoon, receives the waters of the Bayou Teche—each of them heading near, and at high water having navigable connection with, Red river. South of the railroad and east of the Atchafalaya, the country had already been in good part overrun by our forces; but our possession of it was imperfect and debated. Beyond and above, all was Rebel; while fortifications at Butte à la Rose, well up the Atchafalaya, and Fort Bisland, at Pattersonville, on the Teche, were intended to bar ingress by our gunboats from Red river or by our land forces from New Orleans. Fort Bisland was flanked by Grand Lake on the right, and by impassable swamps on the left; a Rebel force, estimated [too high] by Gen. Banks at over 12,000 men, held these strong works and the adjacent country; while to hold New Orleans securely, with its many protecting forts and approaches, Key West, Pensacola, Ship Island, &c., with all Texas backing the zealous and active Rebel partisans in Louisiana, who were promptly apprised by their spies of any weak spot in our defenses—to say nothing of the danger of hostile attacks from the side of Alabama and Mississippi—required the larger part of his corps; so that Banks found his disposable force reduced by inevitable details to less than 14,000 men; while the Rebel array in and around Port Hudson was reported by his spies at 18,000; rendering a siege without large rëenforcements impossible. He, therefore, turned his attention first to the line of the Atchafalaya.

An attempt to open the Bayou

[13] Dec. 11, 1862.

[14] Dec. 18, 1862.

Plaquemine, connecting with the Atchafalaya near Butte à la Rose, having failed—the bayou being found so choked by three years' accumulation of snags and drift as to be impassable by boats—Gen. Weitzel's force on Berwick's Bay was increased to 4,500 men, with a view to an advance to and operations in the Teche region. Starting[15] from Thibodeaux, Gen. Weitzel embarked his infantry next day at Brashear, on the gunboats Calhoun, Diana, Kinsman, and Estrella, Com. McKean Buchanan, who moved slowly up the bayou to Pattersonville; the artillery and cavalry going by land. Encountering formidable obstructions at a place known as Carney's Bridge, a few miles above, Com. Buchanan, after reconnoitering, dropped down a short distance for the night; returning next morning[16] to attack; while the 8th Vermont was sent around to flank the defenses on the north.

The obstructions were found vexatious rather than formidable: consisting of a steamboat filled with brick and sunk across the channel, with the great iron-clad gunboat Cotton behind it; a battery on either flank, and some torpedoes in the bayou below. One of these was exploded under the Kinsman; lifting her stern into the air, but not crippling her; when she fell back to avoid another just ahead, whereof a negro fugitive from the Cotton gave timely warning. Com. Buchanan, on the Calhoun, either not hearing or despising the caution, at once took the advance, standing on the bow of his vessel, spy-glass in hand, in the midst of a furious cannonade from the Cotton and Rebel batteries, and the more deadly fire of sharp-shooters from rifle-pits; when, at 10 A. M., a bullet through his head struck him dead on the instant.

By this time, the 8th Vermont had gained the Rebel rear, and was making a rapid clearance of their rifle-pits; while the batteries of the 1st Maine, the 4th and 6th Massachusetts, supported by sharp-shooters from the 75th and 160th New York, had flanked the defenses on the other side, and were sweeping the decks of the Cotton, whose crew beat a retreat, as did most of the Rebels on land, whereof but 40 were taken prisoners. The Cotton was fired during the ensuing night, and utterly destroyed. The force here beaten consisted of the 28th Louisiana, with Simms's and the Pelican battery, under Col. Gray—in all, but 1,100 men, beside the crew of the Cotton. Our loss was 7 killed and 27 wounded.

Gen. Banks being still intent on opening the Atchafalaya by the meditated advance through the Bayou Plaquemine to the capture of Butte à la Rose, the next month was wasted on this enterprise; and the success at Carney's Bridge was not otherwise improved. Meantime, some 200 Western boys defeated[17] a like number of the 3d Louisiana cavalry at Old River; losing 12 men, killing 4, wounding 7, and taking 26 prisoners.

Admiral Farragut, having heard of our loss of the Queen of the West and De Soto[18] below Vicksburg, decided that it was his duty to run the Rebel batteries at Port Hudson, in order to recover the command of the river above; so he called on Gen. Banks for cöoperation. Hereupon,

[15] Jan. 11, 1863. [16] Jan. 14. [17] Feb. 10. [18] See page 298.

our forces were hastily recalled from the Atchafalaya and concentrated at Baton Rouge; where they crossed and advanced,[*] about 12,000 strong, driving in the Rebel pickets, to the rear of the Port; Farragut having intended, under cover of a land attack on that side, to run the batteries early next morning. He judged best, however, to anticipate Gen. Banks's attack, the night being intensely dark; so, in his stout flag-ship Hartford, lashed side to side with the Albatross, he led the perilous adventure; arriving abreast of the Rebel batteries a little before midnight.

If he had counted on passing unobserved, or shrouded in darkness, he was much mistaken. Hardly was he within range of the nearest Rebel guns, when signal-lights were seen flashing from every direction, including the opposite shore; and, directly, the flames of a vast bonfire in front of the heaviest batteries shot up into the sky, lighting the entire breadth of the river as though it were midday. Rockets were soon streaming in the air; now a gun from the west bank saluted the Hartford, which instantly returned the compliment; and the next moment the earth trembled to the roar of all the Rebel batteries; whereupon our mortar-boats below began firing 13-inch shell at the enemy; and the frigates Hartford, Mississippi, Richmond, and Mononghela, and gunboats Albatross, Genesee, Kineo, Essex, and Sachem, as they severally came within range, fired broadside after broadside; the brass howitzers in their tops and the heavy pivot guns at the bow and stern being industriously worked; while the atmosphere was soon so thick with sulphurous smoke that great care was needfully exercised by our commanders to avoid firing into each other; our aim being now directed by the flashes of the enemy's guns; which, changing from shell to grape as our vessels came within musket and pistol-shot, swept our decks by murderous discharges; some of their batteries being placed on bluffs so high that they could not be harmed by our shots; while the crescent shape of the defenses, following the curve of the channel, enabled them to rake each vessel as it approached, and again as it receded. The greatest care was requisite to avoid grounding or colliding in the dense darkness which followed the burning out of the Rebel bonfire; and there were several narrow escapes from these ever imminent disasters. It was 11½ P. M. when the first gun spoke: and by 1 the fight was virtually over—the Hartford and the Albatross having passed; while most of their consorts had failed, and dropped down to their anchorage below—when a fresh blaze told of a heavy loss. The Mississippi had run aground directly abreast of the heaviest and most central battery; where she was soon discovered and became a target for them all. Here Capt. Melancthon Smith fought her nearly half an hour, till she was completely riddled; when he ordered her set on fire and abandoned; and she was; burning aground till she was so lightened that she floated; when she drifted down the river a blazing ruin, exploding, several miles below, when the fire had reached her magazine. Of her 233 officers and men, but 29 were missing at roll-call next day.

[*] March 13–14.

The Richmond had been stopped on her course by a shot through her steam-drum, and lost 8 killed and 7 wounded. The Kineo was disabled by a shot through her rudder; Capt. McKinstry, of the Monongahela, was badly wounded. Several of our vessels carried ugly marks thereafter; but the loss of the Mississippi, with her splendid armament of 21 large guns and 2 howitzers, was our principal disaster.

Gen. Banks returned forthwith to Baton Rouge; his immediate object being accomplished; while he judged the force holding the Port entirely too strong [20] to be besieged by his little army—a point whereon Gen. Halleck deems him in error. Our columns were again impelled westward to Brashear City and thence across Berwick's Bay;[21] the main body moving thence on Franklin, while Gen. Grover's division was sent by transports up the Atchafalaya and Grand Lake to Irish Bend, above Fort Bisland, where he effected a landing with great difficulty—the water being shallow for over a mile from shore, precluding his expected cöoperation in Gen. Banks's movement. Here he was soon attacked with vigor, but held his ground and beat off the enemy. Still, the attack sufficed to keep open the road for Gen. Dick Taylor, who, evacuating Fort Bisland, and burning several steamboats, retreated on Opelousas; making a brief stand at Vermilion Bayou, and losing heavily, as he reports, by desertion and straggling—much of his force being made up of unwilling conscripts, who improved every opportunity to escape and return to their homes. Taylor reports his men at but 4,000 in all, and blames his subordinate, Gen. Sibley, for persistent disobedience of orders and other unsoldierly conduct. During his retreat, the famous Queen of the West was assailed by our gunboats in Grand Lake, whither she had worked her way down the Atchafalaya from Red river, and destroyed; her crew being made prisoners.

Banks was delayed by Taylor's burning, as he fled, the bridges over the many bayous and sluggish watercourses of this region; but he entered Opelousas in triumph on the same day [22] that our gunboats, under Lt.-Com'g A. P. Cooke, captured Butte à la Rose, opening the Atchafalaya to Red river; so that communication was rëestablished,[23] through the gunboat Arizona, with Admiral Farragut, at the mouth of that stream. And now a new advance was rapidly made [24] by our army to Alexandria; Taylor, evacuating Fort De Russy, again retreating on Shreveport without a fight; while Admiral Porter came up the river with his fleet, and Louisiana, save its north-west corner, was virtually restored, or subjugated, as you will. Gen. Banks sent Weitzel, with a part of his army, on the track of the flying Rebels, nearly to Grand Ecore; when Taylor's force was so reduced that it did not seem worth farther pursuit; and he was unable to retake the field for weeks. Banks reports his captures in this campaign at 2,000 prisoners and 22

[20] He says, in his official report, citing Brig.-Gen. W. W. R. Beall, of the garrison, as his authority:

"The strength of the enemy at Port Hudson was then believed to be from 18,000 to 20,000. It is now *known*, with absolute certainty, that the garrison, on the night of the 14th of March, 1863, was not less than 16,000 effective troops."

[21] April 9–10.

[22] April 20.

[23] May 2.

[24] May 5–9.

guns; while he had seized 2 and destroyed 8 Rebel steamers, beside three gunboats. An intercepted letter showed that Taylor had purposed to attack Brashear City the day prior to our advance to and attack on Fort Bisland.

Gen. Banks had been notified by Admiral Farragut, while at Brashear City, that Gen. Grant—then at his wits' end before Vicksburg—would spare him 20,000 men for a movement on Port Hudson—a proffer which was soon afterward, and most fortunately, retracted. Grant's plan was to join teams and help Banks reduce Port Hudson, when the latter should help him reduce Vicksburg: an arrangement to which Gen. B. very gladly assented. Grant's corps designed to cöoperate against Port Hudson was to be at Bayou Sara May 25th; but on the 12th Banks was advised by letter[25] from Grant that he had crossed the Mississippi in force, and had entered on his campaign which proved so successful. Of course, he had now no corps to spare, but proposed instead that Banks should join him in his movement against Vicksburg. This the latter was obliged to decline, lacking the required transportation, and not daring to leave New Orleans and all we held in Louisiana at the mercy of the strong Rebel garrison of Port Hudson, of whose batteries Farragut had recently had so sore an experience; to say nothing of Dick Taylor's return, strongly rëenforced, from the side of Texas. So Banks, sending Gen. Wm. Dwight to Grant to explain his position, wisely decided to move with all his available force against Port Hudson, where he could be in position either to defend New Orleans below, or to rëenforce, in an emergency, or be rëenforced by, Grant above. And Grant, on hearing all the facts as set forth by Gen. Dwight, heartily concurred in this decision; offering to send Banks 5,000 men so soon as he could spare them.

Gen. Banks, directly after Dwight's return to Alexandria, put[26] his army in motion; sending all he had transportation for by water; the residue marching by land to Simmsport, where they were with difficulty ferried across the Atchafalaya, and moved down the right bank of the Mississippi till opposite Bayou Sara, where they crossed,[27] and, marching 15 miles next day, proceeded forthwith to invest Port Hudson from the north; while Gen. C. C. Augur, with 3,500 men from Baton Rouge, in like manner invested it on the south.

Gen. Gardner, commanding at Port Hudson, sent Col. Miles to resist their junction behind his fastness by striking Augur on his march; but he was repulsed with a loss of 150 men; while our right wing above, under Gens. Weitzel, Grover, and Dwight, drove the garrison, after a sharp fight, within their outer line of intrenchments. The next day,[28] they joined hands with Augur behind the Rebel works, and the investment of the Port, save on the side of the river, was complete.

Reports being current that the enemy had withdrawn—that there was only a handful of them left behind their works, &c.—Banks, after thorough reconnoissance and giving time for preparation, gave the order for a general assault. That assault

[25] Dated the 10th. [26] May 14–15. [27] Night of May 23. [28] May 25.



PORT HUDSON.

Explanations:

A, B, C, D—Redoubts.
E—South Bastion.
F—East Bastion.
G, H—Large forts.
I to Q—Batteries.

was gallantly made;[29] but with the usual ill success of attempts to carry elaborate, extensive, skillfully planned works, enfilading and supporting each other, by merely hurling masses of men against them. Intended, of course, to be simultaneous in every quarter, it failed to be so. Our batteries opened early in the morning; and, after a vigorous bombardment, Gens. Weitzel, Grover, and Paine, on our right, assaulted with vigor at 10 A. M., while Gen. Augur, in our center, and Gen. T. W. Sherman, on our left, did not attack in earnest till 2 P. M. Meantime, the Hartford and Albatross above, and the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex below the Rebel river batteries, under the direction of Admiral Farragut, rained shot and shell upon the besieged, who had already been compelled by our fleet to abandon their southernmost battery; spiking

[29] May 27.

its guns. In this day's fight, the fleet probably did the greater execution on the Rebels, whose attention was mainly absorbed by the land attack: its fire dismounting several of their heavy guns, and taking in reverse their landward defenses.

Never was fighting more heroic than that of our army, assailing nearly equal numbers behind strong defenses, approached only through almost impassable abatis, swept by Rebel shell and grape. If valor could have triumphed over such odds, they would have carried the works; but only abject cowardice or pitiable imbecility could have lost such a position to so small an army; and the Rebels also fought well. We gained ground on both flanks; holding it thereafter on the north, where two negro regiments (1st and 3d Louisiana) vied with the bravest: making three desperate charges on Rebel batteries, losing heavily, but maintaining their position in the hottest forefront to the close. The 1st Louisiana (colored) Engineers were also on trial that day, and justified the most sanguine expectations by their good conduct. Not that they fought better than our White veterans: they did not, and could not: but there had been so much incredulity avowed as to negro courage, so much wit lavished on the idea of negroes fighting to any purpose, that Gen. Banks was justified in according especial commendation to these; saying, "No troops could be more determined or more daring." The conflict closed about sunset.

We lost in this desperate struggle 293 killed, including Cols. Clarke, 6th Michigan, D. S. Cowles, 128th New York (transfixed by a bayonet), Payne, 2d Louisiana, and Chapin, 30th Mass., with 1,549 wounded, among whom were Gen. T. W. Sherman, severely, and Gen. Neal Dow, slightly. The Rebel loss was of course much less—probably not 300 in all.[30]

There was a truce next day to enable us to bury our dead; after which, our soldiers addressed themselves in sober earnest to the arduous labor of digging and battering their way into the works which had proved impervious to their more impetuous endeavor. This was no holiday task, under the torrid sun of a Southern June, with Rebel sharp-shooters close at hand, ever on the keen watch for chances to obey the Donnybrook injunction, 'Wherever you see a head, hit it;' but our boys worked with a will; and soon the pick and spade were pushing zig-zag trenches up to the Rebel works; while the heavy guns of our batteries, alternating their thunders with those of the fleet, gave fresh illustrations of the truth that 'there is no peace for the wicked.'[31]

[30] Gen. Banks reported that the 15th Arkansas, out of a total of 292, lost during the siege 132; of whom 76 fell this day.

[31] The following extracts from the diary of a Rebel soldier (John A. Kennedy, 1st Alabama), who was captured while endeavoring to make his way out through our lines with a letter in cipher from Gardner to Jo. Johnston, gives the most vivid inside view of the siege:

"*May* 29.—The fight continued until long after night yesterday evening. The fight has opened —it opened at daybreak. The fight has been very warm to-day. I received a shot in the foot, but it is slight. The Yanks attempted to charge the works, but was repulsed. It has clouded up and is raining. We have a muddy time—a very wet time for sleeping.

"*May* 30.—The fight opened at daylight. Our company has three wounded in the hospital. The Yanks have been sharp-shooting all day. We have lost but one man belonging to company B. The Yanks are building rifle-pits—they fire very close. I have been sharp-shooting some to-day. The boys are very lively.

Gen. Banks's position was far from enviable. His small army—now scarcely numbering 12,000 effective men—was isolated in a thinly settled, partially devastated, exhausted, and intensely hostile region. It was largely composed of nine-months men, whose terms of service had expired or would soon expire, whose hearts yearned toward loved ones far away, and who decidedly preferred a sure prospect of going home to their chance (if shot) of going to heaven. There were some 2,500 Rebel cavalry in close proximity to his rear, in addition to the garrison of 6,000 or over in his front; his necessary concentration for this siege had left nearly all Louisiana open to Dick Taylor, who would inevitably rëtrace his steps across the country out of which he had so lately been driven, capturing and conscripting by the way; and he might, very possibly,

"*May* 31.—We had a very hot time last night. We have quit living like men and are living like hogs. The Yanks have built rifle-pits with port-holes. Our battery was silenced this morning; 5 of company A was wounded. Our regiment has lost 26 killed and 40 or 50 wounded. We have been relieved from our position by Miles's Legion. We will return to our position, I guess, to-morrow. The Yanks are shelling from the lower fleet. Ten of us are going at a time to camps to get clean clothes.

"*June* 1.—I was on guard last night. The Yanks shelled us last night, but did no damage. Sam Hagin and Bob Bailey was killed by a rifle cannon-shot this morning. The Yanks are still sharp-shooting, also using their artillery. They have dismounted all our guns. They are the best artillerists I ever saw. The lower fleet has pitched us a few shots from Long Tom.

"*June* 2.—The lower fleet shelled us last night. I am a little unwell this morning. There has not been much fighting to-day. The artillery is booming occasionally, and the sharp-shooters are still popping away. The Yanks threw a few balls at one of our batteries near us to-day. It is reported that we have rëenforcements between Clinton and Osica.

"*June* 3.—The Yanks has been shooting all around us to-day. The Hessions seem to be rather afraid to attempt to storm our works again · but seem rather inclined to starve us out. I hope we will receive rëenforcements in time to prevent it. Heaven help us!

"*June* 4.—I am very unwell this morning. The lower fleet shelled us last night. The shells made the boys hunt a place of safety; such as ditches, rat-holes, trees, etc. We are going to our old position. I am sick at camp.

"*June* 5.—We are still besieged by the Yanks. Another day has passed and no rëenforcements. Sim Herring was wounded in the head to-day. The Yanks are still sharp-shooting, also using their artillery with but little effect. We hear a great many different reports.

"*June* 6.—The river is falling very fast. It is very, very hot weather. Several shots from 'Whistling Dick' came over our camp to-day. Sewell is shelling the Yanks. I expect to go to the breastworks in the morning. Several of the boys are at camp, sick.

"*June* 7.—Another day has dawned and no rëenforcements. I shall go to the breastworks this morning. The Yanks are still popping away from their rifle-pits. One of company B was killed to-day while looking over the breastwork. It is very, very hot, and we have lain in the ditch all day.

"*June* 8.—The Yanks began to sharp-shoot at daybreak. We had two men killed yesterday. I am afraid some of our company will get shot next. Another day has dawned and no rëenforcements, but I hope we will receive them soon. The Yanks have been shelling our breastworks, but no damage done. It is very disagreeable sitting in these dirty ditches—but this the Confederate soldier expects and bears cheerfully; but another long hot day has passed, and who knows what may be our situation at this time to-morrow evening?

"*June* 9.—The Yanks attempted a charge last evening but was repulsed. Whistling Dick is at work to-day; it has played a full hand, too. Whistling Dick is tearing our camps all to pieces. Charley Dixon and Berry Hagin was wounded by fragments of our cook shelter, which was shot down. Our sick has been removed to the ravine. It is difficult to get something to eat. The Yankee artillery is playing upon us all around. The Heshians burned our commissary with a shell to-day.

"*June* 10.—Another day and night has passed, and this poor, worn-out garrison has received no assistance. We have lain in the ditches twenty days, and still there is no prospect of succor—but I truly hope we will soon receive rëenforcements. The men is getting sick very fast. The Yankee artillery is keeping a dreadful noise. I and Mormon have been detailed for some extra duty. The Hessions gave us a few rounds as we were crossing the field. I received dispatches from the General in person.

"*June* 11.—The Yanks used their artillery at a tremendous rate last night. I went to or attempted to visit Col. Steedman's headquarters. I had a gay time trying to find them; falling in ravines, etc. I was in a hot place, shure. We captured a Yankee Captain and Lieutenant last night. The Yanks seemed disposed to make a general assault last night."

At this point, the journal suddenly stops; the author having been taken prisoner.

bring from Texas a force sufficient to capture New Orleans itself. Jo. Johnston, with an overwhelming force, might swoop down from Jackson at any moment; Alabama and Georgia might supply a fresh force adequate to the raising of the siege and the rout of the besiegers; add to which, Lee—so recently victorious at Chancellorsville—might dispatch a corps of veterans by rail for the relief of Gardner and his important post. The Rebel line of defense was three or four miles long; ours, encircling theirs, of course considerably longer; so that a stealthy concentration of the garrison on any point must render it immensely stronger there, for a time, than all who could be rallied to resist it. With Vicksburg proudly defying Grant's most strenuous efforts, and Lee impelling his triumphant legions across the Potomac, the chances were decidedly against the undisturbed prosecution of this siege to a successful issue.

After a fortnight's steady digging and firing, a fresh attempt was made,[32] under a heavy fire of artillery, to establish our lines within attacking distance of the enemy's works, so as to avoid the heavy losses incurred in moving over the ground in their front. Our men advanced at 3 A. M., working their way through the difficult abatis; but the movement was promptly detected by the enemy, and defeated, with the loss on our side of some scores as prisoners.

Four days later, a second general assault was made:[33] Gen. Dwight, on our left, attempting to push up unobserved through a ravine and rush over the enemy's works while his attention should be absorbed by the more palpable advance of Gens. Grover and Weitzel on our right. Neither attack fully succeeded; but our lines were permanently advanced, at some cost, from an average distance of 300 yards, to one of 50 to 200 yards from the enemy's works; and here our men intrenched themselves and commenced the erection of new batteries. On our left, an eminence was carried and held which commanded a vital point of the defenses, known as 'the Citadel'; and which enabled Dwight, some days later, to seize and hold a point on the same ridge with 'the Citadel,' and only ten yards from the enemy's lines. Banks professes to think the day's gains worth their price; but, as he had few men to spare, he did not choose to pay at that rate for any more ground, restricting his efforts thenceforth to digging and battering; Farragut still cöoperating to make the slumbers of the besieged as uneasy as might be.

That garrison was not beaten: it was worn out and starved out. A shell fired its mill, burning it, with over 2,000 bushels of corn. Its guns were successively disabled by the remarkable accuracy of our fire, till but 15 remained effective on the landward defenses. Its ammunition for small arms was gradually expended, until but twenty rounds per man remained; and but little more for the artillery. Its meat at length gave out; when its mules were killed and their flesh served out; the men eating it without grumbling. Rats stood a poor chance in their peopled trenches: being caught, cooked, eaten, and pronounced equal as food to squirrels. And thus the tedious

[32] June 10. [33] June 14.

hours rolled on, until the last hope of seasonable relief had all but faded into the deadly stupor of blank despair.

And still the besiegers worked on; losing some men daily by cannon-balls and the more deadly Minié bullet of the sharp-shooter, but gaining ground foot by foot, until our saps on the right had been pushed up to the very line of the defenses; while on our left a mine had been prepared for a charge of thirty barrels of powder, where its explosion must have caused the destruction of 'the Citadel.'

Even had the garrison been full fed and in healthy vigor, they could not have held the place a week longer, unless by successful sallies that virtually raised the siege; whereas, they were utterly exhausted, debilitated, and worn out by famine, overwork, and lack of sleep; until the hospitals were crowded with them, and not half their number could have stood up to fight through a day's earnest battle.

Suddenly, our batteries and gunboats shook[34] the heavens with one tremendous salute, while cheer upon cheer rose from behind our works, rolling from the gunboats above to those below the defenses, and back again, in billows of unmistakable exultation. It was not 'the glorious Fourth,' but two days after it; and the sinking hearts of the besieged anticipated the tidings before our men shouted across to them, "VICKSBURG HAS SURRENDERED!" No one needed to be told that, if that was the truth, further resistance was folly — that rëenforcements would soon be steaming down the river which would render holding out impossible.

That evening, Gardner summoned a council of his six highest subordinates, who unanimously decided that the place must be surrendered. Thereupon, he opened communication with Banks, asking if the news shouted across the lines was authentic. Banks, in reply, inclosed him Gen. Grant's letter, announcing the surrender; whereupon, Gardner applied for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to negotiations as to terms. This was declined. The Rebel commander then averred his willingness to surrender on conditions; when conferees were appointed on either side, and terms of capitulation finally agreed[35] upon, whereby the garrison became prisoners of war; our forces entering and taking formal possession next morning; when thousands of the victors and the vanquished met and fraternized rather as friends who had been temporarily estranged, than as enemies so lately confronted in mortal strife.

Gen. Banks does not report his aggregate loss in this siege; but it can hardly have fallen short, in the entire 45 days, of 3,000 men; including, beside those already named, Cols. Bean, 4th Wisc., Holcomb, 1st La., Smith, 160th N. Y. (Zouaves), Lt.-Cols. Lowell, 8th N. H., Rodman, 38th Mass., and other valued officers. Brig.-Gen. Paine was wounded in the assault of June 14th. Banks says the Rebels admitted a loss during the siege of 610 only; but he is confident that it could not have been less than 800 to 1,000; as he found 500 wounded in the hospitals—most of them severely in the head, by the

[34] July 6.

[35] July 8.

bullets of our sharp-shooters. His prisoners captured in the Port (the sick and wounded inclusive) were 6,408, of whom 455 were officers; while his own force that day was less than 10,000 men. His captures, during the campaign so gloriously terminated, he states at 10,584 men, 73 guns, 6,000 small arms, beside 3 gunboats, 8 other steamboats, and cotton, cattle, &c., &c., to an immense value.

Gen. Banks's sudden withdrawal from Alexandria and the Red river, and the employment of nearly all his disposable force in the siege of Port Hudson, necessarily proffered opportunities which Dick Taylor was on the alert to improve. Collecting in Upper Louisiana a force of some thousands, including several regiments, mainly of cavalry, from Texas, he, early in June, rëoccupied Alexandria and Opelousas; moving thence rapidly down the Atchafalaya, as if making directly for New Orleans. His approach appeared to have been made known to our officers at the front only by vague rumors, often circulated on purpose to mislead; but our advanced posts were drawn back across the Atchafalaya to Brashear; Berwick, just across the bayou, having been needlessly, therefore culpably, bombarded and ultimately burned [36] by a Mr. Ryder, in command of our only gunboat in the bayou. There was abundance of fuss and aimless activity, but no real preparation at Brashear, whither Lt.-Col. Stickney had been recently sent over by Gen. Emory, at New Orleans, to take command: there were no intrenchments, though thousands of willing contrabands were there to dig them; no mustering and drilling of the hundreds of idle convalescents in the hospital camps, awaiting orders to rejoin their regiments; and when at length word came that the Rebels had struck our line of communication and supply at Lafourche, well toward New Orleans, Stickney hurried down, with most of his effectives, to its defense. The enemy easily swept over Thibodeaux, Terre Bonne, and Bayou Bœuf, capturing our few men stationed at each post; while a cöoperating force, under Gens. Mouton and Green, suddenly appeared [37] amid the ruins of Berwick, threatening Brashear, which was held by a sick Colonel and a motley garrison, without organization or discipline; who had hardly begun to fight when a charge was made on their rear by Major Hunter, with 325 Texans, who had crossed the bayou in row-boats during the preceding night, and, working their way through swamps which were on our side supposed impassable, were ready to rush in at the opportune moment, while Col. Majors, from the direction of Lafourche, barred all egress to or rëenforcement from our rear. Fort Buchanan, mounting ten heavy guns, was formidable in front or toward the bayou only: it could not fire a shot eastward; and, in a few minutes, it was stormed and carried by the ragged Texans, who had easily disposed of the infantry mob behind it. Ryder, with his gunboat, made all haste to run away; affording a fresh proof that Vandals are almost always cowards. It was still early morning when Taylor, Mouton, and Green, as well as Hunter, were in Brashear,

[36] June 19.

[37] June 22.

which we had shamefully lost, with nearly 1,000 prisoners, a strong fort, 10 heavy guns, many small arms, and tents, equipments, supplies, valued by the enemy at $6,000,000, and possibly worth to us $2,000,000. Thousands of negroes, liberated by Banks's triumphant advance to Alexandria, were reduced by this and our kindred reverses to a harsher slavery than that from which they had so recently been delivered.

The road to New Orleans[38]—at least, to Algiers, its western suburb—was now open; for Lafourche had been evacuated by Stickney after a gallant defense by the 47th Massachusetts, in which they had repulsed two assaults; but Taylor was too weak to make the great venture. If he had, as is asserted, but 4,000 men at Brashear and between it and Lafourche, he could not have assailed New Orleans with more than double that number at most; and, so long as Farragut held the mastery of the river, this was not enough even to compel Banks to raise the siege of Port Hudson.[39]

Moving north instead of east, Taylor's van, under Green, menaced Donaldsonville, while a small force of Texans, raiding into Plaquemine, burned two steamboats lying there, and took 68 convalescents prisoners; but were soon shelled out by the gunboat Winona.

Green next attempted[40] to carry Donaldsonville by assault; but Farragut had been seasonably apprised of his intention, and had sent thither the Princess Royal, Kineo, and Winona; which, cooperating with the little garrison (225) of the 28th Maine, Maj. Bullen, tore the assaulting column with their shells, and soon put the Rebels to flight, with a loss of 200 killed and wounded, and 124 prisoners. Among their killed was Col. Phillips.

Pollard reports another fight," six miles from Donaldsonville, between 1,200 Texans, under Green, and "the enemy, over 4,000 strong;" wherein we were beaten, with a loss of 500 killed and wounded, 300 prisoners, 3 guns, many small arms, and the flag of a New York regiment. Banks's report is silent with regard to this fight; yet it seems that a collision actually took place; the forces on our side being commanded by Gen. Dudley, and our loss considerable—450 killed and wounded, with two guns, says a newspaper report. The affair can not have been creditable to the Union side, or it would not have been so completely hushed up.

Gen. Banks's force in the field having been rendered disposable by the fall of Port Hudson, Taylor and his subordinates made haste to abandon the country east of the Atchafalaya; evacuating[41] Brashear City just one month after its capture; but not till they had carefully stripped it of

[38] *The Louisiana Democrat* (Alexandria, July 1) has a magnifying Rebel letter from one engaged in the capture of Brashear, who claims for that post an importance hardly second to Vicksburg, numbers 1,800 prisoners and 6,000 negroes among the spoils, and adds:

"This brilliant campaign of Gen. Taylor has another great object in view, and one of *vast* importance, namely: A diversion to force the enemy to raise the siege of Port Hudson. He now has his choice, to lose New Orleans or to abandon his operations against Port Hudson, and retire with his beaten and demoralized army into that city."

[39] Banks says that barely 400 of our men at one time held New Orleans; but the river and the fleet, with his army not far away, were its main defenses.

[40] June 28, 1 A. M. [41] July 12. [42] July 22.

every thing of value that was either movable or combustible.

Gen. Banks now united with Gen. Grant in urging an immediate combined movement upon Mobile; but the suggestion was overruled at Washington, in deference to the urgent representations of Texan refugees; and Gen. B. directed[44] to operate against Texas. He was advised that a movement by the Red river on Natchitoches or Shreveport was deemed most feasible, but was authorized to act as his own judgment should dictate. Deeming the route suggested impracticable at that season, he decided to demonstrate by way of the Sabine, with Houston as his objective point. Accordingly, an expedition, including a land force of 4,000 men, was fitted out at New Orleans, and dispatched[45] to the Sabine, under command of Maj.-Gen. Franklin; the naval force, detailed by Admiral Farragut, consisting of the gunboats Clifton, Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City, under command of Lt. Fred. Crocker. Banks gave Franklin written instructions to debark his troops 10 or 12 miles below Sabine Pass; thence moving rapidly on the Rebel defenses, unless a naval reconnoissance should prove those works unoccupied, or so weak that they could be easily and promptly reduced by bombardment.

Decently managed, this movement could not have miscarried. The troops were abundant and efficient; the weather fine; the sea smooth; and the enemy unwarned of the point of attack. But Franklin and Crocker decided to take the works at once by a naval attack; and, without landing the troops, moved[46] directly upon them with the gunboats, after having been 24 hours in sight, so as to give the Rebels ample warning of their peril.

The result proved this a foolhardy procedure. The gunboats were old merchant steamers, of inferior strength; their guns were of moderate caliber, and made no impression on the Rebel works; while several of them soon grounded in the shallow water of the Pass, where they were exposed to certain destruction by the fire of the batteries, and were soon torn to pieces; when Crocker surrendered the Clifton, as Lt. Johnson did the Sachem; each having been quickly disabled by a shot through her boiler—Franklin thus achieving the distinction of being the first American General [for Renshaw was not a General] who managed to lose a fleet in a contest with land batteries alone. The Arizona grounded, and had her engine disabled; but was kedged off with difficulty at midnight, having received no damage. She was, in fact, of too heavy draft to run fairly abreast of the batteries—at least, to maneuver there with safety. Crocker and Johnson fought their vessels bravely and well; but they were light-draft boats, utterly unfit to assail such batteries, and should not have been impelled to their certain destruction. Our loss in this affair, beside the two boats and their 15 heavy rifled guns, was 50 killed and wounded, beside 200 prisoners—in all, just about equal to the whole number of Rebels engaged; of whom (says Pollard) "not a man was lost on our side, nor a gun injured."

Franklin had still his 4,000 sol-

[44] Aug. 12; by dispatch received Aug. 27. [45] Sept. 5. [46] Sept. 8, 3 P. M.

diers, with his transports and two remaining gunboats; while there were not Rebel soldiers enough within a day's ride to have brought to a halt one of his regiments, properly led. Dick Taylor's force, such as it was, was far away; Houston, flanking Galveston, was but 40 miles distant; Gen. Washburne was at Brashear, with a force equal to Franklin's, ready to cöoperate in the purposed advance, in case the latter had taken these poor earthworks, defended by a captain [46] and 250 men, and sent back his transports for rëenforcements. Instead of taking them, however, or even trying, Franklin—finding no place to land where he might not get his feet wet—slunk meekly back to New Orleans;[47] leaving the Texans to exult, very fairly, over a fruitful victory gained against odds of at least twenty to one.

Gen. Banks now concentrated his disposable forces on the Atchafalaya, with intent to advance directly upon Shreveport; but found this utterly impracticable. The country west and north-west of Brashear had been so exhausted by the armies that had successively occupied it that no food and little forage was to be gleaned from it; an intense drouth now prevailed all over that flat region; where, though bayous abound, living springs and brooks of drinkable water are scarce; the roads were few and very bad, often winding for miles through dense forests; and it was not possible to transport by wagons all the food and forage needed by an army strong enough to overcome all probable resistance. No course seemed open for a fulfillment of the desires and expectations of the Government concerning Texas but that of a marine expedition; which was accordingly resolved on.

Meantime, a considerable force had been sent, under Gen. F. J. Herron, to Morganzia, opposite but above Port Hudson, where the Rebels had a vicious habit of taking advantage of the narrowness and crookedness of the Mississippi to 'bushwhack' our passing vessels. No resistance being here encountered, an outpost had been established several miles inland, consisting of the 19th Iowa and 26th Indiana, with two guns, under Lt.-Col. Leake, with 150 cavalry, under Major Montgomery—in all, some 600 to 800 strong. Though it was known that Green, with a far stronger Rebel force, was in their front across the Atchafalaya, no proper vigilance was exercised; and, three weeks after this outpost had been established, it was surprised [48] by Green, who, with a far superior force, crossed the bayou during a dark night, surrounded our camp, and captured our guns and most of our infantry—not less than 400, including Leake and Lt.-Col. Rose. The cavalry escaped with a loss of five men. We had 14 killed and 40 wounded. Gen. N. J. T. Dana had just succeeded Herron in command at Morganzia.

In order to mask his intended movement on Texas by sea, Gen. Banks now pushed out a considerable force, under Gen. C. C. Washburne, to Opelousas, which was reached without a conflict; but, when Washburne commenced [49] his retreat to the Teche, pursuant to orders, the Rebels, under Taylor and Green, followed sharply on his track, and,

[46] F. A. Odlum. [47] Arriving Sept. 11. [48] Sept. 30. [49] Nov. 1.

stealing up,[50] under cover of woods, to our right, under Gen. Burbridge, struck suddenly and heavily, about noon, while the 23d Wisconsin was engaged in voting for State officers—that being election day in their State. That regiment was speedily reduced from 226 to 98 men—many of the rest, of course, prisoners, including its Colonel, Guppy, who was wounded; while the brigade of which it formed a part went into the fight numbering 1,010, and came out 361. The loss was mainly in the 67th Indiana, which ingloriously surrendered without having lost a man. Our right, thus suddenly assailed in great force, and with intense fury, was broken, and was saved from utter destruction by the devoted bravery of the 23d Wisconsin and the efficient service of Nim's battery. We lost one gun, which was not recovered; the Rebels, upon the bringing up of the 3d division, Gen. McGinnis, retreating rapidly to the shelter of the adjacent woods. Washburne reports a loss of 26 killed, 124 wounded, and 566 missing (prisoners); total: 716. The Rebels lost 60 killed, 65 prisoners, and 300 wounded.

Gen. Banks's new expedition, 6,000 strong, led by Banks himself, but more immediately commanded by Gen. Dana, made[51] directly for the Rio Grande, debarking[52] at Brazos Santiago, driving off the small cavalry force there stationed, and following it to Brownsville, 30 miles above, which was entered by our advance on the 16th; as was Point Isabel two days later. The Rebel works commanding Aransas Pass were next taken by assault, which gave us their guns and 100 prisoners. Moving thence on Pass Cavallo, commanding the western entrance to Matagorda Bay, our army invested Fort Esperanza, which was thereupon abandoned; most of its garrison escaping to the main land.

Banks had expected to follow up this success—which gave us control of the coast from the Rio Grande to the Brazos—by a movement on Indianola or on Matagorda: but this involved a collision with whatever Rebel force could be collected in Texas; and he deemed himself too weak to challenge such an encounter. With a moderate rëenforcement, he might have seized Galveston Island—sealing up the coast of Texas against blockade-runners: as it was, he felt obliged to desist and return to New Orleans.

Gen. Dana, after Banks had left him in command at Brownsville, sent an expedition up the river 120 miles to Roma, which encountered much privation, but no enemy; then another 70 miles eastward, toward Corpus Christi, which found no Rebel force in this direction. The Rebels had shifted their Mexican trade to Eagle Pass, 350 miles up, whither Dana was unable to follow them. Being afterward ordered to Pass Cavallo, he found[53] two of our brigades in quiet possession of Indianola, on the main land, with an equal force on the Matagorda peninsula opposite, and all Texas west of the Colorado virtually abandoned to our arms. He believed we had force enough then on that coast to have moved boldly inland and contested the mastery of the State; but he was overruled, and soon relieved from command.

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[50] Nov. 3. [51] Oct. 26. [52] Nov. 2. [53] Jan. 12, 1864.

XVI.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER BURNSIDE AND HOOKER.

Gen. Burnside reluctantly, and with unfeigned self-distrust, succeeded[1] to the command of the Army of the Potomac. The devotion to McClellan of its principal officers, and of many of their subordinates, was so ardent that any other commander must have had a poor chance of hearty, unquestioning support; and Burnside would gladly have shrunk from the ordeal. Having no alternative, however, but disobedience of orders, he accepted the trust, and immediately commenced preparations for a movement of his forces down the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, which he had selected as on the proper as well as the direct line of operations from Washington against Richmond: masking his purpose, for a few days, by menacing an advance on Gordonsville. Lee soon[2] penetrated his real design, and commenced a parallel movement down the south bank of the river; while J. E. B. Stuart, raiding[3] across at Warrenton Springs, entered Warrenton just after our rear-guard had left it, obtaining ample confirmation of his chief's conclusions; whereupon, the residue of Longstreet's corps was moved rapidly eastward. Meantime, Gen. Sumner's advance had reached[4] Falmouth, and attempted to cross to Fredericksburg, but been easily repulsed; the bridges being burned and our pontoons—owing to a misunderstanding between Gens. Halleck and Burnside, each of whom conceived that the other was to impel their dispatch from Washington—did not start so early as they should have done, and then experienced detention from bad roads and grounded vessels on the way: so that they did not reach Falmouth till after most of Lee's army had been concentrated on the heights across the river, ready to dispute its passage.

Fredericksburg was summoned[5] by Gen. Sumner: the authorities replying that, while it would not be used to assail us, its occupation by our troops would be resisted to the utmost. Most of the inhabitants thereupon abandoned the place, which was occupied by Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, sharp-shooting from behind houses; while Lee's engineers pressed the fortification of the heights behind it, and Wade Hampton dashed[6] across the river above, raiding up to Dumfries and the Occoquan, capturing 200 cavalry and a number of wagons; and a like dash across was made below Port Royal, in boats, by part of Beale's regiment; taking some prisoners. Our gunboats having steamed up the river so far as Port Royal, D. H. Hill assailed[7] them with cannon, and compelled them to retire; when he proceeded to fortify the right bank, so as to prevent their return.

The Rappahannock, above Port Royal, being generally narrow, with high bluffs often approaching it, now on one side, then on the other, Lee decided that he could not prevent its

[1] Nov. 8, 1862. [2] Nov. 15. [3] Nov. 18. [4] Nov. 17. [5] Nov. 21. [6] Nov. 28. [7] Dec. 5.



FREDERICKSBURG.

passage at points where the river was fully commanded from its bluffs on the north, while a considerable intervale adjoined it on the south; but the tenacity with which Fredericksburg was held by sharp-shooters compelled Burnside to dislodge them by bombardment from the Falmouth bluffs, whereby considerable damage was done to the buildings, though less than might naturally have been expected. What with firing on it from either side, however, and the often wanton devastations of our soldiers, it was ultimately reduced to a state of general dilapidation.

Our army being at length in position along the north bank, Burnside

commenced[8] throwing over pontoons to Fredericksburg; also at a point nearly two miles below. The Engineer corps had laid the upper pontoon two-thirds of the way, when daylight exposed them to the fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters, which drove them off; and the work was completed by the 7th Michigan, who had 5 killed and 16 wounded, including Lt.-Col. Baxter. Supported and followed by the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, they speedily finished the job, having dashed across the river in boats;[9] taking 35 prisoners. We lost 300 in all in laying our pontoons and clearing the city of the enemy.

Gen. Franklin, on our left, encountered less resistance—the make of the land being there favorable to us—and laid his pontoons without loss. Possession of both banks being thus secured, two other pontoons were laid at either point, and our army mainly pushed across during that and the following days.[10] The next was that chosen for the assault on the Rebel position; whose strength, though under-estimated by Burnside, was known to be very considerable.

Lee's army, fully 80,000 strong, was stretched along and behind the southern bluffs of the Rappahannock from a point a mile or so above Fredericksburg, to one four or five miles below. At its right, the bluffs recede two miles or so: the Massaponax here falling into the Rappahannock; the ground being decidedly less favorable to the defensive. It was organized in two grand corps, whereof that of Stonewall Jackson held the right; that of Longstreet the left. A. P. Hill commanded the left advance of Jackson's corps; which was confronted by Franklin's grand division, about 40,000 strong. On our right, or in and before Fredericksburg, were the grand divisions of Hooker and Sumner, numbering at least 60,000. But, while 300 Rebel guns were advantageously posted on every eminence and raked every foot of ground by which they could be approached, our heavy guns were all posted on the north side of the river, where their fire could rarely reach the enemy; while they made some havoc among our own men until Burnside silenced them.

The weather had been cold, and the ground was frozen; but an Indian Summer mildness had succeeded, which filled the valley of the Rappahannock with a dense fog, covering for a time the formation of our columns of assault; while a portion of our guns were firing wildly and uselessly; but at length a bright sun dispelled the mist, and, at 11 A. M., Couch's division, on our right, emerging from among the battered buildings, moved swiftly to the assault.

Braver men never smiled at death than those who climbed Marye's Hill that fatal day; their ranks plowed through and torn to pieces by Rebel batteries even in the process of formation; and when at heavy cost they had reached the foot of the hill, they were confronted by a solid stone wall, four feet high, from behind which a Confederate brigade of infantry mowed them down like grass, exposing but their heads to our bullets, and these only while themselves firing. Never did men fight better or die, alas! more fruitlessly than did

[8] Night of Dec. 10–11.

[9] Among the volunteers first to cross was Rev. Arthur B. Fuller, Chaplain 16th Mass., who was killed by a rifle-shot.

[10] Dec. 11–12.

VIEW OF FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA.

most of Hancock's corps, especially Meagher's Irish brigade, composed of the 63d, 69th, and 88th New York, the 28th Massachusetts, and the 116th Pennsylvania, which dashed itself repeatedly against those impregnable heights, until two-thirds[11] of its number strewed the ground; when the remnant fell back to a position of comparative safety, and were succeeded as they had been supported, by other brigades and divisions; each to be exposed in its turn to like pitiless, useless, hopeless slaughter. Thus Hancock's and French's corps were successively sent up against those slippery heights, girdled with batteries, rising, tier above tier, to its crest, all carefully trained upon the approaches from Fredericksburg; while that fatal stone wall—so strong that even artillery could make no impression on it—completely sheltered Barksdale's brigade, which, so soon as our charging columns came within rifle-shot, poured into their faces the deadliest storm of musketry. Howard's division supported the two in advance; while one division of Wilcox's (9th, late Burnside's) corps was detached to maintain communication with Franklin on our left.

Hooker's grand division was divided, and in good part sent to reënforce Franklin; while Hooker himself, believing the attack hopeless, required repeated and imperative orders from Burnside to induce him to order an advance; but Humphreys's division was at length thrown out from Fredericksburg, and bore its full part in the front attack, losing heavily. And thus the fight was maintained till after dark—assault after assault being delivered by divisions advancing against twice their numbers, on ground where treble the force was required for the attack that sufficed for the defense; while a hundred Rebel cannon, posted on heights which our few guns on that side of the river could scarcely reach, and could not effectually batter, swept our men down from the moment that they began to advance, and while they could do nothing but charge, and fall, and die. And when night at length mercifully arrested this fruitless massacre, though the terraces and slopes leading up to the Rebel works were piled with our dead and our disabled, there was no pretense that the Rebel front had been advanced one foot from the ground held by it in the morning. We had reason enough for sorrow, but none for shame.

Franklin, on our left, beside his

[11] Gen. Meagher, in his official report, says:

"Of the 1,200 I led into action, only 280 appeared on parade next morning."

Among his officers who fell, he mentions Col. Heenan, Lt.-Col. Mulholland, and Maj. Bardwell, 116th Pa.; Maj. Wm. Horgan and Adj. J. R. Young, 88th N. Y.; Maj. James Cavanagh, 69th N. Y.; and Maj. Carraher, 28th Mass.

The London Times's correspondent, watching the battle from the heights, and writing from Lee's headquarters, says:

"To the Irish division, commanded by Gen. Meagher, was principally committed the desperate task of bursting out of the town of Fredericksburg, and forming, under the withering fire of the Confederate batteries, to attack Marye's Heights, towering immediately in their front. Never at Fontenoy, Albuera, nor at Waterloo, was more undoubted courage displayed by the sons of Erin than during those six frantic dashes which they directed against the almost impregnable position of their foe.

"That any mortal men could have carried the position before which they were wantonly sacrificed, defended as it was, it seems to me idle for a moment to believe. But the bodies which lie in dense masses within 40 yards of the muzzles of Col. Walton's guns are the best evidence what manner of men they were who pressed on to death with the dauntlessness of a race which has gained glory on a thousand battle-fields, and never more richly deserved it than at the foot of Marye's Heights on the 13th day of December, 1862."

own 40,000 men, was reënforced, the night before, by two divisions (Kearny's and Hooker's own) from Hooker, raising his command nearly to 55,000. At least half our entire force across the river was thus with Franklin on the left, where the main attack manifestly should have been made, and where Burnside appears to have purposed that it should have been made. But it was after 7 A. M. of the fatal day when Franklin received his orders; which, if they were intended to direct a determined attack in full force, were certainly very blindly and vaguely worded,[12] whereas, a military order should be as precise and clear as language will allow, and as positive as the circumstances will warrant. It is very certain that a Massena or a Blucher could have found warrant in that order for attacking at once with his entire corps, leaving Hooker's men to defend the bridges and act as a reserve; but, if hot work is wanted of a Franklin, it should be required and prescribed in terms more peremptory and less equivocal. He asserts that he expected and awaited further orders, which he never in terms received; at least, not till it was too late to obey them with any hope of success.

Franklin's grand division consisted of the two corps of Reynolds (16,000) and W. F. Smith (21,000), with cavalry under Bayard, raising it nearly or quite to 40,000. At 9 A. M., Reynolds advanced on the left; Meade's division, in front, being immediately assailed by Rebel batteries (J. E. B. Stuart's) on his left flank, which compelled him to halt and silence them. At 11 A. M., he pushed on, fighting; while one of Hooker's divisions in reserve was brought across, and Birney's and Gibbon's divisions were moved up to his support. Reynolds's corps being thus all in line of battle, Meade again gallantly advanced into the woods in his front; grappling, at 1, in fierce encounter, with A. P. Hill's corps, crushing back the brigades of Archer and Lane, and, forcing his way in between them, took some 200 prisoners. Here, in attempting to rally Orr's rifles, which had been disorganized, fell Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg,[13] mortally wounded.

But the enemy rallied all their forces; Early's division, composed of Lawton's, Trimble's, and his own brigades, which, with D. H. Hill's corps, had arrived that morning from Port Royal, after a severe night-march, and been posted behind A. P. Hill, rushed to the front; and Meade's division, lacking prompt support,

[12] "Gen. Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The General commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column, of a division or more, to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to Gens. Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an Orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.'

"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of Staff.

"Major-Gen. FRANKLIN, Commanding Grand Division Army of Potomac."

[13] Governor elect of South Carolina.

was overwhelmed and driven back, with heavy loss, to the railroad, which they had crossed in their advance, where they made a brief stand, but were again hurled back by an impetuous, determined Rebel charge, losing many prisoners.

Meade had already called for aid: and Gen. Gibbon had advanced on his right, and one of Birney's brigades on his left, whereby the enemy were checked and repulsed; Col. Atkinson, commanding Lawton's brigade, being here wounded and taken prisoner. Meade's division fell back, having lost 1,760 men this day out some 6,000 engaged; having, of its three Brigadiers, Gen. C. F. Jackson killed, and Col. Wm. T. Sinclair severely wounded. Maj.-Gen. Gibbon, on his right, was also wounded and taken off the field; whereupon, his division fell back also.

Sickles's division of Hooker's men, which had followed Birney's to the front, took the place of Gibbon's; but Smith's corps—21,000 strong—was not sent in, and remained nearer to Fredericksburg, not determinedly engaged throughout the day. Yet, even Reynolds's and Stoneman's corps (the latter composed of Birney's and Sickles's divisions) showed so strong a front that Stonewall Jackson did not venture to assume the offensive till nightfall; when a very brief experience convinced him that he might better let well alone."

The advance of Reynolds's left was for some time retarded by Stuart's cavalry, holding the extreme Rebel right, whose battery opened a most annoying cross-fire on our infantry as it advanced from the Rappahannock. The 9th New York was first sent to take this battery, but failed—taking to their heels instead; when a brigade was brought up by Gen. Tyler, and charged with no better success. A third charge was stopped by the deadly fire of the Rebel battery; when more troops were brought up on our side, and the enemy at length flanked and gradually crowded back to the Massaponax; but they still maintained a bold front, and kept up the contest till nightfall; having succeeded in diverting from Reynolds's main attack in front a force which he could ill afford to spare.

Our losses on this bloody day were not less than 15,000 men; though the number returned as actually killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, foots up but 13,771—as follows:

	Killed.	*Woun'd.*	*Miss'g.*	*Total.*
Hooker's grand division.....	327	2,469	748	3,548
Franklin's grand division...	338	2,480	1,581	4,679
Sumner's grand division....	480	4,159	855	5,494
Engineers.....	7	43	100	50
Total.....	1,152	9,101	3,284	13,771

Not one of these died more lamented than Maj.-Gen. George D. Bayard, commanding our cavalry on the left, who was struck by a shell and mortally wounded; dying that night. But 28 years old, and on the

[14] Jackson, with exemplary candor, says in his official report:

"Repulsed on the right, left, and center, the enemy, soon after, reformed his lines, and gave some indications of a purpose to renew the attack. I waited some time to receive it; but, he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be proceeded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in the evening; so that, if compelled to retire, it would be under the cover of night. Owing to unexpected delay, the movement could not be got ready till late in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned."

eve of marriage, his death fell like a pall on many loving hearts.

Lee at first reported his losses at "about 1,800 killed and wounded" —one of those preposterous misrepresentations to which commanders on either side were too prone. His actual loss, as embodied in the detailed reports of Longstreet and Jackson, was over 5,000,[24] and may probably be fairly estimated at 6,000, including 500 unwounded prisoners. He claims to have taken 900 prisoners and 9,000 small arms, but no guns.

Thus closed what the exulting correspondent at Lee's headquarters of *The Times* (London) calls "a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic." Not so, O owl-eyed scribe! but rather one of those days of bloody baptism from whose regenerating flood that Republic was divinely appointed to rise to a purer life, a nobler spirit, a grander, more benignant destiny!

It would be incredible on any testimony less conclusive than his own[25] that Gen. Burnside, on the very heel of this prodigal, horrible carnage, resolved to attack again next day, and on the very point where the enemy's lines had been proved impregnable at a cost of 10,000 men. Another butchery as fruitless and still more demoralizing would doubtless have been incurred, but for the timely and forcible remonstrance of stern old Sumner —who never kept out of a fight when there was a shadow of excuse for going in—and who protested, backed by nearly every General in the army, against such suicidal madness. Burnside finally gave way, and thus probably saved the 9th corps (of old, his own) from useless, inexcusable sacrifice.

[24] Longstreet reports his losses thus: killed, 251; wounded, 1,516; missing, 127: total, 1,894. Jackson gives his as—killed, 344; wounded, 2,545; missing, 526: total, 3,415: grand total, 5,309. Among their killed, beside those already mentioned, was Brig.-Gen. T. R. R. Cobb, of Ga., brother of Howell Cobb. Among their wounded, were Brig.-Gens. J. R. Cooke and W. D. Pender.

[25] He says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"The two attacks were made, and we were repulsed; still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme advance.

"That night, I went all over the field on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight. I found the feeling to be rather against an attack the next morning; in fact, it was decidedly against it.

"I returned to my headquarters, and, after conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps—which was the corps I originally commanded—to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments. It consisted of some 18 old regiments, and some new ones; and I desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments, by coming quickly up after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and, by going in with them, they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the order. The order was given, and the column of attack was formed.

"The next morning, just before the column was to have started, Gen. Sumner came to me and said: 'General, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it; and I think it will prove disastrous to the army.' Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of an advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same impression prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated. And besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack; that he would give me all the support that he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed, I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried."

The two armies stood facing each other throughout the 14th and 15th: Lee strengthening his defenses and awaiting a renewal of the attack; Burnside at length deciding to withdraw all but Hooker's corps across the river, and continue to hold Fredericksburg; but this he finally gave up, on Hooker's representation that he should be unable to hold the town; and decided to rēcross his entire army during the night of the 15th; which was quietly effected without serious loss. A few of our desperately wounded, a few pickets, and considerable ammunition, were left by us in Fredericksburg; but Franklin did not lose a man; and not one gun was abandoned as a trophy of this ill-starred advance on Richmond. Our pontoons were all taken up and brought off; the Rebels next day rëoccupying Fredericksburg and their side of the river; and thenceforth pickets and sharp-shooters fired across the stream, whenever any temptation to a shot was afforded, with as business-like an air as though the Rappahannock had always been the boundary of two hostile empires, over which no armed force had ever ventured.

Lee has been blamed for not following up his advantage; and it is just possible that he might have made something by a tremendous bombardment of the town while still crowded with our decimated, disheartened troops—possibly by a sudden, determined assault upon it, or upon Franklin's wing, with the great body of his army. But how could he know at once how severely we had suffered? And, even if he *did* know, would it have been wise to rush his men upon our batteries, as ours had been rushed upon his? Jackson had decided against this, when in the flush of his success; and he decided wisely. To push forward their men till under the fire of our heavy guns, commandingly posted on our side of the Rappahannock, would have been to imitate Burnside's blunder; and they had not 15,000 men to spare."[17]

General Burnside's errors in this movement were errors of judgment only; and these were nobly redeemed by his subsequent conduct and bearing. Though he had accepted the chief command with unfeigned reluctance and self-distrust, and keenly felt that he had not been fairly treated in the matter of the pontoons, and that Franklin had not done his best in the hour of trial, he excused others and took all the blame on himself. In his report to Gen. Halleck,[18] he says:

"But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position, we should almost certainly have succeeded; in which case, the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days—long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his stronghold to fight me with his infantry—after which, we rēcrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property.

[17] Lee's 'General Order No. 38,' dated Dec. 21, congratulating his army on their success in this encounter, says:

"The immense army of the enemy completed its preparations for the attack without interruption, and gave battle in its own time, and *on ground of its own selection.*

"It was encountered by *less than twenty thousand* of this brave army; and its columns, crushed and broken, hurled back at every point, with such fearful slaughter, that escape from entire destruction became the boast of those who had advanced in full confidence of victory."

This is so unfair as to be essentially false, and quite unworthy of a great soldier.

[18] Dec. 19.

"As the day broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade—not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

"To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe every thing. For the failure in the attack, *I* am responsible; as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.

"To the families and friends of the dead, I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies; but for the wounded, I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery.

"The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible."

But General Burnside's usefulness as commander of the Army of the Potomac was at an end. Officers and soldiers alike felt that he had sadly misjudged in ordering an assault on the bristling heights south of Fredericksburg—still more, in seeking to repeat that assault after the bloody, calamitous experience of the 13th—and the popularity of McClellan was immensely strengthened and widened by that disastrous repulse. Whatever his faults, 'Little Mac' had ever been careful of the lives of his men; and this fact was now remembered to his credit. Had the army been polled for the choice of a commander at any time during the month following our withdrawal from Fredericksburg, it is probable that McClellan would have had a decisive majority, and morally certain that Burnside's supporters would have proved a still more indubitable minority.

The latter, however, had no idea of sitting down under his defeat. While the Rebel chiefs were congratulating each other that the Army of the Potomac had been paralyzed, at least for the Winter, he was planning a fresh and determined advance on Richmond. Within a fortnight after his bloody repulse, he ordered[29] rations cooked, wagons packed, and every thing made ready for a general movement; intending to make a feint above Fredericksburg, but to cross at the Sedden House, six or seven miles below; while 2,500 cavalry, with 4 guns, crossing at Kelly's ford, were to raid across the Virginia Central, the Lynchburg and the Weldon Railroads, blowing up the locks on the James River Canal; crossing the Nottoway, and reporting to Gen. Peck, in command at Suffolk; while several other flying expeditions were to distract the enemy's attention and deceive him as to the significance of the general movement. He had just given[30] the initial impulse to this combined movement, when a telegram from the President arrested it; and, repairing at once to Washington, Gen. B. learned that representations had been made at headquarters by certain of his subordinates, prompted and sustained by others, that, if he were permitted to proceed, in the existing temper of the army, he would inevitably incur disasters so grave as to signally belittle, if not wholly efface, those of the recent failure. In deference to these representations, the President had telegraphed as he did; and the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief, though now for the first time apprised of the clandestine communications of army officers to Mr. Lincoln, failed even to attempt a removal of the impression

[29] Dec. 26.

[30] Dec. 30.

they had made on the President's mind.

Returning to the army, Gen. Burnside soon ascertained that certain details of the proposed cavalry movement had transpired—in fact, he was assured by Gen. Pleasanton that they were known among Secessionists in Washington two or three days after his first interview with the President—so he abandoned that movement; intending to make one somewhat different, in the course of a few days.

This new movement contemplated a crossing in force at Banks's and at the United States fords, above Fredericksburg; the crossing below being also made, or at least menaced, as originally proposed: and again his preparations were perfected and his army now put [21] in motion; when, at 10 P. M., there burst over it one of the severest and most trying storms ever experienced in that region. Snow, driving sleet, pouring rain, a general breaking up of the roads, hitherto hard and dry; and a chaos of the elements which rendered locomotion impossible and life under the drenching sky scarcely endurable, arrested that advance at its outset, and fixed our army in the mire wherein it for hours wretchedly, sullenly, hopelessly floundered. Daylight exposed to the enemy across the stream movements which were intended to be consummated under the cover of night: they were not foolish enough, had they been able, to squander their men and animals in attempts to assail our stalled and struggling forces; but they guarded the fords so strongly that Burnside was glad to order his men back to their old camps—some of which they had burned on quitting, in the confident expectation that they should nevermore need them.

Gen. Burnside, having discovered, as he believed, the officers who had paralyzed his efforts by fomenting discontent in his army, and by disheartening communications to Washington, now prepared a general order ('No. 8'), dismissing [22] them from the service; but, on the advice of a trusted friend, decided to submit it to the President before giving it publicity or effect. He did so; and the President, after consultation with his official advisers, decided, instead of approving the order, to relieve Gen. Burnside from command; which was accordingly done: the order stating that Gen. B. was so relieved *at his own request*—against which, Gen. B. remonstrated as most unjust, pressing his demand that his resignation should be accepted instead; but he was finally persuaded to withdraw it, and agree to serve wherever his aid might be required, allowing any order to be published that might be deemed essential to the public weal. Thus ended [23] his command of the Army of the Potomac.

During this Winter and the ensuing Spring, a number of raids were made by the Rebel cavalry: one [24]

[21] Jan. 20, 1863.

[22] Maj.-Gen. Hooker, with Brig.-Gens. W. T. H. Brooks and John Newton, were designated in this order for ignominious dismissal from the service; while Maj.-Gens. W. B. Franklin and W. F Smith, and Brig.-Gens. John Cochrane and Edward Ferrero, with Lt.-Col. J. H. Taylor, were relieved from duty with this army.

[23] Jan. 28. Gen. Sumner, at his own request, and Gen. Franklin, with expressive silence, were relieved by the same order. Gen. Sumner died soon afterward, at Syracuse, N. Y.

[24] Dec. 25, 1862.

by J. E. B. Stuart across the Rappahannock to Dumfries, where 25 wagons and some 200 prisoners were taken, and thence toward Alexandria and around Fairfax Court House, burning the railroad bridge across the Accotink, and returning in triumph with their spoils; another,[25] by a party of Imboden's troopers, farther west, from the Valley to Romney, where the guards of a supply train were surprised and routed: 72 men, 106 horses, and 27 wagons taken and carried off; a third,[26] by Fitz Hugh Lee, across the Rappahannock, near Falmouth, surprising a camp, and taking 150 prisoners, with a loss of 14 men; a fourth,[27] by Gen. W. E. Jones, in the Valley, routing two regiments of Milroy's cavalry, and taking 200 prisoners, with a loss of 4 men only; while a more daring raid was made by Maj. White, of Jones's command, across the Potomac at Poolesville, taking 77 prisoners. Lee further reports that Capt. Randolph, of the Black Horse cavalry, by various raids into Fauquier county, captured over 200 prisoners and several hundred stand of arms; and that Lt. Moseby (whose name now makes its first appearance in a bulletin) "has done much to harass the enemy; attacking him boldly on several occasions, and capturing many prisoners." One or two minor cavalry exploits, recited by Lee in 'General Order No. 29,' read too much like romance to be embodied in sober history; yet such was the depression on our side in Virginia, such the elation and confidence on the other, such the very great advantage enjoyed by Rebel raiders in the readiness of the White inhabitants to give them information, and even to scout in quest of it, throughout that dreary Winter, that nothing that might be asserted of Rebel audacity or Federal imbecility is absolutely incredible.

The somber cloud is lighted by a single flash, not of victory, but of humor. In a Rebel raid far within our lines, Gen. Stoughton, a young Vermont Brigadier, was taken in his bed, near Fairfax Court House, and, with his guards and five horses, hurried off across the Rappahannock. Some one spoke of the loss to Mr. Lincoln next morning: "Yes," said the President; "that of the horses *is* bad; but I can make another General in 5 minutes."

When General Hooker assumed[28] command of the Army of the Potomac, its spirit and efficiency were at a very low ebb. Desertions were at the rate of 200 per day; soldiers clandestinely receiving citizens' clothing by express from relatives and others to facilitate their efforts to escape from a service wherein they had lost all heart. The number shown by the rolls to be absent from their regiments was no less than 2,922 officers and 81,964 non-commissioned[29] officers and soldiers—many of them in hospitals, on leave, or detached on duty; but a majority, probably, had deserted. The frequency, audacity, and success, of the Rebel cavalry raids that Winter forcibly indicate the elation and confidence felt on one side, the apathy, born of despondency, on the other. Superior as its

[25] Feb. 16. [26] Feb. 25. [27] Feb. 26. [28] Jan. 26.

[29] So Gen. Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. But this enormous total probably includes all who had deserted from the regiments composing that army since they were severally organized, as well as the sick and wounded in hospitals.



BRIG. GEN. EDWARD D. BAKER
BRIG. GEN. GEORGE D. BAYARD
BRIG. GEN. NATHANIEL LYON
MAJ. GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK
MAJ. GEN. PHILIP KEARNY
MAJ. GEN. ISAAC I. STEVENS
MAJ. GEN. JAMES S. WADSWORTH
MAJ. GEN. JAMES B. McPHERSON
MAJ. GEN. JOHN F. REYNOLDS
MAJ. GEN. EDWIN V. SUMNER
MAJ. GEN. ORMSBY M. MITCHEL
BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK LANDER
Engd by A H. Ritchie
OUR HEROIC DEAD.

numbers still were, it is questionable that this army was a full match, on equal ground, for its more homogeneous, better disciplined, more self-assured, more determined antagonist.

Gen. Hooker very properly devoted the two ensuing months to improving the discipline, perfecting the organization, and exalting the spirit of his men; with such success that he had, before their close, an army equal in numbers and efficiency to any ever seen on this continent, except that which Gen. McClellan commanded during the first three months of 1861. Its infantry was nearly, if not quite, 100,000 strong; its artillery not less than 10,000, every way well appointed; while its cavalry, numbering 13,000, needed only a fair field and a leader to prove itself the most effective body of horsemen ever brigaded on American soil. Horses and forage having both become scarce in the South, there was not, and never had been, any cavalry force connected with any Rebel army that could stand against it.

Being at length ready, Hooker dispatched [30] Stoneman, with most of his cavalry,[31] up the north side of the river, with instructions to cross, at discretion, above the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, strike Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry brigade (computed at 2,000) near Culpepper Court House, capture Gordonsville, and then pounce on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad near Saxton's Junction, cutting telegraphs, railroads, burning bridges, &c., thence toward Richmond, fighting at every opportunity, and harassing by every means the retreat of the Rebel army, which, it was calculated, would now be retiring on Richmond. The spirit of Hooker's instructions is embodied in these sentences:

"Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be *fight, fight, fight;* bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the General as the Rebel carcasses.

"It devolves upon you, General, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution, are every thing in war; and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the enterprise on which you are about to embark."

These instructions seem to have been at once terse and perspicuous, plainly indicating what was expected, and why it was required; yet leaving ample discretion to him who was to give them effect. Yet it is hard to repress a suspicion that irony lurks in such language, when addressed to an officer like George D. Stoneman.

Our cavalry, carefully screening its movements from the enemy, marched two days westward, and had thrown across one division, when a rain raised the river so rapidly that this vanguard was recalled, swimming its horses; and a succession of April storms kept the streams so full and impetuous, while the roads were rendered so bad, that a fresh advance was postponed to the 27th; Gen. Hooker giving the order for the movement of his infantry and artillery next day.

The time was well chosen. Longstreet, with three divisions, had been detached from Lee's army, and was operating against Gen. Peck below the James; and it is not probable that Lee had much, if any, over 60,000 men on the Rappahannock. True, his position at Fredericksburg was

[30] April 13. [31] He says 13,000, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

very strong, as we had learned to our cost; but it might be turned, as Hooker proceeded to show.

His army was still encamped at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. The 11th (Howard's) and 12th (Slocum's) corps moved up the river, but carefully avoiding observation from the hostile bank, so far as Kelly's ford; crossing there the Rappahannock that night and next morning—the men wading up to their armpits—and the Rapidan at Germania Mills, next day, moving thence rapidly on CHANCELLORSVILLE. The 5th (Meade's) corps followed; crossing the Rapidan at Ely's ford, lower down. Meantime, the 2d (Couch's) corps approached, so nearly as it might unobserved, to both the United States and Banks's fords, ready to cross when these should be flanked by the advance of the 11th, 12th, and 5th behind these fords to Chancellorsville. Resistance had been expected here; but none was encountered, as none worth mentioning had been above; and Couch crossed his corps[29] at the United States ford on pontoons, without the loss of a man. Gen. Hooker, at Morrisville, superintended the movement; following himself to Chancellorsville, where he established his headquarters that night.

This important movement had been skillfully masked by a feint of crossing below Fredericksburg; the 6th (Sedgwick's) corps laying pontoons and actually crossing at Franklin's, two or three miles below; the 1st (Reynolds's) at Pollock's Mill, still lower; the 3d (Sickles's) supporting either or both. Sedgwick was in chief command on this wing. The bridges were ready by daylight of the 29th; and, before daylight, Brooks's division had crossed in boats and driven off the Rebel pickets; while Gen. Wadsworth in like manner led the advance of Reynolds's division; when three pontoon bridges were laid in front of Sedgwick, and every thing made ready for crossing in force. Now Sickles's (3d) corps was ordered to move[29] silently, rapidly to the United States ford, and thence to Chancellorsville, while part of the pontoons were taken up and sent to Banks's ford; Reynolds, after making as great a display as possible, and exchanging some long shots with the Rebels in his front, following, May 2d; raising Hooker's force at and near Chancellorsville to 70,000 men.

Sedgwick, on the other side of the Rebel army, had his own corps, 22,000 strong; while Gen. Gibbon's division of the 2d corps, 6,000 strong, which had been left in its camp at Falmouth to guard our stores and guns from a Rebel raid, was subject to his order; raising his force to nearly 30,000.

Thus far, Gen. Hooker's success had been signal and deserved. His movements had been so skillfully masked that Lee was completely deceived; and the passage of the Rappahannock had been effected, both above and below him, and all its fords seized, without any loss whatever. Never did a General feel more sanguine of achieving not merely a great but a crushing victory. "I have Lee's army in one hand and Richmond in the other," was his exulting remark to those around him as he rode up to the single but capacious brick house—at once mansion and tavern—that then, with its appendages, constituted Chancellorsville. But

[29] April 30.

[29] April 30.

the order he issued thereupon evinces an amazing misapprehension of his real position and its perils. It reads as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,
"April 30, 1863.

"It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the Commanding General announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.

"By command of Maj.-Gen. HOOKER.
"S. WILLIAMS, Ass't Adjt.-Gen."

A General who has but eight days' provisions at hand, and these in the haversacks of his men, with a capricious river between him and his dépôts, and who has been obliged to leave behind most of his heavier guns, as well as his wagons, and is enveloped in a labyrinth of woods and thickets, traversed by narrow roads, and every foot of it familiar to his enemy, while a *terra incognita* even to his guides, has no warrant for talking in that strain. Never were a few "intelligent contrabands," who had traversed those mazes by night as well as by day, more imperatively needed; yet he does not seem to have even seasonably sought their services; hence, his general order just recited, taken in connection with his pending experience, was destined to lend a mournful emphasis to the trite but sound old monition, "Never halloo till you are out of the woods."

The fords of the Rappahannock next above Fredericksburg had been watched by Gen. Anderson with three brigades, some 8,000 strong; but Hooker's dispositions were so skillfully made that he did not anticipate a crossing in force until it was too late to call on Lee for rëenforcements; and he had no choice but to fall back rapidly before our advancing columns to Chancellorsville, where a fourth brigade joined him; but, being still too weak to make head against an army, he obliqued thence five miles toward Fredericksburg, at the point where the two roads from Chancellorsville become one.

Here Lee soon appeared from Fredericksburg, with the divisions of McLaws and the rest of Anderson's own. Jackson, with those of A. P. Hill and Rhodes (late D. H. Hill's), had been watching our demonstration under Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg; but, when Lee heard that Hooker had crossed in force above, he at once inferred that the movement below was a feint, and called Jackson away toward Chancellorsville, adding the division of Trimble to his command and impelling him on a movement against Hooker's extreme right; leaving only Early's division and Barksdale's brigade in front of Sedgwick on our remote left, and to hold the heights overlooking Fredericksburg, which he judged no longer likely to be assailed.

Lee had been outgeneraled in the passage of the Rappahannock on his left, while he was watching for Hooker on his right; but he was not disconcerted. Leaving a very small force in his works on the Fredericksburg heights, he pushed his main body—at least 50,000 strong—down the Gordonsville plank and lateral roads to the point, half-way to Chancellorsville, where the old turnpike intersects the plank road; and was



CHANCELLORSVILLE

Explanations:

A. Positions held by Union troops previous to the movement.
B. Positions held by Rebel troops previous to the movement.
C. Position taken and held by Union troops, April 29.
D. Small force of Rebels routed, April 30.
E. Farthest advance made by Union forces, May 1.
F. Line which Union forces retired to and intrenched, May 1.
G. Jackson's attack on the 11th corps, May 2.
H. Position which Union forces retired to and intrenched, May 3.
I. Heights at Fredericksburg carried by 6th corps, May 3.
J. Advanced position attained by 6th corps.
K. Interior line intrenched previous to retiring of Union forces across U. S. ford, night of May 5th.
L. Route pursued by Jackson's forces.

here concentrated in time to watch the development of Hooker's offensive strategy.

A reconnoissance down the old pike for three miles toward Fredericksburg having developed no hostile force, Gen. Hooker ordered[34] an advance of Sykes's regulars (3d division, 5th corps) on that road, followed by part of the 2d corps; the 1st and 3d divisions of the 5th corps moving on a road farther north, in the direction of Banks's ford; the 11th, followed by the 12th, being thrown out westwardly from Chancellorsville, along the two roads, which are here, for a short distance, blended, but gradually separate. An advance of two or three miles toward Fredericksburg was meditated; but Sykes had hardly traversed a mile when he met the enemy coming on, in greater force, and a sharp conflict ensued, with mutual loss; the Rebels extending their line so as to outflank ours, while Sykes vainly attempted to connect with Slocum (12th corps) on his right. Gen. Warren, who was superintending Sykes's movement, returned and reported progress to Hooker, who ordered Sykes to fall back, which he did; bringing off all but a few of his wounded, and very cautiously followed by the enemy. Thus the prestige of success, in the first collision of the struggle, was tamely conceded to the enemy; and the day closed with the woods and thickets in our front filled with Rebel sharp-shooters, and the crests of the

[34] May 1, 9 A. M.

ridges occupied by his batteries, whence he opened on our left, upon our wagons in the cleared space around the Chancellorsville house, next morning."

The 3d (Sickles's) corps, having arrived by a hard march from below Fredericksburg, had been mainly posted in reserve near our center, while Hooker, about daybreak, rode along his right, which he apprehended was too far extended, or not strongly posted, and which he found no wise prepared by earthworks and batteries for a flank attack; but he was assured by Slocum and Howard that they were equal to any emergency.

Thus our army stood still, when, at 8 A. M., Birney, commanding Sickles's 1st division, which had been thrown well forward toward our right, between the 12th and the 11th corps, reported a continuous movement of Rebel forces along his front toward our right; whereupon, Sickles, at his own suggestion, was ordered by Hooker to push forward Birney's division, followed by another, to look into the matter.

Birney, at 10 A. M., directed Clark's rifled battery to open on the Confederate wayfarers, which he did with great effect, throwing their column into disorder, and compelling it to abandon the road. The movement being evidently continued, however, on some road a little farther off, Sickles, at 1 P. M., directed Birney to charge the passing column; and he did so; bridging with rails a petty creek in his front, passing over his division and two batteries, and striking the rear of the Rebel column with such force that he captured and brought off 500 prisoners.

Sunset found him thus far advanced, holding the road over which the Rebels were originally marching; his division formed in square, with his artillery in the center; Barlow's brigade of the 5th corps, which had advanced to support his right, being up with him; but Whipple's division of the 3d and one of the 12th corps, which were to have covered his left, being invisibly distant.

Soon, panic-stricken fugitives from the 11th, now almost directly in Birney's rear, brought tidings of a great disaster. The Rebel movement to our right, along our front—which had been either culpably disregarded by Howard, or interpreted as a retreat of the Rebel army on Richmond—had culminated, a little before 6 P. M., in a grand burst of Stonewall Jackson, with 25,000 men, on the exposed flank of that corps. Emerging suddenly from the thick woods which enveloped that flank, and charging it from three sides, as it were, the Rebels caught some of our men preparing their suppers, with arms stacked, and gave them no time to recover. In a moment, the 1st division, Gen. Devens, was overwhelmed; its commander being among the the wounded, and one-third of his force, including every General and Colonel, either disabled or captured. Driven back in wild rout down the Chancellorsville road upon the position of Gen. Schurz, it was found that his division had already retreated—perhaps fled is the apter word—and an attempt made to rally and form here proved abortive; the 17th Connecticut, which bore a resolute part in the effort, had its Lt.-Col. killed and its Colonel severely wound-

[a] Saturday, May 2.

ed. Back upon Steinwehr's division rolled the rabble rout, in spite of Howard's frantic exertions; and, although a semblance of organization and consistency was here maintained, the great majority of the corps poured down to Chancellorsville and beyond, spreading the infection of their panic, and threatening to stampede the entire army.

Sickles had been preparing to strike a still heavier blow than that of Birney, and had, to that end, obtained from Hooker Pleasanton's cavalry, perhaps 1,000 strong, with permission to call on Howard and Slocum for aid; when he was thunderstruck by tidings that Howard's corps was demolished. As he had heard no firing of consequence, he refused at first to credit the story; but he was soon constrained to believe it. Not only was the 11th corps gone, but the triumphant Rebels were in his rear, between him and headquarters; so that when, recalling Birney from his advanced position, he sent to Hooker for his 3d division, he was informed that it could not be sent—Hooker having been obliged to use it to arrest the progress of the enemy, and prevent their driving him from Chancellorsville.

Sickles was in a critical position; but he had now his two divisions in hand, with his artillery—which had not been used in Birney's advance—massed in a cleared field; where Pleasanton, coming in from the front with a part of his force, met the rushing flood of fugitives from the right, and was told that a charge of cavalry was required to stop the enemy's advance. (He had at most 500 men, wherewith to arrest a charge of 25,000, led by Stonewall Jackson.) Turning to Maj. Keenan, 8th Pennsylvania, he said, "You must charge into those woods with your regiment, and hold the Rebels until I can get some of these guns into position. You must do it, at whatever cost." "I will," was the calm, smiling response of the patriot, who well understood that the order was his death-warrant. Ten minutes later, he was dead, and a good part of his regiment lay bleeding around him; but their charge had stayed the Rebel rush, and enabled Pleasanton to get his own battery of horse artillery into position, his guns double-shotted with canister, and trained on the ground, 200 yards distant, over which the enemy must come on. And now, clearing the field of fugitives, picking up what guns and ammunition he could from the wreck of the 11th corps, and adding these to Sickles's, he had them all properly posted and double-shotted, and was ready for his expected visitors.

He had not long to wait. The woods in his front were by this time full of them; darkness was falling; and some of the enemy resorted to the unworthy stratagem (quite too common on either side) of displaying a false flag, and pretending to be friends. One of our gunners exclaimed, "General, that is our flag!" whereupon he sent forward an aid to ascertain. "Come on, we are friends!" was called out; and, in another moment, the woods blazed with musketry, and the Rebels charged out of them, rushing upon our guns; which that instant opened, and swept whole ranks of them away. Three charges were thus made—one of them to within fifty yards of the guns—but each was repelled with great slaughter; though Pleasanton had no in-

fantry support worth naming for his batteries; and his few remaining troopers, being green recruits, were not adapted to such an emergency; yet these for a time were all the support he had.

In front of these batteries, fell Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded—by the fire of his own men, they say;[*] but it was dark, in dense woods, and men were falling all around him from our canister and grape; so that it is not impossible that he was among them. Prisoners taken by Pleasanton soon afterward told him that Jackson was mortally wounded, and mentioned other high officers as, like him, stricken down by our fire; adding that their forces were "badly cut up," and, "as to the men, they were disorganized." Still, it seems probable that Jackson fell by a fire from his own infantry, delivered in accordance with his orders.

His loss was the greatest yet sustained by either party in the fall of a single man; though Sidney Johnston had probably military talents of a higher order. But Jackson's power over his men was unequaled; and it was justified by the soundness of his judgment as well as the intrepidity of his character. Contrary to the vulgar notion, his attacks were all well considered, and based on a careful calculation of forces; and he showed as high qualities in refusing to squander his men toward the close of the fray at Antietam, and again at Fredericksburg, as he did in his most brilliant charges. Accident seemed to favor him at times, especially in his later Valley campaign; but then, accident is apt to favor a commander who is never asleep when there is anything to be gained or hoped from being awake, and who, if required, can march his men forty miles per

[*] "The Life of Stonewall Jackson, by a Virginian," gives the following account of his fall:

"Gen. Jackson ordered Gen. Hill to advance with his division, reserving his fire *unless cavalry approached from the direction of the enemy;* and then, with that burning and intense enthusiasm for conflict which lay under his calm exterior, hastened forward to the line of skirmishers who were hotly engaged in front. Such was his ardor, at this critical moment, and his anxiety to penetrate the movements of the enemy, doubly screened as they were by the dense forest and gathering darkness, that he rode ahead of his skirmishers, and exposed himself to a close and dangerous fire from the enemy's sharp-shooters, posted in the timber.

"So great was the danger which he thus ran, that one of his staff said: 'General, don't you think this is the wrong place for you?' He replied quickly: 'The danger is all over; the enemy is routed. Go back, and tell A. P. Hill to press right on!' Soon after giving this order, Gen. Jackson turned, and, accompanied by his staff and escort, rode back at a trot, on his well-known 'Old Sorrel,' toward his own men. Unhappily, in the darkness—it was now 9 or 10 o'clock at night—the little body of horsemen was mistaken for Federal cavalry charging, and the regiments on the right and left of the road fired a sudden volley into them with the most lamentable results. Capt. Boswell, of Gen. Jackson's staff, was killed, and borne into our lines by his horse; Col. Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, was wounded; and two couriers were killed. Gen. Jackson received one ball in his left arm, two inches below the shoulder joint, shattering the bone and severing the chief artery; a second passed through the same arm, between the elbow and wrist, making its exit through the palm of the hand; a third ball entered the palm of his right hand, about the middle, and, passing through, broke two of the bones.

"He fell from his horse, and was caught by Capt. Wormly, to whom he said, 'All my wounds are by my own men.'

"The firing was responded to by the enemy, who made a sudden advance; and, the Confederates falling back, their foes actually charged over Jackson's body. He was not discovered, however; and, the Federals being driven back in turn, he was rescued. Ready hands placed him upon a litter, and he was borne to the rear, amid a heavy fire from the enemy. One of the litter-bearers was shot down, and the General fell from the shoulders of the men, receiving a severe contusion, adding to the injury of the arm, and injuring the side severely. The enemy's fire of artillery on the point was terrible. Gen. Jackson was left for five minutes until the fire slackened, then placed in an ambulance and carried to the field hospital at Wilderness Run."

He died, eight days afterward, at Guineas' Station, five miles from the place of his fall, and his remains rest at Lexington, Va., his home.

day. It is doubtful if all the advantages, including prestige, which the Rebels gained around Chancellorsville, were not dearly purchased by the loss of Thomas Jonathan Jackson.

Pleasanton, no longer annoyed, proceeded with his work, getting batteries arranged, with caissons, &c., from the *débris* left behind by the stampeded corps, until he had forty guns in position, and three roads built across an adjacent marsh; so that, with the support of Sickles's infantry, he deemed his position tenable against the entire Rebel army. Sickles, who was again in communication with Hooker, advanced Birney's division at midnight, Hobart Ward's brigade in front, charging down the plank road, driving back the Rebels, and recovering a part of the ground lost by Howard; bringing away several of our abandoned guns and caissons. And now, reporting in person to Hooker, he was ordered to fall back on Chancellorsville—the collapse of the 11th corps having rendered our force inadequate, as was judged, for the defense of so extended a front. This order would seem to have been unfortunate. At daylight,[97] Sickles commenced the movement—Birney in the rear—and was of course closely followed by the enemy, whose infantry filled the woods; but our men retired slowly and steadily, by successive formations, and left nothing to the enemy but one dismounted gun, a shattered caisson, and our dead.

Lee's army was nearly all now concentrated in Hooker's front, and on his left flank, elated with its easy rout of the 11th corps and its general success; covered by woods, which not merely concealed its inferiority in numbers, but rendered it immaterial; while Hooker had lost heart, by reason of Howard's sudden disaster; and his subordinates were paralyzed by their ignorance of this region of woods and dense thickets, in which they could rarely determine whether they were confronting a regiment or a division, and in which, with 60,000 men at hand, they were never able to put in half that number so as to render them of any service.

At daylight, the Rebels pushed forward heavy columns on their chosen points of attack, infesting our whole front with sharp-shooters, and keeping each of our corps which they had determined not to attack in constant expectation of a charge in force. But their main effort was made from the west, by direct advance on Chancellorsville down the plank road on the ground wherefrom Howard had been hurled. Never did men charge with more desperate determination, more utter recklessness of their own lives, than did that morning the Rebels, now led by J. E. B. Stuart (A. P. Hill having been disabled soon after Jackson was, in front of Pleasanton's batteries), dashing themselves upon Sickles's corps; whose forty guns, ably fought, tore through their close ranks with frightful carnage. Those guns were supported by Berry's and Birney's divisions of their own corps; the remaining division (Whipple's) supporting Berry's, as Williams's (of Slocum's corps) supported Birney's. Charging up to the mouths of our cannon, the Rebels were mowed down by hundreds; but fresh regiments constantly succeeded those which had been shattered; until Sickles, finding

[97] Sunday, May 3.

his cartridges running low, sent word to Hooker that he could not hold his ground without assistance.

Major Tremaine, who bore this message, found the General stunned and senseless. A cannon-ball had just now struck a pillar of the Chancellorsville house, against which he was leaning, and hurled him to the floor. He was supposed by his staff to be dead or dying; so Tremaine could get no response to Sickles's message; and, after sending once more to headquarters in vain, Sickles —his artillery being now out of ammunition—was obliged to recede to his second line of defenses, expecting to be sharply followed, and to be compelled to hold his ground with the bayonet. But the enemy's formation had been so completely pulverized by our guns, and their losses had been so fearful, that half an hour elapsed before they renewed their attack. Had a corps been promptly sent to his assistance, Sickles believes that victory was his own.

The precious hour passed, while our army was without a head. Gen. Couch was next in rank, and might have assumed active command during Hooker's insensibility, but hesitated to do so. Nothing had been done to relieve Sickles's corps of the weight of all Jackson's force, save that French and Hancock, with two divisions of Couch's corps, had charged the left of the Rebel attacking force, then threatening Meade's front, and forced it back. But this scarcely abated the pressure on Sickles, who was freshly assailed in his new position, and—being still nearly destitute of ammunition—was again compelled to recoil, after repelling, mainly with the bayonet, five fierce charges, and capturing eight flags. Under Couch's orders, our army was generally withdrawn a mile northward, or toward the Rappahannock, leaving the wreck of the Chancellorsville house to the enemy, whose guns had by this time reduced it to a heap of ruins.

Sickles testified, when before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that only his and a part of the 12th (Slocum's) corps were engaged when he first sent to Hooker for help; and that, with 10,000 of the 30,000 then unengaged, he could have won a decided victory. As it was, the fact that he lost no prisoners, while he took several hundred, and that nearly 4,000 of his 18,000 men were that day disabled, including two of his three division commanders (Berry and Whipple) killed, and Gen. Mott, of the New Jersey brigade, wounded, without the loss of a gun[36] on his repeated retreats,

[36] Sickles, in his testimony, says:

"At the conclusion of the battle of Sunday, Capt. Seeley's battery, which was the last that fired a shot in the battle of Chancellorsville, had 45 horses killed, and in the neighborhood of 40 men killed and wounded; but, being a soldier of great pride and ambition, and not wishing to leave any of his material in the hands of the enemy, he withdrew so entirely at his leisure that he carried off all the harness from his dead horses, loading his cannoniers with it; he even took a part of a set of harness on his own arm, and so moved to the rear. I think this is as significant a fact as I can state to you, indicating the inability of the enemy to follow up."

Gen. Hancock, commanding a division of the 2d corps, thus describes, in his testimony, the retirement of our army from Chancellorsville:

"My position was on the other side of the Chancellor house: and I had a fair view of this battle, although my troops were facing and fighting the other way. The first lines referred to finally melted away, and the whole front appeared to pass out. First the 3d corps went out; then the 12th corps, after fighting a long time; and there was nothing left on that part of the line but my own division—that is, on that extreme point of the line on the side of the Chancellor house toward the enemy. I was directed to hold that position until a change of

save that lost at daylight, sufficiently proves that the ground we conceded was lost by reason of misfortune or bad generalship, not by lack of valor or endurance in our soldiers.

Gen. Hooker recovered his consciousness and resumed command by noon; but the fighting on this front was now nearly over: Lee's attention being forcibly drawn to Sedgwick, who was operating on his rear, where Hooker had expected him to strike heavily at an early hour this morning.

Sedgwick, whose operations had hitherto been intended only to distract attention from the movement on our right, had been directed[*] by Hooker to cross at Fredericksburg, and advance forthwith on the road to Chancellorsville, demolishing any force that might attempt to bar his progress, until he should fall upon Lee's rear, simultaneously with an attack by Hooker on his front, and thus crush him between them. How hazardous such attempts at concerted attack on a great army from opposite and distant points are, was not now to be first learned.

The order found Sedgwick already across the river, but at a point two or three miles below the city Gen. Warren, who was sent by Hooker, after the stampede of the 11th corps, to urge Sedgwick to evince all possible alacrity, found him, at 3 A. M. of the eventful Sunday, just getting his corps in motion, and explained to him Hooker's critical position and the necessity for prompt action in this quarter. The night was clear; there was a full moon; and it would not have been impossible to march a corps from Sedgwick's pontoons to Chancellorsville between midnight and 6 A. M., had there been nothing in his way. But there was a serious obstacle—to wit, Lee's army; some portion of which was in Sedgwick's immediate front, and opened a straggling fire on the heads of his columns so soon as he commenced his march; and at daylight he was just entering Fredericksburg, instead of approaching Chancellorsville. By this time, Gibbon had laid a pontoon, and was crossing into the city, raising Sedgwick's force to nearly 30,000 men. Meanwhile, the Rebel troops in this quarter had been concentrating on Marye's hill, where they had several guns in position; while a canal covering their left, with the bridges all taken up, increased the difficulty of carrying the hill by assault.

One attempt to clear the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the hill was repulsed; and it was nearly 11 A. M.,

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line of battle could be made, and was to hold it until I was notified that all the other troops had gotten off. This necessitated my fighting for a time both ways. I had two lines of battle; one facing toward Fredericksburg, and the other line behind that. And I had to face about the troops in the rear line, so as to be ready for the enemy in that direction, who were coming on. I had a good deal of artillery; and, although the enemy massed their infantry in the woods very near me, and attempted to advance, and always held a very threatening attitude, I judge they had exhausted their troops so much that they dared not attack me, although I remained there for some time alone in this position, very heavily engaged with artillery all the time, and some of my men of the rear line occasionally being shot by their infantry at a distance of several hundred yards. There was no forcible attack on me; and, when the time came, I marched off to my new position, probably three-quarters of a mile from the old position, toward United States ford, where the new line of battle was laid out.

"We immediately commenced to fortify that position by throwing up rifle-pits, and held it until we recrossed the river. In the mean time, we had given up all those great roads connecting with Fredericksburg. The enemy took possession of the belt of woods between us and those roads, and held us in the open space, and commenced using the roads we had abandoned, and marched down and attacked Sedgwick, as it proved afterward."

[*] By order dated May 2, 9 P. M.: received at 11.

before Sedgwick had completed such dispositions as he deemed requisite to storm the heights; when, advancing resolutely, those heights were quickly carried; Gen. Howe's (2d) division forming three storming columns, under Gen. Neill and Cols. Grant and Seaver, and carrying Cemetery hill under a heavy fire of artillery, pushing thence to Marye's hill, which was likewise carried with little loss; our columns having scarcely been checked in their advance: the Rebel force (the 19th and 20th Mississippi, under Barksdale) being too light. Among the trophies of this success were 200 prisoners, some guns, camp equipage, &c.

Having rëformed his brigades, Sedgwick, leaving Gibbon at Fredericksburg, moved out on the Chancellorsville road on the track of Barksdale, following him three or four miles to Salem church, where the Rebels halted and began to fight in earnest; being joined by Wilcox, who had fallen back from Banks's ford. The position was strong, its flanks well covered by woods, and repeated attempts to carry it proved abortive.

By this time (5 P. M.), Lee—the fighting around Chancellorsville being over—had thrown McLaws this way, with orders and men to stop Sedgwick's progress; and they did it. The fight continued till dark; but the enemy were on high ground, and held it; McLaws now taking command against us, with his force continually augmenting. Being the assailants, we of course lost the greater number; and our men lay down on their arms, with little hope of forcing their way through to Hooker on *that* line, especially since he gave no signs of vitality, and afforded no promise of vigorous cöoperation.

Morning broke;[40] and Sedgwick's position was fast becoming critical. The enemy were not only in force on his front, but were feeling around his left, and even back to the heights above Fredericksburg. He was not strong enough to fight the whole Rebel army; yet, should Hooker remain torpid, that luxury was just ahead. He received several dispatches from his chief during the day, evincing a very unsettled frame of mind: one, written early in the morning, saying, "You must not try to force the position you attacked at 5 P. M. Look to the safety of your corps;" another, dated 11 A. M., saying, "If it is practicable for you to maintain a position on the south side of the Rappahannock, near Banks's ford, do so;" and another, dated fifty minutes later:

"If the necessary information can be obtained to-day, and, if it shall be of the character the commanding General anticipates, it is his intention to advance upon the enemy to-morrow. In this event, the position of your corps on the south bank of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the General could desire. It is for this reason that he desires that your corps should not cross the Rappahannock."

While Hooker was thus hesitating and vacillating,[41] the Rebels were acting. No longer dreading an offen-

[40] Monday, May 4.

[41] At 1 A. M., May 5, Hooker telegraphed him: "Dispatch this moment received. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt."

Sedgwick had accordingly brought across most of his force, under a heavy fire of shell; when, at 3:20 A. M., he received this dispatch, dated 20 minutes later than the foregoing, but of course based on one intermediately received from him, (S.) saying that he could hold on south of the river if required:

sive from his side, they concentrated largely upon his isolated lieutenant; rëoccupying the Fredericksburg heights, and, striking him in flank, pushed him down toward the river, and, during the night, over it, at Banks's ford, with heavy loss—hardly less than 5,000 men."[42]

Sedgwick being now out of the way, Lee was at liberty to turn with all his force on Hooker, who still remained within his hasty earthworks between Chancellorsville and the Rappahannock. But the Rebels had been marched and fought till they were exhausted, and had been fearfully slaughtered in their reckless rushes on our batteries on Sunday. They may have been willing to repeat that madness; but Lee manifestly was not. The day passed with little skirmishing and no serious fighting; and, at evening, Hooker called a council of corps commanders, which decided nothing; but he determined to rëcross that night, and did so, utterly unmolested. He states that he brought back one gun more than he took over, and judges that he inflicted greater injury than he received. That is probably an overestimate: since he admits a total loss, while across the Rappahannock, of no less than 17,197 men—as follows:

Sedgwick's (6th) Corps,	4,601	Sickles's (3d) corps,	4,049
Slocum's (12th) "	2,883	Howard's (11th) "	2,508
Couch's (2d) "	2,025	Meade's (5th) "	699
Reynolds's (1st) "	292	Cavalry, &c.	150

He adds that a Rebel surgeon at Richmond stated the loss of their side in these struggles at 18,000;" and it is significant that no official statement of their losses was ever made, and that Pollard is silent on the subject. It is quite probable that, while the prestige of success was wholly with the Rebels, their losses were actually more exhausting than ours. And the violent storm and consequent flood which attended and covered Hooker's rëcrossing, setting some of his pontoons adrift and threatening to separate him from his resources, is cited on one side to explain his retreat, and on the other to excuse Lee's failure to molest it.

Hooker, his army having returned to their familiar camping-ground on the north of the Rappahannock, issued " a congratulatory order, wherein he says:

"The Major-General commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected,

"Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both."

When this came to hand, it is needless to add that its execution was impossible.

[42] Pollard gives the following account of this movement from the Rebel side; which must serve for want of a better:

"The enemy, however, was not yet defeated. One more struggle remained; and, to make that, the enemy during the night massed a heavy force against McLaws's left, in order to establish communication with Hooker along the river road. Anderson moved rapidly to the support of McLaws, and reached the church about 12 M., having marched 15 miles. Gen. Lee having arrived on the field, ordered Anderson to move round the church and establish his right on Early's left (Early having come up from Hamilton's crossing, in rear of the enemy). The enemy having weakened his left, in order to force McLaws and gain the river road, Gen. Lee massed a heavy force upon this weakened part of the enemy, and, at a concerted signal, Anderson and Early rushed upon the enemy's left.

"The signal for the general attack was not given until just before sunset, when our men rushed upon the enemy like a hurricane. But little resistance was made: the beaten foe having fled in wild confusion in the direction of Banks's ford. At dark, a short pause ensued; but, as soon as the moon rose, the enemy was speedily driven to Banks's ford, and on that night of the 4th of May ended this remarkable series of battles on the lines of the Rappahannock."

[43] Among them, Gen. Paxton, killed; and Gen. Heth, wounded.

[44] May 6th.

the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say they were of a character not to be foreseen nor prevented by human sagacity or resources.

"In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents. In fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interest or honor may demand. It will also be the guardian of its own history and its own honor.

"By our celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers was undisputed, and, on our withdrawal, not a Rebel ventured to follow.

"The events of last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army. We have added new luster to its former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have inflicted heavier blows than we have received. We have taken from the enemy 5,000 prisoners, 15 colors; captured and brought off 7 pieces of artillery; placed *hors de combat* 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his dépôts filled with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle."

Lee issued a kindred order next day; in which, with at least equal justice and modesty, he says:

"With heartfelt gratification, the General commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men, during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged.

"Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance He has wrought.

"It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the troops unite on Sunday next in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name.

"Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defense of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example. The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one [Jackson] to whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success."

The operations of our cavalry, under Stoneman and Averill, had been ill-judged, feeble, and inefficient as well could be. Averill, who was on the right, went out to Culpepper Court House, and thence to the Rapidan; where he remained, attempting nothing and achieving it, till an order from Hooker reached[*] him, directing his return to the north side of the Rappahannock; which was obeyed with alacrity.

Stoneman himself pushed down by Louisa Court House and Yanceyville to Thompson's Cross-Roads, on the South Anna; having meantime sent Col. Wyndham with a detachment to Columbia, on the James, where a little damage was done and more attempted to the James and Kanawha Canal. Gen. Gregg, with the 1st Maine and 10th New York, was impelled eastward, to destroy the railroad bridge on the Fredericksburg road at Ashland; but proved unequal to the task, and contented himself with burning two or three turnpike bridges; falling back upon Stoneman. Col. Judson Kilpatrick was sent, with the Harris Light, to cut the railroads leading northward from Richmond still nearer that city, and struck[†] the Fredericksburg road at

[*] May 2.

[†] May 4.

Hungary, cut it, pressing thence to the Virginia Central road, near Meadow Bridge, doing there a little mischief, and thence pushing north-eastward across the Pamunkey near Hanover, and the Mattapony at Aylett's, to King and Queen Court House, and thence south-eastwardly to our lines[47] at Gloucester Point, on York river. Lt.-Col. B. F. Davis, 12th Illinois, had meantime passed[48] down the South Anna to Ashland, where he tore up some rails and captured a train of sick, whom he paroled, and crossed thence to Hanover Station on the Central, which was fractured, and considerable Confederate property destroyed. Davis then pushed down to within seven miles of Richmond, where he bivouacked that night, and set his face next morning toward Williamsburg on the Peninsula; but was stopped and turned aside by a Rebel force at Tunstall's Station, near White House; moving thence northward until he fell in with Kilpatrick near King and Queen Court House, and escaped with him to Gen. King's outpost at Gloucester Point. Stoneman, with Gregg and Buford, turned back[49] from Yanceyville, recrossing the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, and the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford.[50]

Attempts were made to represent Stoneman's movement as successful, when it was in fact one of the most conspicuous failures of the war, though it might and should have been far otherwise. His force, if held well together, was sufficient to have severed for at least a week all connection by rail or telegraph between Lee and Richmond, riding right over any array of cavalry that could have been sent against it, and cutting the Fredericksburg road at or above its junction with the Central; as, below that point, cutting one of those roads, even permanently, was of little use; since communication between Richmond and Fredericksburg might be maintained by either. By keeping his entire force in hand, and thus going where and as he would, Stoneman might have destroyed the principal bridges on both roads, rendering them impassable for weeks; and brought away thousands of able-bodied negroes, mounted on as many serviceable horses. As it was, by dissipating his forces, he rendered them too weak at most points to effect any thing, and kept them running from the enemy instead of running after them; thus giving to his expedition the appearance rather of a furtive raid on smoke-houses and hen-roosts than that of an important movement in a great war. The few little gaps made in the railroads by his detachments were easily and quickly closed; while the 300 horses and mules he brought away would not half replace the horses broken down by his men—mainly in keeping out of the enemy's way.

While Hooker was preparing for and executing his movement across the Rappahannock, Longstreet, with a large force, was aiming a similar blow at the extreme left of our position in Virginia; where Gen. John J. Peck held the little village of Suffolk, with a force ultimately increased to 14,000 men, aided by three gunboats on the Blackwater. Suffolk being an important railroad junction, covering the landward ap-

[47] May 7. [48] May 3. [49] May 5. [50] May 8.

proaches to Norfolk, and virtually commanding that portion of North Carolina which lies east of the Chowan, had been occupied and fortified for the Union not long after the recovery of Norfolk, and a fight had occurred[81] at Kelly's Store, eight miles south of it, between a Rebel force under Gen. Roger A. Pryor and a Union expedition under Gen. M. Corcoran, wherein both sides claimed the advantage. Our loss was 24 killed and 80 wounded. Pryor reports that his loss "will not exceed 50;" among them Col. Poage, 5th Virginia, and Capt. Dobbins, killed.

Suffolk was never seriously threatened till the Spring of 1863, when Longstreet advanced[82] against it with a force which Peck estimates at 40,000: 24,000 (three divisions) having been drawn from Lee's army; while D. H. Hill had brought a full division from North Carolina. There was sharp fighting during the ensuing week, but the advantages of shelter and of naval cöoperation on our side overbalanced that of superior numbers; and every attempt to break through our rather extended lines was decidedly repulsed. A Rebel battery having been planted near the west branch of the Nansemond, it was stormed and carried by Gen. Getty, with the 8th Connecticut and 89th New York, aided by Lt. Lamson and our gunboats: 6 guns and 200 prisoners being the net profit. Still, the siege was prosecuted, with no decided success, until May 3d; when Longstreet gave it up and drew off—doubtless under orders given by Lee when he seemed most in need of help on the Rappahannock. Peck estimates the Rebel loss during the siege at 2,000 men; while ours was inconsiderable.

XVII.

LEE'S ARMY ON FREE SOIL—GETTYSBURG.

While Gen. Hooker and his army, having returned to their old quarters about Falmouth, were still looking across the Rappahannock at the heights and woods so recently and so fruitlessly crimsoned with their blood, Gen. Lee was impelled to break the brief rest by a determined and daring offensive. He was, of course, aware that our army had been depleted, directly after its sanguinary experience of Chancellorsville, by the mustering out of some 20,000 nine months' and two years' men; while his own had been largely swelled by the hurried return of Longstreet and his corps from their sterile and wasteful demonstration on Suffolk, and by drafts on every quarter whence a regiment could be gleaned; so that it is probable that the superiority in numbers was temporarily on his side; but why not seek directly a collision, which "Fighting Joe" would so readily have accorded? Why shun the convenient and inspiring neighborhood of Cedar Mountain and Bull Run for one more remote, and which invoked ominous recollections of South Moun-

[81] Jan. 30.

[82] April 10.

tain and the Antietam? Grant was beginning to be triumphant in Mississippi, and would soon be thundering at the gates of Vicksburg; Dick Taylor, chased almost out of Louisiana by Banks, could do little toward the rescue of threatened Port Hudson: why not spare Longstreet to needy, beseeching Jo. Johnston, enabling him to overwhelm Grant and then to crush out Banks, restoring the Confederate ascendency on the Mississippi, while simply holding on along the Rappahannock, trusting to the great advantages afforded to the defensive by the rugged topography of that region, and to the terrors inspired by the memories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville?

In fact, Lee's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania at that juncture was justifiable on political grounds alone. The Confederate chiefs must have acted on the strength of trusted assurances that the Northern Peace Democracy, detesting the Emancipation policy now steadfastly ascendant at Washington, and weary of high taxes, dear fabrics, a disordered currency, and an enormous yet swelling National Debt, were ripe for revolt: so that a Rebel victory on Northern soil would enable the devotees of Slavery in the loyal States to seize upon the pending Conscription and wield it as an engine of revolution. Lee hints this obscurely where, in the opening of his report on this campaign, after trying to give military reasons for his movement, and failing to satisfy himself of their plausibility, he says:

"In addition to these results, it was hoped that *other valuable results* might be attained by military success."

A month had barely elapsed since Hooker recrossed the Rappahannock, when Lee put his columns in motion up the southern bank of that river. McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps led[1] the march from Fredericksburg, followed[2] by Ewell's corps; while Hood moved up from the Rapidan; all concentrating, with the cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, on Culpepper Court House. These movements were of course carefully screened from observation on our side; A. P. Hill's corps being left to make as much display as possible in and around Fredericksburg: but Hooker was soon aware that something unusual was in progress, and threw[3] over Gen. Howe's division of the 6th corps a little below the city, to ascertain if the enemy were still in force there. Hill soon convinced him that they were; creating an impression that there had been no material reduction of the Rebel strength in that quarter; but, as it was not his policy to fight, and Howe did not care to attack the entire Rebel army, there was no serious conflict. Howe, after some careful skirmishing, desisted, and ultimately withdrew without loss.

It being at length clear that the enemy were operating on our right, Hooker massed his cavalry near Catlett's Station, giving its command to Pleasanton, who speedily prepared to look across the Rappahannock and see what was going on there. He was backed by two small but choice brigades of infantry under Gen. Ames, of the 11th, and Gen. Russell, of the 6th corps, each taking a battery; and the whole moved quietly down to Kelly's and to Beverly

[1] June 3. [2] June 4–5. [3] June 5.

fords, six miles apart, where they were to cross in two divisions, and advance on Culpepper C. H. (*alias* Fairfax), where J. E. B. Stuart was understood to be. But scarcely had Gen. Buford's cavalry, supported by Ames's infantry, crossed[4] Beverly ford, when they were sharply engaged; the Rebel ferry guard, whom they had hoped to surprise, falling back on Jones's cavalry brigade, encamped just behind, and checking our advance until these could mount and charge; when the 8th New York was routed with loss, and Col. B. F. Davis,[5] its commander, killed. The 8th Illinois cavalry, now charging, drove the enemy back in disorder: meantime, Gen. Russell brought over his infantry, and Pleasanton directed him to engage them in front, while Buford, with the cavalry, should strike them in flank. The charge was made with spirit by the 6th Pennsylvania, supported by the 5th and 6th regulars; but, just as the 6th had reached the enemy's guns, it was charged in turn by two regiments of Rebel cavalry which burst from the woods on its flank, and routed with heavy loss.

Pleasanton now found himself in a hornets' nest. Every moment increased the force in his front, which had an infantry corps at hand to draw upon; while Gregg, who had crossed at Kelly's ford, and had sent word at 8 A. M. that he would soon be up, did not make his appearance till afternoon. The fight was therefore allowed to drag, in this quarter; each side covering itself with woods and shelling or sharp-shooting, as opportunity offered, until about 1 P. M., when Gregg came up. He had been fighting pretty steadily all the morning, charging and being charged in turn, and had crowded his antagonists back to Brandy Station, where, Col. Wyndham reported, they were bringing up infantry in railroad cars. Gregg's cavalry had fought well, and taken 150 prisoners, but had lost heavily. The two divisions were now connected, and the Rebels in their immediate front pushed back; two regiments narrowly escaping capture. And now Pleasanton saw that he must begin to fall back or prepare to fight half of Lee's army; so he retreated to the fords and recrossed about dark; having lost about 500 men, and brought off over 100 prisoners.

J. E. B. Stuart (who of course claims the result as his victory) admits a loss of over 600 of his cavalry in this affair, including Col. Saul Williams, 2d N. C., and Lt.-Col. Frank Hampton, 2d S. C., killed; Gen. W. H. F. Lee and Cols. Butler and Harman being among his wounded. He claims 3 guns and a good many small arms captured; and an unofficial Rebel account says they took 336 prisoners, including wounded.

Considered as a reconnoissance in force, Pleasanton's expedition was a decided success. There was no longer any doubt—if there had been till now—that the Rebel army was in this quarter, and tending westward. There had been a grand review of all the cavalry of the army at Culpepper Court House, a few days before; Gen. Lee and his staff being present. Pleasanton sent over next

[4] June 9, at daylight.

[5] Who led the cavalry safely out of Harper's Ferry just before Miles surrendered it; capturing Longstreet's ammunition train on his way to Pennsylvania. Among our wounded here was Col. Percy Wyndham.

day to ascertain the fate of some of his missing officers, and received for answer that every thing had been done for our wounded that humanity dictates, but that they could hold no further communication with him save by truce-boat on the James. Nevertheless, it was already ascertained by our reconnoissance that a Rebel column of infantry and artillery, moving westward, had been three hours and a half in passing through Sperryville, near the Blue Ridge; so that the Rebel army must be making its way into the Shenandoah Valley once more.

Two days later, 250 Rebel cavalry dashed across the Potomac at Edwards's ferry, driving back part of the 6th Michigan cavalry, picketing the river, and burning their camp—recrossing, of course, but making no haste to quit that neighborhood. It was clear that active hostilities in that direction were meditated.

Still, Howe's division remained across the lower Rappahannock, well intrenched, as were the Rebels in its front; and Gen. Hooker, though he had begun[6] to send his sick and wounded to Washington, lingered on the Rappahannock, as if doubtful of Lee's real purpose, and expecting to find him advancing by Warrenton to Bull Run; when a blow was struck that dissipated all reasonable doubt.

Gen. R. H. Milroy was in command in the Valley, holding Winchester, under Gen. Schenck as department commander at Baltimore, to whom Halleck had suggested that Milroy's position seemed perilous; he having too many men to lose, yet not enough to insure his safety. His entire force numbered some 10,000 men, whereof 7,000 may have been considered effective. Of these, one brigade, Col. A. T. McReynolds, was thrown out on his right, holding Berryville, observing the adjacent passes of the Blue Ridge and fords of the Shenandoah; while his cavalry scouts patroled the Valley so far as Front Royal and Strasburg. So early as June 1st, he felt that the enemy holding the Valley above him were inclined to crowd; and, on the 12th, he sent out a strong reconnoissance on either road to ascertain what this meant. That on the Strasburg road went nearly to Middletown, where its troopers decoyed a Rebel cavalry patrol into an ambush, and routed it with a loss of 50 killed and wounded and 37 prisoners. Col. Shawl returned to Winchester, and reported no force on that road which had not been there for months.

On the Front Royal road, the 12th Pennsylvania cavalry, Lt.-Col. Moss, 400 strong, went only to Cedarville, 12 miles, and returned, reporting that they had been stopped by a large Rebel force; but Milroy refused to credit the story; insisting that they had been too easily frightened, and that, if any such force *could* be there, he should have heard of its approach from Hooker or Halleck; nevertheless, he advised McReynolds to look sharp. Next morning,[7] however, his patrols on the Front Royal road reported the enemy advancing in force; whereupon, Milroy signaled McReynolds to join him, while he sent out a considerable force on either road to learn what was brewing.

They had not far to go. Col. Ely, on the Front Royal road, was stopped barely a mile from Winchester,

[6] June 12.

[7] June 13.



WINCHESTER AND VICINITY.

by a Rebel battery, and fell back, after a slight skirmish, unpursued; while General Elliott, on the Strasburg road, advanced a very little farther, and was halted by observing the enemy in force on his left—that is, on the Front Royal road. Here some cannon-balls were exchanged; when our men fell back to Applepie ridge, that next the city; where more skirmishing beguiled the time till dark, when a prisoner was taken who rather astonished Milroy by the information that he belonged to Ewell's (formerly Stonewall Jackson's) corps, and that Longstreet's also was just at hand—the two numbering about 50,000 men.

Col. McReynolds, with his brigade, arrived from Berryville at 9 P. M., and was assigned a position; but what use in that? Lee's army was at hand; Hooker's was many weary marches away, had not been heard from, and knew nothing of the imminent peril. A thoroughly brave and competent commander must have realized, it would seem, that there is a time to fly as well as a time to fight, and that now was the time to run, after destroying every thing that could be of use to the enemy. But Milroy held on, waiting for something to turn up, and let the night pass unimproved.

The next day[8] was one of ominous quiet for the most part; but the enemy was constantly crowding up, and was of course working around to cut off the retreat of the garrison. There was skirmishing at intervals; and the numbers of the foe visibly and steadily increased. At 4 P. M., they made a charge up the Front Royal road to the edge of the town, but were repulsed; when Milroy ordered a charge in turn, which amounted to little—the enemy being found in great force just out of range of our works; and, a little later, they opened fire from two 8-gun batteries on the north-west, hardly a mile from town; and forthwith Ewell's infantry swept up to and over our breastworks, disregarding the fire of our guns, driving out the 110th Ohio with heavy loss, and planting their colors on the defenses. Meantime, the city had been substantially invested on every side, and was now virtually lost; though an attempt to storm the main fort from the position first gained was repulsed; and the assailants desisted for a time.

At 1 A. M.,[9] Milroy held a council, which decided to evacuate and run. It was too late. Though he spiked his guns, and drowned his powder, he was unable to steal off, and obliged to fight—the enemy attacking so soon as he had disarmed himself. The 110th Ohio, Col. Keifer, and the 122d ditto, on one road, the 87th Pennsyl-

[8] Sunday, June 14.

[9] Monday, June 15.

vania, Col. Shawl, and the 15th Connecticut, Col. Ely, on another, did most of the fighting that was done on our side; the former acting as a rear-guard; but the business in hand was not a fight, but a race—and very properly so. Four miles from Winchester, a Rebel division barred the way; and here the fugitives were of course routed, and many of them captured. Most of those who escaped crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and did not stop running till they brought up in Bedford county, Pennsylvania; the residue headed for Harper's Ferry, and soon distanced their pursuers. Milroy says[10] 5,000 of his men reported at the Ferry or at Bloody Run, Pa., and he hoped that 1,000 more would do so; which hope was of course a delusion. Lee says General Rhodes captured 700 prisoners and 5 guns at Martinsburg, and proceeds to enumerate "more than 4,000 prisoners, 29 guns, 277 wagons, and 400 horses," as the fruits of "these operations"—probably including in those totals his Martinsburg spoils. Milroy's great mistake was holding on just one day too long—his communications with Schenck and Halleck having already been severed. Halleck had suggested to Schenck the propriety of withdrawing him so early as the 11th. Early is credited by Lee with the capture of Winchester.

Ere this, the Government had taken the alarm, as it well might. An order[11] from the War Department had constituted of Pennsylvania two new Military Departments—that of the Susquehanna (eastern), under Gen. Couch; that of the Monongahela, Gen. W. T. H. Brooks; and Gov. Curtin had called[12] out the entire militia of that State—the call, though loud and shrill, awaking but few and faint responses. Now the President called[13] specifically on the nearest States for militia, as follows:

Maryland....10,000	New York....20,000
Pennsylvania.50,000	Ohio.....30,000
West Virginia.....10,000.	

The Governors rëechoed the call; but the response was still weak. The uniformed and disciplined regiments of New York City generally and promptly went on; and Gov. Seymour was publicly thanked therefor by Secretary Stanton; but the number of Pennsylvanians, Marylanders, and West Virginians, who set their faces resolutely toward the enemy in this crisis bore but a slim proportion to that of their brethren who seemed just now to have urgent business east of the Susquehanna or west of the Ohio. In other words, the country was profoundly disheartened; while the Army had already absorbed what was bravest and most patriotic of its militia. The number who actually responded to these urgent, repeated, and most reasonable calls from the several States was (liberally estimated) as follows:

New York....15,000	Pennsylvania.25,000
New Jersey.. 3,000	Delaware.... 2,000
Maryland.....5,000.	

Gen. Hooker had now begun[14] to move his army northward—rëcrossing Howe's division and evacuating the valley of the Rappahannock. Lee had just about a fair week's start of him. Moving rapidly north-westward, with his cavalry thrown well out on his left flank, watching the passes of the Blue Ridge, Hooker's infantry passed through Dumfries,[15] to Centerville, covering Washington,

[10] June 30. [11] June 9. [12] June 12. [13] June 15. [14] June 13. [15] June 14–15.

and watching for fresh developments of the enemy's plans.

Meantime, our cavalry, under Pleasanton, was constantly confronted by that of Lee, under Stuart; and nearly every day witnessed a fight or a skirmish, as our troopers crowded up to the passes of the Blue Ridge, and attempted to scan what was going on beyond them, or the enemy dashed down into the valleys this side, incited by a like laudable thirst for knowledge. At length, a pretty general cavalry fight occurred,[16] nearly westward of Washington, on the line of the great highway from Alexandria to Winchester, down which Stuart had pushed so far as Upperville; whence he was repelled by a charge of Kilpatrick's brigade, and forced back into Ashby's Gap, after a spirited brush, with determined charges on either side. Kilpatrick was once taken prisoner, but rescued by a countercharge directly. Buford and Gregg were active this day; as was W. H. F. Lee on the side of the Rebels, who lost 2 guns, and perhaps 150 men in all, including Col. M. Lewis, 9th Virginia, killed. Our loss did not exceed 100.

Meantime, Gen. Jenkins and his brigade of Rebel cavalry had raided across the Potomac and Maryland up to Chambersburg, Pa., which they entered, unopposed, at 11 P. M.[17] They took horses, cattle, &c., destroyed the railroad, and swept off into Slavery some 50 negroes—all they could catch—but did no wanton injury. Jenkins paid liberally for drugs—in Confederate scrip—and, some of his horses having vanished, threatened to burn the town if they were not returned or their value made up. The borough authorities paid the amount demanded (only $900) in Confederate scrip, which had suddenly become abundant there; and it was pocketed without remark, but without obvious relish.

Gen. Ewell, with his corps, had crossed into Maryland at Williamsport,[18] on the heels of Milroy's fugitives, pushing on unmolested to Chambersburg—our force at Harper's Ferry retiring across the river to Maryland Heights, where it was not molested. Early's division of Ewell's corps was impelled eastward from Chambersburg to York; while Johnson's moved northward to Carlisle; Imboden, with his brigade, moving westward up the Potomac, destroying railroad bridges, &c., so far as Cumberland. Lee seems to have meditated a dash on Washington; but, Hooker's army remaining in its front, instead of rushing over into Maryland, no opportunity was presented; so the whole Rebel army forded[19] the Potomac; A. P. Hill's corps at Shepherdstown, and Lee, with Longstreet's, at Williamsport; both, uniting at Hagerstown, advanced, unopposed, on the track of Ewell, to Chambersburg.[20] Ewell had taken quiet possession of Carlisle, pushing forward his advance to Kingston, within 13 miles of Harrisburg. Meanwhile, such militia as had been mustered in or sent from Eastern States to the aid of Pennsylvania were collected, under Gen. Couch, at Harrisburg; while Gen. Brooks, powerfully aided by the volunteer efforts of the citizens, hastily threw up a line of defenses intended to cover Pittsburg.

All doubt as to the enemy's purposes being now dispelled, Gen.

[16] June 21. [17] June 15. [18] June 16. [19] June 24–25. [20] June 27.

Hooker crossed[21] the Potomac near Edwards's Ferry, and advanced to Frederick; himself visiting by the way Harper's Ferry. He found there —or rather, on Maryland Heights— Gen. French, with 11,000 men, whom he, very naturally, desired to add to his army in the momentous battle now impending. For his army, after being strengthened by 15,000 men spared him from the defenses of Washington, and 2,100 by Gen. Schenck from the Middle Department, was barely 100,000 strong; while Lee's, carefully counted by two Union men independently, as it marched through Hagerstown, numbered 91,000 infantry, with 280 guns, and 6,000 cavalry; while not less than 5,000 of its cavalry, under Stuart, crossed the Potomac below Edwards's Ferry, and so advanced into Pennsylvania without passing through Hagerstown. Considering that the Rebels had mustered the best as well as the largest army they ever sent into the contest, and that its triumph on a Northern field would almost certainly incite a Northern uprising in their favor, it was imperative that they should now be met by the heroic but luckless Army of the Potomac in such force as to place the issue beyond contingency. It was a high crime to withhold even a brigade, when a brigade more or less might decide the fate of a continent.

Hooker had already drawn from the garrison at Washington all that Halleck would spare—leaving but 11,000 effectives under Heintzelman; which was none too much. But, having crossed the Potomac, he had very properly inquired by telegraph of Halleck, "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned, after the public stores and property are removed?" and been answered:[22]

"Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I can not approve of their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity."

Surely, the translator of Jomini can find no parallel for such strategy in the whole military career of the great Napoleon. Hooker at once rejoined:

"I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10,000 men here, in condition to take the field. Here, they are of no earthly account. They can not defend a ford of the river; and, so far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the Rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and his Excellency, the President.

"JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General."

In regard to this grave matter of difference, Hooker was clearly in the right: *not* clearly so in sending this dispatch immediately afterward:

"SANDY HOOK, June 27, 1853.

"Maj.-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

"My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition, with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.

"JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General."

Halleck had never regarded Hooker as the proper commander of this army; had prevented his selection as McClellan's immediate successor;

[21] June 26.

[22] June 27, 10½ A. M.

had reluctantly assented to his designation after Burnside's collapse; had been strengthened in his conviction of Hooker's unfitness by the Chancellorsville failure; and now, very naturally, improved his opportunity. The next day brought Col. Hardie to Hooker's headquarters at Frederick, with instructions relieving Hooker and devolving the command on Gen. Meade; who was therewith advised that he might do as he pleased with the Harper's Ferry men; while Couch and his militia, estimated at 20,000 men, were placed under his orders.

Gen. Hooker at once took leave of the army, with whose fortunes he had been so long and so honorably identified, in the following characteristic order:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"FREDERICK, Md., June 28, 1863.

"In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27th, 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotions. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumph of this army may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell.

"JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General."

Bidding a cordial but hurried farewell to his general and staff officers, Gen. Hooker left at once for Baltimore; being instructed to await there further orders from the Adjutant-General's office. Three days bringing none, he went over to Washington; where he was forthwith arrested by Halleck for visiting the capital without leave, and in violation of the rule which forbade officers to do so. Thus ended his service with the Army of the Potomac.

Gen. Meade, astounded by his promotion, announced to the army his acceptance of the command in these sincere, fit, modest words:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"June 28, 1863.

"By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me.

"GEORGE G. MEADE,
"Major-General Commanding."

Such a change of commanders, for no more urgent reasons, on the very brink of a great battle, has few parallels in history. Whatever his faults, Hooker was loved and trusted by his soldiers, who knew less of Meade, and had less faith in him. Had that army been polled, it would have voted to fight the impending battle under Hooker *without* the aid of French's 11,000 men, rather than under Meade *with* that reënforcement. But it was inured ere this to being astonished oftener than delighted, and to moving firmly onward in the path of duty, even when that

path was not irradiated by the sunshine of Hope. And now its heart was swelling with joyful trust that the enemy it had so long confronted was soon to be met in mortal strife where every circumstance of position and local knowledge would not tell in that adversary's favor.

Lee's army had for a few days traversed south-eastern Pennsylvania at will, burning railroad and turnpike bridges, breaking up tracks, severing telegraph wires, &c., &c., as was to be expected, and levying contributions on the country, though rendering a very general obedience to Lee's order,[23] exhorting and enjoining his men to abstain from all wanton destruction or of damage to private property. Col. White, with his cavalry advance, had reached the Susquehanna at Wrightsville;[24] where a bridge over the river was needlessly burned to prevent a crossing. Gen. Ewell that day occupied York, whose Burgess (David Small) went out several miles to meet him and surrender the borough, which was promised special immunity in consideration thereof; but was, immediately upon its occupation, required[25] to furnish, in addition to liberal supplies of food and clothing, $100,000 in cash, whereof $28,000 was actually raised and paid over, with a good portion of the creature comforts likewise required. If this levy of money on a defenseless place, which had in all things evinced a meek and quiet spirit, is justifiable by the laws of war, it is difficult to see how the unsupported charges of rapacity and extortion leveled against Gen. Butler's rule in truculent and venomous New Orleans can be plausibly condemned or complained of.

J. E. B. Stuart, with a considerable proportion of the Rebel cavalry, was watching on our left flank when Hooker crossed the Potomac, and crossed himself[26] at Seneca soon afterward; moving up on our right so far as Westminster; burning 17 canal boats, also a train of 178 army wagons, laden with army stores, and picking up quite a number of our officers who were hastening to join their regiments at the front. From Westminster, he made his way across our front to Carlisle, which he found evacuated; and, hastening thence on the track of Longstreet's infantry, was in season for the fray at GETTYSBURG; whereon Lee, on hearing that Hooker was across the Potomac in force, had hastened to concentrate his whole army.

Hooker was preparing, when superseded, to strike heavily at Lee's line of communications, which would of course compel him to concentrate and fight; Meade changed the direction of certain corps, moving more to

[23] Dated Chambersburg, June 27.

[24] June 28.

[25] "Required for the use of Early's division:

"One hundred and sixty-five barrels of flour, or 28,000 pounds baked bread; 3,500 pounds sugar; 1,650 pounds coffee; 300 gallons molasses; 1,200 pounds salt; 32,000 pounds fresh beef, or 21,000 pounds bacon or pork.

"The above articles to be delivered at the market-house on Main street, at 4 o'clock, P. M.

"WM. W. THORNTON, Captain and A. C. S."

"Required for the use of Early's command:

"Two thousand pairs shoes or boots; 1,000 pairs socks; 1,000 felt hats; $100,000 in money. C. E. SNODGRASS,

"Major and Chief Q. M. Early's division.

"June 28, 1863."

"Approved; and the authorities of the town of York will furnish the above articles and the money required; for which certificates will be given. J. A. EARLY, Maj.-Gen. Commanding."

[26] June 28.

the right, as if his intended point of concentration were Gettysburg also. But, in fact, foreseeing that Lee must give battle, he had issued a timely address to his officers,[27] and was moving circumspectly east of north, looking for advantageous ground whereon to fight, and had about fixed on the line of Pipe creek, some 15 miles south-east of Gettysburg, when an unexpected encounter precipitated the grand collision.

Gettysburg, the capital of Adams county, is a rural village of 3,000 inhabitants, the focus of a well-cultivated upland region. Though long settled and blessed with excellent country roads, all centering on the borough, much of it is too rugged for cultivation; hence, it is covered with wood. The village is in a valley, or rather on the northern slope of a hill; with a college and other edifices on the opposite hill, which rises directly from the little run at its foot.

Part of our cavalry advance, under Gen. Kilpatrick, pushed out from Frederick,[28] moving north-west through Liberty and Taneytown to Hanover, Pa., where they were considerably astonished[29] by an attack from Stuart's cavalry—not imagining that there was any enemy within a march of them. A sharp fight ensued, wherein Gen. G. F. Farnsworth's brigade was at first roughly handled, losing 100 men; but Gen. Custer's, which had passed, returned to its aid, and the enemy was beaten off. A similar dash was simultaneously made on the train of another column of our cavalry at Littlestown, but easily repulsed. Meantime, Gen. Buford, with another division, had moved directly upon Gettysburg; where he encountered[30] the van of the Rebel army, under Gen. Heth, of Hill's corps, and drove it back on the division, by whom our troopers were repelled in their turn. And now the advance division of Gen. Reynolds's (1st) corps, under command of Gen. J. S. Wadsworth, approaching from Emmitsburg, quickened its pace at the familiar sound of volleys, and, rushing through the village, drove back the Rebel van, seizing and occupying the ridge that overlooks the place from the north-west.

Gen. John F. Reynolds, formerly of the Pennsylvania Reserves, was in command of the two corps (1st and 11th) now rapidly coming up, together numbering about 22,000 men. As Gen. Wadsworth was forming his advance division, 4,000 strong, in order of battle, Gen. Reynolds went forward to reconnoiter, and, seeing that the enemy were in force in a grove just ahead, he dismounted and was observing them through a fence, when he was struck in the neck by a sharp-shooter's bullet, and, falling on his face, was dead in a few minutes. Born in Lancaster, in 1820; entering the army in 1846; he had

[27] "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"June 30, 1863.

"The commanding general requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars, are involved. The army has fought well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty this hour.

"By command of Maj.-Gen. MEADE:
"S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adj.-Gen."

[28] June 28. [29] June 30. [30] July 1.



GETTYSBURG—BATTLE OF JULY 1.

served his country in Mexico, in California, and in nearly every important action yet fought in Virginia; returning to fall in defense of the soil of his native State, and almost in sight of his home.

Gen. Abner Doubleday came up half an hour afterward, and assumed command; but the residue of the corps, with the whole of the 11th, did not arrive till nearly two hours later; meantime, the Rebels, under Hill, were too strong, and pushed back Wadsworth's division, eagerly pursuing it. As Wadsworth fell back with his left, and Archer pressed forward on his heels, the right of our division swung around on the rear of the pursuers, enveloping the Rebel advance, and making prisoners of Archer and 800 of his men.

Doubleday fell back to Seminary ridge, just west of the village where he was joined by the residue of his corps; the 11th coming up almost simultaneously and taking post on his right; Howard ranking Doubleday and assuming command, assigning the 11th corps to Schurz. Here the struggle was renewed with spirit; our men having the better position, and the best of the fight; until, about 1 P. M., Ewell's corps, marching from York under orders to concentrate on Gettysburg, came rapidly into the battle—Rhodes's division assailing the 11th corps in front, while Early's struck hard on its right flank. Of course, being greatly outnumbered, the 11th was soon routed, falling back in disorder on Gettysburg, and compelling the 1st, which had hitherto fully held its own, to do likewise—the two divisions, under a heavy Rebel fire, commingling and obstructing each other

in the streets of the village, and thus losing heavily in prisoners. Their wounded, who had thus far been taken to Gettysburg, were of course abandoned to the enemy, as the *débris* of the two corps, scarcely half the number that had marched so proudly through those streets a few hours before, fell hastily back and were rallied on Cemetery hill, just south of the village: Buford, with his troopers, covering the retreat, and trying to show a bold front to the Rebels; who —though there were still several hours of good daylight—did not see fit to press their advantage: presuming that our whole army was moving hitherward, and fearing that they might miscalculate and suffer as Reynolds had just done.

And they were right. For Gen. Sickles, with his (3d) corps, which had advanced, the day before, from Taneytown to Emmitsburg, and had there received from Meade a circular to his corps commanders, directing a concentration on the line of Pipe creek—the left of the army at Middleburg, the right at Manchester—had been preparing to move, as directed, to Middleburg, when, at 2 P. M.,[31] he received a dispatch from Howard at Gettysburg, stating that the 1st and 11th corps were there engaged with a superior force, and that Reynolds had been killed; thereupon, calling urgently for assistance.

Sickles was perplexed. Meade was at Taneytown, ten miles away; and to wait to hear from him was to leave Howard to his fate. Sickles had been moving on Gettysburg till halted by Meade's new circular; and he decided that he ought to persist now; so, leaving two brigades and two batteries to hold Emmitsburg, he put the rest of his corps in rapid motion for Gettysburg; arriving just after Howard had taken post on Cemetery hill, and coming into position on his left. As he came up the Emmitsburg road, he might have been assailed by Hill's forces, holding the ridges on his left; but the enemy were satisfied with their day's work, and did not molest him.

Gen. Meade was at Taneytown, when, at 1 P. M., news came that there was fighting at Gettysburg, and that Gen. Reynolds had been killed. He at once ordered Hancock to turn over his (2d) corps to Gibbon, hasten himself to Gettysburg, and take command there; which was done: Hancock reaching Cemetery hill at 3½ P. M., when the rear of our broken 1st and 11th corps was retreating in disorder through the village, hotly pursued by the triumphant foe. Howard having already formed a division on Cemetery hill, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to post his, or what was left of it (1,600 out of the 4,000 he had led to battle in the morning) on Culp's hill, at our right; while Gen. Geary, with the advance division of Slocum's (12th) corps, then coming up, was directed to take position on high ground toward Round Top, on our left. Meade had hurriedly requested Hancock to judge whether Gettysburg afforded us better ground for a battle than that he had selected on Pipe creek; and Hancock now (4 P. M.) sent word that he would hold on here until Meade could arrive and judge for himself. But Meade had already impelled the 2d corps, under Gibbon, toward Gettysburg. Hancock wrote him that the

[31] July 1.

position here was good, but liable to be turned by way of Emmitsburg. Slocum having arrived at 7, and ranking Hancock, the latter turned over the command, as he had been instructed to do, and rode back to Meade, whom he reached at 9 P. M.; when he was told by Meade that he had decided to fight at Gettysburg, and had given orders accordingly.[32] Both started for Gettysburg immediately, arriving at 11 P. M.

During that night, our army was all concentrated before Gettysburg, save Gen. Sedgwick's (6th) corps, which was at Manchester, 30 miles distant, when, at 7 P. M., it received orders to move at once on Taneytown; which were so changed, after it had marched 7 or 8 miles, as to require its immediate presence at Gettysburg, where it arrived, weary enough, at 2 P. M. next day.[33]

Meantime, Lee also had been bringing up his several corps and divisions, posting them along the ridges north and west of Gettysburg and its rivulet, facing ours at distances of one to two miles. Longstreet's corps held his right, which was stretched considerably across the Emmitsburg road; the divisions of Hood, McLaws, and Pickett posted from right to left. Hill's corps, including the divisions of Anderson, Pender, and Heth, held the center; while Ewell's, composed of Rhodes's, Early's, and Johnson's divisions, formed the Rebel left, which bent well around the east side of our position, making the enemy's front considerably longer than ours. Of the entire Rebel army that had crossed the Potomac, scarcely a regiment was wanting when Pickett's division, forming the rear-guard, came up on the morning of the 2d.

On our side, Sickles's (3d) corps held the left, opposite Longstreet, supported by the 5th (Sykes's); with Hancock's (2d) in our center, touching its right; while what was left of Howard's (11th), reënforced by 2,000 Vermonters, under Stannard, and Reynolds's (1st, now Doubleday's) corps held the face of Cemetery hill, looking toward Gettysburg and Early's division, but menaced also by Johnson's division on its right, and by Hill's corps, facing its left. The 12th corps (Slocum's) held our extreme right, facing Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and had recently been strengthened by Lockwood's Marylanders, 2,500 strong; raising it to a little over 10,000 men. Buford's cavalry, pretty roughly handled on the 1st, was first sent to the rear to recruit, but confronted Stuart on our extreme right before the close of the 2d; Kilpatrick's division being posted on our left.

Meade had resolved to fight a defensive battle; beside, as Sedgwick's strong corps (15,400) had not yet come up, while the whole Rebel army might fairly be presumed present, it was not his interest to force the fighting. Yet he had given orders to Slocum, commanding on our right, for an attack on that wing with the 12th, 5th, and 6th corps so soon as the 6th should arrive; but

[32] Gen. Butterfield, chief of staff, testifies that Meade directed him to make out, next morning, a General Order of retreat from Gettysburg, prescribing the route of each corps. Meade vehemently denies that he ever *intended* to retreat. These statements seem nowise incompatible. A prudent general might very well forecast and mark out his line of retreat, even while resolved to hold on to the utmost. It does not appear that Meade told either of his corps commanders that he had any notion of retreating.

[33] July 2.

Slocum, after reconnoitering, reported that the ground in his front was unfavorable; whereupon, the attack was countermanded. The enemy not being yet ready, the morning wore out and the day were on with the usual skirmishing and picket-firing at intervals along the front, with occasional shots from batteries on one side or the other; but nothing approaching a great battle.

At 3 P. M.—Sedgwick's weary corps having just arrived—Sykes was ordered to move the 5th corps over from our right to our left, while Meade rode out to see it properly posted on the left of the 3d; the 6th resting in reserve behind them. He now found that Sickles (who was very eager to fight, and seems to have suspected that Meade was not) had thrown forward his corps from half to three-fourths of a mile; so that, instead of resting his right on Hancock and his left on Round Top, as he had been directed to do, his advance was in fact across the Emmitsburg road and in the woods beyond, in the immediate presence of half the Rebel army. Meade remonstrated against this hazardous exposure, which Sickles considered within the scope of the discretion allowed him, but said he would withdraw, if desired, from the ridge he then occupied to that behind it, which Meade indicated as the proper one. Meade replied that he apprehended that no such withdrawal would be permitted by the enemy; and, as he spoke, the Rebel batteries opened, and their charging columns came on.

Lee had ordered Longstreet to attack Sickles with all his might, while Ewell should assail Slocum on our right, and Hill, fronting the apex of our position, should only menace, but stand ready to charge if our troops facing him should be withdrawn or seriously weakened to reenforce either our left or our right.

Sickles's new position was commanded by the Rebel batteries posted on Seminary ridge in his front, scarcely half a mile distant; while magnificent lines of battle, a mile and a half long, swept up to his front and flanks, crushing him back[34] with

[34] "Agate" [Whitelaw Reid], of *The Cincinnati Gazette*, gives the following incident of this sanguinary fray:

"Let me give one phase of the fight—fit type of many more. Some Massachusetts batteries—Capt. Bigelow's, Capt. Phillips's, two or three more under Capt. McGilvry, of Maine—were planted on the extreme left, advanced now well down to the Emmitsburg road, with infantry in their front—the first division, I think, of Sickles's corps. A little after 5, a fierce Rebel charge drove back the infantry and menaced the batteries. Orders are sent to Bigelow on the extreme left, to hold his position at every hazard short of sheer annihilation, till a couple more batteries can be brought to his support. Reserving his fire a little, then with depressed guns opening with double charges of grape and canister, he smites and shatters, but cannot break the advancing line. His grape and canister are exhausted, and still, closing grandly up over their slain, on they come. He falls back on spherical case, and pours this in at the shortest range. On, still onward, comes the artillery-defying line, and still he holds his position. They are within six paces of the guns—he fires again. Once more, and he blows devoted soldiers from his very muzzles. And, still mindful of that solemn order, he holds his place, they spring upon his carriages, and shoot down his horses! And then, his Yankee artillerists still about him, he seizes the guns by hand, and from the very front of that line drags two of them off. The caissons are farther back—five out of the six are saved.

"That single company, in that half-hour's fight, lost 33 of its men, including every sergeant it had. The captain himself was wounded. Yet it was the first time it was ever under fire! I give it simply as a type. *So* they fought along that fiery line!

"The Rebels now poured on Phillips's battery, and it, too, was forced to drag off the pieces by hand when the horses were shot down. From a new position, it opened again; and at last the two reënforcing batteries came up on the gallop. An enfilading fire swept the Rebel line; Sickles's gallant infantry charged, the Rebel line swept back on a refluent tide—we regained the lost ground, and every gun just lost in this splendid fight."

heavy loss, and struggling desperately to seize Round Top at his left.

Meade regarded this hill as vital to the maintenance of our position, and had already ordered Sykes to advance the 5th corps with all possible haste to save and hold it. A fierce and bloody struggle ensued; for the enemy had nearly carried the hill before Sykes reached it; while Humphreys, who, with one of Sykes's divisions, had been posted in the morning on Sickles's right, was in turn assailed in front and flank, and driven back, with a loss of 2,000 out of 5,000 men. Ultimately, as Sickles's corps fell back in disorder to the ground from which he should not have advanced, Hancock closed in from the right, while parts of the 1st, of the 6th, and a division of the 12th corps, were thrown in on the enemy's front, and they in turn were repelled with loss; falling back to the ridge to which Sickles had advanced, and leaving our line where Meade had intended to place it.[26]

[26] *The Richmond Enquirer* has the following account of this fight by an eye-witness on the Rebel side, writing from Hagerstown on the 8th:

"About the middle of the afternoon, orders were issued to the different commanders to prepare for a general attack upon the enemy's center and left. Longstreet was to commence the movement, which was to be followed up on his left in quick succession by the respective divisions of Hill's corps. As Anderson's division, or at least a portion of it, took a conspicuous part in this movement, I have ascertained, and now give you, the order of its different brigades: On the extreme right of Anderson's division, connecting with McLaws's left, was Wilcox's brigade, then Perry's, Wright's, Posey's, and Mahone's. At half-past 5 o'clock, Longstreet commenced the attack, and Wilcox followed it up by promptly moving forward; Perry's brigade quickly followed, and Wright moved simultaneously with him. The two divisions of Longstreet's corps soon encountered the enemy posted a little in rear of the Emmitsburg turnpike, which winds along the slope of the range upon which the enemy's main force was concentrated. After a short but spirited engagement, the enemy was driven back upon the main line upon the crest of the hill. McLaws's and Hood's divisions made a desperate assault upon their main line, but, owing to the precipitate and very rugged character of the slope, were unable to reach the summit. The enemy's loss on this part of the line was very heavy. I have heard several officers say that they have never seen the enemy's dead cover the ground so thickly, not even at the first Fredericksburg fight, as they did on that portion of the field over which McLaws's troops fought. While the fight was raging on our right, Wilcox and Wright, of Anderson's division, were pressing the enemy's center. Wilcox pushed forward for nearly a mile, driving the enemy before him and up to his very guns, over and beyond his batteries, several guns of which he captured, and nearly up to the summit of the hill. Wright had swept over the valley, under a terrific fire from the enemy's batteries, posted upon McPherson's heights, had encountered the enemy's advance line, and had driven him across the Emmitsburg pike to a position behind a stone wall or fence, which runs parallel with the pike, and about 60 or 80 yards in front of the batteries on the heights, and immediately under them. Here, this gallant brigade had a most desperate engagement for fifteen or twenty minutes; but charging rapidly up the almost perpendicular side of the mountain, they rushed upon the enemy's infantry, behind the stone wall, and drove them from it at the point of the bayonet. Now concentrating their fire upon the heavy batteries (20 guns) of the enemy on the crest of the heights, they soon silenced them, and, rushing forward with a shout, soon gained the summit of the heights, capturing all the enemy's guns, and driving their infantry in great disorder and confusion into the woods beyond.

"We now had the key to the enemy's stronghold, and, apparently, the victory was won. McLaws and Hood had pushed their line well up the slope on the right; Wilcox had kept well up on his portion of the line; Wright had pierced the enemy's main line on the summit of McPherson's heights, capturing his heavy batteries, thus breaking the connection between their right and left wings. I said that, apparently, we had won the victory. It remains to be stated why our successes were not crowned with the important results which should have followed such heroic daring and indomitable bravery. Although the order was peremptory that all of Anderson's division should move into action simultaneously, Brig.-Gen. Posey, commanding a Mississippi brigade, and Brig.-Gen. Mahone, commanding a Virginia brigade, failed to advance. This failure of these two brigades to advance is assigned, as I learn upon inquiry, as the reason why Pender's division, of Hill's corps, did not advance—the order being, that the advance was to commence from the right, and be taken up along our whole line. Pender's failure to advance caused the division on his left—Heth's—to remain inactive. Here we have two whole divisions, and two brigades of another, standing idle spectators of one of the

Meanwhile, the withdrawal of a division from Slocum had enabled Ewell to assail our right wing in superior force, crowding part of it back considerably, and seizing some of its rifle-pits. Hence, just at dark, the enemy assailed the right of Howard's shattered 11th corps, holding the right face of Cemetery hill; but gained no essential advantage.

Night closed the 2d day of July and of the battle, with the Rebels decidedly encouraged and confident. Of the seven corps composing our army, three had been severely handled, and at least half their effective strength demolished. Reynolds, commanding the 1st, and Brig.-Gen. Zook, of Sickles's corps, had been killed; Sickles, of the 3d, had had his leg shattered by a cannon-ball, and was out of the fight; our total losses up to this hour were scarcely fewer than 20,000 men; and none were arriving to replace them. The ground whereon Reynolds had fought and fallen so gallantly was about the center of their army; they held that also on which Howard had been cut up, and that from which Sickles had been hurled in disorder. True, they also had lost heavily; but they had reason for their hope that the morrow's triumph would richly repay all their losses.[36]

The battle opened next day[37] on our right; where Slocum—his division having returned from the left—pushed forward to retake his lost rifle-pits, and did it, after a sharp conflict, rëestablishing his line, and resting upon it. Meantime, Lee had rëenforced Longstreet with three fresh brigades, under Pickett, which arrived from Chambersburg an hour or two before Sedgwick came up on our side, a division from Ewell, and two detached from Hill; and the Rebel left was firmly established and its batteries planted on the ridge whence Sickles had been driven.

There was a pause of anxious expectation, fitfully broken by spits of firing here and there, while the Rebels were making their dispositions and posting their batteries for the supreme effort which was to decide this momentous contest. At length, at 1 P. M., the signal was given, and 115 heavy guns from Hill's and Longstreet's front crossed their fire on Cemetery hill, the center and key of our position. Here, a little behind the crest, was Meade's headquarters; though the hill had been plowed by Rebel balls during the fierce fighting

most desperate and important assaults that has ever been made on this continent—15,000 or 20,000 armed men resting on their arms, in plain view of a terrible battle, witnessing the mighty efforts of two little brigades (Wright's and Wilcox's; for Perry had fallen back overpowered), contending with the heavy masses of Yankee infantry, and subjected to a most deadly fire from the enemy's heavy artillery, without a single effort to aid them in the assault, or to assist them when the heights were carried. Perry's brigade, which was between Wilcox and Wright, soon after its first advance, was pressed so heavily as to be forced to retire. This left an interval in the line between Wright and Wilcox, and which the enemy perceiving, he threw a heavy column into the gap then made, deploying a portion of it on Wilcox's left flank, while a large force was thrown in rear of Wright's right flank. The failure of Posey and Mahone to advance upon Wright's left enabled the enemy to throw forward a strong force on that flank, and to push it well to his rear along the Emmitsburg pike. It was now apparent that the day was lost—lost after it had been won—lost, not because our army fought badly, but because a large portion of it did not fight at all."

[36] Lee, in his official report, says:

"After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed; and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day."

[37] Friday, July 3.



GETTYSBURG—POSITIONS HELD BEFORE THE FINAL ASSAULT, JULY 3.

of the eve before—some of them coming over from our left and annoying our soldiers on the right. For nearly two hours, this hill was gashed and seamed by round-shot and torn by bursting shells, while perhaps 100 guns from our side made fit reply. But the enemy had concentrated their batteries for this trial, while we had not; and here was no broad river valley, like that of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, to render the fire of guns from bluff to bluff an idle squandering of ammunition. The range was excellent; the Rebel batteries as well posted as ours, while superior in number and in average caliber; so that, gradually, the fire on our side slackened, and at length nearly ceased. Meade or Howard, finding that our guns had become heated, gave the order to cease firing and cool them; though the Rebel balls were still decimating our gunners, while our infantry, crouching behind every projection and nestling in each hollow, awaited patiently the expected charge. And now from behind the enemy's batteries emerged their infantry in line of

battle, three or four miles long, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers and supported by a line of reserves, moving swiftly to the charge upon Cemetery hill, and Hancock's corps more especially, but upon the entire front westward to Round Top. Let the Rebel correspondent of *The Richmond Enquirer* describe this grand assault, as follows:

"Now the storming party was moved up: Pickett's division in advance, supported on the right by Wilcox's brigade and on the left by Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew. The left of Pickett's division occupied the same ground over which Wright had passed the day before. I stood upon an eminence and watched this advance with great interest; I had seen brave men pass over that fated valley the day before; I had witnessed their death-struggle with the foe on the opposite heights; I had observed their return with shattered ranks, a bleeding mass, but with unstained banners. Now I saw their valiant comrades prepare for the same bloody trial, and already felt that their efforts would be vain unless their supports should be as true as steel and brave as lions. Now they move forward; with steady, measured tread, they advance upon the foe. Their banners float defiantly in the breeze, as onward in beautiful order they press across the plain. I have never seen since the war began (and I have been in all the great fights of this army) troops enter a fight in such splendid order as did this splendid division of Pickett's. Now Pettigrew's command emerge from the woods upon Pickett's left, and sweep down the slope of the hill to the valley beneath, and some two or three hundred yards in rear of Pickett. I saw by the wavering of this line as they entered the conflict that they wanted the firmness of nerve and steadiness of tread which so characterized Pickett's men, and I felt that these men would not, could not stand the tremendous ordeal to which they would soon be subjected. These were mostly raw troops, who had been recently brought from the South, and who had, perhaps, never been under fire—who certainly had never been in any very severe fight—and I trembled for their conduct. Just as Pickett was getting well under the enemy's fire, our batteries ceased firing. This was a fearful moment for Pickett and his brave command. Why do not our guns reopen their fire? is the inquiry that rises upon every lip. Still, our batteries are silent as death! But on press Pickett's brave Virginians; and now the enemy open upon them, from more than fifty guns, a terrible fire of grape, shell, and canister. On, on they move in unbroken line, delivering a deadly fire as they advance. Now they have reached the Emmitsburg road; and here they meet a severe fire from the heavy masses of the enemy's infantry, posted behind the stone fence; while their artillery, now free from the annoyance of our artillery, turn their whole fire upon this devoted band. Still, they remain firm. Now again they advance; they storm the stone fence; the Yankees fly. The enemy's batteries are, one by one, silenced in quick succession as Pickett's men deliver their fire at the gunners and drive them from their pieces. I see Kemper and Armistead plant their banner in the enemy's works. I hear their glad shout of victory!

"Let us look after Pettigrew's division. Where are they now? While the victorious shout of the gallant Virginians is still ringing in my ears, I turn my eyes to the left, and there, all over the plain, in utmost confusion, is scattered this strong division. Their line is broken; they are flying, apparently panic-stricken, to the rear. The gallant Pettigrew is wounded; but he still retains command, and is vainly striving to rally his men. Still, the moving mass rush pell-mell to the rear;[38] and Pickett is left alone to contend with the hordes of the enemy now pouring in upon him on every side. Garnett falls, killed by a Minié ball; and Kemper, the brave and chivalrous, reels under a mortal wound, and is taken to the rear. Now the enemy move around strong flanking bodies of infantry, and are rapidly gaining Pickett's rear. The order is given to fall back, and our men commence the movement, doggedly contending for every inch of ground. The enemy press heavily our retreating line, and many noble spirits who had passed safely through the fiery ordeal of the advance and charge now fall on the right and on the left. Armistead is wounded and left in the enemy's hands. At this critical moment, the shattered remnant of Wright's Georgia brigade is moved forward to cover their retreat, and the fight closes here. Our loss in this charge was very severe; and the Yankee prisoners taken acknowledge that theirs was immense."

[38] It is simple justice to brave foes to note that this imputation on Pettigrew's brigade has been proved unjust. They fought as well and held as tenaciously as any of their comrades, having all but one of their field officers killed or wounded; falling back under command of a Major. They mustered 2,800 strong on the morning of the 1st of July: at roll-call on the 4th, they numbered 835.

Now let us hear 'Agate,' from our side, describe that last, determined effort of the Rebellion to maintain a foothold on the free soil of the North:

"The great, desperate, final charge came at 4. The Rebels seemed to have gathered up all their strength and desperation for one fierce, convulsive effort, that should sweep over and wash out our obstinate resistance. They swept up as before: the flower of their army to the front, victory staked upon the issue. In some places, they literally lifted up and pushed back our lines; but, that terrible 'position' of ours!—wherever they entered it, enfilading fires from half a score of crests swept away their columns like merest chaff. Broken and hurled back, they easily fell into our hands; and, on the center and left, the last half-hour brought more prisoners than all the rest.

"So it was along the whole line; but it was on the 2d corps that the flower of the Rebel army was concentrated; it was there that the heaviest shock beat upon, and shook, and even sometimes crumbled, our line.

"We had some shallow rifle-pits, with barricades of rails from the fences. The Rebel line, stretching away miles to the left, in magnificent array, but strongest here—Pickett's splendid division of Longstreet's corps in front, the best of A. P. Hill's veterans in support—came steadily, and as it seemed resistlessly, sweeping up. Our skirmishers retired slowly from the Emmitsburg road, holding their ground tenaciously to the last. The Rebels reserved their fire till they reached this same Emmitsburg road, then opened with a terrific crash. From a hundred iron throats, meantime, their artillery had been thundering on our barricades.

"Hancock was wounded; Gibbon succeeded to the command—approved soldier, and ready for the crisis. As the tempest of fire approached its height, he walked along the line, and renewed his orders to the men to reserve their fire. The Rebels—three lines deep—came steadily up. They were in point-blank range.

"At last, the order came! From thrice six thousand guns, there came a sheet of smoky flame, a crash, a rush of leaden death. The line literally melted away; but there came the second, resistless still. It had been our supreme effort—on the instant, we were not equal to another.

"Up to the rifle-pits, across them, over the barricades—the momentum of their charge, the mere machine strength of their combined action—swept them on. Our thin line could fight, but it had not weight enough to oppose to this momentum. It was pushed behind the guns. Right on came the Rebels. They were upon the guns—were bayoneting the gunners—were waving their flags above our pieces.

"But they had penetrated to the fatal point. A storm of grape and canister tore its way from man to man, and marked its track with corpses straight down their line! They had exposed themselves to the enfilading fire of the guns on the western slope of Cemetery hill; that exposure sealed their fate.

"The line reeled back—disjointed already—in an instant in fragments. Our men were just behind the guns. They leaped forward upon the disordered mass; but there was little need for fighting now. A regiment threw down its arms, and, with colors at its head, rushed over and surrendered. All along the field, smaller detachments did the same. Webb's brigade brought in 800: taken in as little time as it requires to write the simple sentence that tells it. Gibbon's old division took 15 stand of colors.

"Over the fields, the escaped fragments of the charging line fell back—the battle there was over. A single brigade, Harrow's (of which the 7th Michigan is part), came out with 54 less officers, 793 less men, than it took in! So the whole corps fought—so too they fought farther down the line.

"It was fruitless sacrifice. They gathered up their broken fragments, formed their lines, and slowly marched away. It was not a rout, it *was* a bitter, crushing defeat. For once, the Army of the Potomac had won a clean, honest, acknowledged victory."

Gen. Doubleday, testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says:

"About 2 P. M., a tremendous cannonade was opened on us from at least 125 guns. They had our exact range, and the destruction was fearful. Horses were killed in every direction; I lost two horses myself, while almost every officer lost one or more, and quite a large number of caissons were blown up. I knew this was the prelude to a grand infantry charge, as artillery is generally massed in this way, to disorganize the opposing command, for the infantry to charge in the interval. I told my men to shelter themselves in every way behind the rocks, or little elevations of ground, while the artillery-firing took place, and to spring to their feet and hold their ground as soon as the charge came.

"When the enemy finally charged, they came on in three lines, with additional lines called, in military language, wings: the object of the wings being to prevent the

main force from being flanked. This charge was first directed toward my lines; but, seeing that they were quite strong, five lines deep, and well strengthened with rails and stones, behind which the men lay, the enemy changed his mind, and concluded to make the attack on the division of the 2d corps, on my right, where there were but two lines. He marched by his right flank, and then marched to his front. In doing this, the wing apparently did not understand the movement, but kept straight on. The consequence was, that there was a wide gap between the wing and the main charging force, which enabled my men on the right, the brigade of Gen. Stannard, to form immediately on the flank of the charging column, while the enemy were subjected to an awful fire of artillery in front. It is said some few of them laid their hands on our guns. The prisoners state that what ruined them was Stannard's brigade on their flank, as they found it impossible to contend with it in that position; and they drew off, all in a huddle, to get away from it. I sent two regiments to charge them in front at the same time. While this was going on, the enemy were subjected to a terrific artillery-fire at short range; and the result was that they retreated with frightful loss.

"Some five minutes after the charge was broken up and they began to retreat, a large number of batteries and regiments of infantry reported to me, as I sat on horseback, for orders to repulse the attack. I posted them, with the approval of the corps commander, though they were a little too late to be of essential service.

"I would state that the wing of the enemy which got astray was also met by part of Stannard's brigade, which also formed on its flank, and it also retreated. Thus the day was won, and the country saved."

The battle was over; and it was won; but that was all. Our guns were nearly out of cartridges; the reserve ammunition had been drawn upon; a single brigade, standing at ease in the rear, composed the entire reserve of the Army of the Potomac. All beside had been brought forward and put in, on one point or another, to brace up the front for that stern ordeal.

There was very little fighting after this decisive repulse, save that Gen. Crawford, of Sykes's division, holding Round Top on our left, at 5 P. M. advanced McCandless's brigade, by Meade's order, driving back a battery which confronted him without support, and, pushing forward a mile, took 260 prisoners (Georgians), of Anderson's division, and recovering a 12-pounder, three caissons, 7,000 small arms, and all our wounded who had fallen in Sickles's repulse, after they had lain 24 hours uncared for within the enemy's lines. It was manifest that the Rebel force had mainly been withdrawn from this wing to strengthen the grand assault nearer the center, and did not return; as Crawford held the ground thus gained without objection. He could see no reason why a decided advance on this wing of the 5th and the still comparatively fresh 6th corps might not then have been made without meeting serious opposition.

Gen. Meade has been reproached as timid and over-cautious; but it is plain that his strategy, though not daring, was able and wise. Had he allowed his hot-heads to dash their commands at the outset against the Rebel batteries on Seminary ridge, as they would gladly have done, he would have fought a magnificent battle and probably been magnificently beaten. Between two great armies, equally brave, equally resolute, and equal in numbers and in effectiveness of weapons, the choice of position naturally decides the fortune of the day. It is not with these as with armed mobs, where the assailant often triumphs by the mere audacity of his assault—the assailed concluding that those who are charging them will not fly, so they must. Had Lee assailed Burnside on the

heights of Falmouth, he would have been beaten most disastrously. And, though Meade's position at Gettysburg does not compare in strength with Lee's on the Fredericksburg heights, it was probably worth a rëenforcement of 10,000 men.

Nor is Meade justly blamable for not pushing forward at once, on the heels of his beaten foes. Around him lay nearly or quite one-fourth of his army, killed or wounded; he knew that his own ammunition was running low; he *did not* know that Lee's was even more completely exhausted. If he had ordered a general advance, and been repelled from Seminary ridge by such a fire as had met and crushed the Rebel assailants of Cemetery hill, he would have been reproached as rash and fool-hardy by many who have deemed him deficient in courage or in heartiness because he did not make the Union a Fourth-of-July present of the remnant of Lee's army.

His real and grave error dated several days back of this. He had, on assuming command, been authorized to do as he judged best with French's force on Maryland Heights, and Couch's in central Pennsylvania. Had he, on deciding to fight Lee so soon as circumstances favored, ordered both these to join him at the earliest moment, he would now have been consciously master of the situation, and might have blocked Lee's return to Virginia. But he gave no such order to Couch; and having, at Butterfield's urgent suggestion, withdrawn French's 11,000 men from Maryland Heights, he left 7,000 of them standing idle at Frederick, sending the residue as train-guards to Washington, and actually apologized to Halleck, on meeting him, for having moved them at all! Had Gettysburg been lost for want of these 11,000 men, his would have been a fearful responsibility.

Couch's militia were pronounced worthless by worthless officers, who forget what Washington, Gates, and Jackson, severally did with militia; but, though they had been only held in reserve, or set to guarding trains, their presence would have had a wholesome moral effect. And now, if they had been at hand to set on the track of the beaten, flying Rebels, they might have done more, and could not have done less, than Sedgwick did when sent on that same errand.

Meade states our losses in this series of battles around Gettysburg at 2,834 killed, 13,709 wounded, and 6,643 missing (mainly taken prisoners on the 1st): total, 23,186.[39] He only claims 3 guns as captured this side of the Potomac, with 41 flags and 13,621 prisoners—many of them wounded, of course. He adds that 24,978 small arms were collected on the field; but part of them may have been previously our own.

Lee gives no return of his losses; but they were probably not materially greater nor less than ours[40]—our men fighting on the defensive, somewhat protected by breastworks, and

[39] Among our killed, not already mentioned, were Brig.-Gens. S. H. Weed, N. Y., and E. J. Farnsworth, Mich.; Cols. Vincent and Willard (commanding brigades), Cross, 5th N. H., O'Rorke, 140th N. Y., Revere, 20th Mass., and Taylor, Pa. 'Bucktails.' Among our wounded were Brig.-Gens. Gibbon, Barlow, Stannard, Webb, and Paul.

[40] Pollard rather candidly says:

"On our side, Pickett's division had been engaged in the hottest work of the day, and the havoc in its ranks was appalling. Its losses on

having the advantage of position. Doubtless, our loss was much the greater on the first day, a little more than the enemy's on the second, and far the less on the third. Probably, 18,000 killed and wounded, with 10,000 unwounded prisoners, would pretty fairly measure the Confederate losses during their Pennsylvania campaign.

During the 2d and 3d, the cavalry of either army, hovering around its flanks, ready to make a dash at the trains or camps of its adversary if opportunity should serve, had had several slight collisions, but no serious contest. On the 3d, an attempt of Hood, by a movement on the Emmitsburg road, to turn our left—which Gen. Meade regarded as our weak point—was defeated by Merritt's cavalry brigade, then coming up from Emmitsburg with intent to strike the rear and flank of the Rebel right, and by Farnsworth's brigade, which was guarding our own flank in that quarter. Gregg's division watched our right flank, confronted by Stuart. No important advantage was gained on either side; but a considerable infantry force under Hood seems to have been neutralized, during the grand assault, by the sturdy efforts of Merritt and Farnsworth, which were held to indicate that a strong infantry force was behind them, ready to strike heavily and attempt to turn the Rebel right.

The battle being over, Pleasanton, who was in chief command of the cavalry, urged Meade to order a general advance; being satisfied by appearances that not only was the Rebel army demoralized and beginning to retreat, but nearly out of ammunition. But, as it was not certain that the enemy was going, Meade chose to be assured on that point, by a cavalry reconnoissance to the Rebel rear. Pleasanton accordingly dispatched some cavalry on this errand, who rode all night; Gregg, who, moving by our right, had been out 22 miles on the Chambersburg road, returning first, at 8 A. M.,[41] and reporting that road strewn with wounded and stragglers, ambulances and caissons, showing that not only was the enemy in full retreat, but that he was completely demoralized. Gregg had easily taken quite a number of prisoners. Other commanders of cavalry, returning later from similar reconnoissances on other roads, found them likewise covered, and captured many stragglers and wagons. Still, as Meade did not advance in force on their direct line of retreat,[42] and as the movement of the artillery and trains of a great army requires

this day are famous, and should be commemorated in detail. Every Brigadier in the division was killed or wounded. Out of 24 regimental officers, only two escaped unhurt. The Colonels of five Virginia regiments were killed. The 9th Virginia went in 250 strong, and came out with only 38 men; while the equally gallant 19th rivaled the terrible glory of such devoted courage."

Among the Rebel killed were Brig.-Gens. Barksdale, Miss., and Garnett, Va. Among their wounded, Maj.-Gens. Hood, Trimble, Heth, and Pender, the latter mortally; Brig.-Gens. Pettigrew, Kemper, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Hampton, J. M. Jones, Jenkins, Armistead, and Semmes: the two latter mortally.

[41] Saturday, July 4.

[42] Gen. D. B. Birney, who succeeded Gen. Sickles in the command of the 3d corps, says:

"I was ordered to send out a reconnoissance at daylight [on the 4th] to ascertain the position of the enemy. I did so early Sunday morning, and reported that the enemy were in full retreat. I also sent back for permission to open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries as they were crossing a point very near me, upon the turnpike going toward Hagerstown; and the staff officer brought me permission to do so. I had commenced the movement to attack, when another staff officer arrived from Gen. Meade with a written order from him to make no attack;

time, the Rebel pickets along their front were not withdrawn till 2 A. M. of next day."[42] Meantime, an advance division of Couch's militia, about 5,000 strong, under Gen. W. F. ['Baldy'] Smith, had come up in our rear; reporting to Gen. Meade on the 4th.

Next morning, there could no longer be even an affectation of doubt that the enemy were in full retreat; and Sedgwick's (6th) corps was ordered[43] "to follow on the track of the fugitives. The spirit in which this pursuit was prosecuted is thus portrayed by Gen. A. P. Howe, commanding a division of that corps, who thus narrates[44] its progress and results:

"On the 4th of July, it seemed evident enough that the enemy were retreating. How far they were gone, we could not see from the front. We could see but a comparatively small force from the position where I was. On Sunday, the 5th and 6th corps moved in pursuit. As we moved, a small rear-guard of the enemy retreated. We followed them, with this small rear-guard of the enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a gorge of the mountains. There we again waited for them to go on. There seemed to be no disposition to push this rear-guard when we got up to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the enemy came into our lines and gave himself up. He was a Northern Union man, in service in one of the Georgia regiments; and, without being asked, he unhesitatingly told me, when I met him as he was being brought in, that he belonged to the artillery of the rear-guard of the enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition with the rear-guard. But we waited there without receiving any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I informed Gen. Sedgwick, we could easily attack the enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by us until the enemy went away. Then, one brigade of my division, with some cavalry, was sent to follow on after them, while the remainder of the 6th corps moved to the left. We moved on through Boonsboro', and passed up on the pike road leading to Hagerstown. After passing Boonsboro', it became my turn to lead the 6th corps. That day, just before we started, Gen. Sedgwick ordered me to move on and take up the best position I could over a little stream on the Frederick side of Funkstown. As I moved on, it was suggested to me by him to move carefully. 'Do n't come into contact with the enemy; we do n't want to bring on a general engagement.' It seemed to be the current impression that it was not desired to bring on a general engagement. I moved on until we came near Funkstown. Gen. Buford was along that way with his cavalry. I had passed over the stream referred to, and found a strong position, which I concluded to take and wait for the 6th corps to come up. In the mean time, Gen. Buford, who was in front, came back to me and said, 'I am pretty hardly engaged here; I have used a great deal of my ammunition; it is a strong place in front; it is an excellent position.' It was a little farther out than I was—nearer Funkstown. He said, 'I have used a great deal of my ammunition, and I ought to go to the right; suppose you move up there, or send up a brigade, or even a part of one, and hold that position.' Said I, 'I will do so at once, if I can just communicate with Gen. Sedgwick; I am ordered to take up a position over here and hold it, and the intimation conveyed to me was that they did not want to get into a general engagement; I will send for Gen. Sedgwick, and ask permission to hold that position and relieve you.' I accordingly sent a staff officer to Gen. Sedgwick, with a request that I might go up at once and assist Gen. Buford; stating that he had a strong position, but his ammunition was giving out. Gen. Buford remained with me until I should get an answer. The answer was, 'No, we do not want to bring on a general engagement.' 'Well,' said I, 'Buford, what can I do?' He said, 'They expect me to go farther to the right; my ammunition is pretty much out. That position is a strong one, and we ought not to let it go.' I sent down again to Gen. Sedgwick, stating the condition of Gen. Buford, and that he would have to leave unless he could get some assistance; that his position was not far in front, and that it seemed to me that we should hold it, and I should like to send some force up to picket it at least. After a time, I got a reply that, if Gen. Buford left, I might occupy the position. Gen. Buford

which was done. My skirmishers advanced and took possession of their hospitals, with a large number of their wounded. I had sent some twenty orderlies with a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance; and I reported these facts constantly to Gen. Meade; but this peremptory order from him not to open fire at all prevented any pursuit of the enemy."

[43] July 5. [44] July 5, 11 A. M.

[45] Before Committee on the Conduct of the War.

was still with me, and I said to him, 'If you go away from there, I will have to hold it.' 'That 's all right,' said he; 'I will go away.' He did so, and I moved right up. It was a pretty good position, where you could cover your troops. Soon after relieving Buford, we saw some Rebel infantry advancing. I do not know whether they brought them from Hagerstown, or from some other place. They made three dashes, not in heavy force, upon our line to drive us back. The troops that happened to be there on our line were what we considered in the Army of the Potomac unusually good ones. They quietly repulsed the Rebels twice; and, the third time they came up, they sent them flying into Funkstown.

"Yet there was no permission to move on and follow up the enemy. We remained there some time, until we had orders to move on and take a position a mile or more nearer Hagerstown. As we moved up, we saw that the Rebels had some light field-works—hurriedly thrown up, apparently—to cover themselves while they recrossed the river. I think we remained there three days; and the third night, I think, after we got up into that position, it was said the Rebels recrossed the river."

The 4th and 5th were devoted by Gen. Meade to caring for the wounded and burying the dead; part of our cavalry pursuing on the Cashtown road, as Sedgwick did on that by Fairfield. On the 5th, Meade was satisfied that Lee had retreated; but he believed that he was falling back into the Cumberland Valley—not making for the shelter of the Potomac. He decided to move the great body of his forces by the left flank through Boonsboro' Pass, and so place himself between the enemy and his resources. But Sedgwick soon reported [46] that the main body of the enemy was in position in and around Fairfield Pass, and that it might be necessary to fight another battle in those mountains. Hereupon, the 5th corps and some other troops were sent to reenforce Sedgwick, and the 1st and 3d, which had been started by Butterfield, chief of staff, on the Boonsboro' road, were halted; while others, farther in advance, moved on. Soon, word came from Sedgwick that it was unwise to push the enemy farther on the route he was following; whereupon, the whole army was impelled down the Middletown road; Sedgwick being ordered to move the most of his command from Fairfield Pass by Emmitsburg to join the main body. Arrived at Middletown, the army was halted a day to rest and refit, and then moved through South Mountain by Boonsboro' to Hagerstown and the Potomac; where Lee had of course arrived before it, taken a strong position, and was prepared to maintain it. Lee says, in his official report:

"The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners. Nearly 2,000 had previously been paroled; but the enemy's numerous wounded, that had fallen into our hands after the first and second day's engagements, were left behind.

"Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th.

"The march was continued during that day without interruption by the enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon, when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield, and the rest by the way of Cashtown, guarded by Gen. Imboden. In passing through the mountains, in advance of the column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons and ambulances; but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss.

"They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by Gen. Imboden. The attacking force was subsequently encountered and driven off by Gen. Stuart, and pursued for several miles in the direction of Boons-

[46] July 6.

boro'. The army, after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th July."

He had had a marvelous escape. When his shattered columns commenced their retreat from Gettysburg, few of his officers can have imagined that they would ever reach Virginia with their artillery and most of their trains. There was not a probability that they could recross the Potomac with more than the wreck of an army. But heavy rains fell, as usual after great battles; and these are apt to impede pursuers more than pursued, though they need not. Then, every sort of miscalculation combined with lack of energy to impede the progress of our army; so that Lee had had four days wherein to strengthen his position at Williamsport before Meade was there[47] to assail him.

But neither Lee's army nor his troubles were yet over. The heavy rains following the battle had swelled the Potomac to an unfordable state; while Gen. French, who, with 7,000 veterans, had been left idle at Frederick during the great events in Pennsylvania, had, without orders, sent a cavalry force to Falling Waters and Williamsport, which captured the weak guard left by Lee to hold his bridge, which they forthwith destroyed. Lee's hold on the Maryland bank was therefore compulsory, while he collected material and repaired or renewed his bridge. Ere this was accomplished,[48] Meade's army was before him, strengthened by French's division, and by part of Couch's militia, which had reported at Gettysburg and joined the army at Boonsboro'.

The 12th having been spent in getting our troops into position, Gen. Meade called a council of his corps commanders, to consider the expediency of attacking next morning. The council sat long and debated earnestly. Gens. Howard, Pleasanton, and Wadsworth (in place of Reynolds, killed) urged and voted to attack; but Gens. Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French, and Hays (in place of Hancock, wounded at Gettysburg) opposed it. Gen. Meade, having heard all, stated that his judgment favored an attack—that he came there to fight, and could see no good reason for not fighting. Still, he could not take the responsibility of ordering an assault against the advice of a majority of his corps commanders—four of them ranking officers of the army next to himself. His decision would seem to have been a mistake; but he had been in command little more than a fortnight, and the responsibility of overruling a majority and the seniors among his counselors was a grave one. At all events, he did not take it: so our army stood idle throughout the following day; and in the night Lee withdrew across the Potomac, leaving (he says) but two stalled guns, a few disabled wagons, and some weary stragglers, to fall into the hands of his pursuers.

This, however, is not exactly true. Kilpatrick, commanding our cavalry on the left, learning at 3 A. M. that the enemy's pickets in his front were retiring, started after them, and, at 7½ A. M., came up, about two miles from their bridge at Falling Waters, with their rear-guard, under Gen. Pettigrew, who had taken up a strong position and contested thereon his ad-

[47] July 12.

[48] July 13.

vance. A gallant saber-charge by the 6th Michigan, Maj. Webber, into and over their earthworks, was repulsed with loss—Maj. Webber being among the killed; but, after a fight of over two hours, the enemy was driven to the river, with a loss of 125 killed and 1,500 prisoners, which includes 50 of their wounded. Gen. Pettigrew was here mortally wounded. Our total loss was 105.

Our cavalry advance, Col. J. I. Gregg, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry that day,[49] and moved out, next morning, from Bolivar Heights on the Winchester turnpike to Hall's Mills, thence taking the road to Shepherdstown; where it was soon involved in a spirited fight with Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, and driven back a short distance to a strong position, where it held its ground, repulsing several determined charges, until the Rebels were willing to give it up. The day's loss was about 100 on either side; Cols. Drake (1st Virginia) and Gregg were among the Rebel killed; Capt. Fisher, 16th Pa., being the highest officer lost on our side. The ground was so rough and wooded that nearly all the fighting was done on foot.

Gen. Meade crossed the Potomac at Berlin on the 18th; moving by Lovettsville,[50] Union,[51] Upperville,[52] and Salem,[53] to Warrenton;[54] thus retaking the line of the Rappahannock which our army had left hardly two months before. This movement being in advance of Lee, who halted for some days near Bunker Hill, and made a feint of recrossing the Potomac, Meade was enabled to seize all the passes through the Blue Ridge north of the Rappahannock, barring the enemy's egress from the Shenandoah Valley save by a tedious flank march.

Meade, misled by his scouts, had expected to fight a battle in Manassas Gap—or rather, on the west side of it—where our cavalry, under Buford, found the Rebels in force; when the 3d (French's) corps was sent in haste from Ashby's Gap to Buford's support, and its 1st division, Gen. Hobart Ward, pushed through[55] the Gap, and the Excelsior (New York) brigade, Gen. F. B. Spinola, made three heroic charges up so many steep and difficult ridges, dislodging and driving the enemy with mutual loss—General Spinola being twice wounded. Col. Farnum and Major McLean, 1st Excelsior, were also wounded, and Capt. Ben. Price[56] killed.

Next morning, our soldiers pushed forward to Front Royal, but encountered no enemy. Unknown to us, the Excelsiors had been fighting a brigade of Ewell's men, who were holding the Gap while Rhodes's division, forming the rear-guard of Lee's army, marched past up the valley, and had, of course, followed on its footsteps during the night. No enemy remained to fight; but two days were lost by Meade getting into

[49] July 14. [50] July 19. [51] July 20. [52] July 22. [53] July 24. [54] July 25. [55] July 24.

[56] Capt. Price had been for years honorably distinguished as an ardent, indefatigable, efficient advocate for the limitation of the area of individual ownership of real estate, and more especially of the National Homestead bill. He volunteered at the very outset of the war, and gave his best efforts and his life for Freedom and Equal Rights to all mankind. Though distinguished by gallantry, capacity, intelligence, and zeal, he entered the service a captain, and died a captain.

and out of the Gap; during which, Lee moved rapidly southward, passing around our right flank and appearing in our front when our army again looked across the Rappahannock.

So soon as it was known that Lee had started for the North with all the force that he could muster, Gen. Dix, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was directed to make a demonstration on Richmond. Gen. Keyes was appointed to lead it. Starting[57] from White House, about 5,000 men of all arms, under the more immediate command of Gen. Getty, with at least as many more behind at call, Keyes moved up to Baltimore Cross-roads, whence some 1,500 cavalry were sent forward to burn the Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna, which they effected. There was some skirmishing at various points, with the advantage oftener on the side of the enemy; the upshot of all being that Keyes retreated without a serious fight, and without having accomplished any thing worth the cost of the movement. As Richmond was defended by a single brigade under Wise, with such help as might be hastily summoned from points farther south or obtained from her office-holders and other exempts organized as militia, it seems obvious that a more determined leader, who would not have fallen back without knowing why, was badly needed. A spirited, resolute dash might have given us Richmond on the same day that Grant took possession of surrendered Vicksburg and Lee recoiled from Meade's unshaken front at Gettysburg.

Gen. Buford, with his cavalry division, pushed[58] across the river, at Rappahannock Station, and crowded back, first a brigade, then a division, of Stuart's cavalry nearly to Culpepper Court House, when their infantry compelled him to retreat, fighting, till he was supported by the 1st corps; when the foe in turn desisted. Our loss this day was 140, including 16 killed.

Gen. Kilpatrick next crossed[59] at Port Conway below Fredericksburg, driving before him a Rebel force stationed on this side, and burning two gunboats recently captured by the Rebels on the Potomac, and run into the Rappahannock for future use.

Gen. Pleasanton next crossed[60] the Rappahannock at Kelly's and other fords with most of our cavalry, in three divisions, under Buford, Kilpatrick, and Gregg, pressing back Stuart's cavalry to Brandy Station and Culpepper Court House, and thence across the Rapidan, capturing two guns and quite a body of prisoners. Otherwise, the losses on either side were light. Gen. Warren, with the 2d corps, supported our cavalry, but was at no time engaged.

This reconnoissance having proved that Lee had depleted his army to rëenforce Bragg in Tennessee, Gen. Meade crossed[61] the Rappahannock in force, posting himself at Culpepper Court House, throwing forward two corps to the Rapidan; which he was preparing to cross when he was ordered from Washington to detach[62] the 11th and 12th corps, under Hooker, to the aid of our army at Chattanooga. Being rëenforced soon afterward, he sent[63] Gen. Buford, with his cavalry division, across the Rapidan

[57] July 1. [58] Aug. 1. [59] Sept. 1. [60] Sept. 13. [61] Sept. 16. [62] Sept. 24. [63] Oct. 10.

to uncover the upper fords, preparatory to an advance of the 1st and 6th corps; but Lee at the same time crossing Robertson's river and advancing in force from Madison Court House on our right, Meade fell back[64] across the Rappahannock; our cavalry, under Pleasanton, covering the retreat, and being engaged from Culpepper Court House to Brandy Station, where Buford rejoined him, and the enemy were held in check till evening, when Pleasanton withdrew across the river.

Meade now, presuming the enemy in force at Culpepper Court House, pushed over[65] the 6th, 5th, and 2d corps to Brandy Station, while Buford's cavalry moved in the van to Culpepper Court House; when, on hearing from Gen. Gregg, commanding the cavalry division on our right, that the enemy had driven him back from Hazel run across the Rappahannock, and were crossing at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo in heavy force, Meade hastily drew back his army across the river and retreated[66] to Catlett's Station and thence[67] to Centerville; Gregg, with the 4th and 13th Pa. and 1st N. Y. cavalry and 10th N. Y. infantry, being surrounded and attacked[68] near Jefferson, and routed, with a loss of 500, mainly prisoners.

Our army was sharply and impudently pursued, especially by Stuart's cavalry, who gathered up quite a number of prisoners, mainly stragglers, of little value unless to exchange. Stuart, with 2,000 of his cavalry, pressed our rear so eagerly that, when near Catlett's Station,[69] he had inadvertently got ahead, by a flank movement, of our 2d corps, Gen. Warren, acting as rear-guard; and was hemmed in where his whole command must have been destroyed or captured had he not succeeded in hiding it in a thicket of old-field pines, close by the road whereon our men marched by: the rear of the corps encamping close beside the enemy, utterly unsuspicious of their neighborhood, though every word uttered in our lines as they passed was distinctly heard by the lurking foe. Stuart at first resolved to abandon his guns and attempt to escape with moderate loss, but finally picked three of his men, gave them muskets, made them up so as to look as much as possible like our soldiers, and thus drop silently into our ranks as they passed, march a while, then slip out on the other side of the column, and make all haste to Gen. Lee at Warrenton, in quest of help. During the night, two of our officers, who stepped into the thicket, were quietly captured.

At daylight, the crack of skirmishers' muskets in the distance gave token that Lee had received and responded to the prayer for help; when Stuart promptly opened with grape and canister on the rear of our astounded column, which had bivouacked just in his front, throwing it into such confusion that he easily dashed by and rejoined his chief; having inflicted some loss and suffered little or none.

But such ventures can not always prove lucky. That same day,[70] A. P. Hill's corps, which had left Warrenton at 5 A. M., moving up the Alexandria turnpike to Broad Run church, thence obliquing by Greenwich to strike our rear at Bristow Station, had obeyed the order, and fallen in just behind our 3d corps,

[64] Oct. 11. [65] Oct. 12. [66] Oct. 13. [67] Oct. 14. [68] Oct. 12. [69] Night of Oct. 13–14. [70] Oct. 14.

and was eagerly following it, picking up stragglers, and preparing to charge, when, about noon, our 2d corps, Gen. Warren, which was still behind, appeared on the scene, and considerably deranged Hill's (or Lee's) calculations. Hill turned, of course, to fight the advancing rather than the retreating foe, having his batteries ready for action; while Warren, who was for the moment surprised at finding an enemy in his front rather than his rear, required ten minutes to prepare for a suitable reply. Soon, however, Brown's and Arnold's batteries opened on our side, with such effect, aided by the fire of Webb's and Hays's divisions of infantry, that the enemy fell back, abandoning six guns, whereof five—all that were serviceable—were at once seized and put to use on our side. An attempt to charge our right flank by Pettigrew's old brigade, now Heth's, was signally repulsed, with a loss of 450 prisoners. After this, the fighting was more cautious and desultory; the enemy recoiling to the woods, and thence keeping up a long-range cannonade, which amounted to nothing. Our loss in killed and wounded was about 200, including Col. James E. Mallon, 42d N.Y., killed, and Gen. Tile, of Pa., wounded; that of the enemy was probably 400, including Gens. Posey (mortally), Kirkland, and Cooke,[71] wounded, and Cols. Ruffin, 1st N. C., and Thompson, 5th N. C. cavalry, killed. Our soldiers held the field till dark, then followed the rest of our army, whose retreat they had so effectually covered.

Meade, on reflection, was evidently ashamed—as well he might be—of this flight—which, the Rebels assert, continued up to Fairfax Court House—and would have attempted to retrace his steps directly; but a heavy rain[72] had rendered Bull Run unfordable, and obliged him to send for pontoons; meantime, the enemy, after skirmishing along his front and making feints of attack, retreated as rapidly as they had advanced, completely destroying the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Bristow to the Rappahannock—Stuart, aided by a flank attack from Fitz Hugh Lee, worsting Kilpatrick, by force of numbers, in a not very sanguinary encounter[73] near Buckland's Mills, whence our cavalry fell back nimbly to Gainesville. In this affair, Custer's brigade did most of the fighting on our side; but the enemy was so vastly the stronger, backed by infantry, that Kilpatrick did well to escape with little loss. Stuart claims to have taken 200 prisoners.

Lee recrossed the Rappahannock next day; leaving Meade, by reason of his ruined railroad, unable, if willing, to follow him farther for some time.

During these operations, General J. D. Imboden, who, with a Rebel cavalry division, had been guarding the gaps of the Blue Ridge, swooped down[74] upon Charlestown, near Harper's Ferry, which he took; capturing 424 men, with a large amount of stores. Two hours afterward, a superior Union force appeared from Harper's Ferry, before which Imboden deliberately fell back, fighting, to Berryville, saving nearly all his spoils; thence making good his escape by a night-march.

Besides Imboden's, Lee claims to have taken 2,000 prisoners during

[71] Son of Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, Union army. [72] Oct. 16. [73] Oct. 19. [74] Oct. 18.

his dash across the Rappahannock; while our captures were hardly half so many. In killed and wounded, the losses were nearly equal—not far from 500 on either side. But the prestige of skill and daring, of audacity and success, inured entirely to the Rebel commander, who, with an inferior force, had chased our army almost up to Washington, utterly destroyed its main artery of supply, captured the larger number of prisoners, destroyed or caused us to destroy valuable stores, and then returned to his own side of the Rappahannock essentially unharmed; having decidedly the advantage in the only collision which marked his retreat.

Nettled by the trick which had been played upon him, Meade now sought permission to make an attempt, by a rapid movement to the left, to seize the heights of Fredericksburg; but Halleck negatived the project; so Sedgwick, with the 6th and 5th corps, was sent forward at daybreak[15] from Warrenton to Rappahannock Station, where the Rebels had strongly fortified the north bank of the river, covering a pontoon bridge. The works on this side were held by Hayes's Louisiana brigade; while Hoke's brigade, composed of the 6th, 54th, and 57th N. C., was sent over to support it by Lee, who, with Early's division, was just across the river. Our approach was of course well known, and Hoke pushed over on purpose to make all secure.

Arriving at noon opposite the Station, our troops were halted behind a hill a good mile away, rested and carefully formed, and our skirmish lines gradually advanced to the river both above and below the enemy's works; then our lines were quietly advanced over rugged ground till within half a mile of the works; whence a flat, open vale, traversed by a wide ditch, with high, steep banks and three feet of mud and water in its bed, then by a moat 12 feet wide by 5 deep, now dry; beyond which, rose a hill or ridge, directly on the river's bank, on which were the enemy's works. Gen. Wright had command of the 6th corps; while Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell[16] commanded the 1st division, whereof the 3d brigade, comprising the 5th Wisconsin, 6th Maine, 49th and 119th Pa., now commanded by Col. P. C. Ellmaker, of the latter, was his own, and had been carefully drilled by him into the highest efficiency. This brigade was advanced directly opposite the enemy's works; and Russell, after a careful observation, reported to Wright, just before sunset, that those works could be carried by storm, and was authorized to try it.

The next moment, his brigade moved forward in two lines: five companies of the 6th Maine deploying as skirmishers, while the 5th Wisconsin, dashing in solid column on the largest and strongest redoubt, followed close behind them; the 20th Maine, of another brigade, closing on their left, and advancing in line with the 6th; Russell himself at the front, and giving the order to 'charge;' whereupon, with fixed bayonets and without firing a shot, the line swept forward through a deluge of case-shot and Minié bullets.

Ten minutes later, the rest of the brigade came up at double-quick to

[15] Nov. 7.

[16] Of Salem, N. Y.—son of the late Hon. David Russell.

their aid; but, during those ten minutes, the 6th Maine had lost 16 out of 23 officers, and 123 out of 350 enlisted men; three of their veteran captains lying dead, with Lt.-Col. Harris, of this regiment, and Maj. Wheeler, of the 5th Wisc., severely wounded. Adj. Clark, of the former, and Lt. Russell, a relative and aid of the General, were likewise wounded. But now the Pennsylvania regiments rushed in at their highest speed, and the struggle at this point was over; while the 121st New York and 5th Maine, of the 2d brigade, firing but a single volley, swept, just at dusk, through the Rebel rifle-pits on Russell's right, and down to the pontoons in the Rebel rear, cutting off the retreat of the routed garrison, and compelling 1,600 of them to surrender. Four guns, 7 flags, 2,000 small arms, and the pontoon bridge, were among the captures; Gen. Hayes surrendered, but afterward escaped. Two of his Colonels swam the river. Several who attempted to do so were drowned. The whole was the work of two brigades, numbering less than 3,000 men; and most of it of Russell's, barely 1,549 strong. And, while no praise is too high for his men, it is not too much to say that the credit of this rarely paralleled exploit is mainly due to David A. Russell—as capable, modest, and brave a soldier as the army of the Potomac ever knew.

Simultaneously with this movement, the 2d and 3d corps, Gen. French, advanced to Kelly's ford; where pontoons were quickly laid, under the fire of their guns, and the 3d brigade of Ward's division, Gen. De Trobriand, at once dashed across, Berdan's sharp-shooters in front, and charged into the enemy's rifle-pits, capturing Col. Gleason, 12th Virginia, and over 400 men, with a loss of some 40. Our command of the ford was complete; and Lee, thoroughly worsted, fell back to Culpepper that night, and across the Rapidan the next. Our railroad was then rebuilt down to and across the Rappahannock, and rëopened[17] to Brandy Station; which thus became our dépôt of supplies.

It was a prevalent conviction among its more energetic and enterprising officers that our army might have advanced directly on the heel of its brilliant success at Rappahannock Station and its seizure of the fords, and caught that of the enemy dispersed in Winter cantonments or compelled it to fight at disadvantage before it could be concentrated and intrenched in a strong position. Meade, however, with his habitual caution, waited till the bridge at Rappahannock Station was rebuilt, and every thing provided for moving safely; when, finding that he was not assailed nor likely to be, he again gave[18] the order to advance. A storm forthwith burst, which dictated a delay of three days; after which, the start was actually made: Gen. French, with the 3d corps, followed by Sedgwick, with the 6th, crossing the Rapidan at Jacob's mill; Gen. Warren, with the 2d, at Germania ford—both moving on Robertson's tavern; while Sykes, with the 5th, followed by Newton, with two divisions of the 1st, crossed at Culpepper ford, and Gregg, with a division of cavalry, crossed at Ely's

[17] Nov. 19.

[18] Nov. 23.



MINE RUN AND VICINITY.

ford, and advanced on the Catharpen road, covering the left or most exposed flank of our infantry: the other two divisions, under Custer and Merritt, watching respectively the upper fords of the Rapidan and the trains parked at Richardsville in our rear. Fully 70,000 men were engaged in this movement; while Lee (Longstreet being still absent) could oppose to it only the two heavy corps or grand divisions of A. P. Hill and Ewell, estimated by Meade at 50,000 strong.

Our troops moved at 6 A. M.;[79] but energy and punctuality, save in retreat, seem to have long ere now deserted this army; and the 3d corps

[79] Nov. 26.

—through the mistake, it is said, of Gen. Prince, commanding one of its divisions, who took a wrong road—did not even reach Jacob's mill till afternoon;* and then the banks of the river were steep, &c., &c.—the upshot of all being that the prompt corps had to wait for the laggard; so that, instead of concentrating on Robertson's tavern that evening, as Meade had prescribed, our army spent the day in getting across, and the heads of its columns bivouacked a mile or two from the fords; thus precluding all possibility of surprising the enemy or taking him at disadvantage.

Our troops moved on at daylight next morning;[80] the 2d corps repelling the enemy's skirmishers and reaching, at 10 A. M., Robertson's tavern; where Early's, Rhodes's, and E. Johnson's divisions of Ewell's corps confronted it. Warren was thereupon ordered to halt, and await the arrival of French, then momently expected. At 11, word came from him that he was near the plank road, and was there *waiting for Warren.* He was ordered afresh to push on at once to Robertson's tavern, where he would find Warren engaged and requiring his support. Several officers having been sent by Meade to reiterate and emphasize this order, an answer was received from French, at 1 P. M., that the enemy were throwing a force to his right flank at Raccoon ford. Once more, he was ordered to advance forthwith, and, if resisted, to attack with all his might, throwing forward his left to connect with Gen. Warren. French received this order at 2½ P. M., but protested against it as hazardous, and desired the staff captain who brought it to assume the responsibility of suspending its execution! Thus, with all manner of hesitations and cross-purposes—Prince once halting two hours at a fork for orders as to which road he should take—the day was squandered; Meade, sorely disappointed by French's non-arrival, being at length obliged to order the 1st corps over from the plank road to the support of Warren, who was hard pressed,[81] near Robertson's tavern, which he regarded as the key of the position.

The 5th corps came up next morning;[82] and now Gregg went forward with his cavalry on the plank road, and had a smart collision with Stuart's troopers, whom he pushed back upon their infantry supports; when he recoiled and allowed Sykes to go forward, connecting with Warren, to the vicinity of Hope Church.

[80] Nov. 27.

[81] *The Richmond Dispatch* has a letter from a correspondent with the Rebel army, dated Nov. 28, which gives their loss during this day's fighting as "fully 500 killed and wounded;" adding:

"Of the loss of the enemy, I am not advised; but I am now disposed to doubt if it was as heavy as our own. They fought, I am told, quite well, and fired more accurately than usual."

Among their casualties he instances Gens. Stuart (J. E. B.) and J. M. Jones slightly wounded; Col. Nelligan, 1st La., severely; and Lt.-Col. Walton, 23d Va., killed.

Our losses on this day were 309, but this includes none from French's corps, who were skirmishing a good part of the day; while we lost a few more on the 29th and 30th. The *Dispatch* correspondent reports that Rosser's cavalry, raiding in our rear, struck a train near Wilderness tavern, and captured 70 wagons (whereof they destroyed 50), and brought off 150 prisoners and as many mules or horses.

It is probable that, including deserters, either army was depleted by fully 1,000 men during this Mine Run movement.

[82] Nov. 28.

Our army being now disposed for a determined attack, it was found that the enemy had retreated; whereupon the 2d corps moved out two miles farther, and found the enemy in position along the west bank of MINE RUN, facing eastward; where the 2d, 6th, 1st, and part of the 3d corps, under a pelting November rain, were brought into line confronting them a little after dark.

The enemy's deliberately chosen position was of course a good one. The 'run' was of little consequence, so far as water was concerned, being rarely over two feet deep; but its immediate banks were in places swampy and scarcely passable; while a bare, smooth slope ascended gently for half a mile or so to a crest or ridge, perhaps a hundred feet above the surface of the stream, already bristling with abatis, infantry parapets, and epaulements for batteries. After careful reconnoissance, an attack directly in front was negatived: so Warren, with the 2d and a division of the 6th corps, was impelled farther to our left (south), with instructions to feel for the enemy's flank and turn it if possible, while each corps commander should more closely examine the ground in his front, and report on the practicability of an assault.

The next day[83] was spent in this reconnoissance—the Rebel defenses being of course strengthened every hour—Gen. Wright, commanding a division of the 6th corps, reporting, at 6 P. M., that he had discovered a point on our extreme right where an assault might be made with a good prospect of cheap and decisive success. Warren soon reported from our left that he had outflanked the enemy's line of defenses, and could easily assault and turn them. Meade thereupon decided to attack at all points next morning.

At 8 P. M., Warren reported to Meade in person, expressing such confidence in his ability to carry every thing before him, while French had reported against the assault just ordered on the enemy's center, that Meade decided to forego, or at least to postpone, that assault, and send two divisions of the 3d corps to reënforce Warren, so as to give him six divisions (nearly half the army), and thus render the success of his contemplated attack a moral certainty. So our men lay down once more on their arms, with orders to the corps commanders that the batteries of the right and center should open at 8 A. M.;[84] at which hour, Warren was to make the grand assault: Sedgwick striking in on our right an hour later; while the three divisions of the 1st and 3d corps, left to hold our center, which were only to demonstrate and menace in the morning, were to advance and assault whenever the flank attacks should have proved successful. Meantime, our cavalry skirmished at various points with the enemy's, who attempted to molest our communications at the fords and elsewhere; but who were repulsed and driven off.

Our batteries opened at the designated hour; our skirmishers in the center dashed across Mine Run, pushing back those of the enemy; while Sedgwick, who had massed his column during the night, as near the enemy's lines as possible, awaited the moment for attack. But nothing

[83] Nov. 29.

[84] Nov. 30.

was heard from Warren, till ten minutes before 9, when his dispatch reached Meade, stating that he had found the enemy's defenses so strong that he did not feel able to carry them, and had suspended his attack in consequence. Sedgwick was thereupon directed to hold off till further orders, while Meade galloped to Warren, four miles off, and conferred with him as to the situation. He found Warren fixed in the conviction that an attack on this flank was hopeless; and now it was too late to concentrate for a determined attack on the center; while, if the attempt to flank the enemy's left was to be further prosecuted, the whole army must be moved toward our left, abandoning the turnpike, which was our main line of communication and of retreat.

Meade concluded to desist for the day: the 5th and 6th corps, with two divisions of the 3d, returning to their former positions. Meanwhile, the opening of our batteries in the morning had exposed to the enemy the point on his left where we had purposed to attack, and he had made haste to strengthen it by earthworks, abatis, and guns.

Our supply trains had been left north of the Rapidan. If the movement should be persisted in, they must be brought over, in order that our soldiers' haversacks might be replenished. Then the turnpike and plank roads must be abandoned, and our army cut loose from its resources, at a season when a few hours' rain would convert the river in its rear into a raging, foaming flood. All the important roads in this region run from Gordonsville and Orange Court House eastward to Fredericksburg; and our army, moving southward to flank the enemy, must cut and bridge roads for its guns and trains. That army, if not discouraged by the bungles and failures of the last week, must by this time have been soured and intensely disgusted. To rush it *now* on the Rebel defenses—which had grown and were growing stronger each hour—would be to expose it to defeat in a position where defeat was sure to be disastrous, and might prove ruinous. Meade decided, therefore, to back out—and this was the least wretched part of the entire wretched business. He says he should have marched to the heights of Fredericksburg, if Halleck had left him at liberty to do so; but he probably evinced more sense, if less spirit, in plumply retreating, so bringing his army back across the Rapidan during the night,[88] and taking up his pontoons next morning, without having been pursued, or anywise molested during his retreat.[89] And this terminated, with the Army of the Potomac, the campaign of 1863.

[88] Dec. 1–2.

[89] Gen. A. P. Howe, testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, thus sums up the judgment of those officers of his army who were dissatisfied with Meade's leadership:

"I do not think they have full confidence in the ability or state of mind of Gen. Meade. What I mean by that is the *animus* that directs the movements of the army. They do not think there is that heart, and energy, and earnestness of purpose in the war, to make every use of the means at his command to injure the enemy and carry on the war successfully. I do not think they have, I will not say confidence, but faith in him. They do not expect from him what the crisis seems to call for. They believe that, if he is attacked, he will do all he can to defend his position. But that he will act with zeal and energy, or that his whole heart and soul are in the bringing all the means successfully to bear to break down the enemy, so far as I can judge, they do not look for that; they do not expect it. So far as I can judge, a great many officers think he can do very well in a defensive fight. If he was called upon to guard the Potomac or Washington, he will make good marches to stop the enemy; but that he will be active, zealous, en-

The more important military operations in (and from) WEST VIRGINIA, during 1863, were as follows:

A raiding expedition, 1,000 strong, consisting of the 2d Virginia (Union) cavalry, Col. John Toland, and 34th Ohio infantry (mounted), which struck out[87] from Browntown, West Virginia, crossing Lens mountain to Coal river, and thence moving southeasterly by Raleigh and Wyoming Court House, zigzagged over the Guyan, Tug, and several other ranges of mountains, swooped down[88] on Wytheville, a village of 1,800 inhabitants, and a place of considerable importance. Hitherto, they had passed over a rugged, wild, and sterile region, having very few inhabitants and no elements of resistance; but, charging into Wytheville, they were fired on from the houses, whereby Col. Toland was soon killed and Col. Powell, 34th Ohio, mortally wounded, as were several of their leading subordinates. After firing some of the buildings whence they were thus assailed, our men, abandoning their dead and wounded, fell back two miles and encamped; starting for home, under Lt.-Col. Franklin, 34th Ohio, early next morning. Hungry, worn out, and dispirited, they lost nearly half their horses on their devious way homeward: wending from early dawn till midnight over the roughest mountains, and being four days without food, till they struck Tug fork the second night, where they found and killed some cattle. Misled by a treacherous guide, they wasted next day wandering through the mountains, finding[89] rations and feed at Fayetteville; having ridden over 400 miles, lost 83 men, with at least 300 horses, and endured as much misery as could well be crowded into a profitless raid of eight days.

Gen. W. W. Averill, setting forth from Huttonsville, Randolph county, moved down the line dividing West from old Virginia, pushing back the small Rebel forces in that quarter under Col. W. S. ['Mudwall'] Jackson, and menacing an advance on Staunton. At length, when near Lewisburg and White Sulphur Springs, he was met[90] by a force about equal to his own, under Maj.-Gen Sam. Jones, but more immediately commanded by Col. Geo. S. Patton, who had chosen a strong position in a gorge between steep mountains that precluded flanking, where a spirited fight was maintained throughout the day, and till noon of the next; when Averill drew off, short of ammunition, leaving one disabled gun. He had calculated on help from Gen. Scammon, commanding on the Kanawha, which did not reach him. Our

ergetic, in using his means to strike successful offensive blows against the enemy, not at all; he is not the man for that—at least that is my impression.

"*Question:* The same observation you apply to Gen. Meade will apply to the corps commanders you refer to, will it not?

"*Answer:* I think so. I do not know as it would be proper for me to state here the terms we use in the army. However, we say there is too much Copperheadism in it. This is so for different reasons: with some, there is a desire to raise up Gen. McClellan; with others, there is a dislike to some of the measures of the Government; they do not like the way the Negro question is handled. And, again, the impression is made upon my mind that there are some who have no faith in this war, who have no heart in it; they will not do any thing to commit themselves; but there is a wide difference between doing your duty so as not to commit yourself, and doing all that might reasonably be expected of you at these times. I do not know as I can express myself better than saying that there is Copperheadism at the root of the matter."

[87] July 13. [88] July 18. [89] July 23. [90] Aug. 26.

total loss here was 207; Patton reports his at 156, and says he took 117 prisoners. He attempted to pursue with cavalry, but to little purpose. Averill returned to Huttonsville.

Late in the Fall, Averill, starting from Beverly with some 5,000 men, and, chasing Col. 'Mudwall' Jackson, struck[91] a somewhat smaller Rebel force under Gen. Echols, strongly posted on the top of Droop mountain, in Greenbrier county, routed him, and drove him back into Monroe county, with heavy loss. Ours was 120 in all; the Rebels twice or thrice so many, including 100 prisoners, with 3 guns and 700 small arms. West Virginia was thus nearly cleared of armed Rebels at the close of the campaign; and they never after entered it but as raiders.

XVIII.

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

MIDDLE AND EAST TENNESSEE.

While Gen. Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', was accumulating wagons, munitions, and supplies, for a determined advance against Bragg's army confronting him at Shelbyville or Tullahoma, the noted and generally successful raider Morgan was preparing, on our right, for a more extensive and daring cavalry expedition than he had yet undertaken. Meantime, a party of predatory horsemen, about 80 in number, claiming to belong to the 2d Kentucky Confederate cavalry, crossed the Ohio from western Kentucky near Leavenworth, Ind., about the middle of June, raiding through Orange, Orleans, and Washington counties; and were trying to make their way back into Kentucky, when they were cornered[1] by the Leavenworth home guards, Maj. Clendenin, and the steamboat Izetta, and were soon glad to surrender. Barely one of them escaped to the Kentucky shore, and he was immediately captured.

At length, setting out[2] from Sparta, Morgan crossed[3] the Cumberland, then in flood, near Burkesville—building boats for his trains and swimming his horses—with a well-mounted force of 2,028 effectives and 4 guns; pushing back Col. Wolford's cavalry, who sought to impede his march, passing through[4] Columbia, which was partially sacked by his subordinates, contrary to orders, and striking[5] Green river at Tebb's bend; where 200 of the 25th Michigan, Col. O. H. Moore, had, wholly within the last 24 hours, intrenched themselves, formed abatis, &c., and prepared to stay. Morgan summoned them in due form, and was courteously informed by Moore that, on account of this being 'the glorious Fourth,' he could n't entertain the proposition. Morgan, having two regiments at hand, forthwith assaulted; and a desperate fight of some hours ensued, wherein Col. Chenault, Maj. Brent, and several more of his best officers

[91] Nov. 6. [1] June 19, 1863. [2] June 27. [3] July 1–2. [4] July 3. [5] July 4.

were killed, and he was finally compelled to draw off, badly worsted. Moore had but 6 killed, 23 wounded. Morgan lost 25 killed and 20 wounded.[6]

Moving thence on Lebanon, which was held by Col. Hanson,[7] 20th Ky., with 400 of his men, Morgan summoned it at sunrise,[8] and was refused. After spending seven hours in fruitless efforts to reduce it, he at length charged into the town, and set fire to the buildings whence Hanson was firing—burning a good part of the place, and compelling Hanson to surrender. Here Morgan's young brother was killed, leading a charge. And he had lost so much time at Tebb's bend and here, that our cavalry were closing in upon him; so the Rebel raider decamped at dark, during a furious rain, compelling his prisoners (whom he had not yet had time to parole) to race ten miles in ninety minutes to Springfield—one, who could not or would not keep the pace, being shot dead by the way.

Moving rapidly by Shepherdsville and Bardstown,[9] Morgan struck the Ohio at Brandenburg,[10] 40 miles below Louisville; seizing there the steamboats McCombs and Alice Dean, on which he crossed his command—increased, during his progress, by Kentucky sympathizers, till it was said now to number 4,000 men, with 10 guns. The Alice Dean was burned; the McCombs—which probably belonged to a friend, who had placed it where it would be wanted—was left unharmed. Gen. Hobson, who, with a bad start, had been following from the Cumberland, under the direction of Gen. H. M. Judah, reached Brandenburg just after Morgan's last boat-load had left it.

Morgan sped inland, by Corydon, Greenville, and Palmyra, to Salem, Ind., where he surrounded[11] and captured 350 'Home Guards,' who had fallen back thus far from Corydon before him. He here broke up the railroad, burnt the dépôt, and ordered a general conflagration of mills and factories, but allowed each to be ransomed by the payment of $1,000 in cash. Thence moving by zigzags, but in an easterly course, through Vienna, dividing up his command so as to cut railroads and telegraphs on every side, the raider at once threatened[12] Madison and demanded the surrender of Old Vernon, where a body of militia had hastily assembled to oppose him; but he decamped on finding the militia in earnest. Passing thence through Versailles,[13] and making capital bargains in horse-trades all along, his followers concentrated at Harrison, just across the Ohio line; sweeping around Cincinnati[14] at distances of 7 to 20 miles, and pushing thence by Miamisville, Williamsburg, Sardinia, Piketon, and Jackson, they struck the Ohio at Buffington island, not far below Parkersburg, whence they counted on an easy escape through the poor, thinly settled adjacent region of West Virginia and north-eastern Kentucky to the more congenial shades of south-western Virginia.

Of course, they levied on the stores and granaries, as well as the stables and kitchens, along their route; but the pursuit was so hot that they

[6] They say. Moore says 50 killed, 250 wounded.

[7] Brother of Roger W., the Rebel General.

[8] July 5. [9] July 6. [10] July 7. [11] July 9. [12] July 11. [13] July 12. [14] July 13–14.

found time to do comparatively little mischief. Crossing the Little Miami railroad, they obstructed the track at a spot suited to their purpose, and watched it till the train, at 7 A. M., came down from Morrow; throwing off the locomotive, killing the fireman, and wounding the engineer; when they rushed out of the adjacent woods, and, while the cars were being fired and burnt, they captured and paroled 200 unarmed recruits, who they had probably been apprised were coming.

There was some skirmishing from day to day; but the raiders were too strong for any force that could be assembled on the instant, while their route could not be foreseen, and they moved too swiftly—burning bridges and obstructing roads behind them—to permit the gathering cloud in their rear to overtake them: these having but a second and very inferior choice in swapping horses.

Still, a considerable force had collected in their front at Chilicothe; but Morgan had pressing business in another direction.

Hobson, on reaching the Ohio, had foreseen that the chase would be obliged to take water again, and had sent at once to Louisville to have the river well patrolled by gunboats. And, so soon as it became evident that Morgan was making for Pomeroy or Gallipolis with intent to cross, the inhabitants along the roads leading thither began to fall trees across them in his front, materially interfering with the freedom and celerity of his movements. At length,[18] the weary, harassed raiders struck the Ohio just at daylight, at a ford a little above Pomeroy, and sent across two companies, who were received with a volley, which plainly said, 'No thoroughfare;' and the next moment brought tidings of a gunboat, which had drawn off when fired at, but would of course spread the alarm far and wide.

One of Morgan's Colonels now reported that he had charged and routed a hostile force posted in rifle-pits not far distant, capturing 150 prisoners; and the chief was hurrying his preparations for crossing his men forthwith, when the roar of guns down the river argued gunboats at hand, just as three heavy columns of infantry appeared, crowning the bluffs in his rear and on his right, opening fire on the close columns of the fugitives. Forthwith, the word was given to flee up the river, and it was obeyed with alacrity; leaving guns, wagons, &c., with dismounted men, sick, wounded, &c., to the number of 600, to become prisoners.

Morgan and his remaining troopers sped up the river some 14 miles to Belleville; where they had fairly begun, at 3 P. M., to swim their horses across—330 having got away—when Gens. Hobson and Shackleford, in command of a division of their pursuers, were again upon them; while several gunboats confronted them on the river, manned by Gen. Scammon, commanding on the Kanawha; he having brought down two or three regiments to share in the hunt. As there was no hope in fighting, the raiders took post on a high, scarcely accessible bluff, where they were summoned by Shackleford to surrender. They asked an hour for consideration: he gave them forty minutes; and, when these expired, all that re-

[18] July 19.

mained (over 1,000) gave up; but Morgan, with a small body of adherents, had put off, and was not included in the capitulation. Though the surrender was made to the military, it is clear that the gunboats constrained it; the river being then so low that horsemen forded it, aided by a little swimming, with slight difficulty. But the Moose, Lt.-Com'g L. Fitch, was always in the way when a crossing was attempted, dispensing shell and canister to all comers, and driving back the haggard, wayworn raiders to the shore they were so anxious to leave. Other gunboats were likewise on the alert; though the low stage of the water forbade the use of any but the lighter and less effective.

Morgan, with the remnant of his force, now stripped of its guns and wagons, with all the miscellaneous plunder it had hitherto accumulated, fled inland to McArthur; thence making another forlorn attempt to strike the river and cross just above Marietta; then pushing inland again to Eastport, and thence irregularly north-east till near New Lisbon, where they were at length so surrounded and hemmed in by militia, home guards, &c., in addition to the pursuers ever hot on their track, that they were driven to take refuge on a bluff, whence there was no escape; and here they surrendered[16] at discretion. Thus, of all who started on this hare-brained raid, less than 400, under Col. Adam R. Johnson, who got across at Belleville, and fled thence into south-western Virginia, escaped death or captivity. Of the residue, some 500 were killed or wounded. And, while earnest attempts were made to demonstrate that the loss inflicted on the Federals, in the diversion of forces, cutting of railroads, &c., outweighed its unquestioned cost, it is note-worthy that the Confederates never seemed to have any more brigades of cavalry which they wished to dispose of on similar terms.

Morgan and several of his officers were taken to Columbus[17] and confined in the penitentiary; their heads being shaved, like those of ordinary felons. No good reason has been assigned for this treatment, nor does it appear by whom it was ordered—certainly not by the Government. No labor was required of them; but they were confined in cells; whence seven of them, Morgan included, dug out and escaped;[17] changing their clothes in the sentry-box on the outer wall, and separating so soon as they were free. Morgan and a Capt. Hines proceeded at once to the Cincinnati dépôt, got upon the train, which they knew would start at 1 A. M., and were carried by it very near to Cincinnati, when they put on the brakes at the rear of the train, checked its speed, jumped off, and ran to the Ohio, across which they were ferried to Kentucky, and went at once to a house where shelter and refreshment awaited them. Thence, Morgan made his way through Kentucky and Tennessee to northern Georgia; losing his companion by the way, but finding himself at last among those who did not fear to avow their sympathy with his cause, and their admiration for his character. Thence, he proceeded to Richmond, where he was greeted with an ovation, and made a speech, re-

[16] July 26.

[17] Nov. 26.

counting his adventures, and protesting that the telegraphic blazon which appeared at the nick of time of his having just arrived at Toronto, was "purely fortuitous," and that "his escape was made entirely without assistance from any one outside" the prison—an assertion not needed to incite and justify a strong presumption that the fact was otherwise. Thence, he returned to service in East Tennessee; where he was killed the next year.

Gen. Rosecrans's remaining inactive at Murfreesboro' till late in the Summer of 1863 was dictated by imperative necessity. His supplies were mainly drawn from Louisville, far distant, over a single railroad, traversing a semi-hostile country, and requiring heavy guards at every dépôt, bridge, and trestle, to save it from destruction by Rebel raiders or incendiaries. Though his army was stronger than that which confronted him under Bragg, its cavalry was weaker;[18] as had been proved at Stone river, and in other collisions. Though his best efforts were given to strengthening it, he could hardly obtain horses so fast as they were worn out or lost through the superior activity, vigor, or audacity, of the Rebel partisans, Forrest, Wheeler, and Morgan. But, at length—Morgan having departed on his great raid into the Free States, and Rosecrans having obtained, since Winter, about 6,000 beasts of burden, partly by impressment—he felt justified in giving the order to advance.

Of Bragg's infantry, 18,000, under Bishop Polk, held a very strong position, formidably intrenched, at Shelbyville, where over five miles of earthworks had been constructed, mainly by the labor of 3,000 slaves, drawn from Alabama and Georgia. Behind this, 18 miles distant, and behind a difficult mountain region, traversed by bad roads, carried for miles through gorges so narrow that two wagons could scarcely pass, was another intrenched camp at Tullahoma: Hardee's corps, 12,000 strong, at Wartrace, on the right of Shelbyville, covering the railroad and holding the mountain gaps in its front. Beside these, Bragg had a division under Buckner, at or near Knoxville and Chattanooga. Perhaps 40,000 was the extent of the force he would be able to concentrate for a battle; while Rosecrans had not less than 60,000; but then, if the former fell back, destroying the railroads and bridges, he would naturally be strengthened; while Rosecrans, protecting his communications, would be steadily becoming weaker.

Rosecrans advanced[19] with intent to flank the enemy's right, concentrating on Manchester, and thence menacing his communications below Tullahoma in such manner as to compel him to come out of his strongholds and fight a battle on ground which gave him no advantage. To do this, it was necessary to deceive Bragg by a feint of assaulting him in his works at Shelbyville; thus compelling him to concentrate and uncover the difficult mountain passes on his right, through which our main advance must be made. And, on the day

[18] Halleck, in his report, says he sent Rosecrans no more horses, because he could not obtain forage for those he already had. Rosecrans responds that there was forage enough in the country; yet his horses suffered for it, because his cavalry was not strong enough to go out and get it. It is not necessary to add that his is the better reason.

[19] June 24.

our movement commenced, it began to storm, and continued to rain for *seventeen* successive days, swelling the mountain rills to torrents, and gullying the roads so badly that one division was three days in marching 21 miles, though unopposed and making the utmost exertions.

Our army moved on three main roads: the 14th corps, Gen. Thomas, in the center, toward Manchester; the 21st, Gen. Crittenden, on our left, toward McMinnville; the 20th, Gen. A. D. McCook, directly on Shelbyville; Gen. Gordon Granger's reserve division supporting both the 14th and 20th. Crittenden's movement was to be made last, with one brigade of cavalry under Turchin; all the rest, under Stanley, was thrown out on our right.

Every movement directed, though impeded and somewhat delayed by the nearly impassable state of the roads, was successfully made. Liberty gap, in McCook's front, was carried by a vigorous advance of Johnson's division; while Hoover's gap, in Thomas's front, was surprised by Wilder's mounted brigade of Reynolds's division, and held against heavy odds till Reynolds could bring up his entire division and secure it. On the 27th, Rosecrans had his headquarters in Manchester, with Thomas's corps around him; Sheridan, with the right division of McCook's corps, arriving next morning, and the rest of that corps during the 29th. The enemy, deceived and overpowered, had been forced back, with little more than smart, persistent skirmishing, to Fairfield. Manchester itself had been surprised by Wilder on the morning of that day.

Granger had started[20] from Triune, on our extreme right, moving by Rover and Middleton, pushing back the enemy, by lively skirmishes at either place, to Christiana, on the road from Murfreesboro' to Shelbyville, where he was joined by Stanley; advancing[21] thence on Guy's gap, covering Shelbyville, which was at first firmly held by the enemy; but, after two hours' skirmishing, they suddenly fell back, as though they had been covering a retreat. Granger at once directed Stanley to advance his cavalry and clear the gap, which was quickly done; the Rebels making all speed for seven miles to their rifle-pits, barely three miles north of Shelbyville, where two well-posted guns checked the pursuit. But Granger, now satisfied that the enemy must be evacuating, ordered a fresh cavalry charge, before which the foe again gave way, and were chased to within a short mile of the town, where three guns were planted so as to sweep all the approaches, formidably backed by infantry. It was now 6 P. M., and, Granger having his infantry well up, Stanley again charged, and in half an hour Shelbyville was ours, with three excellent brass guns, more than 500 prisoners, 3,000 sacks of corn, &c., &c. Wheeler escaped by swimming Duck river; but the 1st Confederate cavalry, which had formed to stop our charge to enable him to do so, were mainly killed or taken.

Our army now rested a little, while reconnoissances were made to ascertain the position of the enemy, and Wilder was sent to strike the railroad in Bragg's rear near Decherd, burn Elk river bridge, and do whatever

[20] June 23, 2 P. M.

[21] June 27.

other execution he might. He failed in this—the bridge being too strongly held—but damaged the railroad a little, and thoroughly alarmed the enemy; so that, on a renewal of Rosecrans's maneuvers to flank Tullahoma as he had flanked Shelbyville, Bragg decamped,[32] and three divisions of our infantry entered it at noon next day.

Gens. Sheridan, Thomas, and Turchin, severally struck the Rebel rear-guard on Elk river the day after; but found that stream so swollen by the incessant rains as to be scarcely fordable. When they did cross,[33] the enemy had wholly disappeared, and were beyond the reach of present pursuit.

Thus, in nine days, Rosecrans had, without a serious engagement, cleared Middle Tennessee of the Rebel army, at a cost of barely 560 men; disabling at least as many, and taking 1,634 prisoners, 3 guns, and much other spoil. And only the celerity of Bragg's flight, with the lack of suspicion on our side that he would abandon the State and his strong positions without a struggle, saved him from still greater disasters.

Bragg, having obtained a fair start, by running while Rosecrans was intent on fighting, and having the use of a railroad whereon to transport his heavy guns and supplies, destroying it behind him, easily made good his flight over the Cumberland mountains and the Tennessee; crossing the latter at and near Bridgeport, where he destroyed the railroad bridge behind him. Rosecrans was expected at Washington to follow him up sharply: but how could he? His army must live; and it could by no means subsist on what was left it by Bragg's devouring host in that rugged, sterile region; while the wagoning of food, much more of forage, over the steep, often waterless mountains that abound there, was utterly impracticable. While, therefore, his light troops followed the flying enemy to the river, and his advanced posts stretched from Stevenson on the right to Pelham on the left, the General kept his main body behind the Cumberland mountains, on a line from Winchester to McMinnville, while his engineers repaired the railroad down to Stevenson; when the East Tennessee road was in like manner repaired thence to Bridgeport,[34] and Sheridan's division of McCook's corps thrown forward to hold it. Even by the help of such a railroad line, Rosecrans felt that forage could not be had in that rugged, wooded, scantily grassed region, until the Indian corn was far enough matured to afford it. At length, having already accumulated considerable supplies at Stevenson, our army moved on:[35] Thomas's corps following the general direction of the railroad to Stevenson and thence to Bridgeport; McCook's corps moving on its right, with Stanley's cavalry thrown far out on that flank; while Crittenden's corps, on our left, advanced in three columns, under Wood, Van Cleve, and Palmer, from Manchester and McMinnville, across the Sequatchie valley at different points, moved directly on Chattanooga, the remaining Rebel stronghold in Tennessee, the key of East Tennessee and of all practicable northern approaches to Georgia.

These movements were so thoroughly prepared and judiciously

[32] Night of June 30. [33] July 3. [34] July 25. [35] Aug. 16.

timed that but four or five days were employed in their execution, despite the ruggedness of the country —the Sequatchie valley cleaving the heart of the Cumberland mountains for 50 miles, and of course doubling the labor of crossing them — and Chattanooga was wakened[26] by shells thrown across the river from the eminences north of it by Wilder's mounted brigade, simultaneously with Van Cleve's division emerging from the mountains at Poe's crossing, considerably to our left; while Thomas's corps and part of McCook's prepared to pass the Tennessee at several points below.

The Tennessee is here a very considerable river, with its sources 200 miles distant, while the mountains that closely imprison it increase the difficulties of approach and passage. But some pontoons were at hand; while other material was quietly collected at points concealed from hostile observation; and a few days sufficed for the construction of bridges by Sheridan at Bridgeport, Reynolds at Shell Mound, some 10 or 15 miles above, and by McCook at Caperton's ferry, opposite Stevenson, below; while Gen. Brannan prepared to cross on rafts at Battle creek, between Bridgeport and Shell Mound. The passage was commenced[27] by McCook, and completed[28] at all points within ten days: the several corps pushing forward, across high, steep mountains, to concentrate at Trenton, Georgia, in the valley of Lookout creek, which runs north-easterly into the Tennessee just below Chattanooga.

But it was not the plan to approach that stronghold in force down this narrow valley, but only with a brigade of Crittenden's corps, which should climb thence, by a path known as the Nickajack trace, the lofty ridge known as Lookout mountain, looking down, from a fashionable resort known as Summertown, into the streets of Chattanooga; while Thomas, with his corps, supported by McCook, should push boldly forward, through Frick's or Stevens's gap, across Mission ridge, into the far broader valley known as McLamore's cove, which is traversed by the CHICKAMAUGA creek to the Tennessee just above Chattanooga.

Bragg was in a quandary. Chattanooga was strong, and he could hold it against an assault by Rosecrans's larger army; but what use in this, and how long could he defy starvation, if that army, having crossed the river below him, should cut his communications and establish itself across the railroad in his rear? To abandon Chattanooga was to provoke clamor; but to divide his forces, or allow them to be cooped up here, was to court destruction. He did what Johnston tried, when too late, to have done with regard to Vicksburg—he relinquished Chattanooga and saved his army; retiring[29] southward into Georgia, and posting his divisions along the highway from Gordon's mill to Lafayette, facing Pigeon mountain, through whose passes our army was expected to emerge from McLamore's cove.

Rosecrans was evidently misled—though he does not fairly admit it—into believing the enemy absorbingly intent on escaping to Rome. Crittenden, having taken[30] peaceful possession of Chattanooga, was directed

[26] Aug. 21. [27] Aug. 29. [28] Sept. 8. [29] Sept. 7–8. [30] Sept. 9.

to leave one brigade as a garrison, and, bringing all his corps across the Tennessee, pursue the enemy up the East Chickamauga creek and railroad to Ringgold and Dalton; while Thomas, backed by McCook, emerging from McLamore's cove through Dug gap of Pigeon mountain, should swoop down on Lafayette, driving or smashing all before him.

Rosecrans was too fast entirely. Bragg was not fleeing to Rome, and had no idea of going thither at present. On the contrary, he was silently concentrating around Lafayette the most numerous and effective army which had ever yet upheld the Rebel standard westward of the Alleghanies. To render it such, Buckner had been summoned from Knoxville, abandoning East Tennessee to Burnside without a struggle; Johnson had been drawn upon for a strong division under Walker on one hand—matters being now quiescent in and about Mississippi—while Lee, having satisfied himself that Richmond was in no danger from Meade, had dispatched Longstreet's heavy corps of veterans from the Rapidan; and every thing in the shape of militia, &c., that could be gleaned from Georgia, had been set to guarding bridges, dépôts, &c., so as to send every good soldier to the front. Rosecrans estimates Bragg's entire force, when he had thus been strengthened, at 92,000—an enormous excess over ours—and there is no reasonable doubt that he had at length more men under his command than composed the army which was blindly, eagerly rushing upon him, as if intent on a deer-hunt rather than a life-and-death struggle with a wary and formidable foe.

Crittenden advanced[31] to Ringgold, throwing forward Wilder's mounted men to Tunnel hill, where they had a heavy skirmish, while Hazen, with Crittenden's rear division, closed up on the advance; but, by this time, Negley's division, of Thomas's corps, advancing to Dug gap,[32] had found it decidedly held by the enemy, who could not be persuaded to leave. Baird's division came up next morning; but both together were far too light, and wisely fell back, after a smart skirmish, retreating down the cove. And now Crittenden, justly alarmed for his communications, made[33] a rapid flank march to Gordon's mill—Wilder, covering his rear, having to fight smartly at Sill's tan-yard by the way; while McCook, having completely flanked Bragg's position by a southward advance nearly to Alpine, far on Bragg's left, became satisfied that the Rebel army was not retreating, and that he was in very deep water: so he commenced,[34] by order, a very rapid movement to connect with Thomas, away on his left. In doing this, he was carried down into Lookout valley, thence up the mountain and down again; so that he only closed up to Thomas on the 17th.

Bragg had sprung his trap too soon.[35] Had he permitted Thomas

[31] Sept. 11. [32] Sept. 10. [33] Sept. 12. [34] Sept. 13.

[35] Pollard sees the matter in a different light; and his view seems worth considering. He says:

"During the 9th, it was ascertained that a column of the enemy had crossed Lookout mountain into the cove, by the way of Stevens's and Cooper's gaps. Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his center, and deceived by information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail.

"A splendid opportunity was now presented to Bragg. The detached force in McLamore's cove was Thomas's corps. Being immediately opposite Lafayette, at and near which Gen. Bragg

to force his way through Dug gap, with barely a decent show of resistance, he might have crushed this first and our other corps in rapid succession; or he might, disregarding Thomas, have hurled his whole army upon Crittenden at Ringgold, crushed him, and then interposed between Thomas and Chattanooga. But when Negley and Baird were forced back from Dug gap, the game was too plain. Instead of a keen chase after a flying enemy, it was at once comprehended by our Generals that they must concentrate and fight for their lives.

Lafayette lies some 25 miles south by east of Chattanooga, on the main highway leading thence into Georgia, behind Pigeon mountain, in a valley whence Pea Vine creek flows northward into the Chickamauga. Eight or ten miles north of Lafayette, the highway aforesaid passes through a gap in Pigeon mountain into McLamore's cove, crossing the West Chickamauga at Gordon's mill. As Bragg was well aware that Thomas was in the upper part of that cove or valley, he moved down this road by his right, with intent to flank the left of our army—or so much of it as he might find in the cove—meaning thus to interpose between it and Chattanooga, and, if possible, between Thomas's corps and Crittenden's. But Crittenden, as we have seen, had seasonably taken the alarm, and moved hastily across from Ringgold to the Chickamauga; while McCook, zigzagging down and up Mission ridge, had likewise made his way into the cove, and was in position, with most of our army, along the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, from above Gordon's mill on our right a full third of the distance to Rossville, a small hamlet situated in a gap of

had all his forces concentrated, it was completely at the mercy of the latter. It was only necessary that Gen. Bragg should fall upon it with such a mass as would have crushed it; then turned down Chattanooga valley, thrown himself in between the town and Crittenden, and crushed him; then passed back between Lookout mountain and the Tennessee river into Wills's valley, and cut off McCook's retreat to Bridgeport; thence moved along the Cumberland range into the rear of Burnside, and disposed of *him*.

"No time was to be lost in taking advantage of a blunder of the enemy, into which he had fallen in his stupid conceit that the Confederates were retreating. Instant orders were given to Maj.-Gen. Hindman to prepare his division to move against Thomas; and he was informed that another division from Lt.-Gen. P. H. Hill's command, at Lafayette, would move up to him and cooperate in the attack.

"Gen. Hill received his orders on the night of the 9th. He replied that he could not undertake the movement; that the orders were impracticable; that Cleburne, who commanded one of his divisions, was sick; and that both the gaps, Dug and Catlett's, through which they were required to move, were impassable, having been blocked by felled timber.

"Early the next morning, Hindman was promptly in position to execute his part of the critical movement. Disappointed at Hill's refusal to move, Gen. Bragg, with desperate haste, dispatched an order to Maj.-Gen. Buckner to move from his present position at Anderson, and execute, without delay, the orders issued to Hill.

"It was not until the afternoon of the 10th, that Buckner joined Hindman; the two commands being united near Davis's cross-roads in the cove. The enemy was stil lin flagrant error: moving his three columns with an apparent disposition to form a junction at or near Lafayette. To strike in detail these isolated commands, and to fall upon Thomas, who had got the enemy's center into McLamore's cove, such rapidity was necessary as to surprise the enemy before he discovered his mistake.

"Lt.-Gen. Polk was ordered to Anderson's, to cover Hindman's rear; who, at midnight of the 10th, again received orders at all hazards to crush the enemy's center, and cut his way through to Lafayette. The indomitable Cleburne, despite the obstructions in the road, had moved up to Dug gap; was in position at daylight, and only waited the sound of Hindman's guns to move on the enemy's flank and rear.

"Courier after courier sped from Dug gap to urge Hindman on. *But it was too late.* The enemy had discovered the mistake that had well-nigh proved his ruin. He had, taking advantage of our delay, retreated to the mountain passes; and so the movement upon Thomas, which promised such brilliant results, was lost by an anachronism by which the best-laid military schemes are so frequently defeated."

Mission ridge, four miles south of Chattanooga and six or eight north of Gordon's mill. But Negley's division watched Owen's ford, a mile or so to our right, where another and inferior road over Pigeon mountain crossed the creek near Crawfish spring; while Sherman's and Jeff. C. Davis's divisions of McCook's corps were posted intermediately on the right of, but far nearer, our main line, holding the road which, striking off from the main Lafayette road a little north of Gordon's mill, keeps straight up the cove on the west side of the Chickamauga. Gordon Granger, with his reserved corps, was posted two or three miles in the rear of our left, covering all the roads leading from the east and south-east into Rossville, and thus to Chattanooga.

Rosecrans had been deceived, and was taken at disadvantage, as many a good General had been before him. Instead of being warned, as he should have been, by Meade and Halleck, had their spies been worth a rush, that a heavy corps had been detached from Lee's army and probably sent against him, he had very recently received advices of an opposite tenor.[36]

Minty, commanding our cavalry on the left, had been scouting nearly to Dalton, and had had several smart skirmishes[37] with the enemy's horse near that place, Ringgold, Lett's, and Rockspring church. As he still held the left, after our concentration, being thrown across the Lafayette road, he was here attacked[38] in force, and compelled to give ground; showing that Bragg was massing heavily on his right, and crossing the Chickamauga below (north of) Gordon's mill.

Rosecrans was by this time aware that the matter threatened to be serious. The stubborn attack on Minty evinced a disposition to turn his left and cut him off from Rossville, Chattanooga, and any practicable line of retreat. The bulk of his army was too far up the valley for effective resistance to such a demonstration. The next day,[39] therefore, was devoted by him to concentrating his force more compactly, and farther to the left; Bragg (whose rëenforcements from Virginia were just coming up from Dalton, where they had debarked from the cars), contenting himself with a fresh attack by Walker's division on Minty's and on Wilder's horsemen at Alexander's bridge, which was carried, but burned; our left being now fairly driven in to the Rossville and Lafayette road: though heavy clouds of dust were raised in front of our right also. All the fords for miles below Gordon's mill were now in the hands of the enemy, who were firmly established across the creek. By night, Bragg was ready for the onset—a division of Longstreet's men, under Hood, being in position on his extreme right; though

[36] He had been favored, just before, with the following dispatch; which clearly proves that his rash pursuit of Bragg was dictated from, or at least expected at, Washington:

"WASHINGTON, Sept. 11, 1863.

"Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland gap that he holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gap of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving toward Athens to connect with you. *After* holding the mountain passes on the west, *and Dalton*, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move *farther south* into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported here by deserters that *a part of Bragg's army is rëenforcing Lee.* It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.

"H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief."

[37] Sept. 15. [38] Sept. 17. [39] Friday, Sept. 18.

Longstreet himself did not come up till next morning."[40]

Our army, now concentrated, was about 55,000 strong—seven divisions, under Wood, Van Cleve, Palmer, J. J. Reynolds, Johnson (R. W.), Baird, and Brannan, forming our main line—perhaps 30,000 strong, ranging from right to left from Gordon's mill northward; the residue posted on the right and in reserve, as has already been stated. Bragg's general plan of battle was the same as at Stone river, save that he now attempted to turn and crush our left as he then did our right. The Virginians, under B. Johnson, were on his extreme right, already across the creek, and were to flank and turn our left; while Walker was to cross at Alexander's (burned) bridge, just above, supported by Buckner (recently arrived with eight brigades from East Tennessee); the whole advancing upon and crushing our left by a left-wheel movement, while Polk was to press our front at Gordon's mill, fighting his way straight across, if possible; if not, then to veer to the right and cross at Tedford's or Dalton's ford, lower down; while Hill (D. H.) should cover his left flank, and assail in flank any force that should attempt to move down from the isolated divisions on our right to the support of our front and left. Wheeler's cavalry was assigned the easy task of holding the gaps in Pigeon mountain, covering the Rebel left and rear, and gathering up all stragglers from the front. From favorable points on Pigeon mountain, Bragg's scouts—in fact, whole brigades of his men—had looked down on our army as it moved generally northward in the act of concentration, noting its positions and the strength of each corps and division—theirs being all the time concealed from us. The advantage thus secured was a very great one, and explains, otherwise than by superior generalship, the fact that their troops were so disposed for and handled in action as to be more effective in proportion to their numbers than ours were. And thus, when night fell,[41] two-thirds of Bragg's army was across the creek, holding firmly all the fords they cared for, save those directly at Gordon's mill, and had inflicted quite as much damage as they had suffered. True, the stream was often, if not generally, fordable; but its banks were in good part steep and rocky; so that, had they been skilfullly defended and firmly held, they could not have been carried without heavy loss.

Polk was in chief command on the Rebel right, as was Hood on the left; and the former was proceeding[42] to execute Bragg's order aforesaid for a general flanking movement; but Thomas, who held our left, confronting him, chose to strike first. He had only reached at daylight that morning the new position assigned him by Rosecrans, facing Reid's and Alexander's bridges or fords, when Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade of the reserve corps, reported that he had been holding the front here during the night, and had discovered a Rebel brigade this side of the Chickamauga, apparently isolated, and which he thought might be cut off, as he (McCook) had destroyed Reid's bridge directly behind it. Hereupon, Thomas ordered Brannan

[40] Sept. 19. [41] Friday, Sept. 18. [42] Sept. 19.



CHATTANOOGA AND VICINITY.—POSITIONS HELD SEPT. 20 AND NOV. 25, 1863.

to advance with two brigades on the road to Reid's bridge, while Baird should throw forward the right wing of his division on the road to Alexander's bridge; thus attempting between them to capture or crush the Rebel brigade, if such there were where McCook located it.

It was now 9 A. M.; and, while Baird and Brannan were making the required movements, Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps came up and took post on Baird's right. By 10 A. M., Croxton's brigade of Brannan's division had become engaged, driving back Forrest's cavalry; when Ector's and Wilson's infantry brigades were sent in by Walker to Forrest's support. Croxton, of course, was brought to a dead halt; but now Thomas sent up Baird's division, and the Rebel brigades were hurled back, badly cut up. Hereupon, Walker in turn sent up Liddell's division, making the odds against us two to one; when Baird was in turn driven: the Rebels, charging through the lines of the 14th, 16th, and 18th U. S. regulars, taking two batteries; while Walthall's Georgia brigade captured the 5th regulars, 411 strong, and Govan's, charging by its side, took 100 more prisoners.

One of the batteries here lost was the 1st Michigan, formerly Loomis's; regarded by the whole army with pride, and by those who served in it with an affection little short of idolatry. It had done yeoman service on many a hard-fought field, and was fondly regarded as well nigh invincible. But now, abandoned by its supports, who recoiled before a Rebel charge in overwhelming force, with all its horses shot and most of its men killed and wounded, it could not be drawn off, and was doomed to be lost. Its commander, Lt. Van Pelt, refused to leave it, and died, sword in hand, fighting—one against a thousand—by the side of his guns.

And now Johnson's division of McCook's corps, and Reynolds's of Thomas's, came up at quick step, and were instantly put in by Thomas—as was Palmer's division—on Baird's right, giving a clear superiority to our line, which for the moment outflanked the enemy, driving him back in disorder and with heavy loss on his reserves, posted near the creek; retaking our lost guns, and enabling Brannan and Baird to reform their disorganized commands. In resisting this advance, the Rebel Gen. Preston Smith was killed. The enemy's position on the creek was very strong, and it was not deemed wise to assault it: so our men rested on their arms, and there was a lull of an hour, or from 4 to 5 P. M.

Thomas well understood that the fight was not over, and made his dispositions accordingly; expecting that the next effort would be to flank his left, carry the road, and gain his rear (as was Bragg's original programme for the battle). But he judged that the enemy had had enough for the day, and had given orders for a concentration of his divisions on more favorable ground, somewhat to the rear of that to which they had advanced, pursuing their advantage; when his front was again charged by Liddell's and Gist's divisions—Reynolds being first struck on his right (Thomas having been looking for an attack on his left); then Johnson, then Baird, then Van Cleve—the Rebel charge being so impetuous and weighty as to throw our front

into disorder; but this was soon retrieved, and the enemy repulsed: Brig.-Gen. W. Hazen, of Crittenden's corps, massing 20 guns on a ridge that commanded the Rossville road, forming an infantry support of such men as he could hastily collect—his own brigade not being at hand—and pouring a cross-fire of grape at short range into the enemy's charging column, till it recoiled in disorder, and the day was saved.

Another charge was made on Johnson's front just at sunset by Pat. Cleburne, ('the Stonewall Jackson of the West,') with a division of Hill's corps, who pressed up to our very lines, and claim to have gained some advantage; but night soon fell, and the day's fighting was done—either army resting without fires in the keen Autumn night air of that mountain region, on the field where it had so stoutly fought.

There had been some artillery practice during the day on our right, but no serious effort, till afternoon; when Stewart threw forward Brown's, Clayton's, and Bate's brigades by turns, charging one of our batteries and capturing three guns; but he was soon sent to the right about, and compelled to leave the guns where he found them. The attack at this point, though for some time persisted in, was a conceded failure.

Hood, holding the Rebel left, having cannonaded in the morning with no advantage, threw in, at 3 P. M., two of his divisions—his own, under Law, and Bushrod Johnson's—attacking Jeff. C. Davis's division of McCook's corps, pushing it back from the road, and capturing a battery; but Davis maintained a firm front against superior numbers till near sunset, when Bradley's brigade of Sheridan's division came to his aid, and he charged the enemy in turn, recapturing the battery (8th Indiana) that he had lost, taking quite a number of prisoners, and driving the enemy back across the road, (though Trigg's brigade of Preston's division came to his aid), and closing the day with decided advantage to our arms.

Superficially regarded, the net result of that day's combat was favorable. Our army had lost no ground for which it had contended, and claimed a net gain of three guns. Our losses in men had doubtless been less than those of the enemy. And, as we were standing on the defensive, we might fairly claim the result as a success.

But the truth was otherwise. Our soldiers were clearly outnumbered, and now they felt it. Every brigade but two of our army had been under fire—most of them hotly engaged—while the enemy had several yet in reserve. We had no rëenforcements at hand, and could expect none; while Hindman's division (three brigades) and McLaws's (two brigades of veterans, fresh from Virginia) came up during the night, and were posted just where experience had proved that they were most needed. And beside, Longstreet himself came up, and took command of their right wing—and he was worth at least a brigade. The best estimate that can be formed of their entire force on this bloody field makes it 70,000; which, on ground affording so little advantage to the defensive, was a clear overmatch for Rosecrans's 55,000. And, though the profane axiom that 'God is on the side of the strongest battalions,' is not always and absolutely true, it is certain that, as be-

tween two armies equally brave, equally disciplined, and equally well handled, the decidedly larger—the ground affording no considerable advantage to the defensive—must generally triumph.

During the night, Bragg moved Breckinridge's division of Hill's corps from his extreme left to his extreme right: being still intent on flanking our left, and interposing between it and Chattanooga.

Our corps commanders reported to Rosecrans after nightfall. Negley had been brought down from our extreme right during the afternoon, and sent in just before night, on Van Cleve's right, pushing back the enemy. He was now ordered to report to Gen. Thomas; McCook being required to replace him by one of his divisions. McCook was ordered to close well on Thomas, refusing his right, and covering the position at widow Glenn's, where Thomas had his headquarters. Crittenden was to hold two divisions in reserve, ready to support McCook on our right or Thomas on the left, as should become necessary. These orders being given, our Generals lay down to snatch a brief rest; and the silence was thenceforth unbroken.

At daylight,[a] Rosecrans, attended by part of his staff, was galloping along our lines. He found McCook's right too far extended, and Davis, with the reserve division, too far to the right; as were also Crittenden's two divisions in reserve, and ordered the requisite changes of position. Negley had not yet moved when the General returned from visiting our left, and was now directed to send Thomas his reserve brigade only; holding his place in the line with the other two till relieved. Crittenden, having his reserves at hand, was now directed to relieve him; but failed promptly to do so; and it was nearly 10 o'clock when Negley was relieved and enabled to proceed to strengthen Thomas, where he was sorely needed.

Both armies stood to their arms at daylight; and the battle was to have opened at once by an attack by Hill's corps on our left; but Polk's aid, sent with the order, could not find him; and the fighting did not commence till 8½ A. M. In fact, it *could* not, without destruction to the assailants; for a dense fog filled the valley, rendering all objects indistinguishable at a few yards' distance; so that an attack might better have been delivered on any moonless but starlit night."[b] Meantime, Thomas's corps (augmented by successive reenforcements, till it was now more than half our army) improved the non-shining hours by throwing up rude breastworks of logs and rails, which stood it in good stead thereafter.

The fog having lifted, Breckinridge, facing and overlapping our extreme left, advanced his fresh division, flanking our army, and pushing across the Rossville road, fighting desperately, and facing to the left when he had gone forward toward Rossville so far as his orders required. The movement was taken up in succession by the divisions farther and

[a] Sunday, Sept. 20.

[b] Polk says that, when he was ready to advance and attack, he found a division of the left wing (Longstreet's) directly in his front; so that, had he literally obeyed his orders, he must have slaughtered their own men. He had no choice but to wait till it was taken out of his way; and this consumed some two hours.

farther toward the Rebel center—Bragg thus renewing the attempt to interpose between our army and Chattanooga, which Thomas had disconcerted by his advance and attack of the previous day. But now Beatty's brigade of Negley's division, moving from our right center, came into action beside Baird, on our extreme left, checking Breckinridge's advance; and, Baird and Beatty together being still outnumbered and the latter losing ground, several regiments of Johnson's division, hitherto in reserve, were sent up to Baird and posted by him on his front; and these, with Vandever's brigade of Brannan's division and part of Stanley's of Wood's division, completely restored the battle on this flank, hurling back Breckinridge's command in disorder; Gens. Helm and Deshler being killed, Maj. Graves, chief of artillery, mortally wounded, and Gen. Adams severely wounded and taken prisoner. Breckinridge rallied his men on a commanding ridge in the rear of his advanced position, where his heavy guns were posted to repel assault. Walker's division first, then Cheatham's Tennesseans, then Cleburne's, and finally Stewart's, were sent to the support of Breckinridge; and the tide of battle ebbed and flowed on this wing, with frightful carnage on both sides, but without material advantage to either. Still, Bragg's attempt to turn our flank, so as to interpose his army between ours and Chattanooga was baffled by Thomas's firmness and that of the veterans under his command; while the struggle along our left center was equally desperate, equally sanguinary, and equally indecisive.

Our right, however, had ere this been involved in fearful disaster. The movement of several divisions from right to left after the battle had actually commenced was at best hazardous, however necessary, and was attended with the worst possible results. Negley's and Van Cleve's divisions were successively ordered by Rosecrans to move to the support of Thomas on our left; while Wood was directed to close up to Reynolds on our right center, and Davis to close on Wood; McCook, commanding on this wing, being directed to close down on the left with all possible dispatch.

Such movements are at all times difficult of execution in the heat of battle, and in the face of a skillful, resolute, and vigilant enemy. In this instance, the hazard was increased by the fact that they were not clearly comprehended. Wood, understanding that he was ordered to *support* Reynolds, undertook to do so by withdrawing from the front and passing to the rear of Brannan, who was in *échelon* slightly to the rear of Reynolds's right; thus opening a gap in our front, into which Longstreet at once threw Hood's command, supported by an advance of Buckner on our right flank.

The charge was decisive. Davis, by McCook's order, was just attempting to fill with three light brigades the gap made by Wood's withdrawal, when Hood's charging column poured into it, striking Davis on the right, and Brannan on the left, and Sheridan, of Crittenden's corps, farther to the rear, cutting off five brigades from the rest of our army, and pushing them to our right and rear, with a loss of 40 per cent. of their numbers.

In short, our right wing, struck heavily in flank while moving to the left, was crumbled into fragments and sent flying in impotent disorder toward Rossville and Chattanooga, with a loss of thousands in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Rosecrans, McCook, and many subordinate commanders, were swept along in the wild rush; Sheridan and Davis rallying and rëforming the wreck of their divisions by the way, and halting, with McCook, at Rossville; while Rosecrans—prevented by the enemy from joining Thomas—hastened to Chattanooga, there to make all possible provision for holding the place; since it now looked as though our whole army was or would be routed, and that desperate effort would be required to hold Chattanooga, so as to save what might be left of it from being captured or driven pell-mell into the Tennessee.

But matters, though bad enough, were not so bad as they seemed to those who had shared or witnessed the rout and dispersion of our right. Thomas was still fighting stoutly and holding his own on our left; when, not long after noon, Capt. Kellogg, who had been sent to hurry Sheridan, then expected to rëenforce his left, returned with tidings that he had met a large Rebel force advancing cautiously, with skirmishers thrown out, to the rear of Reynolds's position in our center. There was some effort made to believe this was no Rebel force, but Sheridan, till heavy firing on Thomas's right and rear decidedly negatived that presumption. Thomas ordered Col. Hooker, whose brigade held a ridge in the direction of the firing, to resist the advance of these questionable wayfarers, and return their fire if it should be persisted in—an order which that Brigadier proceeded at once to obey. Meantime, Wood came up, and was directed to post his troops on the left of Brannan, who had already taken post on the slope of Mission ridge, behind Thomas's line of battle, and just west of the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, where Capt. Gaw had ere this, by Thomas's order, massed all the artillery he could find in reserve, and supported it by strong lines of infantry. To this position, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, who, behind their log breastworks, had sustained and repulsed a succession of desperate charges on our center, were withdrawn, and here Thomas's command was now concentrated.

Gen. Gordon Granger, with his small reserve corps, had been posted at Rossville, whence Col. J. B. Steedman, with six regiments, made a reconnoissance to within two miles of Ringgold;[45] discovering enough by the way to convince him that a battle was imminent and he out of place; when he returned to Rossville. Gen. Whitaker's and Col. D. McCook's brigades were next sent forward by Granger to the Chickamauga—the latter supporting Col. Minty at Reid's bridge, where he had a smart skirmish, as did Gen. Whitaker, farther down the stream; each falling back; Gen. Steedman ultimately burning[46] Reid's bridge and retreating. Granger held the roads in this direction, on our extreme left, throughout the 19th and till 11 A. M. of the 20th; when, finding that he was not attacked, while the roar of guns on his right front, where Thomas was posted,

[45] Sept. 17.

[46] Sept. 18.

though three or four miles distant, had become loud and continuous, he could no longer resist their appeal. Moving, therefore, without orders, he reported, at 3 P. M., to Thomas; whom he found holding the ridge aforesaid, while the enemy, in overwhelming force, were pressing him at once in front and on both flanks, while they held a ridge on his right running nearly at right angles with that he occupied, and were advancing Hindman's division in a gorge thereof, with intent to assail his right in flank and rear.

The moment was critical. Thomas had work for all his men, and could spare none to confront this new peril. Instantly forming Gen. Whitaker's and Col. Mitchell's brigades, Granger hurled them on the foe: Steedman, seizing the flag of a regiment, heading the charge. Twenty minutes later, Hindman had disappeared, and our men held both gorge and ridge; but Whitaker was knocked senseless from his horse by a bullet, with two of his staff killed and two more mortally wounded. Steedman's horse was killed and he severely bruised by his fall; but he remained on duty to the close of the day. Our loss in this charge was of course heavy; that of the enemy far greater.

There was a pause of half an hour, while the enemy was forming and massing for a desperate charge on all points of our position. About 4 P. M., the storm burst in all its fury. The stampede of our right had swept with it nearly or quite all our ammunition trains, so that cartridges had become scarce, and the utmost economy in their use was indispensable. But for the fortunate arrival with Granger of a small supply, which afforded about ten rounds per man, many regiments would have been compelled to rely on their bayonets.

Longstreet was now here, in immediate command of his own corps —Hood having been wounded and had his leg amputated on the field— with McLaws's, Preston's, Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, Stewart's, Hindman's, Bushrod Johnson's divisions —in fact, all but a fraction of the entire Rebel army—swarming around the foot of the ridge whereon Thomas, with what remained of seven divisions of ours—four having vanished with the dispersion of our right— withstood and repelled assault after assault till sundown; when he, by order from Rosecrans at Chattanooga, communicated by his chief of staff, Gen. Garfield, who reached the ridge at 4 P. M., commenced the withdrawal of his troops to Rossville.

Gen. Reynolds was ordered, at 5½ P. M., to commence this movement, which Wood was directed to cover; Gen. Thomas was riding over to Wood's position to point out the ground he was to hold, when he was cautioned by two soldiers that a large Rebel force was advancing through the woods toward him. Reynolds with his division now approaching, Thomas ordered him to deflect to the left and form line while marching, with his right resting on the State road, thence charging the enemy, who would thus be in his immediate front. The order was promptly obeyed: Turchin's brigade precipitating itself on the enemy with such vigor as to rout them and capture more than 200 prisoners, who were taken off the field in our retreat.

Our divisions were withdrawn in succession from the ridge: Johnson's

and Baird's, being last, were of course assailed by the enemy in overwhelming force, and suffered considerably. But there was no pursuit;[47] and our army retired into and held the Rossville and Dry valley gaps of Mission ridge—Crittenden's corps holding the left of the Ringgold road; McCook's on the right of the Dry valley road, with his right thrown forward nearly to the Chickamauga; while Negley's, Reynolds's, and Brannan's divisions were posted in the Rossville gap and along the ridge on its right; Minty's brigade of cavalry being thrown out over a mile in advance on the Ringgold road. And thus our army stood fronting the enemy unmolested, until 10 next morning; when Minty was driven in by the enemy's advance; which, proving merely a reconnoissance, was easily repulsed, and was not renewed. And thus our army remained unmolested throughout the following day;[48] and at night was withdrawn in perfect order, and without annoyance or loss, to the position assigned it by Rosecrans in front of Chattanooga. Bragg followed next day; taking quiet possession of Lookout mountain and the whole of Mission ridge, whence he looked down into the coveted stronghold, which his army was destined never to regain.

As Bragg was fiercely assailed for not pursuing Rosecrans—whom, it is assumed, he had routed—right into Chattanooga, on the evening of the the 20th, the following extract from a Rebel account of the battle by an eye-witness,[49] who was nowise partial to him, may serve to elucidate the matter. The reader will excuse the tropical luxuriance of its imagery, and its many mistakes of fact, for the

[47] Though it is perfectly settled that Bragg did not pursue, it is not so well established that our army did not flee. On this point, a few citations (out of many that might be made) from eye-witnesses will here be given:

Gen. Hazen, after reporting the last attack of the enemy on our right, and its repulse, says:

"There was no more fighting. At dusk, I received orders from Gen. Thomas to retire on Rossville; which I did quietly and in perfect order: the pickets of the enemy following mine closely as they were withdrawn, and confronting an officer, sent to see that it was thoroughly done."

Col. A. Wiley, 41st Ohio, of Granger's corps, after describing the final Rebel charge on Wood's division, of which he was among the supports, says:

"The possession of the hill was maintained; the regiment losing about a dozen wounded in this part of the action. As soon as it became dark, we withdrew from this position, marched to Rossville, where the regiment bivouacked, and on Monday morning again went into position in the first line on Mission ridge."

An account by "Miles," of the part borne by Steedman's division of Granger's corps in the defense of Thomas's last position, says:

"Another assault was made, and with the same result. The Rebels advanced, were checked; we drove and followed them until fresh troops were arrayed against us, and we in turn were forced to retire. But this time we drove them farther, and kept them at bay longer, than before. One of our regiments—the 96th Illinois—pursued them nearly half a mile, and held that advanced position until it began to receive an enfilading fire from some of our own troops.

"Thus the contest continued until dark, and all the time we held the ridge. Sometimes, a regiment or more would fall back beyond the ridge; but enough always remained to hold it. At last, Gen. Thomas gave the order to retire; but it failed to reach a portion of the 96th Illinois, and a remnant of the 121st Ohio, who at the time occupied a position on the right, somewhat advanced beyond the line; and there for a considerable time they continued to fight with unabated vigor. The order to retire was at last given to this devoted band, who reluctantly left their position. That closed the fighting for the day. We retired from the field, not knowing that the enemy was at the same time also retreating, baffled and discouraged, in fact beaten.

"So the bloody field was left unoccupied that night. No, not wholly unoccupied; for James T. Gruppy, a private of company D, 96th Illinois, not knowing that our troops had fallen back, slept upon the battle-field, and next morning, as he awoke, found a Rebel surgeon near him, looking for Rebel dead, who advised him, if he ever wished to see his regiment again, to hurry on to Chattanooga."

[48] Monday, Sept. 21.

[49] S. C. Reid, correspondent *Mobile Tribune*.

sake of the unintended proof it affords that the fortune of the day was only decided at so late an hour that pursuit in that wooded, rugged region was extremely hazardous, if not impossible. Reid says:

"The western horizon, crimsoned with vermilion hues, now shed its ruddy light on the hill-top and forest-plain, painting the bloody battle-field, still reeking with human gore; but the battle-strife had not yet ceased. Driven to desperation, and determined at all hazards to hold their position on their left wing, the enemy, with a resolute ferocity, hurled his battalions upon our right, at the same time opening his batteries with a storm of shell and grape. Liddell and Gist, of Walker's corps, who had been again ordered forward, being their fifth engagement with the enemy, were met by a most destructive fire, which enfiladed them on both flanks and drove them back. Our line of battle on the right was now about half a mile from the Chattanooga road. The enemy was sorely pressing our wavering lines. Gen. Polk, who had borne the brunt of the battle during the day, and fought his wing against the concentrated masses of the enemy with unequaled bravery and endurance, had now marshaled his forces for a last desperate charge, on which depended the fate of the day. His flashing eye at this moment discovered that Granger's reserve corps of Abolition troops was moving down upon us, and not a moment was to be lost. At the same time, it was reported that Longstreet was driving the enemy's right flank, which added fresh nerve and vigor to our already exhausted men. The signal being given, the whole line advanced: Breckinridge leading off on the extreme right, the division making a left half-wheel, which brought it parallel to the enemy's lines, whose artillery belched forth a blasting fire. Forward pressed Stovall, Gilson, and Helm, in perfect order, cheered by other lines of troops as they advanced, and passing through the 'unterrified' of Walker's line, who was then engaging the enemy, without halting, and reserving their fire until within a few yards of the foe, when they sprang forward with a wild yell to the charge, receiving a volley from the enemy without effect. A second volley from the barricades of trees and stones checked Breckinridge for a moment, and many a brave, with the noble Helm, fell; but the officers rushed forward, mounting the barricades, followed by their men, dealing destruction to the panic-stricken hordes, who fled on every side; a brigade of U. S. regulars, under Gen. King, being perfectly routed by Gibson. Still onward pressed the division of Breckinridge, driving the enemy for three-quarters of a mile, capturing nine pieces of cannon and hundreds of prisoners, until entering the woods about 70 yards west of the Chattanooga road; the enemy's killed and wounded marking its bloody track in the pursuit.

"At the same time, on came the chivalrous Cleburne, with the brave Deshler, Wood, and Polk, who soon came in conflict with Granger's corps, sweeping them before their ranks like leaves, and facing the murderous fire of their barricades. The heroic and dashing Deshler went down, but still the men pressed forward: Wood, with Lucius Polk's brigade, storming breastwork after breastwork, until the third work was carried—Polk capturing three pieces of cannon, the standards of the 2d Ohio, 77th Pennsylvania, 79th Illinois, and 500 prisoners. Like the ocean-wave rolled onward the brigades of the warrior Cheatham toward the center of the enemy's works, which were carried with an irresistible impetuosity: Maney's brigade adding new laurels to its fame, as well as Strahl's, Wright's, Jackson's, and the lamented Preston Smith's; capturing several pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners. This sealed our victory. The enemy was totally routed from right, left, and center, and was in full retreat to Chattanooga; night alone preventing their farther pursuit. Then arose along our lines, from wing to wing for miles, one wild, tumultuous yell, and cheers which made the hills and forest shake again. The day was ours; while the croaking raven of the night perched on the ill-starred banner of the vain, boasting Rosecrans, now crestfallen, defeated, and humiliated. Polk's wing captured 28 pieces of artillery, and Longstreet's 21, making 49 pieces of cannon; both wings taking nearly an equal number of prisoners, amounting to over 8,000, with 30,000 stand of arms, and 40 stands of regimental colors. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, by their own account, is not less than 30,000. Ours is computed at 12,000: our wounded being unusually large compared to the killed. The enemy is known to have had all his available force on the field, including his reserve, with a portion of Burnside's corps, numbering not less than 80,000, while our whole force did not exceed 50,000. Nothing was more brilliant in all Bonaparte's Italian campaigns; it was equally desperate as the battle of Arcola, and far more decisive in its results. So far, it exceeds all previous battles of our revolution; and nothing could surpass the irresistible

courage and heroic intrepidity of our officers and soldiers."

Bragg, in his official report, tersely and sensibly says:

"The darkness of the night, and the density of the forest, rendered further movements uncertain and dangerous; and the army bivouacked on the ground it had so gallantly won."

This is enough for those who consider that human endurance has limits, and that men who have been marching their hardest and fighting their very best for two or three days, with scarcely a pause, need rest.

But it is not so clear that he should not have followed up his advantage next day, by an attack in force on Thomas and so much of our army as still confronted him around Rossville, barring his way to Chattanooga. Thomas could not have had over 25,000 men left; Bragg must have had thousands more, flushed with victory, and in good part confident of their ability to improve it by routing what remained of our army and chasing it into and through Chattanooga. Pollard says that Forrest climbed a tree, just as the fighting closed; and, seeing our army in full retreat, urged a general advance; and that Longstreet ordered Wheeler to interpose his cavalry between Rossville and Chattanooga; but Bragg countermanded the order. The fact officially stated by him, that he had lost *two-fifths* of his army in the terrible struggle thus terminated, suffices to justify his moving cautiously and surely. ———

Our losses on the Chickamauga were officially stated as follows:

	Killed.	*Wound'd.*	*Miss'g.*	*Total.*
Infantry and artillery..	1,644[50]	9,262[51]	4,945	15,851
Cavalry, in various combats and skirmishes.....				500

Total 16,351; which it is perfectly safe to increase, by stragglers and imperfect reports, to 20,000 from the hour of crossing the Tennessee till our army was concentrated in front of Chattanooga. Rosecrans claims to have captured and brought off 2,003 prisoners, and admits a loss of 7,500, including 2,500 of his wounded; also 36 guns, 20 caissons, and 8,450 small arms.

Bragg admits a total loss on his part of 18,000 men,[52] of whom 16,000 must have been killed and wounded; and claims to have captured over 8,000 prisoners (including wounded), 51 guns, and 15,000 small-arms.

These statements are not necessarily incompatible. All the arms dropped by killed, wounded, or flying soldiers—no matter of which army—were of course gathered up by those who held the field, and counted among their spoils; and, while the victor counts all the guns he has taken, his worsted foe subtracts his captures from his losses, and returns only the net loss. And, as our men fought mainly on the defensive, often on ridges or behind rude breastworks, and lost very few in their retreat, it is probable that our killed and wounded were the fewer, as these antagonist reports would indicate.

[50] Including Gen. W. H. Lytle, Ohio, Cols. Baldwin and Heg, commanding brigades; Cols. E. A. King, 68th Ind., Alexander, 21st, and Gilmer, 28th Ill.

[51] Including Cols. Payne, 4th Ohio, Shackleford, 6th Ky., and Armstrong, 93d Ohio, with many others.

[52] Gen. B. H. Helm's Kentucky brigade went into this fight 1,763 strong, and came out 432: Helm being among the killed. Bate's brigade lost 608 out of 1,085. A Mississippi brigade lost 781, and came out with but two regimental officers uninjured; and there were several more brigades which lost fully half their number.

Bragg had won an unmistakable victory; yet all its fruits were reaped on the battle-field. When he advanced in force,[84] and appeared before Chattanooga, not even the fiercest fire-eater in his camp was anxious to storm those intrenchments, behind which Rosecrans stood ready to repeat the fearful lesson he gave Price and Van Dorn, at Corinth. The victor had the field and the dead (hundreds of whom he inhumanly left to rot unburied); but his defeated antagonist had secured the great strategic object of his campaign,[85] and was abundantly able to retain and defend it.

Chattanooga being unattainable, Bragg was urged to anticipate a gigantic, fatal folly in moving by his left across the Tennessee and advancing on Nashville. He answered, like a soldier and man of sense, that half his army consisted of rëenforcements that had joined him just before the recent struggle, without a wagon or an artillery-horse, and that a third of the artillery horses he had were lost on the field. Then, a formidable river was to be crossed, without pontoons, at a season when any day might see it swelled, amid those steep mountains, out of all possibility of fording. He might have added that, with a great army on his flank, and in a country where—its railroads being destroyed—the difficulties of an offensive were at best appalling, to have attempted such a movement would have insured his ruin; and rashness was not his weak point.

Bragg could not carry the coveted stronghold by storm; he could not flank it; but he might starve our army out of it. Holding the left bank of the Tennessee for miles below, he commanded not only the railroads connecting that city with the North and West, and with Middle Tennessee, but the navigation of the river, with the roads crowded against its banks by the steep mountains which on both sides overshadow it. East Tennessee affording insufficient forage and little or no food, our supplies must, for the present, be wagoned across the countless mountain ridges separating it from Middle Tennessee, traversed only by roads of inconceivable badness; and, for a time, our troops were on short allowance, while many thousands of our horses were starved, or worked to death in wagoning over supplies.

Gen. Rosecrans, while thus cooped up in Chattanooga, received [86] an unheralded order relieving him from command, which he at once obeyed; leaving for the North next day—just a year having elapsed since he left Corinth—the theater of his then recent victory—to find himself assigned to command this department.

Deeming it best for the service that he should depart before it was known to the soldiers that he was superseded, he bade adieu to his comrades in the following order:

[84] Wednesday, Sept. 23.

[85] Pollard very fairly says:

"Chickamauga had conferred a brilliant glory upon our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held the prize of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee. Two-thirds of our niter-beds were in that region, and a large proportion of the coal which supplied our foundries. It abounded in the necessaries of life. It was one of the strongest countries in the world, so full of lofty mountains, that it had been called, not unaptly, the Switzerland of America. As the possession of Switzerland opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany, and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama."

[86] Oct. 19.

"H'DQ'RS DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND,
"CHATTANOOGA, Tenn., Oct. 19, 1863.

"The General commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he leaves them, under orders from the President.

"Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will assume the command of this army and department. The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him.

"In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms—officers and soldiers—he congratulates you that your new commander comes not to you, as he did, a stranger. Gen. Thomas has been identified with this army from its first organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with confidence that, under God, he will lead you to victory.

"The General commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves and your country in the future as you have been in the past.

"To the division and brigade commanders, he tenders his cordial thanks for their valuable and hearty cooperation in all that he has undertaken. To the chiefs of the staff departments and their subordinates, whom he leaves behind, he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring devotion to duty.

"Companions in arms—officers and soldiers—farewell; and may God bless you!

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General."

Gen. Burnside, after he was relieved from command on the Rappahannock, had been assigned[56] to that of the Department of the Ohio, and his old 9th corps dispatched with him to the West, with a view to an early and determined advance through eastern Kentucky for the liberation of loyal but crushed and suffering East Tennessee. The exigencies of the service, however, compelled a diversion of the 9th corps to reënforce Grant, then in the crisis of his struggle for Vicksburg. So Burnside was obliged to remain idle at Cincinnati. A force of mounted Rebels having, under Gen. Pegram, emerged from East Tennessee, crossed the Cumberland mountains and river, and addressed themselves to the spoliation of southern Kentucky. They proclaimed their force the vanguard of a large army advancing, under Breckinridge, for the rescue of Kentucky from her Yankee oppressors; paraded the greater portion of their number as infantry on entering any considerable village; and got up a handbill proclamation that every young man who did not choose to serve in the Confederate armies must leave Kentucky! These pretensions seem to have imposed, to some extent, on Gen. S. P. Carter, commanding the Union forces on that frontier, who retreated before Pegram from Danville, across Dick's river and the Kentucky; abandoning the heart of the State to rapine. Pegram lacked the audacity to continue the pursuit, as well as the force to justify it, or he might, perhaps, have chased Carter and Wolford across the Ohio. But the Rebels turned here to fly,[57] thus revealing their weakness; and soon found a dangerous force on their heels. They were sharply chased by Wolford's cavalry through Lancaster, Stanford, and Waynesburg, to within three miles of Somerset, where they were brought to bay:[58] meanwhile, Gen. Q. A. Gillmore had joined the pursuit with 250 of the 7th Ohio cavalry and taken command: swelling the Union force to about 1,200 men. The Rebels are stated, in the reports on our side, to have been twice that number—a statement which is not confirmed by any returns, and is probably a gross exaggeration, explained by the efforts of the enemy to diffuse an extravagant idea of their numbers. At all events, they were very easily driven from their

[56] March 26, 1863. [57] March 27. [58] March 30.

chosen position; and a charge on our rear by Col. Scott's Rebel cavalry, though it threw our forces into temporary confusion, was repelled with spirit by Wolford: when the Rebels renewed their flight, and were pursued 5 or 6 miles; and now they made another stand, and were not again attacked—night soon falling; under the shelter of which, they moved quietly off; crossing the Cumberland in squads, and making good their escape into Tennessee, with a loss of only about 100[59] men and a large share of their plunder. Our loss was about half so many. It is plain that most of them might have been captured, but for the over-estimate of their strength by our officers.

Gen. Burnside, two months later, sent a cavalry force, under Col. H. S. Saunders, from Williamsburg, Ky., across the Cumberland mountains into East Tennessee; which struck the railroad at Lenoir, 40 miles below Knoxville, breaking it thence nearly up to Knoxville; then, passing around that city, struck it again near Strawberry Plains, burning the bridge, 1,600 feet long, across the Holston, and that across Mossy creek, above; capturing in all 3 guns, 500 prisoners, and 10,000 small arms, beside destroying large quantities of Confederate munitions and stores; making its way out with difficulty—the passes being all choked or guarded—to Boston,[60] Ky. Its loss was trifling.

Gen. Burnside, having thoroughly organized and equipped his command, about 20,000 strong, at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Ky., commenced,[61] without awaiting the return of his old corps, his advance on Knoxville simultaneously with Rosecrans's movement on Chattanooga. Marching as light as possible—his men nearly all mounted; his munitions and stores mainly packed on mules—concentrating his forces at Crab Orchard, he pushed vigorously through Mount Vernon, London,[62] Williamsburg, and thence due south into Tennessee at Chitwood, halting two days[63] to rest; and then making a forced march over the mountains of 40 miles in two days, to Montgomery, and thence reaching Kingston, where the Holston and Clinch rivers unite to form the Tennessee; and where he was greeted by Rosecrans's pickets and communicated with Col. Minty's cavalry; while his army made another forced march of two days to Loudon, higher up; hoping thus to save the railroad bridge, 2,000 feet long, over the Holston; which they reached[64] just in time to see it in flames. Pushing as rapidly to Knoxville—which our cavalry advance had occupied on the 1st—Gen. Burnside was welcomed[65] with such an outpouring of enthusiastic loyalty and gratitude as had rarely been equaled. But East Tennessee had been overwhelmingly and invincibly loyal throughout, while the sufferings of her Unionists, from Rebel conscription, persecution, and spoliation, had been terrible. Every able-bodied man having been conscripted into the Confederate armies, those who refused to serve were accounted deserters, worthy of death; and the penalty was freely enforced. But the dungeon, the bullet, and the rope, whereby it

[59] Gillmore first reports their loss at "over 300;" and again says it "will not fall short of 500 men." But the only account (by a newspaper correspondent) that gives precise details, makes the numbers "19 killed, 6 wounded, and 67 prisoners."

[60] June 23. [61] Aug. 16. [62] Aug. 24.
[63] Aug. 27–8 [64] Sept. 1. [65] Sept. 3.

was mainly hoped to stifle the loyalty of this heroic people, had only served to intensify it; and the long-hidden National flags that now waved from almost every house and fluttered in so many hands, the bounteous food and refreshment proffered from every side and pressed upon our soldiers without price, by people whose stores were scanty indeed; the cheers, and fond greetings, and happy tears, of the assembled thousands, attested their fervent hope and trust that the National authority and protection, for which they had prayed and pined through two long, weary years, would never again be expelled from their city. And it has not been.

The flight of the Rebel forces from all the points reached by our army in its advance was unexpected, and was misconstrued. So many passes, wherein a regiment and a battery might temporarily repel a corps, had been precipitately abandoned without a shot, as Kingston and Knoxville were, that it was fondly fancied that the Rebellion had collapsed—at least, in this quarter—that the recent and signal triumphs of the National arms at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, &c., had taken the heart out of the remaining disunionists; that we had only thenceforth to advance and bloodlessly reclaim all that had been ruthlessly torn away.



EAST TENNESSEE.

It was a great mistake. Buckner was simply withdrawing the Rebel forces from East Tennessee to reënforce Bragg and enable him to overwhelm Rosecrans; and this facility of recovery should have aroused suspicion, and incited the quickest possible transfer of all but a brigade of Burnside's army to Chattanooga. In fact, he should have been under Rosecrans's orders from the outset, and all his movements should have been subordinate to those of the Army of the Cumberland. When the enemy were found to be retreating southward, they should have been closely pursued; but Burnside had no superior but Halleck, who had no conviction of Rosecrans's peril till it was too late to avert it. And Burnside himself had no idea of look-

ing to Rosecrans's safety—in fact, this was not in the line of his prescribed duty—but proceeded promptly and vigorously to complete the recovery of East Tennessee. To this end, he impelled[66] Gen. Shackleford directly on the rear of Cumberland gap; on which Gen. De Courcy simultaneously advanced from London on the north; Burnside following in person two days behind Shackleford, who made a forced march of 60 miles in 52 hours, and thus closed in Gen. Frazier, who with four regiments held the gap, and had refused to quit it while he could, supposing himself able to hold it. But his men were in good part disaffected or discouraged, while the mill whereon he depended for flour was burned[67] by two companies of Shackleford's men, who crept through his lines and fired it unperceived. When Burnside arrived,[68] Frazier had refused our summons; but he found, soon afterward, good reason to change his mind, and surrendered his 2,000 men and 14 guns. Our cavalry moved thence rapidly eastward; chasing off a small Rebel force under Sam Jones into Virginia, destroying the principal railroad bridges, and completing the recovery of East Tennessee, with the direct loss, in Burnside's command, of barely one man.

Halleck says he now ordered Burnside to concentrate his army on the Tennessee river westward from Loudon, so as to connect with Rosecrans, who had just reached Chattanooga, and that "it was hoped that there would be no further delay in effecting a junction between the two armies, as had been previously ordered." The military reading of the General-in-Chief having been very extensive, he can probably cite numerous instances wherein the leader of a small army has made haste to unite that army with a large one, which would necessarily absorb it, without having been placed under the orders of its commander; but, in the recollection of this writer, such instances are rare. At all events, Burnside did not add another, but continued to diffuse his command throughout East Tennessee, until it had been beaten out very thin, and was thus exposed to be cut up in detail. Col. Foster, in the far east, after one skirmish[69] near Bristol, was sharply assailed[70] at Blue Springs by Sam Jones, whom he defeated, after two days' desultory fighting; taking 150 prisoners and disabling at least that number, with a loss to our side of barely 100.

Shackleford now took post at Jonesboro', with a part of his command, under Wilcox, at Greenville, with two regiments and a battery, under Col. Israel Garrard, 7th Ohio cavalry, at Rogersville, where they were attacked[71] by 1,200 mounted men under Brig.-Gen. W. E. Jones, acting under the orders of Maj.-Gen. Sam Jones, who struck them at daylight, surprising and easily routing them with a loss of 4 guns, 36 wagons, and 750 prisoners, and creating such a panic at Jonesborough and Greenville that Shackleford's men raced back to Bull's gap, 18 miles, while Jones and his party were making equally good time in the opposite direction, fearing that Shackleford would be upon them in overwhelming force if they did not. This back-

[66] Sept. 5. [67] Sept. 7. [68] Sept. 9. [69] Sept. 21. [70] Oct. 10. [71] Nov. 6.

to-back race was one of the most ludicrous incidents of the war, though the laugh was rather the heartier on the wrong side.

The Army of the Cumberland remaining quiet at Chattanooga, Bragg (or his superiors) conceived the idea of improving his leisure by a movement on Burnside, which Longstreet was assigned to lead. Burnside had by this time spread his force very widely, holding innumerable points and places southward and eastward of Knoxville by brigades and detachments; and Longstreet, advancing silently and rapidly, was enabled to strike [72] heavily at the little outpost of Philadelphia, held by Col. F. T. Wolford, with the 1st, 11th, and 12th Kentucky cavalry and 45th Ohio mounted infantry—in all about 2,000 men. Wolford had dispatched the 1st and 11th Kentucky to protect his trains moving on his right, which a Rebel advance was reported as menacing, when he found himself suddenly assailed in front and on both flanks by an overwhelming Rebel force, estimated at 7,000, whom he withstood several hours, hoping that the sound of guns would bring him assistance from Loudon in his rear; but none arrived; and he was at length obliged to cut his way out; losing his battery and 32 wagons, but bringing off most of his command, with 51 prisoners. Major Delfosse, leading the 12th Ky., was killed. The 1st and 11th Kentucky, under Maj. Graham, having proceeded four miles westward from Philadelphia, found their train already in the hands of the enemy, and recaptured it; chasing its assailants for some distance, and capturing quite a number of them; when our men in turn encountered a superior force, and were chased nearly to Loudon, losing heavily. We took 111 prisoners this day, and lost 324, with 6 guns; the killed and wounded on either side being about 100. Our total loss in prisoners to Longstreet southward of Loudon is stated by Halleck at 650.

The enemy advancing resolutely yet cautiously, our troops were withdrawn before them from Lenoir and from Loudon, concentrating at Campbell's Station—Gen. Burnside, who had hastened from Knoxville at the tidings of danger, being personally in command. Having been joined by his old (9th) corps, he was now probably as strong as Longstreet; but a large portion of his force was still dispersed far to the eastward, and he apprehended being flanked by an advance from Kingston on his left. He found himself so closely pressed, however, that he must either fight or sacrifice his trains; so he chose an advantageous position and suddenly faced [73] the foe: his batteries being all at hand, while those of his pursuers were behind; so that he had decidedly the advantage in the fighting till late in the afternoon, when they brought up three batteries and opened, while their infantry were extended on either hand, as if to outflank him. He then fell back to the next ridge, and again faced about; holding his position firmly till after nightfall; when—his trains having meantime obtained a fair start—he resumed his retreat, and continued it unmolested until safe within the sheltering intrenchments of Knoxville. Our loss in this affair was about 300; that of the enemy was

[72] Oct. 20.

[73] Nov. 6.

probably greater. Though not a sanguinary nor decisive struggle, few occurred during the war that were more creditable to the generalship or the soldierly qualities of either army.

Longstreet continued his pursuit, and in due time beleaguered the city,[74] though he can hardly be said to have invested it. That he intended, and expected, and tried, to carry it, is true; and there was very spirited and pretty constant fighting around it, mainly on its west side; but the day of rushing naked infantry in masses on formidable earthworks covering heavy batteries was nearly over with either side. The defenses were engineered by Capt. Poe, and were signally effective. Directly on getting into position, a smart assault was delivered on our right, held by the 112th Illinois, 45th Ohio, 3d Michigan, and 12th Kentucky, and a hill carried; but it was not essential to the defenses. Our loss this day was about 100; among them was Gen. W. P. Sanders, of Kentucky, killed. Shelling and skirmishing barely served to break the monotony for ten weary days, when—having been rëenforced by Sam Jones, and one or two other small commands from Virginia—Longstreet delivered an assault,[75] by a picked storming party of three brigades, on an unfinished but important work known as Fort Sanders, on our left, but was bloodily repelled by Gen. Ferrero, who held it—the loss of the assailants being some 800, including Col. McElroy, 13th Mississippi, and Col. Thomas, 16th Georgia, killed; while on our side the entire loss that night was about 100; only 15 of these in the fort.

And now—Bragg having been defeated by Grant before Chattanooga, and a relieving force under Sherman being close at hand—Longstreet necessarily abandoned the siege, and moved rapidly eastward unassailed to Russellville, Virginia: our entire loss in the defense having been less than 1,000; while his must have been twice or thrice that number. Sherman's advance reached the city, and Burnside officially announced the raising of the siege, Dec. 5th.

Gen. Halleck had been thoroughly aroused to the peril of Rosecrans at Chattanooga just too late to do any good. On his first advice that Longstreet had been dispatched southward from Virginia—it was said, to Charleston—he had telegraphed [76] to Burnside at Knoxville, to Hurlbut at Memphis, and to Grant at Vicksburg, to move troops to the support of Rosecrans; and the orders to Burnside and Hurlbut were rëiterated next day. Schofield at St. Louis and Pope in the north-west were likewise instructed respectively to forward to Tennessee every man they could spare. And it now occurred to Halleck—or did the day after Chickamauga—that two independent commands on the Tennessee would not be so likely to insure effective cöoperation as if one mind directed the movements of both armies; so—Rosecrans being made the necessary scapegoat of others' mistakes as well as his own—Gen. Grant was selected for chief command; Rosecrans being relieved, and instructed to turn over his army to Gen. Thomas. But Grant was now sick in New Orleans, out of reach by telegraph; and Sher-

[74] Nov. 17. [75] Nov. 28-9. [76] Sept. 13.

CUMBERLAND GAP.

man, who represented him at Vicksburg, did not receive the dispatch till it was several days old. Hurlbut promptly put his West Tennessee corps in motion eastward; but this was not enough; and Halleck, on learning of the reverse on the Chickamauga—hearing nothing from Grant or Sherman—detached[77] the 11th and 12th corps from the Army of the Potomac, and ordered them, under Gen. Hooker, to Middle Tennessee, to hold, till further orders, Rosecrans's line of communications from Nashville to Bridgeport. This transfer of 20,000 men, with all their artillery, munitions, and baggage, was made with remarkable celerity, through the extraordinary exertions of Gen. D. C. McCallum, government superintendent of railroads, M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General, and W. Prescott Smith, master of transportation on the Baltimore and Ohio road: the two corps marching from the Rapidan to Washington, taking cars, and being transported by Cumberland, Wheeling, Cincinnati, Louisville, and Nashville, to the Tennessee, and there debarked in fighting array, within eight days.

Meantime, Bragg had sent a large portion of his cavalry, under Wheeler and Wharton, across[78] the Tennessee at Cottonport, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, instructed to cut our communications and destroy our supplies so far as possible. Wheeler, doubtless thoroughly informed, made directly for a large portion of Gen. Thomas's train of 700 to 1,000 wagons, laden with supplies, then in Sequatchie valley, near Anderson's Cross-roads, which he captured[79] and burned; being attacked, directly afterward, by Col. E. M. McCook, who, with three regiments of cavalry, had been ordered from Bridgeport to pursue him. McCook had the better of the fight; but darkness closed it; and the enemy moved off during the night, while McCook had no orders to pursue him.

Wheeler next struck McMinnville, in the heart of Tennessee, which, with 600 men, a train of wagons, and one of cars, was surrendered to him without a struggle, and where he burned a large quantity of supplies. But here he was overhauled by Gen. Geo. Crook, who, with another cavalry division, 2,000 strong, had started from Washington, Tenn., and had for some hours been pursuing and fighting Wharton, and by whose order Col. Long, with the 2d Kentucky, charged the rear of the now flying foe with spirit and effect. Wheeler's force being superior, he halted and fought dismounted till dark, and then struck out for Murfreesboro'; but that post was firmly held, and he could not wait to carry it; so he swept down to Warren and Shelbyville, burning bridges, breaking the railroad, and capturing trains and stores, taking thence a south-west course across Duck river to Farmington, where another fight[80] was had, and the Rebels worsted by the fire of Capt. Stokes's battery, followed by a charge of infantry, and lost 4 guns, captured by Crook, though he was in inferior force. Wheeler got away during the night to Pulaski, and thence into North Alabama; making his escape across the Tennessee river, near the mouth of Elk; losing 2 more guns and his rear-guard of 70 men in getting over. Gens. Thomas and

[77] Sept. 23. [78] Sept. 30. [79] Oct. 2. [80] Oct. 7.

Crook estimate his loss during this raid at 2,000 men, mostly prisoners or deserters. Ours, mainly in prisoners, must have exceeded that number; while the Government property destroyed must have been worth millions of dollars. Roddy, who crossed[81] the Tennessee at Guntersville, threatening Decherd, retreated on learning that Wheeler had done so, and escaped without loss.

Gen. Grant, having assumed[82] at Louisville command of his new department, telegraphed, next day, to Gen. Thomas at Chattanooga to hold that place at all hazards, and was promptly answered, "I will hold on till we starve." Famine, not fire, was the foe most dreaded by the Army of the Cumberland, though it had a pretty rough experience of both. Proceeding forthwith to Chattanooga, the new commander found[83] Gen. Hooker's force concentrated at Bridgeport, preparing to argue with Bragg our claim to supply our forces at Chattanooga by means of the river and the highway along its bank, instead of sending every thing by wagons across the mountains on either side of the Sequatchie valley—a most laborious and difficult undertaking, which left our men on short rations and starved many of our horses. It is computed that no less than 10,000 horses were used up in this service, and that it would have been impossible, by reason of their exhaustion and the increasing badness of the roads caused by the Autumn rains, to have supplied our army a week longer.

Grant proceeded, the day after his arrival, accompanied by Thomas and Brig.-Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, to examine the river below Chattanooga with reference to crossing. It was decided that Hooker should cross at Bridgeport with all the force he could muster, advancing directly to Wauhatchie in Lookout valley, menacing Bragg with a flank attack. So much was to be observed and understood by the enemy. But, while his attention was fixed on this movement, and on the march of a division, under Gen. Palmer, down the north bank of the river from a point opposite Chattanooga to Whiteside, where he was to cross and support Hooker, a force was to be got ready, under the direction of Smith, and, at the right moment, thrown across the river at Brown's ferry, three or four miles below Chattanooga, and pushed forward at once to seize the range of hills skirting the river at the mouth of Lookout valley, covering the Brown's ferry road and a pontoon bridge to be quickly thrown across the ferry; thus opening a line of communication between our forces in Chattanooga and Hooker's in Wauhatchie, shorter and better than that held by Bragg around the foot of Lookout mountain.

Hooker crossed, unimpeded, on the 26th; pushing straight on to WAUHATCHIE, which he reached on the 28th. Meantime, 4,000 men had been detailed to Smith; of whom 1,800, under Brig.-Gen. Hazen, were embarked on 60 pontoon-boats at Chattanooga, and, at the word, floated quietly down the river during the night of the 27th, past the Rebel pickets watching along the left bank, and, landing on the south side, at Brown's ferry, seized the hills over-

[81] Oct. 11. [82] Oct. 18. [83] Oct. 23.

looking it, without further loss than 4 or 5 wounded. The residue of Gen. Smith's men, with further materials for the bridges, had simultaneously moved across Moccasin point on our side, to the ferry, unperceived by the enemy; and, before dawn, they had been ferried across, and the difficult heights rising sharply from the Tennessee and from Lookout valley on the south-west were firmly secured. By 10 A. M., a capital pontoon-bridge had been completed at the ferry; and now, if Bragg chose to concentrate on Hooker or on Chattanooga, we had the shorter line of concentration, and were ready. Before night, Hooker's left rested on Smith's force and bridge; while Palmer had pushed across to Whiteside in his rear; and now the wagon route of supply for Chattanooga, no longer infested by Rebel sharpshooters, was reduced to the 28 miles of relatively tolerable road from Bridgeport, or, by using the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's ferry, to barely 8 miles. Grant's fighting had not yet begun; but Chattanooga was safe, and Bragg virtually beaten.

Hooker had found no enemy to repel, save pickets and perhaps a few sharp-shooters, until—having passed through a gorge of Raccoon mountain into Lookout valley, some two miles wide, which is commanded and observed throughout by the crests of Raccoon mountain on the one hand and of Lookout mountain on the other, while a low range of five or six hills, 200 to 300 feet high, divides it nearly in the center—he reached Wauhatchie, a petty station on the railroad, some 12 or 15 miles from Chattanooga, directly under the guns of the Rebel batteries on Lookout mountain. Of course, every movement on our side was watched by the enemy, who might almost count the men in our ranks as they marched. Through another gorge on Hooker's left, a road led down to Kelly's ferry, three miles distant. Howard's (11th) corps, in our advance, had passed Wauhatchie, and had lost a few men by shells thrown from Lookout mountain, and as many by an irregular musketry fire from the wooded hills in its front, whence the enemy was speedily dislodged by a flanking advance; burning the railroad bridge over Lookout creek as he fled. At 6 P. M.,[84] our column was halted for the night, but little over a mile from Brown's ferry, toward which three companies were thrown out; while Geary's weak division of the 12th corps bivouacked at Wauhatchie, three miles back, holding the road from Kelly's ferry that leads up Lookout valley.

Law's division of Longstreet's corps held Lookout mountain, and were deeply interested but quiet spectators of Hooker's arrangements for the night. They were not strong enough to fight his entire force by daylight; but it was calculated that they would suffice[85] to strike Geary by surprise in that strange, wooded region; routing him before he should be fairly awake, stampeding his men, running off his animals, and burning his trains. Accordingly, about 1 A. M.,[86] they attacked him with Rebel impetuosity and the unearthly yells wherein they stood confessedly unri-

[84] Oct. 28.

[85] Hooker says they were two strong divisions: Pollard says they were but six regiments.

[86] Oct. 29.

vaded, driving in his pickets on a run, and following them into his lines; but they found him wide awake, and no wise inclined to panic or running. Charged at once on three sides, he met the enemy with a fire as deadly as theirs, and with ranks steadier and firmer than those of a charging column could be, and was fully holding his own against them, when Carl Schurz's division of Howard's corps came rushing from Hooker to his aid; Tyndale's brigade assaulting and carrying the hill whence they were enfiladed on their left, while a thin brigade of Steinwehr's division, which closely followed, was led by Col. Orlan Smith, 73d Ohio, on a charge up a very steep, difficult hill farther behind; carrying it without a shot, and taking some prisoners. It was now time for the Rebels to be off, and they left—all save 153 who lay dead in Geary's front, and over 100 prisoners. Their reports admit a loss of 361. Darkness prevented any effective pursuit. Hooker's total loss here was 416,[87] including Gen. Green severely, and Col. Underwood, 33d Mass., desperately wounded. Capt. Geary, son of the General, was killed.

There can be no severer test of the quality of soldiers than such a night attack, in a country whereof they know nothing and their assailants know every thing; and when the presumption is strong that the latter must have carefully measured their strength, and know what they have to do. Geary's men were inferior in number to their foes; but the ordeal was nobly passed. No regiment quailed; and, though the 73d Ohio suffered most, losing over 100, the charge of the 33d Massachusetts and that of the 136th New York, Col. James Wood, Jr., were equally intrepid and effective. This beginning of its work in the West signally inspirited and prepared Hooker's command for the arduous labors before it.

The flight of the Rebels occurred at 4 A. M., before all Howard's corps had arrived; those in the rear were now halted and impelled in an opposite direction; soon clearing Raccoon mountain of the enemy, with all west of Lookout valley. And Bragg, who had weakened himself by sending Longstreet against Burnside, did not feel encouraged to make any more attacks, but remained quiet and watchful in his intrenchments before Chattanooga.

His position was one of remarkable strength, along the western and northern declivities of the difficult steeps known as Lookout mountain and Mission ridge, and across the valley at the mouth of Chattanooga creek, here very narrow, and so enfiladed by heavy batteries along its mountain sides as to be impregnable to direct assault. Grant was eager to attack, so as to be able to send aid to Burnside, who was urgently calling for it; but the utterly broken-down condition of most of his horses, rendering them unequal to the task of hauling his cannon, much less mounting his cavalry, constrained him to await the arrival of Sherman, who, with the 15th corps, then on the Big Black, had been telegraphed[88] by Grant, on his assuming command of this department, to embark a di-

[87] Since crossing the Tennessee, 437: 76 killed, 339 wounded, 22 missing. He estimates the Rebel loss much higher—some 1,500; but he is clearly in error.

[88] Sept. 22.

vision at once for Memphis, and had started it, under Osterhaus, at 4 P. M. of that day. Repairing next day by order to Vicksburg, he dispatched the rest of his corps up the river; following[89] himself to Memphis, whence he marched eastward, repairing and using the Charleston railroad for his trains, to Corinth. His forces having been sent forward from Memphis in divisions, he took the cars,[90] and reaching, about noon, Colliersville station, found there the 66th Indiana, Col. D. C. Anthony, just undergoing an attack by Chalmers, with 3,000 Rebel cavalry and 8 guns. Having as escort a battalion of the 13th regulars, he helped beat off the assailants, and moved on; reaching Corinth that night.

But the Rebels did not seem reconciled to his movements, and were constantly infesting Osterhaus's division, who held the advance, supported by Morgan L. Smith's, both under the command of Frank Blair, as well as John E. Smith's, which covered the working parties engaged in repairing the railroad; so that the movement had to be made circumspectly and slowly. Stephen D. Lee, with Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades, made up a force of about 5,000 irregular cavalry, who were constantly watching for chances to do mischief; and, though not strong enough to be perilous, they were so lively as to be vexatious. At length, they got directly in the way at Cane creek,[91] near Tuscumbia, compelling Blair to hurt some of them before they would move. By this time—Hooker having long since arrived on the Tennessee—Grant had become impatient for more decisive operations, and a messenger reached Sherman with an order to drop all work on the railroad, and push on rapidly to Bridgeport. Moving energetically to Eastport, Sherman found there two gunboats and a decked coal-barge, which Admiral Porter, at his request, had sent up the Tennessee from Cairo, to facilitate his crossing; but two transports and a ferry-boat soon arrived,[92] by whose aid Sherman was pushing on next day, leaving Blair to protect his rear. Arrived at Rogersville, he found the Elk unbridged and unfordable, and was compelled to move up its right bank to Fayetteville, crossing there on a stone bridge, and marching by Winchester and Decherd to Bridgeport;[93] whence he forthwith reported in person to Grant at Chattanooga,[94] being at once made acquainted with the plans of the General commanding, and accompanying him to a survey of the positions of the enemy; returning forthwith to Bridgeport to expedite the movement of his troops.

Grant had resolved to put in Sherman's force mainly on his left—or up the Tennessee; so his first point was to make Bragg believe that he should use it on his extreme right. To this end, his divisions were crossed as they arrived at Bridgeport; the foremost (Ewing's) moving by Shell Mound to Trenton, threatening to assail and turn Bragg's extreme right. But the residue of this army, as it came up, moved quietly and screened from Rebel observation to Kelly's ford, rëcrossing on Smith's pontoons, and marching around Chattanooga to its assigned position on the left of Thomas, where materials had already been noiselessly prepared for throw-

[89] Sept. 27. [90] Oct. 11. [91] Oct. 27. [92] Oct. 31. [93] Nov. 13. [94] Nov. 15.

ing a bridge across the river above the town. At the proper time, Hugh S. Ewing's division was drawn back from Trenton and followed the others to our extreme left; but the roads were so bad, and the overtaxed bridges broke so frequently—the river being swelled by heavy rains—that unexpected delays occurred; and Osterhaus's division was left to aid Hooker on the right.

Grant, impatient to relieve Burnside, had fixed the 21st for the attack; but it was found impossible for Sherman to get ready by that time; in fact, Ewing was not in position till the 23d, when the movement was begun.

Grant's eagerness to attack was stimulated by the misguiding report of a deserter that Bragg was falling[96] back, when he was only posting his forces to strengthen himself for the coming attack. A most impertinent message[97] from the Rebel chief, received two days before, had strengthened Grant's suspicion that Bragg was mainly intent on getting safely away from that dangerous neighborhood. Hence, before Sherman was fairly in position, Thomas was ordered" to advance our center, and see what was behind the Rebel picket-line facing Chattanooga. Hooker's purposed attack on Lookout mountain was suspended, and Howard's (11th) corps pushed over to Chattanooga and temporarily added to Thomas's command.

The movement was initiated by Granger's (4th) corps; Sheridan's division on the right, Wood's on the left, reaching nearly to Citico creek; Palmer, of the 14th corps, supporting Granger's right with Baird's division, refused; Johnson's division under arms in our intrenchments, ready to move to any point at a word. Howard's corps was likewise held in readiness to act whenever required.

It was 2 P. M. when Granger's men moved out; advancing steadily, squarely, swiftly, upon the Rebel intrenchments, driving before them pickets, reserves, and grand guards, and rushing into the Rebel rifle-pits, on the low hill known as Orchard ridge, where they made some 200 prisoners. This was done so quickly that no force was, and probably none could have been, sent from Bragg's main camp, somewhat farther away from us, to resist it; and Granger, under orders to secure his new position at once by temporary breastworks, and throw out strong pickets, while Howard moved up on his left, was soon too well established to be expelled during the remaining daylight: so he held on, unmolested, through the night.

Hooker was now to take the laboring oar, by an assault on the north face and west side of Lookout mountain, attracting the enemy's attention to that quarter while Sherman should lay his pontoons and cross the Tennessee on our left, near the mouth of the Chickamauga. Accordingly, Hooker, at 4 A. M., was under arms and ready to advance; but an unexpected obstacle confronted him. The heavy rain of the 21st and 22d had

[96] Nov. 22.

[97] "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, "IN THE FIELD, Nov. 20, 1863.

"Maj.-Gen. U. S. GRANT, Commanding U. S. forces at Chattanooga:

"GENERAL: As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, BRAXTON BRAGG, Gen. Com'g."

[97] Nov. 23.

not only deranged our pontoon bridges; it had so swelled Lookout creek that it was unfordable: so he dispatched Geary, supported by Cruft, up the creek to Wauhatchie, there to cross and hold the right bank, while the residue of his command should construct temporary bridges directly in their front, lower down.

A heavy mist favored this movement, which would otherwise have been perilous; as it was, the enemy were so intent on watching Hooker's bridge-builders that they did not observe Geary, who crossed the creek at 8 A. M.,[98] capturing a picket of 42 men posted at the bridge, resting here his left, extending his right to the foot of the mountain, on the enemy's side of the valley, facing northward. Gross's brigade now, by Hooker's order, advanced and seized the bridge over the creek just below the railroad crossing, and pushed across there. Now Osterhaus, who had just come up from Brown's ferry, pushed forward Wood's brigade to a point half a mile above Gross, laid a temporary bridge, and crossed there. Meanwhile, our batteries, established on the most available hills, were so planted as to enfilade the Rebel infantry, as they marched down from their camp on the mountain to man their breastworks and rifle-pits. Part of them had taken post behind a railroad embankment, and kept up a deadly fire with little exposure or loss on their part. Still, Hooker's men—they were 9,681, all told, and no two divisions of them had hitherto fought in the same battle—acted from the first as though they were bound to conquer.

By 11 A. M., Wood had his bridge finished; Geary was close at hand, skirmishing smartly; and now all our guns opened in concert; while Wood and Gross, springing across the creek, joined Geary's left, and moved down the valley, sweeping all before them; taking many prisoners in their rifle-pits, and allowing few to escape up the mountain; our men from right to left following at full speed, right under the muzzles of the enemy's guns; climbing over ledges and bowlders, crests and chasms, and driving the Rebels through their camp without allowing them to halt there; hurling them back with little more than a show of fighting; Geary's advance rounding the peak of the mountain about noon, and still pressing on; though Hooker, who knew that Bragg had reënforced this wing, but not to what extent, had given orders that they be halted and reformed on reaching the summit; but the men would not be halted, but rushed forward, making hundreds of prisoners, and hurling the residue down the precipitous eastern declivity of the mountain.

Darkness, at 2 P. M., arrested our victorious arms; the mountain being now enveloped in a cloud so thick and black as to render farther movement perilous, if not impossible; when Hooker's line was established along the east brink of the precipice, its left near the mouth of Chattanooga creek; where, by 4 P. M., it was so fortified, by whatever means were at hand, that he sent word to Grant that his position was impregnable.

At 5¼, Brig.-Gen. Carlin, of the 14th corps, reported to him, and,

[98] Nov. 24.

with his brigade, was assigned to duty on the extreme right, where Geary's men were nearly exhausted with hours of climbing and fighting. This wing was assailed, about dark, but to no purpose—Carlin easily repelling the enemy; who, before morning, abandoned the mountain altogether, leaving 20,000 rations and the camp equipage of three brigades, as they silently dropped into the Chattanooga valley.

Sherman had begun to cross the Tennessee early this morning.[98] His pontoons had been prepared in the little creek on the north side, called the North Chickamauga; whence they, before daylight, were pushed out into the river, bearing 30 men each, and floated silently past the Rebel pickets, along the south bank, to the destined point just below the mouth of the South or real Chickamauga, where they struck the hostile shore, capturing a picket of 20 before their coming was suspected. The steamboat Dunbar, with a tow-barge, having been employed during the night in ferrying across horses procured from Sherman, wherewith to move Thomas's artillery, was sent up to hasten the crossing here; and, by daylight, 8,000 of Sherman's men were over the river and so established in rifle-trenches as to be prepared for an assault by twice their number. By noon, Sherman had bridges across both the Tennessee and the South Chickamauga, and was pushing over the rest of his command; and, at 3½ P. M., he had, by sharp fighting, carried the north end of Mission ridge nearly to the railroad tunnel; and here he so fortified himself during the night as to be ready for any emergency. Meantime, Col. Long, with his brigade of Thomas's cavalry, had crossed the Tennessee and the Chickamauga on our left, and raided on the enemy's lines of communication; burning Tyner's Station, and, pushing out to Cleveland, capturing 200 prisoners, with 100 wagons, and destroying considerable Rebel stores, with small loss on our side.

Thomas this day improved and strengthened his advanced positions; pushing Howard's corps up the Tennessee till it joined hands with Sherman, just as the latter had brought his rear division across the river.

Thus, by continuous though moderate advances, our army, at small cost, had wrested from the enemy several important advantages of position, and was now stretched in unbroken line from the north end of Lookout mountain to the north end of Mission ridge, with the enemy compressed between them.

Next morning,[99] Hooker moved down from Lookout mountain, and across Chattanooga valley, which his hold of Lookout mountain had compelled the enemy to abandon, burning the bridge over the creek; which arrested our advance here for three hours. So soon as our new bridge could be crossed, Osterhaus pushed on to Rossville; driving the enemy out of the gap in Mission ridge by flanking them, and capturing guns, munitions, wagons, &c. By this time, the bridge was finished, and Hooker's force all over: so Hooker undertook, as ordered, to clear Mission ridge, on his left, of the enemy: Osterhaus moving eastward of the ridge, Geary on the west of it, and Cruft directly upon it, the batteries

[98] Nov. 24.

[99] Nov. 25.

with Geary, and all moving together toward Bragg and Chattanooga. In the progress of the movement, the narrowness of the crest compelled a division of Cruft's command into two lines.

The enemy's front was protected by breastworks, thrown up by our men while holding here in front of Bragg's triumphant army during the night and day following the fight of Chickamauga, and they seemed disposed to hold on; but that was not to be. As their skirmishers advanced to check our movement, the 9th and the 36th Indiana sprang forward, forming line under their fire, and, instantly charging, drove them back; while the residue of our column formed line: Gross's brigade, with the 51st Ohio and 35th Indiana, in advance; the residue of Whitaker's brigade, closely supporting; Geary and Osterhaus advancing abreast of them; and all, at a charging pace, swept on, pushing back all opposition; every attempt of the enemy to make a stand being defeated by a withering flank-fire from Geary and Osterhaus, who gathered up as prisoners all who sought escape by flight down the ridge. Osterhaus alone took 2,000 of them. Those who fled along the ridge were intercepted by Johnson's division of Thomas's corps, who were now advancing from the direction of Chattanooga. At sunset, Hooker halted for the night, there being no more enemies in his front; his troops going into bivouac on the rocky steeps they had so nobly won.

Gen. Sherman, who had been fortifying his position during the night, received orders to attack at daylight this morning, and did so; finding the ground far more difficult than he had anticipated. The ridge was not continuous, but a succession of eminences: that which he had carried being commanded by that in his front, across quite a valley; its crest covered with forest, and bristling with breastworks and abatis. But, difficult as was the task, these works must be carried; and by sunrise Sherman had completed his dispositions and given the order to advance.

Gen. Corse, with a regiment from Lightburn's brigade, was directed to advance along the ridge; Gen. Morgan L. Smith to move along its east base, connecting with Corse; Col. Loomis, in like manner, was to advance along its west base, supported by two reserve brigades under Gen. John E. Smith. And thus our line moved on: the 40th Illinois, supported by the 20th and 46th Ohio, pushing directly down the face of the hill held by Sherman and up that held by the enemy, to within eighty yards of the Rebel intrenchments, where Gen. Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held; calling up his reserves, and preparing to assault, when a hand-to-hand contest was maintained for an hour with varying success and heavy loss on our part; but Corse was unable to carry the enemy's works, as were they to drive him from his sheltering hill. But Gen. Morgan L. Smith on one side, and Col. Loomis on the other, gained ground on the flanks, though John E. Smith's supporting brigades recoiled before a sudden and heavy artillery fire, giving the impression in Chattanooga that Sherman was losing ground. Yet no ground was really lost by our advance; and an attempt to pursue

the recoiling brigades was promptly checked by a flanking fire from the crest; the enemy taking to the shelter of his crest and his woods. Still, no decided success had been won by Sherman's column up to 3 P. M. Meantime, Gen. Giles A. Smith had been disabled at 4 P. M. of the day before; and Gen. Corse had been severely wounded at 10 A. M. of this day.

Gen. Grant had been awaiting advices of Hooker's successful advance on the right, before giving Thomas the signal to advance. Unaware of the long detention of Hooker in bridging Lookout creek, he had expected such advices before noon; and was still impatiently awaiting them, when, seeing that Bragg was weakening his center to support his right, and judging that Hooker must by this time be at or near Rossville, he gave Thomas, at 2 P. M., the order to advance and attack.

At once, Baird's, Wood's, Sheridan's, and Johnson's divisions went forward, with double lines of skirmishers in front, followed, at easy supporting distance, by the entire force, right into the enemy's rifle-pits at the base of the ridge; driving out the occupants, and hardly stopping to rëform their lines before they charged right up the steep and difficult ascent—slowly, of course, but steadily and in order; following so close to the retreating foe as to embarrass, doubtless, his gunners firing from the crest of the ridge. Says Gen. Grant, in his official report:

"These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near 30 pieces of artillery and musketry from still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession. In this charge, the casualties were remarkably few for the fire encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.

"The nearness of night, and the enemy still resisting the advance of Thomas's left, prevented a general pursuit that night; but Sheridan pushed forward to Mission mills.

"The resistance on Thomas's left being overcome, the enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by midnight was in full retreat; and the whole of his strong position on Lookout mountain, Chattanooga valley, and Mission ridge, was in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small arms."

Says Gen. Thomas, in his report:

"Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest; whither they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and ammunition, before they could be removed or destroyed. After halting a few moments to rëorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the assault of the hill, Gen. Sherman pushed forward in pursuit, and drove those in his front, who escaped capture, across Chickamauga creek. Gens. Wood and Baird, being obstinately resisted by rëenforcements from the enemy's extreme right, continued fighting until darkness set in; slowly but steadily driving the enemy before them. In moving upon Rossville, Gen. Hooker encountered Stewart's division and other troops; finding his left flank threatened, Stewart attempted to escape by retreating toward Greysville; but some of his force, finding their retreat threatened in that quarter, retired in disorder toward their right along the crest of the ridge; where they were met by another portion of Gen. Hooker's command, and were driven by these troops in the face of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners."

As yet, we have looked at this re-

markable action from our own side exclusively. Let us now see it as it appeared to Gen. Bragg, posted on the crest of Mission ridge (until driven off), and enjoying by far the wider and clearer view of it. His report, being brief and pungent, is here given almost entire:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
"DALTON, GA., 30th Nov., 1863.

"Gen. S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond:

"SIR—On Monday, the 23d, the enemy advanced in heavy force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary ridge, but made no further effort.

"On Tuesday morning early, they threw over the river a heavy force, opposite the north end of the ridge, and just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; at the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front. After visiting the right, and making dispositions there for the new development in that direction, I returned toward the left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's batteries on our forces occupying the slope of Lookout mountain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only, Walthall's, which made a desperate resistance, but was finally compelled to yield ground. Why this command was not sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that part of the field, Maj.-Gen. Stevenson, had six brigades at his disposal. Upon his urgent appeal, another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his support—though it appeared his own forces had not been brought into action—and I proceeded to the scene.

"Arriving just before sunset, I found that we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were immediately given for the ground to be disputed until we could withdraw our forces across Chattanooga creek, and the movement was commenced. This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to meet the movement in that direction.

"On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, now under Lt.-Gen. Hardee, and threatened by a heavy force, whilst strong columns could be seen marching in that direction. A very heavy force in line of battle confronted our left and center.

"On my return to this point, about 11 A. M., the enemy's forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout, and beyond, to our front, whilst those in front extended to our right. They formed their lines with great deliberation, just beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our position.

"Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. During this time, they had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed, with very heavy loss, by Maj.-Gen. Cleburne's command, under the immediate direction of Lt.-Gen. Hardee. By the road across the ridge at Rossville, far to our left, a route was open to our rear. Maj.-Gen. Breckinridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two regiments and a battery. It being reported to me that a force of the enemy had moved in that direction, the General was ordered to have it reconnoitered, and to make every disposition necessary to secure his flank; which he proceeded to do.

"About half-past 3 P. M., the immense force in the front of our left and center advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced, before they reached musket range. In a short time, the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent that the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front.

"Whilst riding along the crest, congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point under Brig.-Gen. Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front; and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops, and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. Gen. Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time, I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed, upon which to rally.

"Lt.-Gen. Hardee, leaving Maj.-Gen. Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left, when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the

ridge, facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here, the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact. All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed, and in rapid flight; nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, Gen. Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command; and orders were immediately sent to Gens. Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the dépôt at Chickamauga. Fortunately, it was now near nightfall, and the country and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally unknown to the enemy. The routed left made its way back in great disorder, effectually covered, however, by Bate's small command, which had a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. After night, all being quiet, Bate retired in good order, the enemy attempting no pursuit. Lt.-Gen. Hardee's command, under his judicious management, retired in good order and unmolested.

"As soon as all the troops had crossed, the bridges over the Chickamauga were destroyed, to impede the enemy, though the stream was fordable in several places.

"No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left, in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column; and, wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in disorder, after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge, did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless; and the slightest effort would have destroyed them.

"Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and, turning our guns upon us, enfiladed our lines, both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable. Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, who had never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous. They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers. But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts, when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. As yet, I am not fully informed as to the commands which first fled and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however; and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad.

"After arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in motion for a point farther removed from a powerful and victorious army, that we might have some little time to replenish and recuperate for another struggle. The enemy made pursuit as far as Ringgold; but was so handsomely checked by Maj.-Gen. Cleburne and Brig.-Gen. Gist, in command of their respective divisions, that he gave us but little annoyance.

"Our losses are not yet ascertained; but in killed and wounded it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and stragglers, I fear it is much larger.

"The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty (40) pieces.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, BRAXTON BRAGG,
"General Commanding."

He is not usually accounted a good workman who disparages his tools; and the soldiers thus discredited by Bragg were mainly those who fought so bravely, skillfully, tenaciously, successfully, at the Chickamauga, barely two months before. They were probably reduced by the casualties of that bloody contest, by Longstreet's withdrawal, and otherwise, to 40,000; while Grant must have had here not less than 70,000, nearly all of whom were brought into action. This disparity of numbers, together with the fact that the movements on our side appear to have been judiciously planned, skillfully combined, and vigorously made, explain the result more naturally than does Bragg's as-

sertion, that his men quite generally and shamefully misbehaved and were panic-stricken. It is plain that they were largely outnumbered, and that they saw and felt it; yet, with such dispositions, such handling on both sides, as rendered Fredericksburg a black disaster to us, there is no obvious reason for believing that Bragg's eyrie, so difficult of approach, might not have been triumphantly held.

Thomas returned directly from the battle-field to Chattanooga to expedite the movement of Granger's corps thence to the relief of Knoxville; while Sherman and Hooker pursued, at daylight,[101] the routed columns of Bragg: the former, by way of Chickamauga Station; the latter by Greysville and Ringgold; Palmer, in his advance, having overtaken and charged by the way the Rebel rear-guard under Gist, breaking it and capturing 3 guns: our advance—badly delayed by the non-arrival of pontoons at the Chickamauga—bivouacking on the crest of the ridge east of that stream, and resuming the pursuit at dawn next morning;[102] Osterhaus leading, followed by Geary, and he by Cruft; and going into Ringgold, 5 miles farther, close on the heels of the flying enemy.

Cleburne was now in command here—a man always hard to drive—and the gap in Taylor's or White Oak ridge, through which he was retreating, was one easy to hold and difficult to carry. Having guns advantageously posted, he refused to be hurried; while our men, flushed and exultant, could not be restrained from attacking, though our guns were still behind, having been detained at the crossing of the Chickamauga, where the enemy had burned the bridge behind him. A most gallant but rash effort was made to drive him out, wherein the 13th Illinois was honorably conspicuous. Two or three charges on our part were repulsed with loss; and it was not till afternoon, when some of our guns had come up, and the mouth of the gap had been flanked by our infantry crowning the ridge on either hand, that Cleburne was persuaded to continue his retreat; having inflicted on Hooker a loss of 65 killed and 367 wounded. The enemy left 130 killed and wounded on the field. Hooker remained at Ringgold till Dec. 1st; but was not allowed to advance: Sherman, with a large portion of our army, having been dispatched to the relief of Knoxville. Meantime, Gross's brigade visited the battle-field of Chickamauga and buried the moldering remains of many of our slain, who had been left by Bragg to lie as they fell. Osterhaus took post in the valley of the Chattanooga, while Geary and Cruft returned to their camps in Lookout valley.

Granger's corps turned back from the battle-field to Chattanooga,[103] and was impelled directly thence to the relief of Knoxville—Sherman's corps likewise turning back[104] from Greysville, he assuming command also over Granger, and moving rapidly by Charleston, Athens, and Loudon, to Knoxville;[105] making the last 84 miles over East Tennessee roads in three December days; thus compelling Longstreet to raise the siege and decamp; then turning at once and marching back to Chattanooga.

Grant states our losses in this se-

[101] Nov. 26. [102] Nov. 27. [103] Nov. 25–6. [104] Nov. 29. [105] Dec. 6.

ries of struggles (not including Burnside's at Knoxville) at 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing: total, 5,616;[106] and adds:

"We captured 6,142 prisoners, of whom 239 were commissioned officers; 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000 stand of small arms."

Bragg's loss in killed and wounded was comparatively light—his men fighting mainly behind breastworks, in rifle-pits, or on the crests of high ridges, where they suffered little, and getting rapidly out of the way of danger when it came too near them. Probably 3,000[107] would cover his killed and wounded—at least 1,000 of the latter being included in our lists of prisoners. These, however, ultimately exceeded the number reported by Grant; while Bragg's loss by stragglers must have been very considerable. On the whole, his army was doubtless weakened by this struggle and its result by not less than 10,000 men; while its losses in guns, munitions, supplies, and camp equipage, were seldom paralleled.

No further fighting of consequence took place in this vicinity that Winter, and our possession of Chattanooga was not thenceforth seriously disputed.

XIX.

MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS IN 1863.

Missouri, save when fitfully invaded or disturbed by domestic insurrection, remained under the Union flag from and after the expulsion of Price's army by Fremont near the close of 1861.[1] But the Rebel element of her population, though overpowered, was still bitter, and was stirred into fitful activity by frequent emissaries from compatriots serving with Price, Marmaduke, and other chiefs, who, with their Governor, Claiborne F. Jackson, who died in Arkansas,[2] and his Lieutenant, Thomas C. Reynolds, who thenceforth assumed the rôle of Confederate Governor, invincibly hoped, and intrigued, and struggled, for a restoration to the homes they had deserted and the power they by treason had forfeited.

Hardly had the year opened, when a Rebel force, led by Marmaduke, estimated at 4,000 strong, mostly mounted, emerged from northern Arkansas, and, evading our main body, under Gen. Blunt, struck at Springfield, known to be filled with Federal munitions and provisions, lightly guarded. But that important

[106] The returns of the corps commanders add up as follows:

Hooker's	960	Thomas's	3,955
Sherman's	1,989	Total	6,804

And even this makes the loss in Granger's corps (included with Thomas) but 2,391; whereas, Granger makes it about 2,700. It is probable that our entire loss here was at least 7,000.

Among our killed were Cols. Putnam, 93d Ill., O'Meara, 90th Ill., and Torrence, 80th Iowa; among our wounded, Cols. Baum, 56th Ill., Wangeline, 12th Mo., Wiley, 41st Ohio, and Berry, 5th Ky.

[107] *The Telegraph* (London) had a Richmond correspondent's description of these battles, which estimates the Confederate loss in killed and wounded at 2,500, and in prisoners at 5,000.

[1] See Vol. I., pp. 592-3.

[2] At Little Rock, Dec. 6, 1862.

post had by this time been rudely fortified with detached earthworks, which were of decided service against raw, undisciplined troops, as Marmaduke's appear to have been. Springfield was held by Brig.-Gen. E. B. Brown, Missouri militia, whose entire strength can not have exceeded 1,200 men, mainly State militia, with 156 of the 118th Iowa, Lt.-Col. Thos. Cook, rëenforced, on the instant, by some 300 convalescents from the hospitals, known in army jargon as 'the Quinine Brigade,' Col. B. Crabb. With this motley force, Brown fought the Rebels bravely and skillfully from 10 A. M.[3] till dark; when they desisted and drew off, having taken one gun and lost some 200 men. Our loss was 14 killed, 145 wounded, and 5 missing; but among our wounded was Gen. Brown, whose valor had animated his men to fight gallantly, and whose able dispositions had probably saved the post.

The Rebels moved eastward; their advance striking,[4] at daylight, at Wood's fork, the 21st Iowa, Col. Merrill, which, after some fighting, they flanked, moving by a more southerly route, on HARTSVILLE; where Col. Merrill was joined by the 99th Illinois, with portions of the 3d Missouri and 3d Iowa cavalry, supporting Lt. Waldschmidt's battery, and was ready to dispute their progress. A spirited fight ensued, wherein the enemy was repulsed, with a loss of about 300, including Brig.-Gen. Emmett McDonald, Cols. Porter, Thompson, and Hinkley, killed; having 1 gun dismounted and abandoned. Our loss was 78, including 7 killed. Merrill, short of ammunition, fell back, after the fight, on Lebanon; while Marmaduke, moving 13 miles eastward that night, turned abruptly southward and escaped into Arkansas before a sufficient force could be concentrated to intercept him.

Repairing, with a part of his force, to Batesville, Marmaduke was here attacked[5] by the 4th Missouri cavalry, Col. Geo. E. Waring, who drove him over the river, taking Col. Adams prisoner, with others. In a fight the day before, a Rebel band of guerrillas had been routed in Mingo swamp by Maj. Reeder; their leader, Dan. McGee, being killed, with 7 others, and 20 wounded. Lt.-Col. Stewart, with 130 of the 10th Illinois and 1st Arkansas cavalry, scouting from Fayetteville, Ark., surprised and captured,[6] at Van Buren, the Arkansas river steamboat Julia Roon; making 300 prisoners.

Gen. Curtis was relieved[7] as commander of the Department of Missouri; Gen. Schofield being ultimately appointed[8] to succeed him.

The Missouri steamboat Sam Gaty, Capt. McCloy, was stopped[9] at Sibley's landing, near Independence, by a gang of guerrillas, headed by George Todd, who frightened the pilot into running her ashore, robbed boat and passengers of money and valuables, and then proceeded to murder a number of unarmed White passengers, with 20 out of 80 negroes who were known to be on board, and who were the ostensible object of the raid. The other 60 made their escape; but all who were taken were drawn up in line by the side of the boat and shot, one by one, through the head. Barely one of them survived. They were probably escaping

[3] Jan. 8. [4] Jan. 10. [5] Feb. 4. [6] Feb. 28. [7] March 9. [8] May 13. [9] March 28.

from slavery to Missouri Rebels; and this was their masters' mode of punishing that offense.

Fayetteville was our chief outpost on the Arkansas frontier; and here Col. M. L. Harrison, with the 1st Arkansas (Union) infantry and 1st Arkansas cavalry, was charged [10] by Gen. W. L. Cabell, who, with 2,000 mounted men and 2 guns, had rapidly crossed the Boston mountains from Ozark, intending to attack at daylight, but not arriving till after sunrise. After due shelling, a spirited cavalry charge on our right wing was led by Col. Munroe, but repulsed; and by noon the enemy were on their way back to Ozark. Harrison, having very few horses, was unable to pursue. His loss was but 4 killed, 26 wounded, 16 prisoners, and 35 "missing," whom he bluntly reports as "mostly stampeded to Cassville during the engagement." He took 55 prisoners, 50 horses, and 100 shotguns. He says all of his force who did any fighting numbered less than 500.

Marmaduke, after his failure in south-western Missouri and his mishap at Batesville, repaired to Little Rock; where a new campaign was planned, in conjunction with the choice spirits there assembled. South-western Missouri was preponderantly Union; while south-eastern, at least below the Iron mountain, was considered otherwise. It is an unprepossessing, swampy, thinly peopled region, and had been scouted over by each party in turn, and not firmly held by either. Leaving Little Rock about the middle of April, with Price's '1st corps of the trans-Mississippi department,' reported (doubtless, with exaggeration) as 10,000 strong, he moved north-eastward into Missouri;[11] marching up the St. Francis to Frederickton,[12] thence striking south-eastward at Cape Girardeau, a large dépôt of Union army stores, on the Mississippi, whither Gen. John McNeil had repaired from Bloomfield, with 1,200 men and 6 guns; reaching it, by hard marching, two days before Marmaduke's arrival.[13] McNeil found here 500 men, mainly of the 1st Nebraska, Lt.-Col. Baumer, with 4 more guns, behind four very rude and simple earthworks. As a measure of prudence, he sent away most of the stores on steamboats, and was then ready for the fight with which Marmaduke, with four brigades, soon accommodated him: the place being first formally summoned "by order of Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price" (who was not within 100 miles)—30 minutes being allowed for an answer; but only one was taken. The enemy next shelled a while; when another summons was sent; but McNeil refused to stop firing or to make any answer. And now gunboats were seen coming up with rëenforcements to the besieged, and Marmaduke drew off,[14] having lost considerably, and commenced his retreat toward Arkansas; which he was enabled, by burning bridges, to prosecute with little loss—McNeil having been ranked by Gen. Vandever, who arrived with the rëenforcements, and whose ideas of pursuit were of the slow-and-easy pattern. Two or three ineffective skirmishes occurred between our advance and the Rebel rear: McNeil, in the last, having his horse shot: but Marmaduke got over the St. Francis unharmed, and was

[10] April 18. [11] April 20. [12] April 22. [13] April 25. [14] April 26.

thenceforth safe; retreating into Arkansas with as many prisoners as we had taken from him; but his losses in killed and wounded were far the heavier.

The next blow in this department was struck[15] by the Rebels, perhaps 3,000 strong, under Col. Coffey, at Fort Blunt,[16] in the Cherokee Nation, which was held by Col. Wm. A. Phillips, with some 800 mounted men and a regiment of Creek Indians. Phillips's Indian scouts proved untrustworthy, letting the enemy approach him unannounced; still, he had works which they did not care to attack, but, crossing the Arkansas, pounced upon his cattle, that were grazing on his left, and took the whole; only a part being recovered by a charge of his mounted men. "The Creek regiment refused to charge, or they would all have been saved," the Colonel dolefully reports.

The enemy posted themselves in a strong position five miles from his fort; and there Col. Phillips attacked them with spirit—he driving them (or they escaping with their booty) over the Arkansas, with a loss of 50 or 60 on each side. Phillips seems to have conducted his part of the affair with judgment and energy.

A train of 300 wagons, conveying supplies from Kansas to Fort Blunt, and guarded by ten companies of Western cavalry, with the 1st Kansas colored, 800 strong, Col. J. M. Williams, and 500 Indians, Maj. Forman, had a fight[17] at the crossing of Cabin creek, Indian Territory, with a force of Texans and Indians under Standwatie, the Cherokee Rebel chief. The Texans fought well; but they were only 700; while the Rebel Indians proved of no account. Standwatie was driven off, with a total loss of 23 on our side, including Maj. Forman, wounded. The Rebels left 40 dead on the field and 9 prisoners.

Gen. Blunt, learning that Fort Blunt, his advanced post, was in peril, rode thither from Fort Scott—175 miles—in five days, arriving just in time.[18] Learning that the Rebel Gen. Cooper was at Honey Springs, on Elk creek, 25 miles south, waiting, with 6,000 men, for a rēenforcement of three regiments from Texas, which he expected on the 17th, and purposed then to advance and fight, Blunt could not perceive the wisdom of waiting, but resolved to bring the matter to issue forthwith. So, setting out at midnight,[19] with 250 cavalry and 4 guns, and, moving 13 miles up the Arkansas, he crossed and came down the other side, driving back the Rebel outpost and beginning forthwith to cross in boats his entire force—3,000 men, with 12 light guns. Advancing five miles, he came upon the enemy, posted behind Elk creek: their numbers and position concealed by a growth of bushes. At 10 A. M.,[20] Blunt advanced in two columns, under Cols. Judson and Phillips; deploying rapidly to right and left when within 400 yards of the enemy's line, with cavalry dismounted on either flank, armed with carbines and fighting as infantry. In two hours, the Rebels were driven, and, in two or three more, hunted through two or three miles of timber to the open prairie, when they fled in disorder, leaving behind them 150 dead and 77 prisoners, with one dismounted gun and 200 small arms. Blunt estimates

[15] May 20. [16] Near Fort Gibson, Creek Nation. [17] July 1. [18] July 10. [19] July 15–16. [20] July 17.

their wounded at 400. Our loss was 17 killed and 60 wounded.

Hardly had Cooper fled, when Cabell, at 4 P. M., arrived with the expected Texans, estimated by Blunt at 3,000; but they did not see fit to attack; while our men were exhausted with marching and fighting, and were running short of ammunition. So Blunt halted and waited till next morning; when he ascertained that the enemy had decamped during the night, retreating across the Canadian.

But, though beaten at the front, the Rebels soon began to exhibit a fresh vitality by means of guerrilla raids in the rear of our forces. The 6th Missouri cavalry, Col. Catherwood, holding PINEVILLE, in the south-west corner of Missouri, was next attacked[21] by Coffey, raiding up from Arkansas; who was beaten off, with the loss of his wagons, munitions, and cattle, with some 200 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The next raid was more savage and more successful. It was made by a bandit termed Quantrell — though that was not his real name—who, collecting a force of 300 Rebel guerrillas on the Blackwater, in western Missouri, 50 miles from the State line, far within the Union lines, and while no Rebel flag openly floated within 100 miles, rode stealthily across the border and at early dawn[22] into the young city of Lawrence, Kansas, where no preparation for defense existed, for no danger of attack was ever dreamed of. The people were surprised in their beds, the roads picketed, and every one who emerged from a house with a weapon was shot down, of course. But very few thought of resistance, which was manifestly idle. The Eldridge House, the chief hotel, contained no arms of any kind, and was formally surrendered by Capt. Banks, who, frankly avowing himself a Union officer, insisted on seeing Quantrell, who assured him that none who surrendered should receive personal harm. The banks, stores, and safes, were all broken open and robbed, as were the private dwellings. All the horses were taken, of course; otherwise the booty could not have been carried off. Every negro and every German who were caught were killed at once. The Court-house and many of the best dwellings were fired and burnt. Eighteen unarmed recruits were found at the rendezvous near the city, and killed; as were quite a number of private citizens; several of them after they had surrendered and given up their money under a promise that they should be spared; but those taken in the Eldridge House were protected by Quantrell and saved. Few, if any, who were shot, survived. U. S. Senator J. H. Lane escaped; as did Col. Deitzler and some others; Gen. Collamore, who hid in a well, was suffocated, as were two men who successively went down to help him out. At 10 A. M., the work of devastation and murder was complete—140 men having been butchered and 185 buildings burned, including most of the stores and one-fourth of the dwellings—and the bandits left, being fired at by some soldiers across the Kansas, as they fled, and three of them killed.

A series of fatalities had prevented the receipt of any warning of this

[21] Aug. 13.

[22] Aug. 21.

raid. One man was riding in advance of the raiders, to warn Lawrence, when his horse fell under him and was killed; while the rider was so injured that he died next day. The banditti had been seen, the night before, passing five miles south of Aubrey, near the State line, where Capt. Pike, with two cavalry companies, was stationed; but Pike, instead of pursuing them, sent word to Capt. Coleman, at Little Santa Fé; who, with 100 more horsemen, marched to Aubrey, and, with Pike, commenced a pursuit; but the trail was now cold; and the pursuers were six miles from Lawrence, on horses thoroughly blown, when the bandits, with fresh (stolen) horses, were leaving the scene of their murders. They were overtaken near Palmyra by Senator Lane and a weak party from Lawrence; but these could not attack, and were unable to keep them in sight; and, in short, Quantrell, dodging many times his force, who were after him, rested a while that night 5 miles north-east of Paoli, and escaped next day into the timber of the middle fork of Grand river, Missouri; where his band scattered, seeking and finding concealment with congenial spirits throughout the surrounding region. Perhaps 100 of them were overtaken and killed in the pursuit; but the greater number escaped, and were soon indistinguishable.

Col. Woodson, with 600 Missourians, starting[23] from Pilot Knob, Mo., dashed into Pocahontas,[24] Ark., where he captured Gen. M. Jeff. Thompson and some 50 others; returning unmolested.

The surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, with the retreat of Jo. Johnston from Jackson, having left Gen. Grant's army at leisure, Maj.-Gen. F. Steele was sent to Helena,[25] to fit out and lead an expedition for the capture of Little Rock. The force assigned him for this task numbered 6,000 men of all arms, including 500 cavalry, with 22 guns; but Gen. Davidson, with nearly 6,000 more men, mainly mounted, and 18 guns, soon joined him from Missouri; swelling his aggregate to 12,000 men and 40 guns. Steele soon moved out,[26] Davidson's cavalry in advance; crossing White river[27] at Clarendon, and sending forward[28] Davidson to reconnoiter the enemy's position at Brownsville, while he shipped his extra supplies and his sick—by this time numbering 1,000—down to Duvall's bluff, which was accounted the healthiest spot in that unhealthy region.

Davidson advanced, skirmishing, to Brownsville,[29] which Marmaduke evacuated; retreating to his intrenchments at Bayou Metea; whence he was, after some fighting, dislodged[30] and driven over the bayou; burning the bridge behind him, and so checking pursuit.

Gen. True's brigade, from Memphis, reaching Clarendon on the 29th, was ferried over the White next day, and a general advance resumed; Steele concentrating at Brownsville, and, after attempting to pass Bayou Metea on the north and being baffled by miry swamps, decided to move by the left to the Arkansas, which he struck[31] near Ashley's mills; where Davidson's cavalry, reconnoitering in the advance, had another sharp skirmish with the enemy; Steele,

[23] Aug. 21. [24] Aug. 24. [25] July 31. [26] Aug. 10. [27] Aug. 17. [28] Aug. 22. [29] Aug. 25. [30] Aug. 27. [31] Sept. 7.

finding himself embarrassed with 700 more sick; whom, along with his train, he was obliged to leave True's brigade and Ritter's cavalry to guard, while he pushed up the Arkansas and fought his way into Little Rock; Davidson, supported by two divisions and two batteries, crossing directly, and approaching that city on the south side of the river.

Davidson, having completed his reconnoissances and fixed on his point of crossing, threw over his pontoons during the night,[32] and was all over by 11 A. M.; the fire of his batteries having speedily silenced the enemy's opposition. Advancing directly on Little Rock, he was more stubbornly resisted at Bayou Fourche, five miles out, by Marmaduke's cavalry and Tappan's brigade of infantry, supporting two batteries, strongly posted; but Steele, advancing simultaneously on the north bank of the river, his batteries fired across at the enemy obstructing Davidson; which enabled the latter slowly to gain ground, until at length, ordering a charge by Ritter's brigade and Strange's howitzers, supported by part of the 1st Iowa cavalry, his men went into the city, saber in hand, on the heels of the flying enemy; and, at 7 P. M., the capital of Arkansas was formally surrendered by its civil authorities: the United States arsenal being uninjured, and whatever Rebel stores were there falling into our hands; but six steamboats were completely burned by Price, who had been in chief command here, with several railroad cars; while their three pontoon-bridges and two locomotives, though also fired by them, were partially saved.

Steele, moving parallel with Davidson, was opposite the city, when it was evacuated and given up, and entered it late that evening: the enemy making for Arkadelphia too rapidly to be overtaken by our jaded horses, to say nothing of our men.

Steele says his entire loss to or by the enemy during this campaign did not exceed 100; yet he had but 7,000 of his 12,000 when he started that morning to enter Little Rock. True, he had left many guarding hospitals and trains; but he had been reënforced by two brigades: so that his losses by disease must have been fearful. He had taken 1,000 prisoners.

Ere this, Gen. Blunt, pursuing the motley Rebel horde under Standwatie and Cabell, had very nearly brought them to a stand at Perryville,[33] Choctaw Nation; but they were too nimble to receive much damage, and he chased them by Fort Smith, whereof he took[34] bloodless possession. Col. J. M. Johnson, 1st [Union] Arkansas, was made post commander. Cabell, it was said, fell back to participate in the defense of Little Rock; but he failed to arrive in season; joining Price's fugitive force somewhere on its retreat to the Washita. Price ultimately fell back to Red river.

Gen. Blunt, having been on business to Kansas, was returning with a small cavalry escort to Fort Smith, when he was struck,[35] near Baxter's springs, Cherokee Nation, by Quantrell, with 600 guerrillas, and most of his small escort killed or disabled: among the 80 killed—nearly all after they had been captured—were Maj. H. Z. Curtis, son of Maj.-Gen. S. R.

[32] Sept. 9–10. [33] Aug. 26. [34] Sept. 1. [35] Oct. 4.

Curtis, and several civilians. Gen. Blunt, rallying some 15 of his guard, escaped capture and death by great coolness and courage: their persistency in boldly fighting creating a belief that they were the van of a heavy force. A considerable train that accompanied them was sacked and burned. The attack was made very near the little post known as Fort Blair, which was next assailed; but its defenders, though few, were brave and well led by Lt. Pond, 3d Wisconsin cavalry, who beat the enemy off, inflicting a loss of 11 killed and many more wounded. Gen. Blunt and his remnant of escort kept the prairie till night, then made their way to the post. They had not ventured thither before, apprehending that it had been taken.

PINE BLUFF, on the south bank of the Arkansas, 50 miles below Little Rock, was occupied, early in October, by Col. Powell Clayton, 5th Kansas cavalry, with 350 men and 4 guns. Marmaduke, at Princeton, 45 miles south, resolved to retake it. By the time he advanced to do so,[36] Clayton had been rëenforced by the 1st Indiana cavalry: so that he had now 600 men and 9 light guns.

Marmaduke, with 12 guns and a force estimated at 2,500, advanced in three columns, and poured in shell and canister for five hours, setting fire to the place; but Powell had organized 200 negroes to barricade the streets with cotton-bales, by whose services the fire was stopped without subtracting from his slender fighting force. The Rebel shells burned the court-house and several dwellings, battering most of the residue; but they could not take the town; and, at 2 P. M., drew off, having lost 150 killed and wounded, beside 33 prisoners. Our loss was but 17 killed and 40 wounded—5 of the former and 12 of the latter among the negro volunteers.

Part of Cabell's command, which (as we have seen) had been worsted, in the Indian Territory, by Blunt and Phillips, undertook, under Shelby, a Fall raid into Missouri—probably in quest of subsistence. Emerging from the Choctaw region of the Indian Territory, the raiders passed rapidly through the north-west corner of Arkansas, crossing the river eastward of Fort Smith, and evading any collision with our forces near that post as well as with those holding Little Rock, and entering south-western Missouri; being joined[37] at Crooked Prairie by a similar force under Coffey, whereby their number was said to be swelled to 2,500. These advanced rapidly through Western Missouri to the river at Booneville, but forthwith commenced a retreat—disappointed, probably, in their hopes of rëenforcement from the now passive Rebels of that disloyal section. They were pursued by a hastily gathered body of Missouri militia, under Gen. E. B. Brown, who struck[38] them near Arrow Rock at nightfall; fighting them till dark; renewing the attack at 8 next morning, and putting them to flight, with a loss of some 300 killed, wounded, and prisoners.[39]

[36] Oct. 25. [37] Oct. 1. [38] Oct. 12.

[39] "ST. LOUIS, MO., Oct. 14, 1863.
"Maj.-Gen. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
"Gen. Brown brought the Rebels under Shelby to a decisive engagement yesterday. The fight was obstinate and lasted five hours. The Rebels were finally completely routed and scattered in all directions, with loss of all their artillery and baggage and a large number of small arms and prisoners. The enemy's loss in killed

Gen. McNeil was at St. Louis when first apprised[40] of this raid, and at once set out for his post, Lebanon: whence, gathering up what force he could, he advanced on Bolivar, moving by Humansville and Stockton on Lamar, where he hoped to intercept their flight. But Shelby had already passed through Humansville, hotly pursued, losing there his last gun, when McNeil reached that point; so the latter joined the hunt through Greenfield and Sarcoxie into Arkansas, and on through Huntsville over Buffalo mountain, taking prisoners by the way; continuing the chase to Clarksville unable to come fairly up with the nimble fugitives, who had now crossed the Arkansas and vanished among the wilds beyond. McNeil here gave over the pursuit, moving deliberately up the river to Fort Smith. During this chase, he had been designated[41] to command of the Army of the Frontier, vice Gen. Blunt, relieved.

Standwatie and Quantrell made another attack[42] on Col. Phillips's outposts near Fort Gibson, Indian Territory; but, after a fight of four or five hours, the assailants were routed and driven across the Arkansas. This terminated the fighting in this quarter for the year 1863.

A general Indian war on our Western frontier had been gravely apprehended in 1862; and that apprehension was partially realized. Under the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, the Indian agents and other Government employés among the aboriginal tribes of the great plains were of course Democrats; many of them Southrons, and all intensely pro-Slavery. These were generally superseded, under Mr. Lincoln, in the course of 1861; and were suspected of having been stimulated, by wrath at finding themselves displaced and by political and sectional sympathies, to use their necessarily great influence among the several tribes to attach them to the fortunes and involve them in the struggles of the Confederacy. Of some of them, this is probably true; but it is not known to be proved, save with those formerly accredited to the tribes residing within the boundaries of the Indian Territory. But, however caused, the general feeling of the western Indians toward us became more and more hostile during 1861-2; until at length certain bands of the Sioux of Minnesota, with some other tribes, plunged into open war. Little Crow's band bore a conspicuous part in these butcheries; striking in rapid succession the north-western frontier settlements at Yellow Medicine,[43] New Ulm,[44] Cedar City,[45] Minn., and a few other feeble outposts; besieging for nine days Fort Ridgeley;[46] beleaguering and twice assaulting Fort Abercrombie, whence they were driven with heavy loss; and butchering in all some 500 persons, mainly defenseless women and children. Militia were promptly called out and sent against them, under Gen. H. H. Sibley; and the main savage band was finally struck[47] at Wood lake; where Little Crow was utterly routed, fleeing thence into Dakota. Some 500 of the savages were captured; of whom 498 were tried by court-martial, and about 300 convicted and

and wounded is very great. Ours is also large. Our troops are still pursuing the flying Rebels.
"J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General."

[40] Oct. 9. [41] Oct. 20. [42] Dec. 18. [43] Aug. 18, '62. [44] Aug. 21. [45] Sept. 3. [46] Oct. 17-26. [47] Sept. 22.

sentenced to be hanged; but President Lincoln deferred their execution, and most of them were ultimately set at liberty.

Next summer—Gen. Pope being in command of this department—the irregular frontier line of settlements in the north-west was picketed by about 2,000 men; while Gen. Sibley moved westward from Fort Snelling in June, with some 2,500 infantry; Gen. Sully, with a body of cavalry being sent up the Missouri on boats to cöoperate. The two commands did not unite; but Sibley found and fought[48] some of the hostile savages at Missouri Couteau, Big mound, Dead Buffalo lake, and Stony lake; killing or wounding some 130 of them; while Sully encountered[49] a band at Whitestone hill, routing them with heavy loss, and taking 156 prisoners. The remnant fled across the Missouri and evaded pursuit. This was the virtual close of the Sioux war. Our men on these expeditions suffered terribly for water—a great drouth then prevailing on the plains.

Far West, Brig.-Gen. P. E. Connor, 1st California volunteers, commanding in Utah, on hearing[50] of Indian depredations by the Shoshonees on Bear river, western Idaho, marched thither (140 miles) through deep Winter snows, wherein 75 of his men were disabled by frozen feet, and, with the residue, attacked[51] 300 savages in their stronghold, killing 224; his own loss being 12 killed and 49 wounded. Four months later, Gen. Connor, with most of his force, traversed the region westward of the Rocky mountains so far north as old Fort Hall on Snake river, but found no enemy to combat.

These Indian hostilities, though inglorious and most unprofitable, subtracted considerably from our military strength, and added largely to our exhausting outlays during the trying year 1863.

XX.

THE CAROLINAS, GEORGIA, FLORIDA—1862-'63.

The Savannah river having, with its largest affluent, the Tugaloo, formed the boundary between South Carolina and Georgia from their northern verge, after a generally south-east course of some 300 miles, passing, at the head of ship navigation, near its mouth, its namesake city, which is the commercial emporium of Georgia, winds its sluggish way to the Atlantic through a cluster of mud-formed, often sand-fringed sea islands, matted over with a thin crust of grass-roots, covering a jelly-like mud several feet deep, resting uneasily on a bed of light, semi-liquid clay. Fort Pulaski, on Cockspur island (a mile long by half as wide), was a carefully constructed brick National fortress 25 feet above ground by 7½ thick, completely commanding not only the main channel of the

[48] July 25–29, 1863. [49] Sept. 3. [50] January, 1863. [51] Jan. 29.

Savannah, but all other inlets practicable for sea-going vessels to the city and the firm land above. Having early fallen an easy prey to the devotees of Secession, it was held by a garrison of 385 men, Col. C. H. Olmstead, 1st Georgia; its 40 heavy guns barring access to the river by our vessels, and affording shelter and protection to blockade-runners and Rebel corsairs.

Very soon after our recovery[1] of Port Royal and the adjacent sea-islands, Gen. T. W. Sherman directed[2] Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore to reconnoiter this ugly impediment, and report on the feasibility of overcoming it. Gillmore obeyed; and reported[3] that the fort might be reduced by batteries of mortars and rifled guns planted on Big Tybee island, south-east of it, across the narrower southern channel of the Savannah, as also from Venus point, on Jones island, over two miles from Cockspur, in the opposite direction: and submitted his plan; which was sent to Washington, returned approved, and the requisite ordnance and other enginery ultimately forwarded or collected. Meantime, the 46th New York, Col. R. Rosa, was sent[4] to occupy Big Tybee, and a detachment directed quietly to clear out the Rebel obstructions in "Wall's cut," an artificial channel connecting New and Wright rivers, north of Cockspur, and completing an inland water passage from Savannah to Charleston. After some sharp fighting and four nights' hard work, this was achieved;[5] and, after some farther delay, Venus point, on Jones island, north-west of the coveted fortress, was selected[6] as a point whereon to place a battery, barring all daylight access to the beleaguered fort from above. To this point, mortars, weighing 8½ tuns each, were brought through New and Wright rivers (each of them a sluggish tide-course between rush-covered islets of semi-liquid mud); being patiently tugged across Jones island on a movable causeway of planks laid on poles—those behind the moving gun being taken up and placed in its front;[7] and thus the guns were toilsomely dragged across and placed in battery on strong timber platforms, constructed by night behind an artfully contrived screen of bushes and reeds to receive them. Just as the batteries were completed, the Rebel steamboat Ida passed down from Savannah to Pulaski, and the recoil of our guns fired at her sent all but one of them off the platforms; which had thereupon to be enlarged and improved. Soon, another battery was established on Bird island, a little nearer Cockspur: and next, vessels having arrived[8] in Tybee roads with heavy guns and munitions, the 7th Conn., 46th New York, and some detached companies, were employed in landing these on Big Tybee, constructing batteries and magazines, making roads of poles and plank, &c., &c. Nearly all this work had to be done by night, within range of Pulaski's guns—the outline presented to the enemy by the low bushes skirting the river being skillfully and gradually altered, night after night, so as to afford to the garrison no indication of the menacing work going on behind its friendly shelter.

The moving of each gun over the quaking, treacherous bog, from its

[1] See Vol. I., p. 605. [2] Nov. 29, '61. [3] Dec. 1. [4] In Dec. [5] Jan. 14, '62. [6] Jan. 28. [7] Feb. 10–11. [8] Feb. 21.



BOMBARDMENT OF FORT PULASKI.

point of debarkation to its designated position in battery, was the tedious, arduous task of 250 men, all performed under the cover of darkness: the men being forbidden to speak; their movements being directed by a whistle. When a gun slipped, as it often would, off the planks and 'skids' supporting it, the utmost efforts were required to keep it from plunging straight down through the 12 feet of mud to the supporting clay, if no farther.

Thus were the remnant of February and the whole of March intently employed — Maj.-Gen. Hunter, who had just succeeded[9] to the command of the department, with Brig.-Gen. Benham as district commander, visiting the works on Tybee island, and finding nothing in them to improve.

At length, all was in readiness:[10] 36 10 to 13-inch mortars and heavy rifled guns being firmly planted in 11 batteries—the farthest two miles, the nearest less than a mile, from the doomed fort, with a dépôt and separate service magazine where they should be, and carefully considered orders given to regulate the firing. And now the fort was summoned[11] in due form by Gen. Hunter—of course, to no purpose—whereupon, at 8¼ A. M., fire was deliberately opened, and kept up till dark—the mortars throwing very few of their shells within the fort; but the rifled guns chipping and tearing away its masonwork, until it became evident that, unless our batteries should be disabled, the fort would soon be a ruin. Five of the enemy's guns had already been silenced; while our widely scattered, low-lying, inconspicuous batteries had received no damage whatever.

During the ensuing night, four of our pieces were fired at intervals of 15 or 20 minutes each; and at sunrise[12] our batteries opened afresh; and now the breach, already visible, was steadily and rapidly enlarged: casemate after casemate being opened, in spite of a heavy and well-directed fire from the fort; until, at 2 P. M., a white flag was displayed from its walls, and the siege was ended. One only of our men had been killed, and no gun hit or otherwise

[9] March 31. [10] April 9. [11] April 10. [12] April 11.

damaged; the garrison had 10 of their 40 guns dismounted or otherwise disabled, and several men wounded—one of them fatally. They were especially impelled to surrender by the fact that our guns were purposely trained on their magazine, which must soon have been pierced and exploded had our fire continued.

The credit of this almost bloodless conquest is primarily due to Quincy A. Gillmore, who was at once General and Engineer; Gen. Viele, commanding under him the land forces, and Com'r John Rodgers their naval auxiliaries, who were employed only in transporting and landing the *materiel*. But the moral of this siege was the enormous addition made by rifling to the range and efficiency of guns. Our artillerists were as green as might be; and their gunnery—as evinced more especially by the mortar-firing—was nowise remarkable for excellence; but the penetration of a solid brick wall of seven feet thick at a distance of 1,650 yards by old 32s (now rifled) to a depth of 20 inches, and by old 42s to a depth of 26 inches, where the same guns, when smooth-bore, would have produced no effect whatever, was so unlooked-for by Gen. Gillmore that he afterward reported that, had he been aware at the outset of what this siege taught him, he might have curtailed his eight weeks of laborious preparation to one; rejecting altogether his heavy mortars and columbiads as unsuited to such service, and increasing, if that were desirable, the distance at which his nearer batteries were planted to 2,300 or even 2,500 yards.

A considerable flotilla of worthless old vessels, picked up at various northern ports and taken down to our fleet blockading the entrance to Charleston harbor, being loaded with stone, were sunk [13] across one of the channels. A tremendous uproar was raised against this procedure, mainly by British sympathizers with the Rebellion, who represented it as an effort permanently to choke and destroy the harbor. This accusation is absurd. What was intended was to render it more difficult for blockade-runners, navigated by Charleston pilots, to run out and in under the screen of fog or darkness; and this result was probably attained. No complaint has since been made of any actual injury thus inflicted on the peaceful commerce of Charleston: on the contrary, it has been plausibly asserted that the partial closing of one of the passes, through which the waters of Ashley and Cooper rivers find their way to the ocean, was calculated to deepen and improve those remaining.

Com. Dupont, in his steam frigate Wabash, with twenty other armed vessels, and six unarmed transports, conveying a brigade of volunteers, Gen. Wright, and a battalion of marines, Maj. Reynolds, setting out from Port Royal [14] swept down the coast to St. Andrew's and Cumberland sounds; taking unresisted possession of Fort Clinch on Amelia island, Fernandina, St. Mary's, Brunswick,[15] Darien,[16] St. Simon's island, Jacksonville,[17] and St. Augustine; where Fort St. Mark—another of the old Federal coast defenses—was "repossessed" without bloodshed—Gen. Trapier, Rebel commander on this coast, having no force adequate to

[13] Jan. 23, 1862. [14] Feb. 28. [15] March 9. [16] March 13. [17] March 12.

resisting such an expedition—Florida having ere this contributed nearly 10,000 men, out of a total white population of 80,000, to the Confederate armies fighting in other States.

A considerable Union feeling was evinced at various points; a Union meeting held in Jacksonville (the most populous town in the State), and a Convention called to assemble there on the 10th of April to organize a Union State Government; but, on the 8th, Gen. Wright withdrew his forces from that place, sending an invitation to Gen. Trapier to come and rëoccupy it. Of course, the projected Union Convention was no more; and those who had figured in the meeting or call whereby the movement was initiated were glad to save their necks by accompanying our departing forces. That settled, for years, the fortunes of Unionism in Florida. And, though Com. Dupont, on returning with his fleet to Port Royal, left a small force at each of the more defensible places he had so easily recovered to the Union, it is questionable that his expedition effected, on the whole, more good than harm for the national cause.

At Mosquito inlet, the farthest point visited by a detail from his squadron, a boat expedition, under Lt. T. A. Budd, of the Penguin, was fired on while returning from an excursion down Mosquito lagoon, Lt. Budd and 4 others killed, and several more wounded or captured. Thus closed unhappily an enterprise which was probably adequate to the complete recovery of Florida, though not able to hold it against the whole power of the Confederacy.

Pensacola was evacuated by Brig.-Gen. Thos. N. Jones, its Rebel commander; who burned every thing combustible in the Navy Yard, Forts McRae and Barrancas, the hospital, &c., &c., and retreated [18] inland with his command. The place was immediately occupied by Com. Porter, of the Harriet Lane, and by Gen. Arnold, commanding Fort Pickens.

Another naval expedition from Port Royal,[19] under Capt. Steedman, consisting of the gunboats Paul Jones and Cimarone, with three other steamboats, visited the Florida coast in the Autumn, shelling and silencing the Rebel batteries at the mouth of the St. John's.

Gen. Brannan, with a land force of 1,575 men, with a fleet of six gunboats under Capt. Steedman, repeated this visit somewhat later;[20] expecting to encounter an obstinate resistance: but the Rebel works on St. John's bluff were evacuated—9 guns being abandoned—on his advancing to attack them; and he rëtook Jacksonville without resistance, but found it nearly deserted, and did not garrison it. The Rebel steamboat Gov. Milton was found up a creek and captured.

Gen. R. Saxton next dispatched,[21] on three transports, an expedition, composed of two negro regiments under Col. Thos. W. Higginson, 1st S. C. Volunteers, which went up [22] to Jacksonville, captured it with little resistance, and held it as a recruiting station for colored volunteers. Two White regiments were soon afterward sent to rëenforce them; but hardly had these landed when a peremptory order came from Gen. Hunter for the withdrawal of

[18] May 9–10. [19] Sept. 13. [20] Sept. 30. [21] March 6, 1863. [22] March 10.

the entire force; and, as if this were not enough, several buildings were fired by our departing soldiers—of the 8th Maine, it was said, though that regiment laid it to the 6th Connecticut—while hundreds of inhabitants, who desired to leave with our forces, were put ashore after they had embarked, and left to meet the vengeance of the Rebels as they might. The beautiful old town was substantially destroyed; though our higher officers did their best to save it—a high wind fanning the flames, which swept all within their reach. The deserted inhabitants—many of them hearty Unionists—were left to famish among their ashes and ruins; though the few families who were brought away to Hilton Head were treated with considerate humanity. Pensacola was likewise abandoned [23] and burned—burned by the Rebels, it was asserted—but that would neither be reported nor believed within the lines of the Confederates—so that it may be fairly concluded that by this time whatever Unionism there had been in Florida—that is, among the Whites—was pretty thoroughly eradicated by those who were sent thither as upholders of the National cause.

On returning from his Florida expedition to Port Royal,[24] Com. Dupont found that the enemy had, during his absence, abandoned their formidable batteries on Skiddaway and Green islands, conceding to us full possession of Warsaw and Ossibaw sounds; while Gen. Sherman had long since [25] taken quiet possession of Edisto island on our right, carrying our flag more than half way from Beaufort to Charleston. No inhabitants were left on Edisto but negroes; and the cotton which the departing Whites could not remove they had, for the most part, burned. The fall of Pulaski, soon afterward, gave us extension and security on the other flank; and now Gen. Hunter and Com. Dupont proposed to extend our possession still farther toward the city by the reclamation of Wadmilaw and Johns islands, bringing us within cannon-shot of Charleston. To this end, various and careful reconnoissances were made, and soundings taken; ending with marking by buoys the channel of Stono river, separating Johns from James island; whereupon, our gunboats Unadilla, Pembina, and Ottawa, crossed [26] the bar at its mouth and proceeded up that river: the Rebel earthworks along its banks being abandoned at their approach. Thus the gunboats made their way slowly, carefully, up to a point within range of the Rebel batteries guarding the junction of Stono with Wappoo creek, barely three miles from Charleston, whose spires and cupolas were plainly visible, over the intervening trees, from the mast-heads of our vessels.

But this bold advance of our gunboats, unsupported by infantry, was a blunder. These were too weak to effect any thing but give the enemy warning of what they must be prepared to meet. Nearly two weeks had thus been spent ere Gens. Hunter and Benham, with their soldiers, landed [27] on James island; and three more days elapsed ere Gen. Wright came up from Edisto with the residue of their forces. Such dis-

[23] March 3, 1862. [24] March 27. [25] Feb. 11. [26] May 20. [27] June 2.



GEN. HUNTER'S ATTACK ON SECESSIONVILLE.

jointed combinations in an intensely hostile region could have but one result; since the enemy were probably twice as strong, both in defenses and in men, as they would have been found had our advance been made with compact celerity.

Secessionville is a petty village formed of the Summer residences of a few James island planters, on the east side of their island, two miles from the Stono, with salt water on three sides, and swamps narrowing to a mere ridge the only practicable land approach from the west. Pemberton was in chief command at Charleston, Brig.-Gen. N. G. Evans having direction under him in this quarter; but Col. J. G. Lamar was in immediate charge of the works; against which Gen. H. G. Wright advanced at early dawn,[28] with a force of perhaps 6,000 men, though some 1,500 more were on the island,

[28] June 16.

guarding camps, &c. The direct attack was made by Brig.-Gen. Isaac I. Stevens,[39] with Col. W. M. Fenton's brigade, composed of the 8th Michigan, 17th Conn., and 28th Mass., and Col. Leisure's, comprising the 79th New York (Highlanders), 46th do., and 100th Pa., with 4 detached companies of artillery, &c.—in all, 3,337 men. Stevens had these in position at 3½ A. M. at our outer picket line, within rifle-range of the enemy, and advanced at 4—the morning being cloudy and dark—so swiftly and noiselessly that he captured most of the Rebel pickets, and was within 100 yards of the main defenses, not having fired a shot, when Lamar opened on him with grape and canister, plowing bloody lanes through the storming party, and destroying its compactness if not impairing the momentum of its charge.

The 8th Michigan—Col. Fenton's own—was in the direct advance, immediately supported by the Highlanders, with the residue of both brigades ready and eager to do and dare all that men might; and, if well directed valor could have carried the enemy's works by direct assault, they would have done it. But the neck of dry land over which it was possible to advance was barely 200 yards wide, completely swept by grape and canister at close range from six guns in the Rebel works, as well as by their musketry; while insuperable abatis, a ditch seven feet deep, and a parapet nine feet high, rendered such an assault a simple squandering of precious lives. The 8th Michigan lost here 185 out of 534 men, including 12 out of 22 officers; the Highlanders lost 110 out of 450; and our total loss was at least 574, whereof Stevens's two brigades lost 529—nearly all within half an hour. The Rebel loss was 204; Lamar and Lt.-Col. Gaillard being among the wounded.

Though it was plain that the enemy's works could not be carried by storm, a second but feebler assault was made on them after the failure of the first, aided by a flank advance on the enemy's right by a battalion of the 3d R. I. artillery, Maj. E. Metcalf, with the 3d N. H. and 97th Pa.; but nothing was accomplished; and our entire force fell back, unpursued, but leaving their dead and some of their severely wounded to fall into the hands of the enemy. And this virtually terminated in defeat Gen. Hunter's ill-managed advance upon Charleston.

Four months afterward—Gen. Hunter having been succeeded in command of this department by Gen. O. M. Mitchel—the latter planned an advance, not aimed at Charleston, but due northward from Beaufort, with intent to break the railroad connection between Charleston and Savannah, by destroying bridges, &c., about Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie. Gen. Mitchel being prostrated by the disease of which he ultimately died, the execution of this project was confided to Brig.-Gen. J. M. Brannan, with an effective force of 4,448 men.

This force, embarked on gunboats and transports, moved[40] up Broad river to the junction of the Coosawhatchie and Tullifinny, where it was landed and pushed inland; first meeting resistance when 5 or 6 miles on

[39] Killed, a few weeks later, at Chantilly.

[40] Oct. 21–2.

its way; but easily driving the enemy, who burned bridges, &c., before it, and soon made another stand in a wood behind a burned bridge, whence they were expelled by flanking, and still pursued nearly to Pocotaligo; where the Rebels, under Gen. Walker, opened heavily with artillery from a swamp behind a creek. Our caissons being far behind, our guns were soon without a cartridge, and none to be had nearer than ten miles. Night was coming on; and Brannan —aware that his 4,000 men were no match for all that the railroad would bring speedily from Charleston and from Savannah to assail them—wisely took the back track to Mackay's landing; where he at once embarked[21] and returned to Hilton Head.

Meantime, Col. Barton, with 400 men, the gunboats Patroon and Marblehead, and the little steamboat Planter, had gone up the Coosawhatchie nearly to the village of that name—the gunboats getting aground two or three miles below, and the Planter about a mile below. Having debarked his men, Barton pushed on, and encountered a train filled with rëenforcements sent to the enemy from Savannah, under Maj. Harrison, 11th Georgia—Gen. W. S. Walker, commanding in Brannan's front, having telegraphed both ways for all the men that could be spared him. This train was fired on while in motion, and considerable loss inflicted; Maj. Harrison being among the killed. The greater number escaped to the woods and joined the defenders of the village and railroad bridge, against whom Barton now advanced; but, finding himself largely outnumbered by men strongly posted, supporting 3 guns, and night coming on, he, too, retreated to his boats; burning bridges behind him. There was some pursuit notwithstanding; but the gunboats were ugly customers, and were not seriously molested. When the tide had risen, they floated; and Barton returned with them, unmolested, to Port Royal.

Our loss in this expedition was not far from 300. Walker reports his at 14 killed, 102 wounded, 9 missing; but this does not include the losses at Coosawhatchie.

The river Ogeechee, rising in the heart of eastern Georgia, after a generally S. E. course of some 200 miles, usually parallel with the lower half of the Savannah, and, for the last 40 miles, very near it, falls into Ossabaw sound, some 10 miles S. W. of Savannah. A few miles up the Ogeechee, the Rebels had constructed a strong earthwork known as Fort McAllister, in a bend of the stream, enabling it to rake any vessel which should attempt to pass it. A row of heavy piles across the channel, with some torpedoes in the river below, rendered ascent at once difficult and perilous. The steamer Nashville lay under the protection of these works; having long watched an opportunity to run out to sea laden with cotton; disappointed in this, by the vigilance of our cruisers, she was unladen, fitted up as a war vessel, and again watched her opportunity to run out—not being so easily stopped now as formerly. Com'r Worden, who was watching her, in the iron-clad Montauk, at length discovered[22] that she had got aground, just above the fort, and, at daylight next morning, went up,

[21] Oct. 23.

[22] Feb. 27, 1863.

backed by the Seneca, Wissahickon, and Dawn, to attempt her destruction.

He found her still aground; and, by disregarding torpedoes and the fire of the fort, was able to steam within 1,200 yards of her; and, by experiment, soon had her exact range, and was peppering her with 11 and 15-inch shells; while his consorts—forbidden a near approach by the narrowness of the channel—fired at her from positions farther down the stream. Twenty minutes thereafter, she had been set on fire by shells which exploded within her, and flames were seen to burst from every quarter; at 9:20 A. M., her large pivot gun forward was exploded by the heat; at 9:40, her smoke-stack went overboard; and at 9:55, her magazine exploded, shattering her into worthless fragments. Meantime, the fort kept firing away at the Montauk, striking her five times, but doing no damage; and a torpedo which exploded beneath her, as she steamed down the river, accomplished very little. Our other vessels received no harm. We lost no men.

Com. Dupont, encouraged by this cheap success, now resolved to give the fort itself a trial: to which end, the iron-clads Passaic, Capt. Drayton, Patapsco, Montauk, Ericsson, and Nahant, with three mortar-schooners, steamed[33] up the Ogeechee, and opened fire: the Passaic leading, the rest following, and all firing at the fort at the shortest range they could severally attain. But the obstructions proved insuperable, and forbade the Passaic to approach nearer than 1,200 yards; the other iron-clads being, of course, farther off, and the schooners farther still. Thus placed, the Passaic, Patapsco, and Nahant, opened fire; and it was kept up, with one or two intervals, from 8½ A. M. to 4 P. M., and by the mortar-schooners every 15 minutes thenceforth till next morning; when Capt. Drayton—who had dropped down the river out of range at nightfall—went up again and took a look at the enemy's works; finding them so substantial and effective that he concluded to waste no more good cartridges upon them, and came away under a double salute of shells and yells. His 15-inch shells, each weighing 345 pounds, had dismounted one of their 9 great guns, and taken a wheel from another; but no man had been killed, and but one wounded on either side. Captain Drayton, while standing behind the turret of his 'Monitor,' had received a mere scratch from a splinter of shell, and the Rebel loss was swelled to 3 wounded by an accident after the fight; but an enormous expenditure of ammunition on either side had effected nothing of moment. Our shells often tore up the sand to a depth of ten feet, clouding the air with it; but it descended nearly into its former position;[34] even the embrasures of the Rebel battery were but moderately damaged. Our vessels saved their ammunition by letting Fort McAllister alone thereafter.

The National steamboat Isaac Smith, having been sent[35] up Stono

[33] March 3.

[34] *The Savannah Republican*, March 12, says: "Considerable havoc was made in the sand-banks in the fort; and the quarters of the men were almost entirely demolished. * * * Inside the fort, and to the rear of it for half a mile, the earth was dug up into immense pits and gullies by the enemy's shell and shot." [It sees a Providence in the saving of Confederate life.]

[35] Jan. 30, 1863.

river on a reconnoissance, went seven miles above Legaréville without getting sight or sound of an enemy; but, when 6 miles on her way back, was opened upon in a bend by three masked batteries, which had not been observed before, and thereby speedily crippled and captured. The Com. McDonough went to her assistance; but arrived too late, and could do nothing. Several months thereafter, the Rebels attempted to run the Isaac Smith out of Charleston harbor; when she was sunk[36] by the gunboat Wissahickon.

The morning after their capture of the Smith was signalized by the Charleston Rebels by a far bolder and more significant exploit. At 4 A. M., favored by a thick haze, their iron-clads Palmetto State, Capt. D. N. Ingraham, and Chicora, Com'r Tucker, with three steamboats as tenders, stole upon our blockading fleet, lying off the bar, while the Powhatan and the Canandaigua, our two largest men of war, were at Port Royal, coaling; and, first nearing the Mercedita, Capt. Stellwagen, the Palmetto State ran into her amidships with full force, and fired into her side at close range a 7-inch shell, which passed through her condenser and steam-drum, blowing a hole through her farther side, scalding several of her men, and completely disabling her. Stellwagen, unable either to fight or fly, surrendered.

The Palmetto, leaving her to sink if she would, forthwith attacked the Keystone State, Capt. Leroy; lodging a shell in her forehold, which set her on fire. Leroy sheered off, until the fire was got under; when, having a full head of steam, he attempted to run his assailant down; but, as he approached at full speed, another shot was sped through both his vessel's steam-chests, utterly disabling her; ten rifled shells striking her, and two of them bursting on her quarter-deck.

By this time, it was growing light, and our fleet had been thoroughly aroused. The Augusta, Quaker City, Memphis, and Housatonic, went in; the Memphis taking in tow the Keystone State—which had one-fourth of her crew disabled, mainly by scalding—and drawing her out of the enemy's fire; when the Rebel gunboats turned homeward, and took refuge behind the shoals in the Swash channel; thence making their way back to Charleston, and issuing there a bulletin declaring the blockade raised and the port open;[37] the British consul at Charleston and the commander of H. B. M. ship Petrel corroborating the statement; and the foreign consuls in the Confederacy were officially notified of the alleged fact in a circular from J. P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State, "for the information of such vessels of your nation as may choose to carry on commerce with the now open port of Charleston." The "vessels" thus

[36] June 7.

[37] "HEADQ'RS LAND AND NAVAL FORCES,
"CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 31.

"At about 5 o'clock this morning, the Confederate States naval force on this station attacked the United States blockading fleet off the harbor of the city of Charleston, and sunk, dispersed, or drove off and out of sight for the time, the entire hostile fleet.

"Therefore, we, the undersigned commanders respectively of the Confederate States naval and land forces in this quarter, do hereby formally declare the blockade by the United States of the said city of Charleston, South Carolina, to be raised by a superior force of the Confederate States from and after this 31st day of January, A. D. 1863.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General Com'ding.
"D. N. INGRAHAM, Flag-officer Com'ding Naval Forces in South Carolina."

invited did not attempt to profit by the opportunity thus afforded them, but continued to steal into and out of that harbor during the darkest nights and in the most clandestine, insidious manner. None of our vessels were sunk or lost—the Mercedita having been deserted by her captors, who never put a man on board—being clearly no prize. She had but 3 men killed and 4 wounded; the Keystone had 20 killed—mainly by scalding—and 20 wounded.

Gen. Foster, commanding the 18th corps in North Carolina, having been ordered to South Carolina, to cöoperate with Com. Dupont in an attack on Charleston, steamed[38] from Beaufort, N. C., with 12,000 excellent troops, landing them at Hilton Head; whence—finding Com. Dupont not yet ready—he ran up to Fortress Monroe in quest of siege-guns. Gen. Hunter—to whom Foster's advent had been a complete surprise—thereupon took command of Foster's men, broke up his corps organization, and—this exercise of authority being demurred to—ordered Foster's staff out of his department. Foster thereupon obtained authority from Gen. Halleck to return to his own department, leaving his 12,000 men to serve as a reenforcement to Gen. Hunter; under whose auspices, in conjunction with Com. Dupont, the contemplated attack was now to be made. Halleck's sending of Foster into Hunter's department without notice to the latter has not been explained.

Our preparations for this attack were made, so far as possible, at Hilton Head: the iron-clads, so fast as ready, slipping quietly, one by one, to their appointed rendezvous in the mouth of the North Edisto river, half way to Charleston harbor; where they were all finally assembled,[39] awaiting the conditions of wind and tide deemed most favorable. A calm, clear night,[40] following a full moon, proffered the awaited conjuncture; and Com. Dupont steamed[41] in full force up to the harbor bar; shifting there his pennant from the gunboat James Adger to the stately, mailed 'Ironsides,' in which he proposed to direct and share in the bombardment. By 9 A. M. next day, his fleet had all crossed the bar, and was in line along the east shore of Morris island, heading toward the most formidable array of rifled great guns that had ever yet tested the defensive resources of naval warfare.

The iron-clads thus pitted against the tremendous ordnance of Fort Sumter and her satellites were the following:

1. Weehawken, Capt. John Rodgers;
2. Passaic, Capt. Percival Drayton;
3. Montauk, Com'r John L. Worden;
4. Patapsco, Com'r Daniel Ammen;
5. New Ironsides, Com'r Thos. Turner;
6. Catskill, Com'r Geo. W. Rodgers;
7. Nantucket, Com'r Donald M. Fairfax;
8. Nahant, Com'r John Downes;
9. Keokuk, Lt.-Com'r Alex. C. Rhind;

with the gunboats Canandaigua, Unadilla, Housatonic, Wissahickon, and Huron in reserve, below the bar, ready to support the iron-clads should they attack the batteries on Morris island.

The day was bright, bland, and warm—like one of the finest of the later days of a Northern May—the air of midday flashing with the wings of countless butterflies—though a slight haze or smoke in the morning so obscured remoter objects that the landmarks relied on to give bearings

[38] Feb. 2. [39] April 3. [40] April 5. [41] April 6.

DEFENSES OF CHARLESTON.

in the difficult navigation (for vessels of heavy draft) of these intricate channels were indistinguishable, and the advance thereby postponed till a gentle northern breeze cleared the sky. But, as ebb-tide came at 11 A. M., and—the bar being safely passed—that was deemed the stage of water best fitted to the steering of those clumsy alligators—it is not probable that our plans were seriously deranged by this circumstance.

Let us improve this pause to glance at the scene, as it imprinted itself on the mind of an observer,[42] scanning it through a powerful field-glass from the Coast Survey steamboat Bibb, lying in the Swash channel, three miles below Sumter:

"We are, this moment, looking directly up into the harbor and the city, which lies in the vista beyond—its wharves and ships, houses and steeples, standing out in the background like a picture. Steeples and roofs are crowded with spectators; the neighboring shores are lined with onlookers, just as when, now two years ago, less two days, the same spectators stood on the same coignes of vantage to see, in the same harbor, another bombardment, while *another* flag from that which now flaunts in our eyes, floated from the walls of Sumter.

"We are facing Fort Sumter, and looking directly up the harbor. We have, accordingly, Sullivan's island on our right, and Morris island on our left. These two islands end each in curved points of land, and,

[42] Mr. William Swinton, correspondent of *The New York Times*.

at their nearest approach, are separated by an interval of a mile, formed by the entrance to the harbor; and, just in the middle of this passage, and right between the two points of land, stands Fort Sumter, built on an artificial island made in mid-channel. Both Morris and Sullivan's islands are scarcely removed above the level of the sea; which, indeed, would probably invade and cover them, were it not that the margin of the islands on their sea-frontage is marked by a continuous, narrow strip of low sand-hills, some five or six feet in height. Behind the second ridge of the islands, are alternate salt marsh, sand, and clumps of wood of live-oak, palmetto, and tangled tropical undergrowths. The whole coast of South Carolina and Georgia consists of a labyrinth of islands and islets of this character, round which reedy creeks and rivers wind.

"With Sullivan's island on our right, we run the eye up to its upper or north end, formed by Breach inlet. Guarding this point, is Breach inlet battery—a powerful sand-work, having a circular, dome-like, bomb-proof magazine in its center. It is, however, three miles from the entrance of the harbor, and will not be able to molest our ships on their passage. Its chief value has been to aid blockade-runners; as it covers Maffit's channel (the passage through which the great majority of these craft run in) from the approach of our blockaders. At present, it will serve to oppose our landing troops at Breach inlet, should the attempt be made. Coming down along the shore of Sullivan's island, from Breach inlet, we next reach Fort Beauregard, a powerful sand battery, mounting very heavy guns, and situated on the turn of the island a little right of the 'Moultrie House' hotel, from which it is separated only by five intervening sea-shore houses. Next, to the right of the channel, up and opposite Fort Sumter, is Fort Moultrie, which has been prodigiously strengthened by the Rebel engineers, both in its means of offense and of defense. Looking up the harbor and still to the right, the eye takes in the extensive line of works, *en crémaillaire*, called the Redan, and which has been formed by throwing up intrenchments on the line of the breakwater erected some years ago by the United States Government, for the protection of that portion of the harbor. Beyond the Redan, up near the head of the harbor, on an island, appears Castle Pinckney, in the vista, looking like the Battery in New York City as seen from the sea-entrance.

"So far as the eye can see, we have now exhausted the fortifications on the right hand side of the harbor. It now remains briefly to glance at those that line the left-hand side. In the mean while, Fort Sumter rises up conspicuously before us in mid-channel. We can see every brick in its walls. Two faces out of its five, and two angles only, come within sight from our point of view: namely, the south face, on which the sally-port and wharf are placed, and the eastern face. You are too familiar with the general features of this historic work to make any description necessary. It was, you know, pierced for two tiers of guns; but the lower embrasures had been filled in to strengthen it. From the top of the fort frown the barbette guns, which comprise all the heaviest portion of its armament. You can count distinctly each barbette gun—one, two, three, four, five on this; one, two, three, four on that; and so on all around; and it is easy to see that the ordnance is of the most formidable character. From a flag-staff on one of the angles of the fort, floats the Confederate flag; from a flag-staff on the opposite angle, floats the Palmetto flag.

"Passing now to the left-hand side of the harbor, on James Island, we first have the Wappoo battery, near Wappoo creek, effectually commanding the embouchure of Ashley river and the left side of the city. Next, coming down, we have Fort Johnson; and, between it and Castle Pinckney, on an artificial island raised by the Rebels, on the 'middle ground,' is Fort Ripley. Coming down to Cumming's Point, directly opposite Moultrie, is the Cumming's Point battery, named by the Rebels Battery Bee, after the General of that name; south of Battery Bee, on Morris island, is Fort Wagner, a very extensive sand battery of the most powerful construction. Half-way down Morris island, again, from Fort Wagner, is a new sand-work erected by the Rebels since I surveyed the ground from the blockading fleet, a fortnight ago. Finally, down at Lighthouse inlet, which divides Morris from Folly island, is another fortification, guarding against an attempt at a landing at that point. Such is the formidable panorama the eye takes in, in sweeping around the harbor and its approaches."

And now let the same observer depict for us the low, iron-backed turtles about to crawl up and try conclusions with these yawning craters of brick and stone and iron, so soon to burst into fierce and scathing eruption:

"With respect both to the obstacles we are to meet, and the engines with which we are to meet them, every thing is novel and unprecedented. Comparison is simply impossible; for, where there are no points of resemblance, comparison is out of the question.

"But can you imagine—if one were permitted to play with the elements of time and space—the shade of Nelson transferred from his gun-deck off Trafalgar, after but little over half a century, and placed on board of one of those iron craft before us? and can you imagine the sensations of that consummate master of all the elements of naval warfare as known in his day? He must be helpless as a child, and bewildered as a man in a dream. From his splendid three-decker, the Victory, carrying its hundred guns, and towering majestically on the water, which it rides like a thing of life, he finds himself imprisoned in an iron casing, the whole hull and frame of which is submerged in the water, the waves washing clean over its deck, and depending for its defensive power on a couple of guns of a caliber that would astonish him, placed in a circular tower, rising from the deck amidships. This turret is in thickness 11 inches of wrought iron, revolves on an axis by the delicate appliances of steam engineering, and contains the entire armament and fighting crew of the ship. The fire, the animation, the life, of an old-time naval fight, when men gave and took, exposed to plain view—when ships fought yard-arm to yard-arm, and human nature in its intensest exaltation appeared—are here wholly out of the question, with the combatants shut up in impenetrable iron, and delivering their fire by refined process of mathematical and mechanical appliances.

"Nor are the outward shapes of these craft less divergent from all that the world has hitherto seen of naval models than are their internal economy and fighting arrangements removed from all previous modes. The majesty of a first-class man-of-war, with its lines of beauty and strength, on which the æsthetic instincts of ages have been expended, is here replaced by purely geometrical combinations of iron, in which the one paramount and all-controlling consideration is the resisting power of lines, angles, and surfaces. As they stretch in horrid file before us, along the shore of Morris island, awaiting the signal from the flag-ship to move, those nine ships, comprising the three different models represented by the Ironsides, the Monitors, and the Keokuk, one might almost fancy that some of the pachydermous monsters which palæontology brings to view from the 'dark backward and abysm of time' had returned in an iron resurrection; and the spectacle they presented to the Rebels from their posts of outlook must have been one of portentous grandeur."

At 12½ P. M., our iron-clads advanced in the prescribed order—to be stopped directly by the anchor cable of the Weehawken, in the van, becoming fouled with iron grapplings protruding from the raft at her bows, wherewith she was expected to explode any torpedoes and clear away any obstructions she might encounter. An hour was spent in putting this right; and then our fleet moved on, in order: each vessel passing Morris island without evoking a shot from Fort Wagner or Battery Bee, and meaning to make the entrance of the harbor between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's island before the former, at 4:03 P. M., opened on the Weehawken the tremendous broadside of her barbette guns.

And now there dawned upon our perplexed though undaunted commander a revelation of the great and insuperable difficulty of the attack. That our nine small though stanch vessels, mounting 30 guns in all, could last long under the fire which could be concentrated on them while lying close in front or east of Fort Sumter was not and could not reasonably be expected. It had therefore been determined, and was distinctly prescribed in Dupont's order of battle, that

"The squadron will pass up the main ship channel without returning the fire of the batteries on Morris island, unless signal should be made to commence action.

"The ships will open fire on Fort Sumter when within easy range, and will take up a position to the northward and westward of that fortification, engaging its left or northwest face, at a distance of from 1,000 to 800 yards; firing low, and aiming at the center embrasure."

But there were other plans than ours to be taken into account. The

enemy's engineers were quite as well aware as ours of the relative weakness of the north-west face of Sumter (which had never been completed —the fort being designed, indeed, to guard the harbor, but not against an offensive so formidable and persistent as ours), and had no idea of allowing our iron-clads to pass their heaviest batteries and concentrate their fire upon that quarter. Accordingly, when the Weehawken had come fully abreast of Sumter, and completely under the fire of Moultrie's and other batteries as well as hers, she found herself confronted by a stout hawser buoyed up by empty casks, stretching completely across the channel from the north-west angle of Fort Sumter to Moultrie, and festooned with nets, seines, cables, &c., attached to torpedoes below—all contrived, if the torpedoes failed to destroy any vessel which might attempt to break the hawser, at least to foul her propeller and deprive her crew of all command over her movements, leaving her to drift helpless and useless where a few hours at most must insure her demolition.

Capt. Rodgers did not choose to squander his vessel so recklessly; and, after a brief hesitation, attempted to pass westward of Fort Sumter, between that and Cumming's Point: but this channel was found obstructed by a row of great piles, driven far into the earth and rising ten feet above the surface of the water; with another row stretching across its entire width a mile or so farther up the harbor; with still another behind this, backed by three Rebel iron-clads, all smoking and roaring in concert with the forts and batteries on every side. And now, as if our embarrassments were too trivial, the Ironsides is caught by the tide and veered off her course, refusing to mind her helm, and deranging the movements of her consorts: the Catskill and Nantucket running afoul of her on either side, and requiring a precious quarter of an hour to get clear again. This constrained Com. Dupont to signal the rest of the fleet to disregard the movements of the Ironsides, and take the positions wherein their fire would prove most effective. Thus directed, Lt. Rhind ran the Keokuk within 500 yards of Fort Sumter, and there held her, pouring in her hottest fire, till she was riddled and sinking; the Catskill and the Montauk being scarcely farther off. Let the observer already quoted depict for us the manner of serving the guns in those narrow, dim-lit caverns, the turrets of the monitors:

"Could you look through the smoke, and through the flame-lit ports, into one of those revolving towers, a spectacle would meet your eye such as Vulcan's stithy might present. Here are the two huge guns which form the armament of each monitor—the one 11 and the other 15 inches in diameter of bore. The gunners, begrimed with powder and stripped to the waist, are loading the gun. The allowance of powder—thirty-five pounds to each charge—is passed up rapidly from below; the shot, weighing four hundred and twenty pounds, is hoisted up by mechanical appliances to the muzzle of the gun, and rammed home; the gun is run out to the port, and tightly 'compressed;' the port is open for an instant, the captain of the gun stands behind, lanyard in hand—'Ready, fire!' and the enormous projectile rushes through its huge parabola, with the weight of ten thousand tons, home to its mark."

For half an hour thereafter, our sailors maintained the unequal and plainly hopeless contest—all of them under the fire of hundreds of the heaviest and best rifled guns that could be made, or bought, or stolen. The Rebel gunners had been direct-

ed by Beauregard, then in chief command at Charleston, to fire very deliberately and with careful aim; yet 160 shots per minute were counted: and one of our commanders declared that the great iron bolts of the enemy crashed upon the decks and sides of our vessels in succession as rapid as the ticks of a watch. Most of these, of course, rebounded or glanced off, and were added to the pavement of the harbor; but even these often left ugly mementoes of their hasty visit; while the attentions of some were far more impressive. The Nahant carried off thirteen ugly bruises; one of them made by a shot which struck her pilot-house, knocking out several of its bolts, one of which wounded all three of the inmates—captain, pilot, and quartermaster—the last fatally. Four of her crew were injured by a similar injury to her turret. The Passaic had as many wounds—one of them from a shot which passed through the 11-inch plates of her turret, and then had force left seriously to damage her pilot-house beyond. The Nantucket had, among others, a knock on her turret which so deranged it that her port could not be opened thereafter. The Ironsides had one of her port shutters shot away; and the Catskill was struck by a bolt which tore through her deck-plating forward, and still had force to break an iron beam beneath it.

But the Keokuk, though not the strongest among them, had dared most and suffered most. She was struck 90 times, had both her turrets riddled, with 19 holes through her hull; some of them so large that a boy might have crawled through, while her commander and 11 of her crew were wounded, five of them severely. She was at length compelled to draw off, mortally injured, and, limping away down the coast of Morris island to Lighthouse inlet, she had barely been relieved of her wounded, when, at 8 P. M., she sunk—the last of her crew jumping into the sea as she went down, leaving only the top of her smoke-stack above the surface of the water. Three hours earlier, Com. Dupont, seeing half his vessels disabled, while Sumter, though somewhat damaged,[48] was still vociferous and belligerent as ever—gave the signal for retiring; which was willingly, though not swiftly, obeyed.

The iron-clad attack on Fort Sumter and its adjuncts was a failure—not a disaster. We lost few men, and but one vessel; for all but the Keokuk were susceptible of easy repair; while the expenditure of ammunition was many times greatest on the side of the Rebels, and one that they could not afford so well as we could. It was computed that 3,500 shots were fired by them that day; the value of which was hardly to be measured by Confederate currency in its then advanced stage of decomposition. Two guns on Fort Sumter were disabled, and one was burst; while they had but few men injured and only one killed. But their exultation over our repulse was unbounded: Beauregard, for once, hardly going beyond the average sentiment in averring, in his general order, that "the happy issue" of this conflict had "inspired confidence in

[48] "Half a dozen pock-marks show conspicuous; while a huge crater is formed in the parapet near the eastern angle," reports Mr. Swinton aforesaid.

the country that our ultimate success will be complete."

Gen. Hunter had a supporting force of some 4,000 men, under Gen. Truman Seymour, carefully concealed behind a thicket of palms just below Lighthouse inlet, with pontoons, guns, &c., all ready to rush across to Morris island and attack the Rebel forces stationed thereon—either party screening its position and numbers by the usual picket-firing at the front. When it was made manifest that Dupont was worsted, Adjutant Halpine was sent with all haste to Seymour with orders to desist: so no useless slaughter on land intensified the bitterness of our failure on the water.

The Rebels say that a blockade-runner in the harbor during the fight ran out through our fleet during the ensuing night, unperceived or unsuspected; and it is certain that our gunboat George Washington, reconnoitering next day,[44] up Broad river, having got aground, was attacked by a party of Rebels, who succeeded in throwing a shell into her magazine and blowing her up; killing 2 and wounding 8 of the 3d R. I. Artillery.

Dupont, like most old sailors, was naturally partial to fighting on deck, and not a lover of iron-clads. The issue of this struggle ripened his distrust into detestation. He had failed, with 1,000 men and 30 guns, to take, at the first effort, what was probably the best fortified seaport on earth, defended by at least ten times his force in men and metal; and he utterly refused to repeat the experiment. ———

There were no movements thereafter in South Carolina under Hunter; save that Col. Montgomery, with 300 of his 2d S. C. (negroes) on two steamboats, went[45] 25 miles up the Combahee river, burnt a pontoon-bridge, with some private property, and brought away 727 very willing slaves—all that they could take, but not nearly all that wished to be taken. The 2d S. C. recruited two full companies out of 'the spoils.'

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The Fingal, a British-built blockade-runner, which had slipped[46] into Savannah with a valuable cargo of arms, and been loaded with cotton for her return, found herself unable, especially after the fall of Pulaski, to slip out again; and, after many luckless attempts, was unloaded, and iron-clad into what was esteemed a high state of warlike efficiency—14 months having been devoted to the work. She was now christened the ATLANTA, and, wafted from the wharves of Savannah by a breeze of prayers and good wishes, moved down the inlet known as Wilmington river into Warsaw sound, attended by two gunboats and intent on belligerency. Meantime, two poor Irishmen, tired of the Confederacy, had escaped to Hilton Head, and there revealed the character of the craft and the nature of her seaward errand. Hunter's Adjutant, Halpine, a brother Irishman, who had wormed out their secret, by the help of a fluid which seldom fails to unloose the Celtic tongue, at once sped the information to Dupont; who forthwith dispatched the Weehawken and the Nahant to Warsaw sound, wherein the Cimarone alone had been previously stationed.

[44] April 8. [45] June 2. [46] Nov. 12, 1861.

Capt. John Rodgers, in the Weehawken, had been several days in Warsaw sound ere the Atlanta made her appearance. At length, just after daylight,[47] he espied her emerging from Wilmington river, with the Rebel flag defiantly exalted. Perceiving his approach, the Atlanta sent him a ball, then halted to await his coming. The Rebel tenders, it was said, had only come down to tow up the prizes, leaving the Atlanta at liberty to pursue her victorious career: their decks being crowded with ladies, who had voyaged from Savannah to enjoy the spectacle and exult over the victory.

But there was not much of a fight—certainly not a long one. Rodgers disdained to answer the Rebel's fire till he had shortened the intervening distance to 300 yards; when, sighting his 15-inch gun, he struck and shivered the shutter of one of her port-holes, with the iron and wood-work adjacent. Loading and sighting again, he fired and struck her iron pilot-house; carrying it away bodily, and severely wounding two of her three pilots. His next shot grazed the wreck of what had been the pilot-house; his fifth, fired at 100 yards' distance, smashed through her side, bending in her four inches of iron armor, shivering eight inches of plank, killing one and wounding 13 of her gunners; passing through and falling into the water. Hereupon, the Rebel flag came down and a white one went up; just 26 minutes after Rodgers first descried his antagonist; and 15 after she had opened the battle. Her consorts slunk away unharmed; their passengers returning to advise their fellow-citizens that raising the siege of Charleston was not so easy a task as they had fondly supposed it. The Atlanta, it now appeared, had grounded, broadside to, just as she began the fight, but had nevertheless fired briskly and harmlessly to the end of it. She had 4 large guns and 165 men.

Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore having relieved Gen. Hunter,[48] as Com. Dahlgren soon after relieved[49] Com. Dupont, movements were at once set on foot looking to systematic operations against Fort Sumter and Charleston. To a comprehension of these movements, a preliminary glance at the situation seems necessary.

Gen. Gillmore found in the Department of the South a total force of 17,463 officers and soldiers—the most of them veterans of approved quality, in good part brought thither by Foster. Considering the naval cöoperation that might at all times be counted on, his real force must, for all purposes except that of a determined advance into the heart of the enemy's territory, have been fully equal to 20,000 men. For defense, against any but a sudden attack or surprise, it was hardly less than 25,000. But he had so many posts to hold in a hostile region, and such an extensive line (250 miles) to picket, that 11,000 was the very utmost that he could venture to concentrate for any offensive purpose that might not be consummated within a few days at farthest. And he had, apart from the navy, 96 heavy guns (all serviceable but 12 13-inch mortars, which proved too large, and were left unused), with an abundance of munitions, engineering tools, &c.

[47] June 17, 1863. [48] June 12. [49] July 6.

He found our forces in quiet possession of nearly or quite all the Sea islands west of the Stono, with Seabrook and Folly islands, east of that inlet. Our pickets still—as on the day of Dupont's attack—confronted those of the enemy across Lighthouse inlet, which separates these from Morris island.

Gillmore's plan of operations—carefully matured before he entered upon his command—contemplated a descent by surprise on the south end of Morris island—well known to be strongly fortified and held—which, being taken, was to be firmly held as a base for operations against Fort Wagner, a strong and heavily armed earthwork at the north end of that island, 2,600 yards from Fort Sumter, held by a strong garrison under Col. Lawrence M. Keitt. This carried, the less formidable earthwork at Cumming's Point, on the extreme north, must fall, enabling us to plant batteries within a mile of Sumter, and within extreme shelling distance of Charleston itself. Thus, even prior to the reduction of Sumter, it was calculated that our iron-clads might pass that fortress, remove the channel obstructions, run the batteries on James and Sullivan's islands, and go up to the city. To distract the enemy's attention and prevent a concentration of forces from a distance to resist our establishment on Morris island—which Gillmore regarded as the most critical point in his programme—Gen. A. H. Terry was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration on James island; while Col. Higginson, steaming up the Edisto, was to make a fresh attempt to cut the railroad, so as to prevent the reception of reënforcements from Savannah.

Save as a distraction of the enemy, this latter movement proved a failure. Col. Higginson, with 300 men and 3 guns, on the gunboat John Adams and two transports, pushed[*] up the Edisto, making an opening through a row of piles at Wiltown, to within two miles of the railroad bridge; but he was so long detained here as to lose the tide; so that the two transports, going farther up, repeatedly grounded, and found the bridge defended by a 6-gun battery, whereby Higginson was worsted and beaten off; being compelled to burn the tug Gov. Milton, as she could not be floated. He balanced the account by bringing off 200 negroes.

Terry's movement was successful, not only in calling off the enemy's attention from the real point of danger, but in drawing away a portion of their forces from Morris island, where they were needed, to James island, where they were not.

Folly island—a long, narrow beach or sand-spit, skirting the Atlantic ocean south of the entrance to Charleston inner harbor—is, like most of the adjacent islands, barely elevated above the sea-level, and in part flooded by the highest tides. Though naked for half a mile toward the north end, it is, for the most part, densely wooded; and ridges of sand, covered by a thick screen of forest and underbrush along Lighthouse inlet, effectually shield it from observation from Morris island. Here Saxton found Gen. Vogdes firmly posted, alert and vigilant, and gradually, circumspectly strengthened him without attracting hostile observation

[*] July 10.

till he had 47 guns in battery within speaking distance of the Rebel pickets, with 200 rounds of ammunition and all necessary appliances for each —the Rebel batteries right in his front being intent on destroying a blockade-runner which had been chased aground by our cruisers just south of the entrance to Lighthouse inlet. Meantime, Gen. Terry's division, 4,000 strong, and Gen. Strong's brigade of 2,500, were quietly transferred to Folly island, under the cover of darkness, and kept out of sight, while Vogdes made a great parade of strengthening his defenses as though he apprehended an attack.

At length, all being ready, Gen. Terry, with 3,800 men, was conveyed[51] up the Stono, and menaced the Rebel works on the south end of James island; while 2,000 men, under Gen. Strong, were silently embarked[52] on small boats in Folly river, and rowed stealthily to the junction of Lighthouse inlet; where they were halted, behind a screen of marsh-grass, while Vogdes's batteries on the north end of Folly island broke, at daylight,[53] the slumbers of the unsuspecting foe. Dahlgren's iron-clads, Catskill, Montauk, Nahant, and Weehawken, forthwith opened a cross-fire, which they maintained throughout the day; addressing their civilities for the most part to the tranquilizing of Fort Wagner.

After two hours' cannonade, Gen. Strong threw his men ashore, disregarding a hot fire of Rebel artillery and musketry, and, by 9 A. M., we had carried all the enemy's batteries on the south end of Morris island, and held three-fourths of that island firmly, with our skirmishers pushed up to within musket-shot of Fort Wagner. The intense heat and the exhaustion of our soldiers, who had been under arms all night, here arrested operations for the day. Eleven heavy guns, with much camp equipage, were the main trophies of our success.

Next morning, at 5, Gen. Strong led his men to an assault on Fort Wagner, whereof they reached the parapet; but were here met by so withering a fire that they recoiled, with but moderate loss. Thus far, our casualties on this island were 150; those of the Rebels were officially reported by Beauregard at 300.

Convinced by this failure that the fortress was very much stronger than it had been supposed, and could only be taken by regular approaches, Gillmore now sat down before it, in full view of the fact that the enemy could concentrate here at any time a force far larger than that which assailed them. But the narrowness of the island, while it constrained the besiegers to work directly and constantly under the fire of the fort, precluded flanking sallies, and rendered an accumulation here of force by the enemy of little practical account. And, beside, every offensive movement on their part must be made under the enfilading fire of our gunboats; which constantly aided to shield our working parties from a fusillade that, destructive at best, would else have been insupportable.

General Terry, on James island, was attacked at daybreak[54] by a more numerous Rebel force of Georgians, just arrived from Virginia, who, expecting to surprise him, advanced rapidly, driving in the 54th

[51] July 8, P. M. [52] Evening of July 9. [53] July 10. [54] July 16.

Mass., then on picket duty; but they found Terry wide awake and ready, with the gunboats Pawnee, Huron, Marblehead, John Adams, and Mayflower at hand; by whose aid they were easily driven off, with a loss of some 200. Ours was 100. Terry proceeded to Morris island forthwith, to share in the meditated grand assault on Fort Wagner.

The preliminary bombardment was to have opened at daylight;[46] but a terrible storm had so delayed our preparations and dampened our powder that it did not actually commence till 12½ P. M. From that time till dark, the rain of fire from our semicircle of batteries, ranged across the island at the distance of a mile, while our iron-clads, moving up to within a few hundred yards, poured in their heaviest missiles, regardless of the fire of the fort and that of Sumter. Wagner, in fact, kept but two great guns at work; her men lying close in their bomb-proofs, till, their flag being shot away, a dozen or so instantly swarmed out to replace it; when they as quickly disappeared. On our side, fully a hundred great guns steadily thundered; the shells of our monitors often throwing up clouds of sand which must have nearly choked the entrance to the garrison's bomb-proof; tearing the fort out of all regularity of outline, all appearance of structure or symmetry. By many on our side, it was fondly counted that her bomb-proof must have been pierced and riddled, her garrison shattered and routed, by that tremendous bombardment.

Events proved how sadly mistaken were all such sanguine calculations. The garrison had lain all day in their bomb-proof substantially unharmed: returning, for appearance's sake, perhaps one shot for every five hundred hurled at them, but reserving their strength and their iron for the sterner ordeal which they felt to be at hand.

As the day declined, the roar of our great guns, no longer incessant, was renewed at longer and longer intervals, and finally ceased; our iron-clads, save the Montauk, returning to their anchorage; while a thunder-storm burst over land and sea; sharp flashes of lightning intermitting and intensifying the fast coming darkness, as our leaders, galloping hither and thither, perfected their dispositions for the pending assault.

Our men were formed in three brigades: the first, led by Gen. Strong, consisting of the 54th Massachusetts (colored), Col. Robert G. Shaw, the 6th Connecticut, Col. Chatfield, the 48th New York, Col. Barton, the 3d New Hampshire, Col. Jackson, the 76th Pennsylvania, Col. Strawbridge, and the 9th Maine, Col. Emery: the 54th Mass. having been assigned to this brigade at the request of its young Colonel, between whom and Gen. Strong a warm attachment had sprung up during their brief acquaintance, formed and ripened in the field. Shaw's was the first colored regiment organized in a Free State; and it shared his anxiety to prove that it was not in vain that Blacks as well as Whites had been summoned to battle for their country and the Freedom of Man. In order to be here in season, it had been for two days marching through heavy sands and working its way across creeks and inlets, unsheltered through the pelting rains of the intervening

[46] July 18.

nights: only reaching at 6 P. M. Gen. Strong's headquarters, about midway of the island, where it was halted five minutes; but there was now no time for rest or food, and it went forward, hungry and weary, to take its place in the front line of the assaulting column. That column, advancing a few hundred yards under a random fire from two or three great guns, halted half an hour, during which the 54th was addressed by Gen. Strong and by its Colonel; and then —as the dusk was deepening rapidly into darkness—the order to advance was given, and, under a storm of shot and shell from Wagner, Sumter, and Cumming's Point, our soldiers moved swiftly on.

The distance traversed at double-quick was perhaps half a mile; but not many had fallen until the pierced but unshaken column had almost reached the ditch and were within short musket-range of the fort, when a sheet of fire from small arms lighted up the enshrouding darkness, while howitzers in the bastions raked the ditch as our men swept across it, and hand-grenades from the parapet tore them as they climbed the seamed and ragged face of the fort and planted their colors for a moment on the top. Here fell Col. Shaw, struck dead; here, or just in front, fell Gen. Strong, mortally wounded, with Col. Chatfield and many noble officers beside; while Cols. Barton, Green, and Jackson, were severely wounded. The remnant of the brigade recoiled under the command of Maj. Plympton, 3d N. H.; while all that was left of the 54th Mass. was led off by a boy, Lt. Higginson.

The first brigade being thus demolished, the second went forward, led by Col. H. S. Putnam, 7th New Hampshire, whose regiment, with the 62d Ohio, Col. Steele, the 67th ditto, Col. Voorhees, and the 100th N. York, Col. Dandy, was now required to attempt what a stronger brigade had proved impossible.

There was no shrinking, however, until, after half an hour's bloody combat before and upon the fort—Col. Putnam having been killed, and a large portion of his subordinates either killed or wounded—no supports arriving, the remains of the brigade, like the first, fell back into the friendly darkness, and made their way, as they best could, to our lines, as the Rebel yell of triumph from Wagner rose above the thunder of their guns from Sumter and Cumming's Point.

In this fearful assault, we lost fully 1,500 men; while the Rebel killed and wounded did not much exceed 100. There were few or no prisoners taken, save our severely wounded: and the Rebels say they buried 600 of our dead. Among these was Col. Shaw—a hereditary Abolitionist—on whom they vainly thought to heap indignity by "burying him in the same pit with his niggers." His relatives and friends gratefully accepted the fitting tribute; and when in due time a shaft shall rise from the free soil of redeemed Carolina above that honored grave, it will perpetuate, alike for leader and for led, the memory of their devotion to the holy cause whereto they offered up their lives a willing sacrifice.

Fort Wagner being thus proved, at a heavy cost, impregnable to assault — Gillmore — at once General commanding and Engineer-in-Chief —resumed the work of its reduction

by regular approaches. Among the difficulties to be confronted was the narrowness of the neck of dry land along which those approaches must be carried: the fort covering the entire width of the island where it stood; whereas, at the point where we commenced to run our parallels, it is but a third, and at a point still nearer the fort, is but a tenth so wide. The faces of the fort were mutually defensive, and it was provided with a sluice-gate for retaining in its ditch the water admitted at the highest tides. The problem was complicated by the cross-fire from Sumter, Cumming's Point, and several heavy batteries on James island. Its garrison could at all times be readily supplied and rëenforced from Charleston; while the besiegers were embarrassed, and their operations retarded, by the knowledge that they might at any moment be assailed without notice by a force of twice or thrice their strength, suddenly concentrated by railroad from the Rebel armies in any part of the Confederacy.

Within five days after the bloody repulse of the 18th, a row of inclined palisading had been stretched across the island, some 200 yards in advance of our front, with every added precaution against a sortie that experience suggested, a bomb-proof magazine constructed, and a first parallel opened, with 8 siege and field-guns and 10 siege mortars in position, beside three 'Requa batteries' of rifle-barrels, designed mainly for defensive service if needed. And now [56] a second parallel was opened, 600 yards in advance of the first, in which heavy breaching batteries were established so soon as might be: their guns being trained partly upon Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg behind it, and partly upon Fort Sumter: fire being opened on the latter, at a distance of two miles, from two 8-inch and five 100-pounder rifled Parrotts. Meantime, a breaching battery of two 200-pounder rifled Parrotts and two 80-pounder Whitworths, likewise intended for Fort Sumter, had been established by Col. Serrell in the first parallel, which was manned by Admiral Dahlgren from the navy, under Captain Foxhall A. Parker; and which, in one week [57] of service, made a decided change in the physiognomy of that obstinate structure. Com'r Geo. W. Rodgers, of the Catskill, was killed. Still other breaching batteries were simultaneously established on the left, 800 yards farther from Sumter, which participated in the bombardment of that fort, and contributed to its measurable success.

All these extensive and difficult works were of course pushed forward mainly under the cover of darkness, which did not cause an intermission of the enemy's fire, but materially interfered with the accuracy of his aim. The advancing over deep sand and mounting, under fire, of the great guns employed in these operations, was a most arduous labor, taxing the strength as well as patience and courage of all engaged.

Gen. Gillmore had long since [58] resolved to establish a battery in the marsh westward of Morris island, at a point whence he believed it practicable to reach the wharves and shipping of Charleston, and had directed Col. Serrell to make the requisite ex-

[56] July 23. [57] Aug. 17–23. [58] July 15.

aminations. The marsh here was a bed of soft, black mud, 16 to 18 feet deep, overgrown with reeds and grass, traversed by tortuous, sluggish water-courses, and overflowed at high tide. Here, at a point midway between Morris and James islands, fully five miles from the lower end of Charleston, on a capacious and substantial platform of logs, placed directly on the surface of the marsh, but strengthened, beneath its gun platform, by piles, driven through the mud into the solid sand below—the rectangular space inclosed by them being filled in with sand—was established the 'Marsh Battery;' mounting a single 8-inch rifled Parrott, named by the soldiers 'the Swamp Angel.' Protected by a sand-bag parapet and epaulement, it was soon made ready to transmit the compliments of the besiegers to the heart of the Rebellion.

When all was ready, fire was opened[80] with shot and shell, from twelve batteries of heavy guns, on Sumter, Wagner, and the Cumming's Point batteries, but mainly on Sumter—the breaching guns being served with great care and deliberation—the distance of our batteries from Sumter varying from 3,428 to 4,290 yards, or from two to two and a half miles. Those in the second parallel were exposed to a galling fire from Wagner, which, though somewhat impeded by a cross-fire from our iron-clads, at times caused a partial suspension of our bombardment; while a heavy north-easter, raging on two days,[80] seriously affected the accuracy of our fire at distant Sumter; which the Rebels were constantly strengthening by sand-bags so fast as it was demolished by our shot. Yet Gillmore ceased firing on the 23d, because he considered, and reported to Halleck, that Fort Sumter, as an offensive work, was now practically demolished: its barbette guns being mainly dismounted; its stately and solid walls reduced to a heap of unsightly ruins, whence most of the guns were gradually withdrawn by night, because no longer capable of effective service upon or within its walls; and its garrison of artillerists exchanged for one mainly of infantry, who were tolerably safe in the bomb-proofs covered by its sheltering ruins, but capable neither of impeding our approaches to Wagner nor offering formidable resistance to our iron-clads.

Gillmore now expected the iron-clads to force their way into the inner harbor and up to the city, which he deemed no longer defensible against our naval force; but Dahlgren did not concur in this opinion of the feasibility of such an enterprise, and it was not attempted.

Gillmore, having completed[81] his arrangements for opening fire from 'the Swamp Angel,' summoned Beauregard to abandon Morris island and Sumter, on penalty of the bombardment of Charleston. Receiving no reply, he fired a few shots from that battery, and desisted. Beauregard thereupon complained that no reasonable notice was given of this opening on an inhabited city; adding that he was absent from his post when Gillmore's message was received there. Gillmore could not see how *he* was blamable for this absence, and insisted that he had done nothing contrary to the laws of war.

[80] Aug. 17. [80] Aug. 18–19. [81] Aug. 21.

The high tides raised by the storm aforesaid partially filled our works, washing down parapets and impeding our operations as well as destroying our approaches; yet a fourth parallel was soon established,[62] barely 300 yards from Wagner, and only 100 from a sheltering ridge in its front, from behind which Rebel sharp-shooters had seriously impeded our working parties and defied efforts to expel them by infantry, as they afterward did[63] to dislodge them by mortar-firing. But Gen. Terry was now directed to take it with the bayonet, and did so: whereupon our fifth parallel was established behind it, only 240 yards from Wagner. Here, the dry part of the island is but 25 yards wide and barely two feet high: high tides sweeping across in rough weather to the marsh behind it. Henceforward, the ground was filled with torpedo mines; in spite of which, a rude trench had been pushed forward, by daybreak of the 27th, to within 100 yards of the fort.

Yet here the progress of the besiegers was checked. The fire of Wagner, concentring from its extended front on this narrow sand-spit at close range, was necessarily most effective; that of the James island batteries was steadily increasing in volume and accuracy; to push the sap by day was death to all engaged in it; while a bright harvest-moon rendered it all but equally hazardous by night. It became necessary to silence the fort utterly by an overpowering curved fire from siege and Coehorn mortars, at the same time attempting to breach the bomb-proof by a fire of rifled guns at close range; thus expelling the garrison from its only available shelter. To this end, all the light mortars were brought to the front, and placed in battery; the capacity of the fifth parallel and advanced trenches for sharp-shooters was greatly enlarged and improved; the rifled guns in the left breaching batteries were trained upon the fort; and powerful calcium lights prepared to assist the operations of our cannoniers and sharp-shooters, while blinding those of the enemy. The New Ironsides, Capt. Rowan, also moved up and set to work, during the daylight, on the obstinate fortress. All being ready, our batteries rëopened[64] in full chorus: the New Ironsides pouring in an eight-gun broadside of 11-inch shells against the parapet, whence they dropped nearly vertically, exploding within or over the fort; while calcium lights turned night into day, blinding the garrison, and rendering visible to the besiegers every thing connected with the fort. This proved too much for the besieged, who were compelled to seek and abide in the shelter of their bomb-proof, leaving our sappers free to push forward their work until they were so close to the fort that the fire of the James island batteries, which had become their chief annoyance, could only be rendered effective at the peril of friends and foes alike. And now the sap was pushed with vigor, and in entire disregard of the enemy: the workers off duty mounting the parapets of their works to take a survey of the ground; until, a little after dark,[65] the sap was pushed by the south face of the fort, leaving it on their left, crowning the crest of the counterscarp near the flank of the east or sea front, com-

[62] Night of Aug. 21. [63] Aug. 26. [64] Sept. 5, at daybreak. [65] Sept. 6.

pletely masking all the guns in the work, save those on this flank, and removing a row of long pikes which had been planted at the foot of the counterscarp as an impediment to assault.

Gen. Gillmore directed Gen. Terry to assault in three columns at 9 A. M.;[66] that being the hour of ebb tide, which gave the broadest beach whereon to advance the assaulting columns; but, by midnight, it was discovered that the garrison were escaping; and with such celerity did they move that we took but 70 prisoners. They left 18 guns in Wagner and 7 in Battery Gregg.

Though 122,300 pounds of metal had been hurled at it at short range from breaching guns—none of them less than a 100-pounder—within the last two days, the bomb-proof of the former was found substantially intact, and capable of sheltering 1,500 men. Sand was fully proved to possess a power of protracted resistance to the power of heavy ordnance far surpassing that of brick or stone.

During the night of the 8th, a flotilla of 25 to 30 row-boats, from Admiral Dahlgren's fleet, led by Com'r Stephens of the Patapsco, attempted to carry Fort Sumter by assault, whereof no notice was given to, and of course no cöoperation invited from, Gen. Gillmore. The boats, having been towed nearly to the fort, were cast off and made their way to the ragged walls of the old, inveterate obstacle to our progress, whereon the crews of three of them, led by Com'r Williams, Lt. Remey, and Ensign Porter, debarked, and attempted to clamber up the ruins to the parapet; but found the slope far steeper and its ascent more difficult than they appeared when viewed from a distance through a field-glass. The garrison, under Maj. S. Elliot, proved exceedingly wide awake, and at once commenced firing and throwing hand-grenades; while, at a signal given by them, the Rebel batteries on every side but the offing opened a terrific fire, whereby our three boats were soon torn to pieces, and those they had borne to the fort—some 200 in number—either killed, wounded, or compelled to surrender. The killed and wounded were about 80; while 121 were taken prisoners. The residue of the expedition drew off unhurt. No life was lost on the side of the defense.

Gen. Gillmore's 'Swamp Angel' had rather alarmed than injured the Charlestonians—no person having been harmed by its fire, though several shells had reached and exploded in the lower part of their city, and one had entered a warehouse, and, exploding there, done considerable damage to its walls and contents. The 'Swamp Angel,' being fired at a considerable elevation, with a charge of 16 pounds of powder, impelling a projectile weighing 150 pounds, burst at its 36th discharge. But now Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg were transformed and strengthened, while other works were erected on that end of the island, armed with mortars and heavy rifled guns, a full mile nearer to Charleston than the 'Marsh Battery,' and of course far more effective for the bombardment of that city, a full half of which was henceforth under fire, and

[66] Sept. 7.

was, after some casualties, abandoned by most of its inhabitants, who either moved farther up, or left altogether: while many of the buildings, including some of the most substantial and costly edifices, suffered severely. Blockade-running—which had long been a source of activity, importance, and profit to 'the cradle of Secession,' in spite of all the gunboats, iron-clads, &c., that could lie off her bar, rëenforced by the 'stone fleet'—succumbed to and was broken up by the terrible missiles of Gillmore, though sped by guns mounted fully four miles from her wharves.

Meantime, Sumter, though still a volcano, was a volcano asleep—her guns mainly dismantled, her garrison hidden in her inmost recesses. At length, upon advices that the enemy was remounting some guns on her south-east face, Gillmore rëopened[67] on that face from his heavy rifled guns in Wagner and Gregg, crumbling it speedily into ruins, which sloped from the summit of the breach to the level of the surrounding water. Thereafter, a slow and irregular fire from Cumming's Point was maintained for weeks, or till nearly the close of the year; when, all prospect of a penetration of the harbor by the iron-clads being over, and no object seeming to justify a continuance of the fire, it was suspended, or thenceforth mainly directed against Charleston alone.

A luckless attempt[68] to blow up by a torpedo boat the new Ironsides, as she lay off Morris island, and the foundering[69] of the Weehawken, carrying down 30 of her crew, while at anchor in the outer harbor during a gale—owing to her hatches having been inconsiderately left open—complete the record of notable events in this department for the year 1863.

In North Carolina, little of moment occurred in 1863. Gen. D. H. Hill attempted to rëtake Newbern on the first anniversary[70] of its recovery to the Union: attacking, with 20 guns, an unfinished earthwork north of the Neuse: but that work was firmly held by the 92d New York until rëenforced; when its assailants drew off with little loss.

Hill next demonstrated[71] against Washington, N. C.: erecting batteries at Rodman's and Hill's Points, below the town, which commanded the navigation of Pamlico river and isolated the place. But Gen. Foster had meantime arrived: finding a garrison of 1,200 men, with two gunboats and an armed transport under Com'r R. Renshaw; while the defenses were well placed and in good condition. Hill had here his corps, estimated by Foster at 20,000 strong, with 50 guns. But he paused three days before assaulting; which precious time was well improved by the garrison in strengthening and perfecting their works—Foster peremptorily refusing to allow any espionage of his doings under the pretense of summoning him to surrender. Those days being ended, it was understood on our side that an order to assault was given, but not obeyed—our works being deemed too strong to justify the risk. Hill now commenced a siege in due form; mounting guns on the several ridges commanding the town, with one on Rodman's Point, across the river; our small force posted there being easily

[67] Oct. 26. [68] Oct. 5. [69] Dec. 6. [70] March 14. [71] March 30.

expelled. As this position enabled the enemy to shell the town and our vessels lying before it, Foster attempted to recover it by an assault, but failed; and a second attempt, aided by the gunboat Ceres, which had just come up, running the Rebel batteries, was defeated by the untimely grounding of that vessel.

Hill, having opened upon our works with 14 heavy guns, Fort Washington replied; and a mutual bombardment for 12 days was only interrupted by the failure of our ammunition.

Meantime, a small fleet of gunboats had arrived below the Rebel batteries commanding the river, with a relieving force of 3,000 men on transports, under Brig.-Gen. Henry Prince, whom Foster ordered to land and take the Hill's Point battery, so as to allow the boats to come up. Prince decided this impracticable, and refused to attempt it.

Foster was now obliged to supply his batteries with ammunition by means of sail and row-boats, which stole up the river under the cover of darkness; evading Hill's guard-boats, which were on the lookout to intercept them. Thus, he generally received enough during each night to serve his batteries for the ensuing day.

At length, the steamboat Escort, Capt. Hall, having on board the 5th Rhode Island, with a supply of ammunition, ran the blockade by night,[73] and arrived safely at the wharf, giving matters a very different aspect; so Foster returned in her by daylight[74] to Newbern; she receiving, on her way down the river, 47 shots, which killed her pilot and killed or wounded 7 of her crew; but her machinery was so shielded by pressed hay-bales that the gunboat was not disabled.

And now, putting himself at the head of 7,000 men who, under Gen. J. N. Palmer, had been quietly awaiting at Newbern the issue of the siege, Foster started[75] by land to fight his way back; gathering up Prince's 3,000 men by the way, and occupying, next day, Hill's Point battery, which the enemy abandoned on his approach. Pushing on, he found Hill in full retreat, and was unable to bring him to a stand. Of course, the presumption is strong that Hill's force had been over-estimated by Foster at 20,000.

An expedition composed of three Mass. regiments, under Col. J. R. Jones, was soon dispatched[76] to capture a Rebel outpost at Gum Swamp, 8 miles from Kinston; and was partially successful, taking 165 prisoners; but the enemy attacked our outpost in return, killing Col. Jones and inflicting some other loss, though finally repulsed.

A cavalry raid, supported by infantry, to Warsaw,[77] on the Weldon and Wilmington Railroad, and another, soon afterward, to the Rocky Mount station, proved successful: the railroad being broken in either instance, and considerable property destroyed; Tarborough being captured, and several steamers burned there, during the latter.

Gen. Foster was soon ordered[77] to Fortress Monroe—his command being enlarged to embrace that section of Virginia—but no important movement occurred till he was relieved[78] by Gen. Butler, and ordered to succeed Gen. Burnside in East Tennessee.

[73] April 12. [74] April 14. [75] April 17. [76] May 21. [77] July 3. [77] July 13. [78] Oct. 28.

XXI.

THE POLITICAL OR CIVIL HISTORY OF 1863.

UNQUESTIONABLY, the darkest hours of the National cause were those which separated Burnside's and Sherman's bloody repulses, at Fredericksburg[1] and Vicksburg[2] respectively from the triumphs of Meade at Gettysburg,[3] Grant in the fall of Vicksburg,[4] and Banks in the surrender of Port Hudson.[5] Our intermediate and subordinate reverses at Galveston,[6] and at Chancellorsville,[7] also tended strongly to sicken the hearts of Unionists and strengthen into confidence the hopes of the Rebels and those who, whether in the loyal States or in foreign lands, were in sympathy, if not also in act, their virtual allies. No one in Europe but those who ardently desired our success spoke of disunion otherwise than as an accomplished fact, which only purblind obstinacy and the invincible lust of power constrained us for a time to ignore. Hence, when the French Emperor made, during the dark Winter of 1862–3, a formal, diplomatic proffer[8] of his good offices as a mediator between the American belligerents, he was regarded and treated on all hands as proposing to arrange the terms of a just, satisfactory, and conclusive separation between the North and the South. Even before this, and before the repulse of Burnside at Fredericksburg, Lord Lyons, British Embassador at Washington, had sent a confidential dispatch to his Government, narrating the incidents of a visit he had paid to New York directly after our State Election of 1862, wherein Horatio Seymour was chosen Governor and an average majority of over 10,000 returned for the Democratic tickets: he reasonably claiming that vote, with the corresponding results of elections in other loyal States, as a popular verdict against the further prosecution of the War for the Union. While discouraging any present proffer of European mediation, as calculated to discredit and embarrass the 'Conservatives,' and to inspirit and inflame the 'Radicals,' who were still intent on subjugating the South, and would hear nothing of conceded Disunion or of foreign intervention, Lord Lyons gives the following comprehensive and evidently dispassionate view of the current aspects of our domestic politics, as they were presented to his keenly observant vision:

"WASHINGTON, NOV. 17, 1862.

"In his dispatches of the 17th and of the 24th ultimo, and of the 7th instant, Mr. Stuart reported to your lordship the result of the elections for members of Congress and State officers, which have recently taken place in several of the most important States of the Union. Without repeating the details, it will be sufficient for me to observe that the success of the Democratic, or (as it now styles itself) the Conservative party, has been so great as to manifest a change in public feeling, among the most rapid and the most complete that has ever been witnessed, even in this country.

"On my arrival at New York on the 8th instant, I found the Conservative leaders exulting in the crowning success achieved by the party in that State. They appeared to rejoice, above all, in the conviction that per-

[1] Dec. 13, 1862. [2] Dec. 28. [3] July 3, 1863. [4] July 4. [5] July 9. [6] Jan. 1, 1863. [7] May 3–5, 1863. [8] By dispatch of M. Drouyn de l'Huys, Jan. 9, 1863.

sonal liberty and freedom of speech had been secured for the principal State of the Union. They believed that the Government must at once desist from exercising in the State of New York the extraordinary (and as they regarded them) illegal and unconstitutional powers which it had assumed. They were confident that, at all events, after the 1st of January next, on which day the newly elected Governor would come into office, the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* could not be practically maintained. They seemed to be persuaded that the result of the elections would be accepted by the President as a declaration of the will of the people; that he would increase the moderate and conservative element in the Cabinet; that he would seek to terminate the War, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South, and renounce the idea of subjugating or exterminating them.

"On the following morning, however, intelligence arrived from Washington which dashed the rising hopes of the Conservatives. It was announced that Gen. McClellan had been dismissed from the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to repair to his home; that he had, in fact, been removed altogether from active service. The General had been regarded as the representative of Conservative principles in the army. Support of him had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself entirely into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and that the attempt to carry out the policy of that party would be persisted in. The irritation of the Conservatives at New York was certainly very great; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed with consternation and despondency.

"Several of the leaders of the Democratic party sought interviews with me, both before and after the arrival of the intelligence of Gen. McClellan's dismissal. The subject uppermost in their minds, while they were speaking to me, was naturally that of foreign mediation between the North and the South. Many of them seemed to think that this mediation must come at last; but they appeared to be very much afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating the peaceful plans of the Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present moment as peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad that it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Government should be in the hands of the Conservative party.

"I gave no opinion on the subject. I did not say whether or no I myself thought foreign intervention probable or advisable; but I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom, I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was plain that it was not thought prudent to avow this desire. Indeed, some hints of it, dropped before the elections, were so ill received that a strong declaration in the contrary sense was deemed necessary by the Democratic leaders.

"At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of the Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, and reproach the Government with slackness as well as with want of success in its military measures. But they repudiate all idea of interfering with the institutions of the Southern people, or of waging a war of subjugation or extermination. They maintain that the object of the military operations should be to place the North in a position to demand an armistice with honor and effect. The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a Convention, in which such changes of the Constitution should be proposed as would give the South ample security on the subject of its slave property, and would enable the North and the South to rēunite and to live together in peace and harmony. The Conservatives profess to think that the South might be induced to take part in such a Convention, and that a restoration of the Union would be the result.

"The more sagacious members of the party must, however, look upon the proposal of a Convention merely as a last experiment to test the possibility of rēunion. They are no doubt well aware that the more probable consequence of an armistice would be the establishment of Southern independence; but they perceive that, if the South is so utterly alienated that no possible concessions will induce it to return voluntarily to the Union, it is wiser to agree to separation than to prosecute a cruel and hopeless war.

"It is with reference to such an armistice as they desire to attain, that the leaders of the Conservative party regard the question of foreign mediation. They think that the offer of mediation, if made to a Radical administration, would be rejected; that, if made at an unpropitious moment, it might increase the virulence with which the war is prosecuted. If their own party were in power, or virtually controlled the administration, they would rather, if possible, obtain an armistice without the aid of foreign governments; but they would be disposed to

accept an offer of mediation if it appeared to be the only means of putting a stop to hostilities. They would desire that the offer should come from the great powers of Europe conjointly, and in particular that as little prominence as possible should be given to Great Britain."

The State elections of 1863 opened in New Hampshire;[9] where the Republican party barely escaped defeat; losing one of the three Representatives in Congress for the first time in some years, and saving their Governor through his election by the Legislature; he not having even a plurality of the popular vote.[10] The regular Democratic poll was larger than at any former election.

The next State to hold her Election was Rhode Island;[11] where the Republicans triumphed, electing both Representatives in Congress as well as their State ticket; but by a majority[12] considerably reduced from that exhibited on any clear trial of party strength for some years.

Connecticut had, by common consent, been chosen as the arena of a determined trial of strength, at her State Election this Spring,[13] between the supporters and opponents respectively of the War for the Union. The nomination for Governor by the Republicans of William A. Buckingham, the incumbent, who had, both officially and personally, been a strenuous and prominent champion of 'coercion,' was fairly countered by the presentation, as his competitor, of Col. Thomas H. Seymour, an ex-Governor of decided personal popularity, but an early, consistent, outspoken contemner of the War—or rather, of the National side of it. His nomination was made by a very large Convention, and with a degree of unanimity and genuine enthusiasm rarely manifested; while the canvass that ensued thereon was one of the most animated and energetic ever witnessed even in that closely balanced State: its result being the triumph of the Republicans by a much reduced but still decisive majority.[14] It is quite probable that a candidate less decidedly and conspicuously hostile to the War than Col. Seymour might, while polling fewer votes, have come much nearer an election; since Seymour's nomination was a challenge to the War party which incited it to the most vehement exertions.

No other general Election was held in any of the loyal States during the earlier half of 1863; yet the result in these three—though maintaining the Republican ascendency in each—left no room for reasonable doubt that, apart from the soldiers in the field, a majority of the voters in the loyal States were still—as had been indicated by the results of the elections during the later months of 1862[15]—opposed to a further prosecution of the War, and certainly opposed to its prosecution on the anti-Slavery basis established by the action of Congress and by the President's two Proclamations of Sept. 22, 1862, and Jan. 1, 1863. If called to vote directly on the question of making peace on the basis of a recognition of the Southern Confederacy, some of those who voted the Opposition

[9] March 10.

[10] Eastman, Dem., 32,833; Gilmore, Rep., 29,035; Harriman, Union or War Dem., 4,372: Eastman lacks of a majority, 574. [11] April 1.

[12] For Governor: Smith, Rep., 10,828; Cozzens, Dem., 7,537. [13] April 6.

[14] Buckingham, 41,032; Seymour, 38,395.

[15] See page 254.

tickets might—as was indicated by Lord Lyons—have shrunk from an open committal to such a peace; but it is none the less certain that their attitude and action tended directly to insure a result which their bolder or more candid compatriots frankly proclaimed inevitable. Many who adhered to the Democratic organization asserted, what some, at least, must have believed—that the Confederates, in spite of their persistent, peremptory denials and disclaimers, might yet, by conciliatory overtures and proper concessions, be reconciled to a restoration of the Union; but very few who still adhered to that body, out of the army, averred that, if all proffers and guaranties should be rejected, they would favor a prosecution of the War for their subjugation.

The Rebel Congress having long since passed [16] a conscription act, whereby all the White males in the Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through the War, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, since our heavy losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The act providing "for the enrollment of the National forces" was among the last passed [17] by the XXXVIIth Congress prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by Federal provost-marshals and enrolling officers, of all able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens who had declared their intention to become naturalized, between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to constitute the first class; all others the second class—from which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the National armies for not more than three years; any one drafted and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as a deserter. A commutation of $300 was to be received in lieu of such service: and there were exemptions provided of certain heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the residue of a family which has already two members in the service, &c., &c.

The passage and execution of this act inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of opposition to the War. Those who detested every form of 'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels, with those who especially detested the National effort under its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the division being, so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the Senate, a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely postponed was supported

[16] April 16, 1862.

[17] March 3, 1863.

by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays: consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs. McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith, of Oregon. The bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays.

The President proceeding to constitute an enrolling board for each Congress district in the loyal States, and the Board to enroll those who were held to military service under its provisions, the repugnance to being drafted into the service began to threaten organized and formidable resistance. That the enrolling act was unconstitutional and void, was very generally held and proclaimed by the Opposition, and was in due time formally adjudged by Justice John H. McCunn, of the New York Supreme Court, as also by the Democratic justices[18] forming a majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. That Court held broadly that the Federal Government has no power to recruit its armies otherwise than by voluntary enlistments; that the Militia can be called out only by State authority, under State officers, and in accordance with State laws. Says Judge Woodward:

"The great vice of the conscript law is, that it is founded on an assumption that Congress may take away, not the State rights of the citizen, but the security and foundation of his State rights. And how long is civil liberty expected to last, after the securities of civil liberty are destroyed? The Constitution of the United States committed the liberties of the citizen in part to the Federal Government, but expressly reserved to the States, and the people of the States, all it did not delegate. It gave the General Government a standing army, but left to the States their militia. Its purposes, in all this balancing of powers, were wise and good; but this legislation disregards these distinctions and upturns the whole system of government when it converts the State militia into 'National forces,' and claims to use and govern them as such."

If, then, the Governors of the States, or of most of them, should see fit to respond to the President's requisitions as Gov. Caleb Strong, of Massachusetts, did to those of President Madison in 1813–14, and as Govs. Letcher,[19] Ellis, Harris, Magoffin, Jackson, and Burton, did to President Lincoln's requisitions in 1861, the Federal authority may be successfully defied, and what Mr. Jefferson Davis terms "the dissolution of a league" secured. It were absurd to contend that judges who so held were opposed, either in principle or in sympathies, to the cause, or at least to the ethics, of Secession.

The Constitution of the United States (Art. I., § 9) prescribes that

"The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."

The implication that it *may be* suspended in the cases specified is so irresistible that its justice has never been seriously questioned. But *by whom* may it be suspended? And with what effect? That Congress should authorize the suspension, was generally held by the early and esteemed commentators: but suppose Congress not in session—nay, suppose no Congress to be in existence—when a great and imminent public peril shall require such suspension—what then? To this question, no conclusive answer had been given, when, at the very outbreak of the Rebellion, the President authorized[20] Gen. Scott to suspend the privilege of *habeas corpus*,

[18] Chief Justice Lowrie and Justices Woodward and Thompson.

[19] See Vol. I., pp. 459–60. The Democratic Governors were a unit. [20] April 27, 1861.

"if, at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington, you find resistance which renders it necessary."

A similar discretion was soon afterward[21] accorded to our commander on the Florida coast; the authority conferred on Gen. Scott was soon extended;[22] it was next made[23] general so far as it might affect persons arrested by military authority as guilty of disloyal practices; and — Congress having at length by express act authorized[24] such suspension—the President proclaimed[25] a general suspension of the privilege of *habeas corpus*—to "continue throughout the duration of such Rebellion." But, months ere this, a serious collision between military authority and Peace Democracy had been inaugurated, and had created much excitement, in Ohio.

Mr. C. L. Vallandigham, having been defeated in his canvass for re-election by Gen. Robert C. Schenck, at the Ohio State Election in 1862, ceased to be a Member at the close of the XXXVIIth Congress.[26] Returning to Ohio, where he had already been suggested as the Democratic candidate for Governor in the canvass of that year, he speedily engaged in a popular canvass of the War and the Federal Administration, in a spirit of sweeping hostility to both. Gen. Burnside, who had just been transferred to and placed in command of the military department including Ohio, put forth[27] a general order, wherein he proclaimed that henceforth

"All persons found within our lines who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death. * * * The habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested, with a view to being tried, as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends. It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department."

Whether this was specially aimed at Vallandigham or not, it was easily foreseen that he would be one of the first to expose himself to its penalties; and but three weeks elapsed from the date of the order before he was arrested[28] at night while in bed in his own house, on a charge of having, in a recent speech at Mount Vernon,

"publicly expressed sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, and declared disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful Rebellion."

Being arraigned before a Court-Martial over which Brig.-Gen. R. B. Potter presided, he was found guilty on some of the specifications embraced in the charge, and sentenced to close confinement till the end of the War. Gen. Burnside designated Fort Warren, in Boston harbor, as the place of such confinement; but the President modified the sentence into a direction that Mr. V. should be sent through our military lines into the Southern Confederacy, and, in case of his return therefrom, he should be confined as prescribed in the sentence of the court. Judge Leavitt, of the U. S. District Court for Ohio, was applied to for a writ of *habeas corpus* to take the prisoner out of the hands of the military, but refused it.

This sentence was duly executed by Gen. Rosecrans, so far as to send the convict into the Confederacy;

[21] May 2. [22] July 2. [23] Sept. 24, '62. [24] May 3. [25] Sept. 15. [26] March 3, '63. [27] April 3. [28] May 4.

but he remained there only a few weeks, taking a blockade-runner from Wilmington to Nassau, and thence making his way in due time to Canada, where he remained: having meantime been nominated for Governor by an overwhelming vote in a large Democratic State Convention, and with an understanding that, in case of his anticipated election, he should be escorted from the State line to its capital by a volunteer procession of Democrats strong enough to resist successfully any attempt to rëarrest him.

The action in this case of Gen. Burnside and his Court Martial created a profound sensation throughout the country; and a great meeting of Democrats was held[29] at Albany, wherein very strong resolves condemning such action were unanimously passed—among them the following:

"*Resolved*, That we denounce the recent assumption of a military commander to seize and try a citizen of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration and in condemnation of the military orders of that General.

"*Resolved*, That this assumption of power by a military tribunal, if successfully asserted, not only abrogates the right of the people to assemble and discuss the affairs of government, the liberty of speech and of the press, the right of trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the privilege of *habeas corpus*, but it strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law and the authority of the State and Federal Constitutions.

"*Resolved*, That the Constitution of the United States—the supreme law of the land—has defined the crime of treason against the United States to consist 'only in levying war against them, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort,' and has provided that 'no person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.' And it further provides that 'no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land and naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;' and further, that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime was committed.'

"*Resolved*, That, in the election of Gov. Seymour, the people of this State, by an emphatic majority, declared their condemnation of the system of arbitrary arrests and their determination to stand by the Constitution. That the revival of this lawless system can have but one result: to divide and distract the North, and destroy its confidence in the purposes of the Administration. That we deprecate it as an element of confusion at home, of weakness to our armies in the field, and as calculated to lower the estimate of American character and magnify the apparent peril of our cause abroad. And that, regarding the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio as aimed at the rights of every citizen of the North, we denounce it as against the spirit of our laws and Constitution, and most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a 'cruel and unusual punishment' upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the Constitution, and to restore him to the liberty of which he has been deprived."

Hon. Erastus Corning, President of the meeting, transmitted, by its order, these resolves to President Lincoln; who, after taking ample time to consider them, responded frankly, courteously, elaborately, cogently; and, as the subject discussed is one of grave, abiding interest, the material portion of his reply will here be given. He says:

"The resolutions promise to support me in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the Rebellion; and I have not knowingly employed, nor shall knowingly employ, any other. But the meeting, by their resolutions, assert and argue that certain military arrests, and proceedings following them, for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are not. The resolutions quote from the Constitution the definition of treason, and also the limiting safeguards and guaranties therein provided for the citizen on trial for

[29] May 16.

treason, and on his being held to answer for capital or otherwise infamous crimes, and, in criminal prosecutions, his right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. They proceed to resolve, 'that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more *especially* for his protection in times of civil commotion.' And, apparently to demonstrate the proposition, the resolutions proceed: 'They were secured substantially to the English people *after* years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our Constitution at the *close* of the Revolution.' Would not the demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said that these safeguards had been adopted and applied *during* the civil wars, and *during* our Revolution, instead of *after* the one and at the *close* of the other? I, too, am devotedly for them *after* civil war, and *before* civil war, and at all times, 'except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require' their suspension. The resolutions proceed to tell us that these safeguards 'have stood the test of seventy-six years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances which show that, while they constitute the foundation of all free government, they are elements of the enduring stability of the Republic.' No one denies that they have so stood the test up to the beginning of the present Rebellion, if we except a certain occurrence at New Orleans; nor does any one question that they will stand the same test much longer after the Rebellion closes. But these provisions of the Constitution have no application to the case we have in hand, because the arrests complained of were not made for treason—that is, not for *the* treason defined in the Constitution, and upon conviction of which the punishment is death—nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings following, in any constitutional or legal sense, 'criminal prosecutions.' The arrests were made on totally different grounds, and the proceedings following accorded with the grounds of the arrest. Let us consider the real case with which we are dealing, and apply to it the parts of the Constitution plainly made for such cases.

"Prior to my installation here, it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the national Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The Rebellion thus began soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that, in their own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law, all together, the Government would, in great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of 'liberty of speech,' 'liberty of the press,' and '*habeas corpus*,' they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that, in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself, the '*habeas corpus*' might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile, their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases: and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be at least of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's programme, so soon as by open hostilities their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert; and this in quiet times, and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace, bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison, in numbers, have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet,

again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

"Ours is a case of rebellion—so called by the resolutions before me—in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision of the Constitution, that 'the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is *the* provision which specially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the Constitution, that ordinary courts of justice are inadequate to 'cases of rebellion'—attests their purpose that, in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. *Habeas corpus* does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is allowed by the Constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and held who cannot be proved to be guilty of defined crime, 'when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.'

"This is precisely our present case—a case of rebellion, wherein the public safety *does* require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts and arrests in cases of rebellion do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime; while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case, arrests are made, not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases, the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing, when the peril of his Government is discussed, cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more, if he talks ambiguously—talks for his country with 'buts' and 'ifs' and 'ands.' Of how little value the constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, Gen. Robert E. Lee, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Gen. John B. Magruder, Gen. William Preston, Gen. Simon B. Buckner, and Com. Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the Rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the Rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably, if we had seized them and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on *habeas corpus*, were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

"By the third resolution, the meeting indicate their opinion that military arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion actually exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities where rebellion or insurrection does *not* actually exist. They insist that such arrests shall not be made 'outside of the lines of necessary military occupation, and the scenes of insurrection.' Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there *is* any such constitutional distinction. I concede that the class of arrests complained of can be constitutional only when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them, and I insist that in such cases they are constitutional *wherever* the public safety *does* require them; as well in places to which they may prevent the rebellion extending, as in those where it may be already prevailing; as well where they may restrain mischievous interference with the raising and supplying of armies to suppress the rebellion, as where the rebellion may actually be; as well where they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they would prevent mutiny in the army; equally constitutional at all places where they will conduce to the public safety, as against the dangers of rebellion or invasion! Take the peculiar case mentioned by the meeting. It is asserted, in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the General.' Now, if there be no mistake about this; if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth; if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops; to encour-

age desertions from the army; and to leave the Rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the commanding General, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military; and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence.

"I understand the meeting, whose resolutions I am considering, to be in favor of suppressing the Rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertions shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional but withal a great mercy.

"If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in the absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does *not* require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not, in its application, in all respects the same, in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction; and I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown not to be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the Rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and *habeas corpus*, throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during a temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life. * * *

"One of the resolutions expresses the opinion of the meeting that arbitrary arrests will have the effect to divide and distract those who should be united in suppressing the Rebellion; and I am specifically called on to discharge Mr. Vallandigham. I regard this as, at least, a fair appeal to me on the expediency of exercising a constitutional power which I think exists. In response to such appeal, I have to say, it gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandigham had been arrested—that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him—and that it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I can, by any means, believe the public safety will not suffer by it."

The Ohio Democratic Convention, which met [30] at Columbus, and by acclamation nominated Mr. Vallandigham as their candidate for Governor, passed resolves strongly condemning his banishment as a palpable violation of four specified provisions of the Federal Constitution, and appointed their President and Vice-Presidents (nearly all Members or ex-Members of Congress) a Committee to address the President in favor of a revocation of the order of banishment. In obeying this direction, that Committee, claiming to utter the sentiments of a majority of the people of Ohio, said: [31]

"Mr. Vallandigham may differ with the President, and even with some of his own political party, as to the true and most effectual means of maintaining the Constitution and restoring the Union; but this difference of opinion does not prove him to be unfaithful to his duties as an American citizen. If a man, devotedly attached to

[30] June 11.

[31] June 26.

the Constitution and the Union, conscientiously believes that, from the inherent nature of the Federal compact, the war, in the present condition of things in this country, cannot be used as a means of restoring the Union; or that a war to subjugate a part of the States, or a war to revolutionize the social system in a part of the States, could not restore, but would inevitably result in the final destruction of, both the Constitution and the Union, is he not to be allowed the right of an American citizen to appeal to the judgment of the people for a change of policy by the constitutional remedy of the ballot-box?

"The undersigned are unable to agree with you in the opinion you have expressed, that the Constitution is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security. The Constitution provides for no limitation upon or exceptions to the guaranties of personal liberty, except as to the writ of *habeas corpus*. Has the President, at the time of invasion or insurrection, the right to engraft limitations or exceptions upon these constitutional guaranties whenever, in his judgment, the public safety requires it?

"True it is, the article of the Constitution which defines the various powers delegated to Congress declares that 'the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.' But this qualification or limitation upon this restriction upon the powers of Congress has no reference to or connection with the other constitutional guaranties of personal liberty. Expunge from the Constitution this limitation upon the power of Congress to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, and yet the other guaranties of personal liberty would remain unchanged."

Mr. Lincoln responded [23] pungently to this appeal, but less elaborately than he had done to the Albany arraignment; deeming the argument in good part exhausted. On the main point, he said:

"The earnestness with which you insist that persons can only, in times of rebellion, be lawfully dealt with, in accordance with the rules for criminal trials and punishments in times of peace, induces me to add a word to what I said on that point in the Albany response. You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those whose duty it is to combat a giant rebellion, and then be dealt with only in turn as if there were no rebellion. The Constitution itself rejects this view. The military arrests and detentions which have been made, including those of Mr. Vallandigham, which are not different in principle from the other, have been for *prevention*, and not for *punishment*—as injunctions to stay injury, as proceedings to keep the peace—and hence, like proceedings in such cases and for like reasons, they have not been accompanied with indictments, or trials by juries, nor, in a single case, by any punishment whatever, beyond what is purely incidental to the prevention. The original sentence of imprisonment in Mr. Vallandigham's case was to prevent injury to the military service only; and the modification of it was made as a less disagreeable mode to him of securing the same prevention."

In drawing his argument to a close, the President said:

"You omit to state or intimate that, in your opinion, an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time, your nominee for Governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the Rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like; because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so.

"After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength, to the enemy. It is a false hope, and one which you would willingly dispel. I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter, in order that you, or a majority, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them, and return it thus indorsed to me, with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions, and to nothing else:

"1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is, to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion.

[23] June 29.

"2. That no one of you will do any thing which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

"3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the Rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

"And with the further understanding that, upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published; which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham.

"It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him, or from others, as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and hence I shall expect that on returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public service may seem to require.

"I have the honor to be, respectfully, yours, &c., A. LINCOLN."

The Committee rejoined,[33] controverting the President's positions; repelling his imputation that they or their party would encourage desertions, or resistance to the draft, suggesting that

"The measures of the Administration, and its *changes of policy* in the prosecution of the war, have been the fruitful sources of discouraging enlistments and inducing desertions, and furnish a reason for the undeniable fact that the first call for volunteers was answered by very many more than were demanded, and that the next call for soldiers will probably be responded to by drafted men alone."

They express surprise at the President's proffer to revoke the banishment of Mr. V. on the conditions above specified, and decline to "enter into any bargains, terms, contracts, or conditions, with the President of the United States, to procure the release of Mr. Vallandigham. They regard the proffer as involving an imputation on their own sincerity and fidelity as citizens of the United States;" and declare that

"they have asked the revocation of the order of banishment not as a favor, but as a *right* due to the people of Ohio, and with a view to avoid the possibility of conflict or disturbance of the public tranquillity."

At this point, the argument of this grave question, concerning the right, in time of war, of those who question the justice or the policy of such war, to denounce its prosecution as mistaken and ruinous, was rested by the President and his assailants—or rather, it was transferred[34] by the

[33] July 1.

[34] The arbitrary suppression, within a certain military department, by the General commanding therein, of the circulation of two or three journals deemed by him disloyal, having provoked much discussion and excited some alarm, a meeting of the journalists of New York was held at the Astor House, June 8th, and the following declaration of sentiments unanimously adopted:

"*Whereas*, Recent events indicate the existence of grave misapprehensions and lamentable confusion of ideas with regard to this vital question; therefore,

"*Resolved*, That our conceptions of the rights and duties of the Press, in a season of convulsion and public peril, like the present, are briefly summed up in the following propositions:

"1. We recognize and affirm the duty of fidelity to the Constitution, Government, and laws of our country, as a high moral as well as political obligation resting on every citizen; and neither claim for ourselves nor concede to others any exemption from its requirements or privilege to evade their sacred and binding force.

"2. That Treason and Rebellion are crimes, by the fundamental law of this as of every other country; and nowhere else so culpable, so abhorrent, as in a republic, where each has an equal voice and vote in the peaceful and legal direction of public affairs.

"3. While we thus emphatically disclaim and

latter to the popular forum, where—especially in Ohio—it was continued with decided frankness as well as remarkable pertinacity and vehemence. And one natural consequence of such discussion was to render the Democratic party more decidedly, openly, palpably, anti-War than it had hitherto been.

Perhaps the very darkest days that the Republic ever saw were the ten which just preceded the 4th of July, 1863—when our oft-beaten Army of the Potomac was moving northward to cover Washington and Baltimore—when Milroy's demolition at Winchester seemed to have filled the bitter cup held to our lips at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville—when tidings of the displacement of Hooker by Meade, just on the eve of a great, decisive battle, were received with a painful surprise by many sad, sinking hearts—when Grant was held at bay by Vicksburg and Banks by Port Hudson; while Rosecrans had for half a year stood still in Middle Tennessee. At this hour of national peril and depression, when the early appearance of Lee's victory-crowned legions in the streets of Philadelphia and New York was confidently, exultingly anticipated by thousands, our leading Democratic statesmen and orators were preparing orations and addresses for the approaching anniversary of our National Independence, which were in due time delivered to applauding, enthusiastic thousands, though the speakers were generally as chary as the Ohio Democratic State Committee of admitting the existence in our country of a gigantic Rebellion, and insisting on the duty of aiding in its suppression. Not the Rebel chiefs conspiring, nor the Rebel armies advancing at their behest, to overthrow the Government and sever finally the Union, but the directors and chief functionaries of that Government, were regarded and reprobated by those orators as public enemies to be combated, resisted, and overcome.

Ex-President Franklin Pierce[35] was the orator at a great Democratic mass meeting held at Concord, N. H.; and, in his carefully prepared oration, amid the ringing acclaim of thousands, he said:

"The Declaration of Independence laid the foundation of our political greatness in the two fundamental ideas of the absolute independence of the American people, and of the sovereignty of their respective States. Under that standard, our wise and heroic forefathers fought the battle of the Revolution; under that they conquered. In this spirit, they established the Union; having the conservative thought ever present to their minds, of the original sovereignty and independence of the several States, all with their diverse institutions, interests, opinions, and habits, to be maintained intact and secure, by the reciprocal stipulations and mutual compromises of the Constitution. They were master builders, who reared up the grand structure of the Union—that august temple beneath whose dome three generations have enjoyed such blessings of civil liberty as were never before vouchsafed by Providence to man—that temple before whose altars you and I have not only bowed with devout and grateful hearts, but where, with patriotic vows and sacrifices, we have

deny any right, as inhering in journalists or others, to incite, advocate, abet, uphold, or justify treason or rebellion, we respectfully but firmly assert and maintain the right of the Press to criticise freely and fearlessly the acts of those charged with the administration of the government, also those of all their civil and military subordinates, whether with intent directly to secure greater energy, efficiency, and fidelity in the public service, or in order to achieve the same ends more remotely, through the substitution of other persons for those now in power.

"4. That any limitations of this right created by the necessities of war should be confined to localities wherein hostilities actually exist, or are imminently threatened; and we deny the right of any military officer to suppress the issues or forbid the general circulation of journals printed hundreds of miles from the seat of war."

[35] See his letter to Jeff. Davis, Vol. I., p. 512.

so frequently consecrated ourselves to the protection and maintenance of those lofty columns of the Constitution by which it was upheld. No visionary enthusiasts were they, dreaming vainly of the impossible uniformity of some wild Utopia of their own imaginations. No desperate reformers were they, madly bent upon schemes which, if consummated, could only result in general confusion, anarchy, and chaos. Oh, no! high-hearted, but sagacious and practical statesmen they were, who saw society as a living fact, not as a troubled vision; who knew that national power consists in the reconcilement of diversities of institutions and interests, not their conflict and obliteration; and who saw that variety and adaptation of parts are the necessary elements of all there is sublime or beautiful in the works of art or of nature. Majestic were the solid foundations, the massive masonry, the columned loftiness, of that magnificent structure of the Union. Glorious was the career of prosperity and peace and power upon which, from its very birthday, the American Union entered, as with the assured march of the conscious offspring of those giants of the Revolution. Such was the Union, as conceived and administered by Washington and Adams, by Jefferson and Madison and Jackson. Such, I say, was the Union, ere the evil times befell us; ere the madness of sectional hatreds and animosities possessed us; ere, in the third generation, the all-comprehensive patriotism of the Fathers had died out, and given place to the passionate emotions of narrow and aggressive sectionalism. * * * Glorious, sublime above all that history records of national greatness, was the spectacle which the Union exhibited to the world, so long as the true spirit of the Constitution lived in the hearts of the people, and the government was a government of men reciprocally respecting one another's rights, and of States, each moving, planet-like, in the orbit of its proper place in the firmament of the Union. Then we were the model republic of the world, honored, loved, or feared where we were not loved, respected abroad, peaceful and happy at home. No American citizen was then subject to be driven into exile for opinion's sake, or arbitrarily arrested and incarcerated in military bastiles —even as he may now be—not for acts or words of imputed treason, but if he do but mourn in silent sorrow over the desolation of his country; no embattled hosts of Americans were then wasting their lives and resources in sanguinary civil strife; no suicidal and parricidal civil war then swept like a raging tempest of death over the stricken homesteads and wailing cities of the Union. Oh, that such a change should have come over our country, in a day, as it were—as if all men in every State of the Union, North and South, East and West, were suddenly smitten with homicidal madness, and 'the custom of fell deeds' rendered as familiar as if it were a part of our inborn nature; as if an avenging angel had been suffered by Providence to wave a sword of flaming fire above our heads, to convert so many millions of good men, living together in brotherly love, into insensate beings, savagely bent on the destruction of themselves and of each other, and leaving but a smouldering ruin of conflagration and of blood in the place of our once blessèd Union. I endeavor sometimes to close my ears to the sounds and my eyes to the sights of woe, and to ask myself whether all this can be—to inquire which is true, whether the past happiness and prosperity of my country are but the flattering vision of a happy sleep, or its present misery and desolation haply the delusion of some disturbed dream. One or the other seems incredible and impossible: but, alas! the stern truth can not thus be dispelled from our minds. Can you forget, ought I especially to be expected to forget, those not remote days in the history of our country, when its greatness and glory shed the reflection at least of their rays upon all our lives, and thus enabled us to read the lessons of the fathers, and of their Constitution, in the light of their principles and their deeds? Then war was conducted only against the foreign enemy, and not in the spirit and purpose of persecuting non-combatant populations, nor of burning undefended towns or private dwellings, and wasting the fields of the husbandmen, or the workshops of the artisan, but of subduing armed hosts in the field. * * * How is all this changed! And why? Do we not all know that the cause of our calamities is the vicious intermeddling of too many of the citizens of the Northern States with the constitutional rights of the Southern States, cōoperating with the discontents of the people of those States? Do we not know that the disregard of the Constitution, and of the security it affords to the rights of States and of individuals, has been the cause of the calamity which our country is called to undergo? And now, war! war, in its direst shape—war, such as it makes the blood run cold to read of in the history of other nations and of other times—war, on a scale of a million of men in arms—war, horrid as that of barbaric ages, rages in several of the States of the Union, as its more immediate field, and casts the lurid shadow of its death and lamentation athwart the whole expanse, and into every nook and corner of our vast domain. Nor is that all; for in those of the States which are exempt from the actual ravages of war, in which the roar of the

cannon, and the rattle of the musketry, and the groans of the dying, are heard but as a faint echo of terror from other lands, even here in the loyal States, the mailed hand of military usurpation strikes down the liberties of the people, and its foot tramples on a desecrated Constitution. Ay, in this land of free thought, free speech, and free writing—in this republic of free suffrage, with liberty of thought and expression as the very essence of republican institutions—even here, in these free States, it is made criminal * * * for that noble martyr of free speech, Mr. Vallandigham, to discuss public affairs in Ohio—ay, even here, the temporary agents of the sovereign people, the transitory administrators of the government, tell us that in time of war the mere arbitrary will of the President takes the place of the Constitution, and the President himself announces to us that it is treasonable to speak or to write otherwise than as he may prescribe; nay, that it is treasonable even to be silent, though we be struck dumb by the shock of the calamities with which evil counsels, incompetency, and corruption, have overwhelmed our country."

Considering that Gen. Lee, at the head of a formidable Southern army, composed in good part of the Virginians like himself, was on the soil of the Free States when this address was written, intent on compelling them, by force of arms, to submit to a dissolution of the Union, the following passage can hardly be surpassed:

"I trust it may be profitable on this occasion, as the call of your meeting suggests, to revive the memories of that heroic epoch of the republic, even though they come laden with regrets, and hold up that period of our history in contrast with the present—though they come to remind us of what were our relations during the Revolution, and in later years, prior to 1861, to that great commonwealth which we were accustomed to refer to by the name of 'the Mother of Statesmen and of States;' and of what those relations now are. Can it be that we are never to think again of the land where the dust of Washington and Patrick Henry, of Jefferson and Madison, repose, with emotions of gratitude, admiration, and filial regard? Is hate for all that Virginia has taught, all that Virginia has done, all that Virginia now is, to take the place of sentiments which we have cherished all our lives? Other men may be asked to do this; but it is in vain to appeal to me. So far as my heart is concerned, it is not a subject of volition. While there may be those in whose breasts such sentiments as these awaken no responsive feeling, I feel assured, as I look over this vast assemblage, that the grateful emotions which have signalized this anniversary in all our past history are not less yours than they are mine to-day. Let us be thankful, at least, that we have ever enjoyed them; that nothing can take from us the pride and exultation we have felt as we saw the old flag unfold over us, and realized its glorious accretion of stars from the original thirteen to thirty-four; that we say much, when we say, in the language of New Hampshire's greatest son, if we can with assurance say no more: 'The past at least is secure.'"

Mr. Pierce closed his oration with a deprecation of civil war and an appeal for peace on the basis of the Union and Constitution, which—considering by whom and for what the War was initiated—seems to this writer to evince an amazing defiance of the assumption that Man is a rational being. It is as follows:

"My friends, you have had, most of you have had, great sorrows, overwhelming personal sorrows, it may be; but none like these, none like these, which come welling up, day by day, from the great fountain of national disaster, red with the best and bravest blood of the country, North and South—red with the blood of those in both sections of the Union whose fathers fought the common battle of Independence. Nor have these sorrows brought with them any compensation, whether of national pride or of victorious arms. For is it not vain to appeal to you to raise a shout of joy because the men from the land of Washington, Marion, and Sumter, are baring their breasts to the steel of the men from the land of Warren, Stark, and Stockton; or because, if this war is to continue to be waged, one or the other must go to the wall—must be consigned to humiliating subjugation? This fearful, fruitless, fatal civil war has exhibited our amazing resources and vast military power. It has shown that, united, even in carrying out, in its widest interpretation, the Monroe doctrine, on this continent, we could, with such protection as the broad ocean which flows between ourselves and European powers affords, have stood against the world in arms. I speak of the war as fruitless; for it is clear that, prosecuted upon the basis of the proclamations of September 22d and September 24th, 1862, pros-

ecuted, as I must understand those proclamations, to say nothing of the kindred brood which has followed, upon the theory of emancipation, devastation, subjugation, it can not fail to be fruitless in every thing except the harvest of woe which it is ripening for what was once the peerless republic.

"Now, fellow citizens, after having said thus much, it is right that you should ask me, What would you do in this fearful extremity? I reply, From the beginning of this struggle to the present moment, my hope has been in moral power. There it reposes still. When, in the Spring of 1861, I had occasion to address my fellow citizens of this city, from the balcony of the hotel before us, I then said I had not believed, and did not then believe, aggression by arms was either a suitable or possible remedy for existing evils. All that has occurred since then has but strengthened and confirmed my convictions in this regard. I repeat, then, my judgment impels me to rely upon moral force, and not upon any of the coercive instrumentalities of military power. We have seen, in the experience of the last two years, how futile are all our efforts to maintain the Union by force of arms; but, even had war been carried on by us successfully, the ruinous result would exhibit its utter impracticability for the attainment of the desired end. Through peaceful agencies, and through such agencies alone, can we hope to 'form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity:' the great objects for which, and for which alone, the Constitution was formed. If you turn round and ask me, What if these agencies fail? what if the passionate anger of both sections forbids? what if the ballot-box is sealed? Then, all efforts, whether of war or peace, having failed, my reply is, You will take care of yourselves; with or without arms, with or without leaders, we will, at least, in the effort to defend our rights as a free people, build up a great mausoleum of hearts, to which men who yearn for liberty will, in after years, with bowed heads and reverently, resort, as Christian pilgrims to the sacred shrines of the Holy Land."

It can not, surely, be needful to demonstrate that the author of this oration did not regard the Rebel power as *his* enemy, nor that of the country.

Gov. Seymour, who addressed a large gathering in the New York Academy of Music, in language carefully weighed beforehand and tempered by the obvious requirements of his official position, was far more measured and cautious in his assaults and imputations than were the great majority of his compatriots. Yet he opened with this allusion to the Nation's imminent perils and the disappointed hopes, the blighted expectations, of those who, whether in council or on the field, were charged with the high responsibility of upholding its authority and enforcing its laws:

"When I accepted the invitation to speak, with others, at this meeting, we were promised the downfall of Vicksburg, the opening of the Mississippi, the probable capture of the Confederate capital, and the exhaustion of the Rebellion. By common consent, all parties had fixed upon this day when the results of the campaign should be known, to mark out that line of policy which they felt that our country should pursue. But, in the moment of expected victory, there came the midnight cry for help from Pennsylvania to save its despoiled fields from the invading foe; and, almost within sight of this great commercial metropolis, the ships of your merchants were burned to the water's edge."

Having completed his portrayal of the National calamities and perils, he proceeded:

"A few years ago, we stood before this community to warn them of the dangers of sectional strife; but our fears were laughed at. At a later day, when the clouds of war overhung our country, we implored those in authority to compromise that difficulty: for we had been told by that great orator and statesman, Burke, that there never yet was a revolution that might not have been prevented by a compromise opportunely and graciously made. [Great applause.] Our prayers were unheeded. Again, when the contest was opened, we invoked those who had the conduct of affairs not to underrate the power of the adversary—not to underrate the courage, and resources, and endurance, of our own sister States. This warning was treated as sympathy with treason. You have the results of these unheeded warnings and unheeded prayers; they have stained our soil with blood; they have carried mourning into thousands of homes; and to-day they have brought our

country to the very verge of destruction. Once more, I come before you, to offer again an earnest prayer, and beg you to listen to a warning. Our country is not only at this time torn by one of the bloodiest wars that has ever ravaged the face of the earth; but, if we turn our faces to our own loyal States, how is it there? You find the community divided into political parties, strongly arrayed, and using with regard to each other terms of reproach and defiance. It is said by those who support more particularly the Administration, that we, who differ honestly, patriotically, sincerely, from them with regard to the line of duty, are men of treasonable purposes and enemies to our country. ['Hear, hear.'] On the other hand, the Democratic organization look upon this Administration as hostile to their rights and liberties; they look upon their opponents as men who would do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises. I need not call your attention to the tone of the press, or to the tone of public feeling, to show you how, at this moment, parties are thus exasperated, and stand in defiant attitudes to each other. A few years ago, we were told that sectional strife, waged in words like these, would do no harm to our country; but you have seen the sad and bloody results. Let us be admonished now in time, and take care that this irritation, this feeling which is growing up in our midst, shall not also ripen into civil troubles that shall carry the evils of war into our own homes.

"Upon one point, all are agreed, and that is this: Until we have a united North, we can have no successful war. Until we have a united, harmonious North, we can have no beneficent peace. How shall we gain harmony? How shall the unity of all be obtained? Is it to be cöerced? I appeal to you, my Republican friends, when you say to us that the nation's life and existence hang upon harmony and concord here, if you yourselves, in your serious moments, believe that this is to be produced by seizing our persons, by infringing upon our rights, by insulting our homes, and by depriving us of those cherished principles for which our fathers fought, and to which we have always sworn allegiance." [Great applause.]

After some variations on this theme, he continues his appeal to Republicans in these words:

"We only ask that you shall give to us that which you claim for yourselves, and that which every freeman, and every man who respects himself, will have, freedom of speech, the right to exercise all the franchises conferred by the Constitution upon American citizens. [Great applause.] Can you safely deny us these? Will you not trample upon your own rights if you refuse to listen? Do you not create revolution when you say that our persons may be rightfully seized, our property confiscated, our homes entered? Are you not exposing yourselves, your own interests, to as great a peril as that with which you threaten us? Remember this, that the bloody, and treasonable, and revolutionary, doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed by a mob as well as by a government. [Applause.] * * *

"To-day, the great masses of conservatives who still battle for time-honored principles of government, amid denunciation, contumely, and abuse, are the only barriers that stand between this Government and its own destruction. If we should acquiesce in the doctrine that, in times of war, Constitutions are suspended, and laws have lost their force, then we should accept a doctrine that the very right by which this Government administers its power has lost its virtue, and we would be brought down to the level of rebellion itself, having an existence only by virtue of material power. When men accept despotism, they may have a choice as to who the despot shall be. The struggle then will not be, Shall we have constitutional liberty? But, having accepted the doctrine that the Constitution has lost its force, every instinct of personal ambition, every instinct of personal security, will lead men to put themselves under the protection of that power which they suppose most competent to guard their persons."

Near the close of his address, the Governor says:

"We stand to-day amid new-made graves, in a land filled with mourning; upon a soil saturated with the blood of the fiercest conflict of which history gives us an account. We can, if we will, avert all these calamities, and evoke a blessing. If we will do what? Hold that Constitution, and liberties, and laws, are suspended?—shrink back from the assertion of right? Will that restore them? Or shall we do as our fathers did, under circumstances of like trial, when they combated against the powers of a crown? They did not say that liberty was suspended; that men might be deprived of the right of trial by jury; that they might be torn from their homes by midnight intruders? [Tremendous and continued applause.] If you would save your country, and your liberties, begin right; begin at the hearth-stones, which are ever meant to be the foundations of American institutions; begin in your family circle; declare that your privileges shall be held sacred; and, having once proclaimed

your own rights, take care that you do not invade those of your neighbor." [Applause.]

These orations are mild and cautious compared with the great mass of Democratic harangues on this occasion. The allusions to Mr. Vallandigham's arrest as a lawless outrage, and to the States as guardians of the rights of their citizens (with direct reference to the impending draft, which Gov. Seymour, with the great mass of his party, was known to regard as unconstitutional), and all kindred indications of a purpose to resist the Federal Executive, even unto blood, in case his "usurpations" and "outrages" should be repeated and persisted in, were everywhere received with frenzied shouts of concurrence, and approbation: and a proposition to organize at once to march on Washington, and hurl from power the tyrant enthroned in the White House, would have elicited even more frantic manifestations of delight and approval.

The first Draft in the city of New York for conscripts under the Enrollment Act was advertised to commence at the several enrollment offices soon afterward;[36] and, as a preparation therefor, the several Democratic journals of that city seemed to vie with each other—especially in their issues of the eventful morning—in efforts to inflame the passions of those who at best detested the idea of braving peril, privation, suffering, and death, in the prosecution of an 'Abolition war.' That the enrollment here was excessive, and the quota required of the city was too high, were vehemently asserted; that there would be unfairness in the drawing of names from the wheel was broadly insinuated; but that the Draft itself—*any* Draft—was unconstitutional, needless, and an outrage on individual liberty and State rights, was more emphatically insisted on.

Said *The Journal of Commerce:*

"It is a melancholy fact that war, sad and terrible as it is, becomes oftentimes the tool of evil-minded men to accomplish their ends. The horrors of its continuance are nothing to their view. The blood shed counts as of no value in their measurement. The mourning it causes produces no impression on their sensibilities. Such men lose all consciousness of personal responsibility for the war, and only look to selfish desires to be realized. What right has any man, or any class of men, to use this war for any purpose beyond its original object? If they, indeed, have diverted it from that, if they have prolonged it one day, added one drop of blood to its sacrifice, by their efforts to use it for other ends than its original design, then they are responsible before God and man for the blood and cost. There is no evading that responsibility.

"Some men say, 'Now that the war has commenced, it must not be stopped till slaveholding is abolished.' Such men are neither more nor less than murderers. The name seems severe: it is nevertheless correct. Would it have been justifiable for the Northern States to commence a war on the Southern States for the sole purpose of abolishing Slavery in them? No! it would have been murder to commence such a war. By what reasoning, then, does it become less murder to divert a war, commenced for other purposes, to that object? How can it be any less criminal to prolong a war, commenced for the assertion of governmental power, into a war for the suppression of Slavery, which, it is agreed, would have been unjustifiable and sinful if begun for that purpose?"

Said *The World:*

"Whether the weak and reckless men who temporarily administer the Federal Government are aware of the fact or not, it is undeniably a fact that the very existence of the Government they administer is quite as seriously involved, in the execution of the conscription which they are now putting in force, as it has been in any other measure or event of the war. The act itself, which should never have been framed, except with the most absolute deference to the Consti-

[36] Monday, July 13.

tution and on the broadest attainable basis of representative support, was fairly forced to its passage through the Constitution and over the restraints and decencies of Senatorial debate. Such were the circumstances which attended its final passage, that one might almost have supposed the National legislature to be an oligarchic conspiracy plotting a vast scheme of military servitude, rather than the council of a great people giving form to its independent determination and organizing its force for the assertion of its freedom. The idea of a military conscription being in itself profoundly repugnant to the American mind, it might have been supposed that unusual steps would have been taken by the friends of that resort to present it with the utmost possible frankness, and in the light best adapted to dissipate the popular hostility.

"Nothing of the sort was done. A measure which could not have been ventured upon in England even in those dark days when the press-gang filled the English ships-of-war with slaves, and dimmed the glory of England's noblest naval heroes—a measure wholly repugnant to the habits and prejudices of our people—was thrust into the statute-book, as one might say, almost by force. It was not only a conscription, but an act passed by conscription.

"The natural consequences followed. Hundreds of thousands of loyal citizens were led to look with distrust and concern upon the passage of the bill. Men who would not hesitate for a moment to risk their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honors, upon the summons of any legitimate National authority, became discontented and dissatisfied with what they regarded (whether justly or unjustly is not now to the point) as an unnecessary stretch of Governmental control over individual liberty."

Said *The Daily News:*

"It is sincerely to be hoped that measures will be taken to test the constitutionality of the law which threatens to remove sixty-odd thousand of our citizens from the State of New York, before a single individual is permitted to be forced, against his will, to take part in the ungodly conflict which is distracting the land. It is said that Gov. Seymour openly expresses his belief that neither the President nor Congress, without the consent of the State authorities, has any right to enforce such an act as is now being carried into effect under the auspices of the War Department; but that he thinks his interference would do more harm than good, and that the question ought to be settled by the courts.

"The manner in which the draft is being conducted in New York is such an outrage upon all decency and fairness as has no parallel, and can find no apologists. No proclamation has been issued upon the subject; and it is only a matter of surmise whether 300,000 or 600,000 men are to be raised. If, as is supposed, 300,000 additional troops are to be added to the Union Army by the present conscription, the proper quota to be drawn from this city would be about 12,000 of our citizens. Instead of this number, however, over 22,000 are being drafted; and, with 50 per cent. extra required for exemptions, 33,000! No allowance is made for the militia who are in Pennsylvania and Maryland; and the $300 to be paid by rich conscripts, instead of purchasing substitutes, is to be diverted, against the spirit of the law, to some other direction.

"The evident aim of those who have the Conscription Act in hand, in this State, is to lessen the number of Democratic votes at the next election. The miscreants at the head of the Government are bending all their powers, as was revealed in the late speech of Wendell Phillips at Framingham, to securing a perpetuation of their ascendency for another four years; and their triple method of accomplishing this purpose is, to kill off Democrats, stuff the ballot-boxes with bogus soldier votes, and deluge recusant districts with negro suffrages. The crafty, quiet way in which the enrollment has been carried on, forestalled both criticism and opposition. Nevertheless, the work has neither been fairly performed, nor has it been thorough. And, now that it is over, the people are notified that one out of about two and a half of our citizens are destined to be brought off into Messrs. Lincoln & Company's charnel-house. God forbid! We hope that instant measures will be taken to prevent the outrage, and to secure such a decision from our courts as will exempt New York from further compelled participation in the suicidal war which is desolating the land."

A most incendiary hand-bill appeal to the people to rise for the vindication of their liberties had been circulated anonymously throughout the city on the night before the 4th, with evident intent to incite an insurrectionary movement on that day; but the tidings received by telegraph of Meade's success at Gettysburg, calling all the supporters of the War into the streets and inclining its opponents

to solitude and seclusion, interfered with the execution of the programme. But now, inflamed by the appeals of their favorite journals, the commencement of drafting in our several districts was marked by the gathering—especially in the up-town districts, where there is a compact population of laborers, mainly of foreign birth—of excited crowds, who soon proceeded to violence, arson, and bloodshed.

In the IXth Congress district, comprising the most northerly wards of the City, largely peopled by railroad employés and other foreign-born laborers, the drawing commenced at 10 A. M., in the house where the enrollment had been made, at the corner of Third Avenue and 46th-street, in the presence of some 300 persons, mainly spectators. Half an hour thereafter, when 75 to 100 names had been drawn, while all was quiet and orderly within the building, a pistol was fired in the street, where a large crowd had rapidly assembled; whereupon, a shower of brickbats and other missiles was hurled at the house, and the crowd rushed in, driving out the officers and clerks, tearing up the papers, and taking complete possession. In a few minutes, one of the rioters produced a can of spirits of turpentine, which he poured over the floor and set fire to it, and the building was soon in flames—the policemen and draft officers who attempted resistance being driven off by showers of stones—Mr. John A. Kennedy, Superintendent of Police, who was present in plain clothes, being recognized and severely beaten. A small force of the Invalid Corps soon appeared, but was promptly overpowered and driven off by the mob, now swelled to furious thousands; and a strong detachment of the police, which attempted to disperse or drive the mob, was likewise worsted and forced to retreat. The firemen, who were tardy in their appearance, and who were cheered and applauded by the mob, made no effort to save the obnoxious house in which the fire had been kindled, but finally arrested the progress of the conflagration; though not till several more houses had been destroyed, and the bulk of the mob had moved off to other scenes of outrage and devastation.

The organized militia of the city were generally absent in the interior of Pennsylvania; the Government had no military force within call but a handful on Governor's island and in the forts commanding the seaward approaches; while the Police, though well organized and efficient, was not competent to deal with a virtual insurrection which had the great body of the foreign-born laborers of our city at its back, with nearly every one of the 10,000 grog-shops for its block-houses and recruiting-stations. The outbreak had manifestly been premeditated and prëarranged; and the tidings of its initial success, being instantly diffused throughout the city, incited an outpouring into the streets of all who dreaded the Draft, hated the War, or detested Abolitionists and Negroes as the culpable causes of both. The rioters constantly augmented their numbers by calling at the gas-houses, railroad offices, workshops, and great manufactories, and there demanding that all work should be stopped and the laborers allowed to fall into their ranks—a demand which, through sympathy or cowardice, was too generally acceded to. Of

course, the thieves, burglars, and other predatory classes, the graduates of European prisons and the scum and sediment of Old-World felony, who by tens of thousands have their lairs in the great emporium, were too glad to embrace the opportunity afforded them to plunder and ravage under the garb of popular resistance to Abolition despotism, and made haste to swell the ranks and direct the steps of the drunken, bellowing, furious mob, who now rushed through street after street, attacking the dwellings of peaceful citizens who were stigmatized as Abolitionists, or who were exposed to odium by some sort of connection with the Government. By 3 P. M., the rioters had become many thousands in number; and they were probably more numerous throughout the two following days.

The most revolting feature of this carnival of crime and villainous madness was the uniform maltreatment to which the harmless, frightened Blacks were subjected. That *The Tribune* building should have been for days beleaguered by a yelling, frantic crowd, who constantly sought to incite each other to an attack which they were too careful of their own safety to make (save once, just at dark of the first day, before it had been armed, and when they for a moment had possession of the business office, and had just time to dismantle and set it on fire before they were charged and driven out by the Police), was quite intelligible, if not so clearly justifiable; and so of the attacks on enrollment offices, arsenals, police stations, &c.; but that an inoffensive negro boy should be hunted at full speed by a hundred White miscreants intent on his murder, while many a poor Black woman had her humble habitation sacked and devastated as she narrowly escaped into the street —barely saving her life, and nothing else—several of this abused race being killed without even a suggestion or suspicion of fault on their part, and all the rest put in mortal terror—was an exhibition of human fiendishness which the Nineteenth Century has rarely paralleled. In one case that was noted, (and there were doubtless others as atrocious,) a colored boy not ten years of age was set upon in the most public part of the city, and pelted with sticks and stones by scores of men and boys until he managed to make his escape. In another case, a Black man, no otherwise obnoxious save by his color, was chased, caught, hung, and all his clothing burned off. His dead body remained hanging for hours, until cut down by the Police."

The Colored Orphan Asylum was

[37] *The Tribune* of July 15 said:

"It is absurd and futile to attribute this outburst of rufflanism to any thing else than sympathy with the Rebels. If, as some pretend, it results from dissatisfaction with the $300 exemption, why are negroes indiscriminately assailed and beaten almost or quite to death? Did *they* prescribe this exemption? On the contrary, are they not almost uniformly poor men, themselves exposed to the draft, and unable to pay $300? What single thing have they done to expose them to this infernal, cowardly rufflanism? What can be alleged against them, unless it be that they are generally hostile to the Slaveholders' Rebellion? And how are the drafting officers responsible for the $300 clause?

"We may just as well look the facts in the face? These riots are 'a fire in the rear' on our country's defenders in the field. They are, in purpose and in essence, a diversion in favor of Jeff. Davis and Lee. Listen to the yells of the mob, and the harangues of its favorite orators, and you will find them surcharged with 'nigger,' 'Abolition,' 'Black Republican,' denunciation of prominent Republicans, *The Tribune*, &c., &c.—all very wide of the draft and the exemption. Had the Abolitionists, instead of the Slaveholders, revolted, and undertaken to upset the Government and dissolve the Union, nine-tenths of these rioters would have eagerly volunteered to put them down. It is the fear, stimulated by the recent and glorious triumphs

one of the noblest charities of the city. It had a spacious and elegant edifice, worth, with its furniture, some $200,000, at the corner of Fifth Avenue and 46th-street, not far from the enrolling office, where the riots began. It was a school as well as an asylum, affording shelter, sustenance, and Christian nurture, to some 200 colored orphans, under the patronage and management of a society of philanthropic ladies. At 5 P. M., a vast mob surrounded it, disabled or drove off the few policemen who attempted to bar an entrance, and, having afforded time for the hasty exit of the inmates, fired and destroyed the edifice and all its remaining contents; having meantime stolen a liberal share of the carpets, iron bedsteads, and other portable furniture, which women stood ready, at a little distance, to carry off, so soon as they were handed to them by their husbands or sons. Some of the garments, which the fleeing inmates had left behind in their haste, were thus appropriated. The cool, business-like manner wherein this wholesale robbery and arson were perpetrated astonished even the most callous reporters. A liberal but not very responsible offer of "$500 for the sight of a Black Republican," chalked in gigantic letters on the fence of the adjacent cattle-market, failed to elicit any proffers.

The enrolling office of the VIIIth District stood at the corner of Broadway and 29th-st., in a block of stores filled with costly goods, including a goldsmith's shop, heavily stocked with watches and jewelry. These were speedily stripped of their contents and then fired; the firemen here, as at the Orphan Asylum and elsewhere, being forbidden to play on the obnoxious building—an order which the mass of them seemed quite too willing to obey. In twenty minutes after the matches were ignited, the walls fell with a loud crash. The firemen were allowed to play upon and save, so far as they might, all structures not obnoxious to the rioters.

The riots, thus begun on Monday, July 13th, were kept up throughout the three following days, and extended to Brooklyn, where an expensive new Grain Elevator, worth $100,000, which was obnoxious as reducing the demand for labor, was among the buildings burned. But, by this time, some soldiers had been called in from the military posts in the harbor, and some militia mustered in the city; so that, though there was more fighting than on the first day, there was less devastation; and the loss of life was decidedly greatest on the side of the rioters, who were gradually crowded back into those quarters where they were naturally strongest, and no longer plundered and burned at will. But the running of the city railroads was generally stopped by the mob on these days, in order to impede the movements of the defenders of order, as well as to swell the ranks of the rioters; laborers could not be obtained to load vessels in port, and the industry of the city was very generally paralyzed.

But a riot stoutly confronted and checked has reached its culminating point; and this one—which would almost certainly have broken out on

of the Union arms, that Slavery and the Rebellion must suffer, which is at the bottom of all this arson, devastation, robbery, and murder. And this fact should arouse every devotee of Liberty and Law to oppose to the rioters the sternest resistance."

the 4th, but for the news of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg—was now prosecuted under the heavy discouragement of the full tidings of Grant's triumph at Vicksburg; while the first news of Banks's capture of Port Hudson, of Holmes's bloody repulse at Helena, and of Gillmore's initial success on Morris island, now pouring in from day to day, proved a quick succession of wet blankets for the spirits of the rioters.

Gov. Seymour had been in the city on the Saturday previous; but left that afternoon for New Jersey, and did not return till Tuesday forenoon; when he was at once escorted to the City Hall, and thence addressed the crowd who flocked thither—many if not most of them from the mob just before menacing *The Tribune* office—as follows:

"My Friends: I have come down here from the quiet of the country to see what was the difficulty—to learn what all this trouble was concerning the Draft. Let me assure you that I am your friend. [Uproarious cheering.] You have been my friends—[cries of 'Yes,' 'Yes,' 'That 's so:' 'We are, and will be again']—and now I assure you, my fellow citizens, that I am here to show you a test of my friendship. [Cheers.] I wish to inform you that I have sent my Adjutant-General to Washington to confer with the authorities there, and to have this Draft suspended and stopped. [Vociferous cheers.] I now ask you, as good citizens, to wait for his return; and I assure you that I will do all that I can to see that there is no inequality, and no wrong done any one. I wish you to take good care of all property as good citizens, and see that every person is safe. The safe-keeping of property and persons rests with you; and I charge you to disturb neither. It is your duty to maintain the good order of the city; and I know you will do it. I wish you now to separate as good citizens, and you can assemble again whenever you wish to do so. I ask you to leave all to me now, and I will see to your rights. Wait until my Adjutant returns from Washington, and you shall be satisfied. Listen to me, and see that no harm is done to either persons or property, but retire peaceably."

The most objectionable feature of this brief address was not its initial salutation, but its underlying assumption that order and obedience to law were suspended on the stoppage of the Draft. True, he did not in terms say, "It would be right to riot, and burn buildings, and hunt negroes, and slaughter officers, if the Draft were to go on; but I will have it stopped and given up: so go home and keep the peace;" but, to the minds of the rioters, his speech amounted exactly to that. Hence, there was great danger that tranquillity thus attained would be broken whenever the attempt to enforce the Draft should be renewed. And it was already well understood—indeed, it had been proposed to prominent Republicans the day before—that, if they would promise that the Draft should be arrested, the riots should thereupon be stopped.

The riots continued during the fourth day (Thursday); but were then mainly restricted to isolated robberies and assaults on unprotected negroes, many of whom were most inhumanly abused, and two or three murdered. The only continuously embodied force of rioters held the eastern upper part of the city, where many large tenement houses are densely crowded with the poorest of our foreign-born population, and where Col. O'Brien, who had been in command of a volunteer military force, had been followed to his home on Tuesday, and there beaten to death by the rioters, under circumstances of shocking barbarity. Here, especially in and near 21st-st., eastward of Third Avenue, a determined stand was made, during the evening of Thursday, by the rioters, against

a small body of soldiers under Capt. Putnam, 12th regulars, whom Gen. Harvey Brown, commanding in the city under Gen. Wool, had sent to quell the riot, and who did it, by ordering his men to fire at those who were hurling missiles at them from the house-tops, while a body of artillerymen entered the houses and made prisoners of their male inmates. Capt. Putnam returned 13 killed, 18 wounded, and 24 prisoners; while of his men but two or three suffered injury. The whole amount of property destroyed by the rioters, for which the City was held responsible to the owners, was valued at about $2,000,000.

During this night and the following day, several regiments of our disciplined Militia arrived, on their return from Pennsylvania, soon followed by other regiments of veterans from the Army of the Potomac; and it would not thereafter have been safe to attempt rioting. The City authorities now appropriated large (borrowed) sums to pay bounties for volunteers; so that the City's quotas were substantially filled without recourse to drafting: the Government much preferring volunteers, of course, but utterly unwilling, because unable, to forego a resort to drafting when men were not otherwise forthcoming. In other words, it could not admit that its right to endure depended on the volunteering in sufficient numbers of citizens to defend its existence.

There were simultaneous and subsidiary riots in Boston, in Jersey City, and at Troy and Jamaica, N.Y.; with preliminary perturbations in many other places; but all these were plainly sympathetic with and subordinate to the New York effort, and quickly subsided when that was overborne. So there was, at different periods of the War, forcible resistance offered to conscription in two or three counties of Wisconsin, perhaps a few more of Pennsylvania, and possibly two or three other localities. But in no single instance was there a riot incited by drafting, wherein Americans by birth bore any considerable part, nor in which the great body of the actors were not born Europeans, and generally of recent importation. Considering how widespread, earnest, intense, was the feeling of repugnance to the War, especially after it had assumed an anti-Slavery aspect, this fact tends strongly to establish the natural strength in a republic of the sentiment of deference to law and to rightful authority, even when that authority is held to be abused or perverted.

Gov. Seymour next appealed[84] to the President, urging a suspension of the Draft, because of the alleged excessive quota required of the urban districts of his State—saying

"It is just to add that the Administration owes this to itself; as these inequalities fall most heavily on those districts which have been opposed to its political views."

He further insisted that the enforcement of the Draft be postponed till after its constitutionality shall have been adjudged by the courts—saying:

"It is believed by at least one-half of the people of the loyal States that the Conscription Act, which they are called upon to obey because it is on the statute-book, is in itself a violation of the supreme constitutional law. There is a fear and suspicion that, while they are threatened with the severest penalties of the law, they are to be deprived of its protection. * * * I do not dwell upon what I believe would be the consequence of a violent, harsh policy before the constitutional-

[84] Aug. 3.

ity of the Act is tested. You can scan the immediate future as well as I. The temper of the people to-day you can readily learn."

At this time, Democratic organizations and meetings were denouncing the Draft as unconstitutional, and calling on the Governor to invoke the military power of the State to maintain its sovereignty and rightful jurisdiction, and protect its citizens from a ruthless conscription.

President Lincoln, in response[39] to the Governor's appeal, after proposing to suspend the Draft in the City districts, in so far as it was claimed to be excessive, until after a fair and rigid scrutiny, said:

"I do not object to abide the decision of the United States Supreme Court, or of the Judges thereof, on the constitutionality of the Draft law. In fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it. But I cannot consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to rëexperiment with the volunteer system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate; and then more time to obtain a Court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it; and still more time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country."

The Autumnal Elections inevitably hinged on and embodied the popular judgment on the issues thus made up; and the brighter prospects of the National cause were reflected in the general success of the Republican candidates.

Vermont—the first to vote thereafter[40]—did, indeed, show a reduction of her always heavy Republican majority—the Democratic party having made no effort[41] in 1862, and now doing its best; whereas, her election in the former year had been unaffected by the wave of depression and discouragement that swept soon afterward over the loyal States. California voted next:[42] going 'Union' throughout by a very large majority[43]—nearly equal to that of 1861; but Maine—voting somewhat later[44]—felt the full impulse of the swelling tide, and showed it in her vote.[45]

But the October Elections were far more significant and decisive. In Pennsylvania, Gov. Andrew G. Curtin—who had aided the war to the extent of his ability—was presented by the Republicans for rëelection; while the Democrats opposed to him Judge Geo. W. Woodward,[46] who, it was certified, had declared in 1861—"If the Union is to be divided, I want the line of separation run north of Pennsylvania"—and who, not far from the day of election, united with

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[39] Aug. 7.

[40] Sept. 1.

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1862.	*Republican.*	*Democratic.*
	Gov. Holbrook, 30,032.	Smalley, 3,724.
1863.	*Republican.*	*Democratic.*
	J. G. Smith, 29,613.	Redfield, 11,962.

[42] Sept. 3.

[43]

1863.	*Union.*	*Democratic.*
	Gov. F. F. Low, 64,447.	Downey, 44,715.

[44] Sept. 14.

[45]

1862.	*Repub.*	*War Dem.*	*Peace Dem.*
	Gov. Coburn, 45,534	Jameson, 7,178	Bradbury, 32,331
1863—	*Gov.* Cony, 68,299		Bradbury, 50,583

[46] See his 'Peace' speech, Vol. I., pp. 363–5.

his Democratic brethren on the bench of the Supreme Court in adjudging the Enrollment Act unconstitutional. It was hardly possible to make an issue more distinctly than was here made between the supporters and the contemners of the War for the Union; yet Gen. McClellan—still a Major-General in full pay, though not in active service—wrote a letter for publication in the canvass, wherein he declared that—

"Having, some days ago, had a full conversation with Judge Woodward, I find that our views agree; and I regard his election as Governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests of the nation."

The canvass in this State was exceedingly animated and earnest; the vote polled at the election[47] exceeded, by many thousands, any ever cast before; and the result was decisive. Though the vote of the preceding year had shown no decided preponderance of either party,[48] but gave the Legislature and a U. S. Senator to the Democrats, that of 1863 re-elected Gov. Curtin by more than 15,000[49] majority, and established the ascendency of the Republicans in every branch of the State Government. For—as if to render the popular verdict more emphatic—Chief Justice Lowrie, who pronounced the decision of the Supreme Court, adjudging the Enrollment Act unconstitutional, was a candidate for rëelection, opposed by Daniel Agnew, Republican, by whom—though comparatively unknown to the people—he was conclusively beaten.[50] And the Court, as thus reconstituted by the election of Judge Agnew, reviewed and reversed[51] the decision pronounced by Chief Justice Lowrie. Said Judge Agnew, in his opinion:

"The constitutional authority to use the national forces creates a corresponding duty to provide a number adequate to the necessity. The duty is vital and essential, falling back on the fundamental right of self-preservation, and the powers expressed to declare war, raise armies, maintain navies, and provide for the common defense. Power and duty now go hand in hand with the extremity, until every available man in the nation is called into service, if the emergency requires it; and of this there can be no judge but Congress."

Justices David Davis (Circuit) and S. H. Treat (District) in Illinois,[52] and Justice Nathan K. Hall (District) in Northern New York, also pronounced judgments in cases brought before them, affirming the constitutionality of the Enrollment Act and of drafting under it. No Federal Judge ever made a contrary decision.

Ohio—by reason of the unrevoked and continuing banishment of Mr. Vallandigham—was the arena of a contest equally earnest and somewhat more heated. The public meetings, especially those of the Democrats, were enormously attended throughout the canvass, and were brimmed with enthusiasm. Yet, when the vote was polled,[53] the Democratic majority of 5,000[54] on Secretary of State, in 1862, was found to have given place to a 'Union' majority on Governor of over *One Hundred Thousand*,[55] and, even without the Soldiers' vote, of more than Sixty Thousand.[56] And, though the majority on the residue of the ticket was

[47] Oct. 8.

[48] 1862. *Aud. Gen., Rep.* Cochrane, 215,616. *Dem.* Slenker, 219,140.

[49] 1863. Curtin, 269,496; Woodward, 254,171.

[50] Agnew, 267,257; Lowrie, 254,855.

[51] Jan. 16, 1864. [52] June 16, 1864. [53] Oct. 8.

[54] Kennon, Rep., 178,755; Armstrong, Dem., 184,332.

[55] Brough, 288,661; Vallandigham, 187,562.

[56] Brough, 247,194; Vallandigham, 185,274.

somewhat less, it still ranged from 96,445 up to 97,479; while the new Legislature stood 29 to 5 in the Senate and 73 to 24 in the House. Yet the soldiers in the field—who had given 41,467 votes for Brough to 2,288 for Vallandigham—regretted that the election had not taken place before instead of soon after the sanguinary battle of Chickamauga; which, they safely calculated, had reduced Gov. Brough's majority by several thousand votes.

Of the Western States, Indiana and Illinois chose only county or local officers this year; but the results as to these sufficed to show that a great revolution had taken place, and that their Democratic Legislatures, elected in 1862, and the U. S. Senators chosen[57] by them, were already disowned by their constituents. Iowa elected a Legislature almost entirely Republican, and a Governor and Judge of like faith by over 30,000 majority;[58] Wisconsin likewise—not voting till later[59]—rolled up a very heavy majority[60] on every ticket, though she had been very evenly divided in 1862, and had only been saved by the votes of her soldiers in the field from going[61] Democratic at a Judicial election in April of this year. Minnesota of course went Republican now, by a majority largely above[62] that of last year. In Michigan—which only elected by general vote a Regent of her University in 1863, and this early in the year—there was an inconsiderable increase in the Republican majority and vote.[63]

In the Atlantic States, but especially in New York—the arena of the most formidable and bloodiest of the Draft Riots—the popular reaction evinced by the State Election of 1863 was most incontestable: Gov. Seymour's majority of over 10,000 in '62 being reversed by one of nearly 30,000[64] for the Republican State ticket, with a corresponding Legislature; while Massachusetts—upon a far lighter vote than in '62—gave a much larger majority.[65] And Maryland filled the measure of National triumph by electing Unionists to Congress in four of her five districts, and, for the first time, a distinctively Emancipation Controller and Legislature by some 20,000 majority. New Jersey chose only a Legislature this year, and hence evinced no essential change; while in Delaware, which had to choose specially a Representative in Congress, the Democrats withdrew their candidate on the eve of Election, insisting that the voters were to be overawed, if not worse,

[57] Charles R. Buckalew in Pennsylvania; Thomas A. Hendricks in Indiana.

[58] The rival candidates for Governor were Col. Wm. M. Stone (Republican) and Gen. S. Tuttle (Democrat), both at that time in the volunteer service. Their official vote is not at hand; but it was very nearly that cast at the same election for Judge of the Supreme Court, which was as follows:

	Home.	*Soldiers'.*	*Total.*
Dillon (Repub.).....	68,306	17,435	85,741
Mason (Dem.).....	50,829	2,289	53,068
Repub. majority,	17,477	15,046	32,673

[59] Nov. 3.

[60] Total vote for Governor: James T. Lewis (Repub.), 79,959; Palmer (Dem.), 55,248.

[61] Home vote: Repub., 51,948 Dem., 56,840
Soldiers' " " 9,440 " 1,747
Total—Dixon, 61,388 Cothren, 58,587

[62] In 1862 (Cong.), Repub., 15,754 Dem. 11,442
In 1863 (Gov.), " 19,515 " 12,722

[63] In 1862—Gov., Repub., 67,716 Dem. 62,102
In 1863—Regent, " 68,992 " 61,913

[64] Total vote for Sec. State: Depew (Repub.), 314,347; St. John (Dem.), 284,942.

[65] In 1862, Gov. Andrew, 80,835 Devens, 52,587
In 1863, " " 70,483 Paine, 29,207

by Federal provost marshals and soldiers, under the guise of repressing disloyal utterances and seditious manifestations. The results in Kentucky, Missouri, and other Slave States than Maryland, had very little enduring or general significance; but it was evident, from the verdict of the States nowise exposed to Military 'cöercion,' that public opinion had by this time grown to the full stature of the Proclamation of Freedom, and had settled into a determination that Slavery must die and the Union survive, through the overthrow by force of all forcible resistance to the integrity and rightful authority of the one Republic.

XXII.

NEGRO SOLDIERY.

The first fatal collision[1] between British soldiers and American patriots was popularly distinguished as 'the Boston Massacre;' and Crispus Attucks, a mulatto fugitive from Massachusetts Slavery, was a leader of the patriot mob, and one of the four killed outright by the British fire. At the fight of Bunker Hill,[2] Peter Salem, one of the enfranchised negroes who manned the slight breastworks so gallantly defended, shot dead Maj. Pitcairn, of the British marines, who, in the final struggle, had scaled the redoubt, shouting, "The day is our own!" and was commanding the 'Rebels' to surrender. Negroes and mulattoes largely swelled the motley host of raw but gallant patriots suddenly collected[3] around Boston by the tidings of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, and were freely accepted in regiments mainly White; though Maj. Samuel Lawrence, of Groton, Mass., is reported as having, at an early day, commanded a company of negroes in the 'Continental' line. But Slavery was then cherished in nearly all the organized colonies; and its inconsistency with the embodiment of its victims in the armies of Freedom was felt to be so galling that the Committee of Safety judiciously resolved:[4]

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, as the contest now between Great Britain and the Colonies respects the liberties and privileges of the latter, which the Colonies are determined to maintain, that the admission of any persons, as soldiers, into the army now raising, but only such as are freemen, will be inconsistent with the principles that are to be supported, and reflect dishonor on this Colony; and that no slaves be admitted into this army upon any consideration whatever."

This rescript did not forbid the enlistment or retention of negroes or mulattoes, but only of those still held in bondage. Many were thereupon

[1] March 5, 1770. [2] June 17, 1775.

[3] "Nor should history forget to record that, as in the army at Cambridge, so also in this gallant band, the free negroes of the colony had their representatives. For the right of free negroes to bear arms in the public defense was, at that day, as little disputed in New England as their other rights. They took their place, not in a separate corps, but in the ranks with the White man; and their names may be read on the pension-rolls of the country, side by side with those of other soldiers of the Revolution." —*Bancroft's History of the United States*, vol. vii., p. 421.

[4] May 20, 1775.

emancipated in order that they might lawfully serve in the patriot forces; and the tendency to recruiting negroes was so strong that Gen. Gates was constrained to issue[5] the following stringent instructions to the patriot recruiting-officers:

"You are not to enlist any deserter from the Ministerial army; nor any stroller, negro, or vagabond, or person suspected of being an enemy to the liberty of America; nor any under eighteen years of age.

"As the cause is the best that can engage men of courage and principle to take up arms, so it is expected that none but such will be accepted by the recruiting-officer. The pay, provisions, etc., being so ample, it is not doubted but that the officers sent upon this service will, without delay, complete their respective corps, and march the men forthwith to camp.

"You are not to enlist any person who is not an American born, unless such person has a wife and family, and is a settled resident in this country. The persons you enlist must be provided with good and complete arms."

In the Continental Congress, Mr. Edward Rutledge, of S. C., moved[6] that all negroes be dismissed from the patriot armies, and was supported therein by several Southern delegates; but the opposition was so formidable and so determined that the motion did not prevail.[7] Negroes, instead of being expelled from the service, continued to be received, often as substitutes for ex-masters or their sons; and, in Virginia especially, it gradually became a custom among the superior race to respond to an imperative summons to the field by giving an athletic slave his freedom on condition of his taking the place in the ranks assigned to his master. It is stated that, after the close of the war, quite a number who had thus earned their freedom were constrained to sue for it; and that the Courts of the 'Old Dominion'—which had not yet discovered that a slave has no will, and so can make no legal and binding contract—uniformly sustained the action, and gave judgment that compelled the master to act as if he had been honest. The Legislature felt constrained, in 1783, to provide by law[8] that every slave who had enlisted upon the strength of such a promise should be set free accordingly; to which end, the Attorney-General was required to commence an action in favor of every such patriot soldier thereafter unjustly restrained of his liberty, who should be entitled, upon due proof of his averment, not only to his freedom, but to damages for past injury in withholding and denying it.

South Carolina[9] authorized the enlistment of slaves—though not ostensibly as soldiers—by a vote[10] of her Provincial Congress, as follows:

"*Resolved*, That the Colonels of the several regiments of militia throughout the colony have leave to enroll such a number of able male slaves, to be employed as pioneers and laborers, as public exigencies require; and

[5] July 10, 1775. [6] Sept. 26, 1775.

[7] So says Bancroft.

[8] Hening's Statutes at Large of Virginia, vol. xi., p. 308.

[9] John Adams, in his 'Diary,' gives, under date of Sept. 28, 1775, an account of a conference with Messrs. Bullock and Houston; wherein he says:

"These gentlemen give a melancholy account of the States of Georgia and South Carolina. They say that, if 1,000 regular troops should land in Georgia, and their commander be provided with arms and clothes enough, and proclaim freedom to all the negroes who would join his camp, 20,000 negroes would join it from the two Provinces in a fortnight. The negroes have a wonderful art of communicating intelligence among themselves; it will run several hundreds of miles in a week or fortnight. They say their only security is this: that all the 'King's friends' and tools of government have large plantations, and property in negroes; so that the slaves of the Tories would be lost, as well as those of the Whigs."

[10] Nov. 20, 1775.

that a daily pay of seven shillings and six pence be allowed for the service of such slave while actually employed."

A grand patriot Committee of Conference, civil and military, headed by Dr. Franklin, was convened [11] at Washington's headquarters before Boston; and, five days thereafter, voted, on the report of a council of officers, that negroes, "especially such as are slaves," should no longer be enlisted; and an order was issued [12] accordingly; but Washington, upon full consideration, wrote [13] to the President of Congress that "the free negroes" are reported to to be "very much dissatisfied at being discarded;" and adds:

"As it is apprehended that they may seek employ in the Ministerial Army, I have presumed to depart from the resolution respecting them, and have given license for their being enlisted. If this is disapproved by Congress, I will put a stop to it."

Congress hereupon decided [14]

"That the free negroes, who have served faithfully in the army at Cambridge, may be reënlisted therein; but no others."

Lord Dunmore, Royal Governor of Virginia, had ere this issued [15] a Proclamation of martial law, wherein he called "all persons capable of bearing arms, to report to His Majesty's standard," on pain of confiscation, forfeiture, &c., as traitors; and proceeded:

"And I do hereby further declare all indented servants, negroes or others (appertaining to rebels), free, that are able and willing to bear arms; they joining His Majesty's troops, as soon as may be, for the more speedy reducing this colony to a proper sense of their duty to His Majesty's crown and dignity."

An answer to this Proclamation was made through a Williamsburg journal, wherein the existence of Slavery in these colonies was attributed to British royal policy, and the negroes assured that they were far more likely to acquire personal liberty by adhering to the cause of American and of general freedom; and were forcibly reminded that—

"To none, then, is freedom promised, but to such as are able to do Lord Dunmore service. The aged, the infirm, the women and children, are still to remain the property of their masters—of masters who will be provoked to severity, should part of their slaves desert them. Lord Dunmore's declaration, therefore, is a cruel declaration to the negroes. He does not pretend to make it out of any tenderness to them, but solely upon his own account; and, should it meet with success, it leaves by far the greater number at the mercy of an enraged and injured people."

Some of the negroes listened to the voice of the Royal charmer; who at one time had large expectations of raising Black troops for King George; but he finally explained [16] to his Government that a malignant fever, whereof he had already reported the existence,

"has carried off an incredible number of our people, especially the Blacks. Had it not been for this horrid disorder, I am satisfied I should have had 2,000 Blacks; with whom I should have had no doubt of penetrating into the heart of this colony."

Still, negroes were enlisted on both sides; in the North, more on the side of Independence; while in the South a larger number fled from plantation Slavery to strike for King George against their 'Rebel' masters.

An official return [17] of the negroes serving in the army under Washington's command, soon after the battle of Monmouth, makes their number 755; and this was prior to any systematic efforts to enlist them, and while their presence in the army was rather tolerated than invited.

Rhode Island, in 1778, authorized a general enlistment of slaves for the patriot army—every one to be free

[11] Oct. 18. [12] Nov. 12. [13] Dec. 31. [14] Jan. 16, 1776. [15] Nov., 1775. [16] June 26, 1776. [17] Aug. 24, 1778.

from the moment of enlisting, and to receive pay, bounty, &c., precisely like other soldiers. A Black regiment was raised under this policy, which fought bravely at the battle of Rhode Island,[18] and elsewhere; as many of those composing it had done prior to its organization. Massachusetts, New York,[19] and other States, followed the example of Rhode Island, in offering liberty to slaves who would enlist in the patriot armies; and the policy of a general freeing and arming of able and willing slaves was urged by Hon. Henry Laurens, of S. C., by his son Col. John Laurens, by Col. Alexander Hamilton, Gen. Lincoln, James Madison, Gen. Greene, and other ardent patriots. It is highly probable that, had the Revolutionary War lasted a few years longer, it would have then abolished Slavery throughout the Union. Sir Henry Clinton, the King's commander in the North, issued[20] a Proclamation, premising that "the enemy have adopted a practice of enrolling negroes among their troops;" and thereupon offering to pay for "all negroes taken in arms," and guaranteeing, to every one who should "desert the Rebel standard, full security to follow within these lines any occupation which he shall think proper." Lord Cornwallis, during his Southern campaign, proclaimed freedom to all slaves who would join him; and his subordinates—Tarleton especially—took away all who could be induced to accompany them. Jefferson, in a letter to Dr. Gordon,[21] estimates that this policy cost Virginia no less than 30,000 slaves in one year; most of them dying soon of small-pox and camp-fever. Thirty were carried off by Tarleton from Jefferson's own homestead; and Jefferson characteristically says:[22] "Had this been to give them freedom, he would have done right."

The War of 1812 with Great Britain was much shorter than that of the Revolution, and was not, like that, a struggle for life or death. Yet, short as it was, negro soldiers—who, at the outset, would doubtless have been rejected—were in demand before its close. New York authorized[23] the raising of two regiments of "freemen of color"—to receive the same pay and allowances as Whites—and provided that "any able-bodied slave" might enlist therein "with the written assent of his master or mistress," who was to receive his pay aforesaid, while the negro received his freedom: being manumitted at the time of his honorable discharge.

Gen. Jackson's employment of Blacks in his famous defense of New Orleans—his public and vigorous reprobation[24] of the "mistaken policy" which had hitherto excluded them from the service, and his emphatic attestation of their bravery and good conduct while serving under his eye—are too well known to require citation or comment.

When, upon hearing of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, and still more, after the riotous massacre of Massachusetts volunteers in the streets of Baltimore, the city of New York blazed out in a fervid though not very profound enthusiasm, and military or-

[18] Aug. 29, 1778. [19] Act of March 20, 1781.
[20] June 30, 1779. [21] Dated Paris, July 16, 1788.
[22] Letter to Gordon aforesaid. [23] Oct. 24, 1814.
[24] Proclamation dated Mobile, Sept. 21, 1814.

ganization and arming became the order of the day, a number of Blacks quietly hired a public hall and commenced drilling therein, in view of the possibility of a call to active service, they were promptly notified by the Chief of Police that they must desist from these military exercises, or he could not protect them from popular indignation and assault. They had no choice but to do as they were bidden.

Gen. Hunter, while in command at Hilton Head, was the first to direct the organization of colored men as soldiers, soon after issuing his order of general Emancipation throughout his department, already recorded.[25] This movement elicited[26] from Mr. Wickliffe, of Ky., in the House, the following resolution of inquiry:

"*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War be directed to inform this House if Gen. Hunter, of the Department of South Carolina, has organized a regiment of South Carolina volunteers for the defense of the Union, composed of Black men (fugitive slaves), and appointed the Colonel and other officers to command them. 2. Was he authorized by the Department to organize and muster into the Army of the United States, as soldiers, the fugitive or captured slaves? 3. Has he been furnished with clothing, uniforms, etc., for such force? 4. Has he been furnished, by order of the War Department, with arms to be placed in the hands of these slaves? 5. To report any orders given said Hunter, and correspondence between him and the Department."

Secretary Stanton replied[27] that Gen. Hunter had *not* been authorized to organize and muster into the service of the United States either fugitive or captured slaves, nor had he been furnished with clothing or arms for such slaves; and further, that the Government's orders to and correspondence with Gen. Hunter on this subject could not be published at this time without prejudice to the public welfare. But, some days later,[28] he made a further report, covering a letter[29] from Gen. Hunter, in reply to one addressed[30] to him by the Adjutant-General, asking for information on the subject; wherein Gen. H. makes answer to Mr. Wickliffe's several inquiries as follows:

"To the first question, therefore, I reply that no regiment of 'fugitive slaves' has been, or is being, organized in this department. There is, however, a fine regiment of persons whose late masters are 'fugitive Rebels'—men who every where fly before the appearance of the national flag, leaving their servants behind them to shift as best they can for themselves. So far, indeed, are the loyal persons composing this regiment from seeking to avoid the presence of their late owners, that they are now, one and all, working with remarkable industry to place themselves in a position to go in full and effective pursuit of their fugacious and traitorous proprietors.

"To the second question, I have the honor to answer that the instructions given to Brig.-Gen. T. W. Sherman, by the Hon. Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, and turned over to me by succession for my guidance, do distinctly authorize me to employ all loyal persons offering their services in defense of the Union and for the suppression of this Rebellion, in any manner I might see fit, or that the circumstances might call for. There is no restriction as to the character or color of the persons to be employed, or the nature of the employment, whether civil or military, in which their services should be used. I conclude, therefore, that I *have* been authorized to enlist 'fugitive slaves' as soldiers, could any such be found in this Department. No such characters, however, have yet appeared within view of our most advanced pickets; the loyal slaves every where remaining on their plantations to welcome us, aid us, and supply us with food, labor, and information. It is the masters who have, in every instance, been the 'fugitives;' running away from loyal slaves as well as loyal soldiers; and whom we have only partially been able to see—chiefly their heads over ramparts, or, rifle in hand, dodging behind trees—in the extreme distance. In the absence of any 'fugitive-master law,' the deserted slaves would be wholly without remedy, had not the crime of treason given them the right to pursue, capture, and bring back, those persons of whose pro-

[25] See page 246. [26] June 5, 1862. [27] June 14. [28] July 2. [29] Dated June 23. [30] June 13.

tection they have been thus suddenly bereft.

"To the third interrogatory, it is my painful duty to reply that I never have received any specific authority for issues of clothing, uniforms, arms, equipments, and so forth, to the troops in question—my general instructions from Mr. Cameron to employ them in any manner I might find necessary, and the military exigencies of the Department and the country, being my only, but, in my judgment, sufficient justification. Neither have I had any specific authority for supplying these persons with shovels, spades, and pick-axes, when employing them as laborers, nor with boats and oars when using them as lightermen: but these are not points included in Mr. Wickliffe's resolution. To me, it seemed that liberty to employ men in any particular capacity implied with it liberty also to supply them with the necessary tools; and, acting upon this faith, I have clothed, equipped and armed, the only loyal regiment yet raised in South Carolina.

"I must say, in vindication of my own conduct, that, had it not been for the many other diversified and imperative claims on my time, a much more satisfactory result might have been hoped for; and that, in place of only one, as at present, at least five or six well-drilled, brave, and thoroughly acclimated regiments, should by this time have been added to the loyal forces of the Union.

"The experiment of arming the Blacks, so far as I have made it, has been a complete and even marvelous success. They are sober, docile, attentive, and enthusiastic; displaying great natural capacities for acquiring the duties of the soldier. They are eager beyond all things to take the field and be led into action; and it is the unanimous opinion of the officers who have had charge of them, that, in the peculiarities of this climate and country, they will prove invaluable auxiliaries—fully equal to the similar regiments so long and successfully used by the British authorities in the West India islands.

"In conclusion, I would say it is my hope—there appearing no possibility of other reenforcements, owing to the exigencies of the campaign in the Peninsula—to have organized, by the end of next Fall, and to be able to present to the Government, from 48,000 to 50,000 of these hardy and devoted soldiers.

"Trusting that this letter may form part of your answer to Mr. Wickliffe's resolutions, I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your very obedient servant,

"D. HUNTER, Maj.-Gen. Com'ding."

These responses, though not particularly satisfactory to Mr. Wickliffe, appear to have been conclusive; though his colleague, Mr. Dunlap, proposed [21] that it be by the House

"*Resolved*, That the sentiments contained in the paper read to this body yesterday, approving the arming of slaves, emanating from Maj.-Gen. David Hunter, clothed in discourteous language, are an indignity to the American Congress, an insult to the American people and our brave soldiers in arms; for which sentiments, so uttered, he justly merits our condemnation and censure."

The House did not so resolve; preferring to adjourn.

Gen. Hunter's original recruiting and organizing Blacks in South Carolina having been without express authority, there was no warrant for paying them; but this defect was cured, before Congress was ready to act decisively on the subject, by a special order from the Secretary of War,[22] directed to Gen. Rufus Saxton, Military Governor of the Sea Islands, which says:

"3. In view of the small force under your command, and the inability of the Government, at the present time, to increase it, in order to guard the plantations and settlements occupied by the United States from invasion, and protect the inhabitants thereof from captivity and murder by the enemy, you are also authorized to arm, uniform, equip and receive into the service of the United States, such number of Volunteers of African descent as you may deem expedient, not exceeding 5,000; and may detail officers to instruct them in military drill, discipline and duty, and to command them: the persons so received into service, and their officers, to be entitled to and receive the same pay and rations as are allowed by law to Volunteers in the service.

"4. You will occupy, if possible, all the islands and plantations heretofore occupied by the Government, and secure and harvest the crops, and cultivate and improve the plantations.

"5. The population of African descent, that cultivate the land and perform the labor of the Rebels, constitute a large share

[21] July 3.

[22] Aug. 25.

of their military strength, and enable the White masters to fill the Rebel armies, and wage a cruel and murderous war against the people of the Northern States. By reducing the laboring strength of the Rebels, their military power will be reduced. You are, therefore, authorized, by every means in your power, to withdraw from the enemy their laboring force and population, and to spare no effort, consistent with civilized warfare, to weaken, harass, and annoy them, and to establish the authority of the Government of the United States within your Department."

Meantime, Brig.-Gen. J.W. Phelps, commanding under Gen. Butler at Carrollton, La., finding his camp continually beset by fugitives from Slavery on the adjacent plantations, but especially from that of Mr. B. La Blanche, a wealthy and eminent sugar-planter just above New Orleans —(who, it appears, being vexed by military interference with the police of his plantation, had driven off all his negroes, telling them to go to their friends, the Yankees)—had involved himself in a difference with his superior, by harboring and protecting those and other fugitives, contrary to the policy of the Government, which Gen. Butler was endeavoring, so far as possible, to conform to. Gen. Phelps, in his report [33] to Gen. Butler's Adjutant, justifying his conduct in the premises—after setting forth the impossibility of putting down the Rebellion and at the same time upholding its parent, Slavery, and the absolute necessity of adopting a decided anti-Slavery policy—says:

"The enfranchisement of the people of Europe has been, and is still, going on, through the instrumentality of military service; and by this means our slaves might be raised in the scale of civilization and prepared for freedom. Fifty regiments might be raised among them at once, which could be employed in this climate to preserve order, and thus prevent the necessity of retrenching our liberties, as we should do by a large army exclusively of Whites. For it is evident that a considerable army of Whites would give stringency to our Government; while an army partly of Blacks would naturally operate in favor of freedom and against those influences which at present most endanger our liberties. At the end of five years, they could be sent to Africa, and their places filled with new enlistments."

Receiving no specific response to this overture, Gen. Phelps made [34] a requisition of arms, clothing, &c., for "three regiments of Africans, which I propose to raise for the defense of this point;" adding:

"The location is swampy and unhealthy; and our men are dying at the rate of two or three a day.

"The Southern loyalists are willing, as I understand, to furnish their share of the tax for the support of the war; but they should also furnish their quota of men; which they have not thus far done. An opportunity now offers of supplying the deficiency; and it is not safe to neglect opportunities in war. I think that, with the proper facilities, I could raise the three regiments proposed in a short time. Without holding out any inducements, or offering any reward, I have now upward of 300 Africans organized into five companies, who are all willing and ready to show their devotion to our cause in any way that it may be put to the test. They are willing to submit to anything rather than to Slavery.

"Society, in the South, seems to be on the point of dissolution; and the best way of preventing the African from becoming instrumental in a general state of anarchy, is to enlist him in the cause of the Republic. If we reject his services, any petty military chieftain, by offering him freedom, can have them for the purpose of robbery and plunder. It is for the interests of the South, as well as of the North, that the African should be permitted to offer his block for the temple of freedom. Sentiments unworthy of the man of the present day—worthy only of another Cain—could alone prevent such an offer from being accepted.

"I would recommend that the cadet graduates of the present year should be sent to South Carolina and this point, to organize and discipline our African levies; and that the more promising non-commissioned officers and privates of the army be

[33] June 16, 1862.

[34] July 30.

appointed as company officers to command them. Prompt and energetic efforts in this direction would probably accomplish more toward a speedy termination of the war, and an early restoration of peace and unity, than any other course which could be adopted."

Gen. Butler, in response, instructed Gen. Phelps to employ his 'contrabands' in cutting down trees and forming abatis for the defense of his lines, instead of organizing them as soldiers. This Gen. P. peremptorily declined [35] to do; saying, "I am not willing to become the mere slave-driver you propose, having no qualifications that way," and thereupon throwing up his commission. Gen. Butler declined to accept his resignation; but it was, on reference to Washington, accepted by the Government; whereupon, he quit the service and returned to his Vermont home, leaving 600 able-bodied negro men in his camp, and a very decided tendency on the adjacent plantations to increase the number.

The current of events soon carried Gen. Butler along with it; so that—though he was almost isolated from the Government, with which he communicated but fitfully—at least a fortnight being usually required to send a dispatch from New Orleans to Washington and receive an answer—he felt constrained by the necessities and perils of his position, just the day before Stanton's direction to Saxton aforesaid, to appeal to the free colored men of New Orleans to take up arms in the National service; which appeal was responded to with alacrity and enthusiasm, and a first regiment, 1,000 strong, filled within 14 days—all its line officers colored as well as the rank and file. His next regiment, filled soon afterward, had its two highest officers White; all the rest colored. His third was officered by the best men that could be had, regardless of color. His two batteries were officered by Whites only; for the simple reason that there were no others who had any knowledge of artillery.

On the reception at Richmond of tidings of Gen. Hunter's and Gen. Phelps's proceedings with reference to the enlistment of negro soldiers for the Union armies, Jefferson Davis issued [36] an order directing that said Generals be no longer regarded as public enemies of the Confederacy, but as outlaws; and that, in the event of the capture of either of them, or of any other commissioned officer employed in organizing, drilling, or instructing slaves, he should not be treated as a prisoner of war, but held in close confinement for execution as a felon, at such time and place as he (J. D.) should order. It is not recorded that any one was ever actually hung under this order.

So long as the ranks of the Union armies were satisfactorily filled by volunteering alone, and Whites stood ready to answer promptly every requisition for more men, negroes or mulattoes were not accepted as soldiers; though they were, as they had ever been, freely enlisted and extensively employed in the navy, with the same pay and allowances as Whites. At no time during the war was a colored person, if known as such, accepted—as many had been throughout our own Revolutionary War—for service in a regiment or other organization preponderantly

[35] July 31.

[36] Aug. 21.

White." But no sooner had McClellan's campaign against Richmond culminated in disaster and a requisition upon the loyal States for Six Hundred Thousand more recruits to our armies, rendering conscription in some localities unavoidable, than the barriers of caste began to give way.[38] Thus, Mr. Wilson, of Mass., having reported[39] to the Senate a bill to amend the act of 1795, prescribing the manner of calling forth the Militia to suppress insurrection, &c., Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, moved[40] that henceforth there shall be no exemption from Military duty because of color. On the suggestion of Mr. Preston King, of N. Y., this proposition was so amended as to authorize the President to accept "persons of African descent, for the purpose of constructing intrenchments, or performing camp service, or *any* war service for which they may be found competent." This, and the whole project, were vehemently opposed by Messrs. Saulsbury, of Del., G. Davis, of Ky., Carlile, of Va., and others of the Opposition. Mr. G. Davis endeavored to strike out the words last above quoted; but failed: Yeas, 11; Nays, 27. After much debate, the Senate decided, by close votes, to free, as a reward for services in the Union armies, the slaves of Rebels only, and not to free the wives and children even of these. In this shape, the bill passed[41] the Senate: Yeas 28 (including Mr. Rice, of Minn.); Nays 9 (all the Opposition present and voting but Mr. Rice aforesaid). And the bill going thence to the House, Mr. Stevens, of Pa., at once demanded and obtained the Previous Question thereon; and an attempt to lay it on the table having failed (Yeas 30; Nays 77), it was passed,[42] and signed next day by the President. By another act of like date and similar history, Congress prescribed that "the enrollment of the Militia shall in all cases include all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45."

In the next Congress, the enrollment of the National forces being under consideration in the House, Mr. Stevens, of Pa.,[43] moved to amend it by striking out the 27th section, and inserting instead the following:

"*And be it further enacted*, That all able-bodied male persons of African descent, between the ages of 20 and 45, whether citizens or not, shall be enrolled and made a part of the National forces; and, when enrolled and drafted into the service, his master shall be entitled to receive $300, and the drafted man shall be free."

Mr. S. H. Boyd, of Mo., suggested that only *loyal* masters be entitled to the $300 bounty; which Mr. Stevens readily accepted; but, on motion of Mr. Webster, of Md., it was afterward decided—67 to 44—that *any* bounty accruing to a drafted man who is a slave shall be paid to his master. Mr. B. G. Harris, of Md., denied "that you have a right to enlist or enroll a slave." Mr. Fernando Wood, of N. Y., denounced the measure as "clearly, palpably in violation of the Constitution." Mr.

[37] At an early stage of the war, a son of old John Brown influentially aided the enlistment of a regiment of volunteers in Northern New York; and, uniting zeal and ability with some military experience, was appointed a Lieutenant therein; but his brother officers evinced such dissatisfaction that he was obliged to resign.

[38] "I have never," said Mr. Broomall, of Pa., in the House (Feb. 11th, 1863), "found the most *snaky* constituent of mine, who, when he was drafted, refused to let the blackest negro in the district go as a substitute for him."

[39] July 8, 1862. [40] July 9. [41] July 15. [42] July 16. [43] Feb. 10, 1864.

Stevens's proposition prevailed: so that Blacks, whether free or enslaved, were directed to be enrolled and drafted into the National service precisely like Whites. The bill was ultimately sent to a Conference Committee of three members of either House; by whom the 27th section was so amended as to read as follows:

"That all able-bodied male colored persons, between the ages of 20 and 45 years, whether citizens or not, resident in the United States, shall be enrolled according to the provisions of this act, and of the act to which this is an amendment, and form part of the National forces; and, when a slave of a loyal master shall be drafted and mustered into the service of the United States, his master shall have a certificate thereof; and thereupon such slave shall be free; and the bounty of a hundred dollars, now payable by law for each drafted man, shall be paid to the person to whom such drafted person was owing service or labor at the time of his muster into the service of the United States. The Secretary of War shall appoint a commission in each of the slave States represented in Congress, charged to award to each loyal person to whom a colored volunteer may owe service, a just compensation, not exceeding $300, for each such colored volunteer, payable out of the fund derived from commutations; and every such colored volunteer, on being mustered into the service, shall be free."

The report of the Conference Committee was agreed to by the two Houses respectively, and the bill, thus amended, became the law of the land.

By a section of the Act of 1862, aforesaid, the said "persons of African descent" were to be paid $10 per month, $8 of it in clothing; while the pay of the White soldiers was $13 per month, beside clothing. Gov. Andrew, of Mass., on his solicitation, was authorized[44] by Secretary Stanton to raise of three years' men "volunteer companies of artillery for duty in the forts of Massachusetts and elsewhere, and such companies of infantry for the volunteer military service as he may find convenient, and may include persons of African descent, organized into separate corps." Under this order, Gov. A. proceeded to raise two full regiments of Blacks, known as the 54th and 55th Massachusetts; which in due time were mustered without objection into the service of the Union, and there won honorable distinction. When, at length, the paymaster made his usually welcome appearance at their camp, and offered them $10 per month, they refused to accept that or anything less than the regular pay of soldiers of the United States; and a tender of the State to make good the difference between what they were offered and what they demanded, they declined; going wholly without pay for more than a year in order to establish their right to be regarded, not especially as negroes, but as men. Those who, being meantime hopelessly disabled by wounds or by disease, received honorable discharges from the service, did accept what was offered them by the Federal paymaster, and the residue of their full pay from Maj. Sturgis, agent of the State. At last, after repeated and most urgent representations to the War Department by Gov. Andrew, and upon the opinion of Attorney-General Bates that they were legally as well as equitably entitled to it, they received from the United States the full pay they had persistently claimed. And Rev. Samuel Harrison, the Black chaplain of the 54th, being refused by the U. S. paymaster the regular pay of a chaplain be-

[44] Jan. 26, 1863.

cause of his color, or because of that of his regiment, appealed to Gov. Andrew; on whose representation and advocacy, backed likewise by Judge Bates's opinion as Attorney-General, he was ultimately paid in full. And, finally, it was by Congress enacted:[46]

"That all persons of color who were free on the 19th day of April, 1861, and who have been enlisted and mustered into the military service of the United States, shall, from the time of their enlistment, be entitled to receive the pay, bounty, and clothing, allowed to such persons by the laws existing at the time of their enlistment."

When the 54th Massachusetts were ready, in May, 1863, to proceed to the seat of war in South Carolina, application was made in their behalf to the Chief of Police of New York for advice as to the propriety of taking that city in their route, and marching down Broadway. He responded that they could not be protected from insult and probable assault if they did so. They thereupon proceeded wholly by water to their destination. Within seven or eight months thereafter, two *New York* regiments of Blacks, raised by voluntary efforts mainly of the Loyal League, though discountenanced by Gov. Seymour, marched proudly down Broadway and embarked for the seat of War, amid the cheers of enthusiastic thousands, and without eliciting one discordant hiss.

The use of negroes, both free and slave, for belligerent purposes, on the side of the Rebellion, dates from a period anterior to the outbreak of actual hostilities. So early as Jan. 1st, 1861, a dispatch from Mr. R. R. Riordan, at Charleston, to Hon. Percy Walker, at Mobile, exultingly proclaimed that—

"Large gangs of negroes from plantations are at work on the redoubts, which are substantially made of sand-bags and coated with sheet-iron."

A Washington dispatch to *The Evening Post* (New York), about this time, set forth that—

"A gentleman from Charleston says that everything there betokens active preparations for fight. The thousand negroes busy in building batteries, so far from inclining to insurrection, were grinning from ear to ear at the prospect of shooting the Yankees."

The Charleston Mercury of Jan. 3d, said:

"We learn that 150 able-bodied free colored men, of Charleston, yesterday offered their services gratuitously to the Governor, to hasten forward the important work of throwing up redoubts wherever needed along our coast."

The Legislature of Tennessee, that negotiated that State out of the Union, by secret treaty with the Confederate Executive, passed[46] an act authorizing the Governor (Isham G. Harris)—

"to receive into the military service of the State all male free persons of color, between the ages of 15 and 50."

These Black soldiers were to receive $8 per month, with clothing and rations. The sheriff of each county was required, under the penalties of misdemeanor, to collect and report the names of all such persons; and it was further enacted—

"That, in the event a sufficient number of free persons of color to meet the wants of the State shall not tender their services, the Governor is empowered, through the sheriffs of the different counties, to *press* such persons until the requisite number is obtained."

The Memphis Avalanche joyously proclaimed[47] that—

"A procession of several hundred stout negro men, members of the 'domestic in-

[46] June 15, 1864. [46] June 28, 1861. [47] Sept. 3, 1861.

stitution,' marched through our streets yesterday in military order, under command of Confederate officers. They were all armed and equipped with shovels, axes, blankets, &c. A merrier set were never seen. They were brimful of patriotism, shouting for Jeff. Davis and singing war-songs."

And again, four days later:

"Upward of 1,000 negroes, armed with spades and pickaxes, have passed through the city within the past few days. Their destination is unknown; but it is supposed that they are on their way to the 'other side of Jordan.'"

The drafting of Blacks, and especially of slaves, by thousands, to work on Rebel fortifications, was, in general, rather ostentatiously paraded throughout the earlier stages of the War. The Confederate Congress was finally constrained to regulate by law the impressment of property for military service; and its general "Act to regulate Impressments"[45] provides—

"Sec. 9. Where slaves are impressed by the Confederate Government, to labor on fortifications, or other public works, the impressment shall be made by said Government according to the rules and regulations provided in the laws of the State wherein they are impressed; and, in the absence of such law, in accordance with such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, as the Secretary of War shall from time to time prescribe: *Provided*, That no impressment of slaves shall be made when they can be hired or procured by the consent of the owner or agent.

"Sec. 10. That, previous to the 1st day of December next, no slave laboring on a farm or plantation, exclusively devoted to the production of grain and provisions, shall be taken for the public use, without the consent of the owner, except in case of urgent necessity."

The Lynchburg Republican (Va.) had, so early as April, chronicled the volunteered enrollment of 70 of the free negroes of that place, to fight in defense of their State; closing with—

"Three cheers for the patriotic free negroes of Lynchburg!"

The next recorded organization of negroes, especially as Rebel soldiers, was at Mobile, toward Autumn; and, two or three months later, the following telegram was flashed over the length and breadth of the rejoicing Confederacy:

"New Orleans, Nov. 23, 1861.

"Over 28,000 troops were reviewed today by Gov. Moore, Maj. Gen. Lovell, and Brig.-Gen. Ruggles. The line was over seven miles long. One regiment comprised 1,400 free colored men."

The (Rebel) Legislature of Virginia was engaged, so early as Feb. 4, 1862, on a bill to enroll all the free negroes in the State, for service in the Rebel forces; which was favored by all who discussed it; when it passed to its engrossment, and probably became a law.

All these, and many kindred movements in the same direction, preceded Mr. Lincoln's first or premonitory Proclamation of Freedom,[46] and long preceded any organization of negro troops to fight for the Union. The credit of having first conquered their prejudices against the employment of Blacks, even as soldiers, is fairly due to the Rebels. Had the negroes with equal facility overcome *their* repugnance to fighting for their own enslavement, the Black contingent in the Rebel armies might soon have been very little inferior to the White, either in numbers or in efficiency.

Yet Mr. Lincoln's initial Proclamation aforesaid had hardly been diffused throughout the Confederacy, when measures of deadly retaliation and vengeance were loudly pressed on every hand. That a Government struggling against a Rebellion founded on Slavery, should threaten to

[45] Approved, March 26, 1863.

[46] Sept. 22, 1862.

fight the consequence through the cause, was esteemed an immeasurable stretch of presumption. The following dispatch aptly embodies the prevailing sentiment:—

"CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 13, 1862.
"HON. WM. P. MILES, Richmond, Va.:
"Has the bill for the execution of Abolition prisoners, after January next, been passed? Do it; and England will be stirred into action. It is high time to proclaim the black flag after that period. Let the execution be with the garrote.
(Signed) "G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Prior to the issue[80] of President Lincoln's later, unconditional edict of emancipation, Jefferson Davis had, in proclaiming[81] the outlawry of Gen. Butler and his officers,[82] decreed that all slaves captured in arms be turned over to the Executives of their several States, to be dealt with according to law, and that a similar disposition be made of their White officers. So, in his third Annual Message,[83] he dealt, of course, very harshly with President Lincoln's final Proclamation of Freedom, then recently promulgated, which he stigmatized as a violation of a solemn assurance embodied in the author's Inaugural Address, and in the resolve of the Chicago Convention therein quoted.[84] Mr. Davis hailed the proclamation as an admission that the Union could never be restored, and as a guaranty that such restoration was impossible. Says the Confederate chief:

"It has established a state of things which can lead to but one of three possible consequences—the extermination of the slaves, the exile of the whole White population of the Confederacy, or absolute and total separation of these States from the United States. This proclamation is also an authentic statement by the Government of the United States of its inability to subjugate the South by force of arms, and, as such, must be accepted by neutral nations, which can no longer find any justification in withholding our just claims to formal recognition. It is also, in effect, an intimation to the people of the North that they must prepare to submit to a separation, now become inevitable; for that people are too acute not to understand that a restitution of the Union has been rendered forever impossible by the adoption of a measure which, from its very nature, neither admits of retraction nor can cōexist with union."

But the passage which more especially concerns Negro Soldiership is the following:

"We may well leave it to the instincts of that common humanity which a beneficent Creator has implanted in the breasts of our fellow-men of all countries to pass judgment on a measure by which several millions of human beings of an inferior race—peaceful and contented laborers in their sphere—are doomed to extermination, while at the same time they are encouraged to a general assassination of their masters by the insidious recommendation to abstain from violence unless in necessary self-defense. Our own detestation of those who have attempted the most execrable measures recorded in the history of guilty man is tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it discloses. So far as regards the action of this Government on such criminals as may attempt its execution, I confine myself to informing you that I shall—unless in your wisdom you deem some other course more expedient—deliver to the several State authorities all commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be captured by our forces in any of the States embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection. The enlisted soldiers I shall continue to treat as unwilling instruments in the commission of these crimes, and shall direct their discharge and return to their homes on the proper and usual parole."

The Confederate Congress took up the subject soon afterward, and, after protracted consideration, ultimately disposed of it by passing the following:

"*Resolved, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America*, In response to the message of the President, transmitted to Congress at the commencement of the present session, That, in the opinion of

[80] Jan. 1, 1863. [81] Dec. 23, 1862. [82] See p. 106. [83] Jan. 12, 1863. [84] See Vol. I., p. 422.

Congress, the commissioned officers of the enemy ought *not* to be delivered to the authorities of the respective States, as suggested in the said message, but all captives taken by the Confederate forces ought to be dealt with and disposed of by the Confederate Government.

"SEC. 2. That, in the judgment of Congress, the proclamations of the President of the United States, dated respectively September 22d, 1862, and January 1st, 1863, and the other measures of the Government of the United States and of its authorities, commanders, and forces, designed or tending to emancipate slaves in the Confederate States, or to abduct such slaves, or to incite them to insurrection, or to employ negroes in war against the Confederate States, or to overthrow the institution of African Slavery, and bring on a servile war in these States, would, if successful, produce atrocious consequences, and they are inconsistent with the spirit of those usages which, in modern warfare, prevail among civilized nations; they may, therefore, be properly and lawfully repressed by retaliation.

"SEC. 3. That in every case wherein, during the present war, any violation of the laws or usages of war among civilized nations shall be, or has been, done and perpetrated by those acting under the authority of the Government of the United States, on the persons or property of citizens of the Confederate States, or of those under the protection or in the land or naval service of the Confederate States, or of any State of the Confederacy, the President of the Confederate States is hereby authorized to cause full and ample retaliation to be made for every such violation, in such manner and to such extent as he may think proper.

"SEC. 4. That every White person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize, or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack, or conflict, in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court.

"SEC. 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such in the service of the enemy, who shall, during the present war, excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited, a servile insurrection, or who shall incite, or cause to be incited, a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court.

"SEC. 6. Every person charged with an offense punishable under the preceding resolutions shall, during the present war, be tried before the military court attached to the army or corps by the troops of which he shall have been captured, or by such other military court as the President may direct, and in such manner and under such regulations as the President shall prescribe; and, after conviction, the President may commute the punishment in such manner and on such terms as he may deem proper.

"SEC. 7. All negroes and mulattoes who shall be engaged in war, or be taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the State or States in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such State or States."

The connection between the premises here alleged and the action based thereon is by no means obvious. For more than two years, negroes had been extensively employed in belligerent operations by the Confederacy. They had been embodied and drilled as Rebel soldiers, and had paraded with[*] White troops at a time when this would not have been tolerated in the armies of the Union. Yet, in the face of these notorious facts, it is here provided that "every White person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command *negroes or mulattoes* [whether ever slaves or not] in arms against the Confederate States, shall, if captured, *be put to death*, or otherwise punished at the discretion of the court."

Some of the leading and most thorough Rebel journals, on reflection, admitted that this was unjustifiable—that the Confederacy could not prescribe the color of citizens of the Free States, never in bondage at

[*] At New Orleans, see p. 522.

the South, whom our Government might justifiably employ as soldiers. But the resolve nevertheless stood for years, if not to the last, unrepealed and unmodified, and was the primary, fundamental impediment whereby the exchange of prisoners between the belligerents was first interrupted; so that tens of thousands languished for weary months in prison-camps, where many thousands died of exposure and starvation, who might else have been living to this day.

Secretary Stanton, having learned that three of our Black soldiers captured with the gunboat Isaac Smith, in Stono river, had been placed in close confinement, ordered three of our prisoners (South Carolinians) to be treated likewise, and the fact to be communicated to the Confederate leaders. *The Richmond Examiner*, commenting on this relation, said:

"It is not merely the pretension of a regular Government affecting to deal with 'Rebels,' but it is a deadly stab which they are aiming at our institutions themselves—because they know that, if we were insane enough to yield this point, to treat Black men as the equals of White, and insurgent slaves as equivalent to our brave soldiers, the very foundation of Slavery would be fatally wounded."

After one of the conflicts before Charleston, an immediate exchange of prisoners was agreed on; but, when ours came to be received, only the Whites made their appearance. A remonstrance against this breach of faith was met by a plea of want of power to surrender Blacks taken in arms, because of the resolve just quoted and orders based thereon; and this was probably the immediate impulse to the issue of the following General Order:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, July 30, 1863.

"It is the duty of every Government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism, and a crime against the civilization of the age.

"The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

"It is therefore ordered that, for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a Rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into Slavery, a Rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"By order of the Secretary of War,
"E. D. TOWNSEND, Assist. Adj't.-Gen."

It must not be presumed that, because either belligerent had decided to make all possible use of Blacks in the prosecution of the War, the opposition to this policy in Congress or in the Democratic journals and popular harangues was foregone. Far otherwise.[*]

[*] In discussing the first bill that came before the Senate involving directly the policy of arming negroes to fight for the Union, Mr. Preston King—who very rarely spoke, and never with bitterness—said:

"I have done talking in such a manner as to avoid giving offense to our enemies in this matter. I think it was the captain of the watch here at the Capitol who came and consulted me about getting permission to omit, during the sessions of the Senate, to hoist the flag on the top of the Capitol; and, when he was asked what he wanted to omit that for, he said he feared it might be supposed that he desired to save labor and trouble, but he really suggested it because it hurt these people about here to look at it—to see the flag on the top of the Capitol. I had not done much; but I wrote a letter very promptly to the Secretary of the Interior, stating the fact, and saying that I did not care whom he appointed, but I wanted *that* man removed. He *was* removed; and, within ten days, was with the enemy at Manassas."

The Army Appropriation bill being before the Senate, Mr. Garrett Davis, of Ky., moved [87] to add:

"*Provided*, That no part of the sums appropriated by this act shall be disbursed for the pay, subsistence, or any other supplies, of any negro, free or slave, in the armed military service of the United States."

Which was rejected: Yeas 8; Nays 28:

YEAS—Messrs. Carlile, G. Davis, Kennedy, Latham, Nesmith, Powell, Turpie, and Wall (all Democrats).

At the next session—the Deficiency bill being before the House—Mr. Harding, of Ky., moved [88] to insert—

"*Provided*, That no part of the moneys aforesaid shall be applied to the raising, arming, equipping, or paying of negro soldiers."

Which was likewise beaten: Yeas 41; Nays 105—the Yeas (all Democrats) being

Messrs. Ancona, Bliss, James S. Brown, Coffroth, Cox, Dawson, Dennison, Eden, Edgerton, Eldridge, Finck, Grider, Hall, Harding, Harrington, Benjamin G. Harris, Charles M. Harris, Philip Johnson, William Johnson, King, Knapp, Law, Long, Marcy, McKinney, William H. Miller, James R. Morris, Morrison, Noble, John O'Neill, Pendleton, Samuel J. Randall, Rogers, Ross, Scott, Stiles, Strouse, Stuart, Chilton A. White, Joseph W. White, Yeaman.

No other War measure was so strenuously, unitedly, persistently, vehemently resisted by the Opposition, whether Democratic or Border-State Unionists, as was the proposal to arm Blacks to uphold the National cause. Said Mr. S. S. Cox, of Ohio:

"I believe the object of gentlemen, in forcing this bill here, is to bring about—or, rather, to make final and forever—a dissolution of the Union. * * * Every man along the border [Ohio] will tell you that the Union is for ever rendered hopeless if you pursue this policy of taking the slaves from the masters and arming them in this civil strife."

The regular, authorized, avowed employment of Blacks in the Union armies—not as menials, but as soldiers—may be said to have begun with the year 1863—that is, with the issue of the President's absolute Proclamation of Freedom. Mr. Stanton's first order to raise in the loyal States three years' men, with express permission "to include persons of African descent," was that issued to Gov. Andrew, Jan. 20th of this year; which was promptly and heartily responded to. In March, Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of our Army, was dispatched from Washington to the Mississippi Valley, there to initiate and supervise the recruiting and officering of Black regiments—a duty which he discharged with eminent zeal and efficiency; visiting and laboring at Memphis, Helena, and other points, where Blacks were congregated, addressing them in exposition of the Emancipation policy, and urging them to respond to it by rallying to the flag of their country. To our officers and soldiers, in a speech at Lake Providence, La.,[89] he forcibly said:

"You know full well—for you have been over this country—that the Rebels have sent into the field all their available fighting men—every man capable of bearing arms; and you know they have kept at home all their slaves for the raising of subsistence for their armies in the field. In this way, they can bring to bear against us all the strength of their so-called Confederate States; while we at the North can only send a portion of our fighting force, being compelled to leave behind another portion to cultivate our fields and supply the wants of an immense army. The Administration has determined to take from the Rebels this source of supply—to take their negroes and compel them to send back a portion of their Whites to cultivate their deserted plantations—and very poor persons they would be to fill the place of the dark-hued laborer. They must do this, or their armies will starve. * * *

"All of you will some day be on picket-duty; and I charge you all, if any of this

[87] Jan. 28, 1863. [88] Dec. 21, 1863. [89] April 8.

unfortunate race come within your lines, that you do not turn them away, but receive them kindly and cordially. They are to be encouraged to come to us; they are to be received with open arms; they are to be fed and clothed; they are to be armed."

There was still much prejudice against Negro Soldiers among our rank and file, as well as among their superiors; those from New England possibly and partially excepted: but the Adjutant-General was armed with a potent specific for its cure. The twenty regiments of Blacks which he was intent on raising he had authority to officer on the spot from the White veterans at hand; and this fact—at least, until the commissions should be awarded—operated as a powerful antidote to anti-negro prejudice. There were few, if any, instances of a White sergeant or corporal whose dignity or whose nose revolted at the proximity of Blacks as private soldiers, if he might secure a lieutenancy by deeming them not unsavory, or not quite intolerably so; while there is no case on record where a soldier deemed fit for a captaincy in a colored regiment rejected it and clung to the ranks, in deference to his invincible antipathy to "niggers." And, though Gen. Banks, in his order[60] directing the recruitment of a 'Corps d'Afrique' in his department, saw fit to say that

"The prejudices or opinions of men are in no wise involved;" and "it is not established upon any dogma of equality, or other theory, but as a practical and sensible matter of business. The Government makes use of mules, horses, uneducated and educated White men, in the defense of its institutions. Why should not the negro contribute whatever is in his power for the cause in which he is as deeply interested as other men? We may properly demand from him whatever service he can render," &c., &c.—

yet there were few who did not see, and not many who refused to admit, that a systematic arming of the Blacks in defense of the Union imposed obligations and involved consequences incompatible not merely with the perpetuation of Slavery, but with that of Caste as well. Hence, the proclaimed repugnance in Congress, in the Press, and among the People, to arming the Blacks, was quite as acrid, pertinacious, and denunciatory, as that which had been excited by the policy of Emancipation.

Yet, in spite of ugly epithets, the work went on. Presently, a distinct Bureau was established,[61] in the Adjutant-General's office at Washington, "for the record of all matters relating to the organization of colored troops;" and a Board, whereof Gen. Silas Casey was President, organized for the strict examination of all candidates for commissions in Black regiments; by whose labors and investigations a higher state of average character and efficiency was secured in the officering of these than had been attained in the (too often hasty and hap-hazard) organization of our White regiments. In August, the Adjutant-General again visited the Great Valley on this business; and he now issued from Vicksburg[62] an order which was practically a conscription of all able-bodied male Blacks who should seek protection within the Union lines, and should not be otherwise employed, into the National service. Next appeared[63] an order from the War Department, establishing recruiting stations for Black soldiers in Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee, and directing the enlistment as volunteers of "all able-bodied free negroes;" also the "slaves

[60] May 1. [61] May 22. [62] Aug. 18. [63] Oct. 3.

of disloyal persons [absolutely], and slaves of loyal persons with the consent of their owners," who were to be paid $300 for each slave so enlisted, upon making proof of ownership and filing a deed of manumission. Thus the good work went on; until, in December, '63, the Bureau aforesaid reported that over 50,000 had been enlisted and were then in actual service; and this number had been trebled before the close of the following year. And, though some of our Generals regarded them with disfavor, while others were loud in their praise, it is no longer fairly disputable that they played a very important and useful part in the overthrow of the Rebellion. Though they were hardly allowed to participate in any of the great battles whereby the issue was determined, they bore an honorable part in many minor actions and sieges, especially those of 1864–5. In docility, in unquestioning obedience to superiors, in local knowledge, in capacity to endure fatigue, in ability to brave exposure and resist climatic or miasmatic perils, they were equal if not superior to the average of our White troops; in intelligence and tenacity, they were inferior; and no wise General would have counted a corps of them equal, man for man, in a great, protracted battle, to a like number of our Whites. Yet there were Black regiments above the average of Whites in merit; and their fighting at Fort Wagner, Port Hudson, Helena, Mobile, and some other points, was noticed by their commanders with well deserved commendation. To exalt them to the disparagement of our White soldiers would be as unwise as unjust; but those Whites who fought most bravely by their side will be the last to detract from the gratitude wherewith the Republic fitly honors all her sons who freely offered their lives for the salvation of their country.

XXIII.

THE WAR ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST IN 1864.

The XXXVIIIth Congress having assembled,[1] and the House been organized by the friends of the Administration and the War—Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker,[2] and Edward McPherson, of Pennsylvania, Clerk—President Lincoln transmitted next day his Annual Message, to which he appended a Proclamation of Amnesty, which he therewith issued, offering a free pardon, on condition of taking an oath to support the Federal Constitution and Union, and also

"abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing Rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified by decision of the Supreme Court."

Exceptions to this proffer of amnesty were made in case of all who had thrown up seats in Congress, Federal judgeships, or commissions in the army or navy of the United States, in order to embark in the

[1] Dec. 7, 1863.

[2] Vote: Colfax, 101; all others, 81.

Rebellion; all civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the Rebel Government; all officers in the Confederate army, above the rank of Colonel; and of all who had been engaged in treating our colored soldiers or their officers "otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war." This proffer was accepted by very few, and seemed to be regarded with even more contempt than indignation by the Rebel oracles. Where all who are prominently, responsibly engaged in a rebellion are excepted from a proffer of amnesty, those not thus exempted are apt to resent the discrimination as implying an inadequate appreciation of their consequence.

Operations against Charleston having been but languidly prosecuted since the complete conquest of Morris island, the failure of Dahlgren's boat attack on Sumter, and his refusal to attempt to pass its ruins with his iron-clads and fight his way up to the city, Gen. Gillmore decided to employ a part of his force in a fresh expedition to Florida. The President, apprised of this design, commissioned John Hay, one of his private secretaries, as major, and sent[3] him down to Hilton Head to accompany the proposed expedition, under expectations, founded on the assurances of refugees, that Florida was ripe for amnesty and restoration to the Union.

Gillmore's force, under the immediate command of Gen. Truman Seymour, embarked[4] on 20 steamers and 8 schooners, and was off the northern mouth of the St. John's next forenoon; occupying Jacksonville unresisted at 5 P. M. The few Rebel soldiers fired and ran as our troops debarked, to find the place in ruins, and very few residents remaining. A railroad train from Tallahassee had arrived and departed that day; but the rails were to have been taken up that week for use elsewhere.

At 3 P. M. next day,[5] our troops moved westward parallel with the railroad—Col. Guy V. Henry, with the cavalry, leading: the intent being to surprise the Rebel Gen. Finnegan at Camp Finnegan, 8 miles west. The advance was skillfully and bravely made; but only 150 men were at the camp—Finnegan, with the residue, having hurriedly fallen back. Henry evaded a Rebel cavalry force covering the front, and dashed into the camp unannounced; capturing 4 guns, with a large amount of camp equipage and commissary stores, and a few prisoners—but not till the telegraph had had time to give the alarm to Baldwin, beyond. Henry pushed on at 4 A. M., and was in Baldwin at 7; capturing another gun, three cars, and $500,000 worth of provisions and munitions. He had a skirmish at the south fork of St. Mary's, 5 miles farther on, and drove the enemy, but lost 17 men. At 6 P. M., he was in Sanderson, 40 miles from Jacksonville; where he captured and destroyed much property; pushing on, at 2 A. M., very nearly to Lake City, almost half way from the coast to Tallahassee; but here, at 11 A. M., he found Finnegan in position, very stubborn, and too strong to be moved: so he fell back 5 miles, bivouacked in a drenching rain, and telegraphed to Seymour, now at Sanderson with part of his infantry, for orders and food. It was reported that Finne-

[3] Jan. 13, 1864. [4] Feb. 6. [5] Feb. 8.

gan, though he had 3,000 men, fell back from Lake City that night. Whether he did so or not, the belief that he did probably misled Seymour into his great blunder thereafter.

Gillmore had followed his lieutenant down to Jacksonville and out so far as Baldwin;[6] returning directly to Jacksonville, and thence[7] to Hilton Head; without a shadow of suspicion that Seymour contemplated, or (without orders) would attempt, a farther advance. In fact, he had telegraphed to Gillmore from Sanderson on the 12th that

"I last night ordered Col. Henry to fall back to this point. I am destroying all public property here, and shall go back to the south fork of St. Mary's as soon as Henry returns. I hope he will be in this morning."

Gillmore at once responded:

"I want your command at and beyond Baldwin concentrated at Baldwin without delay."

Seymour replied, insisting that

"To leave the south fork of the St. Mary's will make it impossible for us to advance again;"

but intimated no purpose to make such advance without orders. Gillmore thereupon returned to Hilton Head; and was very soon thunderstruck by receiving[8] a letter from Seymour, saying that he had been compelled to remain where his men could be fed; but adding

"Not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me to execute my intention of moving *to the Suwanee river*. But I now propose to go *without* supplies;"

and asking that an iron-clad demonstration be made up the Savannah, to prevent the dispatch of Rebel forces from Georgia to Finnegan!

Gillmore at once wrote him a strong remonstrance against the madness of his project—which was, in effect, to pit his (at most) 6,000 disposable men against whatever force the Rebels, with all Georgia and Alabama to draw from, and railroads at command, might see fit to concentrate upon him. Gen. Turner was sent post-haste with this letter; but it was too late. When he reached Jacksonville, he met there tidings that Seymour was already fighting at Olustee.

Seymour had left Barber's (the south fork aforesaid) that morning,[9] with a few short of 5,000 men; advancing westward along the highway which runs generally parallel with the railroad, frequently crossing it, till about 2 P. M., when the head of his column ran square into the dead-fall which Finnegan had set for him. Our men were faint with hunger and a hard march of 16 miles over miry or sandy ground, until, two or three miles east of Olustee station, our van reached a point where the railroad is carried straight through a long cypress swamp, while the wagon-road makes a square turn to the right, crossing the railroad, in order to avoid and flank the swamp. Here Finnegan had disposed his men, under cover of the swamp and adjacent pine forest, with his flanks thoroughly protected by the former and by a lakelet known as Ocean Pond; while our men, rushing heedlessly, headlong on, were at close quarters before they suspected that they were to be seriously resisted.

Our strength lay in artillery, whereof we had 16 pieces to 4—Finnegan having lost most of his in his hasty retreat from Camp Finnegan—but our guns were rushed up to the

[6] Feb. 9. [7] Feb. 15. [8] Feb. 18—dated Feb. 17. [9] Feb. 20

very edge of the woods which concealed and sheltered the foe, so that their sharp-shooters picked off the artillerists and shot down the horses as though enjoying a sportsman's battue; while our infantry, half formed, and not well armed, were pushed into the slaughter-pen with equal stupidity. Had our line been formed half a mile back from the enemy's, and there simply held while our gunners shelled the woods, we might not have achieved a brilliant success, but we could not have been beaten; but Hamilton's battery went into action, under a heavy fire of musketry, barely 150 yards from the Rebel front, and in 20 minutes had lost 40 out of 50 horses and 45 out of 82 men—when what was left of it recoiled; leaving 2 of its 4 guns where its life-blood had been blunderingly squandered. And this was a fair specimen of the generalship displayed on our side throughout.

Col. Henry's cavalry (40th Mass.), with Maj. Stevens's battalion, and the 7th Conn. (infantry), Col. J. R. Hawley, were in the advance, and drew the first fire of the mainly concealed enemy. Hawley, finding his regiment falling under a concentric fire, ordered up the 7th New Hampshire, Col. Abbott, to its support; Hamilton's, Elder's, and Langdon's batteries also coming into action. The 7th N. H. was a tried and trusty regiment; but it had been lately deprived of its beloved Spencer repeating rifles, and armed instead with Springfield muskets which it pronounced in bad order and unfit for service; so it was not in good condition for maintaining a position in which it was rapidly losing at least ten men for every one of the enemy it had even a chance to hit. It was soon demoralized; when Hawley ordered up the 8th U. S. colored, Col. Chas. W. Fribley—a regiment never before under fire. It held its position in front for an hour and a half, losing 350 killed or wounded (its Colonel mortally); when Col. Barton led his brigade, consisting of the 48th (his own), 49th, and 115th New York, hitherto on the right, into the hottest forefront of the battle. Col. Sammons, of the 115th, was among the first of his regiment disabled; 7 of its captains or lieutenants were killed or wounded; one of its companies lost 32 out of 59 men. The 47th had its Col. (Moore) wounded, and 6 captains or lieutenants killed or disabled.

Our left column, Col. Montgomery, came last into the fight, just in time to stop a Rebel charge. The 54th Mass. went in first, followed by the 1st N. C. (both Black). They were of course overpowered; but the latter left its Col., Lt.-Col., Major, and Adjutant, dead on the field. It was admitted that these two regiments had saved our little army from being routed. For Seymour—who had fought with reckless gallantry throughout, rushing from point to point, wherever Rebel bullets flew thickest—profited by their charge to rëestablish what remained of his batteries farther to the rear; and now, giving four parting volleys of grape and canister, he ordered a retreat; which was covered by the 7th Connecticut, and executed deliberately, and without effective pursuit.[10] We brought off 1,000 of our wounded, and probably left 250 more, beside

[10] Pollard says, "Just then [4 P. M.], our [Rebel] ammunition became exhausted."

quite as many, dead or dying, to the mercy of the Rebels and the vultures.[11] The enemy admitted a loss of but 80 killed and 650 wounded. Seymour retreated nearly or quite to Jacksonville, burning provisions, &c., worth at least $1,000,000. And that virtually ended all hope of the recovery of Florida to the Union before the entire collapse of the Rebellion.

Few disasters were encountered during the War so utterly inexcusable. It was Braddock's defeat repeated, after the lapse of a century. Our soldiers fought as well as ever men ought to fight; they were abundantly able to have routed the enemy; they were simply sacrificed by a leader brave to rashness, and possessing every soldierly quality but the ability to plan and direct the movements of an independent force. Left to himself, he was fit only to afford fresh verification of the old axiom, that, against stupidity, even the gods are impotent. And now, President Lincoln—who had never dreamed of such a folly—was assailed and held up to execration as having fooled away 2,000 men in a sordid attempt to manufacture for himself three additional votes in the approaching Presidential election.

During this Winter, extensive salt-works in West Bay, near St. Andrew's sound, belonging to the Confederate Government, and making 400 bushels per day, were destroyed by order of Rear-Admiral Bailey, with certain private salt-works in that vicinity; also, salt-works on Lake Ocola: the whole being valued at $3,000,000.

Next Summer,[12] Gen. Birney, under orders from Gen. Foster, moved out from Jacksonville to Callahan station, on the Fernandina railroad, burning bridges, two cars, &c.; and a number of petty raids were made from Jacksonville to Whitesville, and to the south fork of the St. Mary's; while, ultimately, Baldwin and Camp Milton were occupied for a season by detachments of our forces; and several skirmishes took place, but with no decided advantage to either party. A meeting at Jacksonville, May 20th, had assumed the style and title of a State Convention of the Unionists of Florida, and deputed six delegates to represent her in the Union National Convention at Baltimore—which some of them did, to their own undoubted satisfaction. But, to all practical intents, the battle of Olustee was the first and last event of consequence that happened in Florida during the year 1864, and thence to the close of the war.

In South Carolina, while the long-range firing at Charleston from Morris island and the surrounding forts was lazily and irregularly kept up through most of the year, eliciting fitful responses from Rebel forts and batteries, there was no movement of importance; save that, in July, four brigades (Birney's, Saxton's, Hatch's, and Schimmelfennig's) were quietly assembled from the sea islands held by us and from Florida, pushed[13] over to Seabrook island, and thence, attended by two gunboats on the North Edisto, to John's island, and so to a place called Deckerville,[14] two miles west of Legaréville. The weather

[11] Pollard says we left 350 dead on the field, and that they took 500 prisoners—(including wounded, of course;) with 5 guns and 2,000 small arms. [12] July 20. [13] July 2. [14] July 4.

was intensely hot; the dusty roads lined by thick brush, which excluded air, yet afforded little or no shade; so that marches of barely 5 or 6 miles per day were accomplished with great fatigue and peril. Our men had no cannon. A Rebel battery, well supported, was found in position three miles north-west of Legaréville; which the 26th U. S. Colored was finally sent[15] forward to take, and made five spirited charges upon, losing 97 killed and wounded. But they were 600 without cannon, against an equal force strongly posted, with 4 guns; so they were worsted, and their Col. (Silliman) falling from sunstroke, they were called off; and the expedition returned,[16] after parading about the islands for another week. What it meant, if it meant any thing, or why force enough was not sent up to take the Rebel battery, if that was deemed desirable, remains among the mysteries of strategy. The foolish, wasteful fight was called by our men 'The Battle of Bloody Bridge.'

In North Carolina—our forces here having been slender since Foster's 12,000 veterans were made over to the South Carolina department in 1863—the initiative was taken this year by Gen. Pickett, commanding the Rebel department, who suddenly struck[17] our outpost at Bachelor's creek, 8 miles above Newbern, held by the 132d New York, carrying it by assault, and making 100 prisoners. Following up his success, he threatened Newbern; and a force under Capt. Wood actually carried, by boarding from boats, the fine gunboat Underwriter, lying close to the wharf, and under the fire of three batteries scarcely 100 yards distant. Those batteries opening upon her, while she had no steam up, the captors could do no better than fire and destroy her. Pickett now drew off, without trying his strength against the defenses of Newbern; claiming to have killed and wounded 100 of our men, captured 280, with two guns, 300 small arms, &c., and destroyed a gunboat of 800 horse-power, mounting 4 heavy guns—all at a cost of 35 killed and wounded.

The next blow was struck at Plymouth, near the mouth of the Roanoke, which was held for the Union by Gen. Wessells, with the 85th New York, 101st and 103d Penn., 16th Conn., and 6 companies from other regiments—in all 2,400 men. It was a fairly fortified position; while the gunboats Southfield, Miami, and Bombshell, were anchored in the river opposite. Gen. R. F. Hoke, with three infantry brigades, a regiment of cavalry, and 7 batteries—in all, at least 7,000 men—advanced against it so stealthily that he was within two miles[18] before Wessells was apprised of his danger. The mailed ram Albemarle, coming down the Roanoke, took part in the attack.

Fort Warren, our up-river outpost, was first assailed; and our gunboat Bombshell, going to its assistance, was disabled by the fire of the Rebel artillery. While the fight here was still in progress, Hoke opened on Fort Wessells, a mile farther down, which was repeatedly charged in immense force; but every assault was repulsed with great slaughter. At length, however, this fort was so completely and closely surrounded by

[15] July 7. [16] July 14. [17] Feb. 1. [18] April 17.

the enemy's infantry, with their guns but 200 yards distant, that it was forced to surrender.

Hoke vigorously pressed the siege. Soon, the Albemarle, Capt. Cooke, ran down by Fort Warren and engaged our two remaining gunboats, of 8 guns each, striking the Southfield, Lt. French, so heavily as to sink her; then, turning on the Miami, killed Lt.-Com'r Flusser, and disabled many of her crew; when she fled down the river. The Albemarle then shelled the town with her rifled 32s, doing considerable execution.

Next morning,[20] Hoke pushed forward all his batteries, and opened on the town and our remaining forts at 1,100 yards: Ransom, with one brigade, assaulting on the right, and Hoke, with two, going in on the left. By a desperate effort, in the face of a murderous fire, the two outer forts, mounting 8 guns, were carried at a heavy cost, and their garrisons made prisoners. A rush was then made on the town; which was likewise carried; and at length Fort Williams—which was still mowing down the assailants with grape and case-shot—was so enveloped and enfiladed that nothing remained for Wessells but to surrender. The fruits of the victory were 1,600 effective prisoners, 25 guns, at least 2,000 small arms, and some valuable stores. The Rebels admitted a loss here of only 300. Our combatants estimated it at fully 1,000, and say we had but 100 killed and wounded.

As a consequence of this disaster, Washington, at the head of Pamlico sound, was soon evacuated by Gen. Palmer;[22] some of our departing soldiers disgracing themselves and their flag by arson and pillage ere they left.

Capt. Cooke, of the Albemarle, being naturally somewhat inflated by his easy triumph ever two unmailed gunboats, our remaining gunboats in those waters, under Capt. Melancthon Smith, were disposed to tempt him to a fresh encounter, on more equal terms. They had not long to wait for it. The Mattabesett, Sassacus, and Wyalusing, were lying 20 miles off the mouth of the Roanoke, when our picket-boats, which had been sent up the river to decoy the ram from under the protecting batteries of Plymouth, reported her coming;[21] and soon she was descried bearing down, accompanied by the river steamboat Cotton Plant, and what was lately *our* gunboat Bombshell. The former—being too frail for such an encounter—put back, with her 200 sharp-shooters and boarders, to Plymouth; and the contest began. The Albemarle was heavily iron-clad and armed with very large Whitworth guns; and our vessels of course played around her, seeking to inject their iron into her weakest quarter: the Sassacus taking occasion to pour one broadside at close range into the Bombshell, which compelled her to strike her flag and fall out of the range of fire. After a spirited cannonade at short range, the Sassacus struck the Albemarle at full speed, crowding her hull under water, but not sinking her. And now these life-and-death wrestlers exchanged 100-pound shots at five or six paces; the gunners of the Sassacus watching for the opening of a port by the Albemarle, and trying—sometimes with success—to fire a shell or shot into it before it could be closed again; as, from the ram's mailed sides or deck,

[20] April 20. [21] April 28. [22] May 5, 3 P. M.

the largest bolts, fired at this distance, rebounded like dry peas. At length, the ram put a shot through one of of her adversary's boilers, killing 3 and wounding 6 of her men, and filling her with scalding steam, from out which the shrieks of the scalded were piercingly heard. And now the chief engineer of the Sassacus was compelled to call his men to follow him into the fire-room, and there to drag the fires from beneath the uninjured boiler, which was on the brink of explosion; while the engine had become entirely unmanageable.

Out of the thick, white cloud which enveloped the two combatants, frequently irradiated by the flashes of guns, the Albemarle soon emerged, limping off toward her sheltering fort; still keeping up her fire; the Sassacus moving slowly in pursuit, working on a vacuum alone. We had the Bombshell, with her 4 rifled guns, as a trophy; while the siege of Newbern—which the Albemarle had set forth to form the naval part of, while that post had already been summoned by Hoke, on the assumption that "the river and sound were blockaded below"—was indefinitely postponed.

The Albemarle made good her retreat, and never cared to renew the encounter. Months afterward, she was still 8 miles up the Roanoke, lying at a dock, behind a barricade of logs, when Lt. Wm. B. Cushing slipped[30] up the river in a steam-launch and, under a fierce fire from the monster, lowered a torpedo-boat, rowed it to and under the overhang of the Albemarle and fired it, at the same instant that one of the enemy's shots crashed through the torpedo-boat, utterly destroying it. The launch likewise was instantly disabled; but Cushing, spurning every call to surrender, ordered his men to save themselves as they best could; himself dropping into the water and swimming down stream half a mile, when he crawled out at daybreak, and hid in an adjacent swamp; through which he slowly, cautiously worked his way until he found a skiff in a creek, and, at 11 P. M., was on board one of our vessels in the offing. The Albemarle sunk like a stone, and was never more troublesome to friend or foe.

Plymouth—Hoke being busy on the James—was now easily retaken[31] by our fleet under Com'r Macomb, who captured a few prisoners, some guns and warlike stores.

Of Burnside's extensive conquests in North Carolina, but little more than Newbern and Roanoke island remained to us, after the loss of Plymouth and the abandonment of Washington; and Hoke was intent on reducing our possessions still further, when the pressure of our advance in Virginia summoned the greater part of his force to the defense of Richmond.

Two or three unimportant raiding expeditions were sent out from Newbern during the Summer; and one from Roanoke island, led by Gen. Wild and composed of colored troops, penetrated far into Camden county; bringing off 2,500 slaves, many horses and cattle, and destroying much grain; at a total cost of 13 men.

[30] Oct. 27.

[31] Oct. 31.

XXIV.

THE WAR BEYOND THE MISSISSIPPI IN 1864.

BANKS—STEELE—ROSECRANS.

Gen. Banks was in New Orleans, intent on further operations against Texas by way of Galveston and the sea-coast, when he received[1] a dispatch from Halleck, prescribing (or, as Halleck says, "suggesting") a totally different plan of campaign. Its line of operations was the Red river; its object, the capture of Shreveport, with the rout and dispersion of Kirby Smith's army, culminating in the recovery of Texas and a boundless supply of cotton for our mills and for export. To this end, Admiral Porter, with a strong fleet of iron-clads and transports, was to embark at Vicksburg, 10,000 of Sherman's old army under Gen. A. J. Smith, and move with them up Red river, capturing by the way Fort de Russy, removing all impediments, and meeting at Alexandria Gen. Banks, who, with his 15,000 to 17,000 disposable men, was to march overland from the Atchafalaya to the designated point of junction; while Gen. Steele, with the bulk (15,000) of his Arkansas force, was to move on Shreveport directly from Little Rock. In other words: we were to threaten Shreveport with 40,000 men, so disposed that the enemy, with a compact, mobile force of 25,000, might fight them all in turn with superior numbers, and so cut them up in detail. It was a very old blunder, so often repeated in our struggle that none could plead ignorance of its oft-tested and certain effect; but braying in a mortar would be effective only with those who do not need it. Had Steele's men been brought down the Arkansas in boats, and added to Banks's and Smith's forces, the issue must almost certainly have been different. But Gen. Steele's demonstration, though designed to be simultaneous and cöoperative with Banks's, was entirely independent;[2] while Gen. Smith's quota was only loaned to Banks for a brief period, and was subject to recall in entire disregard of his authority. Had such a movement missed failing, it would have been a disparagement of good generalship evermore.

Banks's own force was to have moved from Franklin on the 7th of March, so as to be at Alexandria on the 17th: but the General was busy at New Orleans, and intrusted the immediate command of his force to Gen. Franklin; who was not ready to start till the 13th, and had not fully reached Alexandria till the 25th; though his cavalry advance, under Gen. A. L. Lee, had arrived on the 19th.

[1] Jan. 23, 1864.

[2] Gen. Banks, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, testified that—

"The truth was, that while four forces—Gen. Steele's, Gen. Sherman's (under Gen. Smith), Admiral Porter's, and my own—were operating together, neither one of them had a right to give any order to the other. Gen. Smith never made any report to me, but considered his as substantially an independent force. * * * It took us 20 days to communicate with Gen. Steele; and then we could only state our own position, ask what he was doing, and give advice; but we could not tell whether he followed the advice or not, nor what he was doing."

Ere this, Admiral Porter, with 15 iron-clads and four lighter steamboats, had reached[3] the mouth of Red river, where he was joined[4] by Gen. A. J. Smith and his 10,000 men in transports, and proceeded next day, pioneered by the Eastport, up the Red to Simmsport, which was evacuated by the Rebels, who fell back on Fort de Russy. Nine of our gunboats entered the Atchafalaya, followed by the land force; while the residue, followed by the transports, continued up the Red, where the Eastport, in advance, was for hours engaged in removing the Rebel obstructions of piles and chains in the channel, which months had been given to constructing and strengthening. These being disposed of, the Eastport and Neosho passed them, and pushed forward to Fort de Russy, where Smith had by this time arrived; and he, after a few shots from the Eastport, assaulted and carried the works, capturing 10 guns and 283 prisoners. Smith, who had started from Simmsport at daylight, marched 40 miles, built a bridge that detained him two hours, taken a large and strong fort by assault, after considerable skirmishing and cannon-firing, had his day's work done and the fort fully in possession before sunset. The main Rebel force, about 5,000 strong, under Gen. Walker, retreated up the river. Porter at once sent his swiftest vessels up to Alexandria, which was abandoned without a struggle.[5] The Eastport had come up the night before.

But here commenced the real difficulties of the undertaking. There was hardly water enough in the river to float our heavy iron-clads up to this point; and here was a considerable fall or rapid, up which about half of them were forced with great effort. Porter wisely left five or six of the heaviest below, though Banks deemed naval cöoperation essential to the success of the undertaking. One hospital-ship was sunk and lost in getting up. As there was but 6 feet water in the channel at the fall, while our vessels drew from 7½ to 10 feet, it is not surprising that 7 or 8 days[6] were spent in getting over those vessels that went higher. During the halt here, Gen. Warner, with four brigades of Smith's corps, surprised[7] a Rebel post at Henderson's hill, 21 miles westward, capturing 4 guns, 250 men, and 200 horses.

But embarrassments multiplied. Gen. McPherson, now in command at Vicksburg, called for the return of the marine brigade, 3,000 strong, of Smith's corps, to its special duty of guarding the Mississippi from raids; and it had to be sent. Then it was found necessary to make Alexandria a dépôt of supplies, which could not be carried farther; and Gen. C. Grover's division of 3,000 more were left to garrison it. And, as no cöoperation could be expected from Steele,[8] Banks's 40,000 men

[3] March 7. [4] March 11. [5] March 16.

[6] March 26 to April 3. [7] March 21.

[8] Banks says, in his official report:

"The partial disintegration of the several commands assigned to this expedition was a cause of embarrassment, though not entirely of failure. The command of Maj.-Gen. Steele, which I was informed by Maj.-Gen. Sherman would be about 15,000, was in fact but 7,000, and operating upon a line several hundred miles distant, with purposes and results entirely unknown to me. Feb. 5, I was informed by Gen. Steele that, if any advance was to be made, it must be by the Washita and Red rivers; and that he might be able to move his command, by the way of Pine Bluff, to Monroe, for this purpose. This would have united our forces on Red river, and insured the success of the campaign. Feb. 28, he informed me that he could



RED RIVER REGION.

were already reduced, though scarcely a shot had been fired, to about 20,000. Part of these had already been pushed on, 80 miles farther, to Natchitoches[9]—the enemy skirmishing sharply at intervals with our van, but making no stubborn resistance. Gen. A. L. Lee, scouting in advance to Pleasant Hill, 36 miles farther, found the enemy in force; while some of Price's men, here taken prisoners, reported a concentration in that neighborhood of troops from Texas (under Green) and from Arkansas; raising the aggregate Rebel force barring the road to Shreveport to about 25,000 men, with 76 guns.

Shreveport was 100 miles from Natchitoches—the direct road (which was taken) passing through a sandy, barren, mainly pine-covered, nearly uninhabited country. The river, which had been confidently expected to rise, was unequivocally, steadily falling; and our gunboats could not pass Grand Ecore.[10]

Banks should have stopped here; but Smith's corps must soon leave, in obedience to peremptory orders from Gen. Grant, who had work cut out for it elsewhere; and Banks's army, its General inclusive, was hungry for Shreveport. A partisan encoun-

not move by way of Monroe; and March 4, the day before my command was ordered to move, I was informed by Gen. Sherman that he had written to Gen. Steele 'to push straight for Shreveport.' March 5, I was informed by Gen. Halleck that he had no information of Gen. Steele's plans, further than that he would be directed to facilitate my operations toward Shreveport. March 10, Gen. Steele informed me that the objections to the route I wished him to take (by the way of Red river) were stronger than ever, and that he 'would move with all his available force (about 7,000 men) to Washington, and thence to Shreveport.' I received information, March 26, dated March 15, from Maj.-Gen. Halleck, that he had 'directed Gen. Steele to make a real move, as suggested by you (Banks), instead of a *demonstration*, as he (Steele) thought advisable.' In April, Gen. Halleck informed me that he had telegraphed Gen. Steele 'to cooperate with you (Banks) on Red river, with all his available forces.' April 16, I was informed, under date of the 10th, by Gen. Sherman, that Gen. Steele's entire force would cooperate with me and the navy. In May, I received information from Gen. Steele, dated April 28, that he could not leave Camden unless supplies were sent to him, as those of the country were exhausted; that we 'could not help each other operating on lines so wide apart;' that he could not say definitely that he could join me 'at any point on Red river at any given time;' and, from the distance that separated us, that I could render no assistance to him—an opinion in which I entirely concurred. I never received authority to give orders to Gen. Steele. My instructions limited me to communicating with him upon the subject of the expedition. I have no doubt that Gen. Steele did all in his power to insure success; but, as communication with him was necessarily by special messenger, and occupied from 15 to 20 days at each communication, it was impossible for either of us fully to comprehend the relative positions of the two armies, or to assist or to support each other."

[9] April 2–3.

[10] Natchitoches is on the *old* (deserted) channel of Red river; Grand Ecore is on its *new* channel, four miles farther north.

ter,[11] north of Red river, between Col. O. P. Gooding's brigade of 1,500 cavalry and a Rebel force under Harrison, wherein Gooding came out ahead, stimulated the pervading eagerness to advance.

'Forward' was the word, and Natchitoches was left behind on the 6th: Gen. A. L. Lee, with the cavalry, in the van; next, Gen. Ransom, with two thin divisions of the 13th corps; then Gen. Emory, with the 1st division of the 19th corps and a Black brigade: the whole advance immediately commanded by Gen. W. B. Franklin; Gen. A. J. Smith, with part of the 16th corps, followed next morning; but, as the iron-clads had been unavoidably left behind, a division of the 17th corps, 2,500 strong, under Gen. T. Kilby Smith, was guarding the transports creeping up the river, under orders to halt and communicate with the army at Loggy bayou, half way to Shreveport. Gen. Banks left Grand Ecore on the morning of the 7th, reaching the van at Pleasant Hill before night. A rain that day, which had greatly retarded the rear of our extended column, had not reached its front.

Gen. Banks found that Lee had that afternoon had a sharp fight with a body of Rebels; worsting and driving them 9 miles to St. Patrick's bayou, where our van halted for the night. Our loss in this affair was 62 men.

Gen. Lee pushed on at daybreak next morning; driving the enemy three miles farther to Sabine Cross-Roads, three miles below Mansfield, where he encountered the Rebel 'Army of the trans-Mississippi,' under Kirby Smith, Dick Taylor, Mouton, and Green, numbering not less than 20,000 men. Here Banks, reaching our front at 1½ P. M., found our men in line of battle, the skirmishers hotly engaged; the main body of the foe hidden in pine woods behind the crest of a hill, across which ran the only road to Shreveport.

Banks had passed Franklin some miles back, and had ordered him to send forward a brigade of infantry and close up to the front; and he now sent back to hurry him up. Gen. Ransom, with a single brigade of infantry, had already come up when Banks arrived. Lee was ordered to hold his ground, but not attempt to advance. Messenger after messenger was sent back to hurry Franklin; the skirmishing growing gradually hotter; until, at 4½ P. M., the Rebels having, in overwhelming force, outflanked our handful on both wings, made a grand charge, which was gallantly resisted; but the odds were three or four to one, and our front recoiled from the field wherein their line was formed to the woods this side, losing heavily.

It was now 5 P. M. Gen. Franklin had come up, with Gen. Cameron's (3d) division of the 13th corps, and a new and somewhat stronger line was formed; which the exulting foe at once flanked and charged, crushing it back in spite of its desperate resistance. And now the narrow, winding forest-road was found so choked with the supply-train of Lee's division that any orderly retreat became impossible, and 10 of Ransom's guns were lost, with perhaps 1,000 prisoners, including Col. Emerson, 67th Indiana. Gens. Franklin and Ransom, and Col. Robinson, 3d cavalry brigade, were wounded, and Col.

[11] April 4.

J. W. Vance, 96th Ohio, and Lt.-Col. Webb, 77th Illinois, killed. Repeated attempts to rëform our disheartened men, so as to present a fresh barrier to the enemy's victorious advance, proved of no avail. *The Press* (Philadelphia) had a correspondent watching the fight, who thus reports its melancholy finale:

"The reader will understand that our forces were in an open space—a pine-wood clearing—that our line of advance was one single, narrow road; and that, having made the attack ourselves, we found the enemy superior, and were compelled to make a defensive fight. There were other troubles. The country was so formed that artillery was almost useless. We could not place a battery without exposing it in a manner that suggested madness; and yet we had the guns, and were compelled to fight them. A further disadvantage was to be found in the long trains that followed the different divisions. The cavalry had the advance; immediately behind, came the baggage-wagons, moving in a slow, cumbersome manner, and retarding the movements of the infantry. This made it impossible for us to have our divisions in supporting distance; and, when the time came for that support, it could not be rendered. Gen. Banks perceived this at once; but it was too late to remedy it, and he was compelled to fight the battle in the best manner possible. Ransom's division had been engaged and routed. Cameron's division was in the thickest of the fight. Gen. Franklin had arrived on the field, and a division of his magnificent corps, under Gen. Emory, was pushing along rapidly. Gen. Banks personally directed the fight. Every thing that man could do he did. Occupying a position so exposed that nearly every horse ridden by his staff was wounded, and many killed, he constantly disregarded the entreaties of those around, who begged that he would retire to some less exposed position. Gen. Stone, his chief of staff, with his sad, earnest face, that seemed to wear an unusual expression, was constantly at the front, and by his reckless bravery did much to encourage the men. And so the fight raged. The enemy were pushing a temporary advantage. Our army was merely forming into position to make a sure battle.

"Then came one of those unaccountable events that no genius or courage can control. I find it impossible to describe a scene so sudden and bewildering, although I was present, partly an actor, partly a spectator, and saw plainly every thing that took place. The battle was progressing vigorously. The musketry firing was loud and continuous; and, having recovered from the danger experienced by Ransom's division, we felt secure of the position. I was slowly riding along the edge of a wood, conversing with a friend, who had just ridden up, about the events and prospects of the day. We had drawn into the side of the wood to allow an ammunition wagon to pass; and, although many were observed going to the rear, some on foot and some on horseback, we regarded it as an occurrence familiar to every battle, and it occasioned nothing but a passing remark.

"I noticed that most of those thus wildly riding to the rear were negroes, hangers-on, and serving-men; for, now that we have gone so deeply into this slaveholding country, every non-commissioned officer has a servant, and every servant a mule. These people were the first to show any panic; but their scamper along the road only gave amusement to the soldiers, who pelted them with stones and whipped their flying animals with sticks to increase their speed. Suddenly, there was a rush, a shout, the crashing of trees, the breaking down of rails, the rush and scamper of men. It was as sudden as though a thunder-bolt had fallen among us and set the pines on fire. What caused it, or when it commenced, no one knew. I turned to my companion to inquire the reason of this extraordinary proceeding; but, before he had a chance to reply, we found ourselves swallowed up, as it were, in a hissing, seething, bubbling whirlpool of agitated men. We could not avoid the current; we could not stem it; and, if we hoped to live in that mad company, we must ride with the rest of them. Our line of battle had given way. Gen. Banks took off his hat and implored his men to remain; his staff-officers did the same: but it was of no avail. Then the General drew his saber and endeavored to rally his men; but they would not listen. Behind him, the Rebels were shouting and advancing. Their musket-balls filled the air with that strange, file-rasping sound that war has made familiar to our fighting men. The teams were abandoned by the drivers, the traces cut, and the animals ridden off by the frightened men. Bareheaded riders rode with agony in their faces; and, for at least ten minutes, it seemed as if we were going to destruction together. It was my fortune to see the first battle of Bull Run, and to be among those who made that celebrated midnight retreat toward Washington. The retreat of the 4th division was as much a rout as that of the first Federal

army, with the exception that fewer men were engaged, and our men fought here with a valor that was not shown on that serious, sad, mock-heroic day in July."[18]

Gen. Emory, advancing behind Franklin, had been early advised that matters were dubious at the front, and directed to take a position wherein to stop the mischief. Advancing four miles farther, he halted his division at PLEASANT GROVE, three miles behind Sabine Cross-roads, and disposed it for the emergency. It held the western edge of a wood, with an open field in front, sloping toward Mansfield; and here Gen. Dwight formed his (1st) brigade across the road, with the 3d, Col. Lewis Benedict,[19] on his left; the 2d, Gen. McMillen, in reserve; the 161st N. York, Lt.-Col. Kinsey, being thrown out in advance as skirmishers; Lee's and Franklin's flying columns being allowed to pass through and form (if they would) behind the living rampart thus erected.

Hardly was Emory's formation completed when the flushed Rebels came headlong on, driving in our skirmishers pell-mell, and charging up the slope as though there were only the routed fugitives from the Cross-roads before them. Their left overlapping our right, Gen. McMillen was thrown forward on that wing, and our fire reserved until

[18] A grumbling private of the 83d Ohio thus sums up his view of this affair:

"The battle was shockingly managed. It was, no doubt, a surprise on the General commanding. He endeavored to charge the enemy with a baggage-train, but it did n't work. * * * Gens. Banks and Franklin did n't believe there was any force in our front but a few skirmishers, and, by their incredulity, lost the day."

A letter to *The Missouri Republican* has the following:

"About 3 P. M., when within two miles of Mansfield, the advance, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and the 4th division, 13th army corps, while marching through a dense pine forest, there being a thick undergrowth of pines on either side of the road, were attacked by the Rebels in great force, on both flanks and in front. The engagement soon became general: the Rebels suddenly opening with artillery and musketry, charging our surprised and panic-stricken columns with terrific yells, evincing a daring and determination worthy of a better cause. Gen. Banks and Gen. Franklin hurried to the front, and were in the thickest of the fight. The artillery was speedily put in position at the extreme front, and, for a while, did excellent service. Finding the front rather too dangerous for Major-Generals, Banks and Franklin returned to the rear of the wagon-train, just in time to save themselves from capture, as the Rebels pressed upon both sides of our army with crushing effect. A ball passed through Gen. Banks's hat. Every thing was soon in the wildest confusion; the wagon-train, being in the rear and in the narrow road, attempted to turn round to fall back, and completely blocked up the way, cutting off the advance both from a way of retreat and from reënforcements. The Rebels had formed in the shape of an isosceles triangle, leaving the base open, and at the apex planting their artillery. Our advance marched directly into the triangle, having the two wings of the Rebel forces on either side of them. These wings were speedily connected, compelling our forces to retreat or surrender. The batteries above mentioned, consisting of 20 pieces in all, were now captured, together with nearly all their officers and men. The Chicago Mercantile battery was captured entire, and I am informed that all her officers and men fell into the hands of the enemy. The 4th division, 13th corps, 2,800 men, under Gen. Ransom, and Gen. Lee's cavalry, about 3,000 strong, and the batteries above mentioned, were the forces in advance of the wagon-train. These forces fought desperately for a while, but gave way to the superior numbers of the Rebels, and retreated in great precipitation. The scene of this retreat beggars all description. Gen. Franklin said of it, that 'Bull Run was not a circumstance in comparison.' Gen. Ransom was wounded in the knee, but rode off the field before he was compelled, by loss of blood, to dismount. Capt. Dickey, of Gen. Ransom's staff, was shot through the head and killed instantly. His body was left on the field. The position of the wagon-train in the narrow road was the great blunder of the affair. The rear was completely blocked up, rendering the retreat very difficult, and, in fact, almost impossible. Cavalry horses were dashing at full speed through the roads, endangering infantry and other pedestrians more than Rebel musketry: the retreat having become so precipitate that all attempts to make a stand, for a while, seemed impossible.

"The immense baggage and supply train of Gen. Lee's cavalry, consisting of 269 wagons, nearly all fell into the hands of the enemy, together with the mules attached thereto."

[19] Of Albany, N. Y.

they were close upon our line; when a deadly volley swept them down like grass; Gen. Mouton being among the killed. But, though somewhat astonished, they were not dismayed; their superiority in numbers more than counterbalancing our advantage of position. For an hour and a half, the fighting continued at close quarters, till darkness arrested it—all the enemy's impetuous charges having been repelled by the steady valor of our men; their losses being at least double ours. Emory's division had saved our army, and probably our fleet also."[14]

Smith's veterans were still behind. To remain on the ground watered with the blood of both armies was to fight again at daylight with half our force against every fighting Rebel between Shreveport and the Mississippi. To retreat would enable the worsted foe to claim a second victory. Banks preferred the substance to the shadow, and fell back unmolested during the night 15 miles, to PLEASANT HILL: Gen. Emory covering the retreat, after burying his dead and caring for his wounded, and only reaching our new position at 8½ A. M.[15]

Thus far, we had fought against fearful odds—odds that need not, therefore, should not, have been encountered. At Pleasant Hill, the case was somewhat altered. Gen. Smith had arrived and halted here at night, as had Col. Dickey's Black brigade; swelling Banks's forces to fully 15,000 men. But for yesterday's disasters, it might have been nearly 20,000. Our line of battle was formed with Franklin's three brigades in front, supported by Smith's, whereof the 2d, composed of the 14th, 27th, and 32d Iowa, and the 24th Missouri, under Col. Wm. T. Shaw, 14th Iowa, were formed directly across the main road to Shreveport, whereon the Rebels must advance, along the thinly wooded brow of a slight acclivity, half a mile west of the gentle eminence and petty village of Pleasant Hill; though the bulk of our army was formed, and most of the

[14] The *Chicago Tribune's* correspondent says:

"About a half a mile from the field, the 3d division, 13th corps, under Gen. Cameron, came up and formed in line of battle; and here two guns of the Mercantile battery were put in position and opened with good effect upon the enemy. For a short time, it seemed as if a successful rally would be made at this point; but the effort was in vain. The entire strength of the 3d division on the field was only 1,600 men, and, after a short and courageous resistance, the line gave way. A check, however, had been given to the panic, and many of the troops formed into squads and continued the retreat in better order. Efficient aid was also rendered by Col. Robinson, commanding a cavalry brigade detailed to guard the trains, who, hearing the rapidly approaching firing, hastened with a large portion of his command to the front, and, wheeling into line in perfect order, delivered a most destructive volley into the Rebels, who were swarming in the road, and then fell back in good order. For full a mile from the place where Cameron's division had met us, the retreat was continued; the Rebels following closely upon our heels, and keeping up a continuous fire, when, all at once, as we emerged into a more open piece of woods, we came upon Emory's division, of the 19th corps, forming in magnificent order in line of battle across the road.

"Opening their ranks to permit the retreating forces to pass through, each regiment of this fine division, closing up on the double-quick, quietly awaited the approach of the Rebels; and, within less than five minutes, on they came, screaming and firing as they advanced, but still in good order and with closed ranks. All at once, from that firm line of gallant soldiers that now stood so bravely between us and our pursuing foes, there came forth a course of reverberating thunders that rolled from flank to flank in one continuous peal, sending a storm of leaden hail into the Rebel ranks that swept them back in dismay, and left the ground covered with their killed and wounded. In vain the Rebels strove to rally against this terrific fire. At every effort, they were repulsed; and, after a short contest, they fell back, evidently most terribly punished. It was now quite dark, and each party bivouacked on the field."

[15] April 9.

fighting took place, on the right of the road: our left being refused, with strong reserves posted upon and around Pleasant Hill, to be used as circumstances should dictate.

The Rebels had followed our retreating column from Pleasant Grove, but not sharply; and they, from about 11 A. M., cautiously skirmished and felt of our lines, to find a weak point, while their forces were coming up and getting into position, till about 4 P. M., before making a serious attack. Meantime, Banks had dispatched his trains and heavy artillery, guarded by most of our cavalry, with the Black troops and the remains of Ransom's pulverized division, on the road to Grand Ecore; thus weakening our force at the front, in the belief that they would not attack till the morrow. Our remaining brigade of cavalry, Col. O. P. Gooding, had been sent out to reconnoiter a mile or two on the road to Shreveport, and had been roughly handled. But now, a Rebel battery opened, and their infantry advanced; when, their intention of turning our right becoming manifest, Emory's 3d brigade, Col. Benedict, moved to the support of his 1st on that flank, and Shaw's brigade of Smith's corps aforesaid moved forward and took its position in our front; so that, when the enemy charged in earnest, the brunt of the fight fell on this gallant brigade. It could hardly have found one more able or willing to meet it."

At 4 P. M., the Rebel skirmish-fire had seemed suddenly to increase and become general; but it soon died away almost wholly, as if the courage to attack had failed. But a few minutes elapsed, however, till our skirmishers were driven in by two charging columns, advancing obliquely against our left center, and striking heavily Emory's 3d brigade, Col. Lewis Benedict, which, after fighting desperately, gave way, and was slowly pushed back on our reserves: but not till Col. Benedict had been wounded. Emory's 1st and 2d brigades were soon enveloped on three sides in overwhelming force and crowded back; the enemy now passing our right and center in eager pursuit, and pressing on nearly to Gen. Smith's position in reserve; when, after an exchange of several volleys, he was charged in turn by Smith's Western veterans, led by Gen. Mower, and by Emory's division, now formed on their right, and fairly routed; part of the foe being driven two miles: the 49th Illinois, Maj. Morgan, rushing upon one of their batteries, taking two of its guns, and 100 prisoners. The 58th Illinois, brigaded with the 89th Indiana and 119th Illinois, striking the enemy in flank, rëtook one of our lost batteries, and captured 400 prisoners, with 6

[*] A newspaper correspondent on the field writes:

"Col. W. T. Shaw, commanding the 2d brigade, 3d division, 16th corps, deserves great credit for the able manner in which he suppresses Rebel cavalry charges. Col. Sweitzer of the —— Texas cavalry, undertook to break Col. Shaw's lines by a charge. Orders were given to 'Reserve your fire, boys, until he gets within thirty yards, and then give it to him!' As the cavalry dashed on at a gallop, each infantryman had selected his victim, and, waiting till the three or four hundred were within about forty yards, the 14th Iowa emptied nearly every saddle as quickly as though the order had been given to dismount.

"Out of this Rebel cavalry regiment, not more than ten men escaped; and the whole movement was done with that terrible death-alacrity which the science of war teaches, and the awful reality of which the eye alone can describe to the soul."

caissons and their horses." Gen. M. M. Parsons, of Mo., was among the Rebel killed. The fall of the brave Col. Benedict—wounded a second time, and now mortally, as he charged at the head of his brigade, with a shout of triumph on his lips—was part of the cost of this undeniable victory.

That the battle of Pleasant Hill was bravely fought against odds in numbers and dearly won by our soldiers, is not fairly disputable; though the fact that Gen. Banks decided to follow, before morning, that considerable portion of his army which, before it commenced, he had started, guarding his trains, on the road to Grand Ecore, has thrown some haze over the result. But Pollard—who always claims a Rebel victory where it is possible to do so—makes no victory out of this; while Dick Taylor—who addresses the Rebel army as "Major-General commanding," though Kirby Smith was commander of the department, and probably not so far off as Shreveport—after claiming 21 guns, 2,500 prisoners, 250 wagons, and many stands of colors, as trophies of the preceding day's triumph, is only able to say this of the battle of Pleasant Hill:

"The gallant divisions from Missouri and Arkansas, unfortunately absent on the 8th instant, marched 45 miles in two days, to share the glories of Pleasant Hill. This was emphatically the soldiers' victory. In spite of the strength of the enemy's position, held by fresh troops of the 16th corps, your valor and devotion triumphed over all. Darkness closed one of the hottest fights of the war. The morning of the 10th instant dawned upon a flying foe, with our cavalry in pursuit, capturing prisoners at every step."

No prisoners [*we* took at least 500]; no guns [*we* took several]; no colors; no trophies of any kind—nothing but the fact that Banks retreated after the battle, is cited to give color to a Rebel claim of tri-

[17] The *New York Herald's* correspondent says:

"At twenty minutes past 5, the enemy appeared on the plain at the edge of the woods, and the battle commenced: our batteries opening upon him with case-shell as he marched at double-quick across the field to the attack.

"Our left, Col. Benedict's brigade, came into action first; and our right and center were engaged soon after. The battle now raged fiercely: the air was full of lead and iron, and the roar of musketry and artillery incessant. The carnage on both sides was fearful: the men fighting almost hand to hand, and with great desperation.

"Nothing could exceed the determined bravery of our troops; but it was evident Emory's division was fighting the whole Rebel army. Pressed at all points by overwhelming numbers, our line fell back up the hill to the 16th corps, which was concealed just behind the crest. Taylor's battery for a time fell into the hands of the enemy.

"General Smith made all preparations to receive the advancing foe; and, as the human tide came rolling up the hill, he looked quietly on until the enemy were almost up to the muzzles of his guns; when a sheet of flame flashed along his lines, and, with the crash of ten thousand thunders, musket-balls, mingled with grape and canister, swept the plain like a besom of destruction. Hundreds fell dead and dying before that awful fire.

"Scarcely had the seething lead left the guns when the word 'Charge!' was given, and 7,000 brave men precipitated themselves upon the shattered ranks of the enemy. Emory's division, which had only yielded to superior numbers, and remained unbroken, now rushed forward and joined the 16th corps, driving the Rebels rapidly down the hill to the woods, where they broke and fled in the greatest confusion and dismay.

"Col. Benedict, while gallantly leading his brigade in the charge, fell dead, pierced by five balls.

"The battle was fought, and the victory won. Our troops followed the Rebels until night put an end to the pursuit.

"In the last charge, we recaptured Taylor's battery, which had been lost in the earlier part of the action, and retook two guns of Nim's battery, which had been lost in the battle of the preceding day. The 10-pounder Parrott gun, which the Rebels captured last fall at Carrion Crow, was also retaken.

"Five hundred prisoners, all the dead and wounded, three battle-standards, and a large number of small arms, fell into our hands.

"Our victorious army slept upon the battle-field, which was one of the bloodiest of the war."

umph here. The defeat is thus virtually confessed.

But why did Banks retreat, when his soldiers were eager to advance, and efface the stinging recollection of the blundering disaster of the 8th? He says in his official report:

"At the close of the engagement, the victorious party found itself without rations and water. To clear the field for the fight, the train had been sent to the rear upon the single line of communication through the woods, and could not be brought to the front during the night. There was water neither for man nor beast, except such as the now exhausted wells had afforded during the day for miles around. Previous to the movement of the army from Natchitoches, orders had been given to the transport fleet, with a portion of the 16th corps, under the command of Gen. Kilby Smith, to move up the river, if it was found practicable, to some point near Springfield landing, with a view of effecting a junction with the army at that point on the river. The surplus ammunition and supplies were on board these transports. It was impossible to ascertain whether the fleet had been able to reach the point designated. The rapidly falling river, and the increased difficulties of navigation, made it appear almost certain that it would not be able to attain the point proposed. A squadron of cavalry, sent down to the river, accompanied by Mr. Young, of the engineer corps, who was thoroughly acquainted with the country, reported, on the day of the battle, that no tidings of the fleet could be obtained on the river; and we were compelled to assume that the increasing difficulties of navigation had prevented it, even if disaster had not occurred from the obstructions which the enemy had placed in the river.

"These considerations, the absolute deprivation of water for man or beast, the exhaustion of rations, and the failure to effect a connection with the fleet on the river, made it necessary for the army, although victorious in the terrible struggle through which it had just passed, to retreat to a point where it would be certain of communicating with the fleet, and where it would have an opportunity of rēorganization. The shattered condition of the 13th army corps and the cavalry made this indispensable. The wounded were gathered from the battle-field, placed in comfortable hospitals, and left under the care of competent surgeons and assistants. The dead remaining on the field were, as far as possible, buried during the night. The next day, medical supplies and provisions, with competent attendants, were sent in for the sustenance of the wounded; and at daybreak the army reluctantly fell back to its position at Grand Ecore, for the purpose of communicating with the fleet and obtaining supplies; to the great disappointment of the troops, who, flushed with success, were eager for another fight."

It certainly would seem that the impulse of the soldiers was, in this case, more trustworthy than the discretion of the General. For, the want of water was at least as great on the part of the enemy as on ours, and can not have amounted to an absolute drouth in a region generally wooded and not absolutely flat, nor streamless, with Sabine river within a day's march on one flank, and Red river as near on the other. It is surely to be regretted that our army, if unable to advance, had not moved by the right flank to Red river, or simply held its ground for two or three days, while its wounded were sent away to Grand Ecore, instead of being abandoned to the enemy.

Banks admits a loss of 18 guns only on the 8th, with 125 wagons, and claims a gain of three guns on the 9th; at the close of which day, he reports that

"The troops held in reserve moved forward at the critical moment, and maintained our position, from which the enemy was driven precipitately and with terrible destruction of life. He fled to the woods upon the right, and was pursued with great energy by the whole of our forces, until it was impossible in the darkness to distinguish friend from foe. The losses were great on both sides; but that of the Rebels, as we could judge from the appearance of the battle-field, more than double our own."

Banks admits a total loss of 3,969 men in the collisions of the 7th, 8th, and 9th of April—289 killed, 1,541 wounded, and 2,150 missing, mostly prisoners—and says that we fought and won at Pleasant Hill with 15,000

against 22,000. The simple fact that Taylor, and Pollard after him, with Kirby Smith's report of the campaign, are silent with regard to the Rebel losses, is eloquent on this point. Assuming Banks's entire loss during this campaign at 5,000 men, it is morally certain that he inflicted at least equal loss on the Rebels. Even in guns—counting those captured with Fort de Russy—they had nothing to boast of.

Still, the prestige of victory was with them, the mortification of high-raised, blasted hopes, with us. We had undertaken to crush the Rebel power west of the Mississippi, and had fitted out costly expeditions—naval as well as military—for that end; and had ingloriously failed. Not only were the Rebels encouraged by this, but the timid and the wavering Louisianians and Texans were attached to the Rebel cause; while the cowering, silent, long-expectant, heart-sick Unionists of the South-west were plunged into a new abyss of bitter anguish and despair.

Gen. Banks fell back, unassailed, to Grand Ecore; the enemy now giving more immediate attention to Porter's fleet, which had worked its way slowly and laboriously up the river to Springfield landing; where the Rebels had sunk a large steamboat across the channel to arrest its progress. Just as Porter was commencing operations for its removal, a courier from Gen. Banks brought tidings of the reverse at Sabine Cross-roads, and the recoil of our army; with directions to turn back; which were sadly obeyed. The river was remarkably low, and still falling; the difficulty of navigating it with our lighter gunboats and transports almost insuperable; and now the enemy commenced annoying us at every bend and from every covert; the banks being often so high that their sharp-shooters could with perfect impunity fire over them at the men hard at work on the decks of our vessels, getting them over the numerous shoals and bars. The first attack was made at a point called Coushatta; after that, Harrison, with 1,900 cavalry, and 4 guns, persistently annoyed us: our vessels making at best but 30 miles per day; and compelled to tie up at night, which enabled him easily to keep up with them. At length,[18] a more determined attack was made from the right or south bank, by 2,000 infantry (Texans) with 2 guns, led by Gen. Tom Green, whose head was blown off by a shell and one of his guns disabled, before his men could be quieted. Never was attack more reckless than that made by his infuriated, rum-crazed followers, who fancied that they could carry gunboats in that narrow, crooked channel, by infantry charges; and would not be undeceived until the Lexington, Lt. G. M. Bache, got them under a raking fire of canister, which soon strewed the bank for a mile with their bodies. Porter reports their loss here at 500. Kilby Smith's land force of course cöoperated with the gunboats in the contest. The lesson was so impressive that 5,000 Rebels, who were hastening to intercept the fleet at a point below, concluded, on hearing of it, to defer the enterprise.

Meantime, our fleet pursued its arduous voyage till, at Compte,[19] several being hopelessly aground, Porter

[18] April 12.

[19] April 13.

hastened down to Gen. Banks, at Grand Ecore, six miles below; when troops were sent up to their relief; and they were brought down without further annoyance.

At Grand Ecore, Porter found most of his larger vessels aground—several of them drawing a foot more water than there was on the bar at that point. While he was getting them over, the Eastport, which had gone eight miles farther down, was sunk; and several days' hard work were required to stop her leaks, pump her out, and get her afloat again. By this time, Banks had concluded to continue his retreat to Alexandria and below—the return of Smith's force to the other side of the Mississippi being imperatively required—and six days were consumed [28] after the Eastport was afloat in arduous efforts to get her to Alexandria, she running fast aground eight times by the way. At last—Banks's army being now 60 miles ahead, the Eastport having been divested of her guns to induce her to float, and only three of the lighter gunboats left to convoy her—she went hard aground again, when scarcely thirty miles below Grand Ecore, and could not be got afloat; whereon Porter reluctantly gave the order for her destruction—Lt. Com'g Phelps being the last to leave her, after applying a match to the train whereby she was blown up, set on fire, and completely demolished. At this moment, 1,200 Rebels, on the right bank, made a rush to board the Cricket, which stood out from the bank and opened on them with grape and canister, while the Fort Hindman and another gunboat obtained a cross-fire on them, and in five minutes there was not a Rebel in sight; nor did they again make their appearance till our boats had reached Cane river, 20 miles below; when, on rounding a point, they were saluted from the right bank by 18 Rebel guns.

The Cricket, acting Master H. H. Gorringe, was ahead, and received every shot from the Rebel battery; most of them going through her. Her after gun was struck by a shell and disabled; every gunner being killed or wounded. At that moment, another shell exploded by her forward gun, sweeping off every gunner, and, entering the fire-room, left but one man there unwounded. Her decks had by this time been deserted. But Adm. Porter, who was on board, took command, improvising gunners from the negroes on board, put an assistant in place of the chief engineer, who had been killed, stepped to the pilot-house, where one of the pilots had been wounded, and ordered her run by the battery; and it was done, under a terrible fire.

Admiral Porter now attempted to head her up stream; but this proved impracticable: so he let her drift around the point, so that he could, with his two still serviceable guns, shell the Rebel battery in the rear. In the disturbance thus occasioned, the light-draft Juliet and pump-boat Champion, lashed together, were enabled to escape from under the bank where they had helplessly drifted—out of the Rebel fire—the Juliet having been disabled and had her steam-pipe cut by the Rebel balls. The Hindman, from above, now

[28] April 21–6.

joining the Cricket below in enfilading the enemy's battery, the Champion was enabled to tow the Juliet to a place of comparative safety.

Still, the Hindman dared not attempt to pass: so Porter, in the Cricket, ran down three or four miles to a point where he had directed two iron-clads from below to meet him; getting aground by the way, and losing three hours in getting afloat again. He reached the appointed rendezvous after dark; finding there the iron-clad Osage fighting a Rebel field-battery on shore, at which the Lexington had been firing also; having been hulled fifteen times, but had only one man killed. Darkness now fell; and it was impossible to return to the Hindman; which, however, ran the battery above, having her wheel-ropes cut away by their shot, and hence whirling around as she drifted by, being badly cut up in the process. The Juliet likewise got by, badly damaged, with 15 of her crew killed or wounded; while the Cricket had been hulled 38 times and had 25 disabled—half her crew. The Hindman had 3 killed and 4 wounded. The Champion was disabled, set on fire, and destroyed.

No further annoyance was experienced in reaching Alexandria. Admiral Porter estimates that he had killed and wounded at least 500 of the Rebels on his way down; while his own loss was less than 100. The loss of Gen. Green was severely felt by the enemy. Porter attributes his reverses to the low state of the river; saying:

"I can not blame myself for coming up at the only season when the river rises. All the [other] rivers are full and rising; but Red river is falling at the rate of two inches per day—a most unusual occurrence—this river being always full till the middle of June."

It was reported that the Rebels had induced this anomaly, by damming the outlets of several of the quite capacious lakes which discharge into this river.

Gen. Banks remained at Grand Ecore till the fleet was well on its way below; meantime, the Rebel General Bee, with some 8,000 men and 16 guns, had taken a strong position at the crossing of Cane river, 40 miles below, and, with the river on one hand and an impenetrable swamp on the other, expected to stop here our army; which, when it should be deeply involved in front, the rest of the Rebel army was to strike in flank and rear. Banks, apprised of this arrangement, moved suddenly at daybreak[21] from Grand Ecore, marching his army nearly the whole 40 miles, before halting for the night, so as to strike Bee unexpectedly next morning.

Arrived at the river,[22] Emory, with his 1st division, menaced the enemy directly in front; while Gen. H. W. Birge, with his own brigade and Col. Francis Fessenden's of the 19th (Franklin's) corps, moving three miles up stream, flanked the Rebel position, striking heavily on its right; the charge being led with great gallantry by Col. Fessenden, who was here severely wounded. The movement was a complete success: the worsted Rebels abandoning their position and retreating in disorder, on the Fort Jessup road, leading south-westward into Texas. Of course, the attack on Kilby Smith, covering our rear, failed also; the Rebel charge being repulsed, and not renewed. Mower's (16th) corps was in line on Kilby

[21] April 22.

[22] April 23.

Smith's right, but had no chance to fight. Our loss here at the front was 200: Kilby Smith's, at the rear, was only 50. The enemy's must have been greater."[23]

Here—as the return of Gen. Smith's force to its proper department had long since been demanded, and was now imperatively insisted on—a farther retreat was deemed inevitable; and the river was now so low that the fleet could not be got over the falls. For a time, its destruction seemed imminent; but Lt.-Col. Joseph Bailey, engineer of the 19th corps, had foreseen this difficulty, and, on the battle-field of Pleasant Hill, while our troops awaited the Rebel onset, had suggested to Gen. Franklin a means of overcoming it. Franklin approved the project; so did Banks, when it was imparted to him; but Admiral Porter evinced no faith or interest in it till some time afterward. But Banks's official sanction was sufficient; so Bailey set to work,[24] and soon had a main dam of timber and stone constructed across the channel of the river—here 758 feet wide, 4 to 6 deep, and running at the rate of 10 miles per hour—a little below the fall, whereby the depth of water in the main channel on the rapid was increased over five feet. Eight or nine days' work of many willing hands had nearly completed this dam, and had rendered the falls passable by our largest boats above them, when the impetuous current swept[25] away a part of it; whereupon, the Admiral—(who had several of his gunboats at the head, preparing to make the passage, and might have had them taken down)—on rising next day, rode up and ordered the Lexington to be sent down before the water—by this time considerably lower—should have fallen too far; and this was obeyed with entire success. The gunboat took the chute without a balk, and then rushed like an arrow through the narrow aperture in the lower dam; pitched down the roaring torrent; hung for a moment on the rocks below; and was then swept on into deep water, when she rounded gracefully to the bank, amid the thunderous cheer of thirty thousand loyal voices. She had received no damage whatever.

Porter, apprehensive that he had seen the last of dam-building, ordered the Neosho to follow directly; her hatches being battened down, and every precaution taken to insure her safe descent. But her pilot lost heart as he neared the leap, and stopped her engine; so that for a moment her hull was submerged by the current. She rose directly, however, and was swept along to safety with only one hole knocked through her bottom, which was stopped the next hour; the Hindman and Osage following her without accident or damage. In fact, two sunken coal-boats, forming part of the dam, whose loss had been deplored, had only been forced around nearly parallel to the current, so as to form a buffer or cushion, whereby our vessels were prevented from running on ugly rocks which might have proved their destruction.

The deeper gunboats were still above. But Bailey now renewed his efforts, with our whole army as his free-handed assistants; and, in three

[23] Kilby Smith testifies:

"We took many prisoners, all of whom reported a heavy loss on their part of killed and wounded." [24] April 30. [25] May 9.

days more, had constructed several wing-dams, directly at the head of the falls, raising the water on the rapids over a foot additional; and, in three days more,[36] the gunboats Mound City, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Ozark, Louisville, Chilicothe, and two tugs, had successively passed the falls and the dams, with the loss of one man swept overboard and two or three rudders unshipped, were coaled and moving down the river, convoying the transports—the back-water from the swollen Mississippi (150 miles distant) enabling them to pass all the bars below without delay or difficulty.

Ere this, the gunboats Signal and Covington, with the transport Warner, steaming down the river in fancied security, were fired on, soon after daybreak,[37] at Dunn's bayou, 30 miles below Alexandria, by a large Rebel force, and thoroughly riddled; the Covington being abandoned and burned; while the Signal and Warner were compelled to surrender. There were some 400 soldiers on board of these vessels, including Col. Sharp, 156th N. York, and Col. Raynor, 129th Illinois, of whom 150 were captured, and perhaps 100 more killed or wounded. The residue took the shore, and escaped as best they could. Soon afterward, the City Belle, transport, conveying the 120th Ohio, 425 strong, up to Alexandria, was likewise captured; only 200 of the soldiers escaping.

Gen. McClernand, with the larger portion of our forces who had for months held the island posts on the coast of Western Texas, having evacuated those posts by order of Gen. Grant, arrived at Alexandria[38] soon after the return of our army to that point. Gen. Fitz Henry Warren, who had been left in command at Matagorda bay, with the remainder of those forces, evacuated, soon afterward, all our posts on the coast of Texas save those on the Rio Grande, and came around to reënforce Gen. Banks; but was stopped by formidable Rebel batteries at Marksville, on the Red river, when he fell back to Fort de Russy and strengthened that post.

Banks, upon reaching Alexandria from above, had found[39] there Gen. Hunter, with reiterated orders from Grant to bring his Shreveport campaign to a close without delay. Banks sent Hunter back[40] with dispatches, stating that the fleet was above the falls, and that it could not be left there to the enemy, nor yet brought over without serious, protracted effort on the part of the army. Yet, before the dams were completed and the gunboats relieved from their peril, Banks was favored with a fresh dispatch[41] from Halleck, saying:

"Lieut.-Gen. Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red river, and that operations there be continued, under the officer in command, until further orders."

Two weeks earlier, this, with permission to retain Smith's corps, would have been most welcome. But, before it came to hand, the Rebels had control of the river below as well as above Alexandria, and a renewal of the campaign was judged impracticable.

Gen. Banks evacuated Alexandria

[36] May 11–13. [37] May 5. [38] April 29. [39] April 25. [40] April 30. [41] Dated April 30.

simultaneously with the departure of the fleet; striking for Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya. That morning, a fire broke out in a building on the levee which had been occupied by soldiers or refugees; and, in spite of the most determined efforts by our men, a high wind and the proximity of inflammable substances insured the destruction of a considerable portion of the buildings. Gen. Banks had apprehended such a disaster, and had directed Gen. Grover, post commandant, to take precautions against it; but they proved unavailing. It is of course probable that some evil-disposed person or persons purposely started the fire.

On the march to Simmsport, a Rebel cavalry force was encountered just at daybreak[32] at Mansura, near Marksville, by our advance, and pushed steadily back across the open prairie to the woods beyond; where a stand was made for three hours—the fighting being mainly by skirmishers and artillery—until our main body had come up, and Gen. Emory on our right and Gen. A. J. Smith on our left had flanked the foe's position, when, after a sharp but brief struggle, he was driven, with considerable loss—we recapturing a part of the prisoners taken with our vessels on the river ten or twelve days before. No farther resistance being encountered, our advance reached Simmsport that evening.

The Atchafalaya is here 600 yards wide, quite deep, and no ordinary bridge material at hand. Under Col. Bailey's direction, a bridge was constructed of steamboats in two days and a half; the wagon-train passing over it during the afternoon of May 19th. As it did so, our rear at Yellow bayou was assailed by a Rebel force under Prince Polignac, whom A. J. Smith beat off, inflicting a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our loss was 150 killed and wounded. The passage of the Atchafalaya was completed next day; and—Gen. Canby, having appeared as commander of the trans-Mississippi department—Gen. Banks turned over the army to him and hastened to New Orleans. Gen. A. J. Smith returned hence to his own department with his somewhat depleted command. On his way up the Mississippi, he landed[33] at Sunnyside, in the south-eastern corner of Arkansas, and attacked, near Columbia, a Rebel force estimated at 3,000, said to be under command of Marmaduke, strongly posted across a bayou emptying into Lake Chicot, who were worsted and driven, retreating westward. Our loss here was 20 killed, 70 wounded; that of the enemy about the same.

Gen. Banks's movement on Simmsport having loosened the Rebel hold on the river at Marksville, Admiral Porter encountered no farther resistance; but moved down the Red nearly parallel with the army, and resumed his patrol of the Mississippi.

Much odium was excited by the circumstance that sundry cotton speculators visited Alexandria during its occupation by our forces, armed with permits from the President or the Treasury department; so that the campaign wore the aspect of a gigantic cotton raid, prosecuted at the expense of the country for the benefit of individuals. Gen. Banks

[32] May 16.

[33] June 5.

was nowise implicated in these sordid operations; not so Admiral Porter.[34] He, unlike Banks, had been an original advocate of the advance on Shreveport. He had signalized his movement up Red river by a proclamation or order claiming for the fleet —that is, in good part, for himself— all the cotton within a league of that river as lawful prize of war. And, while our army was hard at work to get his gunboats over the falls on his return, Government wagons were engaged in bringing in cotton from the adjacent plantations, to load transports that might far better have been used to bring away the loyal people of Alexandria, who were left defenseless to the vengeance of the returning Rebels.

Gen. Steele moved[35] southward from Little Rock with 7,000 men, almost simultaneously with Banks's advance to Alexandria; Gen. Thayer, with the Army of the Frontier, possibly 5,000 strong, having left Fort Smith the day previous, expecting to join him at Arkadelphia; while Col. Clayton, with a small force, advanced from Pine Bluff on Steele's left. Heavy rains, bad roads, swollen streams, and the absence of bridges, impeded movements and deranged calculations on all hands; so that Steele, after waiting two days at Arkadelphia, pressed on[36] without him. Since it crossed the Saline, the Rebel cavalry, under Marmaduke and Shelby, had skirmished sharply with our advance; and attempts to stop it at river-crossings and other difficult passes were often made, but generally baffled by flanking. Sterling Price, with a considerable force of Rebel infantry, barred Steele's way[37] at Prairie d'Anne; and an artillery fight was kept up for some hours, till darkness closed it; when the enemy attempted to capture our guns by a rush, but was repulsed, with loss; and thereupon retreated to Washington, on the upper course of Red river.[38]

By this time, there were rumors in the air that Banks had been defeated in Upper Louisiana and compelled to retreat; rumors which prisoners and Steele's spies soon corroborated. Instead of following Price, therefore, Steele turned sharply to the left, and marched into Camden;[39] the enemy, when too late, endeavoring to get there before him.

While waiting here, the tidings of Banks's reverses were amply confirmed; whereupon, the activity and daring of the enemy were of course redoubled. First, a train sent out 16 miles west for forage was attacked and captured;[40] with a loss on our part of 250 men and 4 guns; next, a supply train of 240 wagons, which had arrived[41] from Pine Bluff, and, after being unloaded, had been dispatched[42] on its return, guarded by Lt.-Col. Drake, 36th Iowa, with the 2d brigade of Gen. Salomon's division, was assailed next day, when 12 miles out, by Shelby's cavalry, which it easily beat off, camping for the night 6 miles farther on its way; making, by great exertion, 22 miles next day; having to corduroy the road much of the distance.

Next morning,[43] while with difficulty making its way through a swamp four miles long, its advance

[34] Pollard says Porter was already known (among Rebels) as preëminently "the thief of the Mississippi."

[35] March 23–4. [36] April 1. [37] April 10.
[38] April 12. [39] April 15. [40] April 18.
[41] April 20. [42] April 22. [43] April 25.

was attacked, as it debouched at MARKS'S MILL, by Gen. Fagan's Rebel division, said to be 6,000 strong, while most of our men were still making their way through the swamp with the wagons. A desperate but most unequal fight ensued, in which the 43d Indiana and 36th Iowa did all that men could do when confronted by several times their number; Drake making superhuman efforts, and being everywhere at the point of greatest danger, until mortally wounded. By this time, the enemy had been enabled to interpose a strong force between our advance, thus engaged, and the 77th Ohio, guarding our rear; when—nearly one-fourth of our men being killed and wounded—the residue surrendered. The 77th, when assailed in its turn, of course did the same. Some of our wagons were destroyed; but most of them were captured. The Rebel loss in this engagement was estimated by our men (probably much too high) at 1,000. Our own killed and wounded were fully 250. Our soldiers here captured were started southward at 5 P. M., and compelled to march 52 miles without food or rest within the next 24 hours. They reached their destination—the prison-camp at Tyler, Texas—on the 15th of May. The negro servants of our officers were shot down in cold blood after the surrender.

Steele, still at Camden, was soon apprised of this disaster, and regarded it as a notice to quit. By daylight of the 27th, his army was across the Washita and in full retreat, amid constant rains, over horrible roads, with the Rebel cavalry busy on every side. At JENKINS'S FERRY (crossing of the Saline)[44] he was assailed in great force by the Rebels, now led by Kirby Smith in person. Our men had been working in mud and rain throughout the night, getting their pontoons laid and their trains across, having had little or nothing to eat since they left Camden, when, at daybreak, the enemy rushed upon them.

The river bottom is here densely wooded, which gave a great advantage to the defensive. It was sodden and trodden into deep mire, over which guns could not be moved unless on corduroy roads, and into which the combatants sank at every step. The thin brigades of Cols. Engelmann and S. A. Rice had to bear the brunt of the enemy's attack; the disparity in numbers being enormous. Part of our army was already across the river, and could with difficulty be brought back.

The 33d Iowa, Col. Mackay, covering the rear, was first impetuously attacked and pressed in, though the 50th Indiana had advanced to its support. These fell back behind the 9th Wisconsin and 29th Iowa, which were in turn fiercely assailed; and it became necessary to order up all our troops south of the river to their support. Brig.-Gen. Rice was in immediate command. Three several attacks, with different divisions in front, were made on our steadfast heroes, who repelled each with great slaughter. Our right flank being threatened, the 43d Illinois and part of the 40th Iowa were ordered to cross a swollen, muddy tributary, known as Cox's creek, into which they plunged with a shout, dashed across, and drove off the enemy.

[44] April 30.

The last grand attack was made on our left and left center, and succeeded in turning our extreme left, held by the 33d Iowa, whose ammunition had, for a second time, become exhausted. Four companies of the 40th Iowa, under Col. Garrett, rushed to its support, and, forming under a withering fire, restored the line; which now advanced along its entire front a full half-mile, driving the enemy steadily for an hour, passing over their dead and wounded. When, at noon, their repulse was complete, our army drew off, by order, and filed across the bridge.

This was a combat of infantry alone. We had one section of a battery on the field, but could not use it. A section of a Rebel battery appeared and fired one round, when the 29th Iowa and 2d Kansas charged across the field, and brought away the guns.

When all was over, and our men had crossed the river, Kirby Smith sent a flag of truce; but, finding only a burial-party, instead of an army, he made haste to capture these and claim a victory.

Our loss in this brilliant struggle was 700 killed and wounded; that of the enemy was said to be 2,300, including three Generals.

Fagan was reported between our army and Little Rock, compelling rapid movements on Steele's part to save our dépôts at that city; while the roads were unfathomable. Our soldiers had coffee and whatever else they could pick up; which was not much. Our animals had been starving for days, and were unable to draw our wagons; which, except one for each brigade, Steele ordered to be destroyed. And so, bridging streams, corduroying swamps, and dragging guns and caissons over them, our army plodded its weary, famished way toward the capital it had left so proudly; being met at length by a supply train, which passed down the road, throwing out "hard-tack" in profusion—our men scrambling for it in the mud, and devouring it with keen voracity. Steele entered Little Rock May 2d.

Late in June, Shelby crossed the Arkansas eastward of Little Rock, pushing northward to the White, near its mouth; and was met [46] near St. Charles by four regiments under Gen. Carr, who worsted him, taking 200 prisoners. Our loss here in killed and wounded was 200; that of the Rebels was estimated by our officers at 500. Marmaduke soon approaching with rëenforcements for Shelby, Carr fell back on Clarendon, 20 miles below Duvall's bluff, where he also was rëenforced; when the enemy retreated southward.

There were, of course, a good many partisan encounters and raids during the Summer; in one of which a Union scouting party, under Capt. Jug, dashed [46] into Benton and killed Brig.-Gen. Geo. M Holt; in another, Col. W. S. Brooks 56th U. S. colored, moving out from Helena with 400 men, was attacked [47] on Big creek by Gen. Dobbins, with a superior Rebel force, and would have been worsted, had not Maj. Carmichael, who was on a steamboat going down the Mississippi, with 150 of the 15th Illinois cavalry, heard the persistent cannon-firing and resolved to investigate the matter. Brooks had held

[46] June 27. [46] July 25. [47] July 26.

his ground stubbornly for hours, but gained no advantage; and Dobbins was just forming his men for a decisive charge, when Carmichael charged through them and joined Brooks; when our men assumed the offensive. Unhappily, Col. Brooks was killed, with Capt. Lembké, of his battery, Adj. Pratt, and Surgeon Stoddard: so our forces fell back to Helena, followed part way by Dobbins, but not again attacked. Our loss in this affair was 50; that of the enemy was reported at 150.

Next day, at the other side of the State, Gen. Gano, with 1,500 Rebels, surprised an outpost of Fort Smith, held by Capt. Mefford, with 200 of the 5th Kansas, whom he captured, with 82 of his men, after we had lost 10 killed, 15 wounded, to 12 killed, 20 wounded of the enemy. Gano, of course, got away before he could be reached from Fort Smith.

Next month, Shelby, with some 2,000 men, struck[48] the line of railroad between Duvall's bluff and Little Rock, capturing most of the 54th Illinois, who were guarding three stations. Col. Mitchell was reported among the killed.

Steele's advance to and capture of Little Rock the preceding Autumn, with the failure of the Rebels even to attempt its recovery, had been accepted by the Unionists of Arkansas as conclusive of the inability of the foe to regain their lost ascendency in their State. Accordingly, a Union meeting of citizens was held at Little Rock,[49] followed by others; and, ultimately, a Union State Constitutional Convention had been assembled:[50] wherein 42 out of the 54 counties were represented. This Convention had framed a new Constitution, whereby Slavery was forever prohibited. Dr. Isaac Murphy—the only member of the Convention of 1861 who had held out to the last against Secession—had been designated Provisional Governor, and duly inaugurated,[51] with C. C. Bliss, Lieut.-Governor, and R. J. T. White, Secretary of State. This Constitution was submitted to a vote of the people and ratified[52] by 12,177 votes for, to 226 against it. State officers, three members of Congress, a Legislature, and local officers, were at the same time elected. The Legislature met, and elected[53] U. S. Senators. The Unionists had fondly supposed every thing 'restored' that should be, so far as *their* State was concerned; until Steele's reverses in and retreat from the south, with the triumphant advance on his heels of the Rebel armies, surrendered two-thirds of her area to the enemy; whose cavalry, avoiding our few strongholds, careered at will over the open country, foraging on the already needy non-combatants, and dealing vengeance on the 'traitors' and 'renegades' who had declared for the Union. In the Autumn, the Rebel Legislature met[54] at Washington, listened to a message from their Governor, Hannigan, and chose A. P. Garland over Albert Pike to represent them in the Confederate Senate.

This practical surrender of the State to the Rebels, throughout the year following Steele's retreat from Camden, need not and should not have been. But Steele, who was continued in command, never struck

[48] Aug. 23. [49] Nov. 12, 1863. [50] Jan. 8, 1864. [51] Jan. 22. [52] March 14. [53] April 25. [54] Sept. 22.

one hearty blow at the Rebellion where he could, with a decent regard for appearances, avoid it. Identified in principle and sympathy with the enemy on every point but that of Disunion, his powerful influence was thrown against the Emancipation policy of the Government; and, while he was hail-fellow with the Secession aristocracy of the State, he was a sorrow and a scourge to the hearty, unconditional upholders of the Union. Hence, Unionism did not flourish under his rule; hence, the Rebel cavalry and guerrillas roamed almost at will over the State, never fearing aught from his vigilance or his zeal for the National cause; and hence the forces under his command, though amply sufficient to have held all of the State north of the Washita, and repelled all gainsayers, were little better than wasted.

Gen. Rosecrans, having been appointed to the command of the Department of Missouri, found, on his arrival at St. Louis,[84] the State agitated by a feud that threatened trouble. In addition to his force of perhaps 12,000 men—mainly State Militia, who were liable to service only in Missouri—there were, in the north-western counties, some 2,800 "provisionally enrolled militia" (by the Radicals called "Paw-Paws"),[85] who were 'Conservative' in their sympathies, either having been hitherto in the Rebel service, or belonging to Rebel families, or having otherwise evinced sympathy with the Rebels. These had been enrolled for neighborhood or special service—and were accused, by their Radical neighbors, of fighting Abolitionists more heartily than Rebels, and standing ready to join Price's army should it appear in the State the ensuing Summer, as was expected. Rosecrans looked into the matter, and sided generally with the Radicals; finding the great slaveholding counties on the river still infected with the Rebel spirit, and thousands eagerly awaiting the day when their party should again have the upper hand, and be able to avenge some of the indignities and wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the Unionists. Continuing his inquiries, and gradually insinuating his spies into the secret councils or lodges of the disloyal, he became satisfied that they were everywhere organized, to the number of many thousands, as 'The Order of American Knights,' or 'Sons of Liberty,' whereof the Grand Commanders were Sterling Price in the South and C. L. Vallandigham in the North; and that an invasion of Missouri by Price, whom 23,000 members of this order were sworn to join on his appearance, was part of a general programme, which contemplated an invasion also of the North, and a formidable uprising of Rebel sympathizers in the North-West. He first learned through his spies in the Rebel lodges that Vallandigham was soon to return openly from Canada to Ohio, and be sent thence to the Democratic National Convention at Chicago. He further discovered that arms were extensively coming into the State, and going into the hands of those suspected of Rebel sympathies; and he transmitted to Washington urgent representations that perils environed him, which required an augmentation of his force. Gen. Hunt was

[84] Jan. 28, 1864. [85] From the paw-paw, a wild fruit whereon 'bushwhackers' were said to subsist.

thereupon sent to Missouri by Gen. Grant, and traversed the State on a tour of observation; returning strong in the belief that Rosecrans's apprehensions were excessive, and that no more force was needed in this department.

Still, Rosecrans, without encouragement from Washington, prosecuted his investigations; and, upon evidence that, at a recent meeting of one of the lodges aforesaid, a resolve had been offered, and laid over, to commence operations in St. Louis by assassinating the provost-marshal and attempting to seize the department headquarters, he arrested the State commander, deputy commander, grand secretary, lecturer, and some 30 or 40 leading members of the secret organization, and lodged them in prison.

The State commander aforesaid being the Belgian Consul at St. Louis, Rosecrans soon received, by telegraph from the War Department, an order to liberate him, with which he declined to comply; representing that it would not have been given had the Government been in possession of the facts known to him, and which he had dispatched by a trusty hand to Washington. And, that evidence having been received and read by the President, the order of release was countermanded.

The urgent exactions of the public service in other quarters having stripped Missouri of nearly or quite all troops but her own militia, Rosecrans sought and obtained authority to raise ten regiments of twelve-months' men for the exigency; when a Rebel outbreak occurred[87] in Platte county, in the north-west, quickly followed by guerrilla outrages and raids in the western river counties. These were but forerunners of the long meditated Rebel invasion, whereof Gen. Washburne, commanding at Memphis, gave[88] the first distinct warning; apprising Rosecrans that Shelby, then at Batesville, north-western Arkansas, was about to be joined by Price; when the advance would begin. Gen. A. J. Smith was then passing up the river to reënforce Sherman in northern Georgia, when he was halted[89] at Cairo by order from Halleck, and sent to St. Louis to strengthen Rosecrans.

Price entered south-eastern Missouri by way of Poplar bluffs and Bloomfield; advancing unresisted to Pilot Knob, where he was first withstood[90] by a brigade, commanded by Gen. Hugh S. Ewing. Here were Fort Davidson and some other rude works; and Ewing made an obstinate stand, inflicting a loss of not less than 1,000 men on the raiders, while his own was but about 200. Still, as Price had not less than 10,000 men against 1,200, and as a day's desultory fighting had given the enemy possession of some of the steep hills overlooking the fort, Ewing—who had signally repulsed two assaults—wisely decided not to await inevitable capture, but, spiking his heavy guns and blowing up his magazine, escaped during the night; taking the road westward to Rolla through Caledonia and Webster—his more natural line of retreat on Mineral Point and Potosi being already in the enemy's possession. At Webster, he turned abruptly north, and struck the South-western Railroad at Harrison; having made 66

[87] July 7. [88] Sept. 3. [89] Sept. 6. [90] Sept. 27.

miles in 39 hours, though badly encumbered by fugitives. Here his weary men were sharply assailed by a column under Shelby, which had been pursuing them; but, though short of ammunition, Ewing held his ground firmly some 30 hours, until relieved by Col. Beveridge, 17th Illinois cavalry, sent from Rolla by Gen. McNeil to his assistance. Shelby then drew off, and Ewing proceeded at his leisure to Rolla.

Rosecrans remained at St. Louis —the point of greatest consequence, if not of greatest danger—working night and day to collect a force able to cope in a fair field with Price's veterans and the 'Sons of Liberty,' who were pledged to join him—a pledge which they but partially redeemed. For a week or so, the Rebels seemed to have the upper hand; and this created a violent eruption of treasonable guerrilla raids and burnings in the pro-Slavery strongholds of central Missouri.[61] As the Rebel army was mainly mounted, it not only moved with greater celerity than the most of its antagonists could, but was able to mask its intentions, and threaten at once our dépôts at St. Louis, Rolla, and Jefferson City. But time was on our side; as Gen. Mower was on his way from Little Rock, with 5,000 veterans; five regiments of hundred-day men (who had already served out their term) were coming from Illinois to garrison St. Louis; and the militia of eastern Missouri was coming out, to the number of perhaps 5,000 more. Unless Price could strike at once some decisive, damaging blow, which would cripple Rosecrans, paralyze his efforts to raise militia, and call every latent Secessionist into the saddle, he must inevitably decamp and flee for his life.

[61] Rosecrans, in his official report, says:

"While Ewing's fight was going on, Shelby advanced to Potosi, and thence to Big river bridge, threatening Gen. Smith's advance; which withdrew from that point to within safer supporting distance of his main position at De Soto. Previous to and pending these events, the guerrilla warfare in north Missouri had been waging with redoubled fury. Rebel agents, amnesty-oath-takers, recruits, 'sympathizers,' O. A. K.s, and traitors of every hue and stripe, had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were busy making clothes for Rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerrillas; women's tongues were busy telling Union neighbors '*their time was now coming.*' Gen. Fisk, with all his force, had been scouring the bush for weeks in the river counties, in pursuit of hostile bands, composed largely of recruits from among that class of inhabitants who claim protection, yet decline to perform the full duties of citizens, on the ground that they 'never tuck no sides.' A few facts will convey some idea of this warfare, carried on by Confederate agents here, while the agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism—Mason, Slidell, and Mann, in Europe—have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom that our government 'carries on the war with increasing ferocity, regardless of the laws of civilized warfare.' These gangs of Rebels, whose families had been living in peace among their loyal neighbors, committed the most cold blooded and diabolical murders, such as riding up to a farm-house, asking for water, and, while receiving it, shooting down the giver—an aged, inoffensive farmer—because he was a radical 'Union man.' In the single sub-district of Mexico, the commanding officer furnished a list of near one hundred Union men who, in the course of six weeks, had been killed, maimed, or 'run off,' *because they were* 'radical Union men,' or Abolitionists. About the 1st of September, Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on the North Missouri road, took from it 22 unarmed soldiers, many on sick leave, and, after robbing, placed them in a row and shot them in cold blood; some of the bodies they scalped, and put others across the track and run the engine over them. On the 27th, this gang, with numbers swollen to 300 or 400 men, attacked Major Johnson, with about 120 of the 39th Missouri volunteer infantry, raw recruits, and, after stampeding their horses, shot every man, most of them in cold blood. Anderson, a few days later, was recognized by Gen. Price, at Booneville, as a Confederate captain, and, with a verbal admonition to behave himself, ordered by Colonel Maclane, chief of Price's staff, to proceed to north Missouri and destroy the railroads; which orders were found on the miscreant when killed by Lt.-Col. Cox, about the 27th of October."

The enemy, advancing by Potosi across the Meramec to Richwoods, seemed to threaten St. Louis, only 40 miles distant; but this was a feint only, or was seen, on closer observation, to be too hazardous: so, burning the railroad bridge over the Meramec, at Moselle, he turned northwestward:[65] Gen. A. J. Smith, with 4,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, following him vigilantly but cautiously. Burning Herman[66]—an intensely 'Radical' German settlement on the Missouri—and the railroad bridge over the Gasconade; fording the Gasconade near Fredericksburg and the Osage at Castle Rock,[67] burning the railroad bridge here, he appeared before Jefferson City; which Gens. McNeil and Sanborn, with all the men they could mount, had just reached by forced marches from Rolla: and these, added to the force under Gens. Fisk and Brown, already there, made a garrison of 4,100 cavalry and 2,600 infantry—generally twelve-months' men of little experience in the field, but capable of good service behind intrenchments. Fisk decided — the other Generals concurring—to oppose a moderate resistance to the foe at the crossing of the Moreau, 4 or 5 miles east of the city, and then fall back within the rude defenses which he, with the volunteered help of citizens, had been for some days preparing.

Price crossed the Moreau after a sharp but brief skirmish, and advanced[68] on the capital; developing a line of battle 3 or 4 miles long, which enveloped the city on all sides save that of the river; but, on a full survey of the defenses, and a partial glimpse of the men behind them, with the lesson of Pilot Knob fresh in his mind, he concluded not to attack, but, after giving time for his train to move around the city and get a start on the road westward, he drew off and followed it.

Gen. Pleasanton now arrived,[69] and assumed command; dispatching Gen. Sanborn with the cavalry to follow and harass the enemy, so as to delay him, if possible, until Gen. A. J. Smith could overtake him. Sanborn attacked the Rebel rear-guard at Versailles, and drove it into line of battle; thus ascertaining that the enemy were heading for Booneville; but, being nearly surrounded by them, he fell back to California; where Col. Cutherwood, with A. J. Smith's cavalry and some much-needed supplies, joined him on the 14th.

Gen. Mower, by coming from Arkansas, following nearly in the track of the Rebel irruption, had struck the Mississippi at Cape Girardeau; having marched 300 miles, over bad roads, in 18 days. His men were weary, his provisions exhausted, his teams worn down; part of his cavalry dismounted, with the horses of many more lacking shoes: so Rosecrans dispatched steamboats from St. Louis to bring them to that city; whence the infantry were sent up the Missouri by water, while the cavalry, under Col. Winslow, marched[70] by land to rëenforce A. J. Smith; reaching[71] Jefferson City—by reason of the low stage of water in the river—one day in advance of the infantry.

Meantime, Price had, of course, seriously widened the gap between him and our cavalry, of whom Pleas-

[65] Oct. 1. [66] Oct. 5. [67] Oct. 6. [68] Oct. 7. [69] Oct. 8. [70] Oct. 10. [71] Oct. 16.

anton had now assumed the immediate command. A Rebel detachment under Shelby had crossed the Missouri at Arrow Rock and advanced on Glasgow; which they took, after a fight of some hours; capturing part of Col. Harding's 43d Missouri, with small detachments of the 9th Missouri militia, and 17th Illinois cavalry.

This bold stroke ought to have insured the destruction of at least half the Rebel army, which an overwhelming Union force was now moving to inclose and crush. But A. J. Smith was stopped, with our supplies, at the Lamine, where the enemy had burned the railroad bridge; and where Mower joined him: when, taking five days' rations, Smith advanced[69] to Dunksburg; Pleasanton, with our cavalry, including Mower's, under Winslow, being well advanced, on a line stretching northward from Warrensburg.

The enemy was north-west of this, and seemed disposed to stay there: his advance[70] reaching Lexington, driving Gen. Blunt with a force from Kansas, who, after a sharp skirmish, retreated on Independence. Rosecrans, learning this by telegraph, directed[71] Pleasanton, who had been demonstrating toward Waverly, to move in force on Lexington, ordering Smith to follow; and both, of course, obeyed.

These orders seem to have been mistakes—very natural, perhaps, but not the less unfortunate. It is not easy to overtake an army mainly mounted, which lives off the country, has few guns, and burns every bridge behind it; but our only chance of crushing so nimble an adversary, lay in pressing steadily westward, so as to get between the enemy and his necessary line of retreat, and strike him as he attempted to pass; and it matters not whether he had been drawn so far northward in quest of food or in order to double on his pursuers. When Pleasanton's advance, under McNeil and Sanborn, reached[72] Lexington, the enemy had left, moving rapidly westward, and at the Little Blue striking Blunt's Kansas division, of which Gen. Curtis had now assumed command, in such force as compelled him, after a few hours' conflict, being flanked, to fall back to the Big Blue, where he took up a strong position. Rosecrans, presuming that Curtis could hold his ground, ordered Pleasanton to send McNeil, with a brigade only, on the track of the enemy, and, with his remaining cavalry, move southward, to Lone Jack; whither Smith, with his infantry, was now hastening from his false move to Lexington.

These orders seem to have been contingent, and, at any rate, were not obeyed. Pleasanton, with all his cavalry, pressed on the track of the flying enemy; reaching the Little Blue[73] at 10 A. M., only to find the bridge destroyed and the enemy's rear-guard rather stubborn beyond it; he driving them steadily till nightfall; when Independence was taken by a brilliant cavalry charge—Cutherwood's regiment capturing two guns—Pleasanton following sharply, after dispatching McNeil, with his brigade, to Little Santa Fé, to intercept the enemy, and telegraphing Rosecrans, "Let Smith come to this place." Hereupon, Rosecrans—"reluctantly," as he very naturally says

[69] Oct. 18-19. [70] Oct. 18-19. [71] Oct. 20. [72] Oct. 20, 7 P. M. [73] Oct. 22.

—gave the order solicited; which reached Smith that night at Chapel Hill, just as he was putting his column in motion southward, and sent it westward instead.

Next morning, Pleasanton pressed on to the crossing of the Big Blue; where he found the enemy's main body—which, the day before, had fought Curtis, but had not moved him—prepared for resistance. The fight opened at 7 A. M., and was maintained with spirit on both sides till 1 P. M., when the Rebels decamped — were "routed and fled southward," says Rosecrans; though they would of course use different terms in describing the matter. They went, however, beyond doubt; eagerly pursued by Pleasanton and Curtis beyond Little Santa Fé.

Smith, with 9,000 infantry and five batteries, reached Independence at 5 P. M.; when his weary men were forthwith put in motion for Hickman's mills, where it was hoped he would strike the flank of the flying foe. But it was too late. His false moves (through no fault of his own) to Lexington and to Independence, had opened a door of escape to Price, which he was too good a general not to profit by; and he was too fleet and too far ahead to be henceforth overtaken by infantry.

Curtis, with his Kansas men, took[14] the lead in the pursuit; but soon gave place to Pleasanton's horsemen; who, after a march of 60 miles, struck them about midnight at the Marais-des-Cygnes, opening upon their bivouac at 4 A. M.,[15] with artillery; setting them at once in motion, and chasing them to the Little Osage, where they turned to fight, displaying 8 guns in their line of battle. Pleasanton at once ordered a charge by Benteen's and Phillips's brigades, which was superbly made, and resulted in the capture of their 8 guns and 1,000 prisoners, including Maj.-Gen. Marmaduke, Brig.-Gen. Cabell, and five Colonels, beside small arms, wagons, colors, &c.

Sanborn's brigade—which was considerably behind—now came up and took the lead; and, when the enemy again made a stand, a few miles farther south, routed them, and drove them till night stopped the pursuit. The burning wrecks of wagons and other *materiel* marked their course for miles farther; but most of our nearly broken-down cavalry, with all our infantry, was here judiciously halted: Pleasanton turning to Fort Scott for needful food and rest; and Smith moving to Harrisonville with the same purpose.

Blunt, with his Kansas men and Benteen's brigade, followed by Sanborn, kept the trail of the flying foe; striking[16] them at Newtonia, near the south-west corner of the State, and, being outnumbered, was evidently getting worsted, when Sanborn—who had marched 102 miles in 36 hours—came up, and changed the fortunes of the day. The Rebels resumed their flight—having little left to lose but their bodies and their worn-out horses — and escaped into western Arkansas.

Gen. Curtis followed, but did not again overtake them till he reached Fayetteville, Ark., where Col. Larue Harrison, 1st Arkansas cavalry, had been invested[17] by Col. Brooks, with some 2,000 Rebels; who was held at bay until Fagan's division of Price's

[14] Oct. 24. [15] Oct. 25. [16] Oct. 28. [17] Oct. 28.

army appeared[78] and united in the siege; but Curtis came up next day, and drove off the crowd, with heavy loss to them and none at all to our side. So ended the last Rebel invasion of Missouri. Gen. Smith's command had, ere this, taken boats to report to Gen. Thomas at Nashville.

Rosecrans says Price's force in this campaign was variously estimated at 15,000 to 25,000 men—that he obtained 6,000 recruits in Missouri—that he lost 10 guns (nearly all he had) and 1,958 prisoners, with most of his wagons, and large numbers of horses, small arms, &c. It is not probable that the force he took out of Missouri, with its armament, was half so effective as that he brought into it."[79]

XXV.

GEN. GRANT'S ADVANCE ON RICHMOND.

Hon. E. B. Washburne, of Illinois—the townsman and zealous friend of Gen. Grant—having proposed[1] the revival of the grade of Lieutenant-General of our armies, hitherto accorded to George Washington alone (Gen. Scott being such only by brevet), the House, not without considerable hesitation, assented;[2] after negativing, by the emphatic vote of 117 to 19, a motion, by Gen. Garfield, to lay the proposition on the table, and adopting, by 111 to 41, an amendment moved by Mr. Ross, of Ill., respectfully recommending Ulysses S. Grant for the post. The Senate concurred:[3] Yeas 31; Nays 6: having first amended the joint resolve so as to strike out so much of it as limited the existence of this office to the duration of the War and prescribed that the Lieutenant-General should, under the President, be commander of the armies of the United States. The House having rejected these amendments, the difference was settled by a Conference Committee, in substantial accord with the Senate's views; the House agreeing to the report: Yeas 77; Nays 43. The President promptly approved the measure, and nominated[4] Gen. Grant for the place; and he was next day confirmed by the Senate. In this action, Congress expressed, and the President promptly conformed to, the popular judgment, that the efficiency of our various and complicated Mili-

[78] Nov. 14.

[79] Gen. Grant, in his all-embracing report, says:

"The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why Gen. Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob."

As the concentration here suggested, in the face of a formidable army of veterans, mainly mounted, and moving with great celerity, would, if practicable, have enabled the Missouri Rebels to call out the oath-bound members of their lodges and therewith take possession of a large portion of the State, the justice of this criticism is not incontestable. A like judgment was passed on Fremont in 1861; though not by so high a military authority.

[1] Dec. 14, 1863.
[2] Feb. 1, 1864.
[3] Feb. 21.
[4] March 1.

tary operations would be greatly promoted by placing them under the direction of a single mind, which should not be that of Henry Wager Halleck.

Gen. Grant's qualifications for this most momentous trust were not universally conceded. Though over 40 years of age,[1] he had been a quiet civilian most of his adult life. There were many military men who esteemed Gen. Meade, Gen. Buell, Gen. McClellan, or some other of our commanders, his superior as a strategist; and several of his battles—especially those of Belmont and Shiloh—had not escaped the unfavorable judgment of military critics. There was one point, however, wherein his fitness for chief command was decided if not preëminent: and that was an utter disbelief in the efficacy of any rosewater treatment of the Rebellion. He regarded the South as practically bound and helpless in the hands of a haughty, strong-willed oligarchy, who had not spent thirty years in preparation for this supreme effort in order to be bribed, or beguiled, or palavered, or bullied, into its abandonment after the gage had been thrown down and accepted. No love-taps, in his view, would ever persuade the Rebel chiefs to return to loyalty, so long as their military power should remain essentially unbroken; and he had no conception of any mode of breaking that power save by strong armies in bloody battles. His comprehensive, final report tersely says:

"From an early period in the Rebellion, I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the War. The resources of the enemy, and his numerical strength, were far inferior to ours: but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the Government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

"The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team: no two ever pulling together: enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reënforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

"From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the Rebellion was entirely broken.

"I, therefore, determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.

"These views have been kept constantly in mind; and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country."

Such were the views wherewith Gen. Grant, summoned from the West by telegraph, repaired to Washington[2] to receive his commission and instructions as Lieutenant-General commanding all the forces of the Union. He was formally in-

[1] Born April 27, 1822.

[2] March 8, 1864.

troduced, next day, to the President and Cabinet; when he was addressed by the former as follows:

"GENERAL GRANT: The Nation's appreciation of what you have already done, and its reliance upon you for what still remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant-General of the armies of the United States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility.

"As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the Nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

Gen. Grant replied, in perhaps the longest speech he ever made, as follows:

"MR. PRESIDENT: I accept the commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many battle-fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that, if they are properly met, it will be due to those armies; and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

The President's order, investing him with the chief command of all the armies of the United States, appeared the day following; on which day, he paid a flying visit to the Army of the Potomac, and started next morning on his return to arrange matters in the West, preparatory to movements inaugurating the general campaign. Gen. Halleck was announced as relieved from command at his own request, and assigned to duty in Washington as 'Chief of Staff to the Army.' Gen. Grant, in a brief and modest order, assumed command, announcing that his headquarters would be in the field, and, until further orders, with the Army of the Potomac. Gen. W. T. Sherman was assigned to the command of the military division of the Mississippi, comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas; Gen. J. B. McPherson, commanding, under him, the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

The residue of March and nearly the whole of April were devoted to careful preparation for the campaign. The Army of the Potomac, still commanded immediately by Gen. Meade, was completely reorganized; its five corps being reduced to three, commanded respectively by Gens. Hancock (2d), Warren (5th), and Sedgwick (6th). Maj.-Gens. Sykes, French, and Newton, with Brig.-Gens. Kenly, Spinola, and Sol. Meredith, were "relieved," and sent to Washington for orders. Gen. Burnside, who had been reorganizing and receiving large accessions to his (9th) corps in Maryland, crossed[7] the Potomac and joined Meade's army; though the formal incorporation therewith was postponed till after the passage of the Rapidan. This junction again raised the positive or fighting strength of that Army to considerably more than 100,000 men.

Earlier in the Spring, Gen. Custer, with 1,500 cavalry, had crossed[8] the Rapidan, flanking the Rebel Army on the west, and moved from Culpepper C. H. by Madison C. H. to within four miles of Charlottesville, where he found his road blocked by a far superior Rebel force, and was turned back; being again waylaid near Stannardsville by a force of cavalry only, which he pushed aside with little loss, and returned[9] to his old camp, followed by some hundreds of refugees from slavery to Rebels, but

[7] April 23. [8] Feb. 27. [9] March 2.

a plot to liberate our prisoners on Belle Isle, near Richmond, and, by their aid, burn that city, taking the lives of Davis and his Cabinet! That these papers were Rebel forgeries, and the meditated arson and murder a Rebel invention, intended to 'fire the Southern heart,' and justify murder by a pretense of retaliation, seems no longer doubtful; while that the Confederate authorities authorized the placing of several barrels of gunpowder under Libby prison, so as to blow some thousands of Union captives into fragments in case of a successful attack, is entirely beyond dispute.

It is not impossible that Richmond might have been taken at this time, had Kilpatrick kept his men together, and taken the hazards of a sudden, sanguinary, persistent assault; but it could not have been held two days; so that its capture would have been of small importance. Had he been directed simply to destroy the railroads as thoroughly as he could, while Butler, moving by steam, had rushed on Richmond with 20,000 men, well provided with artillery, the chances of durable success would have been far better. Butler had, in fact, attempted [13] to surprise Richmond by a forced march, some weeks earlier; but the design had miscarried, through the escape by bribery of a culprit from prison, who gave the alarm to the enemy, and enabled them to obstruct the roads beyond Bottom's bridge. Butler's infantry, on this expedition, marched 80 miles within 56 hours; his cavalry 150 miles in 50 hours.

All being at length in readiness, Gen. Meade's army, masking its intention by a feint on Lee's left, crossed [14] the Rapidan on his right, at Germania and Ely's fords: Warren leading at Germania, followed by Sedgwick, and pushing straight into 'THE WILDERNESS;' Hancock crossing at Ely's ford, and moving on Chancellorsville, followed by the trains of the whole army. Burnside followed next day.

The Wilderness is a considerable tract of broken table-land, stretching southward from the Rapidan nearly to Spottsylvania Court House, seamed with ravines and densely covered with dwarfish timber and bushes, diversified by very few clearings, but crossed by three or four good roads, the best of them centering on Fredericksburg, and by a multiplicity of narrow cart-tracks, used in peace only by wood-cutters. (It is a mineral region, and its timber has been repeatedly swept off as fuel for miners.) In this tangled labyrinth, numbers, artillery and cavalry, are of small account; local knowledge, advantage of position, and command of roads, everything.

Lee's army, alert and vigilant, was just west of it; the roads diverged, fan-like, on that side: it was Grant's obvious interest to get through this chapparal as quickly and with as little fighting as possible: it was Lee's business not to let him. Hence, the moment our movement was developed, the Rebel army, which had been looking north across the Rapidan, was faced to the right and moved rapidly down parallel with our advance, forming line of battle some six miles east of its strong defenses on Mine run, which proffered a safe refuge in case of disaster. Lee, like Meade, had reorganized his army in three corps;

[13] Feb. 6–9.

[14] May 4.



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

whereof Ewell's (late the right), on its change of front, held the left, next the Rapidan; A. P. Hill coming into line on the right; while Longstreet (recently returned from his East-Tennessee campaign) was posted near Charlottesville, two marches off, but was rapidly brought up, and came into action the second day. The ground was as unfavorable for us as could be; yet Grant, being unexpectedly assailed—for he had confidently expected to get through unmolested—had no choice but to fight: neither Burnside nor our trains being yet fairly over the river; so that any attempt to evade Lee's unlooked-for blow would have compromised, not merely the campaign, but the army.

Hardly a shot had been fired on the first day of our movement; the Rebel pickets retreating precipitately before our imposing advance, to speed the great news to their leaders. Gen. Warren, with his corps, forming our infantry advance, rested for the night at the 'Old Wilderness tavern,' five miles from the ford, where Grant and Meade crossed and made their headquarters next morning; Gen. Sedgwick's corps was between them and the ford; Gen. Hancock, with his corps, halted at or near Chancellorsville, in the rear of Warren. Our cavalry, under Sheridan and his lieutenants, Wilson and Gregg, covered the front and flanks of the infantry.

Warren had orders to move, supported by Sedgwick, early next morning,[15] to Parker's store, five miles S. W. of his camping-ground; following the road leading to Orange Court House: Hancock was to press southward, at considerable distance on his left, making for Shady Grove church; while Sheridan's cavalry swept still farther south-west, making a reconnoissance in force. But these movements were met in their inception by an unlooked-for advance of the Rebel

[15] Thursday, May 5.

infantry under Hill against Warren, and under Ewell against Sedgwick: the former driving in the 5th N. Y. cavalry with loss, and striking Warren heavily and full in front, long before he had reached Parker's store, and before Hancock had orders to arrest his southward march and, facing westward, swing in on Warren's left. In short, the battle commenced before our army was in position, and while our Generals still supposed that there was no considerable Rebel force at hand—as Lee evidently intended to have it. And Hill, having, by an early advance, secured a strong and sheltered position on a ridge crossing the road, repelled with loss the brigades of Bartlett and Ayres, of Griffin's division, that were first sent up against him; not pressing far his advantage until about 3 P. M.; when, perceiving the approach of Hancock, he attempted the favorite Rebel maneuver of interposing a strong force between our usually loosely joined commands, but was checked by Hancock's arresting his direct advance and pushing rapidly to the right, to close on Warren. This was effected, not a moment too soon; the enemy's charging column being already on Warren's left flank; but Hancock, with his division Generals, Birney, Barlow, and Gibbon, struck heavily on their right, and two hours' stubborn and bloody conflict, with musketry alone, resulted in great loss to both sides, and little advantage to either: Hancock's corps, which had, ere this, been strengthened by Getty's division of Sedgwick's, saving itself from rout by the most obstinate fighting.

Sedgwick had been attacked a little after 1 P. M.; but Ewell was not at first in so great force as Hill was; and the advantage here was on our side: the enemy being obliged, at 3½ P. M., to give ground, after a most determined effort: Maj.-Gen. J. M. Jones and Brig.-Gen. Stafford having been killed. Rhodes's division, led by Gordon, next charged vigorously, and pushed back our advance with loss, taking some prisoners. In a return charge from our side, Gen. Pegram fell severely wounded. Hereupon a general advance on our side was ordered, but arrested by the coming of night. The Rebels claimed 1,000 prisoners to our 300 as the net product of the day's work; otherwise, the losses were nearly equal.

Grant had decided to open next morning[16] by an advance along our whole front; Burnside's corps having arrived during the night by a forced march, and been distributed to the points where it seemed to be most needed. Sedgwick was ordered to move at 5 A. M.; but the enemy were upon him a quarter before; attempting to turn our right flank, which was held by Gen. Wright's division, with Gen. Seymour's provisional division still nearer the Rapidan. This attack, twice repeated during the forenoon, but not resolutely (being a feint to mask the real attack on Hancock), was repulsed, and our line advanced a few hundred yards to a more favorable position.

At 8 A. M., our whole front was assailed, and again two hours later, as if the enemy were feeling for a weak point. Then, efforts were made, as before, to push in between our several corps and their divisions; and at length to strike with crushing force

[16] Friday, May 6.

on one wing and then the other; and this proved the more successful maneuver. It was evident that the Rebels, in their perfect knowledge of the country, and in the facility of moving their forces from left to right and back again in the rear of their defenses and fighting line, thus thoroughly screened from observation on our part, possessed advantages fully counterbalancing their deficiency in numbers.

On our left, Gen. Hancock had moved out, at 5 A. M., and had pushed forward, fighting, crowding back Hill and taking many prisoners, nearly two miles, across the Brock road, on his way to Parker's store. Here he was stopped by the arrival of Longstreet; who, after a brief lull, charged in turn, throwing our front into confusion, and requiring the presence of part of Burnside's men to restore and steady it; when Longstreet in turn was pressed back, falling severely wounded—it was said by a fire from his own men. Again a desperate attack by the enemy bore back the front of the 2d corps to its intrenched line and abatis along the Brock road; near which, but farther to the right, Gen. James S. Wadsworth, gallantly struggling to stem the adverse tide, was shot through the head and mortally wounded; as Gen. Alex. Hays had been the day before.

But, another lull now occurring, our front was straightened and strengthened; Gen. Burnside's corps having been thrown in between Hancock and Warren, so as to give our line the full strength of our infantry. Hardly had this been done when the now united corps of Hill and Longstreet fell furiously upon our left and left center, pushing them back, and, striking heavily on Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps, drove it back and rushed through the gap. Hancock promptly sent Col. Carroll, with the 3d brigade of his 2d division, to strike the advancing foe in flank, which was admirably done: the enemy being driven back with heavy loss, and our troops regaining their former position.

Thus ended the battle on our left; but, the enemy, massing swiftly and heavily on our right, after our Generals supposed the day's fighting over, struck again, under Gordon, just before dark, at that flank; surprising and routing Truman Seymour's and then Shaler's brigade, taking nearly 4,000 prisoners, including Seymour himself. For a moment, it seemed that our army, or at least its right wing, was exposed to rout; but Gen. Sedgwick exerted himself to restore his lines, and succeeded: the enemy making off with most of their prisoners in triumph. In fact, this charge had been made at so late an hour that no farther success than was achieved could wisely have been aimed at. Our army rested, after the second day's bloody struggle, substantially on the ground held by it at the beginning.

Early next morning, some guns (which had just been posted on our right) opened; but there was no reply; then our skirmishers advanced, but were met by skirmishers only; and it was soon evident that Lee had intrenched his whole front, and was willing to receive an attack behind his works, but not inclined to advance again and make one. And, as fighting in this labyrinth was nowise Grant's choice, but Lee's wholly, and as the latter did not invite a persistence in it, Grant resolved to resume

his march; and accordingly put his columns in motion southward, aiming to clear the Wilderness and concentrate his army on the high, open ground around Spottsylvania C. H. The only serious conflict this day was an indecisive one near Todd's store, between four brigades of our cavalry and a like force of J. E. B. Stuart's, with a loss about 250 on either side. As Stuart attacked, and failed to achieve any advantage, Sheridan claimed the result as a triumph.

Our losses in this terrible struggle in the Wilderness were nearly 20,000 men, of whom some 6,000 were taken prisoners. Our loss in officers was heavy. The country's salvation claimed no nobler sacrifice than that of Gen. James S. Wadsworth, of New York. Born to affluence and social distinction, already past the age of military service, he had volunteered in 1861, under the impulse of a sense of duty alone. As an aid of Gen. McDowell, he was conspicuously useful at Bull Run; accustomed to every luxury, he had courted, ever since, the hardships and perils of the field; made the Republican candidate for Governor in 1862 by an overwhelming majority, he could not have failed to be elected, could those have voted who, like himself, were absent from the State at the call of their country; and, though he peremptorily declined, his fellow citizens, had he lived, would have insisted on electing him Governor in 1864. Thousands of the unnamed and unknown have evinced as fervid and pure a patriotism, but no one surrendered more for his country's sake, or gave his life more joyfully for her deliverance, than did James S. Wadsworth.

Among our wounded in this contest were Gens. Hancock (slightly), Getty, Gregg, Owen, Bartlett, Webb, and Carroll.

Of the Rebel killed, the most conspicuous were Maj.-Gen. Sam. Jones and Brig.-Gen. Albert G. Jenkins. Among their wounded were Gens. Longstreet (disabled for months), Stafford (mortally), Pickett, Pegram, and Hunter. Doubtless, their aggregate losses were much less than ours, especially in prisoners; but they were nevertheless severe, as they were estimated by themselves at 8,000.

Warren, starting at 9 P. M. of the 7th, preceded by cavalry, emerged[11] from the Wilderness at Alsop's farm, where the Brock road crosses the little river Po; but he had been detained by the obstruction of his roads by the enemy, and by the cavalry fight in his front, so that Longstreet's corps had arrived before him, and taken post across the little river Ny, with his guns planted on the ridge beyond, to sweep our columns as they advanced. After a mutual cannonade, Robinson's overmatched division was advanced to the assault, but repulsed; Robinson being severely wounded. Later in the day, when part of the 6th corps had come up, the assault was renewed, Griffin's division taking part; when the enemy were driven back, with a loss of 1,500. Ours was judged to be less.

Miles's brigade of Hancock's corps was attacked this day at Corbyn's bridge, but beat off its assailants. Wilson, with our advance cavalry, penetrated to Spottsylvania Court House; but, being unsupported, was compelled to retire.

[11] Sunday, May 8.

Next day,[18] our army cleared the Wilderness and was concentrated around Spottsylvania Court House, now held by Hill and Ewell: Warren in the center, Hancock on the right, Sedgwick on the left. While placing his guns, and bantering some of his men, who winced at the singing of Rebel bullets, Gen. Sedgwick was struck in the face by a sharpshooter's missile, and fell instantly dead. He was a native and citizen of Connecticut, a bachelor of 40, a thorough soldier, greatly beloved for his social qualities by all who knew him. Gen. Wm. H. Morris, of New York, was severely wounded this day.

Gen. H. G. Wright next day succeeded to the command of the 6th corps, and Gen. Burnside came into position on our left; when our batteries opened on the enemy's position, and charges on his rifle-pits were made by Barlow's and by Gibbon's divisions, in front of the 2d and 5th corps, bringing on a general engagement. We finally attempted to turn the enemy's left flank, but failed; Barlow's division, which had advanced across the Po, being ordered to return, was fiercely attacked on its retreat, and at one time in danger of destruction, but finally extricated with some loss, including a gun. Several charges on our part were repulsed with loss—Brig.-Gens. J. C. Rice and T. G. Stevenson being among our killed. Late in the afternoon, a most gallant charge was made from our left by Wright's 1st division, Col. Upton, and 3d, Gen. D. A. Russell, who rushed over the first line of Rebel defenses and took 900 prisoners, beside several guns, which, for want of proper support, they were obliged at dark to abandon. The day closed with no decisive success; our aggregate loss having been severe; the enemy's—because of their position—probably much less.

Gen. Grant dispatched next morning to the War Department the following pithy but rather roseate bulletin:

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
"May 11, 1864—8 A. M.

"We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result, to this time, is much in our favor.

"Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater.

"We have taken over 5,000 prisoners by battle, whilst he has taken from us but few, except stragglers.

"I PROPOSE TO FIGHT IT OUT ON THIS LINE, IF IT TAKES ALL SUMMER.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-Gen. Commanding the Armies of the United States."

This day was spent in reconnoitering, skirmishing, and getting ready for the morrow. The afternoon was rainy. Hancock, at nightfall, was ordered to leave at midnight his position fronting Hill, and move silently to the left, taking post between Wright and Burnside, so as to be ready for work early in the morning.

When morning came, the rain had given place to a fog of exceeding density, under cover of which, Hancock sternly advanced, in two lines; Barlow's and Birney's divisions forming the first; Gibbon's and Mott's the second. Before them was a salient angle of earthworks, held by Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps. Swiftly, noiselessly sweeping over the rugged, difficult, thickly wooded intervening space—some 1,200 yards—Barlow's and Birney's divisions dashed, with a thundering cheer, over the front and flank of the

[18] May 9.



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE.

enemy's works, surprising and overwhelming the Rebels in their trenches, and capturing Johnson, with most of his division; also Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Stewart[19] and part of two brigades; also 30 guns. The number of prisoners secured and sent to the rear was over 3,000.

Hancock wrote in pencil to Grant: "I have captured from 30 to 40 guns. I have finished up Johnson, and am going into Early." He had in fact, though he did not know it, all but captured Lee himself, and had nearly cut the Rebel army in two. But the surprise was now over, and the rally of the Rebels was prompt and vigorous. Their case was desperate—for defeat now was annihilation—and they fought with invincible ardor and resolution. Grant had fully prepared for the emergency; Wright's (6th) corps hurried up to the aid of Hancock, and Warren and Burnside charged promptly and bravely on our right; but the enemy's position here was so strong that he held it and at the same time dispatched aid to his endangered right. Charge followed charge in quick succession, and the mutual carnage was fearful. Seeing that no impression was made by our attacks along the enemy's unshaken front, they were intermitted, while Cutler's

[19] Stewart was an old army friend of Hancock, who, when the former was brought before him as a prisoner, held out his hand, cordially inquiring, "How are you, Stewart?" The latter haughtily replied, "I am Gen. Stewart, of the Confederate Army, and, under the circumstances, I decline to take your hand." "And under any other circumstances, General, I should not have offered it," was the prompt and fit response of the victor.

and Griffin's divisions were detached from Warren and sent to the aid of Hancock, who still held fast to the captured work, but could not go beyond it; while Lee made five successive and desperate assaults on him, with intent to hurl him back; the men fighting hand-to-hand, with their respective flags often planted on opposite sides of the same breastwork. These assaults were all repelled with frightful carnage; but Hancock was unable to advance, as he had expected to do, and ultimately got off but 20 of the captured guns. Rain set in again at noon; but the fighting continued till near midnight, when it was terminated by Lee's desisting and leaving Hancock in possession of his hard-won prize; but that was the extent of our advantage, which had cost us several thousand men, and the enemy almost as many. Lee fortified and held a line immediately in front of Hancock; so that the enemy's general position proved as invulnerable as ever.

Here ensued several days of maneuvering, marching and countermarching, in quest of a weak point in the enemy's defenses; but none was found: an assault being delivered on the 18th, by Gibbon's and Barlow's divisions, supported by Birney's and Tyler's, nearly in front of the work they had so gallantly carried on the 12th; but they were stopped by formidable abatis, and repulsed, losing heavily.

Next afternoon, observing or suspecting that our army was gradually moving to the left, with intent to flank and pass him, Lee threw forward Ewell against our weakened right, held by Tyler's division of foot artillerists recently drawn from the defenses of Washington, by whom he was gallantly repulsed and driven off, though not without serious loss on our side. The reckless fighting of the artillerists—mainly veterans in service, but new to the field—excited general admiration, but cost blood. The 2d and 5th corps hurrying to their aid, Ewell's men were run off and scattered in the woods, on our left, where several hundreds of them were hunted up and taken prisoners. Somewhat delayed by this sally, our army, moving by the left, resumed, next night,[20] its march to Richmond.

Gen. Meade reports his losses up to this time at 39,791; to which something must be added for the losses of Burnside's corps before it was formally incorporated with the Army of the Potomac. If we assume that half these fell in the Wilderness, our losses around Spottsylvania C. H. were scarcely less than 20,000 men. The Rebels, holding a ridge, generally fighting on the defensive and behind breastworks, had suffered considerably less, but still quite heavily. Among their officers killed were Gens. Daniels, Perrin, and J. M. Jones.

In the Wilderness, our army had cut loose from its original base north of the Rapidan. It had since established a new one at Fredericksburg, to which its wounded were sent, and where they were met by officers, nurses, and other employés of the Sanitary and Christian Associations, with the amplest and most thoughtful provision for the mitigation of their sufferings. As it moved down toward Richmond, new bases were established at Port Royal and

[20] May 20–21.

then at White House; so that, while there was doubtless much suffering from privation as well as from wounds, it was always within a short distance of posts to which abundant supplies were forwarded from Washington and from the great commercial cities, under the efficient direction of Gen. Rufus Ingalls, its chief Quartermaster.

On emerging from the Wilderness, Gen. Sheridan, with the better part of our cavalry, led by Merritt, Wilson, and Gregg, was dispatched[21] on a raid toward Richmond. Crossing next day the North Anna, Sheridan carried the Beaverdam station on the Virginia Central, destroying the track, three trains of cars, a million and a half of rations, and liberating 400 Union prisoners captured in the Wilderness and now on their way to Richmond. Stuart's cavalry here overtook and assailed his flank and rear, but to little purpose. Crossing the South Anna at Ground Squirrel bridge, Sheridan captured Ashland Station at daylight;[22] breaking up the railroad, destroying a train and a large quantity of stores. He then resumed his march to Richmond.

Stuart had meantime passed him and massed his cavalry at Yellow Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, where he proposed to stop the raid. A spirited fight ensued, wherein Stuart was mortally wounded (as was Brig.-Gen. J. B. Gordon) and his force driven off the turnpike toward Ashland, leaving the road to Richmond open. Sheridan pressed down it; Custer carrying the outer line of defenses and taking 100 prisoners. But Richmond was no longer to be taken on a gallop, and our assault was repulsed; Sheridan crossing the Chickahominy at Meadow bridge, beating off attacks both front and rear, burning the railroad bridge, and moving to Haxall's;[23] where he rested three days, and then, moving by White House and Hanover C. H., rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

Gen. Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, had been rëenforced in pursuance of a programme suggested by him and concurred in by Gen. Grant: Gen. W. F. Smith's (18th) corps and Gen. Gillmore's (10th) corps (from South Carolina) having been sent him, raising our effective strength in his department to some 40,000 men, of whom perhaps 30,000 were disposable. Having sent[24] a small force on steamboats up the York to White House, to move out and menace Richmond so as to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter, the day after Gillmore's arrival his real movement commenced,[25] in cöoperation with General Grant's, and with others. Embarking his infantry and artillery, 25,000 strong, Gen. Butler proceeded up James river, while Gen. Kautz, with 3,000 cavalry, moved out from Suffolk, crossing the Blackwater and cutting the Weldon road at Stony creek; Col. R. West, with 1,500 more troopers, simultaneously advancing from Williamsburg up the north bank of the James. The armed transports moved up the James by night, the unarmed following next day,[26] pioneered by the iron-clads and other naval forces under Admiral Lee. Wilson's wharf, Fort Powhattan, and City Point, were seized without resistance; 10,000 men being at once

[21] May 9. [22] May 11. [23] May 14. [24] May 1. [25] May 4. [26] May 5.

pushed forward to possess and secure the peninsula between the James and the Appomattox, known as Bermuda Hundreds. Next day, Gen. Smith moved out toward the railroad from Richmond to Petersburg, but failed to strike it. On the 7th, Gen. Smith, with his own and part of Gillmore's corps, struck the railroad near Port Walthall junction, and commenced destroying it; having to fight D. H. Hill, but with advantage to our side; while Col. West's cavalry, having forded the Chickahominy, arrived opposite City Point. After breaking up the railroad for some distance, Gen. Butler, misled by advices from Washington that Gen. Lee was beaten and in full retreat on Richmond —which would have brought him down suddenly in overwhelming force on this army—drew back within his intrenchments, which he was engaged in strengthening for the apprehended emergency. The fact that his two corps commanders did not cordially cooperate, while Gillmore did not execute his orders so promptly and vigorously as he deemed fit, somewhat increased the inevitable perplexities of the commander's critical position.

Had Butler been directed to move at once on Petersburg, he could hardly have failed to capture that city—there being no considerable Rebel force then in lower Virginia—and might have been enabled to hold it; separating, for a time, the Rebel capital and Lee's army from the South proper. But, the first astounding news of his movement up the James summoned Beauregard by telegraph from Charleston, with all the forces that could be scraped from that region—now relieved of all apprehension by Gillmore's withdrawal. When, therefore, the first resolute effort was made [27] to cut the railroad, some portion either of the North or South Carolina forces had already arrived; and, when it was renewed,[28] the enemy had been materially strengthened. Still, the advantage of numbers was clearly on our side; and the enemy was forced to uncover the railroad, which was destroyed for some distance; our troops pressing southward to Swift creek, three miles from Petersburg. But now, deceived by fresh, joyful, but hardly truthful, Washington advices, Butler turned his face northward, to participate in the expected speedy capture of Richmond; pushing his lines gradually up to Proctor's creek, whence the enemy withdrew [29] to an intrenched line behind it, which Gen. Gillmore flanked, and which was to have been assaulted; but our troops had been so dispersed that the requisite force was not at hand; so the attack was deferred till next morning.[30]

But Beauregard—whom Butler supposed still at or below Petersburg, unable to get up—was on hand, with a formidable force, and intent on making himself disagreeable. A dense fog shrouded every thing, when, before daylight, our sleeping soldiers on the front were startled by a grand crash of artillery and musketry. Our forces had been so disposed that there was over a mile of open country between our right and the James, merely picketed by 150 cavalry; and Beauregard, having made careful observations before dark, attempted at once to assault in front, to turn this flank, and to strike heavily our left with a divi-

[27] May 7. [28] May 9. [29] May 13. [30] May 16.

sion under Gen. Whiting, which he had left on the Petersburg side of the gap in the railroad.

The attempt to turn our right was at first a decided success. Heckman's brigade, here posted, was surprised and overwhelmed. The enemy gained the rear of this flank, and was carrying all before him, when he met the 112th New York—one of three Gillmore regiments which Butler had fortunately sent to Smith as a support to his long, thin line. Joined on the instant by the 9th Maine, this regiment held the road-junction which the enemy were pressing on to seize, and stubbornly refused to move. The Rebel commander, disconcerted by this unexpected resistance, and reluctant to advance in the fog to unknown and incalculable perils, desisted and withdrew.

The front of Smith's line, held by the divisions of Brooks and Weitzel, was impetuously assailed; but Smith, having found a quantity of telegraph wire lying idle, had resolved to make a precautionary use of it, by directing his men to stretch it tightly along their front, winding it occasionally around a tree or stump, at a height of two or three feet from the ground. The assaulting enemy, rushing blindly upon this in their charge, pitched headlong over it, and were shot or bayoneted ere they could regain their feet. Their attack in front was thus repulsed—the assailants recoiling with loss.

Beauregard thereupon renewed his effort to turn our right; sending a large force, and directing it to make a farther detour; which was done, and Smith thereby compelled to fall back.

Whiting, who was to have struck Gillmore on our left, failed, for some reason, to do so; hence, Gillmore stood in idle expectancy, until Smith drew back, when he did likewise. We had lost in this collision about 4,000 men; the Rebels at least 3,000. Beauregard cautiously followed up, and erected a line of works across the peninsula in front of ours; so that Gen. Butler wrote to Gen. Grant that he was "bottled up:" a remark that the Lieutenant-General, rather inconsiderately, adopts in his report of the campaign. So long as our navy and transports held undisputed possession of the rivers, enabling Butler to launch his troops in any direction but directly northward, the remark had but little pertinence or force; as the unobstructed and ready withdrawal,[31] soon afterward, of Smith's corps to rëenforce the Army of the Potomac, sufficiently proves. When that detachment was required, Butler was on the point of striking that determined blow at Petersburg which should have been his first, and, but for misinformation as to Lee's discomfiture, probably would have been successful.

There was further fighting along Gen. Butler's front, on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st, with considerable loss on each side; but without decisive results. Gen. Terry's line was forced back on the 20th, but rëestablished next day. And Gen. Kautz, who had been sent on a cavalry raid to cut the railroads leading southward and westward from Petersburg, acting with caution, achieved but a moderate success; cutting the Danville road at Coalfield, Powhattan, and Chula, but failing to destroy the iron bridge at

[31] May 30–31.



POSITIONS ON THE NORTH ANNA.

ades of Birney's division, who swept over the plain on the double-quick, disregarding the heavy fire of its defenders, swarmed over the parapet, and drove out the garrison, capturing 30, with a total loss of 150. Repeated efforts by the enemy to burn the bridge during the ensuing night were baffled; and in the morning it was discovered that they had retreated; when Hancock quietly crossed and established himself on the south side; as Wright, following Warren, had done at Jericho ford the night before.

The passage of the river thus seemed to be triumphantly and cheaply effected; but the appearance was delusive. The river was barely fordable at different points, with high, rocky banks; and Lee had chosen a strong position, with both flanks drawn back; his right covered by marshes; his left resting on Little river; his front on the North Anna narrow and strong; our army being situated much as his was at Gettysburg, when Meade was able to throw divisions and corps from right to left to breast a coming shock, or strike a return blow, in half the time that Lee required to countervail the movement. So, when Burnside, approaching the river half way between our right and left wings, attempted to cross, his advance division (Crittenden's) was promptly repelled with heavy loss; and when Warren attempted to connect with Burnside by pushing Crawford's division down the south bank of the river, he in turn was assailed in overwhelming force, and was with difficulty extricated. Grant paused and pondered, and studied and planned; but Lee's position was absolutely invulnerable, or only to be wrested from good soldiers with an enormous disparity of force, and by a frightful sacrifice of life. After deliberate and careful reconnoissances, continued throughout two days, an assault was forborne, and our army, cautiously with-

drawing at nightfall[36] from the enemy's front, recrossed the river unassailed, and, after pushing well east to avoid another charge on the flank of its long columns while extended in movement, again turned southward and took the road to Richmond: the 6th corps in advance, followed in succession by the 5th, 9th, and 2d: Hancock not starting till next morning; when Sheridan, with our cavalry in the advance, was, after a march of 22 miles, approaching the Pamunkey at Hanovertown. Wright's corps crossed directly, and took post to cover the fords; Warren's and Burnside's were over the next morning;[37] Hancock crossed almost four miles higher; so that our whole army was south of the Pamunkey without loss, and in unobstructed communication with its new base at White House.

Lee had, as usual, a much shorter road, and was already in position on our new front; his army facing north-eastward, covering both railroads as well as the road to Richmond, and rendering it hazardous, if not impossible, to cross the Chickahominy on his right so as to interpose between him and the Confederate capital. Grant had shown at the North Anna his aversion to sacrificing the lives of his men when there was a practicable alternative; but now it seemed that the great object of the campaign positively required a disregard of the advantages of position possessed by the enemy. A spirited fight[38] at Hawes's shop, on our front, wherein Sheridan, with the brigades of Davies, Gregg, and Custer, met and worsted the Rebel troopers under Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton—our loss being 400, and the enemy's 800—doubtless stimulated the general eagerness for battle. A reconnoissance in force along our front was accordingly made; developing the enemy's position across Tolopotomy creek, with its right on the Mechanicsville pike, near Bethesda church, where Col. Hardin's brigade of Reserves, Crawford's division, was struck[39] on its flank by Rhodes's division of Ewell's corps, and hurried back to the Shady Grove road; where Crawford, bringing up the remainder of the Reserves and Kitching's brigade (of Warren's corps), repulsed Rhodes, and established our left on the Mechanicsville pike. Meantime, Hancock, on our right, had been stopped, after heavy skirmishing, at the Tolopotomy, finding the enemy in his front too strong and too well covered by defenses and a swamp; while Burnside had come into position on his left, and Wright on his right. Reconnoissances showed the enemy's position so unassailable in front that no course seemed open but an attempt to flank its right, crossing the Chickahominy opposite or just below COLD HARBOR; a focus of roads which Sheridan had seized,[40] after a brief skirmish, and on which the 6th corps, moving in the rear from our right to our left, was immediately directed; reaching it next day—just before Gen. W. F. Smith, with 10,000 men detached from Butler's army, and brought around by steamboats to White House, came up and took post on its right; and the two were met here by orders from Meade to advance and repel the enemy in their front, with a view to forcing a passage of the Chickahominy.

[36] May 26. [37] May 28. [38] May 28, P. M. [39] May 29. [40] May 31.



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR.

The attack was made at 4 P. M.: the enemy of course posted in a wood, which concealed their strength, facing a level, open field, across which our men advanced with great spirit under a heavy fire, carrying a good part of the enemy's advanced line of rifle-trenches and taking 600 prisoners. Their second line, however, was far stronger and more firmly held; and night fell with the Rebels still fully in its possession: our advance holding and bivouacking on the ground it had gained, at a cost of 2,000 killed and wounded. For Longstreet's corps, which had confronted our right the day before, had been moved rapidly to our left, parallel with Wright's movement, and was here facing us before the Chickahominy, as it had just been on the Tolopotomy, with a little less advantage of position but the same spirit and resolution; so that (as Lincoln once remarked to McClellan) the chief obstacle had been shifted, not surmounted, by our movement to the left. Nevertheless, Hancock was now called down from our right to the left of Wright; Warren was directed to extend his left so as to connect with Smith; while Burnside was to withdraw entirely from the front and mass on the right and rear of Warren.

These flank movements, in the presence of a vigilant and resolute enemy, may not often prove so disastrous as Rosecrans found them at the Chickamauga, but they are always critical. Burnside, attempting to obey this order in broad daylight,[41] his movement was of course detected by the foe in his front, who sharply followed up his skirmishers covering the operation, taking some of them

[41] June 2, P. M.

prisoners, and, striking Warren's left, cut off and captured 400 more; arresting Warren's extension to the left, by compelling him to look to the safety of his corps. But new dispositions were made, and Grant and Meade, now at Cold Harbor, resolved that the Rebel lines should be forced on the morrow."

The two armies held much of the ground covered by McClellan's right, under Fitz-John Porter, prior to Lee's bold advance, nearly two years before: Gaines's mill being directly in the rear of the Confederate center; while Sheridan's cavalry patrolled the roads in our rear leading to our base at White House, covered our left and observed the Chickahominy eastward of Richmond. Wilson, with his cavalry division, watched our right flank. Burnside was still on Warren's right and rear; Smith, Wright, and Hancock stretched farther and farther to the left. In our front, Lee not only had a very good position naturally, but he knew how to make the most of its advantages—the single point in which (but it is a vital one) his admirers can justify their claim for him of a rare military genius. No other American has ever so thoroughly appreciated and so readily seized the enormous advantage which the increased range, precision, and efficiency given to musketry by rifling, have insured to the defensive, when wielded by a commander who knows how speedily a trench may be dug and a slight breastwork thrown up which will stop nine-tenths of the bullets that would otherwise draw blood. The lessons of Bunker Hill and New Orleans, impressive as they were, must have been trebly so had our countrymen been armed with the Enfield rifle or Springfield musket of to-day.

At sunrise, or a little before, the assault was made" along our whole front—bravely, firmly, swiftly made; and as swiftly repulsed with terrible slaughter. On our left, Barlow's division of Hancock's corps gained a transitory advantage; dislodging the enemy from their position in a sunken road, taking three guns and several hundred prisoners. But his second line failed to advance promptly to the support of the first, against which the enemy rallied in overwhelming force, retaking their defenses, hurling Barlow back, but not to the lines from which he started. He fell back a few yards only, and covered his front so quickly that the enemy could not dislodge him.

Gibbon, charging on Barlow's right, was checked by a swamp, which separated his command: part of which gained the Rebel works nevertheless; Col. McMahon planting his colors on their intrenchments a moment before he fell mortally wounded. No part of the Rebel works was held; but part of Gibbon's men also covered themselves so close to the enemy's lines that, while the Rebels dared not come out to capture them, they could not get away, save by crawling off under cover of fog or thick darkness.

Wright's and Smith's assaults were less determined—at all events, less sanguinary—than Hancock's; and Warren, having a long line to hold, was content to hold it. Burnside swung two of his divisions around to flank the enemy's left, which he hotly engaged, and must have worsted had

" June 3.

" June 3.

the battle along our front been protracted. But that could not be. Twenty minutes after the first shot was fired, fully 10,000 of our men were stretched writhing on the sod, or still and calm in death; while the enemy's loss was probably little more than 1,000. And when, some hours later, orders were sent by Gen. Meade to each corps commander to renew the assault at once, without regard to any other, the men simply and unanimously refused to obey it. They *knew* that success was hopeless, and the attempt to gain it murderous: hence they refused to be sacrificed to no purpose.

Our total loss at and around Cold Harbor was 13,153; of whom 1,705 were killed, 9,042 wounded, and 2,406 missing. Among the killed were acting Brigadiers P. A. Porter,[46] Lewis O. Morris, and F. F. Wead; all of New York. Cols. Edward Pye, 95th N. Y., O. H. Morris, 66th N. Y., J. C. Drake, 112th N. Y., John McConihe, 169th N. Y., Edwin Schall, 51st Pa., and F. A. Haskell, 36th Wisc. Brig.-Gen. R. O. Tyler was among the severely wounded. Brig.-Gen. Doles was the only Rebel officer of note reported as killed. Col. Lawrence M. Keitt, formerly a conspicuous M. C. from South Carolina, had fallen the day before.

Our army had suffered terribly in this battle; but it had lost blood only. The fighting closed with our front advanced on several points and forced back on none; but Lee, overestimating the effects of our repulse on the morale of our men, and seeing that our hastily constructed intrenchments directly before his lines were but slight, hazarded a night attack[47] on our front, but was repulsed at every point, and soon desisted. Next day, a partial assault was made on our left; but this also was easily repulsed. Meantime, our army was gradually moving to its left, by the successive withdrawals of Burnside and of Warren; when another night attack was made[48] on our right, again held by Burnside, but without success. And now an armistice of two hours was arranged, during which the wounded lying between the armies were removed and the dead buried.

Next day,[49] our left was extended to the Chickahominy, finding the enemy in force opposite Sumner's and Bottom's bridges; while Sheridan was dispatched with two divisions of cavalry around Lee's left, to tear up the Virginia Central railroad in his rear, which he did: crossing the Pamunkey at Aylett's, breaking the Fredericksburg road at Chesterfield station, and thence pushing over the North Anna by Chilesburg and Mount Pleasant, over the upper branches of the North Anna,[50] striking the Central railroad at Trevilian's, routing a body of Rebel horse, under Wade Hampton, that interfered with his operations, and breaking up the

[46] Col. Peter A. Porter, of Niagara Falls, son of Gen. Peter B. Porter, who served with honor in the War of 1812, and was Secretary of War under J. Q. Adams. Col. Porter, in the prime of life, and in the enjoyment of every thing calculated to make life desirable, volunteered from a sense of duty; saying his country had done so much for him that he could not hesitate to do all in his power for her in her hour of peril. When nominated in 1863 as Union candidate for Secretary of State, he responded that his neighbors had intrusted him with the lives of their sons, and he could not leave them while the War lasted. He was but one among thousands animated by like motives; but none ever volunteered from purer impulses, or served with more unselfish devotion, than Peter A. Porter.

[47] June 4. [48] June 6. [49] June 7. [50] June 10.

road nearly down[49] to Louisa C. H.; but, soon finding the Rebels too numerous and pressing, he retraced his steps to Trevilian's, where he had a sharp, indecisive, sanguinary fight, and then drew off; making his way to Spottsylvania C. H., and thence by Guiney's station to White House, and so rejoined Gen. Grant. His raid was less effective than had been calculated, because Gen. Hunter, who was expected to meet him at Gordonsville, had taken a different direction, leaving more foes on Sheridan's hands than he was able satisfactorily to manage. His total loss, mainly in the last fight at Trevilian's, was 735, whereof some 300 were prisoners. He brought out 370 prisoners. The Rebel loss in killed and wounded was at least equal to ours, and included Gen. Rosser and Col. Custer, wounded, and Col. McAllister, killed.

Gen. Grant now decided to pass the Chickahominy far to Lee's right, and thence move across the James to attack Richmond from the south. It was a bold resolve, especially as the authorities at Washington had a settled and reasonable repugnance to a movement which seemed to place the Federal City at the mercy of Lee. Taking up the rails from the Chickahominy to White House, and shipping them around for use south of the James, Smith's corps was likewise embarked[50] and returned to Butler; while the Army of the Potomac was put in motion[51] for the passage of the James: Wilson's cavalry, in advance, crossing the Chickahominy at Long bridge, followed by Warren's corps; which was passed at Long bridge by Hancock's, which struck the James at Wilcox's wharf, between Charles City C. H. and Westover. Wright and Burnside, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's bridge, moved thence to Charles City C. H.; our trains, for safety, taking roads still farther to the east. The enemy made some attempts at annoying our right flank during the march, but to no purpose. Pontoons and ferry-boats being at hand, the passage was promptly and safely made;[52] and very soon our guns were thundering at the southern approaches to the Rebel capital.

This is not a military history, and its author makes no shadow of pretension to other military knowledge, than that which is necessarily gained by all students of history; while no one who carefully reads this volume will accuse him of partiality or special admiration for Gen. Grant. Yet the criticisms which have been leveled at that commander's advance to Richmond seem so unjust as to demand exposure.

"Why not embark his army at once for City Point?" has been triumphantly asked, "and establish it there at a cost of a few hundred men, instead of fifty or sixty thousand?" The question not only ignores the Rebel losses in the course of this movement—losses which were at least as large in proportion to their resources as ours—but ignores also the obvious fact that Lee's army around Richmond, hard pressed by a superior force, was no peril to Washington and the loyal States; whereas, to leave it on the Rapidan and take ship for the James was either to make the enemy a present of our capital, with

[49] June 12. [50] June 12–13. [51] June 12. [52] June 14–15.

its immense stores of every warlike material, or compel that division and dispersion of our forces whereof McClellan had so persistently, and with some justice, complained. Lee at Richmond, with the country northward to the Potomac thoroughly exhausted and devastated, could not reach Washington at all without abandoning Richmond to its fate; and corps after corps of our army could be transferred to the Potomac in less than half the time required for a march of the Rebel forces to Centerville. Of course, Grant set out expecting to defeat Lee decisively between the Rapidan and the Chickahominy, and was disappointed; but it is difficult to see how he could have evaded obstacles at least as serious as those he encountered. As he pertinently observed, the Rebel army was his true objective; and this must be encountered, whichever route he might take. Had he attempted, as Lee evidently anticipated, to advance by Gordonsville or Louisa C. H., flanking Lee's left instead of his right, he would have been starved into a retreat before he came in sight of the James.

Petersburg, at the head of sloop navigation on the Appomattox, 22 miles south of Richmond, is the focus of all the railroads but the Danville which connected the Confederate capital with the South and South-west. Petersburg taken and firmly held by our forces, the stay of the Rebel Government and Army at Richmond must be of short duration. But merely to take it, without the ability to hold it against the force which Lee, near at hand, could easily send against it, would be worse than useless.

The moment it was decided that Meade's army must cross the James below Richmond and threaten that city from the south, Grant hastened to Butler's headquarters to impel against Petersburg whatever force might there be disposable, so soon as it should be certain that that attempt could be seasonably supported by the legions of Meade.

Butler, after the dispatch of the best part of his force, under W. F. Smith, to Meade, had been inclined to keep quiet within his intrenchments; but that was not permitted. His northern outpost at Wilson's wharf, north of the James, held by Gen. Wild with two Black regiments, had already been summoned and charged[83] by Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry, who, after a fight of some hours, were beaten off with loss: and now Gen. Gillmore, with 3,500 men, was thrown across[84] the Appomattox, to approach Petersburg by the turnpike on the north, while Gen. Kautz, with 1,500 cavalry, should charge into it from the south or south-west. Two gunboats and a battery were simultaneously to bombard Fort Clinton, defending the approach up the river.

The combination failed, though it should have succeeded. Gillmore advanced[85] unresisted to within two miles of the city, where he drove in the enemy's skirmishers and halted—or rather, recoiled—deeming his force altogether too weak for the task before him, and understanding that he was free to exercise his discretion in the premises. Kautz, on the other hand, made his way not only up to but into the city—the Confederates' attention having been concentrated on Gillmore—but, now that they

[83] May 24. [84] June 8. [85] June 10.

were released from apprehension on this side, they turned upon Kautz; driving him out with ease.

Grant, having hurried from the Army of the Potomac, when it had begun to cross the James, to Bermuda Hundreds, directed Butler to push W. F. Smith's corps, just arrived from the Chickahominy by steamboat via White House, against Petersburg as quickly as possible; it being known that A. P. Hill, with the van of Lee's army, was already on the south front of Richmond. Smith moved out accordingly, crossing the Appomattox by a pontoon-bridge at Point of Rocks, and following Gillmore's route southward to Petersburg; confronting, before noon,[56] the north-east defenses, 2½ miles from the river. Hincks's black brigade was sent up directly, taking a line of rifle-pits and two guns. But there—though moments were inestimable—Smith paused[57]—not assaulting till near sundown, when part of his force was sent forward, forming a very strong skirmish line, and cleared the enemy's rifle-trenches in their front, capturing 300 prisoners and 16 guns, with a loss on our part of about 600.[58] And now—though the night was clear and the moon nearly full—Smith rested till morning, after the old but not good fashion of 1861–2.

Fatalities multiplied. Hancock, with two divisions, forming the van of the Army of the Potomac, came up just after nightfall, and waiving his seniority, tendered his force to Smith, who put part of it into the captured works, relieving his own troops, but made no further use of it. And Hancock, it seems, in the hurry of the moment, when there were a thousand things to be attended to at once, had not, up to 5 P. M. of that day, even been apprised that Petersburg was to be assaulted, and had lost some hours of the morning waiting for rations, which would not have stopped him if he had known[59] how urgent was the necessity for haste: and some further time by marching by an inaccurate map, which carried him too far to the left.

Smith's hesitation to follow up his success proved the turning-point of the campaign. Before morning, there was a very different sort of enemy in his front from that he had beaten yesterday—the van of Lee's iron-sided veterans, who did not comprehend how formidable intrenchments and batteries could be lost when assailed only by strong skirmish-lines. By their arrival, the fall of Petersburg, a few hours since so imminent, was indefinitely postponed.

During the 16th, Warren and

[56] June 15.

[57] Grant, in his final, comprehensive report, says:

"Smith, for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault the enemy's main lines until near sundown."

As more than a year had intervened when this report was written, it is not probable that Gen. Grant's satisfaction on this point will ever be perfected.

[58] Col. Simon H. Mix, 3d N. Y. cavalry, was killed in front of Petersburg, fighting at the head of his regiment. He had served with credit since early in 1861.

[59] So says Swinton ('Army of the Potomac'), who quotes Hancock's report as his authority; and adds:

"There is on file in the archives of the Army a paper bearing this indorsement by Gen. Meade: '*Had Gen. Hancock or myself known that Petersburg was to be attacked, Petersburg would have fallen.*'"

Swinton seems to have been eagerly supplied, by those officers who are not admirers of Gen. Grant, with all the weapons of assault in their armory.

Burnside came up, with the greater part of the Army of the Potomac; but so did Lee, with most of the Army of Virginia. Smith held our right, touching the Appomattox; Hancock, Burnside and Warren reaching farther and farther to the left, which was covered by Kautz's cavalry. Meade, after posting his army, hastened to City Point for a consultation with Grant; and, returning at 2 P. M., gave orders for a general assault, which was delivered at 6 P. M. Hancock's, Burnside's, and part of Warren's corps, went forward in the face of a terrible fire from a sheltered and formidable foe, and a night of combat and carnage resulted in a general advance of our lines, though at a heavy cost. Birney, of Hancock's corps, had stormed and carried the ridge in his front; while Burnside, repelled during the night by the deadly fire he encountered, carried at daylight the outwork defying him, capturing 4 guns and 400 prisoners. Potter's division, which had made this desperate charge, was now relieved by Ledlie's, which pushed our advance still farther, or to within a mile and a half of the city, which was hence reached by our shells. On other points, however, we had either been repulsed, or had made no progress; while the preponderance of losses, and even of prisoners, was heavily against us. And, as the advanced position gained in Burnside's front was projected, as it were, into the enemy's still unshaken lines, a tremendous assault upon it was made the next night, and our men driven out with heavy loss.

The desperate struggle for Petersburg having drawn the Rebel forces mainly to that city, Gen. Butler, by order, struck out,[66] under Terry, from his front at Bermuda Hundreds toward Port Walthall junction, with intent to take, and if possible hold, the railroad. Terry, finding the railroad slightly held, seized, and was proceeding to destroy it, when the approach of Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, marching from Richmond on Petersburg, compelled him to draw back. Grant had foreseen and provided against this contingency, by relieving (with part of the 6th) Smith's (18th) corps, and sending it to the aid of Butler; but, by some mistake, Smith's men were halted too soon; so that Terry was overpowered and hurled back; and, when he again advanced, reënforced, the enemy had so strengthened their former works that they were deemed impregnable.

Grant, believing that a good part of the Rebel army had not yet arrived, ordered another general assault for the 18th; but, when our skirmishers that morning advanced, the enemy had abandoned their works in our immediate front, withdrawing to a new, stronger, and more symmetrical line nearer Petersburg. Hours were now spent in making new dispositions to assault this with effect; and, at 3 P. M., an attack was made, first by Martindale, commanding the division left here of Smith's corps; then by Birney, in temporary command of the 2d; and later by the 5th and 9th; but with very heavy loss, and no success, save that Martindale carried the enemy's skirmish-line in his front, and made a few prisoners. The losses of the enemy, sheltered behind their works,

[66] June 16.

bore, of course, no comparison to ours.

It had now been established, at a cost of fully 10,000 men,[61] that Petersburg could not be carried by direct assault, no matter in what force: and our troops were directed to intrench strongly in its front, while the 2d and 6th corps were moved[62] to the left, with intent to find and turn the enemy's right; cutting or holding the Weldon railroad.

The 2d moved around to the Jerusalem plank road, where it was met by the enemy in force, and driven back a short distance; the 6th not being at hand. Next morning, the advance was resumed by both corps, but too tardily and disconnectedly—the country being, for the most part, thickly wooded and difficult. A. P. Hill was watching the movement, and, at the proper moment, threw a division of his corps in between our two, striking rapidly in flank successively Barlow's, Mott's, and Gibbon's divisions, rolling them up and forcing them back, with a loss of 4 guns and many prisoners. At the same time, another of Hill's divisions struck the flank of the 6th corps likewise, inflicting on it also considerable loss. But Meade now arrived on the field—the Rebel advance having been checked—and, getting both corps well in hand, he ordered, at nightfall, an advance, which was made, and most of the lost ground recovered—Hill not being in force to resist him in the open field.

Our advance southward was resumed next morning,[63] and the Weldon railroad reached; but hardly had operations upon it begun, when Hill again struck the flank of our three regiments in advance, and routed them, taking many prisoners, and driving the fugitives back on the main body; when he again desisted, carrying off his captives. Our losses in this baffled effort were scarcely less than 4,000 men, mainly prisoners; with no resulting advantage, save a moderate extension of our left toward the Weldon railroad.

The mishap of this first attempt to clutch the Weldon railroad involved or drew after it another. Gen. Wilson, with his own and Kautz's divisions of cavalry, together 8,000 strong, had on that day been impelled still farther to our left, on a raid against the enemy's railroads. Moving southward for some distance, he turned abruptly to his right, and struck the Weldon road at Reams's station, where he burned the dépôt and tore up a long stretch of track. Passing thence rapidly westward, he struck the Lynchburg road at a point 15 miles from Petersburg, and followed it westward to Nottoway station, destroying the track for 22 miles; here encountering and defeating a Rebel cavalry force under W. F. Lee. Hence, he dispatched Kautz to Burkesville, the junction of this with the Danville road, where both roads were torn up, as was the Danville so far S. W. as Meherrin station; where Kautz was rejoined[64] by Wilson, and the work prosecuted so far as Roanoke bridge (over the Staunton); where they were con-

[61] Between June 10 and 20, Meade's losses were—killed, 1,198; wounded, 6,853; missing, 1,614: total, 9,665. And this does not probably include the losses of Sheridan's cavalry, who were fighting north of the James.

[62] June 21. [63] June 23. [64] June 24.

fronted by a stronger force than they could dislodge, and commenced their return to our camps.

But, by this time, the enemy were all around them, and intent on their destruction. Striking the Weldon road at Stony creek,[66] they were again confronted by more Rebels than they could drive; and, after a hard fight, were obliged to give up the attempt, and make for Reams's station, which Wilson undoubtedly supposed to be now held by Hancock or Warren. He was badly mistaken, however; for here was a far stronger Rebel force (including Mahone's and Finnegan's infantry brigades, beside Hampton's cavalry) than that which had baffled him at Stony creek; and his attempt to force a passage resulted in his signal defeat, involving the loss of his guns, his train, with many prisoners and their horses. About 1,000 negroes, who had fallen into the wake of our cavalry—many of them mounted on horses borrowed for the occasion—here fell into the hands of the Rebels, and were returned to a servitude which their effort to escape was not calculated to lighten. Wilson and Kautz fled separately across the Nottoway, and, by a long circuit southward, made their way back to our lines before Petersburg—men and horses coming in pretty nearly used up. Grant, in his report, says, indeed, with his habitual optimism, that

"the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks;"

but such was not the general opinion; and Grant sent no more cavalry to the Rebel rear for months. Lee claims to have taken from Wilson and Kautz on this raid 1,000 prisoners (beside the wounded), 13 guns, and 30 wagons.

On our right, Gen. Butler had been directed to throw a pontoon-bridge over the James to Deep Bottom, north of his stronghold at Bermuda Hundreds; which he did skillfully and without loss; Brig.-Gen. Foster, with a brigade of the 10th corps, taking post at Deep Bottom, only 10 miles from Richmond, and very near its southward defenses at Howlett's.

Gen. Sheridan, who, with his cavalry, had rested some days at White House, after their return from their harassing raid toward Gordonsville, now moved across the Peninsula to the James, being resolutely attacked[67] by the way; but he beat off his assailants, with a loss of some 500 on either side, and made his way safely to our right, bringing in his guns and train.

The residue of the 18th corps was now returned to Butler; and thus, in spite of reverses, our lines were extended on both flanks, so as to threaten Richmond above the James, while we attempted to flank and carry Petersburg on the south. Why it was not then, or thereafter, found advisable to mass suddenly against the center of the enemy's long, thin line, and burst through it, wherever, between Richmond and Petersburg, it should seem weakest, Gen. Grant in his report does not inform us. Possibly, the sore experience of Cold Harbor had made him chary of infantry assaults on lines fortified and held by marksmen of such nerve as now composed the bulk of Lee's decimated but still formidable army.

There were several collisions along

[66] June 28.

[67] June 25.

our lines in front of Petersburg, generally provoked by the now elated enemy, who assailed[67] Gen. Stannard's division of the 10th corps; first opening with artillery and then charging with infantry; only to be repulsed with a loss of 150 prisoners. A demonstration was made next day against Burnside's front; but it was not resolute, and was easily repulsed.

Thence ensued some days of comparative quiet—our men having marched and fought almost incessantly for eight weeks, having lost meantime fully 70,000 of their number by desperate fighting—mainly against great advantages of position or shelter, which screened the enemy from losses at all proportionate to ours—and they were by no means in such heart for daily conflict as when they last crossed the Rapidan. True, their numbers had been nearly or quite kept up by rëenfôrcements from various quarters; but many of these were such men as high bounties attract to military service, and who were not 'bounty-jumpers' only because they had, as yet, found no chance to jump.[68] In fact, the Army of the Potomac in 1864, though still including many thousands of excellent and now veteran soldiers, was in good part formed of material very different from and inferior to that which McClellan led to the Peninsula in 1862. And this army, when concentrated south of the James, was by no means equal in morale and efficiency to that same army at the opening of the campaign.

Grant, however, remained at its head—undismayed, unshaken, inflexible. Having given his soldiers some much needed rest—the Summer being intensely hot and dry, and the earth parched and baked so that any movement raised a cloud of dust which nearly suffocated men and horses, and revealed its existence, its strength, and its destination, to the ever-watchful foe—another effort on our right was resolved on. A railroad along the rear of our position was, during the Summer, completed, facilitating not only the distribution of munitions and provisions from our chief landing and dépôt at City Point, where the Lieutenant-General had his headquarters, but serving to accelerate also the movement of troops.

Foster's fortified post at Deep Bottom, threatening an attack on Richmond, while easily strengthened from Bermuda Hundreds, disquieted Lee; and one or two attempts had been made upon it, but easily repulsed. Grant resolved to reciprocate the enemy's attentions; so, having quietly transferred the 2d corps from his extreme left to his extreme right, across the James, at Deep Bottom,[69] he directed Hancock to turn the enemy's advance position, while Foster should amuse him by a feint in front; and this order was so admirably obeyed that the Rebel outpost was successfully flanked and carried by Miles's brigade[70] of Barlow's division, capturing 4 guns. The enemy fell back behind Bailey's creek; still holding firmly his strong defensive work at Chapin's bluff, opposite Fort Darling.

Sheridan, with his cavalry, attempted to flank this work, and gained some high ground from which he

[67] June 24.

[68] It was officially stated that, of 500,000 men drafted in 1864, the requisitions being filled by the payment of $500 to $1,000 each as bounty, only 168,000 ever made their appearance at the front.

[69] July 26–7.

[70] Consisting of the 183d Pa., 28th Mass., and 26th Mich., under Col. J. C. Lynch.

hoped to get into its rear; but night came on before he was ready; and, so imminent seemed the danger on this flank, that Lee drew [1] five of his eight remaining divisions across the James to avert it, affording the opportunity which Grant was awaiting.

Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front. Under this fort, a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals.

All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defenses by the explosion. It was calculated that, if a crest barely 400 yards behind the doomed fort could be gained and held, Petersburg must fall, with heavy loss to its defenders.

The mine was to be fired at 3½ A. M.; when the match was duly applied, but no explosion followed. After a considerable pause, Lt. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees, of the 48th Pa., ventured into the gallery, detecting and removing the cause of failure. And now, at 4¾ A. M.—the fuse having been relighted—the explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom.

But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point, failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet, because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to *cast lots* to see which of them should go in—or rather, which two of them should stay out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brig.-Gen. Ledlie—and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three. It need hardly be added that no preparation had been made during the night preceding the explosion, by quietly removing (or opening paths through) the abatis, &c., which protected our front from sudden dashes

[1] July 27-29.

of the enemy, for the instant advance in force of our column of assault.

The explosion had occurred; the Rebel fort had been hoisted 200 feet, and had fallen in fragments; our guns had opened all along the front, eliciting a far feebler and ineffective response; but several minutes passed—precious, fatal minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path—went forward *into* the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but, once in the crater, Ledlie's men barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together, losing their formation and becoming mixed up; Gen. Potter finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest; but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while the Rebels, recovering their self-possession, were planting batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. The Black charge, feeble as it was, had given us a few prisoners; but now our men could no more retreat than advance; the enemy's guns sweeping the ground between the chasm and our front. A first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands, of course, took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000.

Undismayed by the disastrous result of "this [needlessly] miserable affair," as he fitly characterizes it, Grant paused scarcely a fortnight before he resumed the offensive; returning to successive operations on both flanks. Once more, Hancock was impelled[73] against the front of the Rebel left, facing Deep Bottom; his depleted corps being strengthened by the 10th, now led by Birney, and by Gregg's division of cavalry. Again pushing out to the right, Hancock attempted to flank the Rebel defenses across Bailey's creek: Barlow, with two divisions, being sent around to assault in flank and rear; while Mott's division menaced their eastern front, and Birney's corps assailed them next the river. Birney gained some advantage, taking 4 guns; but Barlow's assault was delivered by a single brigade, and came to nothing. In fact, Hancock had been delayed in landing his men, so that Lee, forewarned, had begun to rëenforce this flank; as he did more fully next day: so that, when our troops again ad-

[73] Aug. 12.

vanced to the assault"[13]—Terry's division having meantime been moved to the left of Barlow—though Terry at first carried the Rebel intrenchment, taking over 200 prisoners—he was soon driven out of it. and the enemy was seen to be in such force that a further assault was deemed impracticable.

Meantime, Gen. Gregg's cavalry, supported by Miles's infantry brigade, advanced on the Charles City road, driving the enemy before him with considerable loss on their part—Gen. Chambliss being among their killed. Still, the movement, on the whole, had no decided success; and an attempt to draw out the enemy, to leave his lines and attack ours, by the *ruse* of seeming to send off most of our men on steamboats, proved wholly abortive. A night attack by the Rebels on the 18th was repulsed. Hancock was soon[14] withdrawn in earnest: our total losses in the movement having been about 5,000; that of the enemy probably less, but still heavy: Gen. Gherardie being killed.

Lee was probably aware that this demonstration on Richmond covered an advance on the other end of his attenuated line; but he was obliged to strengthen his lieutenant north of the James or risk the fall of Richmond. No sooner had he done this, however, than Warren struck out[15] from our left at the long coveted Weldon railroad, barely three miles distant from our flank; reaching it unresisted before noon. Leaving here Griffin's division, he advanced, with Crawford's and Ayres's, a mile toward Petersburg, where he found the enemy awaiting him. After a pause, he moved on; and was soon struck on his left flank—the enemy advancing by a road wholly unknown to our officers—and 200 of the Maryland brigade captured. The brigade falling back under the wing of the 15th N. Y. Heavy Artillery (now serving as infantry), that regiment stood its ground, and, by rapid and deadly volleys, repelled the enemy. Our movement was here arrested—our loss during the day having been 1,000—but Warren held his ground, fortified it; and the Weldon road was lost to the enemy.

Yet, though Warren's position was good, it was unconnected with our lines, still on the Jerusalem plank-road; Brig.-Gen. Bragg, who had been ordered to fill the gap, having neglected promptly to do so. Warren, perceiving the fault, reiterated his order; but, before it could now be executed, Hill pushed a considerable force into the vacant space, and, striking Crawford's division impetuously in flank and rear, rolled it up; taking 2,500 prisoners, including Brig.-Gen. Hays. But now, the brigades of Wilcox and White, of Burnside's corps, came up, and the enemy made off in a hurry with his spoils; enabling Warren to recover the lost ground and reestablish his lines.

Warren was well aware that his position astride the Weldon road was not adapted to tranquillity, and governed himself accordingly. Hardly three days had elapsed, when he was suddenly saluted[16] by 30 Rebel guns; and, after an hour's lively practice, an assaulting column advanced on his front, while another attempted to reach and turn his left flank. But Warren was prepared for this ma-

[13] Aug. 16. [14] Aug. 20. [15] Aug. 18. [16] Aug. 21.

nœuver, and easily baffled it, flanking the flanking column and routing it, with a net loss of 302 on our part, and at least 1,200 to the enemy, of whose dead he buried 211, while he took 500 prisoners. He had lost in this entire movement 4,455 men—most of them prisoners—while the enemy had lost scarcely half that number; but he had lost and we had gained the Weldon road.

Hancock, returned from the north of the James, had moved rapidly to the Weldon road in the rear of Warren. Striking[17] it at Reams's station, he had been busily tearing it up for two or three days; when his cavalry gave warning that the enemy in force were at hand. Their first blow fell on Miles's division, on our right, and was promptly repulsed; but Hill ordered Heth, under a heavy fire of artillery, to try again, and at all events carry the position; which he ultimately did at the fourth charge, capturing three batteries.

Hancock ordered Gibbon's division to retake it; but they failed to do so. Miles, rallying a part of his scattered division, and fighting it admirably, recovered part of his lost ground and one of his captured batteries. Gibbon's division, assailed by a force of dismounted cavalry, was easily driven from its breastworks; but the enemy, attempting to follow up his success, was checked and repelled by a heavy flank fire from our dismounted cavalry, posted on the left.

Though but four miles from Warren's position, no rëenforcements, owing to various blunders, reached Hancock till after he had been forced to retreat, abandoning Reams's station, after a total loss of 2,400 (out of 8,000) men, and 5 guns. Hill's loss was also heavy, but considerably smaller.

Warren's hold on the road had become too strong to be shaken, and there ensued a pause of over a month; during which the Rebels planned and executed a smart raid on our cattle-yard at Coggin's Point on the James; running off 2,500 beeves at no cost but that of fatigue.

The calm was broken at last by Grant, who ordered an advance by Warren on the left, to cover one more determined by Butler on the right. Gen. Warren pushed westward[18] with two divisions of his own corps and two of the 9th, under Parke, with Gregg's cavalry in advance; reaching the Squirrel Level road, and carrying two or three small works at different points. There was fighting along our new front throughout this and the following day; we holding the newly gained ground and intrenching on it; our losses in the movement having been 2,500; those of the enemy probably less, including Gen. Dunnovan, killed. The ground thus taken was promptly joined by proper works to Warren's former position across the railroad.

Gen. Butler, in his turn, crossing the James, advanced with the 10th corps, now commanded by Birney, and the 18th, now under Ord, and struck[19] the enemy's outpost below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, which he assaulted and took, with 15 guns, and a considerable portion of the enemy's intrenchments. He attempted to follow up his blow with the capture of Fort Gilmer, which was next in order; but was repulsed by Maj.-Gen. Field,

[17] Aug. 21. [18] Oct. 1. [19] Sept. 29.



DEFENSES OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG.

with a loss of 300. On our side, Gen. Ord was wounded, and Brig.-Gen. Burnham killed.

Fort Harrison was so important to Richmond, that Field resolved to retake it, but deferred the assault till next morning, when he hurled three brigades against it on one side, while Gen. Hoke charged on the other. These assaults failed to be made simultaneously, and of course were both repulsed with slaughter; as they probably would have been at any rate. But, a few days thereafter, the Rebels surprised at dawn our right, held by Kautz's cavalry, which had been pushed up the Charles City road, to within 4 or 5 miles of Richmond, and drove it; capturing 9 guns and perhaps 500 prisoners. A desperate fight ensued, in which the Rebel Gen. Gregg, of Texas, was killed. Both sides claimed a clear advantage, but neither obtained much, save in the capture of Fort Harrison; while the losses of each had been quite heavy.

Butler pushed forward a strong reconnoissance on the 13th, and assaulted some new works that the enemy had constructed on a part of their front; but they were firmly held, and the attack was not long persisted in.

After a considerable pause, spiced only by cannonading and picket-firing along the intrenched front of both armies, and some sanguinary encounters around Fort Sedgwick (nicknamed by our soldiers 'Fort Hell') covering the Jerusalem plank-road, Gen. Grant again sounded a general advance. While Gen. Butler demonstrated in force on our extreme right—the 18th corps moving on the Richmond defenses by both the Charles City and Williamsburg roads—on our left, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only men enough to hold its works before Petersburg, and taking three days' rations, marched[80] suddenly by the left against the enemy's works covering Hatcher's run and the Boydton plank-road. In other words, Meade's army was here pushed forward to find and turn the right flank of the enemy.

Starting before dawn, the 9th corps, under Parke, on the right, with the 5th, under Warren, on its left, struck, at 9 A. M., the right of the Rebel intrenchments, which rested on the east bank of Hatcher's run; assaulting, but failing to carry them. Warren thereupon undertook, as had been arranged, to come in on its flank by a turning movement; while Hancock, who had simultaneously advanced still farther to our left, and had found but a small force to dispute his passage of Hatcher's run where he struck it, moved north-westward by Dabney's mill, gained the Boydton plank-road, and pushed up to strike the Lynchburg railroad in the enemy's rear. Gregg, with his cavalry division, was thrown out on Hancock's left.

Hancock had reached, with little opposition, the Boydton plank-road, and was pushing farther, when, at 1 P. M., he was halted by an order from Meade. Warren, upon the failure of Parke to carry the intrenchment in his front, had pushed Crawford's division, strengthened by Ayres's brigade, across the run, with orders to move down the north bank of that stream, so as to turn the Rebel defenses. Hancock, hitherto several miles distant, it was intended to connect with by this movement.

[80] Oct. 27.

Crawford, with great difficulty, advanced as ordered, through woods and swamps all but impenetrable, and in which many of his men were lost, while regiments were hopelessly separated from their division, until he was directly on the flank of the Rebel intrenchments; when he, too, was halted by Warren to give time for consultation with Meade—the country having proved entirely different from what was expected. Hancock was now but a mile from Crawford's left; but the dense woods left them in entire ignorance of each other's position. And now, of course, as Hancock was extending his right (Gibbon's division, now under Egan) to find Crawford's left, and receiving a mistaken report that the connection had been made, though a space of 1,200 yards still intervened, Lee threw forward Hill to strike Hancock's right and roll it up after the established fashion.

Hill's leading division, under Heth, crossed the run, making for Hancock, and, following a forest path, swept across in front of Crawford's skirmishers and across the interval between Crawford and Hancock, without clearly knowing where it was. Arriving opposite Hancock's position, Hill, seeing but unseen, silently deployed in the woods, and, at 4 P. M., charged; striking Mott's division, whose first notice of an enemy's approach was a volley of musketry. The brigade (Pierce's) thus charged gave way; a battery was lost; and, for a moment, there was a prospect of another Reams's station disaster. Hancock of course instantly sent word to Egan to change front and hurry to the rescue; but Egan had already done that at the first sound of Hill's guns; and, as the enemy, emerging into the cleared space along the Boydton road, pushed across that road in pursuit of Mott's fugitives, firing and yelling, Egan struck them in flank with two brigades, sweeping down the road, retaking the lost guns, and making over 1,000 prisoners. The disconcerted Rebels retreated as rapidly as they had advanced; but, over 200 of them, fleeing in utter confusion toward the run, fell into Crawford's lines, and were captured. Could Crawford have instantly comprehended the situation and advanced, their loss must have been far greater.

Warren was with Meade in the rear of Crawford's line, when Hill's blow was struck, and at once ordered up Ayres to the support of Hancock; but night fell before Ayres could get up.

Simultaneously with the charge on Hancock's front, Wade Hampton, with five brigades of cavalry, charged his left and rear, guarded by Gregg's cavalry; and Hancock was required to send all his available force to Gregg's support. Hampton persisted till after dark, but gained no ground, and was ultimately beaten off. Hancock's total loss by the day's operations was 1,500; that of the enemy was greater.

Hancock was now authorized by Meade either to withdraw or to hold on and attack next morning, if he could do so safely with the aid of Ayres and Crawford. Being short of ammunition, with no certainty that any more would reach him, or that Ayres and Crawford could bring up their divisions in season for the attack that would naturally be made on him at daybreak, Hancock pru-

dently decided to draw off,[81] and, at 10 P. M., commenced the movement; which ended with our whole army back in its intrenchments before Petersburg, and thence westward to Warren's works, covering not only the Weldon railroad, but the Vaughan and Squirrel Level highways. Thus, while our several advances on the left had been achieved at heavy cost, the following movement, wherein we had the advantage in the fighting and in losses, gave us no foot of ground whatever.

Butler's advance on our farthest right, being in the nature of a feint, had effected nothing but a distraction of the enemy's attention, and this at considerable cost.

Here ended, practically, for the year 1864, Grant's determined, persistent, sanguinary campaign against Lee's army and Richmond: and the following tabular statement of the losses endured by the Army of the Potomac, having been furnished by one of Gen. Grant's staff to the author of "Grant and his Campaigns," can not be plausibly suspected of exaggerating them:

Tabular Statement of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, from May 5, 1864, to November 1, 1864.

BATTLES.	DATES.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		Aggregate.
		Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Wilderness	May 5 to 12	269	3,019	1,017	18,261	177	6,667	29,410
Spottsylvania	May 12 to 21	114	2,032	259	7,697	81	248	10,881
North Anna	May 21 to 31	12	188	67	1,063	3	324	1,607
Cold Harbor	June 1 to 10	144	1,561	421	8,621	51	2,355	13,153
Petersburg	June 10 to 20	85	1,118	361	6,492	46	1,568	9,665
Ditto	June 20 to July 30	29	576	120	2,374	108	2,109	5,316
Ditto	July 30	47	372	124	1,555	91	1,819	4,008
Trenches	August 1 to 18	10	128	58	626	1	45	868
Weldon Railroad	August 18 to 21	21	191	100	1,055	104	3,072	4,543
Reams's Station	August 25	24	93	62	484	95	1,674	2,422
Peeble's Farm	Sept. 30 to Oct. 1	12	129	50	738	56	1,700	2,685
Trenches	Aug. 18 to Oct. 30	13	284	91	1,214	4	800	2,417
Boydton Plank-road	October 27 to 28	16	140	66	981	8	619	1,902
	Totals	796	9,776	2,796	51,161	775	23,083	88,387

NOTE.—The first line of the above table includes several days' desperate fighting at Spottsylvania, in which our losses were fully 10,000. Our actual losses in the Wilderness were rather under than over 20,000, and at Spottsylvania just about as many. These corrections, however, make no difference in the aggregates given above.

Whether the foregoing returns of losses do or do not include those of Burnside's (9th) corps before it was formally incorporated with the Army of the Potomac, is not stated; but, as they do not include the losses in the Army of the James, it is safe to conclude that the killed, wounded, and missing of 1864, in our armies operating directly for the reduction of Richmond, reached the appalling aggregate of 100,000 men. If we assume that, of nearly 54,000 wounded and 24,000 missing (most of the latter prisoners, of whom few of the able-bodied were exchanged during that year), 30,000 recovered of their wounds, or were recaptured, or escaped from the enemy, it leaves our net losses in that campaign not less than 70,000. The enemy's net loss, including 15,373 prisoners, after deducting the wounded who recovered and returned to their colors, we may safely estimate at 40,000, though they would doubtless make it less. Dur-

[81] Heth says that, if he had remained, he would have been attacked next morning by 15,000 infantry and Hampton's cavalry. His lack of ammunition compelled withdrawal.

ing the many desperate combats of this bloody year, the Army of the Potomac lost only 25 and gained but 32 guns. Its losses of guns were mainly incurred at Reams's station; its gains were chiefly made at Spottsylvania.

Grant's conduct of this campaign was not satisfactory to the Confederate critics, who gave a decided preference to the strategy of McClellan. They hold that the former aimed only to overpower and crush by brute force—by the employment of overwhelming numbers—and by a lavish expenditure of blood. Doubtless, a great military genius, such as appears once in two or three centuries, might have achieved them at a smaller cost; as a timid, hesitating, purposeless commander would have failed to achieve them at all. The merit which may be fairly claimed for Grant is that of resolutely undertaking a very difficult and formidable task, and executing it to the best of his ability—at all events, *doing* it. That, when south of the James, he was just where the Rebels wished him *not* to be, they showed by desperate and hazardous efforts to draw him thence; and the proof was duplicated in the final collapse of the Rebellion. Other campaigns were more brilliant; but none contributed more positively and eminently to break the power of the Confederates than that which began on the Rapidan and ended in front of Petersburg and across the Weldon road.

XXVI.

WEST VIRGINIA AND NORTH OF THE RAPIDAN IN 1864.

THE 'ANACONDA' is a clumsy, sluggish beast; effecting his ends by an enormous, even lavish expenditure of force; but Grant's anaconda differed from that of Scott and McClellan in being thoroughly alive. The simultaneous National advance in 1864 from all points, against the armies and remaining strongholds of the Rebellion, was not merely ordered; it was actually attempted—with many reverses at the outset, and no decidedly encouraging results for some months, but with ultimately overwhelming success.

Before Gen. Grant had been placed in chief command, there had been several collisions in western and northern Virginia. The first occurred[1] at Jonesville, in the extreme west of old Virginia, near Cumberland gap, held by Maj. Beers with 300 Illinoisans and 3 guns, who were surrounded, surprised, and captured by Sam. Jones, after a smart contest, in which our loss was 60. The excuse for holding an outpost thus exposed was the necessity of collecting forage for our larger force at Cumberland gap.

A nearly simultaneous raid by Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry, on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad west of Cumberland, came to nothing; but a later expedition, sent under Rosser over into West Virginia from the Valley by Early, surprised[2] a train

[1] Jan. 3, 1864.

[2] Jan. 30.

no room for doubt that he was virtually beaten.

Gen. Crook, with 11 regiments, numbering some 6,000 men, had made directly for the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at Dublin station; 4 miles from which he was met by a far inferior Rebel force under McCausland, which fought bravely, but was beaten off, with a loss on our part of 126 killed and 585 wounded. The railroad here, and for a short distance eastward, was destroyed. And now the appearance of a considerable Rebel rëenforcement, dispatched from Wytheville by Morgan before he fought Averill, impelled Crook to retreat to Meadow bridge; so that, when Averill reached Dublin, Crook was gone, which left him no choice but to follow. Thus the concentric movement upon Lee's flank and rear resulted, as usual with such combinations, in general failure, if not positive disaster. A force that, if concentrated, could have beaten all the Rebels in Virginia west of the Blue ridge, had been so dispersed and frittered away as to achieve less than nothing.

Grant at once relieved Sigel, sending Gen. Hunter to succeed him. The old, fatally vicious system of a concentric advance from opposite points on a common focus was still adhered to. Hunter, somewhat strengthened, at once resumed the offensive; the pressure on Lee by Grant's persistent hammering having constrained Breckinridge's withdrawal, with the better part of his force, to the defenses of Richmond; W. E. Jones, with most of the Rebel forces in the western part of old Virginia, including McCausland's, having been hurried forward to confront the new danger. The two armies met[9] at PIEDMONT, near Staunton—Hunter's being somewhat more numerous[9]—and a spirited and well-fought action resulted in the defeat of Jones, who was shot through the head, and fell dead on the field. Among the fruits of this victory were 1,500 prisoners, 3 guns, and 3,000 small arms. It was, in fact, a rout; leaving the Rebel army incapable of further resistance.

Hunter advanced to Staunton, where Crook and Averill—no considerable force having been left by Jones to oppose them—joined[10] him;

[9] June 5.

[9] Col. C. G. Halpine, chief of staff to Hunter, says of this conflict:

"The forces actually engaged were about equal: Gen. Hunter having some 9,000 men actually in action, while the enemy had about the same—strongly posted, however, on a range of hills, horse-shoe shaped and heavily timbered, and further protected by rifle-pits and rail-fence barricades, hastily thrown up the night before. The Rebel morning report of the day previous, found on the dead body of Gen. Jones that afternoon, showed that he had then under him 6,800 regular Confederate soldiers; while we knew that he was joined on the morning of the engagement by Vaughan's brigade from East Tennessee, and also by about 1,500 militia—old men and young boys, not worth the powder required to kill them—hurried forward from Staunton and Lynchburg on news of our advance.

"The fight, though not large in numbers, was singularly obstinate and fluctuating: the enemy beating back repeated charges of our infantry and cavalry, under Gens. Sullivan and Stahl—for neither the divisions of Crook nor Averill had then joined us; and it was quite late in the afternoon, after a long and sweltering day of battle, when the movement of the gallant Col. Thoburne's division across the narrow valley, and its charge up hill upon the enemy's right flank, decided the contest in our favor. Gen. Wm. E. Jones, their commander, was killed, as also four Colonels; and we had about 1,800 prisoners, including the worthless reserve militia, seventy regular officers, and 2,800 stand of arms, as the spoils attesting our success. But for the coming on of night, and the broken, heavily-timbered nature of the country, the famous feat of 'bagging' that army—so popular with Congressional orators and enthusiastic editors—might have been easily accomplished; for a worse whipped or more utterly demoralized crowd of beaten men never fled from any field."

[10] June 8.

and moved thence directly to Lexington; disappointing Grant, who had expected him at Gordonsville, and had sent his cavalry under Sheridan to meet him there. His failure to do so subjected Sheridan to like failure in his approach to Gordonsville, as we have seen.

Hunter's force was now increased to about 20,000 men; and he hastened, via Lexington, to Lynchburg —the chief city of western (old) Virginia—intent on its speedy reduction. But Lynchburg, the focus of a rich, populous region, and of extensive manufactures, lies on the James river and canal, in unbroken railroad communication with Richmond and Petersburg on the one side, and with the farther south on the other. Lee—who might as well have lost Richmond—dispatched a very considerable force to its relief; part of which arrived the day before Hunter attacked [11] the city from the south, and still more during the following night, wherein several trains arrived from the east filled with men.

Hunter found his ammunition running low, a strong city before him, and the whole Confederacy virtually rallying to overwhelm him. He had no choice but to retreat, sharply pursued; following the railroad westward to Salem—where the pursuit ended—and thence striking, via Newcastle,[12] for Meadow bluff,[13] in West Virginia; his provisions long since exhausted, and very little to be gleaned in midsummer from that poor, thinly-peopled, war-exhausted region. No rations were obtained till the 27th; and the sufferings of men and loss of horses were deplorable.

The direction of his retreat may have been misjudged; but Hunter, lacking many things, never lacked courage; and he believed that an attempt to regain the Shenandoah directly from Lynchburg would have seriously imperiled his army. But his withdrawal into West Virginia rendered him no longer formidable to the enemy, and involved a circuitous, harassing movement by the Kanawha, the Ohio, Parkersburg, and Grafton, before he could again be of any service.

The Rebels, aware of this, promptly resolved to make the most of their opportunity. Early, who had headed the corps sent from Richmond to the relief of Lynchburg, collecting all the forces he could muster, moved rapidly northward, and very soon appeared [14] on the Potomac: Sigel, commanding at Martinsburg, retreating precipitately by Harper's Ferry, with a heavy loss of stores, and taking post on Maryland Heights, where the enemy did not see fit to assail him, but once more destroyed the Baltimore and Ohio railroad for a considerable distance, levied a contribution of $20,000 on Hagerstown, burned some buildings at Williamsport, and, raiding up into the border of Pennsylvania, scoured the country far and wide for horses, cattle, provisions, and money. The movement was so well masked by cavalry that the strength of the invading force—probably never so much as 20,000—was enormously exaggerated, spreading general panic, and causing the Government to call urgently on Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, for militia to meet the emergency.

Gen. Couch was commanding in Pennsylvania; Gen. Lew. Wallace

[11] June 18. [12] June 22. [13] June 25. [14] July 2–3.

in Maryland: the demonstrations against the former were only intended to distract attention from a blow aimed at the latter. Wallace, soon satisfied of this, drew out his scanty forces—for the East had, ere this, been swept nearly bare of troops to fill the chasms made by constant fighting in the armies operating against Richmond—and resolved to confront the invaders on the MONOCACY, which afforded a tolerable defensive position. Yet, when his forces were concentrated at Frederick,[15] they numbered barely 3,000; and these mainly Home Guards and 100-day volunteers, who had never been in action.

Col. Clendenin, with his cavalry—some 400 in all—was sent out to Middletown to find the enemy; but was soon driven back[16] by Gen. Bradley T. Johnson, with 1,000 Rebel horsemen. Clendenin retreated on Frederick, and was there supported by Lt.-Col. Griffin's infantry, raising his force to 1,000; and a brief artillery duel ensued, which resulted in Johnson's falling back.

Wallace now reached Frederick—his forces having hitherto been immediately directed by Gen. Tyler—but could gain no reliable account of the enemy's strength or purposes—the wildest and most conflicting reports being in circulation. He soon learned by telegram from Sigel, on Maryland Heights, that the enemy lately beleaguering him had left, marching northward, as if making for Pennsylvania; while he had assurances from Washington that a corps of veterans were hurrying to his assistance. General Ricketts, with a brigade of good soldiers, belonging to the 19th corps, actually came up. Finding the enemy in his front rapidly growing formidable, and threatening to turn his left, Wallace now withdrew by night[17] from Frederick across the Monocacy, and took up the position on its left bank, already held by Gen. Ricketts, which he resolved to hold so long as he could—since, if the Rebels were in strong force, and intent on a dash at Washington, it was important at least to check them, by compelling them to concentrate and fight; thus gaining time for the arrival of help from Grant.

Early in the morning,[18] Wallace's dispositions for battle were completed. His right, under Gen. Tyler, covered the Baltimore pike; his left, under Gen. Ricketts, held the high road to Washington. Each had three guns. The bridges were held; skirmishers being thrown out beyond them. Col. Clendenin's cavalry watched the lower fords. Only part of Ricketts's division was on hand; but the residue was expected by railroad at 1 P. M. At 8 A. M., the enemy advanced in force from Frederick, throwing out skirmishers and planting behind them his guns, which soon opened the battle. Having not less than 16 Napoleons to our 6 smaller pieces, the superiority of his fire was very decided. The skirmishing grew gradually warmer and more general, and soon there was serious fighting at the stone bridge on the Baltimore pike. A considerable body of Rebel infantry, moving by their right just out of range of our guns, flanked our left, forcing a passage of the Monocacy at a ford nearly two miles below the wooden bridge on the Washington road. And now, at 10½ A. M., the enemy advanced in battle array

[15] July 6. [16] July 7. [17] July 8. [18] July 9.

upon Ricketts, who had changed front to the left, to meet their advance on his flank, his right resting on the river; and, though he had been obliged to form in a single line without reserves, so great was the disparity of numbers that his front was considerably overlapped by theirs. Wallace, perceiving the inequality, sent two of Tyler's guns to Ricketts; and soon—burning the wooden bridge and the block-house across it, so as to preclude an easy advance of the enemy thereby—sent to Ricketts every man who could be spared.

The enemy's first line charged, and was quickly repelled; his second line next advanced, and was likewise repulsed; but after a fiercer, more protracted struggle. And now Wallace might have retreated with honor, having achieved the main purpose of his stand; but 1 o'clock was at hand, when Ricketts's three absent regiments of veterans were promised; and, with their help, he felt able to hold his ground against the enemy's far superior numbers. But 1 P. M. arrived and no regiments; nor could anything be heard of them—both telegrapher and railroad agent having decamped. He waited an hour longer; but there were no rëenforcements; while the enemy, in two strong lines, again issued from the woods on our left and advanced deliberately to the charge; and he reluctantly ordered Ricketts to prepare for a retreat by the Baltimore pike, which commenced at 4 P. M.

The stone bridge on that road was held by Col. Brown; and it was of vital importance that it should still be held firmly. Gen. Tyler had already sent his reserve to Brown; he now galloped thither himself, and took command; Wallace soon arriving to rëiterate the order that it must be held at whatever cost until Ricketts should have crossed to the Baltimore pike and commenced his retreat thereon. Tyler held on, fighting, till 5 P. M.; by which time his remaining force was nearly enveloped by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy; so that he, with his staff, was compelled to dash into the woods on the right, and thus barely escaped capture. Brown had just retreated down the pike; losing some of his men, but holding the most of them steadily in their ranks. The enemy made no effective pursuit; Bradley T. Johnson's cavalry being absent, marching on Baltimore by the Liberty road. Ricketts's three missing regiments had been halted at Monrovia, 8 miles distant; whence they had ample time to reach the field in time to save the day. They joined Wallace at Newmarket, and thence covered the retreat: which terminated twelve miles from the Monocacy.

Our loss in this action was 98 killed, 579 wounded, 1,282 missing: total, 1,959. Many of the missing probably only straggled in the retreat, as the enemy took but 700 prisoners. They admitted only a total loss of 600; but 400 of their severely wounded were found in hospital at Frederick, when we rëoccupied that city two or three days afterward.

Johnson's cavalry next day approached Baltimore, when that city was filled with reports that Wallace's little army had been annihilated at the Monocacy. The Baltimore Secessionists, less numerous than in April or July, 1861, were no whit less bitter; and they reasonably hoped, for



DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON.

Explanations.

1. Fort Sumner.
2. " Mansfield.
3. " Simmons.
4. " Bayard.
5. " Gaines.
6. " Reno.
7. " Kearny.
8. " De Russy.
9. " Stevens.
10. " Slocum.
11. " Totten.
12. " Slemmer.
13. " Bunker Hill.
14. " Saratoga.
15. " Thayer.
16. Fort Lincoln.
17. " Mahan.
18. " Chaplin.
19. " Meigs.
20. " Dupont.
21. " Davis.
22. " Baker.
23. " Wagner.
24. " Ricketts.
25. " Stanton.
26. " Snyder.
27. " Carroll.
28. " Greble.
29. " Foote.
30. " Willard.
31. Fort O'Rourke.
32. " Weed.
33. " Farnsworth.
34. " Lyon.
35. " Ellsworth.
36. " Williams.
37. " Worth.
38. " Ward.
39. " Reynolds.
40. " Bernard.
41. " Scott.
42. " Berry.
43. " Richardson.
44. " Albany.
45. " Runyon.
46. Fort Craig.
47. " McPherson.
48. " Tillinghast.
49. " Whipple.
50. " Casa.
51. " Woodbury.
52. " Morton.
53. " Strong.
54. " C. F. Smith.
55. " Bennett.
56. " Corcoran.
57. " Haggerty.
58. " Ethan Allen.
59. " Marcy.
60. " Ramsey.

some hours, to welcome a 'liberating' army. But Early, after a brief halt on the battle-field, was now marching on Washington; and Baltimore, though weakly held, was not to be taken on a gallop. Brig.-Gens. Lockwood and Morris were there; and they soon rallied thousands of loyal citizens, by whom every approach was guarded, and earthworks thrown up in the suburbs which could not be carried without difficulty and delay. Johnson declined the attempt; but a detachment of his horsemen, under Harry Gilmor, made a dash at the Philadelphia railroad near Magnolia station, next morning; burning the long trestle over the inlet known as Gunpowder, stopping there the morning train northward, and robbing passengers and mails.

Early's cavalry advance reached Rockville on the evening of the 10th; his infantry was next day within 6 or 7 miles of Washington; which they actually menaced on the 12th. Gen. Augur, commanding the defenses, pushed out, toward evening, a strong reconnoissance to develop their strength; and a smart skirmish ensued, wherein we had 280 killed and wounded, and the enemy at least as many. If Early had rushed upon Washington by forced marches from the Monocacy, and at once assaulted with desperate energy, he might have taken the city, and might have lost half his army: he must have lost *all* his army if he had carried the city and attempted to hold it.

Whatever his purpose, it was now too late to do any thing but what he did — retreat across the Potomac, with his cavalry, batteries and trains freshly horsed, 2,500 spare horses, and 5,000 cattle. For the 19th corps (Emory's), ordered from New Orleans by sea, had reached Fortress Monroe a few days previous, and had been sent by Grant to Washington; as had the 6th (Wright's) from before Petersburg, with directions that Gen. Wright should assume command. Had Early waited, his force, now reduced to 15,000, would have been confronted and crushed by one of at least 40,000.

Wright's pursuit was not made in such force as he should have had, and was timid and feeble. Crossing the Potomac at Edwards's ferry, he moved through Leesburg and Snicker's gap to the Shenandoah; which he had partially crossed when Early turned[19] upon him suddenly and fiercely, driving back his advance with a loss of fully 500. Wright recrossed after the enemy had moved off, but soon returned to Leesburg, and, turning over the command to Crook, repaired to Washington.

Averill, moving from Martinsburg on Winchester, was fought[20] near that city, for three hours, by a Rebel force, which he finally worsted; taking 200 prisoners and 4 guns; with a loss of 150 or 200 killed and wounded on either side. The approach of Early from Snicker's gap now compelled him to draw off.

Grant, deceived by advices that Early was returning to Lynchburg and Richmond, ordered the 6th and 19th corps by water to Petersburg, intending to strike a blow with his thus augmented forces before Early could arrive. Hunter was still on his weary way from his miscarriage at Lynchburg — dry rivers, broken railroads, &c., impeding his progress.

[19] July 19.

[20] July 20.

Crook, left in command of the depleted force on the Potomac, now moved up to Harper's Ferry, and thence pushed out once more to Winchester, supposing that there was nothing there that could stop his progress.

He was grievously mistaken. Early had not gone south, but was close at hand; and soon our advance was annoyed[21] by smart skirmishing, which pushed back our cavalry on our infantry, and next day routed them, driving Crook's entire command pell-mell to Martinsburg with a loss of 1,200, including Gen. Mulligan[22] killed. Early's loss was trifling. There was an artillery duel next day at Martinsburg; but Crook, having gained time to save his trains, crossed over into Maryland, leaving Early undisturbed master of the south side of the Potomac from Shepherdstown to Williamsport.

He made an unwise use of his advantage. Maryland and southern Pennsylvania being in utter panic—many running off their stock to places of safety, while thousands openly exulted at the brightened prospects of the Rebellion—he sent B. T. Johnson, McCausland, and others, with perhaps 3,000 cavalry, on a sweeping raid northward. McCausland took a considerable circuit, threatening some points in order to distract attention from others; dispersing a small body of recruits at Carlisle barracks, and finally striking Chambersburg,[23] then totally defenseless and in good part deserted, and demanding $100,000 in gold or $500,000 in currency, under penalty of conflagration. The money not being instantly produced, the place was fired, and about two-thirds of it destroyed.

The excuse alleged for this act of Vandalism was the burning of ex-Gov. Letcher's house at Lexington by Hunter, six weeks before. That was held to be justified—and, at all events, was solely incited—by finding in a Lexington printing-office the type and proof of a handbill issued and signed by Letcher, calling on the people of that region to 'bush-whack' Hunter's men—that is, fire at them from every covert, while not embodied as a military force and seeming to be peaceful farmers or artisans. If this burning violated the laws of war, it had already been twice avenged by burning Gov. Bradford's country residence near Baltimore, and ex-P. M. General Blair's, near Washington. It was not in accordance with Lee's orders nor his practice in either of his invasions; for, though he burned Thaddeus Stevens's iron-works near Gettysburg (as *we* burned manufactories of warlike material, clothing, &c., throughout the South), he sternly forbad wanton devastation; and he was obeyed.

Averill, with 2,600 cavalry, perplexed by the enemy's bewildering demonstrations, had fallen back from Hagerstown to Greencastle, and was but 9 miles from Chambersburg while Johnson and McCausland, with but part of the Rebel cavalry north of the Potomac, sacked and burned that town. He arrived that day, but they had left; moving westward to McConnellstown, whither he followed; arriving in time to save it from a similar fate. He promptly charged; but there was not much of a fight; the enemy hurrying southward to Hancock, and thence across the Potomac.

[21] July 23. [22] The Col. Mulligan who defended Lexington, Mo., in 1861. [23] July 30.

consequences of a defeat, opening the North to a fresh invasion, and perhaps compelling—what Lee most desired and Grant most dreaded—a withdrawal of our army from the James—were so grave, that Grant hesitated to authorize a determined advance until he had made him a second visit,[20] and become convinced that he had a lieutenant on the Potomac who thoroughly comprehended his position, his work, his strength, and that of his antagonist, and needed but liberty of action and a trust which his achievements would abundantly justify. "I saw;" says Grant, in his report, "that but two words of instruction were necessary—'Go in!'" So he gave them, and Sheridan went in.

Early held the west bank of Opequan creek, covering Winchester, Sheridan was in his front and to his right, holding Berryville. In a skillful and spirited reconnoissance, Gen. Wilson had struck[21] the flank of Kershaw's division, capturing without loss Col. Hennegan and 171 of the 8th S. C. The principal value of such a stroke inheres in its effect on the spirits of an army; and Sheridan, believing his in the mood for battle, drew out, at 2 A. M.,[22] his entire force, resolved to carry the enemy's position by assault.

That position was naturally strong, and had been thoroughly fortified. To assail it, our army had to advance through a narrow ravine, shut in by steep, thickly wooded hills, form in an irregular, undulating valley in the enemy's front, advance through a wood, and attack desperately his center, while flanking and crushing in his left. His right, too strongly posted to be turned, was to be menaced and kept strong and idle, if possible; he striving in turn to thrust that wing through our left and seize the mouth of the ravine, so as at once to sever our army and deprive its right of any line of retreat.

It was 10 A. M. when the 6th corps emerged from the ravine, and took ground on our left; Ricketts's division pushing forward, through thick woods and over steep hills, where musketry only could be used, right against the enemy's front; for here ground must be gained and held to enable the 8th corps to debouch behind our front from the pass, turn the enemy's left, and charge him in flank and rear. When our impetuous advance had cleared the woods and heights, a broad, open valley was before them, with the Rebel army sheltered by the woods and rocks beyond; whence a terrific shelling already told upon our ranks. Yet so vehement and resolute was the charge of Grover's division of the 19th corps that Early's first line was carried—Gen. Rhodes being killed and three Rebel colonels sent to our rear as prisoners.

Early, seeing that no moment was to be lost, promptly hurled two fresh divisions upon Grover and Ricketts, pushing them back in disorder and with fearful loss; a heavy fire opening on their flank as they surged toward the pass—many regiments utterly broken, their officers fallen, and the battle seemingly lost beyond hope. The 156th N. York had barely 40 men grouped around its colors; Capt. Rigby, 24th Iowa, was seen retreating firmly, deliberately, followed by a sergeant and 12 men who, reaching the assigned rallying-point,

[20] Sept. 16. [21] Sept. 13. [22] Sept. 19.



GEN. SHERIDAN'S MOVEMENTS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

halted, faced to the front, and gave three hearty cheers. Five minutes later, that platoon had been swelled by other such to a battalion; while Capt. Bradbury, 1st Maine battery, had, by Grover's order, posted two guns in a gap and opened on the exultant Rebels; who, charging to seize them, received a volley in the rear from the 131st N. York, which Gen. Emory had rallied and posted in a projection of wood, with orders not to fire till the enemy should have passed them. As they staggered under this unexpected salute, a volley from the newly formed line in their front sent them pell-mell back across the fields to their original cover. And now our shattered front, closing in from right and left, was rëformed and advanced over most of the ground it had lost; the 1st division of the 19th corps—still glorying in its achievements at Port Hudson and Pleasant Hill—instead of following the 8th corps in the flank movement, as had been intended, was brought back and used to piece out and brace up the center; where desperate fighting, with little advantage to either side, and heavy loss at least to ours, was maintained till 3 P.M.

And now a shout from the far right, shut out from view by woods and hills, announced that the turning movement was effected—that our cavalry under Torbert, and Crook with his 8th corps (the 'Army of West Virginia' that was), have struck the enemy's left in flank, and are charging it under a terrible fire. Instantly, a redoubled fire breaks out along our central front, in spite of the general scarcity of cartridges; and, these being soon exhausted, Col. Thomas, 8th Vermont, ordered his men to charge at double quick with the bayonet. In vain general officers shouted 'Halt!' 'Lie down!' 'Wait for supports!' &c.; for, while some were still confused and vacillating, a staff officer from the right galloped in front, and pointed with his saber to the woods which sheltered the enemy. At once, all dissent was silenced, all hesitation at an end; the whole center, as one man, swept forward, cheering, and plunged into the woods, meeting there Crook's corps, charging from the flank. All the Rebels who could still travel were by this time going or gone.

A height in the rear of Early's position, crowned by a fort, still held out; but Crook's column quickly stormed and carried both. And now our cavalry—which had been fighting and routing the enemy's—came up on our right, and charged superbly on the rear of the flying foe, taking 700 prisoners and 2 guns at the first onset; following till dark close on the heels of the fugitives, and gathering up prisoners, &c., as they hurried through Winchester in utter rout and disintegration.

Our loss in this battle was fully 3,000, including Gen. David A. Russell, killed, with Gens. McIntosh, Chapman, and Upton wounded. The heroic 19th corps—on which fell the brunt of the fight—alone lost 1,940 killed and wounded. Among the Rebels killed were Gens. Rhodes and A. C. Godwin. Pollard admits a loss of 3,000 on their side; but, as we took 3,000 prisoners, with 5 guns, it was probably much greater.

Early fell back to FISHER'S HILL, 8 miles south of Winchester, between the North and Massanutten mountains—regarded as the very strongest position in the Valley. Sheridan followed sharply, allowing but two days to intervene between his first and his second victory. Advancing the 6th corps against the front and the 19th on the left of the Rebel stronghold, he again sent the 8th by a long circuit around on the right, striking heavily in flank and rear, while a vigorous attack in front broke the enemy's center. The victory here was even more decisive, as well as far more cheaply purchased, than that won at the Opequan. Though our attack could not be made till 4 P. M., there was still time enough to take 1,100 prisoners, 16 guns, &c., &c. The pursuit hence was so sharp that Early had to abandon the Valley and take to the mountains, where cavalry could with difficulty operate. Sheridan followed with infantry and artillery to Port Republic,[33] where he captured and destroyed 75 wagons; sending his cavalry, under Torbert, to Staunton, where they destroyed large quantities of army supplies, and thence to Waynesborough, where the Virginia Central railroad was broken up, the bridge burned, and a large Confederate tannery destroyed.

Gen. Grant, in his letter of instructions to Gen. Hunter,[34] had directed that—

> "In pushing up the Shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that *nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return.* Take all provisions, forage, and stock, wanted for the use of your command; such as can not be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected—but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected; and we are determined to stop them at all hazards."

This order, Sheridan, in returning down the Valley, executed to the letter. Whatever of grain and forage had escaped appropriation or destruction by one or another of the armies which had so frequently chased each other up and down this narrow but fertile and productive vale, was now given to the torch. Some of it was the property of men who not only adhered to the Union, but were fighting to uphold it; more belonged to Quakers, Tunkers, &c., who abhorred bloodshed, and had taken no part in the strife, unless under absolute constraint. The excuse, of

[33] Sept. 25.

[34] Aug. 5.

to Strasburg, being infested[35] by Rebel horse under Rosser, he ordered Torbert, commanding his cavalry, to turn upon and chastise the presumption. The Rebels broke and fled at the first charge, and were chased back 26 miles; losing 11 guns, 47 wagons, and 330 prisoners. Sheridan's retreat was no further molested; but, having halted near Fisher's hill, Early attempted[36] to steal upon him unaware, but found him ready, and, after a short struggle, the Rebel chief drew off, badly worsted.

Sheridan now left[37] on a flying visit to Washington, supposing his adversary had had fighting enough for the season. He miscalculated. Early, aware of our commander's absence, stung by his repeated defeats, and considerably rëenforced, resolved on retrieving his ragged fortunes by a daring enterprise—nothing less than the surprise and rout of a veteran army. Having strengthened himself to the utmost, and thoroughly organized his forces in his forest-screened camp near Fisher's hill, he silently moved out at nightfall,[38] resolved to flank our position across CEDAR CREEK, 6 miles distant, and fall on our sleeping camps at daybreak next morning.

Our forces were encamped on three crests or ridges: the Army of West Virginia (Crook's) in front; the 19th corps (Emory's) half a mile behind it; the 6th corps (Wright's) to the right and rear of the 19th. Kitching's provisional division lay behind Crook's left; the cavalry, under Torbert, on the right of the 6th. It is a fact, though no excuse, that they had no more apprehension of an attack from Early than from Canada.

Early had arranged his army in two columns, in order to strike ours at once on both flanks. He had of course to leave the turnpike and move over rugged paths along the mountain-side, climbing up and down steep hills, holding on by bushes, where horses could hardly keep their feet, and twice fording the North fork of the Shenandoah—the second time in the very face of our pickets. For miles, his right column skirted the left of Crook's position, where an alarm would have exposed him to utter destruction. So imperative was the requirement of silence that his men had been made to leave their canteens in camp, lest they should clatter against their muskets. The divisions of Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram thus stole by our left; those of Kershaw and Wharton simultaneously flanking our right.

At 2 A. M., the pickets of the 5th N. Y. heavy artillery (Kitching's division) heard a rustling of underbrush and a sound as of stealthy, multitudinous trampling; and two posts were relieved and sent into camp with the report. Gen. Crook thereupon ordered that a good lookout be kept, but sent out no reconnoitering party; even the gaps in his front line caused by detailing regiments for picket duty were not filled; and, when the crash came, the muskets of many of our men were not loaded. There was some suspicion and uneasiness in Crook's command, but no serious preparation.

An hour before dawn, the Rebels had all reached, without obstruction or mishap, the positions severally assigned them, and stood shivering in the chill mist, awaiting the order to attack. No sound of alarm, no hum

[35] Oct. 9. [36] Oct. 12. [37] Oct. 15 [38] Oct. 18.

of preparation, disquieted them. At length, as the gray light of dawn disclosed the eastern hill-tops, a tremendous volley of musketry, on either flank and away to the rear, startled the sleepers into bewildered consciousness; and the next moment, with their well known battle-yell, the charging lines came on.

"Tell the brigade commanders to move their men into the trenches," said Gen. Grover, calmly; and the order was given; but it was already too late. The Rebels, disdaining to notice the picket-fire, were themselves in the trenches on both flanks before our astonished soldiers could occupy them in effective force. On our side, all was amazement and confusion; on theirs, thorough wakefulness and perfect comprehension. In fifteen minutes, the Army of West Virginia was a flying mob; one battalion of its picket-line had lost 100 killed and wounded, and *seven* hundred prisoners. The enemy, knowing every foot of the ground as familiarly as their own door-yards, never stopped to reconnoiter or consider, but rushed on with incredible celerity.

Emory tried, of course, to stop them, but with no chance of success. Assailed in overwhelming force in front, on both flanks, and well to the rear, he pushed forward McMillen's brigade to breast the Rebel torrent, and give time for the 6th corps to come up. One-third of it was killed and wounded in the effort; but to no purpose, though two other brigades were sent up to its support. But Early's three divisions on our left, led by Gordon, continued their flanking advance, turning us out of every position whereon a stand had been made; while Kershaw led the column pressing fiercely on our right and front. The resistance of the 19th corps was brief and bloody; and, when it had melted away, the 6th, assailed in turn, gave ground—slowly, in good order, but as if consciously unable to resist the determined charge of the flushed and eager foe. And when at length it had gained a position where it seemed able and willing to stand, Wright saw that it had been crowded clear off the turnpike, while our forces had no other line of concentration or retreat; so that to hold here was to enable Gordon to interpose between it and the rest of our army: hence he ordered a general retreat; which was made in good order: our columns inclining toward the turnpike so as to recover their communications. The enemy, intent on plundering our captured camps, and doubtless hungry, thirsty, and exhausted with sixteen hours' arduous marching and fighting, had halted, or were advancing slowly and cautiously, their muskets silent, with but occasional shots at long range from their artillery. We had lost, beside our killed and wounded, the battle, our camps, defenses, equipage, 24 guns, and 1,200 prisoners.

Sheridan had slept unapprehensively at Winchester, on his return from Washington, while the enemy were executing his bold movement; but the morning breeze wafted ominous sounds to his ears; and he was soon riding rapidly southward, and not long in meeting the kind of drift that may be seen in the rear of every fighting army, more especially if that army is being worsted. Putting spurs to his horse, he reached the front at 10 A. M.; just as Wright had

halted and the enemy had ceased to press him.

The current notion that our army instantly faced to the front, charged, and routed the exultant foe, does justice neither to Sheridan nor to facts. The defeated are not thus easily converted into conquerors. Sheridan met his crest-fallen, shattered battalions without a word of reproach, but joyously, inspiringly, swinging his cap and shouting to the stragglers as he rode rapidly past them—"Face the other way, boys! We are going back to our camps! We are going to lick them out of their boots!" Most of them obeyed, as the weaker will submits to the stronger. Then, having ordered each command to face to the front, form line, and advance, he rode for two hours along that line, gathering information, and studying the ground, while he rapidly and cheeringly talked to his soldiers. "Boys, if I had been here, this would not have happened!" he assured them, and they believed it. And so their spirits gradually rose, and they became convinced that their defeat was an awkward accident—unpleasant, of course, but such as might happen to any army so self-confident as to be easily caught napping. Finally, they began to doubt that they had actually been beaten at all.

Emory's 19th corps was strongly posted in a dense wood on the left, and had thrown up a rude breastwork of rocks and rails along its front. Here he was attacked at 1 P. M., but not in great force nor desperately; and, after a spirited fusillade, he sent word that the enemy had been repulsed. Sheridan accepted and reported the tidings as very natural and indicative of more such to come. And now, at 3 P. M., all being ready, the order was given, "The entire line will advance. The 19th corps will move in connection with the 6th. The right of the 19th will swing toward the left, so as to drive the enemy upon the pike." Steadily, not eagerly, our infantry rose to their feet, and went forward through the woods to the open ground beyond. The scream of shells, the rattle of musketry, the charging shout, rolled at once from right to left; and soon the Rebels' front line was carried and their left decidedly turned. Gordon's division, which led the charge on our left that morning, had now been flanked and driven, if not broken.

There was a pause in the advance, but not in the fight. The Rebel guns (they had a good part of ours) opened on our new position, and were replied to mainly by musketry. Again Sheridan moved along our front, correcting its formation, giving particular orders to subordinates, and words of cheer and confidence to all. Emory's 1st division was formed nearly at right angles with the Rebels' front, so as to face the turnpike and crowd them, when it charged, toward the way they should go. And now came the second charge, more determined, more confident, more comprehensive than the first; our cavalry advancing on both wings and, as the Rebel front gave way, charging fiercely upon their disordered ranks, and running them through Strasburg. Our weary, famished infantry—whose rations and cooks had long since paid tribute to the enemy, or found shelter in Winchester—sank down in their recovered quarters to shiver through the night as they could.

Our loss in this double battle was nearly 3,000, including Gen. D. D. Bidwell, of N. Y., and Col. Jo. Thoburn, killed, with Gens. Wright (slightly), Grover, Ricketts, and acting Brigadiers J. H. Kitching and R. G. McKinzie, wounded. Many of our men taken prisoners in the morning were rescued toward evening. The Rebel loss was heavier, including Gen. Ramseur (mortally wounded, and died a prisoner next day), 1,500 prisoners, 23 guns (not counting the 24 lost by us in the morning and recovered at night), at least 1,500 small arms, besides most of their caissons, wagons, &c. In fact, Early's army was virtually destroyed; so that, with the exception of two or three cavalry skirmishes, there was no more fighting[*] in the Valley, because there was very little left for Sheridan to fight. And this victory, snatched from the jaws of defeat, affords one of the very few instances in which an army, thoroughly beaten in the morning, is even more thoroughly victorious in the evening, though it has meantime been rëenforced by but a single man.

XXVII.

BETWEEN VIRGINIA AND THE MISSISSIPPI.

FROM VICKSBURG TO ABINGDON.

DURING the Autumn, Winter, and Spring of 1863–4, and the ensuing Summer, a great number of desultory, indecisive expeditions were impelled by one side or the other, which, though they exerted no considerable influence over the issue of the struggle, will be rapidly summed up, preliminary to the narration of Gen. Sherman's memorable Atlanta campaign.

Several detachments of cavalry or mounted infantry, about 1,600 strong, sent out by Gen. Hurlbut, commanding in West Tennessee, under Lt.-Col. J. J. Phillips, 9th Illinois (infantry), Lt.-Col. W. R. M. Wallace, 4th Ill. cavalry, and Maj. D. E. Coon, 2d Iowa cavalry, raided through northern Mississippi to Grenada; where they captured and destroyed[1] over 50 locomotives and about 500 cars of all kinds. At 9½ P. M., Col. Winslow arrived from Gen. Sherman's army near Vicksburg, with orders not to destroy but save the rolling stock; and, he being the ranking officer, some effort was made to obey those orders; but fire had already done its work pretty effectually. Each party returned the way it came. They encountered little resistance, and their losses were inconsiderable.

Gen. McPherson, with Tuttle's and Logan's divisions of infantry and Winslow's cavalry, 8,000 in all, was pushed out from Vicksburg[2] nearly to Canton, skirmishing with and push-

[*] Early came down the Valley in November, crossing Cedar creek; but he was not in force to fight a battle, and, being pressed, retreated; his cavalry (under Lomax) being defeated and chased by Gen. Powell up the Luray valley, with a loss of 2 guns and 150 prisoners. On our side, Col. Hull, 2d, and Capt. Prendergast, 1st N. Y. cavalry, were killed.

[1] Aug. 16, 1863. [2] Oct. 14.

ing back Wirt Adams's cavalry and Cosby's, Logan's, and Whitman's brigades of infantry, until, finally, McPherson found himself confronted by a superior force, comprising Loring's division and other forces hurried down from Grenada and up from points so distant as Mobile; when he retreated without a battle, via Clinton, to Vicksburg.[3]

Under cover of demonstrations at Colliersville and other points by Chalmers, Lee, and Richardson, against our lines covering the Memphis and Charleston railroad, Forrest, with 4,000 mounted men, slipped through[4] them near Salisbury, and advanced to Jackson, West Tennessee; which had ceased to be held in force on our side since the department headquarters had been transferred to Memphis. Drawing recruits from the sympathizers and supplies from the plantations and farms of all that region, he was soon emboldened to impel raiding parties in every direction; while Brig.-Gen. A. L. Smith—directed against him from Columbus, Ky., by Hurlbut, with 6,000 men, of whom 2,000 were mounted—was brought to a full stop by the execrable badness of the roads, and finally retraced his steps to Columbus. Hence, a cöoperating force dispatched from Corinth on the south, consisting of Gen. Mower's brigade of infantry and Col. Mizener's cavalry, found nothing to cöoperate with; while the 7th Illinois cavalry, Col. Prince, which had moved out from Memphis to Bolivar, was compelled to fall back[5] to Somerville; near which, it was surrounded next day by Richardson's mounted force—1,000 against 500—and routed with considerable loss.

Forrest had by this time taken the alarm, as well he might—the forces at Hurlbut's command being three times his own—and had started southward to make his escape. Much of the country in this quarter being flat and swampy, and the rivers being bank-full, while Forrest was notoriously short of pontoons, he was obliged, after passing the Hatchie, to bear westward nearly to Memphis to find roads which even horsemen could traverse. Hurlbut was aware of this, and had ordered the burning of every bridge over Wolf river. His orders were obeyed everywhere but at the bridge near Lafayette; and it was for that bridge that Forrest, accordingly, struck; crossing over his army and his plunder, including a large drove of cattle, and pushing rapidly southward. This movement was covered by a fresh feint by Richardson on Colliersville; so that Gen. Grierson, who was watching for Forrest at Lagrange, was misled; and, when the pursuit was actually commenced, the scent was too cold. Grierson followed to Holly Springs, and then desisted; Forrest getting safely away with more men and better horses than he led into Tennessee.

Gen. Sherman, with four divisions of Hurlbut's and McPherson's corps, and a brigade of cavalry under Winslow, moved[6] eastward from Vicksburg through Jackson, crossing Pearl river on pontoons, and advancing through Brandon, Morton, Hillsboro', and Decatur, across the Octibbeha and Tallahaha, to Meridian[7]—a railroad junction on the eastern

[3] Oct. 21. [4] Early in December. [5] Dec. 24. [6] Feb. 3, 1864. [7] Feb. 14–16.

corps, under Gen. Palmer, to counteract this diversion. The divisions of Jeff. C. Davis, Johnson, and Baird, moved on the direct road to Dalton; Stanley's division, under Gen. Crufts, moving from Cleveland on our left, and forming a junction with Palmer just below Ringgold. The advance was resisted, but not seriously, at Tunnel Hill and at Rocky-Face ridge; whence Palmer pressed forward, against continually increasing resistance, to within two miles of Dalton; where, hearing that the two Rebel divisions which were sent south had been brought back, and that all Johnston's (late Bragg's) army was on his hands, he fell back to Tunnel Hill, and ultimately to Ringgold;[13] having lost 350 killed and wounded. The Rebel killed and wounded were but 200.

Various inconsiderable collisions and raids on frontier posts occurred in southern Tennessee during the Winter and Spring; in one of which, a steamboat on the Tennessee was captured and burnt by the enemy; but nothing of moment occurred until Forrest, at the head of 5,000 cavalry, advanced[14] rapidly from northern Mississippi through West Tennessee, after a brief halt at Jackson, to Union City, a fortified railroad junction near the Kentucky line, held by the 11th Tenn. cavalry, Col. Hawkins, who tamely surrendered,[15] after repelling an assault without loss. The spoils were 450 prisoners, 200 horses, and 500 small arms. Gen. Brayman, with a relieving force from Cairo, was but 6 miles distant when Hawkins gave up.

Forrest now occupied Hickman without resistance, and next day appeared before Paducah at the head of a division of his force which had moved thither directly from Jackson. He found here the 40th Illinois, Col. Hicks, 655 strong; who promptly withdrew into Fort Anderson, where he could be aided by the gunboats Piosta and Paw-Paw, Capt. Shirk, and whence he answered Forrest's summons with quiet firmness. Two assaults were made and repelled: the enemy at length occupying the town and firing from behind the houses at the garrison, but to no purpose. At 11 P. M., after burning a steamboat on the marine ways and some houses, Forrest drew off; our loss in the siege having been 14 killed and 46 wounded. Forrest reports his loss here and at Union City, "as far as known," at 25;[16] but names Col. A. P. Thompson and Lt.-Col. Lanhum, killed, and Col. Crosslin and Lt.-Col. Morton, "slightly wounded." His loss was doubtless far heavier than he admitted.

Buford, with a part of Pillow's men, next summoned[17] Columbus, held by Col. Lawrence, 34th New Jersey; who refused to surrender, and could not be taken. Moving thence to Paducah, Buford summoned that post; but, a surrender being declined, he retired without assaulting.

Forrest, with the larger portion of his command, had meantime fallen back into Tennessee, where he suddenly appeared[18] before FORT PILLOW, some 40 miles above Memphis, held by Maj. L. F. Booth, with a garrison of 557 men, 262 of whom were Blacks (6th U. S. heavy ar-

[13] March 10. [14] March 16. [15] He afterward makes it 10 killed, 40 wounded.
[16] March 24. [17] April 13. [18] April 12.

tillery); the other battalion was White, under Maj. Bradford, 13th Tennessee cavalry. Maj. Booth had six guns.

The attack was made before sunrise, and the fighting was sharp until 9 A. M., when Maj. Booth was killed. Hitherto, our men had defended an outer line of intrenchments; but Major Bradford now drew the garrison back into the fort, situated on the high, steep, but partially timbered bluff of the Mississippi, with a ravine on either hand, also partially wooded. The gunboat New Era, Capt. Marshall, cöoperated in the defense; but to little purpose; because of the height of the bank, and because the Rebels, if shelled up one ravine, shifted their operations to the other.

The fighting went on till considerably after noon, without material advantage to the enemy; when the fire on both sides slackened to allow the guns to cool, while the New Era, nearly out of cartridges, moved back into the channel to clean her guns. Forrest improved the opportunity to send a summons, and soon after a second, demanding a surrender within 20 minutes; which Bradford declined.

While these negotiations were in progress, the Rebels were stealing down both ravines and gaining sheltered positions whence they could rush upon the fort whenever the signal should be given.

Bradford's answer having been received, their rush was instantaneous, and in a moment the fort was in their hands; while the garrison, throwing down their arms, fled down the steep bank, trying to hide behind trees or logs, or skulk in bushes, or find comparative safety in the river; while the Rebels followed, butchering Black and White, soldiers and non-combatants, men, women, and children, with no more discrimination than humanity. Disabled men were made to stand up and be shot; others were burned with the tents wherein they had been nailed to the floor. This carnival of murder continued till dark, and was even renewed the next morning. Major Bradford was not murdered till they had taken him as a prisoner several miles on their retreat to Mississippi.

It was in vain that Forrest and his superior, Lt.-Gen. S. D. Lee, undertook to palliate this infernal atrocity, in defiance of their own record. Apart from the general threats (hitherto cited) of the Rebel authorities[29] that they would refuse to treat Black soldiers or their White officers as prisoners of war, Forrest, not three weeks before, had seen fit to summon Paducah in these terms:

"H'DQU'RS FORREST'S CAVALRY CORPS,
PADUCAH, March 25, 1864.

"*To Col. Hicks, commanding Federal forces at Paducah:*

"Having a force amply sufficient to carry your works and reduce the place, in order to avoid the unnecessary effusion of blood, I demand the surrender of the fort and troops, with all the public stores. If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but, *if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter.*

"N. B. FORREST, Maj.-Gen. Com'ding."

Both Booth and Bradford having been killed, the precise terms in which he summoned Fort Pillow do not appear;[30] but Buford's demand for the surrender of Columbus, the next day after the massacre, was

[29] See pages 106, 523–4.

[30] Forrest's official report speaks of his summonses No. 1 and No. 2, as "hereto appended;" but the report, as printed, does not give them.

couched in this unequivocal language:

"*To the Commander of the United States forces, Columbus, Ky.:*

"Fully capable of taking Columbus and its garrison by force, I desire to avoid shedding blood. I therefore demand the unconditional surrender of the forces under your command. Should you surrender, the negroes now in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I be compelled to take the place by force, *no quarter will be shown negro troops whatever;* White troops will be treated as prisoners of war.

"I am, Sir, yours,

"A. BUFORD, Brig.-Gen."

It is in vain, in the face of these documents, that Forrest—giving his loss at 20 killed and 60 wounded, and claiming to have buried 228 of our men on the evening of the assault, beside "quite a number" next day—pretends that all these were killed in fair fight, or "by a destructive fire into the rear of the retreating and panic-stricken garrison;" and that his superior, Lee, thus pettifogs the case of the subordinate assassin:

"The garrison was summoned in the usual manner, and its commanding officer assumed the responsibility of refusing to surrender, after having been informed by Gen. Forrest of his ability to take the fort, and of his fears as to what the result would be in case the demand was not complied with. The assault was made under a heavy fire, and with considerable loss to the attacking party. Your colors were never lowered, and your garrison never surrendered, but retreated under cover of a gunboat, with arms in their hands and constantly using them. This was true particularly of your colored troops, who had been firmly convinced by your teachings of the certainty of slaughter in case of capture. Even under these circumstances, many of your men—White and Black—were taken prisoners. I respectfully refer you to history for numerous cases of indiscriminate slaughter after successful assault, even under less aggravated circumstances. It is generally conceded, by all military precedent, that where the issue had been fairly presented and the ability displayed, fearful results are expected to follow a refusal to surrender. The case under consideration is almost an extreme one. You had a servile race armed against their masters, and in a country which had been desolated by almost unprecedented outrages.

"I assert that our officers, with all the circumstances against them, endeavored to prevent the effusion of blood; and, as an evidence of this, I refer you to the fact that both White and Colored prisoners were taken, and are now in our hands."

All this can not weigh against the solemn oaths of scores of unimpeached witnesses, several of whom were themselves shot and left for dead long after the fighting had utterly ceased, when they were known to have surrendered, and several of whom testify that they saw prisoners thus butchered next day. And the evidence[21] of Whites and Blacks proves that the murderers a hundred times declared that they shot the Blacks because they were "niggers," and the Whites for "fighting with niggers." If human testimony ever did or can establish any thing, then this is proved a case of deliberate, wholesale massacre of prisoners of war after they had surrendered—many of them long after—and for the naked reason that some of them were Black, and others were fighting in Black company.

Forrest retreated rapidly from the scene of this achievement into Mississippi, and was not effectively pursued; there being no adequate cavalry force at hand for the purpose.

Gen. S. D. Sturgis, with 12,000 men, was sent after[22] Forrest; advancing from Memphis to Bolivar; but of course did not come near him: in fact, there was no chance of overtaking him after he had passed Wolf river and the forces guarding our lines in that quarter.

[21] Special Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War (House No. 65), 38th Congress, 1st session. The testimony is there given in full.

[22] April 30.

Some weeks later, a similar and in good part the same force, but including most of A. J. Smith's corps, now returned from the luckless Red river campaign, was sent from Memphis after Forrest, with instructions to push on till he was found and beaten, so as to prevent the transfer of a large part of his force to Jo. Johnston, then resisting Sherman in northern Georgia. Maj.-Gen. S. D. Sturgis—in spite of overwhelming proofs of his aggravated unfitness—was again intrusted with the command. His force consisted of 9,000 infantry and artillery, with 3,000 cavalry led by Gen. Grierson. Sturgis had advanced E. S. E. nearly 100 miles, through West Tennessee and northern Mississippi, meeting little opposition till near GUNTOWN, on the Mobile railroad; where Grierson's troopers found[33] Forrest's cavalry, and pushed it vigorously back on his infantry, which was strongly posted on a semi-circular ridge or crest, with a naked slope in front, and a small creek at its foot, which could with difficulty be forded by infantry at a few points only. Word was sent back to the infantry, now 5 or 6 miles behind; and, in an intensely hot day, they were pushed forward at double-quick to the scene of action, arriving thoroughly blown and incapable of exertion. As if this were not folly enough, the train of more than 200 wagons came rushing up with them, filling the road and impeding the movement of the troops; being hurried over the bridge and parked within sight and range of the enemy's lines. And now, without rest or proper formation, without an attempt to flank the enemy's strong position, or exhibit any common sense whatever, our exhausted infantry was sent in to the support of the already engaged cavalry; and both, of course, were speedily, thoroughly routed, and in most disorderly flight, over a bad, narrow road, with their train utterly lost at once, and no supplies, no place of refuge, no rëenforcements, within three days' march. The 1st cavalry brigade, Col. Geo. E. Waring, had been carved up to give an escort to the commanding General, and for various details, until not enough was left to present an imposing front; but the 2d brigade, Col. E. F. Winslow, was disposed as a rear-guard, and did what it could to cover the retreat of the hungry mob of fugitives on foot. After crossing a stream at Ripley,[34] a stand was made and a sharp fight ensued, whereby the pursuit was checked, but with a considerable loss in prisoners on our side. Thenceforward, the pursuit was less eager; but it was continued nearly to Memphis: no attempt being made by Sturgis to rëorganize his infantry or do any thing effective to mitigate the severity of the disaster. Our loss, mainly in captives, was variously stated at 3,000 to 4,000; but it is probable that the force that Sturgis brought back to Memphis, counting guns, wagons, and supplies (all lost), was not half so efficient as that with which he set out. Among our killed were Col. T. W. Humphrey, 95th, and Col. Geo. W. McKeag, 120th Illinois; the former for months acting Brigadier, and both excellent officers.

Another expedition, also numbering 12,000, was promptly organized to wipe out the recollection of this most needless disgrace; Gen. A. J. Smith

[33] June 10.

[34] June 11.

being placed in command. It was fully equipped at Salisbury, 50 miles east of Memphis, advancing[25] thence, skirmishing incessantly with Forrest's cavalry, to Tupelo, where the Rebel chief had concentrated his command, estimated by our officers at 14,000, and where he had decided to fight. Thrice his infantry assaulted[26] our lines, and were each time repulsed with heavy loss; being finally driven from the field, leaving on it as many of his men killed or desperately wounded as the whole number of our killed, wounded, and missing.

Gen. Smith made no farther advance; but there was a sharp, indecisive cavalry skirmish next day at Old Town creek; after which our army was withdrawn to the vicinity of Memphis; whence Smith once more advanced,[27] with 10,000 men, by Holly Springs to the Tallahatchie;[28] but found no enemy to fight, save a very small body of cavalry. Forrest's main body had been drawn off for service elsewhere. Smith remained in this region several days, and then returned to Memphis; whence he was soon called to the aid of Rosecrans in Missouri, as has already been stated.

But while Smith was vainly hunting for Forrest in Mississippi, that chieftain reported himself in person at Memphis. Taking 3,000 of his best-mounted men, Forrest flanked[29] our army by night, and made a forced march to Memphis, which he charged into at dawn;[30] making directly for the Gayoso house and other hotels, where his spies had assured him that Gens. Hurlbut, Washburne, and Buckland, were quartered. He failed to clutch either of them, but captured several staff and other officers, with soldiers enough to make a total of 300. Yet he failed to carry Irving prison, where the Rebel captives were in durance, made no attempt on the fort, and was driven out or ran out of the city after a stay of two hours, in which he had done considerable damage and appropriated some plunder. He lost some 200 men here and at Lane's, outside; where a smart skirmish occurred on his retreat, and Cols. Starr and Kendrick on our side were wounded. On the whole, the raid can hardly be deemed a success, and can not have realized the enemy's expectations, unless they were very moderate. As Hurlbut had at least 6,000 men in or about the city, it was not practicable to do more; and Forrest left not a moment too soon. He made his way back to Mississippi unharmed.

In East Tennessee, Gen. Longstreet's withdrawal into Virginia, after his failure at Knoxville, was at first closely pursued by our cavalry under Shackleford, on whom he turned[31] at Bean's station, near Morristown, and a spirited fight ensued, with no decided result; but Shackleford does not appear to have hurried Longstreet thereafter.

Wheeler, with 1,200 mounted men, struck[32] a supply train from Chattanooga to Knoxville, guarded by Col. Siebert, near Charlestown, on the Hiwassee, and had easily captured it—Siebert having but 100 men—when Col. Long, 4th Ohio cavalry, came to his aid with 150 more cavalry and Col. Laibold's 2d Missouri infantry; wherewith he quickly retook the train, and hurled the

[25] July 7. [26] July 14. [27] Aug. 4. [28] Aug. 17. [29] Aug. 18. [30] Aug. 21. [31] Dec. 14, 1863. [32] Dec. 28

raiders back on the road to Georgia, with a loss of 41 killed or wounded and 123 prisoners. We lost but 16.

Gen. S. D. Sturgis, commanding our advance east of Knoxville, had a fight[34] at Mossy creek, near Newmarket, with a Rebel force reported by him at 6,000, led by Martin Armstrong and John Morgan; wherein the Rebels were worsted. Our loss was 18 killed, 82 wounded. Sturgis reports the enemy's at 250 to 400; saying that he buried 22 of their dead and took 44 prisoners.

Our advance eastward from Knoxville, having occupied[35] Dandridge, was attacked there next day, and more determinedly at 3 P. M. the day after; holding the town till after dark, when our men fell back to Strawberry Plains.

Gen. Vance, with 500 mounted men and 2 guns, crossed Smoky mountain from North Carolina into East Tennessee, making for Seviersville; near which place he, with 175 picked men, charged and captured a train of 17 Union wagons, making 26 prisoners. Attempting to return, however, he was surrounded[36] on Cosby creek by the 4th Illinois cavalry, Maj. Davidson, who routed and captured him, with 100 of his men.

Sturgis had several further collisions[37] with the Rebel cavalry under Martin and Morgan, wherein he claimed the advantage, with a superior loss inflicted on the enemy; but, as he began them near Dandridge and Newmarket, and left off at Maryville —some 30 miles farther back—it is not safe to credit his estimates of the respective losses. He claims to have taken 150 prisoners in a cavalry fight near Seviersville; another account says he lost 200 when the Rebels captured Strawberry Plains. It was supposed on our side that this Rebel advance presaged a fresh attempt on Knoxville by Longstreet; but that able General was doubtless masking the movement of the bulk of his forces into Virginia, whither he retired next month. Of course, that ended the pressure on our lines east of Knoxville. ———

Morgan remained in East Tennessee—hiding, as well as he could, the paucity of his numbers—till the 1st of June; when he started on another raid, via Pound gap, into Kentucky; evading Gen. Burbridge, who was in that quarter with a superior force, meditating an advance into southwestern Virginia, in concert with the advance of Crook and Averill up the Kanawha. Morgan had but 2,500 followers, and these not so well mounted as they would have been two years earlier. Still, sending forward small parties to purvey as many good horses as possible, he moved, so swiftly as he might, by Paintville, Hazel Green, Owingsville, Flemingsburg, and Maysville, into and through the richest part of the State; capturing Mount Sterling, Paris, Cynthiana, and Williamstown, burning trains, tearing up railroads, &c., almost without resistance. The most amazing feature of this raid was the capture of Gen. Hobson, with 1,600 well-armed Unionists, by Col. Giltner, one of Morgan's lieutenants, who had 300 only, by crowding him into a bend of the Licking, and then threatening him from the opposite bank so that he was glad to surrender. It is added that the Rebels were nearly out of ammunition. It is

[34] Dec. 29. [35] Jan. 15, 1864. [36] Jan. 15. [37] Jan. 16–28.

to be hoped that they paroled their prisoners not to serve again during the War, unless on their side.

Gen. Burbridge, who had promptly started on Morgan's track, had, by a forced march of 90 miles, struck[37] him heavily at Mount Sterling; Morgan decamping at the close to continue his career. Part of his force entered Lexington at 2 next morning, burned the railroad dépôt, and left, heading for Frankfort and Georgetown. Part of Cynthiana was burned by another detachment. But, near that place, Burbridge fell[38] on the Rebel raiders while at breakfast; killing and wounding 300 of them, capturing 400, beside 1,000 horses, and liberating some of Hobson's men. Hobson and staff were recaptured soon afterward. Our loss in this conflict was but 150. Morgan fled to south-western Virginia with the wreck of his command, which was no longer a force. He had only gathered a small band, with which he occupied Greenville, East Tennessee, when he was surprised[39] and killed by Gen. Gillem; who, being apprised of his arrival, had made a forced march of 16 miles from Bull's gap to catch him.

Burbridge was detained for weeks in Kentucky, rëorganizing and remounting his overmarched force; when he resumed the movement which had been arrested by Morgan's raid. He struck directly for the salt-works at Saltville, near Abingdon; where he found himself confronted[40] in strong force by Breckinridge, by whom he was beaten off, with a loss of 350 men, including Col. Mason, 11th Michigan, killed. He drew off during the night after the conflict, alleging a lack of ammunition; but, as he left his wounded to the enemy, it would seem that the real difficulty was a superfluity rather than a scarcity at least of balls.

Gen. Gillem, still posted near Bull's gap, finding a Rebel force, composed of the brigades of Vaughan and Palmer, in his rear at Morristown, suddenly attacked[41] and routed them, with a loss on their side of 400 men and 4 guns. Two weeks later, Breckinridge in like manner surprised Gillem by a night attack;[42] routing him utterly, with the loss of his battery, train, and most of his small arms, which his men threw away to expedite their flight. The darkness was intense, and Burbridge admits a loss of 220 men only. He took refuge in Knoxville, leaving Breckinridge transiently master of the situation.

Johnson's island, Lake Erie, near Sandusky, Ohio, having been made a prison-camp, where several thousands of captive Rebels were usually confined, plots were laid by certain of the Rebel agents and refugees in Canada to liberate them. To this end, the unarmed steamboat Philo Parsons, on her way[43] from Detroit to Sandusky, stopping at Malden, Canada, there took on board 20 passengers, who, at 6 P. M., proclaiming themselves Confederate soldiers, seized the boat, and with her captured the Island Queen; soon scuttling the latter; then standing in for Sandusky, where they expected, in concert with secret allies in that city, to capture the U. S. gunboat Michigan; but their signals were not answered, and they soon put off; running the boat on the Canada shore near Sandwich, and escaping.

[37] June 9. [38] June 12. [39] Sept. 3. [40] Oct. 2. [41] Oct. 28. [42] Nov. 13. [43] Sept. 19.

XXVIII.

SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

GEN. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, at the instance of Lt.-Gen. Grant, succeeded him in command of the military division of the Mississippi, embracing the four great departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas. Receiving the order at Memphis,[1] he repaired at once to Nashville, where he met the Lt.-General, and accompanied him so far as Cincinnati—Grant being then on his way to Washington to direct thenceforth our operations generally, but more especially those in Virginia. The plans of the superior were freely imparted to and discussed with his most trusted subordinate, ere they parted to enter respectively on their memorable campaigns against Richmond and Atlanta. Those campaigns were to be commenced simultaneously on the Rapidan and the Tennessee; and either movement to be pressed so vigorously, persistently, that neither of the Rebel main armies could spare troops to reenforce the other. When Sherman received[2] his final instructions from Grant, it was settled that the campaign should open with May; and Gen. Sherman set forth[3] accordingly from the Winter encampments of his forces around Chattanooga with an army barely short of 100,000 men[4] of all arms, with 254 guns. It was far superior in every thing but cavalry to that which it confronted; and which, though estimated by Sherman at 55,000 to 60,000, probably numbered hardly more than 50,000.[5] Johnston's army was organized in three corps, led by Hardee, Hood, and Polk. Sherman was from time to time rëenforced, so as nearly to keep his original number good; but, as he advanced into Georgia, the necessity of maintaining his communications seriously reduced his force at the front.

The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta is different from, but even more difficult than, that which separates Washington from Richmond. Rugged mountains, deep, narrow ravines, thick, primitive woods, with occasional villages and more frequent clearings, or irregular patches of cultivation, all traversed by mainly narrow, ill-made roads, succeed each other for some 40 miles; then intervenes a like distance of comparatively open, facile country, traversed by two considerable rivers; then another rugged, difficult region of mountains and passes reaches nearly to the Chatta-

[1] March 14, 1864. [2] April 30. [3] May 6.

[4] *Army of the Cumberland*—Gen. Thomas:

Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
54,568	8,828	2,877	60,773

Army of the Tennessee—Gen. McPherson:

Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
22,437	624	1,404	24,465

Army of the Ohio—Gen. Schofield:

Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
11,188	1,697	679	13,559

Grand total..... 98,797

[5] Johnston reported his infantry at 40,900. Sherman estimated his cavalry (under Wheeler) at 10,000. Estimating his artillery at 3,100, his total force would be 54,000. It was occasionally swelled rather than strengthened by drafts of such Georgians not already in the service as passed for militia. The force which Sherman, after passing the Oostenaula, could show at the front, was probably about 70,000 to Johnston's 45,000.

hoochee; across which, 8 miles distant, lies the new but important city of Atlanta—a focus of several railroads, having some 20,000 inhabitants, and then the seat of extensive manufactories of Confederate supplies. It had been well fortified, early in 1863.

Johnston's position at Dalton was covered by an impassable mountain known as Rocky-Face ridge, cloven by the passage of Mill creek called Buzzard's Roost gap. The railroad traverses this pass, but our army could not; it being naturally very strong and now thoroughly fortified. Hence, while Thomas menaced[6] and feebly assailed it in front, McPherson flanked the enemy's left, moving down by Ship's gap, Villanow, and Snake creek gap, to seize either Resaca or some other point well in its rear, while Schofield should press on Johnston's right. In executing these orders, Thomas was compelled to bear more heavily on the Rebel front than was intended: Newton's division of Howard's (4th) corps, and Geary's of Hooker's (20th) corps, assaulting in earnest and even carrying portions of the ridge; whence they were soon repelled with loss. Meantime, McPherson had reached the front of Resaca, scarcely resisted; but he could not carry it, and dared not remain between it and Johnston's main body; so he fell back to a strong position in Snake creek gap, which he could hold for some hours against all gainsayers. Sherman now, leaving Howard's corps and some cavalry to threaten Dalton in front, moved[7] the rest of his forces rapidly in the track of Schofield, and through Snake creek gap; which compelled Johnston to evacuate his stronghold and fall back rapidly to Resaca; advancing in force against which, Kilpatrick, fighting the enemy's cavalry, was disabled by a shot. Sherman had calculated on seriously damaging Johnston when he thus retreated, but was unable to reach him—Johnston having the only direct, good road, while our flanking advance was made with great difficulty. Howard entered Dalton on the heels of the enemy, and pressed him sharply down to Resaca.

Sherman forthwith set on foot a new flanking movement by his right to turn Johnston out of Resaca; which Johnston countered by an attack on Hooker and Schofield, still in his front and on his left; but he was rather worsted in the bloody fight[8] thus brought on: Hooker driving the Rebels from several hills, taking 4 guns and many prisoners. The Rebels retreated across the Oostenaula during the night, and our army entered Resaca in triumph next morning.

McPherson crossed on our right at Lay's ferry next day; Gen. Thomas moving directly through Resaca, on the heels of Hardee, who covered the Rebel retreat; while Schofield advanced on our left, over a rough region, by such apologies for roads as he could find or make. Jeff. C. Davis's division of Thomas's army kept down the north-west bank of the Oostenaula to Rome, where he took 8 or 10 great guns, and destroyed mills and founderies of great importance to the enemy; leaving here a garrison. Johnston made a momentary stand against our central advance in a strong position covering Adairsville; but, on the approach of our main body, he again retreated, with only

[6] May 7. [7] May 10–11. [8] May 15.

sharp skirmishing between our van and his rear-guard; until, having passed through Kingston, he was again found[9] holding a strong and fortified position about Cassville, apparently intent on a decisive battle. Upon being pressed, however, he retreated, under cover of night, across the Etowah; burning the railroad and other bridges, and taking a still stronger position covering the Allatoona pass, where the country again becomes mountainous, rugged, and difficult, and where he doubtless had determined to fight in earnest.

Sherman, after halting two days to rest and reconnoiter, decided to flank him out of this by moving well to the right, concentrating his army on Dallas; to which point Jeff. C. Davis, at Rome, had already been directed, and on which Thomas now advanced; McPherson moving still farther to the right, by Van Wert, and swinging in on Thomas's right; while Schofield, moving on the east, should aim to come in on Thomas's left. Johnston promptly divined this movement, and prepared to baffle it.

Thomas, advancing from Burnt Hickory to Dallas, was confronted[10] at Pumpkinvine creek by Rebel cavalry, whom he rapidly pushed across, saving the burning bridge; but, as Hooker's corps, in the van, pushed on, his foremost division (Geary's) found the enemy in line of battle; and a severe conflict ensued, without decisive result. Hooker finally concentrated his command four miles north of Dallas, and struck hard, by Sherman's order, at Stewart's position covering New Hope church; whence, though he gained some ground, he was unable to drive the well sheltered foe. Next morning, the Rebel intrenched lines stretched unbrokenly from Dallas to Marietta, over a most difficult region, wherein days were necessarily spent by Sherman, amid continual skirmishing and fighting, in making careful approaches. He had just ordered Schofield to advance our left and flank the enemy's right, when Johnston struck heavily at *our* right at Dallas, held by McPherson. But this attack gave our men the advantage of breastworks, and was repulsed with loss; as one made by Howard's corps on Cleburne, farther toward the center, was repulsed by the enemy. Our army was now moved[11] to the left along the Rebel front, enveloping the Allatoona pass, and compelling the enemy to evacuate it; as he soon after did his intrenchments covering New Hope church, and Ackworth also. Allatoona pass was promptly garrisoned by Sherman, and made a secondary base of supplies: the railroad bridge across the Etowah being repaired, and our trains down the road run to this point.

Gen. Frank Blair here came up,[12] with two divisions of the 17th corps, and Col. Long's brigade of cavalry; raising Sherman's effective force nearly to that with which he left Chattanooga; and he moved forward next day to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw mountain, with its almost equally formidable neighbors, Pine and Lost mountains, now loomed before him, with Rebel lines two miles long covering the points not impregnable by nature—lines which the enemy were actively strengthening each hour. Here Sherman halted perforce, and studied and planned

[9] May 19. [10] May 25. [11] June 1. [12] June 8.

and manœuvered; finally attempting to force, by sharp fighting, a way between Kenesaw and Pine mountains. In the desultory conflict that ensued, Lt.-Gen. Polk, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, was instantly killed[13] by a cannon-ball. He was engaged, with Johnston and Hardee, in making observations, when they were observed on our side, and two shots fired at them—it was said by Thomas's order—the first of which scattered the party to places of safety; but Polk soon tired of his, and, coming out to watch the firing, was struck in the side by a three-inch shot, which tore him to pieces. He neither spoke nor breathed thereafter.

Pushing forward wherever the rugged nature of the ground would permit, with frequent assaults and constant battering and picket-firing, Sherman compelled the enemy to abandon Pine mountain,[14] and then Lost mountain,[15] with the long line of strong breastworks connecting the latter with Kenesaw. Meantime, rain fell almost incessantly; the narrow mountain roads were rocky gullies; and the Rebel batteries on Kenesaw belched iron constantly at our lines—the balls generally passing harmlessly over the heads of our men, whom the enemy's guns could not be depressed sufficiently to reach.

It being evident that we were steadily though slowly gaining ground, especially on our right, a sally and attack were made[16] by the enemy, led by Hood, with intent to interpose between Thomas's right and Schofield's left, near what was known as 'the Kulp house.' The blow fell on Williams's division of Hooker's corps, and Hascall's of Schofield's army, but utterly failed—the enemy being repulsed from our lines with heavy loss, including some prisoners.

Sherman now determined to assault in turn, and did[17] so, after careful preparation, at two points, south of Kenesaw, and in front of Gens. Thomas and McPherson respectively; but the enemy's position was found, at fearful cost, absolutely impregnable—each attack being signally repulsed, with an aggregate loss of 3,000, including Gens. Harker and Dan. McCook, killed, and Col. Rice, with other valuable officers, badly wounded. The Rebels, thoroughly sheltered by their works, reported their loss at 442.

Gen. Sherman, in his report, defends this assault as follows:

"Upon studying the ground, I had no alternative but to assault or turn the enemy's position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would *not* assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan that promises success. I wished, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his breastworks. * * * Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim that it produced good fruits; as it demonstrated to Gen. Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them."

If these be sound reasons, they at least as fully justify Grant's order to assault at Cold Harbor: Kenesaw being a palpable Gibraltar, which Cold Harbor is not.

Sherman did not choose to rest on this bloody repulse; but, waiting only

[13] June 14. [14] June 15. [15] June 17. [16] June 22. [17] June 27.

to bury the dead and care for the wounded, he again threw [18] forward his right: McPherson, in front of Kenesaw, being relieved by Garrard's cavalry, and ordered to move rapidly by the right down to the Chattahoochee, threatening to cross with the railroad at or near Turner's ferry. The success of this manœuver was instantaneous. Though its execution began at nightfall, Kenesaw was forthwith evacuated by Johnston; our skirmishers stood on the summit at dawn; and—our whole army pressing forward—General Sherman rode into Marietta on the heels of the Rebel rear-guard at 8½ A. M.

Sherman was thus eager in the pursuit, expecting to catch Johnston crossing the Chattahoochee and destroy half his army; but the wary Confederate had ere this strongly intrenched a position on this side, covering the passage of the river, and stood here awaiting—in fact, inviting—an assault. Sherman paused, and cautiously approached; sending forward at length [19] a strong skirmish-line, which carried the enemy's outer line of rifle-pits, taking some prisoners. Next morning, he was mainly over the river; and our army advanced in triumph to its bank at several points, with Atlanta just at hand.

But the Chattahoochee is here a large stream; rapid as well as deep, and barely fordable at one or two points. The railroad and other bridges, of course, were covered by the enemy's strong work on our side, which they still held. But Gen. Schofield was now moved rapidly from our extreme right to our left, and there pushed across, above Power's ferry, surprising the guard, capturing a gun, and soon fortifying himself strongly on high ground, commanding good roads, tending east, while he had laid a pontoon and a trestle bridge across the river. Howard soon had a similar bridge and position two miles below; and there was a general movement of our forces from right to left, which constrained Johnston to abandon his fort or bridge-head, burn his bridges and bring his last man across the Chattahoochee.[20] His new line, covering Atlanta, had the river on its left front and Peach-tree creek on its right.

Sherman now gave his men a little much needed rest; and, before active operations recommenced, Johnston had been superseded in chief command by Gen. J. B. Hood, of Texas.

Johnston's campaign, it appeared, had not answered the expectations of his superiors at Richmond. He had not demolished Sherman, with an army of little more than half the numerical strength of ours, and in nothing superior thereto. He had not even been able to prevent Sherman's persistent, determined, and generally skillful advance. But he had made the most of the rare advantages to the defensive afforded by the chaotic region across which he had been steadily driven, and had missed no good opportunity to strike a damaging blow. Pollard says he had lost about 10,000 in killed and wounded, and 4,700 from "all other causes"—that is, about one-fourth of his entire army—which, considering that he had fought no great battle, and could not afford to fight one, argues tolerably sharp work for a two months' purely

[18] July 2. [19] July 4. [20] July 10.

left; when, about noon, the sound of guns, on that flank and on our rear toward Decatur, apprised Sherman that mischief was afloat. Hood had determined, while holding the bulk of our army with a small part of his, by reason of the strength of his defenses, to fall, by a long flank night-march, with his main body, led by Hardee, on our left and rear, rolling up and pulverizing each division before it could be supported by another. And Hardee had already struck his first most unexpected blow at Giles A. Smith's division of Blair's corps; while Gen. McPherson, riding in fancied security through a wood in the rear of that division, had been shot dead, just as he had given an order to hurry up Wangelin's brigade of Logan's corps to fill a gap between Blair's and Dodge's corps, into which the charging Rebels were pouring like a torrent. Here Murray's battery (6 guns) was surprised and taken —the men generally escaping to the woods; and two more guns were lost by Smith, as one wing of his division was forced back by the impetuous rush of the enemy.

Simultaneously with Hardee's flank attack, Stewart's corps was to have struck Blair in front; but Stewart was not up to time. Hardee swept along the slope of the hill on which Blair was preparing to plant his batteries, making prisoners of his working party. The Rebel charge bore heavily on Giles A. Smith's division of Blair's corps, which was compelled gradually to give ground and form a new line connecting with Leggett's division, which held the crest of the hill; and here for hours the battle raged fiercely: our men having the advantage in position, and inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. At 4 P.M., the Rebels virtually desisted here, having been unable to drive Blair; while Dodge, striking their right, had handled it severely, capturing many prisoners.

Meantime, Wheeler's cavalry (ours on this wing, under Garrard, being absent at Covington, breaking up a railroad) had raided, unopposed, to Decatur, where were McPherson's wagons, and attempted to capture them; but Col. Sprague, in command there, covered them skillfully and held firmly; sending them off, so fast as he could, to the rear of our center, and losing but three, whereof the teamsters had fled with the mules.

After a brief lull, the enemy charged again up the Decatur road; catching a regiment thrown forward upon it unsupported, and taking two more guns; pushing through the interval between Wood's and Harrow's divisions of the 15th corps, posted on either side of the railroad, and hurling back Lightburn's brigade in some disorder. But Sherman was close at hand, and, perceiving the importance of checking this advance, he ordered several of Schofield's batteries to stop it by an incessant fire of shell; Logan (now commanding McPherson's army) was directed to make the 15th corps regain at any cost its lost ground; while Wood, supported by Schofield, was to go forward with his division and recover the captured batteries. These orders were promptly and thoroughly executed; all our guns being retaken but two, which had been hurried off the field; and the day closed with our army triumphant and the enemy recoiling to his defenses.

In this stubborn contest, our total

two bodies of horse should be concentrated at Lovejoy's, and Wheeler defeated or chased off by their superior force; but, this failing, Wheeler was too strong for either division, and the scheme became chimerical.

Stoneman, with his segment of the raiding force, struck out eastward to Covington; thence moving down the east side of the Ocmulgee, breaking up roads and burning bridges, without even attempting to keep his tryst with McCook at Lovejoy's. When at length he appeared before Macon, he had not more than 3,000 men; and, being confronted with spirit by a hastily collected Rebel force under Iverson, he was unable even to cross the river; but, abandoning all idea of reaching Andersonville, turned on his trail, pursued by Iverson. Now he consented to a still further dispersion of his force—the three brigades composing it attempting to escape separately. That led by Col. Adams reached Sherman nearly unharmed; that under Col. Capron was surprised by the way, charged and dispersed: those who escaped generally straggling into camp before Atlanta on foot and disarmed; while that with which Stoneman attempted to maintain some show of resistance was soon surrounded by Iverson, and Stoneman induced, by an imposing pretense of superior force, to surrender at discretion—he having 1,000 men left, and Iverson at hand only some 500. Stoneman, it was reported, *cried* when he discovered how he had been duped; but his sorrow subserved no good purpose. He had, by incapacity, imbecility, and disobedience of orders, squandered a full third of Sherman's cavalry.

Gen. Howard succeeded,[27] by the President's order, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee; whereupon, Gen. Hooker, considering himself disparaged, was relieved, at his own request, from the command of his corps, which was given to Gen. Slocum. Gen. Palmer was soon relieved from the command of the 14th corps by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis. Gen. D. S. Stanley succeeded Gen. Howard as the head of the 4th corps.

The Army of the Tennessee was now shifted[28] from our extreme left to our extreme right; moving behind the rest of the army from the Decatur road on the east to Proctor's creek on the south-west; initiating a general movement to flank Hood out of Atlanta by cutting the railroads in his rear. The movement was of course detected by Hood; yet it had been substantially completed, and our men were hastily covering their new front with a rude breastwork of logs and rails, when Hood struck out[29] as heavily from his left as he had done the week before from his right. Evidently expecting to catch Howard in disorder, or at least unprepared, he poured out his masses from the west side of Atlanta, and charged impetuously on our new right, held by Logan's (15th) corps, which had been formed on the crest of a wooded ridge, with open fields sloping from its front, its right refused, and something like a rail breastwork in its front; Howard standing behind it, ready to hurry Blair's and Dodge's corps to its support; and Sherman himself on hand, eager and alert for the encounter. After a brief cannonade, Hood's infantry, under Hardee and Lee, was thrown forward against

[27] July 27 [28] July 26–7. [29] July 28.

Howard's right flank, which had been fully prepared for their reception, and which, as they approached, swept them down by a murderous fire. Again and again were they reformed and pushed up by their officers, only to be again decimated and broken; a few of them pressing up to our rail-pile parapet, only to be there shot down or hauled over as prisoners. When they could no more be driven to this foolish slaughter, their officers, at 3 P. M., gave it up and recoiled; leaving on the ground 642 dead, who were counted by our regular burial-parties; and these were not all. Sherman, whose total loss was but 600, estimates Hood's at 5,000. Hood admits but 1,500.[30]

Hood's appetite for attacks in force seems to have been satisfied by this time; since he made no more, though our long-range guns now reached into and shelled Atlanta from several points, kindling fires that involved heavy losses. Meantime, Sherman was steadily extending his right; bringing down Schofield's[31] army, and then Palmer's corps; until his intrenched line had been pushed nearly to East Point, commanding the railroads whereby Atlanta must be fed. Hood barely watched these operations, and extended his outworks accordingly. Yet a vigorous defensive was so little suited to his impatient, heady disposition that, having squandered half his infantry in rash assaults and charges, he now dispatched Wheeler with his cavalry to our rear, to burn bridges, capture supplies, and break up the railroad whereon Sherman must depend for subsistence. Sherman had already[32] resolved on a bold stroke for Atlanta; but, when he heard that Wheeler, having passed our left, was in his rear, had captured 900 beeves, broken the railroad near Calhoun, and was bent on havoc generally, he joyfully ordered Kilpatrick, now commanding our 5,000 remaining cavalry, to move[33] from Sandtown, in the rear of our right, down to Fairburn, break up the West Point railroad thoroughly; then push across to the Macon road and destroy that; fighting any cavalry that might get in his way, but avoiding a serious conflict with infantry.

Kilpatrick obeyed; striking the Macon road at Jonesboro', routing a small cavalry force under Ross, and doing some work on the railroad; when a brigade of Rebel infantry and a small force of cavalry appeared from below, and compelled him to resume his travels. Drawing off to the east, he made a circuit, and again struck the railroad near Lovejoy's; but the enemy were already here; so, charging through their cavalry, taking 70 prisoners and a 4-gun battery, which he destroyed, he made for camp by a north-east circuit; reaching Decatur on the 22d.

Sherman did not hesitate. He made the proper discount on Kilpatrick's estimate of the damage he had done to the railroads; but he was confident that, though not sufficient to interrupt transportation for ten days, as Kilpatrick judged, it was worth something. He ordered the siege to be abandoned; the sick and wounded, surplus wagons, &c., to be sent back to his intrenched position on the Chattahoochee, which the 20th corps,

[30] Logan estimates the Rebel loss at from 6,000 to 7,000. He says he took 1,500 to 2,000 muskets, with 100 prisoners, beside 73 wounded.

[31] Aug. 1. [32] Aug. 16. [33] Aug. 18.

now Gen. Slocum's, was left to cover, while the rest of the army should move by the right southward; the 4th corps, on our extreme left, marching[34] to the rear of our right, while Howard, drawing back, should move[35] to Sandtown, and then to the West Point railroad above Fairburn; Thomas coming into position just above him near Red Oak; while Schofield closed in on Thomas's left, barely clear of the Rebel defenses near East Point. These movements being quietly executed without resistance or loss, our whole army, save the 20th corps, was behind Atlanta, busily and thoroughly destroying the West Point railroad, before Hood knew what Sherman was doing; and the next day it was thrown forward[36] to the Macon road; Schofield moving cautiously, because of his proximity to Atlanta, and the danger of another of Hood's irruptions, to Rough-and-Ready; Thomas to a point designated as Couch's; while Howard, encountering more resistance, halted at dark: having crossed Flint river, barely half a mile from Jonesborough.

Hood had, because of Kilpatrick's recent raid, and to guard his communications, divided his army; sending half, under Hardee, to Jonesborough; while he remained with the residue in Atlanta: hence his failure to fall on Schofield during our swinging flank movement; hence the formidable resistance encountered by Howard on our right, where none was expected.

The light of day[37] revealed to Howard—who had been fighting the day before, but constantly gaining ground—the immediate presence of a formidable foe. Deploying the 15th corps in the center, with the 16th and 17th on either flank, he covered his front with the habitual breastwork, and stood in quiet expectation. Hardee drew out his whole force, embracing Lee's corps beside his own, and attacked with great vigor, calculating that Howard might be overwhelmed before he could be rëenforced; but Howard's position was good; his front well covered, and his soldiers as cool as though bullet-proof; and, after two hours of carnage, the enemy recoiled, leaving 400 dead on the ground, and 300 desperately wounded in Jonesboro' when he retreated. Sherman places Hardee's entire loss in this conflict at 2,500; while ours was hardly 500.

Sherman was with Thomas at Couch's, intent on road-breaking, when the sound of guns on the right drew his attention to that quarter, and induced him to impel Thomas and Schofield in that direction, leaving Garrard's cavalry to watch our rear toward Atlanta, while Kilpatrick should hasten down the west bank of the Flint and strike the railroad below Jonesborough. Davis's corps, being on Thomas's right, soon closed on to Howard, relieving Blair's (15th) corps, which was at once drawn out and thrown to Howard's right, so as to connect with Kilpatrick's troopers. All being at length ready, Davis's corps, at 4 P. M., charged the enemy's lines, covering Jonesboro', carrying them at once, capturing Gen. Govan with most of his brigade and two 4-gun batteries. Orders were repeatedly sent to hurry up Stanley and Schofield; but the ground was diffi-

[34] Aug. 25–6. [35] Aug. 26–7. [36] Aug. 29. [37] Aug. 31.

cult and the roads bad, so that they were not up in season to charge that night; and next morning[28] Hardee was gone, with all that could and would follow him.

Before that morning dawned, ominous sounds, first heavy, then lighter, from the north, indicated to Sherman that something momentous was occurring in Atlanta, 20 miles distant. They might have proceeded from an attack on that stronghold by Slocum —which was most unlikely—but the more probable supposition pointed to the truth, that Hood, completely outgeneraled and at his wit's end, was blowing up his magazines, burning his stores, and escaping with the little he could, deprived of railroads, carry off in his flight. But this, if so, could wait; so Sherman ordered a vigorous pursuit in force of Hardee's beaten column.

Hardee was found well intrenched, near Lovejoy's, with his flanks covered by Walnut creek and Flint river—a strong position, which was thoroughly reconnoitered, but Sherman was in no hurry to attack it. Soon, flying rumors, then more trust-worthy accounts, imported that Hood had blown up whatever he could in Atlanta and decamped: Stewart's corps retreating on McDonough, while the militia were marched off eastward to Covington. The news was fully confirmed on the 4th by a courier from Slocum, who had entered the city unopposed on the morning after Hood's withdrawal. Sherman thereupon returned[29] to Atlanta, and, encamping his army on all sides, allowed it that season of rest which, under his able leadership, it had so nobly earned.

Atlanta had been cheaply won; for, not only was the position one of great importance, but the loss of munitions, guns, locomotives, cars, manufacturing machinery, &c., was very great, and such as the Confederacy could no longer afford. Yet, when Sherman had succeeded, without loss, in placing at least 70,000 veterans between it and the better part of Hood's army, it seems singular that his prisoners were so few. Had he known how Hood's army was divided, he ought, it would seem, to have destroyed or captured at least half of it.

General Sherman, having established his headquarters in Atlanta, ordered the removal of its remaining inhabitants—they going South or coming North, as each should prefer. In order to effect this removal with the least possible hardship, a truce for ten days was proposed by Sherman and acceded to by Hood; who took occasion to "protest, in the name of God and humanity," against this "unprecedented measure," which, he asserts, "transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever brought to my attention in the dark history of war."

Let us consider:

Every one who could shoulder a musket or drive a team had been conscripted into and marched off with the Rebel army. All the factories, founderies, machine-shops, &c., in which Atlanta had hitherto abounded, and which had done the Confederacy good service, had been destroyed by Hood on leaving, or so dismantled as to be unserviceable. No food of consequence had been left by Hood in Atlanta; while our single railroad

[28] Sept. 1.

[29] Sept. 5–7.

(which Hood had just broken, and was purposing more thoroughly to destroy) was fully taxed with transporting the supplies needed by our army; and not a pound of food would be sent in by the Confederates from the adjacent country, whoever might perish. To feed the remaining inhabitants of Atlanta in that city could not cost our Government less than $1,000,000 per quarter, supposing it were at all practicable; while it must greatly cripple Sherman and fetter his future operations, even supposing it could be done at all. To let them stay and starve would have excited still louder and more frenzied denunciations. The order for the removal of the people was therefore at once wise, provident, and humane; yet Mayor J. M. Calhoun and his council appealed to Sherman in deprecation of "the woe, the horror, the suffering" involved in the execution of his order, as if it had been impelled by mere caprice or wanton cruelty, instead of being the stern dictate of an obvious, imperative necessity. And this was but one of many instances wherein the Rebels chilled the admiration which the desperate gallantry of their fighting was calculated to excite, by screechy objurgations, and theatrical appeals for sympathy with their distresses, which they, who had so haughtily and so needlessly rushed into war, should have had the dignity and self-respect to abstain from.

The removal was quietly and humanely effected: all who chose to go South (446 families, 2,035 persons) being transported in wagons at the national cost, with their furniture and clothes, averaging 1,651 pounds per family, to Rough-and-Ready, or to our outpost in that direction; while those who preferred to come North were brought at Government cost by railroad to Chattanooga. When all was done, Major Clan, of Hood's staff, tendered to Col. Warner, of Sherman's staff, his written acknowledgment[40] of "the uniform courtesy you have shown on all occasions to me and my people, and the promptness with which you have corrected all irregularities arising in our intercourse." This was the simple truth. The removal was not only right in itself, but was effected with considerate tenderness.

While Sherman was still north of the Chattahoochee, a Rebel raiding force of cavalry, under Pillow, had dashed into Lafayette, nearly up to Chattanooga, held by Col. Watkins with 400 men, and had very nearly taken it; when Col. Croxton, 4th Kentucky, came up and beat them off; taking 70 prisoners. The killed and wounded on either side were about 100.

Wheeler, after breaking the railroad at Calhoun, as already narrated, appeared before Dalton, which he summoned; but Col. Leibold held it firmly till Gen. Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove the Rebels off. Wheeler now pushed up into East Tennessee, halting at Athens; whence, on being menaced, he dashed eastward across the Little Tennessee, and thence across the Holston at Strawberry plains; and so, circling around Knoxville, he crossed the Clinch near Clinton, and the Cumberland mountains, by Sequatchie, McMinnville, Murfreesbo-

[40] Sept. 21.

rough, and Lebanon, whence he was chased southward across the Tennessee near Florence into Alabama. He destroyed much property during this extensive raid; but his operations had little influence on the results of the campaign.

Hardee, moving to his right, formed a junction with Hood near Jonesboro', and their army was soon considerably reënforced: Jefferson Davis hastening from Richmond to Georgia, visiting the army at Palmetto, and making at Macon [41] a speech remarkable for the frankness of its admissions that the loss of Atlanta was a great blow, and that the prospects of the Confederates were gloomy; yet which was said to have aroused many to a more desperate activity in the cause. Hood was still retained in command; and very soon, flanking Sherman's right, he crossed the Chattahoochee, pushed up to Dallas, and thence impelled his cavalry rapidly by the right to Big Shanty, where they tore up the railroad and broke the telegraph; while French's division of infantry appeared [42] before Allatoona, where one million rations were stored, under protection of Col. Tourtelotte, 4th Minnesota, with three thin regiments. Happily, Gen. Corse, holding Rome, had been ordered hither with his brigade, and had arrived with two regiments a few hours before.

Sherman had ere this been aroused by news that the Rebels had crossed the Chattahoochee; and he had sent [43] Gen. Thomas to Nashville to look out for Rebel demonstrations across the Tennessee. Leaving Slocum's 20th corps to hold Atlanta, he had impelled the bulk of his army northward; and, when French attacked Allatoona, he was near Kenesaw, 18 miles distant; whence, at 10 A. M., he could see the smoke of the conflict and faintly hear the sound of the guns. He was even able to signal Corse that he was not to be abandoned.

Corse had 1,944 men; French many times that number. The place was completely invested at daylight, and a sharp cannonade of two hours was followed by a summons, which being declined, French assaulted in full force, rushing his men up to the very parapets, where they were mowed down by hundreds; yet still assault after assault was delivered; while the 23d corps, under Gen. J. D. Cox, were making all haste to come to the rescue, and flags conveying from peak to peak the messages interchanged by Sherman and Corse. Sherman, on learning that Corse was there, exclaimed, "He will hold out! I know the man!" And he *did* hold out; though 707 (more than a third) of his men had fallen, when the enemy desisted. Corse himself had been struck in the face at noon by a bullet, but refused to leave his post; Tourtelotte and Col. R. Rowell, 7th Illinois, were also among the wounded. French drew off, as Cox approached, leaving 231 dead, 411 prisoners, and 800 of his muskets behind, to attest the severity of the struggle.

Hood, instructed to draw Sherman out of Georgia, moved rapidly northwest, threatening again to strike the railroad, and compelling Sherman to make a forced march of 38 miles to save Kingston.[44] Here he learned

[41] Sept. 23. [42] Oct. 5. [43] Sept. 28. [44] Oct. 8–10.

that Hood, after making a feint on Rome, had moved 11 miles down the Coosa and was passing that river on a pontoon-bridge: Sherman followed to Rome,[46] and dispatched thence Gen. Cox's division and Garrard's cavalry across the Oostenaula to harass the right flank of the enemy, as he moved northward. Garrard chased a brigade of Rebel cavalry toward the Chattooga, capturing 2 guns.

Hood, moving rapidly, had by this time appeared before Resaca, summoning it; but Sherman had rëenforced it with two regiments, and Col. Weaver had held it firmly, repulsing the enemy; who had moved up the railroad through Tilton and Dalton, destroying it so far as the Tunnel. Sherman, on reaching Resaca,[46] was evidently puzzled to divine what his adversary meant in thus employing the second army of the Confederacy on a raiding expedition, but resolved to strike him in flank and force him to fight a battle. Accordingly, Howard was impelled westward to Snake creek gap, where he was to skirmish and hold the enemy, while Stanley, with the 4th and 14th corps, moved from Tilton on Villanow, with intent to gain Hood's rear.

But Hood had other plans; so Howard encountered no solid resistance at the gap, but had pressed through it by noon, before Stanley had time to gain its rear. Our army was then directed on Lafayette, expecting thus to get into the enemy's rear; but Hood had evidently been cured of his voracious appetite for fighting, and, having very scanty trains, was far too light-footed to be caught. He nimbly evaded Sherman, slipping around his front, and, moving by his left, was soon out of reach; Sherman halting[47] in the vicinity of Gaylesville, Alabama, and feeling in various directions for his vanished foe.

After the lapse of a week, he was satisfied that his adversary, as if intent on drawing him out of Georgia at all events, had crossed Sand mountain, and was making for the Tennessee. Sherman refused to follow an enemy who would not fight, whom he could not overtake, and who might be able to lead him a profitless wild-goose-chase for months. He detached Stanley, with his (4th) corps, and Schofield, with the 23d, with orders to march to Chattanooga, and thence report to Thomas at Nashville; most of the cavalry, under Wilson, being given similar orders. A single division, under Kilpatrick, was reserved for operations in Georgia.

To Thomas was confided the defense of Tennessee, with unlimited discretion as to the use of his resources. A. J. Smith, then on his way from hunting Price out of Missouri, was ordered to report to him. Sherman had of course a full understanding with him, as well as with Grant, as to his plans. Hood's army, he advised them, now consisted of about 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry; and he did not turn his back again on Tennessee until assured that Thomas was strong enough to hold it. And now, learning that Hood, after a feint on Decatur, had passed on to Tuscumbia and laid a pontoon-bridge across the river to Florence, Sherman turned his face southward, and, gathering up all his garrisons

[46] Oct. 11. [46] Oct. 14. [47] Oct. 19.

holding the railroad, sending some back to Chattanooga to aid in the defense of Tennessee, and drawing others forward to Atlanta, he thoroughly dismantled the railroads, burned the foundries, mills, &c., at Rome, and, cutting loose from all his communications, and drawing around him all his remaining forces, made diligent preparations for the Great March wherewith his name is so inseparably linked, and which so largely contributed to hasten the downfall of the Rebellion.

XXIX.

THE WAR ON THE OCEAN—MOBILE BAY.

THE formation of the Southern Confederacy was quickly followed by the resignation of a large proportion —though not nearly all—of the Southern officers of the United States Navy—resignations which should not have been, but were, accepted. Many of these officers had, for fifteen to forty years, been drawing liberal pay and allowances from the Federal treasury for very light work—often, for no work at all: and now, when the Government which had educated, nurtured, honored, and subsisted them, was for the first time in urgent need of their best efforts, they renounced its service, its flag, and their fealty, in order to tender their swords to its deadly foe. Under such circumstances, no resignation should have been accepted, but their names should have been stricken with ignominy from the rolls they disgraced.

These recreants made haste to repair to the Confederate capital, where they were received with flattering distinction, and accorded rank in the embryo Confederate navy at least as high as that which they had respectively attained in the service of the United States. The "Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers in the Navy of the Confederate States," issued at Richmond, Jan. 1, 1864, contained several hundred names—over two hundred of them being noted as having formerly been officers of the U. S. Navy. Some of these lacked even the poor excuse—"I go with my State,"—as at the head of the list stands their only Admiral, Franklin Buchanan, of Maryland; who entered the service of the United States Jan. 28th, 1815, and that of the Confederacy Sept. 5th, 1861. Of the Captains (twelve) who follow, three were born in Maryland, though one of them (Geo. N. Hollins) claims to be a citizen of Florida; as did another (Raphael Semmes) of Alabama. Of the thirty-six Provisional Captains and Commanders, twelve were born in non-seceding States, though most of them claimed to have since become residents of the 'sunny South.'

Very great ingenuity and nautical (or pyrotechnic) skill was evinced during the war, by the Rebel navy thus constituted, in the construction of rams and iron-clads, and their use for harbor and coast defense, but

more especially in devising, constructing, charging, and planting torpedoes, wherewith they did more execution and caused more embarrassment to blockaders and besieging squadrons than had been effected in any former war. Their devices for obstructing the mouths or channels of rivers and harbors were often unsurpassed in efficiency. On the ocean, however, they were hampered by the fact that the Southrons are neither a ship-building nor a sea-faring people; that, while they had long afforded the material for a large and lucrative commerce, they had neither built, nor owned, nor manned, many vessels. They would, therefore, have been able to make no figure at all out of sight of their own coast, but for the facilities afforded them by British sympathy and British love of gain, evading the spirit if not the strict letter of international maritime law. Great ship-building firms in Liverpool and Glasgow, wherein members of Parliament were largely interested, were almost constantly engaged in the construction of strong, swift steamships, calculated for corsairs and for nothing else; each being, when completed, in spite of information from our consuls and protests from our Minister, allowed to slip out of port under one pretext or another, and make for some prëarranged rendezvous, where a merchant vessel laden with Armstrong, Whitworth, Blakely, and other heavy rifled guns of the most approved patterns, with small arms, ammunition, provisions, &c., was awaiting her; and, her cargo being quickly transferred to the embryo corsair, a crew was made up, in part of men clandestinely enlisted for the service, in part of such as liberal pay, more liberal promises, and the cajolery of officers, could induce to transfer their services to the new flag; and thus the unarmed, harmless British steamship of yesterday was transformed into the Confederate cruiser of to-day: every stick of her British, from keel up to mast-head; her rigging, armament, and stores, British; her crew mostly British, though a few of her higher officers were not; and, thus planned expressly to outrun any heavily armed vessel and overpower any other, she hoisted the Confederate flag and commenced capturing, plundering, burning, and sinking our merchant vessels wherever she could fall upon them unprotected by our navy: every British port, on whatever sea, affording her not only shelter and hospitality, but the fullest and freshest information with regard to her predestined prey and the quarter wherein it could be clutched with least peril. Shielded from the treatment of an ordinary pirate, by the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, and from effective pursuit by the maritime law which forbids the stronger belligerent to leave a neutral harbor within twenty-four hours after the weaker shall have taken his departure, though the latter may have dodged in just out of range of the former, after a keen chase of many hours—one of these corsairs was able to do enormous damage to our commerce with almost perfect impunity; for, by the time her devastations in one sea had been reported to our nearest naval commander, she would be a thousand miles away (but in what direction none could guess), lighting up another coast or strait with the glare of her conflagrations.

If it be gravely held that Great Britain was nowise responsible for the ravages of these marauders, then it must be confessed that the letter of existing international law does no justice to its spirit and purpose, but stands in need of prompt and thorough revision.

The career of the Sumter, Capt. Raphael Semmes, came to an early and inglorious end, as has already been narrated.[1] But another and superior cruiser was promptly constructed at Birkenhead to replace her; which our Embassador, Hon. Charles F. Adams, tried earnestly, but in vain, to have seized and detained at the outset by the British Government. Escaping from Liverpool under the name of *Oreto*, she was twice seized at Nassau, but to no purpose: that island being the focus of blockade-running, and, of course, violently sympathetic with the Rebellion—as was, in fact, nearly every officer in the British naval or military service. Released from duress, she put to sea, and soon appeared as a British ship of war off the harbor of Mobile, then blockaded by Com'r Geo. H. Preble, who hesitated to fire on her lest she should be what she seemed; and in a few minutes she had passed him, and run up to Mobile, showing herself the Rebel corsair she actually was. Preble was promptly dismissed from the service—an act of justice which needed but a few repetitions to have prevented such mistakes in future. Running out[2] again under cover of darkness, the Oreto, now commanded by John N. Maffitt,[3] became the Florida, thereafter vieing with her consort, the Alabama—a new British vessel henceforth commanded by Semmes—and with other such from time to time fitted out, in their predatory career. Each of these habitually approached her intended prey under her proper (British) colors, but hoisted the Confederate so soon as the prize was securely within her grasp. Occasionally, a vessel of little value was released on condition of taking to port the crews of several of the most recently burned; a few were bonded, mainly because they carried British cargoes or were insured in British offices; but the great majority were simply robbed of their money, food, &c., and burnt. Among those bonded by the Alabama was the steamship Ariel,[4] on her way from New York to Aspinwall, with the California passengers and freight; but the $250,000 which was to have been her ransom, being expressly "payable six months after the recognition [by the United States] of the independence of the Southern Confederacy," has not yet fallen due. Such was the just alarm caused by this capture, while several National vessels were anxiously looking for the Alabama, that the Ariel dared not bring the specie from California that met her at Aspinwall, but left it there, until a gunboat was sent for it by the Government; and the specie continued to be so transmitted for some months thereafter.

The merchant ships captured and destroyed by these freebooters were hundreds in number, and the value of vessels and cargoes amounted to many scores of millions of dollars.

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[1] Vol. I., pp. 602-3.

[2] Dec. 27, 1862.

[3] Of Texas: son of a once noted Methodist clergyman of like name, who was Irish by birth, and a noted pulpit orator.

[4] Nov. 18, 1862.

But the damage thus inflicted was not limited to this destruction—far from it. The paralysis of commerce—the transfer (at a sacrifice) of hundreds of valuable ships to British owners (real or simulated) in order that they might be allowed to keep the seas with impunity—with the waste of money and service involved in sending many costly and formidable steamships to every ocean and almost every port in quest of some corsair, which was plundering and burning, perhaps on one side of a petty island, while the Vanderbilt or Tuscarora was vainly seeking it on the other—which was sure to be anywhere but where it was awaited or sought—and which would drop into the neutral harbor whither its pursuer had repaired for coal, or food, or information, and lie there by his side, bearding him with impunity; taking its own time to depart in peace and safety, because no pursuit was allowed for the next 24 hours—such are the bare outlines of a system of maritime injury and annoyance which for years sickened the hearts of stanch upholders of the Union. That the officers of the Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and their confrères, were greeted in every British port with shouts and acclamations, receptions and dinners, as though they had been avowed Britons engaged in honorable warfare with their country's deadly foe, was observed by loyal Americans with a stinging consciousness of the hollowness and fraud of British neutrality which will not soon be effaced. And, when every remonstrance made by our Government or its representative against the favor shown to these privateers, not only in their construction, but throughout their subsequent career, was treated as though we had asked Great Britain to aid us against the Confederates, when we had only required that she cease to aid unwarrantably our domestic foes, the popular sense of dishonesty and wrong was with difficulty restrained from expressing itself in deeds rather than words.

Early in May, 1863, the Florida, while dodging our gunboats among the innumerable straits and passages surrounding the several West Indies, captured the brig Clarence, which was fitted out as a privateer and provided with a crew, under Lt. C. W. Read, late a midshipman in our navy. This new buccaneer immediately steered northward, and, sweeping up our southern coast, captured some valuable prizes; among them, when near Cape Henry, the bark Tacony,[5] to which Read transferred his men, and stood on up the coast; passing along off the mouths of the Chesapeake, Delaware, New York, and Massachusetts bays, seizing and destroying merchant and fishing vessels utterly unsuspicious of danger; until, at length, learning that swift cruisers were on his track, he burned the Tacony (in which he would have been easily recognized), and in the prize schooner Archer, to which he had transferred his armament and crew, stood boldly in for the harbor of Portland; casting anchor at sunset[6] at its entrance, and sending at midnight two armed boats with muffled oars up nearly to the city, to seize the steam revenue cutter Cushing and bring her out for his future use. This was done; but, no sooner

[5] June 12, 1863.

[6] June 24.

had the Cushing left, under her new masters, than she was missed, and two merchant steamers were armed and manned (by volunteers) and started after her. She was soon overhauled, and, having no guns to cope with her armament, the pursuers were about to board, when her captors took to their boats, firing half-a-dozen shots at her and blowing her up. The Portland boys kept on till they captured first the boats, then the Archer, towed them up to their city in triumph, and lodged Read and his freebooters snugly in prison.

The merchant steamer Chesapeake, plying between New York and Portland, was seized[7] by 16 of her passengers, who, suddenly producing arms, proclaimed themselves Confederates, and demanded her surrender; seizing the captain and putting him in irons, wounding the mate, and killing and throwing overboard one of the engineers. After a time, they set the crew and passengers ashore in a boat, and, putting the steamer on an easterly course, ran her into Sambro harbor, Nova Scotia, where she was seized[8] by the Union gunboat Ella and Anna, taken, with a portion of her crew, to Halifax, and handed over to the civil authorities. The prisoners were here rescued by a mob; but the steamboat was soon, by a judicial decision, restored to her owners.

During 1864, in addition to those already at work, three new British-Confederate corsairs, named the Tallahassee, Olustee, and Chickamauga, were set afloat; adding immensely to the ravages of their elder brethren. Up to the beginning of this year, it was computed that our direct losses by Rebel captures were 193 vessels; valued, with their cargoes, at $13,455,000. All but 17 of these vessels were burned. But now the Tallahassee, in August, swept along the Atlantic coast of the loyal States, destroying in ten days 33 vessels; while the Chickamauga, in a short cruise, burned vessels valued in all at $500,000. The Florida likewise darted along our coast, doing great damage there and thereafter; finally running into the Brazilian port of Bahia;[9] having just captured and burnt the bark Mondamon off that port. Here she met the U. S. steamer Wachusett, Capt. Collins, and came to anchor, as a precaution, in the midst of the Brazilian fleet and directly under the guns of the principal fort; and here, after ascertaining that he could not provoke her to fight him outside the harbor, Capt. Collins bore down upon her, at 3 A. M.,[10] while part of her crew were ashore; running at her under a full head of steam with intent to crush in her side and sink her; but, not striking her fairly, he only damaged, but did not cripple her. A few small-arm shots were fired on either side, but at random, and without effect. Capt. Collins now demanded her surrender, with which the lieutenant in command—(Capt. Morris, with half his crew, being ashore)—taken completely by surprise and at disadvantage—had no choice but to comply. In an instant, the Florida was boarded from the Wachusett, a hawser made fast to her, and the captor, crowding all steam, put out to sea; making no reply to a challenge from the Brazilian fleet, and unharmed by three shots fired at her from the fort; all

[7] Dec. 6, 1863. [8] Dec. 16. [9] Oct. 5, 1864. [10] Oct. 7.

which passed over her. The Brazilian naval commander tried to chase; but was not fast enough, and soon desisted. The Wachusett and her prize soon appeared in Hampton roads; where the latter was sunk by a collision a few days afterward.

There can be no reasonable doubt that, if the Florida was a fair, honest vessel, her capture was a foul one. Our consul at Bahia, Mr. T. F. Wilson, had seasonably protested against the hospitality accorded to her in that port, but without effect. As he was known to be implicated in the capture, his official recognition as consul was revoked. On a representation of the case by the Brazilian Minister, Gov. Seward, in behalf of President Lincoln, disavowed the acts of Collins and Wilson, dismissed the latter from office, suspended the former from command, and ordered him to answer for his act before a court-martial. He further announced that the persons captured on board the Florida should be set at liberty. But he took care to place this reparation wholly on the ground of the unlawfulness of any unauthorized exercise of force by this country within a Brazilian harbor—no matter if against a conceded pirate—saying:

"The Government disallows your assumption that the insurgents of this country are a lawful naval belligerent; on the contrary, it maintains that the ascription of that character by the Government of Brazil to insurgent citizens of the United States, who have hitherto been, and who still are, destitute of naval forces, ports, and courts, is an act of intervention, in derogation of the law of nations, and unfriendly and wrongful, as it is manifestly injurious, to the United States.

"So, also, this Government disallows your assumption that the Florida belonged to the aforementioned insurgents, and maintains, on the contrary, that that vessel, like the Alabama, was a pirate, belonging to no nation or lawful belligerent, and, therefore, that the harboring and supplying of these piratical ships and their crews in Brazilian ports were wrongs and injuries for which Brazil justly owes reparation to the United States, as ample as the reparation which she now receives from them. They hope and confidently expect this reciprocity in good time, to restore the harmony and friendship which are so essential to the welfare and safety of the two countries."

The Georgia was a Glasgow-built iron steamboat, which had left Greenock, as the Japan, in April, 1863; receiving her armament when off the coast of France, and at once getting to work as a beast of prey. Having destroyed a number of large and valuable merchant ships, she put in at Cherbourg, and afterward at Bourdeaux; whence she slipped over to England, and was sold (as was said) to a Liverpool merchant for £15,000. She now set out for Lisbon, having been chartered, it was given out, by the Portuguese Government; but, when 20 miles from her port of destination, she was stopped[11] by the U. S. steam-frigate Niagara, Capt. Craven, who made her his prize; returning with her directly to England, and landing her captain and crew at Dover. Her seizure provoked some newspaper discussion, but its rightfulness was not officially questioned.

The Alabama had already come to grief. After a long and prosperous cruise in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans, she had returned to European waters, taking refuge in the French port of Cherbourg; when the U. S. gunboat KEARSARGE,[12] which was lying in the Dutch harbor of Flushing, being notified by telegraph, came around at once to look after her. Semmes, however, seems to have been quite ready for the en-

[11] Aug. 15. [12] So named after a mountain in New Hampshire.

counter; as he dispatched[13] to Capt. Winslow a request that he would not leave, as he (Semmes) purposed to fight him. Winslow was glad to find their views so accordant, and was careful to heed Semmes's reasonable, courteous request.

The two vessels were very fairly matched: their dimensions and armaments being respectively as follows:

	Alabama.	Kearsarge.
Length over all.....	220 feet.	214½ feet.
Length on water-line ...	210 "	198½ "
Beam.....	32 "	33 "
Depth..	17 "	16 "
Horse-power, two engines of	300 each.	400 h.power.
Tonnage.....	1,150	1,030

Armament of the Alabama—One 7-inch Blakely rifle, one 8-inch smooth-bore 68-pounder, six 32-pounders.

Armament of the Kearsarge—Two 11-inch smooth-bore guns, one 30-pounder rifle, four 32-pounders.

Note.—The Kearsarge used but 5 guns; the Alabama 7. The Kearsarge had 162 officers and men; the Alabama about 150.

Having made all imaginable preparations in a friendly port, where he was surrounded by British as well as French sympathizers, Semmes—having first providently deposited on shore his chest of coin, his 62 captured chronometers, the relics of so many burned merchantmen—at his own chosen time, " steamed out of the harbor, followed by his British friend Lancaster in his steam-yacht Deerhound, and made for the Kearsarge, which was quietly expecting but not hurrying him, seven miles outside. When still more than a mile distant, the Alabama gave tongue; firing three broadsides before the Kearsarge opened in reply. Winslow endeavored to close and board: but his cautious adversary sheered off and steamed ahead, firing rapidly and wildly; while the Kearsarge, moving parallel with her, fired slowly and with deliberate aim. The badness of the Alabama's practice was notable from the fact that her British gunners had been trained on board Her Majesty's ship Excellent in Portsmouth harbor. Several had recently come on board, as if on purpose to take part in the expected fight.

Firing and steaming on, the combatants described seven circles; the Kearsarge steadily closing, and having diminished, by fully half, the distance at which the Alabama opened fire; when, after a mutual cannonade of an hour, the Kearsarge, at 12¼ P. M., was just in position to fire grape, and her adversary, having received several 11-inch shells, one of which disabled a gun and killed or wounded 18 men, as another, entering her coal-bunkers, and exploding, had completely blocked up the engine-room, compelling her to resort to sails, while large holes were torn in her sides, at length attempted to make for the protection of the neutral shore; but she was too far gone to reach it, being badly crippled and rapidly filling with water. Semmes and his crew appear to have had an understanding that she should beat the Kearsarge or sink with all on board; but, when she began to sink in good earnest, he hauled down his flag, and sent a boat to the Kearsarge to accelerate their rescue from the wreck as prisoners.

Semmes, in his letter to envoy J. M. Mason, adds:—

"Although we were now but 400 yards from each other, the enemy fired upon me five times after my colors had been struck. It is charitable to suppose that a ship of war of a Christian nation could not have done this intentionally."

Capt. Winslow does not "suppose," but states, as follows:—

"I saw now that she was at our mercy; and a few more guns, well directed, brought down her flag. I was unable to ascertain

[13] June 15, 1864.

[14] Sunday, June 19, 10¼ A. M.

whether it had been hauled down or shot away; but, a white flag having been displayed over the stern, our fire was reserved. Two minutes had not more than elapsed before she again opened on us with the two guns on the port side. This drew our fire again; and the Kearsarge was immediately steamed ahead and laid across her bows for raking. The white flag was still flying, and our fire was again reserved. Shortly after this, her boats were seen to be lowering, and an officer in one of them came alongside, and informed us that the ship had surrendered and was fast sinking. In twenty minutes from this time, the Alabama went down: her mainmast, which had been shot, breaking near the head as she sunk, and her bow rising high out of the water as her stern rapidly settled."

Lancaster—a virtual ally and swift witness for Semmes—who was close at hand, watching every motion with intense interest, in his log of the fight, dispatched to *The Times* that evening, when he arrived in his yacht at Cowes, with Semmes and such of his crew as he had snatched from the water and their captors—clearly refutes Semmes's charge. He says:—

"At 12, a slight intermission was observed in the Alabama's firing; the Alabama making head-sail, and shaping her course for the land, distant about nine miles.

"At 12:30, observed the Alabama to be disabled and in a sinking state. We immediately made toward her, and, in passing the Kearsarge, *were requested to assist in saving the Alabama's crew.*

"At 12:50, when within a distance of 200 yards, the Alabama sunk. We then lowered our two boats, and, with the assistance of the Alabama's whale-boat and dingy, succeeded in saving about 40 men, including Capt. Semmes and 13 officers. At 1 P. M., we steered for Southampton."

The Alabama had 9 killed and 21 wounded, including Semmes himself, slightly. Two of the wounded were drowned before they could be rescued.

The Kearsarge had three men badly wounded, one of them mortally;[15] but neither would go below to be treated till the victory was won.

The triumph of the Kearsarge is doubtless in part due to the superior effectiveness of her two 11-inch guns, but in good part also to the cool deliberation and excellent aim of her gunners. As to her being iron-clad, this is Semmes's story:

"At the end of the engagement, it was discovered, by those of our officers who went alongside the enemy's ship, with the wounded, that her midship section on both sides was *thoroughly iron-coated;* this having been done with chain constructed for the purpose, placed perpendicularly from the rail to the water's edge, the whole covered over by a thin outer planking, which gave no indication of the armor beneath.

"This planking had been ripped off in every direction by our shot and shell, the chain broken and indented in many places, and forced partly into the ship's side. She was most effectually guarded, however, in this section, from penetration."

Now let us hear Capt. Winslow on this point:

"The Alabama had been five days in preparation. She had taken in 350 tons of coal, which brought her down in the water. The Kearsarge had only 120 tons in; but, as an offset to this, *her sheet-chains were stowed outside,* stopped up and down, as an additional preventive and protection to her more empty bunkers."

[15] This hero, William Gowin, of Michigan, must not fade from his country's memory. Surgeon J. M. Browne reports that, being struck quite early in the action, by a fragment of shell, which badly shattered his leg near the knee-joint, Gowin refused assistance, concealed the extent of his injury, and dragged himself from the after pivot-gun to the fore-hatch, unwilling to take any one from his station. During the progress of the action, he comforted his suffering comrades by assuring them that "Victory is ours!" Whenever the guns' crews cheered at the successful effect of their shot, Gowin waved his hand over his head and joined in the shout. When brought at length to the Surgeon, he appeared with a smile on his face, though suffering acutely from his injury. He said, "It is all right, and I am satisfied; for we are whipping the Alabama;" adding, "I willingly will lose my leg or life, if it is necessary." In the hospital, he was calmly resigned to his fate, repeating again and again his willingness to die, since his ship had won a glorious victory. His country owes a monument to William Gowin.

The London Daily News says:

"The Kearsarge is spoken of as being iron-clad; she was no more iron-clad than the Alabama might have been, had they taken the precaution. She simply had a double row of chains hanging over her sides to protect her machinery. Two shots from the Alabama struck these chains, and fell harmlessly into the water."

Of the crew of the Alabama, 65 were picked up by the Kearsarge as prisoners; while Capt. Semmes and his officers and men who were picked up and carried off by Lancaster, with a few picked up by a French vessel in attendance, were also claimed as rightful prisoners of war; but they denied the justice of the claim, and were not surrendered.

The steady increase of our naval force, and our successful combined operations in Pamlico and Albemarle sounds; before Charleston, Savannah, and among the Sea Islands; up the mouths of the Mississippi; along the coasts of Florida; and at the mouth of the Rio Grande, had gradually closed up the harbors of the Confederacy, until, by the Spring of 1864, their blockade-runners were substantially restricted to a choice of two ports—Wilmington, N. C., and Mobile—where the character of the approaches and the formidable forts that still forbade access by our blockaders to the entrance of their respective harbors, still enabled skillfully-piloted steamers, carefully built in British yards expressly for this service, to steal in and out on moonless, clouded, or foggy nights; not without risk and occasional loss, but with reasonable impunity. To close these eyes of the Rebellion was now the care of the Navy Department; and it was resolved to commence with Mobile—the double entrance to whose spacious bay was defended by Forts Morgan and Powell on either hand, and by Fort Gaines on Dauphine island, which separates Grant's pass from the main channel. Beside the heavy guns and large garrisons of these forts, there was a considerable fleet, commanded by Franklin Buchanan, sole Rebel Admiral, and formerly a captain in our Navy, whose iron-clad Tennessee, 209 feet long, 48 feet beam, with timber sides 8 feet thick, doubly plated with 2-inch iron, fitted with tower, beak and overhang, and mounting two 7-inch and four 6-inch rifled guns, throwing projectiles respectively of 110 and 95 pounds, propelled by two engines and four boilers, was probably as effective a craft for harbor defense as fleet ever yet encountered. Her three consorts were ordinary gunboats of no particular force; but when to these forts and vessels are added the vague terrors and real dangers of torpedoes, carefully constructed and planted in a channel where it is scarcely possible for attacking vessels to avoid them, it must be felt that the fleet, however strong, which defies and assails them, can only hope to succeed by the rarest exhibitions alike of skill and courage. Ten years had not elapsed since the immense naval power of Great Britain, wielded by a Napier, recoiled before the defenses of Cronstadt; while no attempt was made on the fortifications of Odessa.

The fleet which Rear-Admiral Farragut led[16] to force its way into the bay of Mobile was composed of 4 iron-clads and 14 wooden ships-of-war or gunboats, as follows:

[16] Aug. 5, 1864.



DEFENSES OF MOBILE.

Hartford (flag-ship), Capt. P. Drayton;
Brooklyn, Capt. James Alden;
Metacomet, Lt.-Com'r J. E. Jouett;
Octorara, Lt.-Com'r C. H. Green;
Richmond, Capt. T. A. Jenkins;
Lackawanna, Capt. J. B. Marchand;
Monongahela, Com'r J. H. Strong;
Ossipee, Com'r W. E. Leroy;
Oneida, Com'r J. R. M. Mullany;
Port Royal, Lt.-Com'r B. Gherardi;
Seminole, Com'r E. Donaldson;
Kennebec, Lt.-Com'r W. P. McCann;
Itasca, Lt.-Com'r George Brown;
Galena, Lt.-Com'r C. H. Wells;
* Tecumseh, Com'r T. A. M. Craven;
* Manhattan, Com'r J. W. A. Nicholson;
* Winnebago, Com'r T. H. Stevens;
* Chickasaw, Lt.-Com'r T. H. Perkins.

* Iron-clads.

Gen. Canby had sent from New Orleans Gen. Gordon Granger, with a cöoperating land force, perhaps 5,000 strong, which had debarked on Dauphine island, but which could be of no service for the present; and did not attempt to be. Pollard says that our fleet carried 200 guns with 2,800 men.

Thursday, August 4, had been fixed on for the perilous undertaking; but, though the troops were on hand, the Tecumseh had not arrived; and—in contempt for the nautical superstition touching Friday—the attack was postponed to next morning; when, at 5¾ o'clock, the wooden ships steamed up, lashed together in couples; the Brooklyn and Octorara leading, followed by the Hartford and Metacomet; the iron-clads having already passed the bar, and now advancing in line on the right, or between the fleet and Fort Morgan. The Tecumseh, leading, at 6:47, opened fire on Fort Morgan, still a mile distant, which responded at 7:06; and forthwith, every gun that could be brought to bear on either side awoke the echoes of the startled bay.

The Brooklyn, when directly under the guns of the fort—which, disregarding the iron-clads, were trained especially on the Hartford and her, while their progress was retarded by the slowness of the monitors—had just opened on the fort with grape, driving its gunners from its more exposed batteries, when the Tecumseh, then 300 yards ahead of her, struck a torpedo which, exploding directly under her turret, tore a chasm in her bottom, through which the water poured in a flood, sinking her almost instantly, and carrying down Com'r Craven and nearly all his officers and crew. Out of 130, but 17 were saved; part in one of her own boats and part by a boat sent, by Farragut's order, from the Metacomet, under a terrible fire.

Farragut had reluctantly consented to let the Brooklyn lead the wooden fleet, because of her four chase-guns specially adapted to the work in hand, and because she had a peculiarly ingenious contrivance for picking up torpedoes. "Exposure is one of the penalties of rank in the navy," is his characteristic observation; in accordance with which, he had stationed himself in the Hartford's main-top, as the point whence every thing that transpired could best be observed; and the strong presumption that the Rebel fire would be concentrated on the flag-ship rendered him specially anxious that she should be accorded the post of pre-eminent peril and honor. Overruled at the outset, Farragut, when the Brooklyn very naturally recoiled at the spectacle of the Tecumseh's destruction, directed Drayton to go ahead, followed by the rest, in the full belief that several must pay the penalty of heroism just exacted of

the Tecumseh. But no more torpedoes were encountered; while the fire of the fort, now checked by the grape of our ships, became comparatively harmless, from the moment that he had fairly passed its front.

The Rebel fleet had opened fire directly after the fort; and the Tennessee, at 7:50, rushed at the Hartford, which simply returned her fire and kept on. The three Rebel gunboats, still ahead, poured their shots into the Hartford; the Selma getting a raking fire on her, which she could not return. Farragut, therefore, at 8:02, ordered the Metacomet to cast off and close with the Selma; which she captured, after an hour's fight: the Selma's captain, P. N. Murphy, with 9 others, being wounded; her Lieut. Comstock, with 5 more, being killed. She had 4 great pivot guns and 94 men. The Morgan and Gaines now took refuge under the guns of the fort; where the Gaines, badly crippled, was run ashore and burned. The Morgan escaped, and ran up to Mobile under cover of the ensuing night.

Farragut now supposed the fight over, and had ordered most of his vessels to anchor; but he was undeceived when the Tennessee, at 8:45, stood bravely down the bay, and, trusting to her invulnerability to shot, made for our flag-ship, resolved to run her down. At once, our ironclads and stronger wooden ships were signaled to close in upon and destroy her; our fire, save of the very largest guns, seeming scarcely to annoy her.

The Monongahela gave her the first blow; rushing at her at full speed, striking her square in the side, and, swinging around, pouring into her, when but a few feet distant, a broadside of solid 11-inch shot, which seemed to have much the same effect on her that a musket-wad or pop-gun pellet might be expected to produce on a buffalo's skull. Not satisfied with this, Capt. Jenkins drew off and came at her again, with the net result of losing his own beak and cut-water.

The Lackawanna next struck the Rebel monster at full speed; crushing in her own stem to the plank-ends, but only giving the ram a heavy list, without doing her any perceptible harm.

The Hartford came on next; but her blow was evaded by an adroit motion of the Tennessee's helm, so that the Hartford merely hit her on the quarter and rasped along her side: pouring in a broadside of 10-inch shot, at a distance of ten feet.

Our monitors had now crawled up, firing when they could do so; and the Chickasaw ran under her stern; while the Manhattan, also coming up behind her, gave her a solid 15-inch bolt, which struck her on her port quarter, carrying away her steering-gear, and breaking square through her iron plates and their wooden backing, but doing no harm inside.

Farragut had ordered Drayton to strike her a second blow; and he was proceeding to do so, when the Lackawanna, already badly crippled, in attempting to ram the enemy a second time, came in collision with the flag-ship, doing her considerable injury. Both drew off, took distance for another pass at her, and were coming on at full speed, when the Rebel alligator, sore beset from every side—her smoke-stack shot away, her steering-chains gone, several of her port-shutters so jammed by our shot

that they could not be opened, and one of them battered to fragments, with the Chickasaw boring away at her stern, and four other great vessels coming at her full speed—saw that the fight was fairly out of her, with no chance of escape, and, hauling down her flag, ran up a white one, just in time to have the Ossipee back its engine ere it struck her; changing its heavy crash into a harmless glancing blow. On her surrender, Admiral Buchanan was found severely wounded, with 6 of his crew; 3 being killed. Of prisoners, we took 190 with the Tennessee, and 90 with the Selma.

Our total loss in this desperate struggle was 165 killed (including the 113 who went down in the Tecumseh) and 170 wounded: the Hartford having 25 killed, 28 wounded, and the Brooklyn 11 killed and 43 wounded. The Oneida had 8 killed and 30 wounded, including her commander, Mullany, who lost an arm: most of them being scalded by the explosion, at 7:50, of her starboard boiler by a 7-inch shell, while directly under the fire of Fort Morgan. Nearly all her firemen and coal-heavers on duty were killed or disabled in a moment; but, though another shell at that instant exploded in her cabin, cutting her wheel-ropes, her guns were loaded and fired, even while the steam was escaping, as if they had been practicing at a target. The Tennessee passed and raked her directly afterward, disabling two of her guns. A shell, in exploding, having started a fire on the top of her magazine, it was quietly extinguished; the serving out of powder going on as before.

The Rebel fleet was no more; but the Rebel forts were intact. Farragut sent the wounded of both fleets to Pensacola in the Metacomet, and prepared to resume operations. During the ensuing night, Fort Powell was evacuated and blown up, so far as it could be; but the guns were left to fall into our hands. Fort Gaines was next day shelled by the iron-clad Chickasaw, with such effect that Col. Anderson, commanding there, next morning sued for conditions. He might probably have held out a little longer; but, being on an island, with the fleet on one side and Granger's army on the other, there was not a possibility of relief or protracted resistance. At 9¾ A. M., the Stars and Stripes were raised over the fort, and Anderson and his 600 men were prisoners of war.

Gen. Page, commanding in Fort Morgan, had much stronger defenses, and was on the main land, where he had a chance of relief; at the worst, he might get away, while Anderson could not. He telegraphed the latter peremptorily, "Hold on to your fort!" and his representations doubtless did much to excite the clamor raised against that officer throughout Dixie as a coward or a traitor. But when *his* turn came—Granger's troops having been promptly transferred to the rear of Morgan, invested" it, and, after due preparation, opened fire[18] in conjunction with the fleet—Page held out one day, and then surrendered at discretion. He doubtless was right in so doing; since—unless relieved by an adequate land force—his fall was but a question of time. Yet his prompt submission tallied badly with his censure of Anderson. Before surrendering, he had damaged

[17] Aug. 9.

[18] Aug. 22.

his guns and other material to the extent of his power.

Thus fell the last of the defenses of Mobile bay; sealing that port against blockade-runners thenceforth, and endangering the Rebel hold on the city. With those defenses, we had taken 104 guns and 1,464 men—not without cost certainly; but there were few minor successes of the year which were won more cheaply, or which contributed more directly and palpably to the downfall of the Rebellion.

XXX.

POLITICAL MUTATIONS AND RESULTS.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS OF 1864.

As, since McClellan's recoil from the defenses of Richmond, the judgment of the loyal States was divided concerning the probabilities of National success or defeat, so the fortunes of the contending parties reflected closely the changing aspects of the military situation. The Fall elections of 1862 had resulted in a general Opposition triumph; because the reflecting and unimpassioned had been led, by our recent reverses and our general disappointment, to doubt the ability of the Government to put down the Rebellion. Those of 1863, on the other hand, had strongly favored the Administration; because the National successes at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Helena, &c., the röopening of the Mississippi, and the recovery of East Tennessee, with a good part of Arkansas, had induced a very general belief, which our reverse at the Chickamauga did not shake, that the Union would surely triumph, and at no distant day. The victory of Mission ridge, followed by the appointment of Gen. Grant to the chief command of all the National forces, strengthened this belief into conviction; so that, though there were still those who did not desire the overthrow of the Rebellion, as there had been, even in the darkest hours, many whose faith in the National cause never faltered nor was shaded by a doubt—the strongly prevalent opinion of the loyal States, throughout the Spring of 1864, imported that Gen. Grant would make short work of what was left of the Confederacy. Hence, the Spring Elections were scarcely contested by the Opposition: New Hampshire opening them with an overwhelming Republican triumph;[1] Connecticut following with one equally decided,[2] though her Democratic candidate for Governor was far less obnoxious to War Democrats than his predecessor had been; and, though Rhode Island showed a falling off in the Republi-

[1] Total vote: *Republican.* *Democratic.*
Governor...Gilmore, 37,006 Harrington, 31,340

[2] Total vote: *Republican.* *Democratic.*
Governor..Buckingham, 39,220 O. S. Seymour, 34,1[illegible]

25th, and there choose delegates to the *Democratic* National Convention which was to assemble at Chicago for the nomination of a Presidential ticket—a call which insured the vote of this State in November to the candidates of the Opposition.

Gov. Bramlette, accompanied by ex-Senator Dixon and Col. A. G. Hodges, soon visited Washington, expressly to protest against, and (if possible) to obviate, this enrollment of negroes, or at least to render its execution less offensive and annoying to their masters—finding the President disposed to do whatever he could to reconcile the Kentuckians to the bitter prescription. Mr. Lincoln was induced to put the substance of his observations at their interview into the following letter:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, April 4, 1864.

"A. G. HODGES, Esq., Frankfort, Ky.:

"MY DEAR SIR: You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said the other day, in your presence, to Gov. Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows:

"I am naturally anti-Slavery. If Slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think and feel; and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that, in ordinary and civil administration, this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary, abstract judgment on the moral question of Slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on Slavery. I *did* understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that Government—that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life *and* limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save Slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of Government, country, and Constitution, altogether. When, early in the war, Gen. Fremont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, Gen. Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the Blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, Gen. Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When, in March, and May, and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the Blacks would come, unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition; and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and, with it, the Constitution, or of laying a strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our White military force—no loss by it anyhow, or anywhere. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite 130,000 soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, *as* facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men; and we could not have had them without the measure.

"And now let any Union man, who complains of this measure, test himself by writing down in one line, that he is for subduing the Rebellion by force of arms; and in the next, that he is for taking 130,000 men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be but for the measure he condemns. If he can not face his case so stated, it is only because he can not face the truth.

"I add a word which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale, I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity.

I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either perty or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.

"Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN."

Persuasive and cogent as this letter will now seem, it did not placate the indignation of the Kentuckians, nor change the destination of their delegates from the Chicago to the Baltimore Convention.

The careful reader will note in this letter a decided advance upon Mr. Lincoln's earlier allusions to Slavery in its necessary relations to our struggle. By nature, slow, cautious, tentative, and far from sanguine, he had profoundly distrusted the policy of Emancipation; apprehending that its adoption would alienate from the Union cause more strength than it would bring to its support. This distrust yielded tardily to evidence, which (in fact) was slowly furnished; but when at length it appeared that, while very few original, hearty Unionists were repelled by it, the Blacks became day by day a more active and more efficient element of our National strength, his doubts were fully dispelled, and his faith was the firmer and clearer for his past skepticism. Hence, at the great gathering which inaugurated[1] the National Cemetery carved from the battle-field of Gettysburg for the ashes of our brethren who there died that their country might live, though the elaborately polished oration of Edward Everett was patiently listened to, while Cabinet Ministers and Governors were regarded with lively curiosity, the central figure on the platform was the tall, plain, unpresuming, ungainly 'rail-splitter' from the prairies; and the only words uttered that the world cares to remember were those of the President, who —being required to say something— thus responded:

"Fourscore and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we *say* here; but it can never forget what they *did* here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government *of* the people, *by* the people, and *for* the people, shall not perish from the earth."

The first National Convention of 1864 met at Cleveland, May 31st, pursuant to a call "To the Radical Men of the Nation." About 350 persons were present; very few or none of them in the capacity of delegates. Ex-Gov. William F. Johnston, of Pa., was made temporary and Gen. John Cochrane, of N. Y.,

[1] Nov. 19, 1863.

permanent presiding officer. Gen. John C. Fremont was here nominated for President, and Gen. John Cochrane for Vice-President. The platform adopted is as follows:

"1st. That the Federal Union shall be preserved.

"2d. That the Constitution and laws of the United States must be observed and obeyed.

"3d. That the Rebellion must be suppressed by force of arms, and without compromise.

"4th. That the rights of free speech, free press, and the *habeas corpus*, be held inviolate, save in districts where martial law has been proclaimed.

"5th. That the Rebellion has destroyed Slavery, and the Federal Constitution should be amended to prohibit its reëstablishment, and to secure to all men absolute equality before the law.

"6th. That integrity and economy are demanded at all times in the administration of the Government; and that in time of war the want of them is criminal.

"7th. That the right of asylum, except for crime and subject to law, is a recognized principle of American liberty; that any violation of it can not be overlooked, and must not go unrebuked.

"8th. That the national policy known as the 'Monroe doctrine' has become a recognized principle; and that the establishment of an anti-republican Government on this continent by any foreign power can not be tolerated.

"9th. That the gratitude and support of the nation are due to the faithful soldiers and the earnest leaders of the Union army and navy for their heroic achievements and deathless valor in defense of our imperiled country and of civil liberty.

"10th. That the one-term policy for the Presidency, adopted by the people, is strengthened by the force of the existing crisis, and should be maintained by constitutional amendment.

"11th. That the Constitution should be so amended that the President and Vice-President shall be elected by a direct vote of the people.

"12th. That the question of the reconstruction of the rebellious States belongs to the people, through their representatives in Congress, and not to the Executive.

"13th. That the confiscation of the lands of the rebels, and their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers, is a measure of justice."

Gen. Fremont, in his letter of acceptance, repudiated the sweeping policy of confiscation above indicated. Gen. Cochrane demurred to such confiscation, but remitted the question to the wisdom of Congress, when it should be called to act on the subject of Reconstruction.

Ultimately, both candidates withdrew from the contest; convinced that the great mass of the popular vote must be divided between the 'Union' and the 'Democratic' tickets.

The 'Union' National Convention assembled at Baltimore, Tuesday, June 7. Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D. D., of Kentucky, was made temporary and Hon. William Dennison, ex-Governor of Ohio, permanent President. All but the incontestably, persistently Rebel States were found to be represented. Hon. Preston King, of N. Y., from the Committee on Credentials, reported in favor of admitting all the delegates claiming seats, but those from South Carolina and the 'Conservative' Unionists from Missouri: the delegations from the Territories, from the District of Columbia, and from the States of Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Florida, and Arkansas, not to be entitled to vote. Upon consideration, this report was overruled so far as to authorize—by a vote of 310 to 151—the delegates from Tennessee to vote; those from Louisiana and Arkansas were likewise authorized to vote, by 307 to 167. The delegates from Nebraska, Colorado, and Nevada, were then allowed also to vote; but not those from Virginia, Florida, and the remaining territories.

Mr. Henry J. Raymond, of N. Y., reported the platform, which was

unanimously adopted. It is as follows:—

"*Resolved*, That it is the highest duty of every American citizen to maintain against all their enemies the integrity of the Union and the paramount authority of the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and that, laying aside all differences and political opinions, we pledge ourselves as Union men, animated by a common sentiment, and aiming at a common object, to do everything in our power to aid the Government in quelling by force of arms the Rebellion now raging against its authority, and in bringing to the punishment, due to their crimes, the Rebels and traitors arrayed against it.

"*Resolved*, That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not to compromise with Rebels, nor to offer them any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an unconditional surrender of their hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and that we call upon the Government to maintain this position, and to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppression of the Rebellion, in full reliance upon the self-sacrificing patriotism, the heroic valor, and the undying devotion of the American people to their country and its free institutions.

"*Resolved*, That, as Slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this Rebellion, and as it must be always and everywhere hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic; and that we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the Government, in its own defense, has aimed a death-blow at this gigantic evil. We are in favor, furthermore, of such an amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of Slavery within the limits or the jurisdiction of the United States.

"*Resolved*, That the thanks of the American people are due to the soldiers and sailors of the Army and the Navy who have periled their lives in defense of their country, and in vindication of the honor of the flag; that the nation owes to them some permanent recognition of their patriotism and their valor, and ample and permanent provision for those of their survivors who have received disabling and honorable wounds in the service of the country; and that the memories of those who have fallen in its defense shall be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance.

"*Resolved*, That we approve and applaud the practical wisdom, the unselfish patriotism and unswerving fidelity to the Constitution and the principles of American Liberty, with which Abraham Lincoln has discharged, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, the great duties and responsibilities of the Presidential office; that we approve and indorse, as demanded by the emergency and essential to the preservation of the nation, and as within the Constitution, the measures and acts which he has adopted to defend the nation against its open and secret foes; that we approve especially the Proclamation of Emancipation, and the employment as Union soldiers of men heretofore held in slavery; and that we have full confidence in his determination to carry out these and all other constitutional measures essential to the salvation of the country into full and complete effect.

"*Resolved*, That we deem it essential to the general welfare that harmony should prevail in the National councils; and we regard as worthy of public confidence and official trust those only who cordially indorse the principles proclaimed in these resolutions, and which should characterize the administration of the Government.

"*Resolved*, That the Government owes to all men employed in its armies, without regard to distinction of color, the full protection of the laws of war; and that any violation of these laws or of the usages of civilized nations in the time of war by the Rebels now in arms should be made the subject of full and prompt redress.

"*Resolved*, That the foreign immigration which in the past has added so much to the wealth and development of resources and increase of power to this nation, the asylum of the oppressed of all nations, should be fostered and encouraged by a liberal and just policy.

"*Resolved*, That we are in favor of a speedy construction of the railroad to the Pacific coast.

"*Resolved*, That the National faith, pledged for the redemption of the public debt, must be kept inviolate; and that for this purpose we recommend economy and rigid responsibility in the public expenditures, and a vigorous and just system of taxation; that it is the duty of every loyal State to sustain the credit and promote the use of the National Currency.

"*Resolved*, That we approve the position taken by the Government, that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government on the Western Continent, and that they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence

of this our country, the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for monarchical governments, sustained by a foreign military force in near proximity to the United States."

On proceeding to vote for a Presidential candidate, Abraham Lincoln was named by the delegates from each State and Territory permitted to vote, save Missouri, which named Gen. Grant. Mr. Lincoln was then unanimously nominated.

The Convention proceeded to vote for Vice-President, with the following result:

Andrew Johnson	200	Hannibal Hamlin	150
Daniel S. Dickinson	108	Scattering	59

Several delegations thereupon changed to Johnson; who was nominated without further balloting by 494 votes to 26 for others.

These nominations were formally tendered and heartily accepted. Mr. Johnson's letter of acceptance, in its allusion to Slavery, tersely expressed what had ere this become the generally accepted faith of War Democrats—as follows:

"It is in vain to attempt to reconstruct the Union with the distracting element of Slavery in it. Experience has demonstrated its incompatibility with free and republican governments, and it would be unwise and unjust longer to continue it as one of the institutions of the country. While it remained subordinate to the Constitution and laws of the United States, I yielded to it my support; but when it became rebellious, and attempted to rise above the Government, and control its action, I threw my humble influence against it."

The resolves of the Union, like those of the Radical Convention, were, as we have seen, pitched in a very high key. The delegates had been chosen, had assembled, and deliberated, in the prevalent conviction that Grant's advance from the Rapidan and Sherman's from the Tennessee had each been a series of unbroken and not costly successes—that the Rebellion was already reeling under their heavy blows—that Richmond and Atlanta were on the point of falling—and that their fall involved that of the Confederacy. No doubt, no apprehension, disturbed the serenity of the Baltimore platform-builders. Their language was that of a monarch who had subdued an insurrection, and was intent on dispensing rewards to his lieutenants and pronouncing the doom of the defeated insurgents. In this spirit, the Convention met, acted, and dissolved; assured that the year 1864 would witness alike the reëlection of President Lincoln and the downfall of the Rebellion.

Events soon transpired which materially changed the aspect of affairs. Gen. Grant's determined attack at Cold Harbor was found to have been not merely unsuccessful—that had been frankly and promptly admitted—but an exceedingly expensive and damaging failure—damaging not merely in the magnitude of our loss, but in its effect on the morale and efficiency of our chief army. It had extinguished the last hope of crushing Lee north of the James, and of interposing that army between him and the Confederate capital. The failure to seize Petersburg when it would easily have fallen, and the repeated and costly failures to carry its defenses by assault, or even to flank them on the south—the luckless conclusion of Wilson's and Kautz's raid to Staunton river—Sheridan's failure to unite with Hunter in Lee's rear—Sturgis's disastrous defeat by Forrest near Guntown—Hunter's failure to carry Lynchburg, and eccentric line of retreat—Sherman's bloody repulse at Kenesaw, and

the compelled slowness of his advance on Atlanta—Early's unresisted swoop down the Valley into Maryland, his defeat of Wallace at the Monocacy, and his unpunished demonstration against the defenses of Washington itself—the raids of his troopers up to the suburbs of Baltimore, on the Philadelphia Railroad, and even up into Pennsylvania; burning Chambersburg and alarming even Pittsburg—and finally the bloody, wretched fiasco of the Mine explosion before Petersburg—these, and other reverses, relieved by a few and unimpressive triumphs—rendered the midsummer of 1864 one of the gloomiest seasons of our great struggle for the upholders of the National cause.

An impudent and treasonable stock-jobbing forgery, purporting to be a Proclamation by the President[9]—confessing the failure of Grant's advance on Richmond and the cooperating efforts, and ordering a fresh levy of men to recruit our decimated armies—though speedily detected and exposed, had meantime been flashed over the country; and had, while producing its intended effect on the prices of the National and other securities, caused a momentary sinking of the popular heart, which its exposure did not wholly countervail.

Another and profounder shock to public confidence followed; in the resignation[10] of Hon. Salmon P. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury. Gov. Chase had filled in the public service, through years of doubt, depression, and disaster, the second place in importance, and the first in the magnitude of its requirements, and had discharged its duties with prëeminent ability, energy, and courage. When he accepted it, on the accession of Mr. Lincoln, the Finances were already in chaos; the current revenue being inadequate, even in the absence of all expenditure or preparation for war; his predecessor[11] having attempted to borrow $10,000,000 in October, 1860, and obtained only $7,022,000—the bidders to whom the balance was awarded choosing to forfeit their initial deposit rather than take and pay for their bonds. Thenceforth, he had tided over till his resignation, by selling treasury notes payable a year from date at 6 to 12 per cent. discount; and when, after he had vanished from the scene, Gen. Dix, who succeeded him in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, attempted[12] to borrow a small sum on twenty-year bonds at 6 per cent., he was obliged to sell those bonds at an average discount of 9½ per cent. Hence, of Mr. Chase's first loan of $8,000,000, for which bids were opened[13] ten days before Beauregard first fired on Fort Sumter, the offerings ranged from 5 to 10 per cent. discount; and only $3,099,000 were tendered at or under 6 per cent. discount—he, in the face of a vehement clamor, declining all bids at higher rates of discount than 6 per cent., and placing, soon afterward, the balance of the $8,000,000 in two-year treasury notes at par or a fraction over.

Such were the financial auspices under which the Republic commenced the most gigantic and costly struggle that the world had ever known—a struggle in which it was ultimately required to keep on foot an army of one million men, with a

[9] May 18. [10] June 30. [11] Howell Cobb, of Georgia. [12] In Feb., 1861. [13] April 2.

vast and costly steam navy—a war in which well-appointed armies had to be transported by water or by railroads for hundreds of miles—a war for which nearly every weapon, every carriage, every means of offense or defense, had to be created or bought on the spur of the exigency—a war wherein our inexperience and lack of adaptation to the business were serious elements of cost—a war wherein countless millions had to be raised on the heel of every great disaster—often, when our seat of Government was in imminent peril of capture, and when foreigners, with scarcely an exception, proclaimed our cause already hopelessly lost, and deafened the general ear with their vehement protests against the criminal madness of pouring out rivers more of blood and heaping up mountains of debt to no possible end but to gratify a sullen, stupid, brutal obstinacy—a bankrupt but inexorable pride. When we add that a very considerable proportion of the wealth and intelligence of the loyal States was profoundly hostile to the prosecution of the War on our part, as fatal to all hopes of any desirable or even possible restoration of the Union, and, very naturally, not only refrained from subscribing to the loans continually pressed on the market, but dissuaded others from subscribing, and that we number few moneyed capitalists among our people—most, even of those in thrifty and comfortable circumstances, being oftener in debt than otherwise, while very few are accustomed to control considerable sums in money—it must be felt that the raising, in one way or another, of the gigantic loans and other means whereby the War was at length brought to a triumphant conclusion, was the standing miracle of the contest. Had the wildest devotee of 'Manifest Destiny' been asked beforehand to estimate the extent to which our Government could borrow money or incur debt to prosecute a Civil War which imperiled its existence, he could hardly have gone beyond One Thousand Millions of Dollars—which was barely a third of the debt actually created; and, when we consider also the State and local debts likewise incurred in raising and fitting out their several contingents, the actual debt incurred was probably over Four Billions—the total expenditure in prosecuting the War on our side being considerably above that stupendous sum.

The marvel of this achievement is not dwarfed by the fact that the Rebels encountered even greater financial straits and struggled through kindred difficulties. They were fighting almost always on their own soil—they used railroads, &c., as though they were public property—nearly all their men of wealth and position either were or professed to be wholly devoted to their cause, and ready to contribute whatever they had to its maintenance. They paid nothing as bounties to recruits, obtaining them by a relentless conscription; their marches were hundreds of miles to our thousands. On the ocean, they spent little or nothing; while our outlay for vessels, in building, equipping, and maintaining our fleets and naval armaments, amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. True, they were obliged to resort to irredeemable paper earlier, while its depreciation proceeded faster and much farther than ours; but, having ceased to pay their soldiers, and

feeding them mainly by requisitions, they were able to prosecute the contest after their credit was gone and their currency worthless; whereas, had the time ever arrived when 'greenbacks' would no longer buy bacon, at some not absolutely intolerable price, that circumstance must have ended the War. The South was not so rich nor so populous that an invading army might there support itself, however amply provided with arms and munitions.

The rapid growth of our National Debt is summarily exhibited in the following table:—

1860—June 30—total....	$64,769,703
1861 " " "	90,867,828
1862 " " "	514,211,371
1863 " " "	1,097,274,360
1864 " " "	1,740,036,689
1865—March 31st[14].....	2,423,437,001
1866—Jan. 1 (less cash on hand).....	2,749,491,745

To make treasury notes, or any form of Government promise, a legal tender, is an exercise of sovereign power which only a great public exigency will justify, and which a statesman will hesitate long before resorting to; but there are cases wherein no practical alternative exists; and ours was such a case.

The banks of the loyal States were forced to suspend specie payments in December, 1861—followed, of course, by the Treasury, whose heavy demands had been the primary cause of suspension. The act of Congress that authorized[15] an issue of treasury notes, which should be a legal tender as money throughout the United States, was a natural consequence. The amount first provided for was $150,000,000; but the aggregate issued was increased, under subsequent acts, till it exceeded $433,000,000, beside a very large amount in notes which bore interest and were payable at a specified early day.

The general suspension of specie payment was instantly followed by a depreciation of the Currency—in other words, the bank notes which formed the usual, recognized circulating medium wherein payments were made, sank in value below the coin they represented—the disparity being indicated by the *premium* at which gold could be purchased with irredeemable paper. Throughout January, 1862, this ranged from 1 to 5 per cent.; in February, its range of fluctuation was within those extremes, or from 2½ to 4¾ per cent. In March, April, and May—though the 'Legal Tender' act had meantime been passed and the issue of treasury notes (or 'greenbacks') commenced—the range was from 1½ to 3½ per cent.; but in June it mounted to 9½; and in July (after McClellan's failure before Richmond) to 20½ per cent. In August, it fell off—varying from 12½ to 15½; but in September it mounted to 24½, and in October to 36½ per cent. In November and December, it ranged between 29½ and 33¾; but, in January, 1863—under the disheartening influence of Burnside's misfortunes at and near Fredericksburg—it went up to 60 per cent. Here are its highest and lowest rulings during the two following years of anxiety and doubt—of alternate hope and despair:

[14] Virtual close of the War. But the paying off and mustering out of our vast armies, the settlement of outstanding bills, &c., required—as the next item indicates—nearly Four Hundred Millions more; raising our total Debt to about $2,800,000,000.

[15] Feb. 25, 1862.

	1863.		1864.	
	Highest.	Lowest.	Highest.	Lowest.
January	160	133½	159½	151½
February	172½	152½	160½	157½
March	171	139½	170	159½
April	159½	146	159	164
May	156	143½	195	167½
June	149½	140½	252	167
July	145½	133½	290	229
August	128½	122½	261	231
September	142½	127½	254½	185
October	156½	142½	222½	189
November	154½	143½	260	209½
December	153	146½	243½	211

By the pecuniary gauge thus afforded, it appears that the very darkest hours of our contest—those in which our loyal people most profoundly despaired of a successful issue—were those of July and August, 1864; following Grant's repulse from Cold Harbor, the mine explosion before Petersburg, and during Early's unpunished incursion into Maryland, and his cavalry's raids up to Chambersburg and McConnellsburg.

Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one of whom wrote [16] to the author of this work, averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and Geo. N. Sanders (the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise confidentially assured that the two former had full powers from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and suggesting certain terms of rëunion and peace which he judged might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they should be accepted or rejected. The facts that an important election was then pending in North Carolina, wherein William W. Holden was an avowed anti-Davis and virtual reunion candidate for Governor, and that his triumph would be a staggering blow to the Confederacy, were urged as affording special reasons for treating the Niagara overture in such manner as to strengthen the Peace Party in that and in other revolted States. The "Plan of Adjustment" which he suggested that the President might advantageously offer, in case he should decide to make any offer, was as follows:

"1. The Union is restored and declared perpetual.

"2. Slavery is utterly and forever abolished throughout the same.

"3. A complete amnesty for all political offenses, with a restoration of all the inhabitants of each State to all the privileges of citizens of the United States.

"4. The Union to pay four hundred million dollars ($400,000,000) in five per cent. United States stock to the late Slave States, loyal and secession alike, to be apportioned *pro rata*, according to their slave population respectively, by the census of 1860, in compensation for the losses of their loyal citizens by the abolition of Slavery. Each State to be entitled to its quota upon the ratification by its Legislature of this adjustment. The bonds to be at the absolute disposal of the Legislature aforesaid.

"5. The said Slave States to be entitled henceforth to representation in the House on the basis of their total, instead of their Federal population: the whole being now free.

"6. A National Convention to be assembled so soon as may be, to ratify this adjustment, and make such changes in the Constitution as may be deemed advisable."

He added:

"I do not say that a just peace is now attainable, though I believe it to be so. But I *do* say that a frank offer by you to the insurgents of terms which the impartial must say ought to be accepted, will, at the worst, prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the National cause. It may save us from a Northern insurrection.

"P. S.—Even though it should be deemed unadvisable to make an offer of terms to the Rebels, I insist that, in any possible case, it is desirable that any offer *they* may be disposed to make should be received, and either accepted or rejected. I beg you to

[16] July 5, 1864.

invite those now at Niagara to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum.

"H. G."

The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the regret of his correspondent—to depute *him* to proceed to Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question. He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment, and did not greatly care (since the more unreasonable their proposition, the better for the National cause), and had neither purpose nor desire to be made a confidant, much less an agent in the premises, it was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was in effect to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of adjustment and peace. This expectation was indicated in a final note from the President, transmitted by his Private Secretary, Maj. Hay, with the message that sent him to Niagara; but its purport was misapprehended in view of his explicit, repeated refusals to do more in the premises than be the means of bringing the Confederate agents to Washington, provided they should prove to be responsibly accredited. The whole matter thus terminated in failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the Opposition, because of a final missive from the President, couched in these terms:

"Executive Mansion,
"Washington, July 18, 1864.

"*To whom it may concern:*

"Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of Slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on substantial and collateral points; and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

"(Signed) Abraham Lincoln."

Messrs. Clay and Holcombe made the most of this in a public manifesto, intended to 'fire the Southern heart,' and to disaffect those in the loyal States who were anxious for honorable peace at the earliest moment. And there was a very widespread impression that the overture of the Confederates had not been met in the manner best calculated to strengthen the National cause and invigorate the arm of its supporters. In other words, it was felt that—since the overture originated with them—they should have been allowed to make their own proposition, and not required in effect to make one dictated to them from our side, however inherently reasonable.

But, happily, another negotiation—even more irregular and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Col. James F. Jaques, 73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies for the purpose. Arrived in Richmond, they addressed a joint letter to Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with

President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar, earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief presented his ultimatum in these terms:

"I desire peace as much as you do; I deplore bloodshed as much as you do; but I feel that not one drop of the blood shed in this War is on *my* hands—I can look up to my God and say this. I tried all in my power to avert this War. I saw it coming, and for twelve years I worked night and day to prevent it; but I could not. The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the War came: and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, *unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery. We are fighting for* INDEPENDENCE; and *that or extermination we* WILL *have.*"

Again, at parting, Mr. Davis bade them—

"Say to Mr. Lincoln, from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."

Thus it was not only incontestably settled but proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens, that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be recognized as an independent power, or till it should be utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was worth more than a victory to the National cause. For, though the Confederate chiefs had ever held but one language on this point—had at no time given any one reason to believe that they might be reconciled to the Union—it was habitually assumed by the Opposition in the loyal States that they were fighting not against the Union, but against Abolition; and that they might easily be placated and won to loyalty, were but the Democratic party restored to power."[17]

The Democratic National Convention had been originally called[18] to assemble at Chicago on the 4th of July; but its meeting was, in June, postponed to the 29th of August; on which day, it there assembled, and was fully organized, with Gov. Horatio Seymour, of New York, as President. The States not absolutely in the power of the Rebellion were fully and strongly represented; but, in addition to the delegates, there was a vast concourse of the master-spirits of the party, especially from the Western States, where hostility to the War was more pronounced and unqualified than at the East; while the 'Order of American Knights,' 'Sons of Liberty,' or by

[17] John B. Jones, formerly editor of the *Southern Monitor*, Philadelphia, who returned to his native South at the outbreak of the Rebellion, and obtained a clerkship in the Confederate War Department, in his 'Rebel War-Clerk's Diary,' thus records an incident of Mr. C. L. Vallandigham's brief sojourn in the Confederacy under the sentence of Gen. Burnside's court-martial:—

"*June 22d*, 1863.—To-day, I saw the memorandum of Mr. Ould, of the conversation held with Mr. Vallandigham, for file in the archives. *He says, if we can only hold out this year, that the Peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence.* He seems to have thought that our cause was sinking, and *feared we would submit;* which would, of course, be ruinous to his party. But he advises strongly against any invasion of Pennsylvania; for that would unite all parties at the North, and so strengthen Lincoln's hands that he would be able to crush all opposition, and trample upon the constitutional rights of the people.

"Mr. Vallandigham said nothing to indicate that either he or the party had any other idea than that the Union would be reconstructed under Democratic rule. The President indorsed, with his own pen, on this document, that, in regard to invasion of the North, experience proved the contrary of what Mr. Vallandigham asserted. But Mr. Vallandigham is for restoring the Union, amicably, of course; and, if it can not be so done, then possibly he is in favor of recognizing our independence. He says any reconstruction which is not voluntary on our part would soon be followed by another separation, and a worse war than the present one." [18] Jan. 12.

whatever name the secret, oath-bound leagues of thorough-going sympathizers with Slavery and the Rebellion chose to be known to each other, were, by evident preconcert, on hand in extraordinary strength and in immeasurable virulence. Gov. H. Seymour—who seems to have nursed secret hopes of achieving a nomination for the Presidency—made an extreme anti-War address on assuming the chair; but his polished sentences seemed tame and moderate by comparison with the fiery utterances volunteered from hotel balconies, on street-corners, and wherever space could be found for the gathering of an impromptu audience; while the wildest, most intemperate utterances of virtual treason—those which would have caused Lee's army, had it been present, to forget its hunger and rags in an ecstasy of approval—were sure to evoke the loudest and longest plaudits. For example, the ex-Rev. C. Chauncey Burr, of New Jersey, thus set forth his sympathy with the insurgents:—

"We had no right to burn their wheat-fields, steal their pianos, spoons, or jewelry. Mr. Lincoln had stolen a good many thousand negroes; but for every negro he had thus stolen he had stolen 10,000 spoons. It had been said that, if the South would lay down their arms, they would be received back into the Union. The South could not honorably lay down her arms, for she was fighting for her honor. Two millions of men had been sent down to the slaughter-pens of the South, and the army of Lincoln could not again be filled, neither by enlistments nor conscription. If he ever uttered a prayer, it was that no one of the States of the Union should be conquered and subjugated."

Rev. Henry Clay Dean, of Iowa, said:

"For over three years, Lincoln had been calling for men, and they had been given. But, with all the vast armies placed at his command, he had failed! *failed!!* FAILED!!! FAILED!!!! Such a failure had never been known. Such destruction of human life had never been seen since the destruction of Sennacherib by the breath of the Almighty. And still the monster usurper wanted more men for his slaughter-pens. * * * Ever since the usurper, traitor, and tyrant, had occupied the Presidential chair, the Republican party had shouted 'War to the knife, and the knife to the hilt!' Blood had flowed in torrents; and yet the thirst of the old monster was not quenched. His cry was for more blood."

Such was the spirit of the harangues which were poured forth on every side throughout the sittings of that Convention. Their substance was tersely though coarsely summed up in the remark of Judge Miller, of Ohio, that

"There is no real difference between a War Democrat and an Abolitionist. They are links of one sausage, made out of the same dog."

None can say how many of the vast gathering who yelled assent to such utterances *knew* that they were surrounded by and mixed up with Rebel officers fresh from Canada, who had been sent here expressly to cooperate with certain domestic traitors, high in office in the secret organizations aforesaid, in the sudden mustering of a force, mainly of 'American Knights' (locally known as 'Illini'), which should first liberate the 8,000 Rebel captives then held in Camp Douglas, near that city; thence rushing with rapidly augmented numbers to the achievement of a similar success at the prison-camp near Indianapolis—thus raising the siege of Richmond and Atlanta by 'a fire in the rear'—but that such a conspiracy had for weeks existed; that many then in Chicago were heartily engaged in it; and that, but for the extraordinary astuteness, vigilance, and energy, of Col. B. J. Sweet, then in command over Camp Douglas—there

would have been at least a desperate *attempt* to execute the bloody programme—are facts which rest on testimony too positive, and drawn from too many independent sources, to be distrusted. But Sweet had mastered their secret, through the treachery of one or more who were trusted by the leaders, and had accumulated such an array of force that, when the time came for striking the blow, its failure was so plainly inevitable that a postponement was ordered."[19]

A strong Committee of one from each State, whereof Hon. James Guthrie, of Kentucky, was chairman, but C. L. Vallandigham, recently returned from Canada, a master-spirit, having been chosen to construct a party platform for the canvass, that Committee in due time reported the following:—

"*Resolved*, That in the future, as in the past, we will adhere with unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution, as the only solid foundation of our strength, security, and happiness as a people, and as a framework of government equally conducive to the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both Northern and Southern.

"*Resolved*, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that, after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity of a war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate Convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

"*Resolved*, That the direct interference of the military authority of the United States in the recent elections held in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware, was a shameful violation of the Constitution; and the repetition of such acts in the approaching election will be held as revolutionary, and resisted with all the means and power under our control.

"*Resolved*, That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired; and they hereby declare that they consider the Administrative usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution, the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection, the arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial, and sentence, of American citizens in States where civil law exists in full force, the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press, the denial of the right of asylum, the open and avowed disregard of State rights, the employment of unusual test-oaths, and the interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms, as calculated to prevent a restoration of the Union and the perpetuation of a government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed.

"*Resolved*, That the shameful disregard of the Administration to its duty, in respect to our fellow-citizens who now and long have been prisoners of war in a suffering condition, deserve the severest reprobation, on the score alike of public interest and common humanity.

"*Resolved*, That the sympathy of the Democratic party is heartily and earnestly extended to the soldiery of our army, who are and have been in the field under the flag of our country; and, in the event of our attaining power, they will receive all the care and protection, regard and kindness, that the brave soldiers of the Republic have so nobly earned."

There were men in that Convention whose judgment did not approve this platform; but these were intent on the nomination of McClellan for President, and feared to injure his chances

[19] Weeks later, with larger means and a better organization, the conspirators had prepared for an outbreak on the day of the Presidential Election; but Sweet, fully apprised of their designs, pounced upon them on the night of Nov. 6, making prisoners of Col. G. St. Leger Grenfell, who had been John Morgan's Adjutant, Col. Vincent [brother of Gen. M. M.] Marmaduke, Capt. Cantrill, of Morgan's old command, and several Illinois traitors, thus completely crushing out the conspiracy, just as it was on the point of inaugurating civil war in the North.

by attempting to stem the torrent. In fact, the extreme "Peace" men, who were hostile to McClellan, had from the first been intent on making a platform whereon a Major-General of the Union army could not creditably stand; and they would seem to have succeeded.

The Convention proceeding to designate by ballot a candidate for President, Gen. McClellan received 162 votes to 64 for others; but several delegations now changed to McClellan; so that the vote, as finally declared, stood 202½ for McClellan to 23½ for Thomas H. Seymour, of Connecticut. Gov. H. Seymour had voted in his delegation for Justice Nelson, of the Supreme Court; but his vote was swamped by a decided majority in that delegation for McClellan, which gave him the full vote of the State. McClellan's nomination was now made unanimous.

The first vote for Vice-President showed 65½ for James Guthrie, 54½ for Geo. H. Pendleton, of Ohio, 32½ for Gov. Powell, of Ky., 26 for Geo. W. Cass, of Pa., and 47½ scattering. As Mr. Pendleton had in Congress been an unswerving opponent of the War, and, as the "Peace" men evinced anxiety for his nomination, Mr. Guthrie's name was withdrawn, and Mr. Pendleton unanimously nominated. The Convention soon dissolved, after providing that it might be rëconvened if necessary.

When the platform was read next morning by the cooler millions throughout the land, whose blood had not been fevered by the harangues of the 'Sons of Liberty,' it was very widely felt by Democrats that the Convention had made an enormous and probably fatal mistake; while those supporters of Mr. Lincoln, who, a few weeks earlier, had scarcely hoped for success, and, even the day before, had regarded the issue as exceedingly doubtful, laid down their morning papers in joyful confidence that their triumph was secure. So stupendous, so amazing a political blunder, had not been committed for the last twenty years.

Directly on the back of this, the tidings were flashed over the country, "Sherman has taken Atlanta!" "Farragut has carried the defenses of Mobile!" emphasized by a Proclamation [20] from President Lincoln for thanksgiving in all the churches on the following Sabbath, with "the National thanks" to Sherman, Farragut, Canby, and their associates, and salutes of 100 guns from every Navy Yard and naval arsenal [21] for Mobile, followed by like salutes [22] from each military headquarters and military arsenal for Atlanta. It was in vain that Gen. McClellan attempted to stem the swelling tide, so suddenly evoked, by a letter of acceptance which was in effect a repudiation of the platform whereon he had just been placed. He said:

"The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils and in the hearts of the people. The rëestablishment of the Union, in all its integrity, is and must continue to be the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, rëestablish

[20] Sept. 3. [21] Sept. 5. [22] Sept. 7.

the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace. We ask no more.

"Let me add what I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent: that, when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights. If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain these objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union; but the Union must be preserved at all hazards. I could not look in the face my gallant comrades of the army and navy who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain—that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives. A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy, or at home, would, as *I* would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood; but *no peace can be permanent without Union.*"

The great majority very properly recognized the Convention, not one of its candidates, as the authorized expounder of the party's principles and purposes, and the platform, not the letter of acceptance, as the authentic party creed. Gov. Seward, called out [23] by a procession of the Lincoln and Johnson Association of Washington, pungently said:

"Fellow Citizens: The Democracy at Chicago, after waiting six weeks to see whether this war for the Union is to succeed or fail, finally concluded that it would fail; and therefore went in for a nomination and platform to make it the sure thing by a cessation of hostilities and an abandonment of the contest. At Baltimore, on the contrary, we determined that there should be no such thing as failure; and therefore we went in to save the Union by battle to the last. *Sherman and Farragut have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations;* and the elections in Vermont and Maine prove the Baltimore nominations stanch and sound. The issue is thus squarely made up —*McClellan and Disunion*, or *Lincoln and Union*. Have you any doubt of the result on that issue? [Cries of 'No!' 'No!'] Nor do *I* have any doubt. Many thanks, my friends, for this visit."

Gen. Fremont now withdrew [24] his name from the Presidential canvass, saying:

"The Presidential contest has, in effect been entered upon in such a way that the union of the Republican party had become a paramount necessity. The policy of the Democratic party signifies either separation or rëestablishment with Slavery. The Chicago platform is simply separation. Gen. McClellan's letter of acceptance is re-establishment with Slavery. The Republican candidate is, on the contrary, pledged to the rëestablishment of the Union *without* Slavery; and, however hesitating his policy may be, the pressure of his party will, we may hope, force him to it. Between these issues, I think that no man of the liberal party can remain in doubt; and I believe I am consistent with my antecedents and my principles in withdrawing—not to aid in the triumph of Mr. Lincoln, but to do my part toward preventing the election of the Democratic candidate. In respect to Mr. Lincoln, I continue to hold exactly the sentiments contained in my letter of acceptance. I consider that his administration has been politically, militarily, and financially, a failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret for the country."

A few of the ultra "Peace" men talked of repudiating McClellan because of his letter of acceptance; and some, probably, refused on account of it to vote for him; but they finally ran no ticket: so that their disaffection had scarcely a perceptible effect on the canvass. Not so the successive victories of Sheridan in the Valley; which did not serve to elect Lincoln and Johnson—*that* had been already secured—but doubtless contributed to swell their popular and electoral majority.

The Autumn Elections opened, as usual, with Vermont; [25] which gave a slight Republican gain on the vote

[23] Sept. 14. [24] Sept. 17. [25] Sept. 6.

of 1863 for Governor,[26] and on the whole ticket. Maine followed;[27] and here the Opposition claimed an encouraging gain: the vote being far less than that drawn out by the vehement contest of 1863, and the majority reduced in proportion.[28] Both parties then held their breath for the returns from the October elections: Pennsylvania and Indiana having for an age been held to indicate, by the results of those elections, the issue of the pending Presidential canvass. Indiana now showed a change of 30,000 since 1862;[29] electing Governor Morton and carrying the Republican tickets throughout by over 20,000 majority, with 8 Republican to 3 Democratic Representatives in Congress—a gain of 4 seats to the victors. The vote was heavy beyond precedent—swelled, the losers said, unfairly. Pennsylvania elected no State officer this year by a general vote; but her representatives in Congress—before 12 to 12—were now 15 to 9, with a Legislature strongly Republican in both branches, and an average popular majority of 10,000 to 15,000. Ohio, on the same day,[30] went 'Union' by a popular majority of 54,754 [31] on Secretary of State; while, instead of the 14 Democrats to 5 Republicans chosen in '62 to represent her in Congress, she now elected 17 Republicans to *two* Democrats. These results left little doubt that Mr. Lincoln would be rëelected to the Presidency.

But no election of that month was of more lasting consequence than that held in Maryland;[32] which State was now to adopt or reject the new Constitution which banished Slavery from her soil and withdrew the Right of Suffrage from those of her citizens who had abetted the Rebellion. The Constitution was carried—and barely carried—by the vote of her soldiers in the field: the total vote, as declared, being 30,174 *for*, to 29,699 *against* ratifying; whereof the soldiers gave 2,633 *for*, to 163 *against* it. Had not the Convention enabled them to vote in their respective camps, the Constitution would have been rejected by all but 2,000 majority—the vote in all the lower counties—that is, in all but Baltimore, Cecil, and the western counties—showing heavy adverse majorities.

The death of Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the United States, on the day which witnessed this result, was a remarkable cöincidence. Judge Taney had long been a main bulwark of Slavery, not only in Maryland, but throughout the Union. The Dred Scott decision is inseparably linked with his name. His natural ability, eminent legal attainments, purity of private character, fullness of years,[33] and the long period he had officiated as Chief Justice,[34] caused him to be regarded by many as a pillar of the State; and his death at this moment seemed to mark the transition from the era of

	Rep.		*Dem.*	
[26]	1863—Smith,	29,613	Redfield,	11,962
	1864—Smith,	31,260	Redfield,	12,283

[27] Sept. 12.

	Union.		*Dem.*	
[28]	1863—Cony,	68,299	Bradbury,	50,583
	1864—Cony,	62,389	Howard,	46,476
[29]	1862—Peele,	118,517	Athon,	128,160
	1864—Morton,	152,084	McDonald,	131,201

[30] Oct. 11.

	Union.		*Dem.*	
[31]	Smith,	237,210.	Armstrong,	182,439.

[32] Oct. 11–12.

[33] Born March 17, 1777.

[34] Appointed by Gen. Jackson, March, 1836, to succeed John Marshall, deceased.

Slavery to that of Universal Freedom. Though he held his office and discharged its functions to the last, it was notorious that he did not and (with his views) could not sympathize with the Republic in her struggle against red-handed Treason. Originally an ultra-Federalist, Slavery had transformed him into a practical disciple of Calhoun.

The choice of Presidential Electors was made simultaneously[35] in every State; and the result was such as all intelligent observers had for weeks anticipated. Gen. McClellan secured the Electoral votes of New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky—21 in all: the residue—212[36]—were cast for Lincoln and Johnson. The only States wherein the voters were divided with a near approach to equality were New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Delaware, and perhaps New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon.

No election was held in the ten States which were or had been most completely under the sway of the Rebellion; and, though Lincoln and Johnson electors were chosen in Tennessee, their vote was not accepted and counted by Congress. The aggregate poll in each loyal State was as follows:

	Lincoln.	McClellan.
Maine	72,278	47,736
New Hampshire	36,595	33,034
Massachusetts	126,742	48,745
Rhode Island	14,343	8,718
Connecticut	44,693	42,288
Vermont	42,422	13,325
New York	368,726	361,986
New Jersey	60,723	68,014
Pennsylvania	296,389	276,308
Delaware	8,115	8,767
Maryland	40,153	32,739
Kentucky	27,786	64,301
Ohio	265,154	205,568
Indiana	150,422	130,233
Illinois	189,487	158,349
Missouri	72,991	31,026
Michigan	85,352	67,379
Iowa	87,331	49,260
Wisconsin	79,564	63,875
Minnesota	25,060	17,375
California	62,134	43,841
Oregon	9,888	8,457
Kansas	14,228	3,871
West Virginia	23,223	10,457
Nevada	9,826	6,594
Total	2,213,665	1,802,237

Lincoln's popular majority, 411,428.

Fourteen of the States had authorized their soldiers in the field to vote; those of New York sending home their ballots (sealed) to be cast by their next friends. Of course, no one can say *how* her soldiers voted. The vote of the Minnesota soldiers did not reach her State canvassers in season to be counted, and were probably destroyed unopened. So with most of the Vermont soldiers' vote. Of the States whose soldiers voted so that their ballots can be distinguished, the Army vote was returned as follows:

	Lincoln.	McClellan.
Maine	4,174	741
New Hampshire	2,066	690
Vermont	243	49
Pennsylvania	26,712	13,349
Maryland	2,800	321
Kentucky	1,194	2,823
Ohio	41,146	9,757
Michigan	9,402	2,959
Iowa	15,178	1,364
Wisconsin	11,372	2,458
Kansas	2,867	543
California	2,600	237
Total	119,754	34,291

Lincoln's majority, 85,461—over 3 to 1.

Great changes in the composition of the House of Representatives necessarily attended this result: the new House ultimately comparing with the old as follows:

[35] Tuesday, Nov. 8.

[36] Nevada chose three electors, as she had a right to do; but one of them failed to appear, and his colleagues did not fill his place.

States.	XXXVIIIth Congress. Rep.-Union.	Dem.	XXXIXth Congress Rep.-Union.	Dem.
California	3	—	3	—
Connecticut	3	1	4	—
Delaware	1	—	—	1
Illinois	5	9	11	3
Indiana	4	7	8	3
Iowa	6	—	6	—
Kansas	1	—	1	—
Kentucky	4	5	4	5
Maine	4	1	5	—
Maryland	4	1	3	2
Massachusetts	10	—	10	—
Michigan	5	1	6	—
Minnesota	2	—	2	—
Missouri	5	4	8	1
New Hampshire	2	1	3	—
New Jersey	1	4	2	3
New York	17	14	20	11
Ohio	5	14	17	2
Oregon	1	—	1	—
Pennsylvania	12	12	15	9
Rhode Island	2	—	2	—
Vermont	3	—	3	—
West Virginia	3	—	3	—
Wisconsin	3	3	5	1
Nevada (new)	—	—	1	—
Total	106	77	143	41

NOTE.—Some members ultimately became alienated from the party by which they were respectively elected; some were unseated as improperly returned; and several were elected from States formerly in revolt who were not admitted to seats; the above table conforms to the original returns.

The XXXVIIIth Congress rëassembled[37] soon after the Presidential Election; and Mr. Lincoln addressed to it his last Annual Message. With reference to the recent election, he said:

"Judging by the recent canvass and its result, the purpose of the people, within the loyal States, to maintain the integrity of the Union, was never more firm, nor more nearly unanimous, than now. The extraordinary calmness and good order with which the millions of voters met and mingled at the polls give strong assurance of this. Not only all those who supported the Union ticket, so called, but a great majority of the opposing party also, may be fairly claimed to entertain, and to be actuated by, the same purpose. It is an unanswerable argument to this effect, that no candidate for any office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the Union. There have been much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the Union cause; but, on the distinct issue of Union or no Union, the politicians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there is no diversity among the people. In affording the people the fair opportunity of showing, to one another and to the world, this firmness and unanimity of purpose, the election has been of vast value to the National cause."

He discouraged further attempts at negotiation with "the insurgent leader," as precluded by the fixed resolve on our side not to concede Disunion and on his to accept nothing less; and added:

"In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the National authority, on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to Slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that, 'while I remain in my present position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to Slavery any person who is free by the terms of that Proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.' If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to rëenslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it.

"In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it."

The event of this session was the passage, by the required two-thirds vote, of the Constitutional Amendment abolishing and forever prohibiting Slavery throughout the United States. This measure had been first submitted[38] to the Senate by Mr. Henderson of Mo., and adopted[39] in that branch by the strong vote of 38 to 6; as follows:

YEAS—[Democrats in *Italics*.]
MAINE—Fessenden, Morrill.
NEW HAMPSHIRE—Clark, Hale.
MASSACHUSETTS—Sumner, Wilson.
RHODE ISLAND—Anthony, Sprague.
CONNECTICUT—Dixon, Foster.
VERMONT—Collamer, Foot.
NEW YORK—Harris, Morgan.
NEW JERSEY—Ten Eyck.

[37] Dec. 6, 1864. [38] Jan. 11, 1864. [39] April 8.

PENNSYLVANIA—Cowan.
MARYLAND—*Reverdy Johnson.*
WEST VIRGINIA—Van Winkle, Willey.
OHIO—Sherman, Wade.
INDIANA—Henry S. Lane.
ILLINOIS—Trumbull.
MISSOURI—Brown, Henderson.
MICHIGAN—Chandler, Howard.
IOWA—Grimes, Harlan.
WISCONSIN—Doolittle, Howe.
MINNESOTA—Ramsey, Wilkinson.
KANSAS—J. H. Lane, Pomeroy.
OREGON—Harding, *Nesmith.*
CALIFORNIA—Conness.—Total, 38.

NAYS—[All Democrats.]

DELAWARE—Riddle, Saulsbury.
KENTUCKY—Davis, Powell.
INDIANA—Hendricks.
CALIFORNIA—McDougall.—Total, 6.

Not Voting.—Buckalew, Pa.; Wright, N. J.; Hicks, Md.; Bowden and Carlile, Va.; Richardson, Ill.—all Democrats.

But it failed [40] in the House: Yeas 95; Nays 66—substantially, though not absolutely, a party division. Mr. Ashley, of Ohio—changing his vote to enable him to do so—now moved a rëconsideration; and the subject went over to await the issues of the War and of the pending election of President.

Mr. Lincoln, in his Message already quoted, now urged the House to concur with the Senate in adopting the Amendment—saying:

"Without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the rëconsideration and passage of the measure at the present session. Of course, the abstract question is not changed; but an intervening election shows, almost certainly, that the next Congress will pass the measure if this does not. Hence, there is only a question of *time* as to when the proposed Amendment will go to the States for their action. And, as it is to so go at all events, may we not agree that the sooner the better? It is not claimed that the election has imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes, any further than, as an additional element to be considered, their judgment may be affected by it. It is the voice of the people now, for the first time, heard upon the question. In a great National crisis, like ours, unanimity of action among those seeking a common end is very desirable—almost indispensable. And yet, no approach to such unanimity is attainable, unless some deference shall be paid to the will of the majority, simply because *it is* the will of the majority. In this case, the common end is the maintenance of the Union; and, among the means to secure that end, such will, through the election, is most clearly declared in favor of such Constitutional Amendment."

Mr. Ashley accordingly called up [41] in the House his motion to reconsider the vote above given; and the question was at length brought [42] to issue—a motion to lay it on the table having been defeated by 111 to 57—when the reconsideration was ordered: Yeas 112; Nays 57. The vote was then taken on concurring with the Senate in passing the Amendment, in the shape reported by Mr. Trumbull from the Judiciary Committee of the Senate—as follows:

"*Be it resolved*, &c., That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of said Legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said Constitution, namely:

"ARTICLE XIII.

"SECTION 1. Neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

"SEC. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

The House now concurred with the Senate, by the following vote:

YEAS—[Democrats in *Italics.*]

MAINE—Blaine, Perham, Pike, Rice.
NEW HAMPSHIRE—Patterson, Rollins.
MASSACHUSETTS—Alley, Ames, Baldwin, Boutwell, Dawes, Eliot, Gooch, Hooper, Rice, W. D. Washburn.
RHODE ISLAND—Dixon, Jenckes.
CONNECTICUT—Brandagee, Deming, *English*, J. H. Hubbard.

[40] June 15. [41] Jan. 6, 1865. [42] Jan. 31.

VERMONT—Baxter, Morrill, Woodbridge.
NEW YORK—A. W. Clark, Freeman Clark, Davis, Frank, *Ganson*, *Griswold*, *Herrick*, Hotchkiss, Hulburd, Kellogg, Littlejohn, Marvin, Miller, Morris, *Nelson*, *Odell*, Pomeroy, *Radford*, *Steele*, Van Valkenburg.
NEW JERSEY—Starr.
PENNSYLVANIA—*Baily*, Broomall, *Coffroth*, Hale, Kelley, *McAllister*, Moorhead, A. Myers, L. Myers, C. O'Neill, Schofield, Stevens, Thayer, Tracy, Williams.
DELAWARE—Smithers.
MARYLAND—Cresswell, Henry Winter Davis, F. Thomas, Webster.
WEST VIRGINIA—Blair, Brown, Whaley.
KENTUCKY—Anderson, Randall, Smith, Yeaman.
OHIO—Ashley, Eckley, Garfield, *Hutchins*, Schenck, Spaulding.
INDIANA—Colfax, Dumont, Julian, Orth.
ILLINOIS—Arnold, Farnsworth, Ingersoll, Norton, E. B. Washburne.
MISSOURI—Blow, Boyd, *King*, Knox, Loan, McClurg, *J. S. Rollins*.
MICHIGAN—*A. C. Baldwin*, Beaman, Driggs, F. W. Kellogg, Longyear, Upson.
IOWA—Allison, Grinnell, A. W. Hubbard, Kasson, Price, Wilson.
WISCONSIN—Cobb, McIndoe, Sloan, *Wheeler*.
MINNESOTA—Donnelly, Windom.
KANSAS—Wilder.
OREGON—McBride.
NEVADA—Worthington.
CALIFORNIA—Cole, Higby, Shannon.—Total, 119.

NAYS—[All Democrats.]
MAINE—Sweat.
NEW YORK—Brooks, Chanler, Kalbfleisch, Kernan, Pruyn, Townsend, Ward, Winfield, Ben. Wood, Fernando Wood.
NEW JERSEY—Perry, W. G. Steele.
PENNSYLVANIA—Ancona, Dawson, Dennison, P. Johnson, W. H. Miller, S. J. Randall, Stiles, Strouse.
MARYLAND—B. G. Harris.
KENTUCKY—Clay, Grider, Harding, Mallory, Wadsworth.
OHIO—Bliss, Cox, Finck, Wm. Johnson, Long, J. R. Morris, Noble, J. O'Neill, Pendleton, C. A. White, J. W. White.
INDIANA—Cravens, Edgerton, Harrington, Holman, Law.
ILLINOIS—J. C. Allen, W. J. Allen, Eden, C. M. Harris, Knapp, Morrison, Robinson, Ross, Stuart.
WISCONSIN—J. S. Brown, Eldridge.
MISSOURI—Hall, Scott.—Total, 56.

Not Voting—Lazear, Pa.; Marcy, N. H.; McDowell and Voorhees, Ind.; Le Blond and McKinney, Ohio; Middleton and Rogers, N. J.—all Democrats.

[By the subsequent ratification of more than two-thirds of the States, this Amendment has become a part of the Federal Constitution.]

Several informal attempts at opening negotiations for the termination of hostilities were made in the course of this Winter—Hon. Francis P. Blair, of Maryland, visiting Richmond twice on the subject, with the consent, though not by the request, of President Lincoln. At length, upon their direct application, Messrs. Alex. H. Stephens, John A. Campbell, and Robert M. T. Hunter, were permitted to pass Gen. Grant's lines before Petersburg, and proceed to Fortress Monroe; where they were met by Gov. Seward, followed by President Lincoln;[43] and a free, full conference was had: but it resulted in nothing. The Confederate Commissioners were not authorized to concede the rëunion of the States; President Lincoln would treat on no other basis; so the parties separated as they met: and a great meeting was held[44] at Richmond on the return of those Commissioners, which was addressed by Gov. William Smith, of Virginia, and by Jefferson Davis, who said:

"In my correspondence with Mr. Lincoln, that functionary has always spoken of the United States and the Confederacy as 'our afflicted country;' but, in my replies, I have never failed to refer to them as separate and distinct governments; and, sooner than we should ever be united again, I would be willing to yield up every thing I have on earth, and, if it were possible, would sacrifice my life a thousand times before I would succumb."

He concluded by exhorting those at home, who were able to bear arms—

"to unite with those already in the army in repelling the foe; believing that thereby we would compel the Yankees, in less than

[43] Feb. 3, 1865.

[44] Feb. 6.

twelve months, to petition us for peace upon our own terms."

The meeting unanimously

"*Resolved*, That we, the citizens here assembled, do spurn, with the indignation due to so gross an insult, the terms on which the President of the United States has offered peace to the people of the Confederate States.

"*Resolved*, That the circumstances under which that proffer has been made add to the outrage, and stamp it as a designed and premeditated indignity to our people."

A "War Meeting" was held there three days afterward; whereat R. M. T. Hunter presided, and addresses were made by Secretary J. P. Benjamin and others. This meeting likewise

"*Resolved*, 1. That the events which have occurred during the progress of the war have but confirmed our original determination to strike for our independence; and that, with the blessing of God, we will never lay down our arms until it shall have been won. [Wild and long-continued cheering followed the reading of this resolution.]

"*Resolved*, 2. That, as we believe our resources to be sufficient for the purpose, we do not doubt that we shall conduct the war successfully to that issue; and we hereby invoke the people, in the name of the holiest of all causes, to spare neither their blood nor their treasure in its maintenance and support."

Mr. Lincoln's Address, on his second inauguration[46] as President, may fitly close this final chapter of our political history. In its profoundly religious spirit, its tenderness, its undesigned solemnity, in view of the triumphs already achieved and the still more conclusive triumphs rationally anticipated and now just at hand, the reader will discern the then unperceived but awful shadow of impending death:

"FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN—At this second appearing to take the oath of the Presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then, a statement somewhat in detail of a course to be pursued seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energy of the nation, little that is new could be presented.

"The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

"On the occasion corresponding to this, four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it. All sought to avert it. While the Inaugural Address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to the saving of the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city, seeking to destroy it without war—seeking to dissolve the Union and divide the effects by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would *make* war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would *accept* war rather than let it perish—and the war came. One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and beneficial interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union even by war; while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude nor the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces. But let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayer of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.' If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs

[46] March 4, 1865.

come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those Divine attributes which the believers in a loving God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'

"With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work we are in, to bind up the Nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."

XXXI.

HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN.

Gen. Thomas had been detached by Gen. Sherman from his main army in Georgia, and sent back to assume chief command in Tennessee, in doubt as to what were Hood's real intentions. It was obvious enough that his eccentric movement to the north and north-west was intended to compel a corresponding movement on our part, and thus deprive us of all the fruits of Sherman's Atlanta campaign; but suppose we refused to be thus tolled out of Georgia, and across the Tennessee, what then? Sherman could not determine; so he gave Thomas the widest discretion. If Hood should push boldly into the heart of Tennessee, he was to be resisted, beaten, and driven out; if he should turn upon Sherman, he was to be followed circumspectly but closely.

Grant, in his camp before Richmond, could hardly realize that Hood was moving on Nashville, "which seemed to me," says he in his report, "to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting."

Thomas had probably quite as many men under his command as Hood led across the Tennessee—counting all between Knoxville and Memphis, he may have had more. But they were mainly fragments of brigades and regiments, dispersed over a wide region, holding posts which could not well be evacuated, guarding large dépôts of supplies, and watching railroad bridges and trestles which Rebel guerrillas and 'bushwhackers' were lurking to burn, while their loss might involve that of war-wasted Tennessee itself. Nearly everything consumed by our armies in their quarters was now brought by rail from the banks of the Ohio.

Forrest, with a large body of light cavalry, preluded Hood's advance. Crossing the Tennessee near Waterloo, he suddenly presented[1] himself at Athens, Alabama, held by Col. Campbell, 110th U. S. colored, with 600 men. Investing the town, he opened with a 12-pounder battery on

[1] Sept. 23, 1864.

the fort; sending in two different summonses, which were declined; then soliciting and obtaining a personal interview with Campbell; at which the latter "*allowed*" himself to be convinced" that it was useless to hold out, and ingloriously gave up, just 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the 18th Michigan and 102d Ohio to rëenforce him; compelling them also to succumb, after a sharp contest. Forrest now raided north to Pulaski, destroying the railroad and capturing a fortified post by the way; skirmishing heavily all day[3] at Pulaski; but Gen. Rousseau was here, and had hastily collected such a force that an assault would have been madness; so Forrest drew off eastward and struck the Chattanooga railroad[4] near Tullahoma and Decherd, doing it some damage; but Rousseau had moved rapidly around by rail through Nashville, and again confronted him at Tullahoma; while Gen. Steedman, leading 5,000 men, crossed the Tennessee from northern Georgia, and advanced upon him from the south-west; Morgan's division of the 14th corps moving simultaneously from Atlanta to cooperate in enveloping and crushing him.

All in vain. Forrest turned on his track, and pushed south-east to Fayetteville; there dividing his forces and sending Buford, with 4,000 men, to summon Huntsville,[5] and then Athens, Ala.; while he, with 3,000, swept north-west to Columbia; threatening that place, but not assaulting it; for by this time Rousseau, with 4,000 mounted men, was coming after him from Nashville; while Gen. C. C. Washburne, with 3,000 cavalry and 1,500 infantry, was steaming up the Tennessee to join in the hunt; and Lt.-Com'r Forrest, with several gunboats, was patroling that river in Alabama, on the lookout for his reappearance hurrying southward.

Buford tried to carry[6] Athens, Ala.; which was firmly held by Lt.-Col. Slade, 73d Indiana, who repulsed him handsomely; when he drew off westward and escaped[7] over the Tennessee at Brown's ferry.

Forrest had now enemies enough encircling him to have eaten all his horses; but, destroying five miles of the railroad, and paroling his prisoners, he sped south-west through Mount Pleasant and Lawrenceburg, and got safely across the Tennessee at Bainbridge; having inflicted much injury, kept busy many times his number of men, worn out a good many of our shoes, taken at least 1,000 prisoners, and escaped with very little loss.

Hood, who had meantime been operating, and continued for a fortnight longer to operate, on Sherman's line of communications nearly up to Chattanooga, and had thence moved westward, as we have seen, into northern Alabama, next demonstrated[8] in considerable force against Decatur—being the point at which the railroads cross the Tennessee which tend eastward to Chattanooga, westward to Memphis, and northward to Nashville. He found here Gen. Gordon Granger, with a considerable force, which he pressed for several days; establishing a line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the defenses; intrenching strongly, and threatening an assault; but using no guns, and being roughly handled in

[3] Gen. Thomas's official report. [4] Sept. 27. [5] Sept. 29. [6] Oct. 5. [7] Oct. 2–3. [8] Oct. 3. [9] Oct. 26.

a sortie,[9] wherein a part of the garrison gained the rear of the rifle-pits on his left; clearing them and taking 120 prisoners. On that day, one of the batteries on his right was carried and spiked by Col. Morgan's 14th U. S. colored, with some loss; and he drew off westward next evening.

The pressure on Decatur was a feint to cover his crossing farther west; which was soon effected near Florence, in spite of resistance by Gen. Croxton's brigade of cavalry, there picketing the river. Meantime, Forrest, moving eastward from Corinth, Miss., through Paris, Tenn., with 17 regiments of cavalry and 9 guns, had struck the Tennessee at Johnsonville, an important dépôt connected by railroad with Nashville, and a chief reliance of that city for supplies; defended by Col. C. R. Thompson, 12th U. S. colored, with 1,000 men, aided by Lt. E. M. King with three gunboats; and several days'[10] sharp fighting ensued; the enemy ultimately drawing off, upon the approach by rail of Gen. Schofield with his 23d corps from Nashville; but not till—our mariners having been worsted in a fight with Forrest's cavalry—our commanders had fired their gunboats and transports, lest they should fall into the enemy's hands; and the flames had extended to the stores on the levee and the commissary's and quartermaster's dépôts, involving a loss of $1,500,000 worth of provisions, &c., just when they could worst be spared. Gen. Thomas reports this destruction needless and unjustifiable.

It being no longer doubtful that Hood—who had been rëenforced by part of Dick Taylor's army from below—was about to follow his vanguard across the Tennessee—Gen. Thomas directed a concentration of the 4th and 23d corps on Pulaski, with intent to impede rather than seriously dispute the Rebel advance on Nashville. Hood's infantry, according to our best advices, now exceeded 40,000; his cavalry were 12,000, well equipped, in high spirits, under their boldest and most skillful leader; so that, including artillery, the entire Rebel force, well concentrated, was not far from 55,000 men. Many of these were Tennesseans and Kentuckians, long exiled, who had come home to stay, alive or dead. To oppose these, Thomas had in hand the 4th corps, Gen. Stanley, 12,000; the 23d, Gen. Schofield, 10,000; and 8,000 cavalry, under Hatcher, Croxton, and Capron—in all 30,000 men. He may have had as many more, scattered over the wide region under his command; but, to concentrate these, he must abandon such posts as Chattanooga, Stevenson, Huntsville, Decatur, Athens, &c., and in effect relinquish more to the enemy than they could hope to win by a victory. He knew that time was on his side—that, if he fell back to Nashville, showing a firm front that would compel Hood to keep his army together, our strength would be constantly augmenting, while the enemy must be steadily weakened. There was a more brilliant alternative, but he chose to be safe.

While Sherman remained near Kingston, Ga., menacing his flank and rear, Hood seemed to linger on the Tennessee; possibly deeming the odds against him too great; perhaps not yet fully provided and equipped

[9] Oct. 28.

[10] Oct. 28–Nov. 5.

for his great venture. At length, a dispatch from Sherman[11] apprised Thomas that the former had cut loose from his base and started southward from Atlanta on his Great March; and no sooner had the tidings reached Hood, still at Florence, Ala., where he had a pontoon bridge, with part of his force on either side of the river, than the crossing of his remaining corps commenced;[12] while his van, already over, moved through Waynesboro' and Lawrenceburg on Nashville.[13]

Hood's army was organized in three corps, under Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Lt.-Gens. A. P. Stewart and S. D. Lee, beside his strong cavalry corps under Forrest. Each corps was composed of three divisions: Maj.-Gens. Cleburne, Loring, Bate, E. Johnson, and Buford, being the best known of their commanders. Thomas had but five divisions of infantry at the front; but he had collected several more before the struggle was brought to a final issue.

Gen. Schofield, at Pulaski, now fell back, by order, on Columbia; where his corps was concentrated,[14] as was most of Stanley's; while Gen. Granger withdrew the garrisons from Athens (Ala.), Decatur, and Huntsville, retiring on Stevenson. The force left at Johnsonville now evacuated that post, withdrawing to Clarksville. When the enemy appeared before Columbia, declining to assault, but evincing a purpose to cross Duck river above or below, Gen. Schofield withdrew[15] across that stream; and on learning that the Rebels had crossed six miles above, directed Gen. Stanley to follow his trains to Spring Hill; where he arrived just in time to save them from Forrest's cavalry, which was close upon them, but which he drove off; being assailed, soon afterward, by a much stronger force, including infantry, with which he fought till dark; barely holding the road whereby Schofield must make good his retreat.

Schofield, with Ruger's division, had been kept awake all day by the enemy's efforts to cross Duck river at Columbia; repulsing, with heavy loss to them, their repeated attempts to do so. When night fell, he resumed his movement; brushing aside the Rebel cavalry who infested the road, and finding at Spring Hill the enemy bivouacking within half a mile of his line of retreat. He did not choose to have any difficulty with them just then; but pushed on with his entire command; and, after fighting all day and marching 25 miles during the following night, he got into position at FRANKLIN early on the 30th. His cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, several miles eastward, had encountered no enemy. Time being absolutely required to save our trains, which choked the road for many miles, Schofield halted on the southern verge of the village, threw up a slight breastwork, and proposed to stop, while his train should be got over the Harpeth and fairly on its way to Nashville.

Franklin is situated in a bend of the Harpeth, which here rudely describes the north and east sides of a square, which was completed by our lines of defense. These were held

[11] Dated Cartersville, Ga., Nov. 12.

[12] Nov. 17.

[13] Thomas says: "Had the enemy delayed his advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet him at some point south of Duck river." [14] Nov. 24. [15] Nov. 27-8.

petuous, as well as so heavy, that it was scarcely checked by the advanced works held too long by the two brigades aforesaid, but swept over them like a torrent, hurling back our men in tumultuous rout, taking many prisoners, and driving the residue right through the center of our main line, which not merely opened to receive them, but kept widening after they had rushed past. In an instant, the wings next that pike of the 2d and 3d divisions of the 23d (Cox's) corps recoiled before the enemy's charge; the hill was lost, 8 of our guns taken, and the Rebel flag planted in triumph on our breastworks, as the exulting victors, having passed over them, hastily formed on the inside, intending to follow up their triumph. Caissons as well as men streamed wildly to the bridges, supposing the day utterly lost and nothing left to do but save from the wreck as much as possible.

"First brigade! forward to the works!" rang out the steady voice of Opdycke, as the rabble rout swept by; he riding rapidly forward as the bayonets of his men came down to a charge, flashing back the rays of the setting sun. Swiftly, steadily, grandly, that brigade rushed upon the foe; a brief but bloody struggle ensued; and at its close no Rebel remained upon or inside of the works but the dead and wounded, with 300 prisoners. Our guns were recovered; 10 Rebel battle-flags taken; our line was restored, and Opdycke's headquarters established here on the pike; and here they remained till the last shot was fired that night.

Our defenses had been regained as much by surprise as by valor—the enemy not expecting a countercharge—they must now be held by valor alone. Exasperated rather than disconcerted, Hood threw heavy masses against the lost breastworks, hoping to retake them before they could be adequately manned; while Opdycke, first exhausting all the shots in his revolver, employed it as a club to drive up stragglers to the help of his heroic brigade; and, when he had broken the pistol, he dismounted and borrowed a musket, which he found even more efficient in the work of persuasion; driving skulkers out of the reserve fort in which they had sought and found comparative safety.[17] Of course, his efforts and those of his men were nobly supported by others—there being ample scope and work for all.

The battle raged fiercely till 10 P. M.; the enemy shifting gradually to our right and attacking on the flank; where they were more especially confronted and repelled by Stanley's 1st division, Gen. Nathan Kimball. But our lines were never again broken: assault after assault being repulsed with great loss to the assailants and smaller to the defenders; until the enemy desisted; and then, a little after midnight—our trains being by this time well on their way—our men quietly drew out of their defenses, and followed; until, about noon, our weary, sleepless heroes were safe within the defenses of Nashville.

[17] An official recommendation to promotion, indorsed by Gen. Thomas, thus testifies:

"At the battle of Franklin, Opdycke [formerly Col. 125th Ohio] displayed the very highest qualities as a commander. It is not saying too much to declare that, but for the skillful dispositions made by Gen. Opdycke (all of which was done entirely on his own judgment), the promptness and readiness with which he brought his command into action at the critical and decisive moment, and the signal personal gallantry he displayed in a counter assault on the enemy, when he had broken our lines, disaster instead of victory would have fallen on us at Franklin."

Forrest had followed sharply since daylight, but to no purpose.

Our loss in this sanguinary encounter was officially reported at 189 killed, 1,033 wounded (including Maj.-Gen. D. S. Stanley, severely), and 1,104 missing (many of these doubtless wounded also, and nearly all captured): total, 2,326. Not a gun was left behind in our retreat.

Gen. Thomas reports the Rebel loss in this struggle at 1,750 killed, 3,800 wounded, and 702 prisoners: total, 6,252.

Hood, in a conversational account of the battle, says:

"The struggle lasted till near midnight; when the enemy abandoned his works and crossed the river, leaving his dead and his wounded in our possession. Never did troops fight more gallantly. During the day, I was restrained from using my artillery, on account of the women and children remaining in the town. At night, it was massed, ready to continue the action in the morning; but the enemy retired. We captured about a thousand prisoners, and several stands of colors. Our total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was 4,500. Among the killed were Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne, Brig.-Gens. Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Granbury. Maj.-Gen. Brown, with Brig.-Gens. Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott, were wounded, and Brig.-Gen. Gordon captured. The number of dead left by the enemy on the field indicated that his loss was equal to or near our own. The next morning at daylight—the wounded being cared for and the dead buried—we moved forward toward Nashville: Forrest with his cavalry pursuing the enemy vigorously."

The loss of Pat. Cleburne—'the Stonewall Jackson of the West'—would of itself have been a Rebel disaster. He was an Irishman by birth, who had served as a private in the British army; and who left behind him no superior as a rough and ready fighter. By the carnage of this day, Hood's army was depleted of a full sixth, not of its numbers, but of its effective force—a loss which it had no means of replacing.

Hitherto, Thomas had resisted very considerable odds; but, when Hood sat down [18] before Nashville, the case was bravely altered. The Rebel army had by this time been reduced, by the casualties and hardships of an offensive and unseasonable campaign, to 40,000 at most; A. J. Smith's command, transported from Missouri on steamboats, had just arrived, [19] and been posted on our right; while Gen. Steedman, with 5,000 of Sherman's men and a Black brigade, had come up by rail from Chattanooga. Add the garrison of Nashville, and a division organized from the employés of the quartermaster's, commissary's, and railroad departments, now working diligently on the defenses, and it was clear that Thomas's infantry outnumbered that which affected to besiege him, in a city which had already been extensively fortified. Still, he was so deficient in cavalry that he paused to mount a few thousand men before challenging the enemy to a decisive conflict. This perplexed Gen. Grant; who, chafing at the idea of such a display of Rebel audacity in the heart of Tennessee, had left his camp on the James and reached Washington on his way westward, when he was met by telegraphic reports which convinced him that his Tennessee lieutenant, like Sheridan, needed no supervision.

Thomas, reluctant to relax his hold on the railroad to Chattanooga, had left Gen. Rousseau, with 8,000 men, in Fortress Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro': the railroad being further de-

[18] Dec. 2.

[19] Nov. 30–Dec. 1.

fended by a block-house at Overall's creek, five miles north, which was attacked[20] by Bate's division of Cheatham's corps, but firmly held till Gen. Milroy, with three or four regiments, came out from Murfreesboro', and repelled the assailants. During the next three days, a division of Lee's corps and 2,500 of Forrest's cavalry rëenforced Bate, and Fortress Rosecrans was threatened, but not really assaulted; Buford's cavalry finally shelling and charging[21] into Murfreesboro', but being promptly driven out by a regiment of infantry. The Rebel cavalry moved hence north to Lebanon, and threatened to cross the Cumberland, but found it patroled by gunboats and drew off. Gen. Milroy, being this day sent out from Murfreesboro' with 7 regiments of infantry, attacked the Rebels on the Wilkeson pike, driving them and taking 207 prisoners, with 2 guns; losing 30 killed and 175 wounded.

Hood had established[22] his lines south of Nashville, with his salient on Montgomery hill, opposite our center, and but 600 yards distant. Wilson, with cavalry, was across the river at Gallatin, watching for raiders from Forrest's command. And now ensued a week of severe cold, wherein both armies were nearly torpid: the Rebels, worse clad and more exposed, probably suffering more sensibly. When at length the temperature softened,[23] Thomas issued orders for a general advance on our right next day; to cover which, Gen. Steedman, on our left, sharply and successfully attacked the enemy's right that evening: pushing it back toward Hood's center, and causing a movement from that center to its support.

Morning broke[24] auspiciously. The weather was still mild, and a dense fog, lasting till near noon, concealed our movements. Gen. A. J. Smith, with his thinned corps, with Wilson's cavalry on his right, now moved out on the Hardin pike, to flank the left of the enemy's infantry; while Johnson's cavalry division, advancing on the Charlotte pike, struck at Chalmers's cavalry on that wing and a Rebel battery, posted at Bell's landing on the Cumberland, which he attacked late that afternoon, in conjunction with our gunboats under Lt.-Com'r Fitch. They did not carry it; but it was evacuated during the ensuing night.

Hatch's division of Wilson's cavalry first struck the enemy; driving him from his position, and taking prisoners and wagons. Swinging slightly to the left, Hatch, dismounting his men, assaulted and carried a redoubt, taking four guns, and turning them on their late possessors. A second stronger redoubt was soon reached; and this, too, was carried: the spoils being four more guns and 300 prisoners. McArthur's division of Smith's infantry, closing on the left of the cavalry, cöoperated in these assaults, so far as the impetuous charges of the cavalry allowed them a chance to do so.

The 4th corps, Gen. T. J. Wood commanding (because of Stanley's wound), had moved parallel with Smith, closing on his left, and had also, about 1 P. M., assaulted Montgomery hill: the assault being immediately delivered by Col. Sidney P. Post, 59th Illinois, with the 3d brigade of the 2d (Wagner's) division, who gallantly carried the work,

[20] Dec. 4. [21] Dec. 8. [22] Dec. 4. [23] Dec. 14. [24] Dec. 15.



BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

taking some prisoners. And now, giving a hand to Smith's left, Wood's corps resumed its advance; carrying by assault Hood's entire line of defenses, taking several guns and 500 prisoners, and forcing the enemy back to a new position at the foot of Harpeth hills.

Schofield, meantime, had been sent up on Smith's right, so as to enable our cavalry to operate freely on the enemy's flank and rear; and, moving rapidly, had come into action just before night. Steedman had gained a little more ground on our extreme left. And now our line was readjusted: Wilson's cavalry on our extreme right; Schofield next; then Smith in the center, with Wood on his left; Steedman still farther in that direction, but less advanced. The day's work had given us 16 guns, 1,200 prisoners, many small arms, and 40 wagons; while our losses had been light. Never had men fought with more alacrity or

greater steadiness than those who now lay down on their arms, prepared to finish their work on the morrow.

The second day opened with an advance by Wood, pushing back the enemy's skirmishers eastward across the Franklin pike, and then, inclining to the right, moving due south from Nashville till he confronted Hood's new line of defenses on Overton's hill, five miles from the city. Hereupon, Gen. Steedman, pushing rapidly down the Nolensville pike, closed in on Wood's left flank; while Smith came in on Wood's right; Schofield, facing eastward, threatened the enemy's left flank; and Wilson, still farther to the right, and more advanced, gained the Rebel rear—reaching across the Granny White pike, and threatening to cut them off from any line of retreat on Franklin. And now, while this movement against his rear was prosecuted, our entire front advanced till within 600 yards of the enemy; and, at 3 P. M., Post's brigade, supported by Streight's, was directed by Wood to assault Overton's hill in front; while Col. Morgan's Black brigade was impelled by Steedman against it farther to our left.

The assault was duly made; but the enemy had seen all the preparations for it, had concentrated accordingly, and now received it with such a storm of grape, canister, and musketry, as our men charged over abatis up the hill, that they were driven back, terribly cut up—Col. Post being among the wounded. But the survivors were promptly reformed by Wood, and his front restored; while Smith's and Schofield's men, instantly charging on our right, swept over the enemy's works in their front; Wilson's troopers, dismounted, charging still farther to the right, and barring all retreat by the Granny White pike. And now, hearing the shouts of victory on our right, Wood's and Steedman's corps renewed the assault on Overton's hill, and, though they encountered a heavy fire, swept all before them. The routed Rebels fled through the Brentwood pass, leaving most of their guns, and many of their comrades as prisoners.

Wilson instantly mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions of cavalry, and pushed them down the Granny White pike, hoping to reach Franklin ahead of the fugitive host, and bar their farther flight; but, after proceeding a mile, he found a barricade across the road, and the enemy's cavalry under Chalmers behind it. Col. Spalding, 12th Tennessee cavalry, charged and carried the position, scattering the enemy, and taking some prisoners, including Gen. E. W. Rucker; but it was now too late to reach Franklin that night, and our men lay down on their arms, while the enemy pursued their disorderly flight.

In this two days' battle, Thomas had taken 4,462 prisoners, including 287 officers (one of them a Major-General), 53 guns, and many small arms. Hood's invasion had been suddenly finished, and his army utterly demoralized.

Our cavalry followed closely next day; Knipe's division riding over a rear-guard that had been posted at Hollow Tree gap, 4 miles north of Franklin; taking 413 prisoners. Pressing on after the fugitives, Wilson found them again facing him in

Franklin, attempting to defend the crossing of Harpeth river; but Johnson's division, which had been sent down the Hillsboro' pike, now came up from the south and struck the enemy's rear, forcing him to decamp; leaving 1,800 of his wounded and 200 of ours in hospital here to fall into Wilson's hands.

Four miles south of Franklin, another stand was made by the enemy's rear-guard; but Wilson ordered his body-guard (4th regular cavalry) to charge through their center, while Knipe and Hatch pressed their flanks; and again they were routed and scattered, losing more guns. Night now closed in, and enabled most of the fugitives to escape.

The pursuit was kept up for several days; but rain fell almost incessantly; the country was flooded; the brooks were raging rivers; the fleeing enemy of course burned the bridges after crossing them; Thomas's pontoon train was away with Sherman; and the roads were hardly passable in the rear of the fleeing foe. Thus the Harpeth, Rutherford's creek, and Duck river, were crossed; the weather at length changing from dreary, pelting rain to bitter cold; Forrest—who had been absent on a raid when our army pushed out from the defenses of Nashville—rejoining Hood at Columbia, and forming a rear-guard of 4,000 infantry under Walthall, and all his cavalry that was still effective. With this, after leaving Pulaski,[25] he turned sharply on our leading brigade of cavalry (Harrison's) and captured a gun, which was carried off, though the ground on which it was lost was almost instantly recovered. The pursuit was continued to Lexington,[26] Ala.; when, learning that Hood had got across the Tennessee at Bainbridge, Thomas ordered a halt; Gen. Steedman having already been sent from Franklin across to Murfreesboro', and thence by rail to Stevenson, where was Gen. Granger, with the former garrisons of Huntsville, Athens (Ala.), and Decatur, with directions to reoccupy our former posts in north Alabama, then cross the Tennessee and threaten the enemy's railroad communications. He reached Decatur on the 27th; only to learn that Hood was already so far advanced that operations south of the Tennessee would be useless.

Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee had been requested by Thomas to send all the gunboats he could spare up the Tennessee to head off Hood; and had done so; but, though he reached Chickasaw, Miss., on the 24th, destroying there a Rebel battery, and capturing 2 guns at Florence, he did not intercept Hood.

While Hood invested Nashville, he sent 800 cavalry, with 2 guns, under Brig.-Gen. Lyon, by our right across the Cumberland to break up the Louisville railroad in Thomas's rear. Lyon was manifestly too weak to effect any thing of importance. He took Hopkinsville, Ky., and was soon afterward attacked, near Greensburg, by Lagrange's brigade, and worsted; losing one of his guns and some prisoners; hurrying thence, sharply pursued, by Elizabethtown and Glasgow to Burkesville, where he recrossed the Cumberland, and raced southward by McMinnville and Winchester, Tenn., to Larkinsville, Alabama; thence moving east and attacking[27]

[25] Dec. 25. [26] Dec. 28. [27] Jan. 10, 1865.

a petty post at Scottsboro', where he was repulsed and his command scattered: getting over the Tennessee with a remnant of 200 men, but losing his last gun. Being still pursued, he fled to a place known as Red hill; where his bivouac was surprised[28] by Col. W. J. Palmer, 15th Pa. cavalry, and 100 of his men taken. Lyon escaped, after surrendering, by seizing a pistol, shooting a sentinel, and vanishing in the darkness. This was the final blow given to Hood's army.

Thomas expected now to put his forces into well-earned Winter-quarters; but he soon received advices from Washington that this did not meet the views of Gen. Grant, who proposed to crush what was left of the Rebellion first and *then* rest. Accordingly, Gens. Smith's, Schofield's, and Wilson's corps were taken up by boats at Clifton, on the Tennessee, and conveyed to Eastport, Miss; and Gen. Wood's was directed to Huntsville, north Alabama, preparatory to a further Winter campaign.

Meantime, matters of decided interest had occurred in East Tennessee and south-western Virginia. Gen. Stoneman had been dispatched by Thomas from Louisville to Knoxville to take command there, while Burbridge, with all his disposable force, was sent thither from eastern Kentucky through Cumberland gap. Breckinridge, doubtless apprised of this movement, withdrew from this neighborhood quite as rapidly as he had advanced; while Gen. Ammen, just arrived with 1,500 men from Chattanooga, was pushed out to Strawberry plains on his track.

Stoneman, as directed by Thomas, started[29] from Knoxville in pursuit of the now over-matched and retreating foe: taking three mounted brigades, led by Burbridge and Gillem; at whose head, he swept[30] rapidly eastward, skirmishing, to Bristol; while Gillem, on his right, struck Duke at Kingsport, capturing 300 prisoners, with several well-laden trains, and dispersing Duke's command. Pushing Burbridge on to Abingdon, Va., where he was rejoined[31] by Gillem, Stoneman captured that place also; destroying there a large quantity of stores.

Vaughan, with the Rebel frontier force of cavalry, had been flanked by this rapid advance, but had moved parallel with our column to Marion; where Gillem now struck[32] him and chased him 30 miles into Wytheville; capturing 200 men, 8 guns, and a large train. Vaughan was again attacked and driven at the lead mines, 15 miles farther east, which were captured, and all the works destroyed. At Max Meadows, near this point, Gillem destroyed the railroad and other valuable property.

Breckinridge had by this time concentrated what was left of his various subordinate commands, and had been following our advance on Wytheville. Stoneman now turned upon and met him near Marion, expecting to give battle next morning; but Breckinridge, deeming his force quite too slender, retreated across the mountains into North Carolina during the night; losing a few wagons and caissons by our pursuit, which was not long persisted in.

This retreat—doubtless, inevitably—abandoned to its fate Saltville,

[28] Jan. 14. [29] Dec. 6. [30] Dec. 12. [31] Dec. 15. [32] Dec. 16.

with its extensive and costly salt-works, hitherto successfully guarded and defended; and it now fell to Stoneman without a struggle: 8 guns, 2 locomotives, many horses and mules, and a large quantity of ammunition, being here captured. The salt-works were utterly destroyed. And now—there being no hostile force left in this quarter to overcome, the country pretty thoroughly devastated, and East Tennessee utterly cleared of the enemy—Stoneman and Gillem returned quietly to Knoxville; while Burbridge led his force back through Cumberland gap into Kentucky.

Gen. Thomas, in summing up the results of his campaign, states, that from Sept. 7, 1864, to Jan. 20, 1865, he had captured 1 Major-General, 7 Brigadiers, 16 Colonels, 14 Lt.-Colonels, 22 Majors, 212 Captains, 601 Lieutenants, 89 Surgeons and Chaplains, and 10,895 non-commissioned officers and privates: total, 11,857; beside 1,332 who had been exchanged. He had also received and administered the oath of submission and amnesty to 2,207 deserters from the Rebel service. He had captured 72 serviceable guns and 3,079 infantry small arms.

Our total loss during this campaign amounted, in killed, wounded, and missing, to about 10,000; which was less than half that of the enemy. In fact, the Rebel army had almost ceased to exist when Gen. Hood—then at Tupelo, Miss.—was "relieved at his own request," Jan. 23, 1865.

XXXII.

SHERMAN'S GREAT MARCH.

GEORGIA—THE CAROLINAS.

Gen. Sherman, after sending back to Chattanooga his sick and wounded, surplus guns, baggage, and the garrisons of his more northern posts in Georgia, had still under his immediate command the 14th, 15th, 17th, and 20th corps, numbering 60,000 infantry and artillery and 5,500 cavalry. Concentrating these around Rome and Kingston, Georgia, he thoroughly destroyed [1] such portions of the railroads and such other property as he judged might be used to his prejudice by the enemy, reserving for the last sacrifice the telegraph which still connected him with Grant, Washington, and the North; but, at length, cutting that,[2] after sending his parting messages, his army stood clear of all posts and communications—a strictly movable column—and commenced its memorable march.

For this, it had been organized in two grand divisions or wings: the right led by Gen. O. O. Howard, comprising the 15th corps, Gen. P. J. Osterhaus, and the 17th, Gen. Frank P. Blair; the left, led by Gen. H. W. Slocum, comprising the 14th corps, Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, and the 20th, Gen. A. S. Williams. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick led the cavalry; which careered in front and on either

[1] Nov. 2-11, 1864.

[2] Nov. 11.



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

flank of the infantry, so as to screen, so far as possible, the direction of our advance and the points to which it was directed. Each wing had its separate and efficient pontoon train. Gen. Sherman marched and camped first with one wing, then with the other.

Moving rapidly to Atlanta,[3] Howard advanced thence by McDonough, Monticello, and Clinton, to Gordon;[4] while Slocum advanced by Covington, Madison, and Eatonton, concentrating on Milledgeville,[5] which was entered without opposition; Sherman thus far accompanying the 14th corps, which was the last to leave Atlanta,[6] and had not had a chance to fire a shot. In fact, the principal resistance encountered by our infantry was that of the bad roads of Georgia at that rainy season. Osterhaus had seen (for a moment) a few Rebel cavalry at the crossing of Cotton river; but, though they set fire to the bridge, they were driven off so promptly that only the planks were damaged.

Thus far, our infantry had mainly been busied with destroying railroads and foraging on the plenty of central Georgia; each subordinate commander being instructed to live on the country so far as possible; saving to the utmost the twenty days' bread, forty days' beef, coffee, sugar, &c., and three days' forage, contained in our wagons. Helping the trains across the Ocmulgee and its tributaries, and up the long, steep hills beyond, had been the principal labor of the march; which was intended to average 15 miles per day.

Kilpatrick held the laboring oar. Moving south[7] from Atlanta with Howard, he had been confronted at East Point by Rebel cavalry; with whom he skirmished, driving them to Flint river, which he crossed at Jonesboro' at 7 A. M. next day; following the enemy to Lovejoy's, where they had taken post in the old Rebel works, having two guns. Dismounting Murray's brigade, Kilpatrick attacked and carried the works, capturing 50 prisoners; Atkins's brigade soon after charging the fleeing foe, and taking their guns. Kilpatrick pushed thence by McDonough and

[3] Nov. 14. [4] Nov. 23. [5] Nov. 23. [6] Nov. 16. [7] Nov. 15.

Monticello to Clinton; whence he made a dash at Macon, driving in the enemy's cavalry; but was unable to carry the defenses, which were held by infantry and artillery. He burned a train of cars, and broke up the railroad; covering all the roads which diverged eastward from Macon, by the aid of Wolcott's brigade of infantry, which was sharply assailed from Macon, but worsted and beat off its assailants; while the right wing marched by to Gordon.

Howard now advanced[8] to the Oconee at Ball's ferry, where a small force in his van crossed on a raft, but was driven back with loss. When his two corps had been brought up, and a detachment thrown across the swift current in boats, the enemy had decamped. Meantime, the Georgia Central railroad had been demolished, and the right wing pushed on, keeping to the right of that road, and encountering no serious resistance. Sherman was here with Blair; Howard with Osterhaus.

Slocum had moved out of Milledgeville simultaneously with Howard's advance from Gordon, and had concentrated at Sandersville,[9] driving out a small party of Wheeler's cavalry. Thence, the left wing followed the Central railroad, breaking it up to the Ogeechee, which it crossed[10] at Louisville; whence it kept north of that road, striking out for the Savannah river. The roads and bridges in our advance, bad at best, were of course made worse by the enemy; while the great swamps wherein this region abounds rendered the movement of our trains and guns a matter of difficulty, and taxed the best efforts of our engineers and axmen.

At Millen, on the Central railroad, half way from Sandersville to Savannah, was a great prison-camp, where some thousands of our captured soldiers had long endured unspeakable privations. Sherman was intent on reaching and liberating them. To this end, he had sent Kilpatrick, with most of our cavalry, far to our left, so as to give the impression that he was making for Augusta rather than toward the coast, lest the prisoners should be removed from Millen. Kilpatrick had advanced from Milledgeville by Sparta and Gibson to Waynesboro',[11] skirmishing with Wheeler, who constantly menaced, but did not seriously attack him; and now Kilpatrick learned that the enemy had taken the alarm and removed the prisoners from Millen: so he judged it wiser to fall back on the left wing than to persist in a hazardous, unsupported advance, which had no longer a motive. In effecting this retreat, Kilpatrick and his staff, with the 8th Indiana and 9th Michigan, were, through a misapprehension of orders, cut off from the main body and very nearly surrounded by Wheeler; but they fought their way out and rejoined their comrades with little loss. Wheeler pressing on, Kilpatrick dismounted, selected a good position, threw up a breastwork, and received the enemy's charge; which, though desperately made, was repulsed at all points with little loss. He then moved on a few miles and camped, unpursued; being soon reenforced by Col. M. C. Hunter's brigade of Baird's division, which Jeff. C. Davis, hearing of his peril, had

[8] Nov. 24-5. [9] Nov. 26. [10] Nov. 28-9. [11] Nov. 25-28.

sent from the left wing to his aid. The need of assistance, however, was now over. Kilpatrick now joined the left wing, and covered its flank when it again advanced.

Sherman, still with Blair, crossed [13] the Ogeechee near Barton, advancing to Millen;[14] Howard, with Wood's and Corse's divisions of the 15th corps, still moving south of the Ogeechee on the old dirt road to Savannah; while Hazen's and John E. Smith's divisions, keeping farther to the right, reached Statesboro'.[15] Hazen had a skirmish here with a regiment of cavalry, which was easily driven; but the roadless swamps were vanquished with more difficulty. Wood threw [16] over the Ogeechee, by a foot-bridge, Williamson's brigade, which moved down the left bank; while Corse crossed his division on pontoons at Jenks's bridge, some distance below; Rice's brigade, in advance, having a smart skirmish with a Rebel battalion which disputed the passage; losing 5 men and taking 17 prisoners. The right wing now moved down both banks of the river; Osterhaus crossing Cannouchee creek; while Blair encountered [17] a Rebel force holding an intrenched line, with guns in position and rifle-pits in front, in a dense swamp, where his men had to wade knee-deep to form line of battle. The enemy were not in great force, however, and were easily driven: two brigades pushing on to the Savannah and Gulf railroad and breaking it; while J. E. Smith's division closed up on Corse's, and Corse pressed on toward Savannah. He was opposed by 600 infantry and 2 guns; but his advance brigade quickly ran them off, taking a gun and some prisoners. He followed the fugitives across the Little Ogeechee to within 8 miles of the city, where he halted, and resumed breaking up the Gulf railroad; King's bridge having been burned by the enemy. No force remained in our front here save the garrison of Fort McAllister. And now Blair's pontoons were laid across the Ogeechee, near Fort Argyle, and the two wings thus substantially united before Savannah.

Slocum had set forward from Louisville [18]—the 20th corps in advance—and had moved down between the Savannah and the Ogeechee; finding the roads mainly of quicksand, coated by a thin crust of firmer sand, which was soon cut through by our trains, rendering their movement barely possible, and requiring miles of 'corduroy.' At intervals, the Rebels had fallen trees across the roads, but not exactly where they were wanted. The 14th corps had advanced farther to the left, with Kilpatrick still farther east; Sherman's object being still to threaten Augusta and bewilder the enemy as to his purpose. Thus Kilpatrick, supported by Baird, was thrown out again to Waynesboro'; fighting [19] Wheeler and driving him 8 miles across Briar creek; while Baird destroyed the Augusta railroad; when the 14th was concentrated on Jacksonboro', and all moved rapidly down Briar creek toward the Savannah; Baird and Kilpatrick in the rear, which was now pressed by Wheeler, with sharp skirmishing, but with little loss on either side. Gen. Morgan, in Davis's van, was halted, near Ebenezer church, a strong field-work in his front,[20] which seemed to

[13] Nov. 30. [14] Dec. 2. [15] Dec. 4. [16] Dec. 6–7. [17] Dec. 9. [18] Dec. 1. [19] Dec. 4. [20] Dec. 9.

be firmly held; but night fell while he was preparing to attack it, and it was found empty next morning. Morgan's and Carlin's divisions encamped next day 10 miles from Savannah; and here the 20th corps passed them and pushed toward the city. Thus, on the 10th of December, Savannah was completely beleaguered, and the mystery which had hung over Sherman's march and its destination dispelled.

Hazen was in front of Fort McAllister on our left, and had been exchanging shots with it—hoping thus to attract the attention of our fleet blockading the coast, when Gens. Sherman and Howard rode[20] to Dr. Cheves's rice-mill to reconnoiter that fort. Kilpatrick had just been sent across the Ogeechee with a like purpose, and to open communication, if possible, with our fleet off the coast. About noon, as the two Generals scanned the fort through their glasses, it was observed to open fire inland from several guns; while Hazen's skirmishers could be discerned approaching it, and the smoke as of a steamer was visible off the mouth of the Ogeechee. A signal from Hazen now imported that he had invested the fort. Sherman signaled back that it was important to carry it that day. The steamer signaled that she was sent by Gen. Foster and Admiral Dahlgren to communicate with our army, but was in doubt whether to approach the fort as hostile or friendly. At that moment, Hazen's bugles sounded the charge; when his division rushed over torpedoes and abatis, through a shower of grape, up to and over the parapet, and, after a brief but desperate struggle, McAllister was ours. Her garrison of 200 surrendered; having 40 or 50 killed and wounded to our 90. Among the spoils were 22 guns and much ammunition.

Sherman watched till he saw our colors hoisted over the fort, and heard the cheers of the victors as they fired their pieces into the air; when, taking a boat, he went with Howard down to the fort and congratulated Hazen; rowing thence down the Ogeechee till he met the National tug Dandelion, Lt.-Com'r Williamson; who informed him that Capt. Duncan, whom Howard had sent down the Ogeechee in a canoe, to run by the fort and communicate with Foster and Dahlgren, had safely reached them several days before, and that they might be expected here directly.

Foster arrived in the Nemaha during that night; and Sherman met Dahlgren on board the Harvest Moon next day; sending by him to Hilton Head for heavy guns wherewith to bombard the city—those which he had brought through Georgia in his Winter march being inadequate. When several 30-pounder Parrotts had reached him, Sherman formally summoned[21] Hardee, who held the city, and who refused; suggesting that he was not yet completely invested. Slocum was now ordered to get the siege-guns into position, while Sherman started[22] to pay a flying visit to Hilton Head, to arrange with Foster for stopping the exit from Savannah toward Charleston. Being detained by high and adverse winds, however, he was met,[23] in one of the inland passages among the Sea Islands, by an army tug

[20] Dec. 13. [21] Dec. 17. [22] Dec. 20. [23] Dec. 21.

with the news that Hardee, with a force reported at 15,000 men, had evacuated the city during the dark and windy night of the 20th; crossing the Savannah on a pontoon-bridge, and marching up the causeway road toward Charleston. The movement had been unsuspected by our pickets; and, when next morning broke, Savannah was ours, and Hardee beyond the reach of pursuit. He had destroyed, under cover of a heavy fire, which he kept up through the day and evening of the 20th, the Navy Yard, two iron-clads, many smaller vessels, and a large quantity of ammunition, ordnance stores, and supplies of all kinds. His guns he could not even wait to spike, lest his flight should be detected. As our bombardment had barely commenced, the city was surrendered almost intact; while, of its cotton, a large share had been made over to the Confederacy, and so was an incontestable prize.

We had lost, in that march of 255 miles, which was substantially the conquest of Georgia, six weeks' time and 567 men; whereof 63 were killed, 245 wounded, and 159 missing. To offset these, we had taken 1,328 prisoners and 167 guns. Our ammunition expended was inconsiderable; while our 65,000 men and 10,000 horses had lived generously off a State wherein our captives in thousands had died of virtual starvation and kindred agonies because (as was alleged) their captors were unable to subsist them. Aside from sheep, swine, fowls, sweet potatoes, and rice, whereof they had found an abundance, 13,000 beeves, 160,000 bushels of corn, and over 5,000 tons of fodder, had been gathered from the country and issued to our men and animals; while 5,000 horses and 4,000 mules had been 'pressed' into the National service. Of cotton, 20,000 bales had been burned; while 25,000 more were captured in Savannah. Of negroes, 10,000 had abjured the delights of bondage to follow the National flag; beside thousands more —most of them women and children —who had had been most shamefully driven back by certain of our officers[34] at the crossings of rivers; and pitilessly rëconsigned to Slavery, and thus to their masters' vengeful wrath. Sherman made some little atonement for this cruelty by assigning lands on the Sea Islands, deserted by Rebels, to the Blacks who had followed him to the coast.

The merit of Sherman's achievement is dwarfed to vulgar appreciation by circumstances which should rather exalt it. It is true that Hood's movement on Nashville had withdrawn the main obstacle from his path; yet it was still possible to have confronted him on the Oconee, and then on the Ogeechee, with 30,000 men, one-third of them mounted; and thus have compelled him to repeated concentrations, assaults, and flank marches, which might have exhausted his food if not his munitions, and left him helpless while encircled by foes and vast stretches of inhospitable swamps and forests. The country, which yielded bounteous subsistence to an army covering a breadth of 40 miles and advancing from 10 to 20 miles per day, would have proved utterly inadequate in the face of a foe able to detain him a week at each considerable river and drive in or cut

[34] Gen. Jeff. C. Davis appears to have been prominent in this inhumanity.

off his foraging parties; forcing back his cavalry on his infantry. Georgia was swiftly and cheaply traversed, simply by reason of the admirable dispositions which left the enemy in doubt as to his objective, and paralyzed, at Macon, Augusta, Savannah, &c., forces which should have been concentrated to oppose his advance.

Sherman announced his crowning triumph to President Lincoln as follows:

"I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

The President responded as follows:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 26, 1864.

"MY DEAR GEN. SHERMAN:

"Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift—the capture of Savannah.

"When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was *anxious*, if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And, taking the work of Gen. Thomas into the account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success.

"Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing forces of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see great light.

"Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.

"Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN."

Two separate expeditions were sent out from the Mississippi to distract the enemy's attention from Sherman, and prevent a concentration against him. One of them, under Gen. Dana, was dispatched from Vicksburg; encountering,[25] on the Big Black, a Rebel force which it defeated, after an obstinate fight; destroying several miles of the railroad, including the bridge, with locomotives, cars, cotton, and valuable stores. The other, under Gen. Davidson, moved simultaneously from Baton Rouge to Tangipahoa, where it broke up the same railroad, destroying bridges, &c.; pushing on to Franklinton and West Pascagoula; meeting little resistance, taking some prisoners, and causing alarm for the safety of Mobile.

A third and more important mounted expedition was dispatched[26] by Gen. Dana from Memphis, 3,500 strong, led by Gen. Grierson, southeastward through north Alabama to Tupelo on the Mobile railroad, which was thoroughly broken up southward to Okolona; Col. Karge, by the way, surprising[27] a Rebel camp at Verona, dispersing the force holding it, capturing 32 cars, 8 warehouses filled with ordnance and supplies, which were being loaded for Hood's army on 200 wagons taken by Forrest from Sturgis at Guntown. All were destroyed.

At Okolona, Grierson intercepted[28] dispatches from Dick Taylor, at Mobile, promising rëenforcements, which deserters said would arrive at 11 A. M. next day. He decided, therefore, to attack at daylight, and did so: the Rebels being intrenched at a little station known as Egypt, with 4 guns on platform cars, and some 1,200 to 2,000 men. While the fight was in progress, two trains came up the road with rëenforcements for the enemy; but Grierson interposed between these and his stationary foes, repelling the former, and routing the latter; capturing and destroying a

[25] Nov. 25. [26] Dec. 21. [27] Dec. 25. [28] Dec. 27.

train, taking 500 prisoners, and dispersing the force at Egypt. Among their killed was Gen. Gholson.

Making feints in different directions, Grierson now moved southwestward; striking the Mississippi Central at Winona, and tearing it up for miles on either hand; while the 4th Iowa pushed south to Bankston, destroying there Confederate cloth and shoe factories. Grierson moved from Winona to Benton; where Col. Osband engaged and defeated Col. Wood's Rebel cavalry. The expedition made its way thence to Vicksburg with 500 prisoners, 800 beeves, and 1,000 negroes; having destroyed immense amounts of Rebel property, most of it of great military value, including 95 cars, 300 wagons, 30 full warehouses, &c., with a total loss of 27 killed, 93 wounded, 7 missing. Among its prisoners were 100 who had been recruited from among our men famishing in Rebel prison-camps, who had taken this course to save their lives.

Gen. Foster, commanding on the Sea Islands, being directed by Gen. Halleck to make a demonstration inland in behalf of Gen. Sherman, who was expected near Pocotaligo at the end of November, was enabled to spare from his various garrisons but 5,000 men for this service. At the head of this force, he ascended Broad river on steamboats, landing[30] at Boyd's Neck; immediately pushing out Gen. J. P. Hatch to seize the Charleston and Savannah railroad near Grahamsville. Hatch, missing the way, failed to reach the railroad that day, and was confronted, next morning, by a strong Rebel force intrenched on Honey hill, covering Grahamsville and the railroad. Assaulting this, he was stoutly fought and worsted, recoiling at nightfall; having suffered a loss of 746 in killed, wounded, and missing.

Foster now threw two brigades, under Gen. E. E. Potter, across the Coosawhatchie to Devaux Neck, between the two branches of Broad river, whence Potter advanced and seized[31] a position within cannon-shot of the railroad, which he fortified and held, while the rest of Foster's movable column was brought up to his support. Here, Foster received[31] his first news of Sherman's appearance before Savannah, and proceeded at once to the Ogeechee to meet him. By Sherman's direction, he held on to his position; and, after Hardee had fled past to Charleston, he occupied without resistance the Rebel works at Pocotaligo, and at the railroad crossings of the Coosawhatchie and Tullifinny. Gen. Foster was preparing to operate, under Sherman's orders, against Charleston, when he was relieved — because of his suffering from an unhealed wound—by Gen. Gillmore.

Gen. Sherman remained over a month at Savannah, resting and refitting his army preparatory to further and more arduous efforts. He had intended to resume his advance on the 15th of January, 1865; at which time, accordingly, the 17th corps, Gen. F. P. Blair, was taken by water around by Hilton Head to Pocotaligo, whence it menaced Charleston; as the left wing, Gen. Slocum, with Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the Savannah to Sister's ferry,

[30] Nov. 30. [30] Dec. 6. [31] Dec. 12.

threatening an advance on Augusta —Gen. Sherman thus pursuing his favorite strategy of dividing the enemy's forces and distracting his attention from his real objective, so as to prevent a concentration to resist him in the difficult, inhospitable region through which his course lay.

Incessant rains, which flooded most of the adjacent country, giving the Savannah at Sister's ferry a surface width of nearly three miles, submerging the causeway road, and breaking up Gen. Slocum's pontoon-bridge, compelled a delay of a fortnight; during which, Savannah was made over[32] to Gen. Foster: Gen. Grover's division of the 19th corps having been sent by Gen. Grant to form its garrison. Some feints were made from Pocotaligo of an advance on Charleston; Foster's position between the Coosawhatchie and Tullifinny abandoned as no longer of use; and at length—the flood having somewhat abated—Sherman's whole army moved[33] nearly northward; Slocum, with Kilpatrick, crossing the Savannah at Sister's ferry or Purysburg, and moving on Barnwell and Beaufort's bridge, threatening Augusta; while the right wing, keeping for some distance west of the Combahee and Salkehatchie, should cross at Rivers's and at Beaufort's bridges and push rapidly for the Edisto; thus flanking Charleston and compelling its precipitate evacuation by the enemy, after they should have been kept paralyzed so long as might be in apprehension of a siege.

Southern South Carolina is so inveterately and generally a swamp, and was now so sodden and covered with water, that the belief was common among her people that for an army, with its trains, to traverse her whole extent, from south-west to north-east, in mid-winter, was a physical impossibility. Yet, to provide against the chance of Sherman's proving able to overcome the resistance of the elements, Gov. Magrath had, by proclamation, summoned[34] to the field as militia every White male in the State between the ages of 16 and 60, not already in the service; proclaiming that those who did not voluntarily come out should be forced out, and that all former exemptions would be disregarded.

Ample time had been afforded for felling her abundant trees across her narrow roads—that being about the last conspicuous service which her slaves were constrained to render to their masters. Wheeler's troopers hovered around our advance, watching for chances; while a brigade of infantry lay behind the Salkehatchie at Rivers's bridge, prepared to dispute its passage. This, however, was brushed[35] aside by a turning movement from below—to make which, Mower's and G. A. Smith's divisions of Blair's corps waded through a swamp three miles wide, covered with water, one to four feet deep—the weather having become bitterly cold—the two Generals wading at the head of their men. Once over, the Rebels were quickly driven off in disorder, retreating behind the Edisto at Branchville: our loss here being 18 killed and 70 wounded. Our infantry pressed rapidly after them; the enemy burning the bridges over the Edisto while our men broke up the South Carolina railroad for many miles; and Kilpatrick, skirmishing heavily with Wheeler,

[32] Jan. 18, 1865. [33] Feb. 1. [34] Dec. 29, 1864. [35] Feb. 3, 1865.

SHERMAN'S ROUTE FROM SAVANNAH TO GOLDSBOROUGH.

moved by Barnwell and Blackville to Aiken, threatening Augusta. Thus, by the 11th, our whole army was on the line of the railroad aforesaid, tearing it up, and holding apart the enemy's forces covering Augusta on one hand and Charleston on the other.

Our right was now directed on Orangeburg; the 17th corps crossing the South Edisto at Binnaker's bridge, while the 15th crossed at Holman's bridge, farther up; the two approaching at Poplar Spring: the 17th moving swiftly on Orangeburg bridge over the South Edisto, and carrying it by a dash; the enemy trying to burn it with but partial success. A battery was in position behind it, covered by a parapet of cotton and earth, with wings extending so far as could be seen. Blair confronted it with G. A. Smith's division, and sent his other two to a point two miles below, where pontoons were quickly laid and Force's division crossed; Mower's holding the bridge as a support. When Force emerged from the swamp on the right flank of the Rebels at Orangeburg, they gave way; when Smith pushed over; occupied their works, repaired the bridge; and by 4 P. M. the whole corps was in and around Orangeburg, tearing up the railroad leading to Columbia; pressing thence, so soon as possible, on that metropolis, regardless of Branchville or Charleston on their right; as Sherman knew that, being thus flanked, they must be abandoned rather than run the obvious risk of losing the troops by whom they were held.

The 15th corps was again resisted[36] at the crossing of the Congaree; where the bridge was swept by the guns of a substantial fort on the north side, with a smaller work or bridge-head on the south: the approach being over level, open ground, covered with mud from the recent inundation. Gen. Chas. R. Woods, whose division had the advance, turned the bridge-head by sending up Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp on the left; when the enemy decamped, after having fired but not destroyed the bridge, which was promptly repaired; so that our guns were brought over, and at night the head of the column bivouacked near the fine bridge over the Congaree leading into Columbia, which was fired and consumed as our van approached it next morning.

The left wing, under Slocum, had found the crossing of the swollen Savannah so difficult, that it was not entirely clear of that river till the 7th; but it had encountered thenceforth very little resistance; Wheeler's cavalry being the only force that infested its march, and this being kept quite busy by Kilpatrick alone. Augusta was full of Rebel stores; and, in painful apprehension of a visit from Sherman, was defended by such Georgians as could be mustered for militia; but Sherman had no notion of molesting or being molested by them. The shattered remnant of Hood's army—once more consigned to Jo. Johnston—was making its way, under Cheatham, from north Mississippi across Sherman's track through Georgia to his front in the Carolinas, but was not yet near enough to give us trouble: so Slocum, unvexed by any obstacle but the necessity of corduroying the interminable swamps he must traverse, crossed the South

[36] Feb. 15.

Edisto on the 13th, concentrating his command at and below Lexington, and reaching the Saluda a few miles above Columbia only an hour or two after Howard appeared on that river (which here unites with the Broad to form the Congaree) on the 16th.

Gen. Howard, by Sherman's order, promptly threw forward his left across the Saluda, skirmishing with cavalry; then, during the ensuing night, threw a flying bridge over the Broad, three miles above Columbia; crossing Stone's brigade, and thus securing a foothold on the Columbia side, north of the city, and enabling him to lay his pontoons on the morning of the 17th. Columbia was now plainly ours; there being no adequate force present to dispute its possession; so the Mayor came out, at 11 A. M., and formally surrendered it to Col. Stone, of Logan's corps, on the north, about the same time that some of the 17th corps, crossing the Congaree in a skiff, entered it, unresisted, from the west. Sherman and Howard now rode in; Col. Stone having already taken possession and posted sentinels: the inhabitants moving fearlessly through the streets. During the day, the 15th corps marched through the city and out on the Camden road. The 17th corps did not enter it at all; while the left wing and the cavalry, crossing both rivers above, were at no time within two miles of it. Yet night saw that city in flames, and a great part of it reduced to ashes: hence, mutual accusations and reproaches by Gens. Sherman and Wade Hampton. Here is Gen. Sherman's statement in his report:

"In anticipation of the occupation of the city, I had made written orders to Gen. Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These were: to destroy absolutely all arsenals and public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, dépôts, and machinery useful in war to an enemy; but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. I was the first to cross the pontoon-bridge, and, in company with Gen. Howard, rode into the city. The day was clear; but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of Col. Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. Gen. Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our making use of it. Bales were piled everywhere; the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow-storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the court-house; but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day, the 15th corps passed through Columbia and out on the Camden road. The 17th did not enter the town at all; and, as I have before stated, the left wing and cavalry did not come within two miles of the town.

"Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smoldering fires, set by Hampton's order, were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark, they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Woods's division was brought in; but it was found impossible to check the flames; which, by midnight, had become unmanageable, and raged until about 4 A. M.; when, the wind subsiding, they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Gens. Howard, Logan, Woods, and others, laboring to save houses and protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire; but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And, without hesitation, I charge Gen. Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia; not with malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly 'Roman stoicism,' but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others, not on duty, includ-

ing the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the Capital of South Carolina."

It will be seen that Gen. Sherman does not charge Hampton with intending to burn the city, which he was confessedly unable to hold; nor does he deny that some of our men, not on duty, may have aided to extend the conflagration. Nor does Beauregard, who was Hampton's superior in command at Columbia, and who ordered its evacuation, indorse the charges against his successful antagonist. Nor does Pollard —who never misses an opportunity to defame the detested 'Yankees'— directly accuse Sherman of having ordered or desired the conflagration; though he evidently wishes to convey the impression that he did. Here is his account of the capture:

"A white flag, displayed from the steeple of the City Hall, announced the surrender of the town. With bands playing, drum-corps beating, flags flying, and their men in step, the Yankee army marched down Main-street to the Capitol square.

"No sooner had the enemy entered Columbia than a wild and savage scene of pillage commenced. Stragglers, 'bummers,' pontoon men, and the riffraff of the army, were to be met in every street and almost every house. If they wanted a pair of boots, they took them from one's feet. Watches were in constant demand — in several instances, being snatched from the persons of ladies. Ear and finger rings were taken by force; and, in isolated cases, the dresses of ladies were torn from their bodies by villains who expected to find jewels or plate concealed. Search for silver and provisions was made in every conceivable place. Ramrods were used as probes to indicate where boxes were buried; and gardens, out-houses, cellars, garrets, chimneys, and nooks never thought of by anybody but a thief in search of plunder, were turned, so to speak, inside out. Rev. Mr. Shand, the Episcopalian clergyman, while conveying a trunk containing the communion service of silver from the church to the South Carolina College, was accosted by a Yankee and a negro, who compelled him, under threat of death, to give it up.

"The conflagration which destroyed the city commenced about dusk. The fire started near the rear of the jail. A high wind prevailed; and, in a short time, the flames were in full and unconquerable progress, spreading rapidly in three directions —up and down Main-street, and eastwardly. From 10 P. M. till 3 A. M., the scene was appalling. The sky was one broad sheet of flame; above which, amid the lurid smoke, drifted in eddying circles a myriad of sparks: these falling, scattered the conflagration on every side. The monotone of the roaring, leaping, hissing tongues of flame, as they careered on their wild course, alone filled hearts with dismay. The air was like that of a furnace. Many of the streets were impassable. Frightened men, women, and children, ran in all directions; some only to flee again from the fresh attacks of the destroying element. Property thrown out of houses was either burned or stolen. Many of the Federal soldiers, maddened by liquor, dashed through the city with lighted torches to inflame the dwellings yet untouched. Morning revealed, to some extent, the broad sweep of destruction. Four thousand or more citizens were houseless and homeless. From the State House to Cotton Town, and an average of two or three squares on each side of Main-street, nothing but blackened ruins remained. Every vestige of that once busy street was gone. After having completed, as far as possible, the destruction of Columbia, Sherman continued his march northward."

As the fall of Columbia involved that of Charleston, including Fort Sumter and all its other defenses— Hardee properly declining to be here isolated and consigned to capture at our convenience—and, as the scene of destruction which marked *that* evacuation has not even been charged to the Unionists, we will copy Pollard's graphic description of this also, as a companion-piece to that of Columbia. He says:

"The movement of Sherman had already been decisive of the fate of Charleston. Gen. Hardee, finding himself flanked at Charleston, and appreciating the instant necessity of effecting a junction with Beauregard and Cheatham and concentrating all available forces in Sherman's path, resolved

to evacuate this city, so famous in the War, and so long coveted by the Yankees. But he was resolved to leave as little as possible for the enemy's rapacity.

"At an early hour of the morning, before the retirement of Gen. Hardee's troops, every building, warehouse, or shed, stored with cotton, was fired by a guard detailed for the purpose. The engines were brought out; but, with the small force at the disposal of the fire department, very little else could be done than to keep the surrounding buildings from igniting. On the western side of the city, the flames raged with great fury.

"The horrors of the conflagration were heightened by a terrible catastrophe. It appears, some boys had discovered a quantity of powder at the dépôt of the North-western railroad, and amused themselves by flinging handfuls of it upon the masses of burning cotton in the streets. It was not long before the powder running from their hands formed a train upon the ground, leading from the fire to the main supplies of powder in the dépôt. The result is easily conjectured. A spark ignited the powder in the train; there was a leaping, running fire along the ground, and then an explosion which shook the city to its very foundations from one end to the other. The building was, in a second, a whirling mass of ruins, in a tremendous volume of flame and smoke. About 200 lives were lost by the explosion, and not less than 150 bodies were found charred in that fiery furnace.

"From the dépôt, the fire spread rapidly, and, communicating with the adjoining buildings, threatened destruction to that part of the town. Four squares, embracing the area bounded by Chapel, Alexander, and Washington streets, were consumed before the conflagration was subdued.

"The destruction of public property had been as complete as Gen. Hardee could make it. He burned the cotton warehouses, arsenals, quartermaster's stores, railroad bridges, two iron-clads, and some vessels in the ship-yard. Among the captured property were 200 pieces of artillery; spiked and temporarily disabled, as they could not be brought off.

"The Yankees occupied Charleston on the 18th of February. A scarred city, blackened by fire, with evidences of destruction and ruin wrought by the enemy at almost every step, had at last come into their possession; but not until a heroic defense, running through nearly four years, and at last only by the stratagem of a march many miles away from it. The appearance of the city was eloquent of the sacrifices and heroism of its people. A Yankee correspondent, who had joined in the triumphal entry into Charleston, thus described the scene before his eyes: 'Not a building for blocks here that is exempt from the marks of shot and shell. All have suffered more or less. Here is a fine brown-stone bank building vacant and deserted, with great, gaping holes in the sides and roof, through which the sun shines and the rain pours; windows and sashes blown out by exploding shell within; plastering knocked down; counters torn up; floors crushed in, and fragments of Mosaic pavement, broken and crushed, lying around on the floor, mingled with bits of statuary, stained glass, and broken parts of chandeliers. Ruin within and without; and its neighbor in no better plight. The churches, St. Michael's and St. Philip's, have not escaped the storms of our projectiles. Their roofs are perforated, their walls wounded, their pillars demolished, and within the pews filled with plastering. From Bay street, studded with batteries, to Calhoun street, our shells have carried destruction and desolation, and often death, with them.'"

Lt.-Col. A. G. Bennett, commanding on Morris island, receiving information which justified a belief that Charleston had been evacuated, at once dispatched a boat toward Fort Moultrie; which boat, when 40 yards east of Fort Sumter, was met by one from Sullivan's island, containing a band of musicians left behind by Hardee. These confirmed the rumored evacuation; whereupon, Maj. J. A. Hennessy was sent to raise the flag over recovered Fort Sumter; which was effected at 9 A. M. Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney submitted promptly and gracefully to a like embellishment—their guns having been left in a serviceable condition. At 10 A. M., Bennett reached the city, which the enemy had not yet wholly evacuated; a mounted force being still engaged in setting fires. He at once demanded of Mayor Macbeth a surrender, which was promptly accorded. A small force was brought up so soon as possible, and the work of extinguishing the raging fires vigorously prosecuted—the Blacks of

the city being impressed therefor. The U. S. Arsenal was thus saved from destruction, as were large quantities of Confederate rice, which were distributed among the poor of the city.

Georgetown was at the same time evacuated—Hardee, with 12,000 men, gathered from all lower South Carolina, making all haste to cross the Santee and Pedee before Sherman could turn upon and crush him; which, as Sherman did not attempt to intercept him, having other objects in view, was safely accomplished.

Gen. Gillmore, then in command on the coast, reports the guns captured in Charleston and its defenses at 450; a good part of them 8 and 10-inch Columbiads and 7-inch rifled guns—many of foreign make. Much good ammunition, 8 locomotives, with many passenger and platform cars, also escaped the Rebel conflagration, and came into possession of the victors.

Before proceeding with the narrative of Sherman's Great March, it is but just to speak of the devastation of South Carolina by his army.

Sherman's general order, prescribing the conduct of his troops in their march, was precise and considerate, though its execution would naturally seem harsh to those it despoiled. He says:

"IV. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command: aiming at all times to keep in the wagon-trains at least ten days' provisions for the command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass; during the halt or at camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road traveled.

"V. To army corps commanders is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but, should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.

"VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, &c., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance."

Of course, "the inhabitants" *did* "burn bridges, obstruct roads," and "otherwise manifest local hostility." Most of them were quite willing; but they would have been compelled so to act if *un*willing. And such manifestations of "local hostility," according to the terms of the order above given, constrained the corps commanders to "enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostillity." But the mere necessity of subsisting such an army off the country, while passing rapidly through it, necessarily involved its devastation. It was like a cloud of locusts, devouring every thing edible, and many things that were not. And Gen. Sherman, in

his report of his passage through Georgia, says of his men:

"*A little loose in foraging*, they 'did some things they ought not to have done;' yet, on the whole, they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated."

Naturally, the "little violence" and "little loss" looked larger, and were regarded with less complaisance, from the other side; but there was not much complaint of wanton destruction or outrage.

In South Carolina, new conditions were presented. The region traversed was, in the main, more sparsely settled than central Georgia—the mass of its people poorer, and its supplies more scanty. And South Carolina was regarded by our soldiers with more marked disfavor, as having been the cradle of Secession and Civil War. So, doubtless, the taste for plunder had grown keener by gratification, while the instinct that discerns the location of hidden food and valuables had by use become amazingly sharp and subtle. Though a good many watches and pieces of plate which were claimed to have been "found hidden in a swamp, a mile from any house," were in fact drawn from less occult sources, it would have been difficult to hide a watch or goblet where it would not have been discovered and appropriated. And the business of foraging had been gradually assumed as a specialty by the least scrupulous of the soldiers, who, having mounted themselves somehow on beasts of burden, scoured the whole region in advance of our marching columns—often many miles in advance—gathering provisions for the army, and any thing inviting and portable for themselves—dismounting and fighting in line of battle when charged or impeded by cavalry or militia in moderate numbers;[37] but fonder, on the whole, of rifling a house than of fighting its owner; and constantly intent on the main-chance. No other State or section has in modern times been so thoroughly devastated in a single campaign signalized by little fighting, as was South Carolina by that march through its utmost length, and over an average breadth of forty miles, by Sherman's army.

Gen. Kilpatrick, with a total force of 5,068 men, including a 6-gun battery of horse artillery, and a small brigade of dismounted men, had demonstrated northward, on our extreme left, so far as Aiken; imbuing the enemy with the fullest belief that Augusta was Sherman's objective, and causing Wheeler's cavalry to confront him in this direction; leaving the passes of the Edisto unguarded. In effecting this, one of his brigades, led by Col. Spencer, had engaged,[38] near Williston's station, Gen. Allen's division of Alabama cavalry (six thin regiments), and routed it with no serious loss to either side. Having destroyed the railroad hereabout to his heart's content, and deceived Wheeler as to his purpose, Kilpatrick merely sent[39] Atkins's brigade into Aiken, where Wheeler was in force, and of course drove Atkins back; charging, at 11 A. M., Kilpatrick's entire command, and being repulsed with a loss of 31 killed, 160 wounded, and 60 prison-

[37] "Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would, in ordinary times, rank as respectable battles."—*Sherman's Report.* [38] Feb. 8. [39] Feb 11.

ers. He thereupon fell back into Aiken; and Kilpatrick, after threatening him there till the night of the 12th, suddenly drew off, moved rapidly across the South and then the North Edisto,[40] and, moving on the left of the 14th corps, struck the Lexington and Augusta road 9 miles north-west of Lexington, when barely 1,500 of Wheeler's men had got between him and Columbia, while Cheatham's force (the remnant of Hood's army) was moving parallel with our advance still farther to the left. But, on crossing the Saluda,[41] Wheeler was found to be ahead; and our cavalry marched all day[42] parallel with Cheatham's corps, moving at times within three miles—a difficult stream forbidding an attempt to strike the enemy in flank, as he was strung along the road. Crossing the Greenville and Columbia road, Kilpatrick tore it up down to Alston, where he crossed[43] the Broad, and pushed north nearly to Chesterville; when he found that Wheeler had moved around his front, united with Wade Hampton, and was before him on the road to Charlotte and Raleigh, N. C., which Sherman's advance northward from Columbia to Winnsboro'[44] had led the enemy to believe was his intended course.

They were at fault, as usual. Though his left wing was thrown north nearly to Chesterville, the movement in this direction was a feint, and the whole army soon turned sharply to the right, crossing the Catawba,[45] and, after halting the right wing three days to enable Slocum (who had been delayed by a flood in the Catawba) to come up, struck the Great Pedee at Cheraw[46] (where Blair captured 25 guns), and thence up to the State line at Sneedsboro'; moving on parallel roads within easy supporting distance, till they were concentrated at Fayetteville,[47] N. C.; leaving Charlotte and the bulk of the Rebel army far to our left. Heavy rains and almost impassable streams had delayed our different columns; and Hardee was expected to make a stand at Fayetteville and resist our passage of the Cape Fear river; but he merely burned the bridge and put off as Blair came up. Kilpatrick, still on our extreme left had advanced by Rockingham;[48] striking next day the rear of Hardee's column retreating from Cheraw on Fayetteville; when, learning from prisoners that Hampton's cavalry was behind, he resolved to intercept it. Posting a mounted brigade near Solemn Grove on one road, he made, with Spencer's brigade, a rapid night-march across to another; during which, he rode through a division of Hampton's cavalry: losing by capture his escort of 16 men, but escaping with his staff.

Hampton skillfully deceived Gen. Atkins, whom Kilpatrick had left behind, passed him by an unsuspected road, and fell in full force upon Kilpatrick and Spencer about 2 A. M.; taking them completely by surprise, routing them and capturing all their guns. Spencer and most of Kilpatrick's staff were made prisoners; Kilpatrick barely escaping on foot. Driven back into a swamp, with most of his men, he succeeded in rallying them, while the enemy, supposing him utterly routed, were intent on plundering his camp; and,

[40] Feb. 15. [41] Feb. 17. [42] Feb. 18. [43] Feb. 19 [44] Feb. 21 [45] Feb. 23. [46] March 3. [47] March 11. [48] March 7.

charging on foot, he retook his headquarters and guns, just as the enemy were harnessing the horses to draw them off, and opened upon their receding backs when scarcely twenty paces distant, quickening the pace of all who still retained the power of locomotion. Hampton soon rallied his command, and tried hard to regain all that he had so suddenly won and lost; but Kilpatrick kept him at bay till Gen. Mitchell, hearing the guns, at 8 A. M. came hastily across with a brigade of infantry of the 20th corps; when the enemy disappeared; having inflicted a loss of 19 killed, 61 wounded, and 103 prisoners.

Kilpatrick reached Fayetteville, N. C., on the 11th, and the whole army was concentrated there next day; when the army tug Davidson and the gunboat Eolus steamed up from Wilmington with news of the capture of that city and of all that had occurred during the six weeks that the army had been corduroying its way through the interminable swamps and pontooning across the swollen streams of South Carolina. At Columbia, the disastrous fire and the bitter hostility of the people had prevented the only corps that entered that city from learning much of the outer world; but here Sherman was in full communication with the Government and the cöoperating Generals, and able to dispatch full instructions to Gen. Schofield; who, having been brought around from Tennessee to Newbern, was preparing to rëenforce him at Goldsboro'.

Sherman halted three days at Fayetteville; completely destroying the U. S. Arsenal and the costly machinery which had been brought hither from the U. S. armory at Harper's Ferry on its first capture in April, 1861. His army greatly needed rest; and besides, there was reason now to apprehend other resistance than that afforded by the swamps, the streams, and the elements. Hardee from Savannah and Charleston; Beauregard from Columbia; Cheatham from the Tennessee; with a considerable force drawn from North Carolina and her seaward defenses under Bragg and Hoke, made up, with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry, a body of not less than 40,000 men, mainly veterans, now united under the able and wary Jo. Johnston. It would no longer answer to move as hitherto; our columns must be kept well closed up, the corps within easy supporting distance, on peril of surprise and disaster.

True to his favorite policy, Sherman again pushed [*] four divisions of his left wing, covered by Kilpatrick, directly northward to AVERYSBORO', as if intent on Raleigh; while Slocum's train, his two remaining divisions, and the right wing, moved by various roads nearly east, toward Goldsboro,' his true destination. The incessant rains had reduced the roads to a state wherein horses would mire almost anywhere, and 'corduroy' was essential wherever guns or wagons were to be moved.

Sherman was on the left with Slocum, who was that day required to send up a brigade of infantry to the aid of Kilpatrick, who was skirmishing heavily in the advance.

Next morning, when near Averysborough, on approaching the road, which runs eastward to Bentonville, the enemy, under Hardee, was found

[*] March 15.

posted on a narrow, swampy neck of land between the Cape Fear and South rivers; his total strength being estimated at 20,000. Ward's division of the 20th corps, in our left advance, was deployed, sending forward a skirmish line, developing a brigade of infantry behind a light field-work, with a battery enfilading the approach. Williams sent Case's brigade by a circuit to our left; turning the enemy's work, and, by a quick charge, driving back the infantry brigade holding it, under the fire of Winnegar's battery, to a stronger and better line behind it; whereupon, Ward's division charged directly on the retreating foe, capturing 3 guns and 217 prisoners, of whom 68 were wounded; while 108 of the enemy's dead were buried by Williams on the field.

Jackson's division was now sent up on the right of Ward, and two divisions of the 14th corps on the left: while Kilpatrick, massing his cavalry farther to the right, was directed to feel for the road to Goldsborough. He had gained that road with one brigade, when he was vehemently assailed by McLaws's Rebel division, and pushed back, fighting gallantly; until, at length, our whole line advanced, driving the enemy within his intrenchments and pressing him there till night fell, dark and stormy; under cover of which he retreated, taking the road not to Raleigh but to Smithfield. Slocum's loss was 77 killed and 477 wounded (no prisoners)—which may or may not include that of Kilpatrick. The enemy's was probably about the same. Ward's division made a show of pursuing the enemy; while the rest of our army, bearing to the right, pushed directly for Goldsborough.

Sherman, supposing the fight all out of the Rebels for the present, had ridden across to the right wing, and was intent on reaching Goldsborough and meeting Schofield, when the sound of guns on the left again challenged his attention. Slocum, approaching BENTONVILLE, had been assailed by Jo. Johnston with the entire Rebel army. Couriers from Schofield and from Terry now arrived; the former reporting himself at Kinston, short of provisions, but able to reach Goldsboro' on the 21st, which he was directed to do; Terry being likewise directed to advance. Meantime, the several divisions of the right wing were ordered to move on rapidly to the relief of the outnumbered left.

Slocum had at first encountered [86] Dibbrell's cavalry; which he was driving, when he ran headlong upon the whole Confederate army: the two leading brigades of Carlin's division being hurled back on the main body, with a loss of 3 guns and their caissons. Slocum thereupon, very properly, stood on the defensive; showing a front of four divisions, and throwing up slight barricades; while Kilpatrick came into action on the left. Here our left received six assaults from Johnston's army; holding our ground firmly, and inflicting heavy loss on the foe with our artillery — they having brought up little or none. Johnston had hurried hither by night from Smithfield, moving very light, expecting to crush Slocum before he could be supported; but he was mistaken. Night fell

[86] March 18.

without giving him any ground; and, before morning, Slocum got up his wagon-train, with its guard of two divisions, while Hazen's division of the 15th (Logan's) corps came up on his right, rendering his position secure. The enemy not risking further attacks, Slocum awaited the coming up of Howard and the entire right wing; by which time, Johnston had intrenched thoroughly in a strong position, forming a sort of triangle, with its apex at the front, but facing Slocum on one side and Howard on the other. Here he was very cautiously approached and felt of by Sherman, who was aware that Schofield was improving this delay to get possession of Goldsborough in the enemy's rear, while Gen. Terry advanced to the Neuse at Cox's bridge, some 10 miles higher up. And now,[51] during a heavy rain, under cover of a noisy demonstration along the Rebel front, Mower's division of Blair's corps worked around by our right to the enemy's rear; hoping to secure the bridge over Mill creek, which was his only line of retreat. But Johnston was not to be thus caught; nor did he choose to stop here and fight 60,000 men with (at most) 40,000; so he decamped during the night, retreating on Smithfield and Raleigh so suddenly as to leave his pickets behind, as well as his severely wounded.

Our total loss here was 191 killed, 1,108 wounded, and 344 missing: in all, 1,643. We buried here 267 Rebel dead, and took 1,625 prisoners—many of them wounded.

No further resistance being made, our army moved on to Goldsboro', where it rested and was rëclad, while Gen. Sherman, after a hasty visit to Gens. Terry and Schofield, took[52] the first train of cars that ran to Morehead City, and thence a swift steamer to City Point;[53] where he met in council the President, Gens. Grant, Meade, &c.; returning as hurriedly to his army at Goldsboro', which he reached on the 30th.

We may now narrate the events of the Winter in North Carolina, which signally contributed to the final overthrow of the Rebellion.

Wilmington, N. C., had—because of its location, so convenient for the supply of ordnance, munitions, &c., to the main Rebel armies, and the extraordinary difficulty of precluding the ingress and egress of blockade-runners, at this port—been, from the outset, one of the most important sea-ports of the Confederacy, before, by the gradual closing of the others, it became the only one of consequence that remained accessible. To close it, therefore, became at length synonymous with barring all direct and nearly all commercial intercourse between the Confederacy and the non-belligerent world.

Early in the Autumn of 1864, Gen. Grant proposed to Gen. Butler the dispatch of Brig.-Gens. Weitzel and Graham to reconnoiter Fort Fisher, the main defense of the seaward approaches to Wilmington, to determine its strength, preparatory to a combined attack. The reconnoissance was made accordingly, and its result duly reported.[54]

The meditated attack was intended to have been a virtual surprise, when the pressure of our armies at all points should have probably re-

[51] March 21. [52] March 25. [53] March 27. [54] About Sept. 20.



DEFENSES OF WILMINGTON.

Com'r Rhind, at 10½ P. M. of the 23d; exploding her at 1¼ next morning, but to very little purpose—the miraculous power which gave efficacy to the assault with rams'-horns on Jericho not having been vouchsafed. Rhind and his crew did their work: following in (unperceived) a blockader whose signals of amity were respected and answered by the fort. When all was ready, they escaped in a tender which had accompanied them on their perilous errand, and which, having attained a considerable distance, was scarcely harmed by the explosion. The fort and its defenders seem to have been nowise disturbed by it—Col. Lamb supposing it to be merely the bursting of one of the great guns of our fleet.

Porter had 33 war vessels, several of them iron-clad, beside a reserve of 17 small ones. At 11½ A. M., he followed up the abortive explosion by an order to advance and bombard the fort: the Ironsides leading, closely followed by the Monadnock, Canonicus, Mahopac, Minnesota, and nearly all his larger ships; and so terrible was their concentrated fire that the fort was completely silenced by it in 75 minutes; having been set on fire in several places and two of its magazines exploded. The bombardment was continued till sunset, when Gen. Butler arrived in his flagship; his transports being still absent. Com. Porter now drew off for the night.

At 7 A. M. next day, the transports and troops having arrived, the bombardment was renewed, and was continued for seven hours: the Rebels responding for a while with two guns only. Some of our vessels drew off before the rest, because out of ammunition. The iron-clads were ordered to continue their fire throughout the night.

Our land forces had meantime commenced debarking, under the immediate command of Gen. Weitzel, who headed the first or reconnoitering party of 500 men; going himself to within 800 yards of the fort, pushing up a skirmish-line to within 150 yards, and capturing a little outwork called Flag-pond Hill battery, with 65 men.

Weitzel's observations convinced him that the work was exceedingly strong, and that its defensive power had not been essentially injured by Porter's fire. He soon returned, as directed, to Butler, and reported that it would be murder to assault such a fort with our 6,000 men. Butler, disappointed, now ran close up in his vessel, reconnoitered for himself, and reluctantly acquiesced in Weitzel's decision. Our men, of whom about half had been landed, were thereupon rëembarked;[87] and Gen. Butler returned with the land force to the James, leaving the fleet still off Wilmington.

Our loss in this bombardment was about fifty killed and wounded—nearly or quite all by the bursting of six of our heavy Parrott guns—the enemy inflicting no injury, because he could not work his guns under our fire. His loss was 3 killed and 55 wounded. Butler reports that we took 300 prisoners.

Grant was profoundly dissatisfied. In the first place, he had not intended that Gen. Butler should go, and had at length plainly intimated this; though, as Fort Fisher was in

[87] Dec. 26-7.

Butler's military department, he did not absolutely forbid it. Still, as Weitzel was his choice, and the decision not to assault was primarily Weitzel's, he could not object to this. But he did complain, and with reason, that his express order, addressed to Butler for Weitzel, had been violated in the return of the expedition. That order is as follows:

"CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 6, 1864.

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under Gen. Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matters of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by cōoperating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops, immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under Gen. Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General B. F. BUTLER."

Gen. Weitzel had concurred in the propriety of returning, but in entire ignorance of this order. Had it been directed to him, and he placed in command of the expedition, he would have obeyed it.

Advised by the Navy Department that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and ready for a fresh attempt, Grant promptly determined that it should be made. Designating Gen. Alfred H. Terry to command the new expedition, he added a brigade of about 1,500 men and a siege-train (which was not landed), and ordered Gen. Sheridan to send a division to Fortress Monroe, to follow in case of need. Terry's force, therefore, though nominally but a quarter stronger, was really much more so; since all who were under his orders added vigor and confidence to his efforts. Gen. Terry was first apprised of his destination by Gen. Grant, as together they passed down the James.

The new expedition, composed in good part of the old one, *minus* its two Generals, left Fortress Monroe Jan. 6, 1865; put into Beaufort, N. C., on the 8th; was detained there by bad weather till the 12th; was off Wilmington that night; and commenced its landing, under cover of a heavy bombardment from Porter's fleet, early next morning; and, by 3 P. M., nearly 8,000 men, with three days' rations in their haversacks, 40 rounds of ammunition in their boxes, arms, intrenching tools, munitions, &c., complete, had been landed, in spite of a heavy surf; having thrown out pickets which had exchanged shots with those of the enemy. The work assigned them was already well begun.

Gen. Terry's first concern was to throw a strong defensive line across the sandy peninsula whereon Fort Fisher stands, so as to isolate it from

Pennypacker, advancing to Curtis's support, overlapped his right, drove the enemy from the heavy palisading that extended from the west end of the land-face to the river, taking some prisoners; and now the two brigades, uniting, drove the enemy, by desperate fighting, from about one-quarter of the land-face. Gen. Ames, commanding the assaulting division, now brought up Bell's brigade, and placed it between the fort and the river, where the hollows whence sand had been dug for the parapet, the ruins of barracks and store-houses, and the large magazine, formed, with the huge traverses of the land-face, a series of rude breast-works, behind which successively the enemy rallied, and over which the combatants fired into each others' faces. Nine of these traverses were successively carried by our men; while Terry strengthened the assailants by sending down Abbott's brigade from the north, where their place was taken by the discomfited sailors and marines, with the 27th U. S. colored, Brig.-Gen. A. M. Blackman; who entered the fort and reported to Ames at 6 P. M.

Still, the defense was obstinately maintained; the fleet now shifting its fire from that portion of the fort not yet gained by our troops to the beach, to prevent the possibility of succor from the Rebel garrison of Battery Buchanan; until, at 9 P. M., two more traverses having been carried, the Rebels were fairly driven by Abbott's men out of their last foothold in the fort, fleeing down the Point to Battery Buchanan; but it was idle to hope to make a successful stand here against their eager pursuers; and Maj.-Gen. Whiting (mortally wounded), Col. Lamb, and their followers, had no choice but to surrender. Terry took 2,083 prisoners; while his material trophies were 169 guns, most of them heavy, over 2,000 small arms, and considerable ammunition, provisions, &c. Before morning, Fort Caswell, across the river, with the extensive works at Smithville and Reeve's point, were abandoned and blown up by the enemy: so that the triumph was complete.

Our loss in this desperate assault was 110 killed, 536 wounded; but among these were Col. Bell, mortally, and Gen. N. M. Curtis and Col. G. A. Pennypacker, severely wounded, while leading their brigades in the assault.

Gen. Hoke, with a considerable Rebel force, had watched the landing of our troops at a respectful distance inland; but did not venture to annoy them, though expected, and finally ordered, by his superior, Bragg, to do so. The prompt extension of our lines across the peninsula precluded the possibility of success after the first night; so that, when Bragg reiterated his order more peremptorily, he was requested by Hoke to reconnoiter for himself, and did so; when his order was withdrawn. They now resolved to reënforce the fort; but the rapidity of Terry's and Porter's operations left them no opportunity to do so. It only remained to the two Rebel commanders to look quietly on and see Fort Fisher taken. They were not long compelled to endure their necessarily painful anxiety.

Next morning[66] after the capture, while the fort swarmed with our curious, exulting soldiers and sailors,

[66] Jan. 16.

Newbern on Goldsborough. Couch's and Cox's divisions were now ordered across the country to Kinston; but the lack of wagons delayed their movement till March 6; when they started under Couch, while Schofield went by sea to Morehead city, and thence by rail to Newbern; whence he reached, on the 8th, Cox's position at Wise's forks, near South-west creek, on his way to Goldsboro'. Cox had sent up two regiments under Col. Upham, 15th Conn., to seize and hold the crossing of the creek; but Hoke, who had ere this been re-enforced by part of Cheatham's corps from the Tennessee, had that morning flanked and surprised Upham there; striking him suddenly in the rear, and capturing 700 of his men.

Elated by this stroke, Hoke advanced on Schofield; attempting to bore in betwixt Carter's and Palmer's divisions, after the Virginia fashion; but was checked by the arrival of Ruger's division, and desisted without serious fighting or loss.

Schofield, seeing the enemy strong and eager, directed Cox to intrench and stand on the defensive till Couch could arrive. Hoke skirmished sharply next day, and struck heavily at Cox's left and center the day after:[66] the blow falling mainly on Ruger's division, by which it was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants. Schofield reports our loss here at only 300; while he estimates the enemy's at 1,500. Hoke retreated across the Neuse and burned the bridge. Couch came up and reënforced Schofield next morning. Lack of pontoons delayed Schofield at the Neuse till the 14th, when—having rebuilt the bridge—he crossed and entered Kinston unopposed—Hoke having hastened to Smithfield to aid Johnston in making head against Sherman. Schofield again advanced on the 20th, and entered Goldsboro', scarcely resisted, next day; barely ahead of the arrival of Sherman and his whole army, as has already been narrated.

XXXIII.

THE REPOSSESSION OF ALABAMA.

WILSON—CANBY.

Gen. Grant's comprehensive plan of campaign for the Winter and Spring of 1864–5 embraced a combined demonstration from north and south upon Alabama; which State, save at its northern extremity, had thus far suffered less from the ravages of war than any part of the Confederacy but Texas. The movement at the south was impelled and directed by Gen. Canby, commanding at New Orleans; that at the north was led by Gen. James H. Wilson, under the direction of Gen. Thomas, whose cavalry Wilson had been detached by Grant from the Army of the Potomac and sent West expressly to command, with results that did credit to the Lieut.-General's sagacity and judgment.

[66] March 10.

struck at Trion by Gen. Cuxton, who had been detached by Wilson at Elyton, and who had interposed between Jackson's force and his train, and was to be attacked by Jackson this morning. Chalmers was at Marion, south of Tuskaloosa; and all were moving, under Forrest's direction, to concentrate upon and defend Selma. A note from Cuxton—who had been detailed to strike Tuskaloosa—now apprised Wilson that he should postpone this enterprise, and fight Jackson, with intent to prevent his junction with Forrest. Wilson hereupon directed McCook to move rapidly to Centerville, cross the Cahawba, and push on, via Scottsborough, to strike Jackson. McCook found Jackson well posted near Scottsborough, and, hearing nothing of Cuxton, did not venture to attack, but recoiled, after a sharp skirmish; burning the Scottsboro' factory and Centerville bridge, and rejoining Wilson near Selma.

Wilson was moving eagerly and in force on Selma, driving small parties of Rebel cavalry, when he was brought to a halt by Forrest, strongly posted on Boyle's creek, near Plantersville, with a creek on his right and a high, wooded ridge on his left, with 4 guns planted to sweep the Randolph and 2 on the Maplesville road, whereon our troopers were advancing. He had in line about 5,000 men, mainly cavalry (Roddy's division, with Armstrong's and Crossland's brigades), with his front covered by rail barricades and abatis. Wilson had here Long's and Upton's divisions—perhaps 6,000 in all, but all veterans, of excellent quality, and admirably led.

Long arrived first, on our right; when, dismounting and forming his men on the left of the road, he charged, breaking the Rebel line. Lt.-Col. Frank White, with 4 companies of the 17th Indiana (mounted), being ordered forward, rode over the Rebel guns, cutting his way out with a loss of 17 men; among them Capt. Frank Taylor, killed.

Gen. Alexander, leading Upton's division, hearing the noise of the fight, came rapidly up on the Maplesville road; dismounting and deploying his brigade, and going right in on the left, with such energy that the enemy were soon in headlong flight, leaving 2 guns and 200 prisoners to Alexander, and 1 gun to Long. Winslow's brigade now took the advance, and pursued sharply to Plantersville, 19 miles from Selma; but the fugitives could not be overtaken. Forrest had been driven 24 miles that day.

Long's division now * took the lead, followed by Upton's; and all, by 4 P. M., were in sight of SELMA. Forrest had here a motley force of perhaps 7,000 men; but many of them green conscripts—boys and old men—and not to be relied on. He was indisposed to attempt the defense of extensive works with such a force; but Dick Taylor, his superior, had been here, and ordered him to hold the town at all hazards—disappearing on a southward-going train directly afterward. Forrest, with a doubting heart, prepared to do his best. His works were good and strong; extending, in a semicircle of three miles, from the Alabama above the city to that river below it.

Wilson had here 9,000 men. After carefully reconnoitering, he directed

* April 2.

dark, Gen. Wilson ordered an attack; when 300 of the 3d Iowa cavalry moved forward, supported by the 4th Iowa and 10th Missouri, under a heavy fire of grape, canister, and musketry, pushed through strong abatis, and pressed back the Rebel line. Gen. Upton now sent up two companies of the 10th Missouri to seize one of the bridges leading into Columbus; which, under cover of darkness, was effected. And now Gen. Upton charged again, sweeping away all resistance; and soon the city was ours, with 1,200 prisoners, 52 field guns, and large quantities of small arms and stores, at a cost to us of barely 24 killed and wounded. Among the Rebels killed was C. A. L. Lamar, of Howell Cobb's staff, former owner and captain of the slaver Wanderer. We destroyed here the Rebel ram Jackson, mounting six 7-inch guns, burned 15 locomotives, 250 cars, 115,000 bales of cotton, &c., &c.

Lagrange's advance reached West Point at 10 A. M. this day, and found the crossing of the Chattahoochee defended by Fort Tyler, a strong, bastioned earthwork, 35 yards square, situated on a commanding hill, and mounting 4 guns. At 1½ P. M., this fort was bravely assaulted on three sides; but its ditch, 12 feet wide by 10 deep, stopped our men under a withering fire of musketry and grape. Lagrange, refusing to fall back, posted sharpshooters to tranquilize the Rebel gunners while he gathered materials for bridges, over which his men sprang at the sound of the bugle; rushing over the parapet, and capturing the entire garrison—265 men. Gen. Tyler, its commander, with 18 of his men, had been killed, and 27 more severely wounded.

Simultaneously with this charge, the 4th Indiana cavalry dashed headlong through the town, secured both bridges over the Chattahoochee, drove out the slender Rebel force found there, and burned 5 engines with their trains. Early next morning, Gen. Minty, commanding (since Long's fall) the division, was on his way to Macon, as was Wilson on the Columbus road; both columns arriving on the 21st, after Wilson and Minty had both received assurances from Gen. Howell Cobb, commanding in Macon, that the war was virtually ended.

Cuxton did not arrive till the 30th. Outnumbered by Jackson in their encounter near Trion,[9] he had moved off swiftly to Johnson's ferry on the Black Warrior, 44 miles above Tuskaloosa, where he crossed and came down the west bank; surprising and capturing[10] Tuskaloosa, with 3 guns and 150 prisoners; destroying the military school, public works, stores, &c. Hearing nothing from Wilson or McCook, he burned the bridge over the Black Warrior, and sped south-west nearly to Eutaw; where he heard that Wirt Adams, with 2,000 cavalry, was close upon him. Too weak to fight such a force, Cuxton turned and countermarched nearly to Tuskaloosa; thence by Jasper, Mount Benson and Trionsville, to Talladega; near which, he scattered a small Rebel force under a Gen. Hill; pushing thence by Carrollton, Ga., Newnan, and Forsyth, to Macon; having, with his small force, moved 650 miles in 30 days, in entire ignorance of the position or for-

[9] April 2.

[10] April 5.

planted with torpedoes, which, unless cautiously sought out and exploded, were very destructive. Quite a number of men and horses were killed by them.

'Spanish Fort,' the strongest of the eastern defenses of Mobile, was thus approached and finally invested:[16] the Rebel movable column retiring on Blakely. The 16th corps, on the right, threatened Blakely, while the 13th, on our left, more immediately invested Spanish Fort. Steele now joined hands with Smith, thus forming our extreme right.

Our fleet had moved up the bay parallel with our army, making for Howard's landing just below Spanish Fort, with intent to aid in the reduction of that stronghold by bombardment, and by isolating it from Mobile. Notwithstanding the general shallowness of the bay, they were enabled to approach the shore so nearly as to deliver a very effective fire, which was seldom returned, and which ultimately cut off the fort from all communication with the city; but, in effecting this, the Metacomet first, afterward the Osage, were blown up by torpedoes, and destroyed. Their crews generally escaped, owing to the shallowness of the water. The gunboats Stockdale, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Albatross, Winnebago, and Genesee, with some smaller vessels, remained. After firing leisurely through the day, they usually dropped down the bay to Great Point Clear to anchor for the night.

The siege of Spanish Fort was opened in due form on the 28th; our lines having been established during the preceding night, at distances of 300 to 400 yards. Up to this time, our total loss had not exceeded 400 men. The siege was pressed with great ardor, and with considerable loss from Rebel shells. On the morning of the 30th, Veatch's division of Gen. Granger's corps, while relieving guard, blundered into the Rebel lines, and were regarded as the head of an assaulting column; provoking a sally, whereby our skirmishers and working parties were hurled back, with some loss; but the enemy, advancing too far, were repelled in turn; whereupon, the artillery on both sides suddenly rēopened and kept firing till daylight to little purpose. Still, the siege was steadily pressed forward; and, the investment being completed,[17] the result was no longer doubtful: our troops having already built an earthwork and mounted siege-guns within 200 yards of the Fort

Our losses were mainly from shells: many of them thrown by batteries whose location was concealed, and which could not, in consequence, be silenced. One of these shells killed or wounded 15 men; another 12. Our fleet, unable otherwise to get within effective distance of the fort, crossed the bar and engaged the Rebel fleet, which included several iron-clads; compelling it to move up toward the city.

All being at length ready, a tremendous concentric fire at close range was opened[18] at nightfall on the doomed fort, from siege-guns and field-pieces in battery, and from gunboats on the side of the bay; while our skirmishers and sharp-shooters, creeping up from ridge to ridge, and firing from the heads of our trenches, picked off the Rebel artillerists or

[16] March 27. [17] April 3. [18] April 8.

explosion under their feet of a dozen torpedoes; yet, under a furious fire of grape and canister, the assault was steadily persisted in till the victory was complete.

On our right, the Blacks, led by Gen. Hawkins, were pitted against Mississippians, who specially detested them, but who found them foemen worthy of their steel. 'Remember Fort Pillow!' passed from rank to rank as, with set teeth and tightly grasped weapons, they went over the Rebel breastworks, hurling back all before them. By 7 P. M., Blakely was fully ours, with 3,000 prisoners, 32 guns, 4,000 small arms, 16 flags, and large quantities of ammunition. It had cost us fully 1,000 killed and wounded; while 500 Rebels lay stretched beside them.

Mobile was lost and won. It could no longer be held; so its evacuation commenced on the 10th, and was completed on the 11th. Gen. Maury fled up the Alabama, with 9,000 men, leaving 4,000 prisoners in our hands; while 1,000 more were found in the city, when, at 2 P. M. of the 12th, the flag of the Union—already floating over every fort and battery that looked on the bay—was exultingly raised over the last important Confederate seaport. Its reduction had cost us 2,500 men; beside two iron-clads, two 'tin-clads' (or slightly shielded gunboats), and one transport—all sunk by torpedoes. The guns captured in the city and its defenses numbered 150. The powerful rams Huntsville and Tuscaloosa were sunk by Maury before the evacuation.

The Rebel ram W. H. Webb, from Red river, freighted with cotton, rosin, &c., came down the Mississippi past New Orleans[29] so wholly unexpected that she received but two shots in passing—our fleet being still mainly absent in Mobile bay. Being pursued by gunboats from above, she was making all speed toward the Gulf, till she encountered the corvette Richmond, coming up the river; when her commander, seeing no chance of escape, terminated her brief but not particularly brilliant career, by running her ashore and blowing her up. Her crew escaped to the swamps, but were mainly captured.

XXXIV.

FALL OF RICHMOND—END OF THE WAR.

GRANT—LEE—SHERIDAN

Gen. Grant's comprehensive strategy, while it exacted offensive activity in almost every other quarter, was best subserved by quiet in Virginia throughout the eventful Winter of 1864–5. Instead of wishing to drive the Rebel Government and Army from the banks of the James, he constantly apprehended and dreaded a movement by Lee which, abandoning Virginia at least for the time, should precipitate the main Rebel army,

[29] April 24.

rëenforced to the utmost, suddenly, unexpectedly, upon Sherman, as he struggled through the gloomy forests and treacherous quicksands of eastern Georgia, or the flooded swamps of South Carolina. Had Lee's effective force (by his muster-rolls, 64,000 men—but suppose the number available for such a campaign but 50,000), swelled by such rëenforcements as Hardee, Beauregard, Wheeler, and Hoke, might have afforded him, been hurled upon Sherman, as he confidently approached Savannah, Columbia, or Fayetteville, it is indeed possible that the blow—so closely resembling that dealt to Cornwallis at Yorktown by Washington and Rochambeau—might have been effectively countered (as theirs was not) by the hurried movement southward by water of corps after corps of the Army of the Potomac; yet the necessity of stopping Sherman's career was so indubitably manifest and vital that it seems strange that every thing was not staked on a throw where success would have kindled new hope in so many sinking hearts, while defeat could only have been what inaction was—ruin. But any suggestion of the abandonment of the Confederate capital was met with such a deafening clamor by the Richmond journals—by which it was pronounced synonymous with surrender at discretion—that Davis and Lee must have been strong men indeed to have chosen to defy it. It does not appear, however, that they ever seriously inclined to an expedient which, even if desperate, was neither so hopeless nor so mortifying as that to which they were actually driven in their grudging, eleventh-hour attempt to recruit their wasted ranks by freeing and arming such slaves (only) as were deemed fit for military service. Had they met Lincoln's first Proclamation of Freedom to such slaves (only) as were not then within his jurisdiction, by an unqualified liberation of every slave in the South and a proffer of a homestead to each of them who would shoulder his musket and help achieve the independence of the Confederacy, it is by no means unlikely that their daring would have been crowned with success; since the passions of their adherents had, by this time, been so thoroughly aroused that they would have welcomed any resort that promised them a triumph over the detested 'Yankees'; while the Blacks must have realized that Emancipation, immediate and absolute, at the hands of those who had power not only to decree but to enforce, was preferable to the limited, contingent, as yet unsubstantial, freedom promised by the Federal Executive. Unmeasured vituperation of President Lincoln's edict as unwarranted, outrageous, and designed to whet the assassin's knife for the throats of the mothers and sisters of the heroes who had hurled back his armies from the banks of the James and the Tennessee, would have sweetened its bitterness to the Southern Whites, without being especially obnoxious to the emancipated Blacks. But, after having so fiercely reprobated emancipation as essentially a wrong to both races, utterly unjustified by any conceivable exigency of war, and denounced the enlistment on our side of Black soldiers as at once a crime, a futility, and a confession of defeat, and after having mercilessly ridiculed the suggestion that negro slaves could ever be transformed into effective soldiers,

the Rebel attempt to replenish with Blacks the thinned ranks of their armies—hitherto largely swelled by appeals to the intense prejudice of the lowest Whites against 'Nigger Equality'—was a most palpable and damaging confession that the knell of the Confederacy had sounded.

A single expedition, under Warren, was sent out[1] from Meade's left to destroy the Weldon railroad farther southward, and thus prevent its use by the enemy in transporting supplies from North Carolina nearly up to our lines; whence they were wagoned around our left to Lee's camps. This expedition, consisting of Warren's (5th) corps, Mott's division of the 2d, and Gregg's mounted division, moved down the railroad so far as the Meherrin; across which to Hicksford the few Rebels encountered were driven, while the road was effectually destroyed down to that point—some 20 miles. Hicksford had been fortified, and was strongly held by the enemy; while our troops, having started with but four days' rations, were constrained to hasten their return. No considerable loss was suffered, nor (otherwise than in destroying the railroad) inflicted.

The withdrawal of most of our naval force from the James, to participate in the operations against Wilmington, tempted the authorities in Richmond again to try their luck upon the water. Their three ironclads—the Virginia, Fredericksburg, and Richmond—with five wooden steamers, and three torpedo-boats, dropped[2] silently down from the city under cover of darkness, passing Fort Brady at midnight, responding to its fire, and dismounting a 100-pounder in its battery; then passing out of its range, and breaking the chain in front of the obstructions placed in the channel by Gen. Butler at the lower end of Dutch gap, so that the Fredericksburg passed through; while the Richmond, Virginia, and Drewry, attempting to follow, grounded: the last-named, being immovable, was abandoned by her crew at daylight, and soon blown up by a shell from one of our batteries; while the Virginia received a 300-pound bolt from a monitor which killed 5 of her crew. Firing was continued on both sides throughout the day; and at night the Rebel fleet—all but the Drewry—drew back to Richmond.

The next effort on our side was made—probably with intent mainly to develop the strength with which the Rebel lines confronting ours were still held—on the old beaten and bloody track; the 5th and 2d corps, with Gregg's cavalry, pushing out[3] from our left to Reams's station, and thence to Dinwiddie C. H.: the 5th corps being directed to turn the Rebel right, while the 2d assailed it in front. The two corps having taken position on the Rebel flank—Smythe's division and McAllister's brigade of Mott's having gallantly repulsed the enemy's attempt to turn the right of the former—Gregg's cavalry were drawn back from Dinwiddie C. H. to Warren's left, which, under Crawford, was now[4] thrown forward to Dabney's mill, whence he drove a Rebel force under Gen. Pegram, who was killed. By this time, the enemy had sent a strong force around our left, to strike it in flank and rear, after the Stonewall Jack-

[1] Dec. 7, 1864. [2] Jan. 23, 1865. [3] Feb. 5. [4] Feb. 6.

market, while the other tore up the Lynchburg railroad so far west as Amherst C. H.; thence crossing the country to Newmarket and uniting with the former.

Attempts to surprise and seize bridges over the James at Duguidsville, Hardwicksville, &c., so as to cross and come in on Grant's left, were all baffled by the vigilance of the enemy; while heavy rains had so swollen that river that Sherman's pontoons would not reach across it: so he was compelled to choose between returning to Winchester and passing behind Lee's army to White House and thence to Grant's right. He wisely chose the latter; following and destroying the canal to Columbia,[10] where he rested a day, sending scouts with advices to Grant; thence moving easterly, destroying bridges and railroads, across the Annas to the Pamunkey, and down the right bank of that stream to White House;[11] where four days were given to most needed rest and recuperation; when he moved down to the James, crossed it at Jones's landing, and reported to Grant in front of Petersburg on the 27th—just in time.

Gen. Lee—foreseeing clearly the speedy downfall of the Confederate cause unless averted by a prompt concentration of its remaining forces and a telling blow delivered thereby on some one of our encircling armies, which were now palpably crushing out the life of the Rebellion—resolved to anticipate Grant's initiative by an attack on his lines before Petersburg and Richmond. This attack was made on Fort Steedman, nearly east of Petersburg, where its success would have cut our army in two, and probably compelled a hasty concentration to recover our lines and works; thereby opening a door for the unassailed withdrawal of the Rebel army southward by the most direct route, to unite with that of Johnston and thus overpower Sherman. It was delivered by Gordon with two divisions: all that was disposable of the Rebel Army of Virginia being collected just behind the assaulting column and held in hand as a support.

Gordon charged at daybreak;[12] his men rushing instantly across the narrow space that here separated the confronting lines, and pouring into Fort Steedman, which was held by the 14th N. Y. artillery, who were completely surprised and overwhelmed; part of them fleeing for their lives, while the residue were made prisoners. The guns were deserted without a struggle, and immediately turned by their captors on the adjacent works, whereof three batteries were abandoned by the Union troops and seized by the enemy.

Here their triumph ended. Their assault on Fort Haskell, next to Fort Steedman on the left, was but feebly made and easily repulsed; they failed to press forward and seize the crest of the ridge behind the forts, thus cutting our army in two; the 20,000 men whom Lee had massed in their rear to support the assault either were not promptly ordered forward or failed to respond: so that their initial success had only isolated them, a comparative handful in the midst of an army of foes. In short, it was the Mine explosion repeated with the parts reversed. For, when our soldiers had recovered from their aston-

[10] March 10. [11] March 19. [12] March 25.



LEE'S RETREAT FROM PETERSBURG.

Explanations.

A. Union lines.
B. Rebel lines.
C. Union routes of march.
D. Rebel routes of march.

28. Positions held previous to movement, March 28.
31. Positions held March 31.
1. Positions at battle of Five Forks, April 1.
2. Extension of lines to the Appomattox, April 2.
5. Positions at Jetersville, April 5.
6. Positions at battle of Sailor's creek, April 6.
7. Positions held evening of April 7.
9. Positions held at time of Lee's surrender, April 9.

ishment, and the 9th corps was rallied to drive the foe out—Hartranft's division making the counter-assault—the Rebels were too few to hold their perilous position; while the ground over which they had reached it was so swept by our guns from either side, that 2,000 preferred to surrender rather than follow their fleeing comrades through that terrible fire. Aside from this, the loss of either army was some 2,500.

Nor was this the extent of the enemy's mishap. Gen. Meade, convinced that their lines generally must have been depleted to strengthen this assault, ordered an advance along the front of the 6th and 2d corps, holding our works before Petersburg to the left of Fort Steedman; and this was made with such spirit that the thinned line of the enemy recoiled before it, and their strongly intrenched picket-line was wrested from them and permanently held by their antagonists. Thus, instead of shaking himself free from Grant's gripe, Lee had only tightened it by this bold stroke; rendering his withdrawal to North Carolina even more difficult and hazardous than before.

Grant had already[13] prepared, if not issued, his order for a general, determined advance by his left on the 29th. To the obvious reasons which had formerly impelled a movement to flank the enemy's right was now added the necessity of intercepting and precluding Lee's withdrawal to North Carolina. Hence, the strategy of a nearly simultaneous attack on both flanks of the Rebel position was now abandoned: three divisions of the Army of the James, now commanded by Ord, being withdrawn[14] from the banks of the James, where it had so long menaced Richmond, and brought over to the left of our lines facing Petersburg; when the 5th (Warren's) and 2d (Humphreys's) corps moved quietly out[15] southwestward till they had crossed Hatcher's run; when, facing northward, they advanced, feeling for the enemy's right. Sheridan was on our extreme left, at the head of nearly 10,000 cavalry, acting under orders directly from Gen. Grant. The 9th (Parke's) and one of Ord's divisions were left to hold our extended lines under the command of Gen. Parke: all dismounted troopers being ordered to report to Gen. Benham, who guarded our immense accumulation of supplies at City Point.

Humphreys crossed Hatcher's run at the Vaughan road; while Warren, moving farther to the left, crossed four miles below, where the stream, since its junction with Gravelly run, has become Rowanty creek; thence moving up by the Quaker road to strike the Boydton plank-road. Sheridan moved nearly south to Dinwiddie C. H.; where, at 5 P. M., he halted for the night.

Warren's corps alone encountered any serious resistance this day. Approaching the Confederate lines, Griffin's division, leading, was sharply assailed; but held its ground and repulsed the enemy, taking 100 prisoners. Our loss here was 370 killed and wounded. Warren rested for the night in front of the Rebel intrenchments covering the White Oak road. Humphreys—moving in an extended line, over a densely wooded and difficult country, repelling skirmishers only—had not struck the

[13] Dated March 24. [14] March 27. [15] March 29.

pelling Devin to make a long detour by the Boydton plank-road to rejoin his chief. The Rebels, mistaking this for a farther retreat, attempted pursuit; thereby presenting their flank and rear to Sheridan, who charged with the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs; compelling the enemy to let go of Devin, and permit him to rejoin his chief without farther trouble. And, though they now assailed the latter in superior force, fully resolved to drive him, they were unable to make any headway. Sheridan dismounted his troopers, posted them behind a slight breastwork, and received his assailants with so deadly a fire that they recoiled; and darkness fell before they were ready to try again. When morning came, they had been withdrawn by Lee; who doubtless saw that Pickett was exposed to be struck in flank by Warren, while assailed in front by Sheridan, and thus disastrously routed.

Meantime, there was very natural alarm and anxiety at headquarters, where it was only known that Sheridan had been driven back from Five Forks to Dinwiddie, and there attacked by the enemy in force, with every prospect of routing him. Warren received order after order to hasten to Sheridan's rescue, and had sent Ayres's division through the mire and darkness; but Ayres, moving on the Boydton plank-road, had been stopped at Gravelly run, where the bridge was gone; and it was 2 A. M. before he had rebuilt and got across it; hurrying on to Dinwiddie; where he arrived at daybreak;[17] just as the last of the Rebels—a picket of cavalry—were hurrying off to join their departed comrades.

Sheridan, who had ascertained by midnight that the enemy were leaving, had been perfectly at ease while all beside his command had passed a night of apprehension on his account; so at daybreak he advanced, supported by Ayres, on the track of his late assailants; being, at 7 A. M., joined midway by Warren with his two other divisions.

Advancing steadily and boldly, Sheridan had, with his cavalry alone, by 2 P. M., pressed back the Rebels into their works at Five Forks, leaving Warren's corps entirely disposable: and now, while directing Gen. Merritt, with his division of cavalry, to threaten to turn the Rebel right, at the same time that they were sharply pressed in front, Sheridan ordered Warren—hitherto passive in his rear—to advance the 5th corps on our right to the White Oak road, so as to be fully on the enemy's left flank, and then, by a left-wheel movement, fall upon that flank in full force, striking the enemy well toward the rear, and rolling his force up on itself, in utter rout and confusion. Meanwhile, McKenzie, with the inconsiderable cavalry of the Army of the James, just arrived, was to cover Warren's right flank against attack from the direction of Petersburg. This order was promptly and thoroughly obeyed; McKenzie vigorously attacking and driving the only Rebel force discoverable in that quarter. This done, he promptly countermarched, and was back in the vicinity of Five Forks, ready to participate in the combined attack, before Warren was prepared to charge.

Sheridan was profoundly dissatisfied with the slowness of Warren's

[17] April 1.

movements, and suspected him of not wishing to make a decisive charge that day. It was now 4 P. M.—darkness, in that wooded region, would quickly follow sunset—when all offensive operations, over ground to which our men were strangers, must utterly cease. As yet, many more of our men than of the enemy had fallen this day; and the morrow would doubtless show the Rebels either strongly rëenforced or missing. Sheridan—a raging lion on the battle-field—sought to hurry Warren's movements, using some language more energetic than courteous; and at length—the whole corps having reached the position assigned it and faced westward—the charge was made; McKenzie's horsemen having been thrown out on Warren's right, so as completely to outflank the Rebels and bar their retreat northward.

Ayres's division advanced nearest to the White Oak road and the Rebel defenses, with Crawford's on its right, or farther north; Griffin's being in reserve behind it. But Crawford's left, advancing across open ground under fire of the enemy—whose left had been refused and formed at right angles with its main line to meet this attack—swerved to the right to gain the shelter of the woods, opening a gap between it and Ayres's right, on which the Rebels now directed their fire, causing it to waver and crumble; a portion of it going to the right-about in haste and disorder.

Sheridan was watching this turning movement and charge in no amiable temper, and now saw its success imperiled by what he considered Warren's indifference or inefficiency; for he believed this chasm in our charging lines could never have been opened if our troops had been handled with energy and resolution. He therefore deprived[18] Warren of his command, giving it to Griffin, whose division he ordered thrown forward to fill the gap in our line, which was now impelled forward with irresistible momentum; while Merritt, with the cavalry, charged the enemy's front.

The Confederates, facing their foes in each direction, stood bravely to their arms; but they were two divisions—Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's—against at least double their number, and their case was manifestly hopeless. In a few minutes, Ayres's division burst over their flank intrenchments, taking 1,000 prisoners; while Griffin struck their refused flank in the rear, capturing 1,500 more; and Crawford—resisted only by skirmishers—pressed forward rapidly to the Ford road, running northward from their center, precluding their retreat toward Lee; and then, turning southward on that road, came rapidly down upon their rear, taking 4 guns—our cavalry all the time sharply assailing their front and right, and at length charging over their intrenchments, as Ayres and Griffin, having turned their left out of its works, bore down upon its renewed front, hurling all that remained of the enemy in disorderly flight westward; charged and pursued for miles by our cavalry until long after dark, and until our prisoners exceeded 5,000; while our total loss this day was but about 1,000. At this cost,

[18] Swinton says that "*After the close of the action*, Sheridan relieved Gen. Warren from duty." Sheridan's official report does not sustain this averment. Warren, however, in his defense, asserts positively that Sheridan's order did not reach him till after the fighting was over.

Lee's right wing had been substantially demolished. Among our killed was Brig.-Gen. Fred'k Winthrop (Col. 9th N. York), cousin to Maj. Theo. Winthrop, killed at Big Bethel.

Sheridan now directed Griffin to move eastward with two divisions of his infantry to Gravelly church, some miles toward Petersburg, thus rëopening his communications with the rest of our army, while Griffin's own division (now Bartlett's) supported McKenzie's cavalry, which had pushed northward up the Ford road to Hatcher's run.

And now, as darkness fell, by Grant's order, our guns in position before Petersburg opened from right to left, making the night lurid with a bombardment that proclaimed the signal victory just achieved on our left, and predicted more decisive triumphs at hand. Wright, Parke, and Ord, still holding our intrenchments facing Petersburg and thence eastward to the Appomattox, were ordered to assault, and did assault, at daybreak next morning.[19] Parke, in front of Petersburg, carried, with his (9th) corps, the outer line of Rebel works confronting him, capturing some guns; but found an inner line behind them which he could not force, and desisted; Wright, on his left, with the 6th corps, supported by two divisions of Ord's, charging at dawn, drove every thing before him up to the Boydton road; on which, wheeling to the left, toward Hatcher's run, he swept down the rear of the Rebel intrenchments, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners: meantime, Ord's other division had forced the enemy's lines at the run; and now Wright and Ord swung to the right, pressing on Petersburg from the west; while Humphreys, farther to our left, with Hays's and Mott's divisions of the 2d corps, having stormed a redoubt in his front, came up with two divisions, closing in on their left. Thereupon, the Rebel lines defending Petersburg on the south were assaulted by Gibbon's division of Ord's corps, which carried by storm two strong and important works—Forts Gregg and Alexander—shortening our besieging lines, and weakening the defenses of that city. Fort Gregg was held by Harris's Mississippi brigade, now reduced to 250; of whom but 30 remained when it fell. Gibbon's loss in this assault was about 500.

Miles's division of the 2d corps had been sent to rëenforce Sheridan, reaching him at daybreak, and had been directed to follow the White Oak road eastward toward Petersburg, and attack the enemy at the intersection of the Claiborne road, where they were reported in force; Sheridan following immediately, with Griffin's and Crawford's divisions of the 5th. Miles assailed and carried the designated position; forcing the enemy northward across Hatcher's run, and pursuing them to Sutherland's dépôt; where he was about to attack when Gen. Humphreys came up and reclaimed Miles's division: when Sheridan desisted, returned to Five Forks, and took the Ford road out to Hatcher's run, where he crossed the 5th corps and moved rapidly toward Sutherland's dépôt, to strike in flank and rear the enemy who had confronted Miles. But Miles, ere this, under Humphreys's order, had dis-

[19] Sunday, April 2.

lodged and defeated his antagonists, taking 2 guns and 600 prisoners.

Longstreet, who had hitherto held the defenses of Richmond north of the James, had joined Lee at Petersburg at 10 A. M. this day, with Benning's brigade; and A. P. Hill, on Lee's left, now ordered a charge by Heth to regain some of the works carried by Parke in his assault. The attack was so vigorous and persistent that our men holding City Point were ordered up to Parke's support. Heth was repulsed. Hill was shot dead while reconnoitering this day. He was among the ablest of Lee's lieutenants.

Petersburg was still held by the Rebel army; but Lee saw that it could not be held much longer. His heavy losses—by this time exceeding 10,000 men—and the utter demolition of his right, rendered it morally certain that to hold on was to insure the capture or destruction of his army; and well he knew that his veterans were the last hope of the Rebellion. For Grant was now at liberty to throw forward his left to the Appomattox; while it was morally certain that his cavalry would soon clutch the railroad junction at Burkesville, which had now become the jugular vein of the gasping Confederacy. At 10½ A. M., therefore, he telegraphed to Davis in Richmond a dispatch, containing very nearly these words:

"My lines are broken in three places. Richmond must be evacuated this evening."

That message found Mr. Davis, at 11 A. M., in church, where it was handed to him, amid an awful hush; and he immediately went quietly, soberly out—never to return as President of the Confederacy. No word was spoken; but the whole assemblage *felt* that the missive he had so hastily perused bore words of doom. Though the handwriting was not blazoned on the wall, it needed no Daniel to declare its import.

But no one can duly depict that last afternoon and night of Confederate rule in Richmond but an eyewitness: so let Pollard narrate for us the visible collapse and fall of the Slave Power in its chosen metropolis. After stating how, upon Mr. Davis's withrawal from church, "the rumor was caught up in the streets that Richmond was to be evacuated, and was soon carried to the ends of the city," he proceeds:

"Men, women, and children, rushed from the churches, passing from lip to lip news of the impending fall of Richmond. And yet, it was difficult to believe it. To look up to the calm, beautiful sky of that Spring day, unassailed by one single noise of battle, to watch the streets, unvexed by artillery or troops, stretching away into the quiet, hazy atmosphere, and believe that the capital of the Confederacy, so peaceful, so apparently secure, was in a few hours to be the prey of the enemy, and to be wrapped in the infernal horrors of a conflagration!

"It was late in the afternoon when the signs of evacuation became apparent to the incredulous. Wagons on the streets were being hastily loaded at the departments with boxes, trunks, &c., and driven to the Danville dépôt. Those who had determined to evacuate with the fugitive Government looked on with amazement; then, convinced of the fact, rushed to follow the Government's example. Vehicles suddenly rose to a premium value that was astounding; and ten, fifteen, and even a hundred dollars, in gold or Federal currency, was offered for a conveyance. Suddenly, as if by magic, the streets became filled with men, walking as though for a wager, and behind them excited negroes with trunks, bundles, and luggage of every description. All over the city, it was the same—wagons, trunks, bandboxes, and their owners, a mass of hurrying fugitives filling the streets. The banks were all o and depositors were as busy as bees ing their specie deposits; and the were equally active in getting lion. Hundreds of thousa

paper money was destroyed, both State and Confederate. Night came; and with it came confusion worse confounded. There was no sleep for human eyes in Richmond that night.

"The City Council had met in the evening, and resolved to destroy all the liquor in the city, to avoid the disorder consequent on the temptation to drink at such a time. About the hour of midnight, the work commenced, under the direction of committees of citizens in all the wards. Hundreds of barrels of liquor were rolled into the street, and the heads knocked in. The gutters ran with a liquor freshet, and the fumes filled and impregnated the air. Fine cases of bottled liquors were tossed into the street from third-story windows, and wrecked into a thousand pieces. As the work progressed, some straggling soldiers, retreating through the city, managed to get hold of a quantity of the liquor. From that moment, law and order ceased to exist. Many of the stores were pillaged; and the side-walks were encumbered with broken glass, where the thieves had smashed the windows in their reckless haste to lay hands on the plunder within. The air was filled with wild cries of distress, or the yells of roving pillagers.

"But a more terrible element was to appear upon the scene. An order had been issued from Gen. Ewell's headquarters to fire the four principal tobacco warehouses of the city—namely, the public warehouse, situated at the head of the basin, near the Petersburg railroad dépôt; Shockoe warehouse, situated near the center of the city, side by side with the Gallego flour-mills; Mayo's warehouse, and Dibrell's warehouse, on Cary-st., a square below Libby prison.

"Late in the night, Mayor Mayo had dispatched, by a committee of citizens, a remonstrance against this reckless military order, which plainly put in jeopardy the whole business portion of Richmond. It was not heeded. Nothing was left for the citizens but to submit to the destruction of their property. The warehouses were fired. The rams in the James river were blown up. The Richmond, Virginia, and another one, were all blown to the four winds of heaven. The Patrick Henry, a receiving-ship, was scuttled. Such shipping, very little in amount, as was lying at the Richmond wharves, was also fired, save the flag-of-truce steamer Allison.

"The bridges leading out of the city—namely, the Danville railroad bridge, the Petersburg railroad bridge, Mayo's bridge, leading to Manchester and the opposite side of the James, were also fired, and were soon wrapped in flames.

"Morning broke upon a scene such as those who witnessed it can never forget. The roar of an immense conflagration sounded in their ears; tongues of flame leaped from street to street; and in this baleful glare were to be seen, as of demons, the figures of busy plunderers, moving, pushing, rioting, through the black smoke and into the open street, bearing away every conceivable sort of plunder.

"The scene at the commissary dépôt, at the head of the dock, beggared description. Hundreds of government wagons were loaded with bacon, flour, and whisky, and driven off in hot haste to join the retreating army. Thronging about the dépôt were hundreds of men, women, and children, black and white, provided with capacious bags, baskets, tubs, buckets, tin pans, and aprons; cursing, pushing, and crowding; awaiting the throwing open of the doors, and the order for each to help himself.

"About sunrise, the doors were opened to the populace; and a rush that almost seemed to carry the building off its foundation was made, and hundreds of thousands of pounds of bacon, flour, &c., were soon swept away by a clamorous crowd."

Our lines opposite Richmond—that is, north of the James—had been held, since Ord's withdrawal southward, by Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, with Kautz's division of the 24th, and Ashborne's and Thomas's divisions of the 25th corps, under instructions from Grant to make the utmost show of strength and purpose to assault, so as to keep the enemy here in force, while the bulk of our army should be flanking and fighting him out of Petersburg. These instructions had been faithfully, efficiently obeyed; though Longstreet, confronting Weitzel, had at length suspected the true character of Grant's strategy, and had himself, with a part of his force, moved southward to the help of Lee at Petersburg. Weitzel, however, persisted in speaking daggers, but using none; and, throughout the memorable Sunday evening of the Rebel Hegira, though his guns were silent, his bands were vocal far into the night, treating our friends behind the opposite intrenchments with va-

riations and iterations of 'Hail Columbia,' 'Yankee Doodle,' and 'The Star-Spangled Banner,' in utter disregard of Shakspeare's dictum averring a natural antagonism between Treason and Melody. No one on our side seems to have suspected that the Rebel soldiery were even then stealthily withdrawing from their works in our front, preparatory to hastening after their comrades who had already filed hurriedly and dolefully out of the opposite portals of Richmond.

At length, our musicians having played the soldiers to sleep, had themselves sunk also to rest, when, about 2 A. M.,[39] Weitzel, still alert, was startled by the sound of explosions. They were fewer, nearer, and heavier, than the dull, continuous booming of cannon in the south, which had been audible throughout the previous morning; and they evidently claimed instant attention. Lt. J. L. Depeyster, of his staff, having ascended the signal tower, 70 feet high, at headquarters, reported, on his return, that he had seen a great light in the direction of Richmond, but could not determine whether that city was or was not on fire. Efforts were now made to capture a Rebel picket; and, about 3 A. M., one was clutched; who, in response to inquiries, said he belonged to the 37th Virginia artillery, but could tell neither where his regiment nor its commander then was. Gen. G. F. Shepley, Weitzel's chief of staff, at once inferred that the Rebels were evacuating Richmond—a conjecture which was verified at 3½, by the report of a deserter; and at 4, a negro drove into our lines in a buggy, who confirmed the statement. Yet the Rebel works in front were so intricate, and the ground was known to be so studded with torpedoes, that it was not till after broad daylight that our soldiers went forward—Draper's Black brigade in advance—over a road strewn with all manner of abandoned munitions and amid a perpetual roar of bursting shells. But the position of each of the abundant torpedoes planted by the Rebels was indicated, for their own safety, by a little red flag, which, in the hurry of their departure, they had failed to remove: so there were few, if any, casualties.

The Rebel defenses appeared to have been, while manned, almost impregnable. Two separate lines of abatis, three lines of rifle-pits and earth-works—the first and second connected by regular lines of redans—with a fort or very strong earth-work on every elevation—such were a part of the impediments which had so long kept our soldiers out of Richmond. If one of these lines had been carried, it was completely commanded by that next behind it; so that our loss while holding it must have been ten to one; while to advance and storm the next barrier must, for the moment, have involved still greater prodigality of life. Yet these works our troops had lain down the previous night expecting to assail at daybreak in the morning.

At 6 A. M., Gen. Weitzel and staff, having already cleared the exterior defenses, riding rapidly past our still advancing column, entered the immediate suburbs of the burning city, amid a constant roar of exploding shells and falling walls, and were received with shouts of welcome and exultation from thousands of (mainly)

[39] Monday, April 3.

negro throats. The last of the Rebel soldiers had departed, or were just going. Majs. A. H. Stevens, 4th Mass., and E. Graves, of Weitzel's staff, had already hoisted two cavalry guidons over the imposing Capitol of Virginia, wherein the Confederate Congress had, since July, 1861, held its sittings; but these, being scarcely visible from beneath, were now supplanted by a real American flag, formerly belonging to the 12th Maine, which had floated over the St. Charles, at New Orleans, when that hotel was Gen. Butler's headquarters. Gen. Shepley had long since expressed a hope that it might yet wave over Richmond; whereupon, Lt. Depeyster had asked and obtained permission to raise it there, should opportunity be afforded; and now, having brought it hither on purpose, it was run up on a flag-staff rising from the Capitol, and saluted with enthusiastic huzzas from the excited thousands below.

Jefferson Davis had left at 10 P. M. of Sunday. Nearly all the Rebel officials, including their members of Congress, had also taken their leave; as had William Smith, Rebel Governor of Virginia, and most of his satellites. There was no shadow of resistance offered to our occupation; and there is no room for doubt that a large majority of all who remained in Richmond heartily welcomed our army as deliverers. Probably some cheered and shouted who would have done it with more heart and a better grace if our soldiers had been brought in as prisoners of war.

The city was of course placed under military rule: Gen. G. F. Shepley being appointed Governor; Lt.-Col. Manning, Provost-Marshal. The fire was extinguished so soon as possible; but not till it had burned out the very heart of Richmond, including its great warehouses, the post-office, the treasury, the principal banks, newspaper offices, &c. The losses of private property by the conflagration must have amounted to many millions of dollars, since a full third of the city was destroyed. Libby prison, Castle Thunder, and the Tredegar Iron-works, were unharmed.

Though most of the Confederate stores had been burned, the spoils were considerable. They included 1,000 prisoners, beside 5,000 sick and wounded left in the hospitals, over 500 guns, at least 5,000 small arms, 30 locomotives, 300 cars, &c., &c. Lack of time or of fuel doubtless prevented the loading of these cars with munitions and provisions, and taking them along with the fugitive host.

Before noon of that day, the news of Richmond's fall had been flashed across the loyal States, and it was soon confirmed by telegrams from President Lincoln, then at City Point, and from the Secretary of War at Washington. At once, all public offices were closed, all business suspended by that great majority who profoundly rejoiced in the National triumph, so long, so anxiously awaited —which had seemed so often just at hand, and the next moment farther off than ever—so intensely longed for by the Millions who had for years been constrained to endure the taunts of Northern sympathizers with the Rebels, and 'the heart-sickness of hope deferred.' These instantly and undoubtingly comprehended that the fall of Richmond was a death-blow to the Rebellion, and rejoiced over it accordingly. In New York, an im-

west of Petersburg, so narrowed and distorted his possible lines of retreat as to render the capture or dispersion of his entire army at least possible. And, with Grant and Sheridan as his antagonists, it was morally certain that all would be made of their advantages that could be.

The Army of Virginia—now reduced by desertions and its recent heavy losses, mainly in prisoners, to 35,000 men—was concentrated, from Richmond on the north to Petersburg on the south, at Chesterfield C. H.; thence moving rapidly westward to Amelia C. H., where Lee had ordered supplies to meet him by cars from Danville; but where he found none—an order from Richmond having summoned[32] the train to that city to aid in bearing away the fugitives; and it was taken without unloading: so that the overmatched, worsted, retreating, and fainting Rebel soldiery, while endeavoring to evade the fierce pursuit of Sheridan's troopers, must snatch their subsistence from the impoverished, exhausted country. And, while Lee halted here, throughout the 4th and 5th, trying to gather from any and every quarter the means of feeding his famished men, Sheridan, moving rapidly westward by roads considerably south of Amelia C. H., had struck the Danville railroad at Jetersville, while his advance had swept down that road nearly to Burkesville, scattering by the way such portions of the Rebel cavalry as had fled westward from their discomfiture at Five Forks. At Deep creek, a considerable force of infantry was encountered,[33] and ultimately driven by the 5th corps. Concentrating at Jetersville, Sheridan had here planted himself across the railroad, intrenched his infantry, and, supported by his cavalry, prepared to stop Lee's entire force, until Grant and Meade, pursuing, should be able to overtake and crush him. Meade, with the 2d and 6th corps, came up late on the 5th, while Lee was still at Amelia C. H. Thus the provisions which the Confederates at Lynchburg and Danville had collected and prepared to send to Lee were intercepted, and all hope of succor to his sore beset army cut off.

Lee left Amelia C. H. at nightfall of the 5th; moving around the left of Meade and Sheridan's position at Jetersville, striking for Farmville, in order to recross there the Appomattox, and, if possible, thus escape his pursuers.

But this was not to be. Already, Gen. Davies, making a strong reconnoissance to our left and front, had struck, at Paine's cross-roads, Lee's train, moving in advance of his infantry, and destroyed 180 wagons; capturing 5 guns and many prisoners. Lee's soldiers, not far behind, attempted to envelop and crush our cavalry, now swelled by Gregg's and Smith's brigades, sent to support Davies; and a spirited fight ensued; but Davies was extricated; falling back on Jetersville; where nearly our whole army was next morning[34] concentrated, and the pursuit vigorously resumed: Sheridan returning the 5th corps to Meade, and henceforth commanding the cavalry only.

Crook, now holding Sheridan's left (facing eastward), advanced to Deatonsville, where Lee's whole army was seen moving rapidly westward.

[32] April 2. [33] April 3. [34] April 6.

cluded that a capitulation was inevitable. Even if they were yet strong enough to beat off and cut through the host of pursuers so sharp upon their trail, they could only do so by the sacrifice of their remaining guns and munitions, and in a state of utter inefficiency from famine. Already, weakness and fatigue had compelled half of their followers to throw away the arms which they were no longer able to carry. Lee was not present; but the judgment of the council was conveyed to him through Gen. Pendleton.

Gen. Lee was spared by Gen. Grant the pain of first proposing a surrender. While directing from Farmville the pursuit, the latter dispatched to the front next morning the following letter:

"APRIL 7, 1865.

"GENERAL—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so; and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lt.-General.

"Gen. R. E. LEE."

The letter reached Lee toward night; ere which, Humphreys, following on his track, had been halted, 4 or 5 miles north of Farmville, by all that was left of Lee's forces, intrenched in a strong position, covering both the old and plank roads to Lynchburg, with batteries commanding an open, gentle southward slope of half a mile, over which an assaulting column could only advance at a heavy cost. Humphreys attempted to turn the enemy's flank, but found this impracticable with his single corps; when, sending up Barlow in front, and extending his right, he ordered Miles to attack on this wing; which he did, and was repulsed with a loss of over 600 killed and wounded. Brig.-Gen. Smyth and Maj. Mills were among our killed; Maj.-Gen. Mott, Brig.-Gens. Madill and McDougall, and Col. Starbird, 19th Maine, were severely wounded. When Barlow had got into position, it was too late to assault again that night; and, when darkness had shrouded his movements, Lee silently resumed his retreat, first sending this response to Grant, which reached him at Farmville next morning:

"APRIL 7, 1865.

"GENERAL—I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"Lt.-General U. S. GRANT."

To this, Grant immediately replied:

"APRIL 8, 1865.

"GENERAL—Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lt.-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

Sheridan, with all his cavalry, had started again on the morning of the 7th; Merritt, with two divisions, moving by the left to Prince Edward C. H., to head off Lee from retreating on

"APRIL 9, 1865.

"GENERAL—Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms, they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c., U. S. GRANT, Lt.-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

Sheridan was with his cavalry near the Court House, when the Army of Virginia made its *last charge*. By his order, his troopers, who were in line of battle, dismounted, gave ground gradually, while showing a steady front, so as to allow our weary infantry time to form and take position. This effected, the horsemen moved swiftly to the right and mounted, revealing lines of solid infantry in battle array, before whose wall of gleaming bayonets the astonished enemy recoiled in blank despair, as Sheridan and his troopers, passing briskly around the Rebel left, prepared to charge the confused, reeling masses. A white flag was now waved by the enemy before Gen. Custer, who held our cavalry advance, with the information that they had concluded to surrender. Riding over to Appomattox C. H., Sheridan was met by Gen. Gordon, who requested a suspension of hostilities, with the assurance that negotiations were then pending between Gens. Grant and Lee for a capitulation.

Gen. Grant, before reaching Sheridan's headquarters, had received the following additional note:

"APRIL 9, 1865.

"GENERAL—I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"Lt.-General U. S. GRANT."

The two commanders met immediately at the dwelling of Mr. W. McLean, near the Court House. The interview was brief: the business in hand frankly discussed, as became soldiers. Three commissioners on either side were appointed; but the day's work was done by the chiefs, and its result summed up in these concluding letters:

"APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, Va.,
"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL—In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. U. S. GRANT, Lt.-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

"HEADQ'RS ARMY OF NORTHERN VA.,
"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL—I received your letter of this date, containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.

"Lt.-General U. S. GRANT."

The parting of Lee with his devoted followers was a sad one. Of the proud army which, dating its victories from Bull Run, had driven McClellan from before Richmond, and withstood his best effort at Antietam, and shattered Burnside's host at Fredericksburg, and worsted Hooker at Chancellorsville, and fought Meade so stoutly, though unsuccessfully, before Gettysburg, and baffled Grant's bounteous resources and desperate efforts in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, on the North Anna, at Cold Harbor, and before Petersburg and Richmond, a mere wreck remained. It is said that 27,000 were included in Lee's capitulation; but, of these, not more than 10,000 had been able to carry their arms thus far on their hopeless and almost foodless flight. Barely 19 miles from Lynchburg when surrendered, the physical possibility of forcing their way thither, even at the cost of half their number, no longer remained. And, if they were all safely there, what then? The resources of the Confederacy were utterly exhausted. Of the 150,000 men whose names were borne on its muster-rolls a few weeks ago, at least one-third were already disabled or prisoners, and the residue could neither be clad nor fed—not to dream of their being fitly armed or paid; while the resources of the loyal States were scarcely touched, their ranks nearly or quite as full as ever, and their supplies of ordnance, small arms, munitions, &c., more ample than in any previous April. Of the million or so borne on our muster-rolls, probably not less than half were then in active service, with half so many more able to take the field at short notice. The Rebellion had failed and gone down; but the Rebel Army of Virginia and its commander had *not* failed. Fighting sternly against the Inevitable—against the irrepressible tendencies, the generous aspirations of the age—they had been proved unable to succeed where success would have been a calamity to their children, to their country, and the human race. And, when the transient agony of defeat had been endured and had passed, they all experienced a sense of relief, as they crowded around their departing chief, who, with streaming eyes, grasped and pressed their outstretched hands, at length finding words to say, "Men, we have fought through the War together. I have done the best that I could for you." There were few dry eyes among those who witnessed the scene; and our soldiers hastened to divide their rations with their late enemies, now fellow-countrymen, to stay their hunger until provisions from our trains could be drawn for them. Then, while most of our army returned to Burkesville, and thence, a few days later, to Petersburg and Richmond, the work of paroling went on, under the guardianship of Griffin's and Gibbon's infantry, with McKenzie's cavalry; and, so fast as paroled, the Confederates took their way severally to their respective homes: many of them supplied with transportation, as well as food, by the Government they had fought so long and so bravely to subvert and destroy.

XXXV.

DEATH OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN—PEACE.

JOHNSTON—DAVIS—TAYLOR—KIRBY SMITH.

President Lincoln had gone [1] down to the front in anticipation of Grant's final movement against Lee's right south of Petersburg, and was thenceforward in constant communication with the Lieutenant-General commanding in the field, while Lee made his assault on our lines, Sheridan crossed the James, moving from our farthest right to our extreme left, and Grant impelled the advance of that left with such memorable results. He was mainly at City Point, receiving reports from Grant and telegraphing their substance to the War Department for dissemination over the country till the day after Richmond fell; when [2] he accompanied Admiral Porter in a gunboat up to Rockett's, a mile below the city, and thence was rowed up to the wharf, and walked thence, attended by Admiral Porter and by a few sailors armed with carbines, to Gen. Weitzel's headquarters, in the house so recently and suddenly abandoned by Jefferson Davis. Recognized and stared at by all, his hearty greetings, aside from those of our soldiers, were all but confined to the Blacks, who crowded in thousands to welcome and bless their emancipator; so that it became necessary to summon a military force to clear a way for him through the streets. After holding a hasty levee, the President took a rapid drive through the principal streets, and, at 6½ P. M., left on his return to City Point; whence he repeated his visit to Richmond two days later—this time attended by Mrs. Lincoln, by Vice-President Johnson, several U. S. Senators, &c. He was now waited on by several leading Confederates, who, seeing that their cause was hopelessly lost, were naturally anxious to make the best terms possible; and to whom, in a spirit of kindness and magnanimity that had never been shaken, he lent a favorable ear. In deference to a suggestion by some of their number, he wrote the following:

"Headquarters Armies of the United States, City Point, April 6, 1865.

"Major-Gen. Weitzel, Richmond, Va.:

"It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia, in support of the Rebellion, may now desire to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States; in which case, you will notify them, giving them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public. Yours, etc., A. Lincoln."

The President returned, on the day of Lee's surrender, to Washington; whence he dispatched [3] to Gen. Weitzel a recall of the permission above given—the object contemplated by it having been otherwise fully attained. He had, the day before, issued two Proclamations: one of them closing, till further orders, in accordance with law, certain ports in the Rebel States whereof the blockade had been raised by their capture respectively; the other, de-

[1] March 24. [2] April 4. [3] April 12.

front door, stood for a few moments, after presenting a card to the President's messenger, in the passage-way behind the dress-circle, surveying the spectacle before him; then entered the vestibule of the President's private box, shut the door behind him, fastened it from the inside by placing a short plank (previously provided) against it, with its foot against the opposite wall, and then, holding a pistol and a dagger in either hand, stepped through the inner door into the box just behind the President, who was leaning forward with his eyes fixed on the stage, and fired his pistol, while holding it close to the back of the President's head, piercing his skull behind the left ear, and lodging the ball, after traversing the brain, just behind the right eye. Mr. Lincoln's head fell slightly forward, his eyes closed, but he uttered no word or cry; and, though life was not extinct for nine hours thereafter, he gave, thenceforth to his death in a neighboring house, at 7:22 next morning, no sign of intelligence; and it is probable that he never on earth knew that he had been shot, or was conscious even of suffering, much less of malice and murder. Hating and wishing ill to none, he had never comprehended the hell of demoniac passion which seethed and surged around him, and which the utter collapse of the Rebellion had only intensified; hence, he had ever treated lightly the anonymous threats which men placed as he was receive as matters of course, and had disregarded all entreaties that he should take precautions against assassination.

The report of Booth's pistol startled the house, but especially the President's companions in the box; of whom, Maj. H. R. Rathbone—the only man there beside the President—turning his eyes, saw, through the sulphurous smoke, a stranger standing behind him, whom he instantly clutched; but Booth, tearing away from his grasp, and dropping his pistol, made a pass at him with the dagger, inflicting a serious wound on his left arm. Rushing now to the front of the box, theatrically flourishing his weapon, and exclaiming '*Sic semper tyrannis!*' Booth put his hand on the railing in front of the box, and leaped over, alighting on a corner of the stage; but, catching with one of his spurred heels in the American flag draped across the front of the box, he fell; spraining his ankle so as to cripple his flight and afford a clue to the detectives who were soon on his trail. Recovering immediately from his fall, he faced the audience, brandished his dagger, exclaimed "*The South is avenged!*" and ran across the stage to and out of the back door, which he shut, and, mounting his horse—which a half-witted, stage-struck youth was there holding for him—rode off and across the Anacosta bridge out of Washington; seeking refuge in the adjacent region of southern Maryland; whose Whites, being intensely pro-Slavery, were mainly Rebel sympathizers, and were therefore counted on to conceal him and aid his escape.

That President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy of partisans of the Rebellion is established by undeniable proof; not so the charge that the chiefs and master-spirits of the Confederacy were implicated in the crime. Booth himself was, so far as has been shown, the projector and animating soul of the monstrous

Seward shrieked 'murder' from the window and the porter ran into the street crying for help. The assassin, aware that another moment's delay must seal his doom, now broke from the soldier's grasp, and rushed to escape; meeting at the head of the first flight of stairs Maj. Augustus Seward, another son of the Secretary, whom he struck with his dagger; being next confronted, just below, by Mr. Hansell, one of the Secretary's attendants, whom he stabbed in the back; thus clearing his way to the street, where he mounted a horse he had left there, and rode rapidly off unheeded.

The quiet accession to the Presidency of Vice-President Johnson—the funeral honors to the good, beloved President, so suddenly snatched away at the moment when long years of trial and disaster had at length been crowned by a fullness of triumph and gladness rarely paralleled—the slow and long dubious recovery of the stricken Secretary and his self-devoted son—the flight, pursuit, and capture of Booth, so severely wounded by his captors that he died a few hours afterward—the arraignment, trial, and conviction before a military court of Payne and several of their fellow-conspirators or accomplices—may here be hurriedly passed over, as non-essential to this history. Not so the burst of unmeasured, indignant wrath, the passionate grief, the fierce cry for vengeance, which the crime of the assassins very generally incited. Mr. Lincoln was widely known as radically, immovably averse to aught that savored of severity in dealing with the defeated insurgents. No 'railing accusations,' no incitements to severity or bitterness on the part of the loyal, had ever found utterance through his lips. Inflexibly resolved that the Rebellion should be put down, he was equally determined that its upholders, having submitted to the Nation's authority, should experience to the utmost the Nation's magnanimity. Such was the palpable drift of his speech, delivered two nights prior to his death, as of all his prior inculcations. And now, the butchery of this gentle, forbearing spirit, by the hand, hardly less blundering than bloody, of a pro-Rebel assassin, incited a fierce, agonized, frantic yell for retaliation, that, for the moment, could only be braved at the cost of great personal obloquy and sacrifice; and the appearance of an official proclamation,* signed by the new President, and countersigned by William Hunter, as acting Secretary of State, charging that the appalling crime of Booth and his associates had been

"incited, concerted, and procured by and between Jefferson Davis, late of Richmond, Va., and Jacob Thompson, Clement C. Clay, Beverly Tucker, George N. Sanders, W. C. Cleary, and other Rebels and traitors against the Government of the United States, harbored in Canada,"

and offering a reward of $100,000 for the arrest of Davis, and of $25,000 to $10,000 each for the other persons thus denounced, was widely hailed as justifying the suspicions already current, and rendering the Confederates as a body morally guilty of the murder of Mr. Lincoln, and justly liable therefor to condign punishment.

Gen. Lee had only assumed to surrender the army under his immediate command; though he manifestly realized that this capitulation was

* May 2.

south-westward from Greensborough to Salisbury; and all were pressing keenly forward, intent on a battle or a capitulation by the enemy, when he received from his outposts the following overture:

"HEADQ'RS IN THE FIELD, April 14, 1865.
"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding United States Forces:

"GENERAL—The results of the recent campaigns in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lt.-Gen. Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. E. JOHNSTON, General."

The prompt response was as follows:

"HEADQ'RS MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,
IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C.,
April 14, 1865.

"Gen. J. E. JOHNSTON, Commanding Confederate Army:

"GENERAL—I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities as between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column to-morrow to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the University, and expect that you will also maintain the present position of your forces until each has notice of a failure to agree.

"That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Gens. Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th instant, relative to our two armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from Gen. Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. Gen. Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damages they would sustain by the march of this army through central or western parts of the State.

"I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen."

Our forces were now halted; but no response from Johnston was received next day; though Maj. McCoy, of Sherman's staff, remained with Kilpatrick in the advance to receive one. Gen. Sherman had already written to the War Department, on the receipt of Johnston's overture:

"I send copies of a correspondence begun with Gen. Johnston, which I think will be followed by terms of capitulation. I will accept the same terms as Gen. Grant gave Gen. Lee, and be careful not to complicate any points of civil policy."

Late on the 16th, Gen. Sherman received, through Kilpatrick, a message from Wade Hampton, stating that Johnston desired a meeting at 10 A. M. next day at Durham's station; which was promptly accorded; Sherman only changing the time to 12 M.

The meeting took place accordingly; and was adjourned over to next day—Johnston requiring and urging conditions of general pacification which Sherman felt that he had no power to guarantee. Finally, however, at the second meeting, his scruples were overcome; and he was persuaded to sign the following

Memorandum or Basis of Agreement.

"1st. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *status quo* until notice is given by the commanding General of any one to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

"2d. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both State and Federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington city,





subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

"3d. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the several State Governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and, when conflicting State Governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

"4th. The rëestablishment of all Federal courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution and the laws of Congress.

"5th. The people and inhabitants of all States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

"6th. The executive authority or Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people, by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, and abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

"7th. In general terms, it is announced that the war is to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men hitherto composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain authority, and will endeavor to carry out the above programme.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-General,
"Commanding Army of the U. S. in North Carolina.
"J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
"Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina."

Gen. Sherman had already received[14] with horror the tidings of President Lincoln's assassination; but he had not adequately realized the effect of that atrocious deed on the temper and spirit of the loyal millions and their rulers. This statement is made in explanation simply. He had seen Gen. Weitzel's permission to the Rebel Legislature of Virginia to rëassemble at Richmond; he was not aware that President Lincoln's authorization of it had been rëcalled and the permission annulled. And he—neither cherishing nor affecting decided anti-Slavery convictions—unquestionably believed and felt that his arrangement with Johnston was one that ought to be, and probably would be, accepted at Washington; whither he immediately dispatched it by Maj. Hitchcock, of his staff.

He had very gravely miscalculated. There were many in the North who had deemed Grant quite too generous in fixing the terms of Lee's capitulation; but their hesitating utterances had been drowned in the general burst of gladness and thanksgiving over the virtual collapse of the Rebellion. That other Rebel chiefs—now that their ablest commander and most formidable army had surrendered—should exact and secure better terms than were accorded to Lee, was not imagined, even prior to Lincoln's assassination: *after* that hideous crime, the bare suggestion of such concession seemed intolerable. Hence, when his agreement reached[15] Washington, it was—in strict accordance with the views and feelings of the great body of those who had heartily sustained the Government through the War—rejected by the new President and his Cabinet, with the hearty concurrence of Gen. Grant, for reasons unofficially, but by authority, set forth as follows:

"1st. It was an exercise of authority not vested in Gen. Sherman, and, on its face, shows that both he and Johnston knew that Gen. Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrangements.

"2d. It was a practical acknowledgment of the Rebel Government.

[14] April 17.

[15] April 21.

"3d. It undertook to rëestablish Rebel State governments that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousand loyal lives and immense treasure, and placed arms and munitions of war in the hands of Rebels at their respective capitals, which might be used, so soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue loyal States.

"4th. By the restoration of Rebel authority in their respective States, they would be enabled to rëestablish Slavery.

"5th. It might furnish a ground of responsibility on the part of the Federal Government to pay the Rebel debt, and certainly subjects loyal citizens of Rebel States to debts contracted by Rebels in the name of the State.

"6th. It puts in dispute the existence of loyal State governments, and the new State of West Virginia, which had been recognized by every department of the United States Government.

"7th. It practically abolished confiscation laws, and relieved Rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

"8th. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly, rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the Rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition.

"9th. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but relieved Rebels from the presence of our victorious armies, and left them in a condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the United States Government and subdue the loyal States whenever their strength was recruited and any opportunity should offer."

Gen. Grant was sent post-haste to Raleigh to announce the rejection of the Sherman-Johnston programme, and to direct an immediate and general resumption of hostilities. On reaching Morehead City,[16] he dispatched the decision of the Government to Sherman at Raleigh, who instantly transmitted its purport to Johnston, adding a notification that the truce would close 48 hours after the receipt hereof at the Rebel lines, with a demand that Johnston's army be forthwith surrendered on the identical terms accorded by Grant to Lee. He at once directed his subordinate commanders to be ready to resume the offensive at noon on the 26th.

Grant reached Raleigh on the 25th; when another invitation to a conference was received from Johnston by Sherman, who referred it to his superior. Grant declined to relieve Sherman from command, as he was authorized to do, and urged him to meet Johnston as requested; so the 26th was appointed for their third and final interview; at which Johnston's army was surrendered on the terms already accorded to Lee's. The agreement was signed by Sherman and Johnston, but indorsed,

"Approved: U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General:"

and thus passed out of existence the second army of the Confederacy.

The surrender to Gen. Canby of Gen. Taylor's Rebel forces in Alabama was effected at Citronelle, May 4, as the result of negotiations commenced April 19. More words were used; but the terms were essentially the same as had been accorded to Lee and Johnston, with this addition:

"Transportation and subsistence to be furnished at public cost for the officers and men, after surrender, to the nearest practicable point to their homes."

Com. Farrand, at the same time and on the same terms, surrendered to Rear-Admiral Thatcher the twelve Rebel gunboats blockaded in the Tombigbee river, with 20 officers and 110 others.

Mr. Jefferson Davis, with his staff and civilian associates, having journeyed by rail from Richmond to Danville,[17] he there halted, and set up his Government; issuing[18] thence a stirring proclamation, designed to in-

[16] April 23. [17] April 3. [18] April 5.

spirit the Confederates to a determined prosecution of the contest; saying:

"We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to move from point to point to strike the enemy in detail far from his base. Let us but will it, and we are free.

"Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any one of the States of the Confederacy. That Virginia—noble State—whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious recent history—whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock of this war—whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so sublime as to render her illustrious in all time to come—that Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of her territory.

"If, by the stress of numbers, we should ever be compelled to a temporary withdrawal from her limits, or those of any other Border State, again and again will we return, until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people resolved to be free.

"Let us, then, not despond, my countrymen; but, relying on God, meet the foe with fresh defiance and with unconquered and unconquerable hearts.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

He waited there several days, in anxious expectation of the approach of Lee, or at least of tidings that he was still confronting and baffling the Union forces; until astounded[19] by advices of his surrender at Appomattox. The Confederacy thereupon took to wheels again—there being no acceptable alternative—and retreated by rail to Greensboro', N. C., where another considerable halt was made—the days and nights spent mainly in the cars by President, Cabinet, and followers; since very few of the citizens saw fit to throw open their houses — when the imminence of Johnston's surrender compelled another flitting[20]—this time in wagons and on horseback: the railroad having been disabled by Stoneman—via Salisbury to Charlotte, N. C., where its foundering ark again rested for a few days; and where, unlike their fare at Greensboro', the falling President and his Cabinet were received with consideration and hospitality—until, alarmed by the reported approach of Stoneman's cavalry, it resumed its flittings southward, via Yorkville and Abbeville, S. C.; being now compelled to take entirely to horse, and escorted by 2,000 cavalry, who, as well as the Presidential cortege, gradually dwindled by the way: thus reaching[21] Washington, Ga., where the rapidly dissolving view of a Government was dispensed with—most of the Cabinet itself having by this time abandoned the sinking craft, leaving Davis attended by Reagan (late Postmaster-General, now acting Secretary of the Treasury) and his military staff; and the remaining fugitives, with a small but select escort of mounted men, took their way southward: perhaps intent on joining Dick Taylor or Kirby Smith, should either or both be still belligerent, or, at the worst, hoping to make their way to some petty port on the coast, and thence out of the country. Mr. Davis had even separated, for greater safety, from his family; but, on an alarm of peril to which they were said to be exposed from a conspiracy to rob them of the gold they were supposed to be carrying off, had rejoined them over night; when his sylvan encampment near Irwinsville,

[19] April 10. [20] April 15. [21] May 4.

Ga., was struck [23] by Lt.-Col. Pritchard, 4th Michigan cavalry, who, upon advices that what remained of the Rebellion was making its way furtively southward through Georgia, had been dispatched [24] by Gen. Wilson from Macon in quest of him; as had also the 1st Wisconsin cavalry, Lt.-Col. Harden. These two commands, moving by different roads down the Ocmulgee, Pritchard at length struck the trail he was seeking, and followed it to the encampment aforesaid; which he surprised at early dawn; easily taking captive [25] Mr. Davis, his wife, her sister, and his children; but being, directly thereafter, involved in a fight with the 1st Wisconsin, which was closing in on the quarry from another quarter, and —each taking the other for enemies —the two commands opened a reciprocal fire, whereby two men were killed and several wounded before the mutual mistake was discovered. The dead were borne sadly to Abbeville, and there buried; the wounded, with the prisoners, were conveyed to Macon,[26] whence Davis was taken, via Savannah and the ocean, to Fortress Monroe; where he was long closely and rigorously imprisoned, while his family were returned by water to Savannah and there set at liberty. Secretary Reagan—the only person of consequence captured with Davis—was taken to Boston, and confined, with Vice-President Stephens (captured about this time also in Georgia), in Fort Warren; but each was liberated on parole a few months thereafter.

The following general order seemed for a time to menace a protracted, though not doubtful, struggle in Texas:

"HEADQ'RS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEP'T.,
SHREVEPORT, LA., April 21, '65.

"*Soldiers of the trans-Mississippi Army:*

"The crisis of our revolution is at hand. Great disasters have overtaken us. The Army of Northern Virginia and our Commander-in-Chief are prisoners of war. With you rest the hopes of our nation, and upon your action depends the fate of our people. I appeal to you in the name of the cause you have so heroically maintained—in the name

[23] May 11. [24] May 7.

[25] With regard to Davis's alleged attempt to elude his captors in female guise, the following statement by Lt. C. E. L. Stuart, of his staff, probably embodies the literal truth:

"When the musketry-firing was heard in the morning, at 'dim, gray dawn,' it was supposed to be between the apprehended [Rebel] marauders and Mrs. Davis's few camp-defenders. Under this impression, Mr. Davis hurriedly put on his boots, and prepared to go out for the purpose of interposing, saying:

"'They will at least as yet respect me.'

"As he got to the tent door thus hastily equipped, and with this good intention of preventing an effusion of blood by an appeal in the name of a fading but not wholly faded authority, he saw a few cavalry ride up the road and deploy in front.

"'Ha, Federals!' was his exclamation.

"'Then you are captured!' cried Mrs. Davis, with emotion.

"In a moment, she caught an idea—a woman's idea—and, as quickly as women in an emergency execute their designs, it was done. He slept in a wrapper—a loose one. It was yet around him. This she fastened, ere he was aware of it, and then, bidding him adieu, urged him to go to the spring, a short distance off, where his horses and arms were. Strange as it may seem, there was not even a pistol in the tent. Davis felt that his only course was to reach his horse and arms, and complied. As he was leaving the door, followed by a servant with a water-bucket, Miss Howell *flung a shawl over his head.* There was no time to remove it without exposure and embarrassment; and, as he had not far to go, he ran the chance exactly as it was devised for him. In these two articles, consisted the woman's attire of which so much nonsense has been spoken and written; and, under these circumstances and in this way was Jefferson Davis going forth to perfect his escape. No bonnet, no gown, no petticoats, no crinoline—nothing of all these. And what there was, happened to be excusable under ordinary circumstances, and perfectly natural as things were.

"But it was too late for any effort to reach his horses; and the Confederate President was at last a prisoner in the hands of the United States." [26] May 13.

of your firesides and families, so dear to you —in the name of your bleeding country, whose future is in your hands. Show that you are worthy of your position in history. Prove to the world that your hearts have not failed in the hour of disaster, and that, to the last moment, you will sustain the holy cause which has been so gloriously battled for by your brethren east of the Mississippi.

"You possess the means of long resisting invasion; you have hopes of succor from abroad. Protract the struggle, and you will surely receive the aid of nations who already deeply sympathize with you.

"Stand by your colors—maintain your discipline! The great resources of this department, its vast extent; the numbers, the discipline, and the efficiency of the army, will secure to our country terms that a proud people can with honor accept, and may, under the providence of God, be the means of checking the triumph of our enemy and securing the final success of our cause. E. KIRBY SMITH, General."

At a public meeting held at Shreveport on the receipt of news of President Lincoln's assassination, there were military men found base or mad enough to exult over that atrocity. Their countrymen of all parties will gladly forget their names.

The last actual collision[36] of forces in our struggle occurred[37] on the Rio Grande. Col. Barrett had set forth[38] from Brazos Santiago to surprise a Rebel camp at Palmetto Ranche, some 15 miles above, and had succeeded in taking and burning the camp; but, lingering to secure horses, he was overtaken on his return by Gen. J. E. Slaughter, with 8 guns and a considerable force, and hunted back to Brazos with a loss of 80, mainly captured. Slaughter's loss was trifling.

Gen. Sheridan had been sent to New Orleans, and was there fitting out a formidable expedition for the re-

[36] Though the war on land ceased, and the Confederate flag utterly disappeared from this continent with the collapse and dispersion of Kirby Smith's command; it was yet displayed at sea by two of the British-built, British-armed, and (mainly) British manned cruisers engaged in the spoliation of our commerce; whereof the powerful iron-clad Stonewall, after having been for some time watched by the Niagara and the Sacramento in the Spanish port of Ferrol, finally ran across to Havana, where she arrived after the fall of the Confederacy, and was taken in charge by the Spanish authorities, who promptly handed her over, May 28, 1865, to Rear-Admiral Godon, who, with a formidable fleet, had been sent, May 16, to cruise among the West Indies in quest of her. Admiral Godon brought her into Hampton Roads June 12, and turned her over to the Navy Department.

There still remained afloat the swift steamer Shenandoah, Capt. Waddell, built at Glasgow in 1863, and which, as 'the Sea King,' put to sea from London, Oct. 8, 1864, in spite of the protests of our functionaries; having cleared for Bombay: but which was met at a barren islet off Madeira, Oct. 17, by the British steamer Laurel, from Liverpool, with officers and men, nearly all British, who, with guns and munitions, were promptly transferred to the henceforth Rebel corsair Shenandoah, which at once engaged in the capture, plunder, and destruction of our merchantmen; in due time, turning up at Melbourne, Australia, where she received a hearty and munificent welcome. Having left that port, Feb. 8, 1865, she was next heard of in the North Pacific, the Sea of Ochotsk, and northward nearly to Behring's straits, where she raided at will among our defenseless whalers, of which she burned 25 and bonded 4—many of them after she had received the news of Lee's and Johnston's surrender and Davis's capture. Finally, having been assured by a British sea-captain that the Confederacy was no more, she desisted, four months after the collapse, from her work of destruction, and made her way directly to her native country; anchoring Nov. 6, 1865, in the Mersey; whence Waddell addressed a letter to the British Minister, surrendering her in due form to the British Government; by which she was in turn tendered to ours, and most unwisely accepted. As she had never attempted to enter a Confederate port, nor (so far as is known) any other than British, and as she had never been manned by any other than a (substantially) British crew, and as she still stood, up to a very late day, on the official registry of British shipping as the British steamship Sea King, she ought to have been left on the hands of her legitimate owners.

[37] May 13. [38] May 11.

covery of Texas, when the good sense of the Rebel rank and file in that State saved her from a hopeless and damaging experience of the horrors of war. While the chiefs were still making preparations for a desperate resistance, their hitherto submissive followers bluntly refused to be thus foolishly sacrificed, and, dissolving their organizations, they helped themselves to whatever they could seize of the effects of the death-stricken Confederacy, and dispersed to their several homes; leaving their officers no choice but to make the best attainable terms. Before Sheridan had started, therefore, certain of Smith's staff officers, headed by Lt.-Gen. S. B. Buckner, made their way down to Baton Rouge, and there concluded[30] with Gen. Osterhaus, acting for Gen. Canby, a capitulation substantially identical with that accorded by Canby to Dick Taylor; the stipulation for "transportation and subsistence" inclusive. This requirement involved the Government in very moderate expense. The great body of the 'soldiers of the trans-Mississippi Army' had already appropriated all the 'subsistence and transportation' they could lay their hands on, and gone their several ways—profoundly convinced that rebellion, with overt war against the authority and integrity of the Union, was not a paying business, and determined to devote their time and talents henceforth to something more profitable.

Ere this surrender, the removal[31] by Presidential proclamation of restrictions on commercial intercourse with the revolted States, the release[32] on parole of all prisoners of war below the rank of Colonel who would take the oath of allegiance, and the mustering for review at Washington[33] of the two main armies of the Republic, gave earnest of the virtual termination of hostilities; which was soon afterward formally announced in the following General Order:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJ.-GEN'S. OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 2, 1865.

"*Soldiers of the Armies of the United States:*

"By your patriotic devotion to your country in the hour of danger and alarm, your magnificent fighting, bravery, and endurance, you have maintained the supremacy of the Union and the Constitution, overthrown all armed opposition to the enforcement of the laws and of the proclamations forever abolishing Slavery—the cause and pretext of the Rebellion—and opened the way to the rightful authorities to restore order and inaugurate peace on a permanent and enduring basis on every foot of American soil. Your marches, sieges, and battles, in distance, duration, resolution, and brilliancy of results, dim the luster of the world's past military achievements, and will be the patriot's precedent in defense of liberty and right in all time to come. In obedience to your country's call, you left your homes and families, and volunteered in her defense. Victory has crowned your valor, and secured the purpose of your patriotic hearts; and, with the gratitude of your countrymen and the highest honors a great and free nation can accord, you will soon be permitted to return to your homes and families, conscious of having discharged the highest duty of American citizens. To achieve these glorious triumphs and secure to yourselves, your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the blessings of free institutions, tens of thousands of your gallant comrades have fallen and sealed the priceless legacy with their blood. The graves of these a grateful nation bedews with tears, honors their memories, and will ever cherish and support their stricken families.

"U. S. GRANT, Lt.-General."

The wholesale discharge of Rebel prisoners of war—to whom was accorded transportation to their respective homes—was directed by an order from the Adjutant-General's office, dated May 6th. The number actu-

[30] May 26. [31] April 29. [32] May 7. [33] May 22–3.

II.

Though the War for the Union doubtless exposed the upholders of the National Cause to extraordinary hardships and sufferings, because of the densely wooded and sparsely peopled regions over which they generally marched and fought, traversed only by roads of an intensity of badness utterly inconceivable by readers of European experience only, and often submerged by the overflow of the neighboring streams and swamps, it would be black ingratitude to leave unnoticed the mitigations of those hardships through the systematic, gigantic efforts of patriotic generosity. Of the Soldiers and Sailors who fought for the Union, all but an inconsiderable fraction were volunteers; and few of these were mustered into service without having received a bounty, varying from $100 up to $1,200 each, but usually between $300 and $800, from his stay-at-home neighbors. Many of these, as well as some others, were further assured that their families should be shielded from absolute want in their absence by a municipal or volunteered weekly stipend; and these pledges were almost uniformly redeemed. It must be within the truth to estimate the aggregate thus disbursed at $200,000,000 paid directly as bounties and $100,000,000 more devoted to subsisting the families of soldiers, living or dead, in grateful though partial requital of their heroic patriotism.

But soldiers in the field, still more in the hospital, sorely need comforts and delicacies which no Government does or can provide; and these were supplied to our armies, but especially to their sick and wounded, in a profusion and with a regularity wholly unprecedented.

The Sanitary Commission and the Christian Commission were chief among the agencies whereby the willing heart of the Nation went forth to succor and save her sons writhing in agony on the battle-field or tossing on beds of pain in field or camp hospitals. A single Fair, held in New York City in aid of the Sanitary Commission, realized —mainly through the gifts of her merchants and other citizens—no less than $1,351,275, whereof $1,181,506 was clear income. Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Pittsburg, Albany, and most other cities, held similar fairs with corresponding results: the aggregate of contributions received and disbursed through this channel amounting to about $5,000,000 in cash and $9,000,000 in supplies. Those of the Christian Commission amounted to $4,500,000. And these are but samples of a work which, beginning with a subscription in April and May, 1861, of $179,500 in New York to form a "Union Defense Fund" for the equipment and subsistence of Volunteers, was maintained with unflagging spirit to the close of the struggle—Com. Vanderbilt's magnificent present of the noble steamship Vanderbilt, valued at $1,000,000, being the largest individual offering; but many a poor widow or girl doing as much, in proportion to her scanty resources. The Union Refreshment Saloons, wherein Philadelphia was honorably conspicuous, for the supply of free meals, baths, &c., to each passing regiment and soldier, and the State Relief agencies, whereby the "boys in blue" were sheltered, lodged, and fed, in every great city, on their way to or from the seat of War, were among the most judicious of the many arrangements to mitigate the inevitable hardships of the soldier's lot. Very rarely had the thunders of battle been stilled ere the agents and ambulances of the Sanitary and Christian Commissions were at hand, with bounteous provision of ice, stimulants, delicacies, &c., for the wounded; while every hospital and camp was irradiated by their active presence and activity. That thousands of precious lives were thus saved, and the anguish of tens of thousands soothed and mitigated, is well known; but the sources of these rivers of beneficence were in the far distant rural neighborhoods, where a few women and girls gathered weekly to spend some hours in preparing lint, clothing, preserves, cordials, &c., &c., for the use and comfort of our soldiers in the field. It would be quite within the truth to estimate the aggregate value of free-will offerings in aid of the National cause at Five Hundred Millions of Dollars—equal to $100 for each family inhabiting the loyal States of the Union.

Nor would our survey of the great struggle be complete without a recognition of the fact that the spirit evinced by the women of the South, while even more intense and vehement, prompted them to efforts and sacrifices equally practical and beneficent. Their means were limited, and they unaccustomed to persistent labor; but they gave to their brothers and sons, in field and hospital, every solace for their hardships and sufferings which affection could devise and unwearying devotion provide. True, they did not (as had often been threatened) seize the arms that dropped from the hands of their vanquished kinsmen and renew the strife; but they did whatever they could to mitigate the hardships of the soldier's lot and insure the triumph of the Rebellion.

III.

THE treatment and exchange of prisoners during our great struggle deserves a fuller elucidation than is given in the preceding pages, or than I am enabled as yet to proffer. Each belligerent vehemently charged the other with violating the cartel which, at an early stage of the war, provided for regular and prompt exchanges at Richmond in the East and at Vicksburg in the West, and at these points only. The Confederates never admitted that Negroes came within the purview of this arrangement; and this of itself must have incited a serious collision. Having enrolled and called out Blacks as well as Whites for its defense, our Government could not recognize the right of the Confederates to treat our Black soldiers as fugitives from slavery —which some of them were, while others were not. Judicial proceedings under State law in Virginia in 1866 established beyond question the fact that at least *one* Black Union soldier, born free in Ohio and regularly enlisted into the National service, having been taken prisoner by the Rebels, was sold into slavery in Virginia, and held as a slave till months after the collapse of the Rebellion; when, having resisted and killed his 'master,' he was arraigned, tried, and executed therefor. And, while it is unquestionable that the Confederate authorities were more than willing, were even anxious, to effect a general exchange of prisoners during the last year of the contest, I lack proof that they ever offered to produce and hand over the Blacks whom they had captured and treated as culprits and fugitives rather than as soldiers.

When, in 1863, Gen. Lee had crossed the Potomac and was advancing into Pennsylvania, an order was issued on our side that such Union soldiers as he might capture should not give paroles, thereby relieving the enemy of the burden of guarding and depriving us of the chance of recapturing them. It was added that paroles so given would not be deemed valid on our side. The fortunes of war having, soon after, given us many thousands of prisoners, the Rebel authorities regarded the above order as justifying them in repudiating the paroles given by their soldiers captured at Vicksburg and Port Hudson; and it was charged that thousands of those soldiers, still unexchanged, were found fighting again in the Confederate ranks at Chickamauga. Hence paroles fell into discredit and disuse not long after exchanges had been discontinued.

That our War Department regarded this with complacency is intrinsically probable. Every Confederate soldier was conscripted to fight to the end; and, being released from captivity, was at once returned to the ranks; while our men, being exchanged, were often found to have served out their term of enlistment, or, at all events, to be so near its end that it was not advisable to return them to their respective regiments. Thus, an exchange of twenty thousand men on either side would add far more to both the positive and the relative strength of the Confederate than of the Union armies. Hence, the Rebel authorities became at last by far the more anxious to effect a general exchange; and it is alleged that they at one time offered to parole and release generally our men in their hands, requiring only a pledge that they should be put to no military use until regularly exchanged. It is not stated, however, that the Blacks were included in this offer, especially those whom they had sold into slavery.

Prisoners of war are apt to complain of harsh treatment, and not without reason; and such complaint was made by Rebel prisoners against our officers who held them in custody, especially at 'Camp Douglas' (Chicago), and on Rock Island, in the Mississippi—the former having been the focus of repeated conspiracies to overpower their guards, break out, and, in conjunction with secret allies outside, cut their way back to the Confederacy, liberating other prisoners by the way. In Missouri, Gen. John McNeil was charged with cruelty in shooting ten prisoners (bushwhackers), in retaliation for the secret taking off of one Unionist, who suddenly disappeared.

On the other hand, the treatment of Union prisoners by the Confederates, in the matter of food and shelter, was quite generally and unreasonably harsh. The Rebel soldiers, save in their fitful butchery of Blacks, deserve no part of this reproach. White captives were usually treated by them considerately, and even chivalrously. But the Rebels' prison-camps were mainly and inexcusably devoid of the comforts to which even captives are justly entitled. It was scarcely their fault that their prisoners were coarsely and scantily fed during the last year or more wherein their armies were on half rations, and when no one willingly gave grain or meat for their currency; but they at no time lacked either eligible sites or timber; and there is no excuse for their failure to provide ample and commodious shelter, with abundance of pure water and fuel; so that the horrors of An-

dersonville and many a subordinate but kindred Golgotha are utterly without excuse. Here, mainly unsheltered from drenching rain, or torrid sun, or chilling night-dews, thousands of our captive brothers were huddled in an open stockade surrounded by woods, dying constantly and rapidly of diseases engendered by privation, exposure, filth, and vermin, when they might have lived to return to their friends if treated with common humanity. The returns kept in our War Department show that 220,000 Rebels in all were captured by our armies during the War, of whom 26,436 died of wounds or of disease during their captivity; while of our men but 126,940 are there recorded as captured, of whom 22,576 died while prisoners. These latter numbers are of course far too low. Probably the aggregate of Union soldiers captured was little less than 200,000, of whom those who died in captivity can hardly have fallen short of 40,000.

IV.

THE subject of Reconstruction (or Restoration) being, so far as possible, purposely avoided in this work, it is deemed proper to embody herein only that one among the many terse avowals of sentiment by Mr. Johnson, directly after his accession to the Presidency, which relates mainly to the Rebellion and the War. Being waited on and addressed, when such visits were in vogue, by a delegation of citizens of New Hampshire sojourning or casually in Washington, the new President said:

"I have now, as always, an abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of justice and right; and I shall seek the inspiration and guidance of this faith, in the assured belief that the present struggle will result in the permanent establishment of our Government, and in making us a free, united, and happy people. This Government is now passing through a fiery and, let us hope, its last ordeal—one that will test its powers of endurance, and determine whether it can do what its enemies have denied—suppress and punish treason. This is the trial through which we are now passing; and, if we are true to ourselves and the principles upon which the Constitution was framed, who can doubt that the Government will settle down upon a more enduring basis than its friends have dared to hope for it?

"In entering upon the discharge of the grave duties before me, it has been suggested, and even urged, by friends whose good opinions I value, and whose judgment I respect, that I shall foreshadow the policy that would guide me, in some formal public manifesto. But who could have foretold the events of the past four years? Who was wise enough to indicate, beforehand, a line of policy adapted to all the changing emergencies of that period? It is not in the wisdom and foresight of man to prescribe a course of action in advance for such disturbed and perilous conditions as now distract public affairs. I believe I may say that my past life is known to the country, especially that part connected with the Rebellion. The country must accept, then, my past course as an index of what my future will be. I think the people understand and appreciate my position.

"I know it is easy, gentlemen, for any one who is so disposed, to acquire a reputation for clemency and mercy. But the public good imperatively requires a just discrimination in the exercise of these qualities. What is clemency? What is mercy? It may be considered merciful to relieve an individual from pain and suffering; but to relieve one from the penalty of crime may be productive of national disaster. The American people must be taught to know and understand that treason is a crime. Arson and murder are crimes, the punishment of which is the loss of liberty and life. If, then, it is right in the sight of God to take away human life for such crimes, what punishment, let me ask you, should be inflicted upon him who is guilty of the atrocious crime of assassinating the Chief Magistrate of a great people? I am sure there is no one present who has not the answer ready upon his lips! Him whom we loved has been removed from our midst by the hand of a ruthless assassin, and his blessed spirit has gone to that bourne whence no traveler returns. If his murderer should suffer the severest penalty known to the law, what punishment should be inflicted upon the assassins who have raised their daggers against the life of a nation—against the life and happiness of thirty millions of people? Treason is a crime, and must be punished as a crime. It must not be regarded as a mere difference of political opinion. It must not be excused as an unsuccessful rebellion, to be overlooked and forgiven. It is a crime before which all other crimes sink into insignificance; and, in saying this, it must not be considered that I am influenced by angry or revengeful feelings.

"Of course, a careful discrimination must be observed; for thousands have been involved in this rebellion, who are only technically guilty of the crime of treason. They have been deluded and deceived, and have been made the victims of more intelligent, artful, and designing men—the instigators of this monstrous rebellion. The number of this latter class is comparatively small. The former may stand acquitted of the crime of treason—the latter never; the full penalty of their crimes should be visited upon them. To the others I would accord amnesty, leniency, and mercy."

V.

THE fact that Maj.-Gen. Fitz John Porter was arraigned and tried before a Court-Martial on a charge of culpable disobedience to the orders of Gen. Pope during the desperate and ultimately disastrous struggle around Gainesville ('second Bull Run'), though quite notorious, is not stated in the foregoing text. Though his impressions are unfavorable to Gen. Porter's conduct in that emergency, the author has not been able to give his case such a searching examination as would justify him in pronouncing a final judgment thereon. That Gen. P. was so intense a partisan of M'Clellan, and so offended at the virtual transfer of his army to Pope, that he cherished feelings and used language during that campaign incompatible with thorough loyalty to his commander, is scarcely denied; but good soldiers, who were with him throughout, testified on his trial that his acts were unexceptionable. The court, however, decided otherwise. The following dispatch from Gen. Pope, written the second morning after his defeat at Gainesville, refers unquestionably to Porter as 'one commander of a corps,' and is here given only as proving Gen. Pope's convictions as to the causes of his disaster:

"CENTERVILLE, Sept. 1—8:50 A. M.

"Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

"All was quiet yesterday, and so far this morning. My men all resting. They need it much. Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can raise a trot. The consequence is, that I am forced to keep considerable infantry along the roads in my rear to make them secure; and even then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads. I shall attack again to-morrow if I can; the next day certainly.

"I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula. Every word and act and intention is discouraging, and calculated to break down the spirits of the men, and to produce disaster. One commander of a corps, who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all; and, worse still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, and in plain hearing, at less than three miles' distance, of a furious battle, which raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he joined me next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier-general of which professed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centerville, in plain view of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the whole matter worse, these are both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is, that 'the Army of the Potomac will not fight,' that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsula, &c. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the influence is very bad among those in subordinate stations.

"You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites; but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you (I give it with freedom, as I know you will not misunderstand it) is, that in view of any satisfactory results, you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reörganize and rearrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light; and it is bad enough and great enough to make some action very necessary. Where there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men.

"Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I need them badly; worse than I can tell you.

"(Signed) JOHN POPE, Maj.-General.

"A true copy:

"T. C. H. SMITH, Lt.-Colonel and A. D. C."

VI.

As many facts set forth in this work bear with just severity on the general loyalty of the Democratic party to the Government throughout its long, doubtful struggle with the Rebellion, it is proper to state here explicitly that very many Democrats promptly separated from their party and acted with the Republicans as Unionists from first to last; while others, who adhered to their party organization, nevertheless gave a hearty, efficient support to the Government in raising soldiers, subscribing to loans, and otherwise. There was, moreover, a very considerable and influential body, especially in the great cities, who had steadily opposed the Republican

party from its formation and were accounted conservatives, though they disclaimed partisanship, who, from the hour of the first tidings of the bombardment of Fort Sumter by the Confederates, consecrated all they had to the maintenance of the Union. This class is fitly represented by the eminent New York merchant, A. T. Stewart, who acted throughout in the spirit evinced in the following business letter, which, unexpectedly to the writer, first reached the public through the [Rebel] *Memphis Appeal:*

"NEW YORK, April 29, 1861.

"DEAR SIR—Your letter requesting to know whether or not I had offered a million of dollars to the Government for the purposes of the war, and at the same time informing me that neither yourself nor your friends would pay their debts to the firm as they mature, has been received.

"The intention not to pay seems to be nearly universal in the South, aggravated in your case by the assurance that it does not arise from inability; but, whatever may be your determination, or that of others at the South, it shall not change *my* course. All that I have of position and wealth I owe to the free institutions of the United States; under which, in common with all others, North and South, protection to life, liberty, and property, has been enjoyed in the fullest manner. The Government to which these blessings are due calls on her citizens to protect the capital of the Union from threatened assault; and, although the offer to which you refer has not in terms been made by me, I yet dedicate all that I have, as I will, if need be, my life, to the service of the country—for to that country I am bound by the strongest ties of affection and duty.

"I had hoped that Tennessee would be loyal to the Constitution. But, however extensive may be secession or repudiation, as long as there are any to uphold the sovereignty of the United States, I shall be with them supporting the flag.

"Yours, &c., ALEXANDER T. STEWART.

"To Mr. J. P. STRANGE, Memphis, Tenn."

The Appeal saw fit to accompany this letter by the comment that, "after the Confederates should have thrashed the hireling hordes of New York into a proper appreciation of Southern rights, Stewart and his Black Republican comrades may feel inclined to come down South on a collecting tour. If so, they will be quite *warmly* received." The consummation of the War anticipated by *The Appeal* not having, thus far, been attained, it is presumed that the "collecting tour" has not yet been undertaken: hence, Memphis has thus far been constrained to restrict her amiable demonstrations to negroes.

VII.

WHILE the outbreak and early stages of the Rebellion were signalized by conspicuous exhibitions not only of the blackest treachery but of amazing imbecility on the part of certain officers then serving in our Army or Navy, these were relieved by instances of heroic devotion to the Union and its flag which were the more admirable because passive, and thus unnoted and unknown. Among these may be reckoned the preservation to the Union of Fort McHenry, at Baltimore, by Capt. [since, Maj.-Gen.] John C. Robinson, 5th infantry, who, with a handful of men, held that important position during the four weeks which separated the bloody triumph of the Rebel mob in the slaughter of the Massachusetts men (April 19, 1861) from the bloodless recovery of Baltimore by Gen. Butler, May 13. Had the fort, with its arms and munitions, been given up by its defenders, its repossession, with that of Baltimore, could only have been secured by a lavish outlay of effort and of blood on the part of the Union.

VIII.

IT is the author's well known conviction that Disunion was not purposed by the great body of those who originally favored Secession. They went into the movement, not to divide the country, but to obtain new guaranties and advantages for Slavery throughout the whole of it. The following dispatch to the *New York Herald* of Dec. 20, 1860, tends to strengthen this conviction:

"BALTIMORE, Dec. 19, 1860.

"Judge Hand, Commissioner from Mississippi to Maryland, addressed an audience of about 5,000 citizens to-night in the Maryland Institute. He advocated the right of separate secession, which was received with considerable applause. He strongly recommended that the Southern States secede before Lincoln's inauguration, and asserted that all the cotton States were determined to do so. He wanted the entire South to join them, and then to form a compact *until they could be guaranteed all Southern rights*, and that their institutions would be respected. The South would never be in a position to demand her rights under Lincoln's administration. They could *afterward*, in solid phalanx or separately, present an ultimatum to the North, and reunite, if practicable, with the present Constitution properly amended, on amicable terms."—All which was favorably received.

BARCLAY, COL., 23d Ga., killed at Antietam, 210.

BARKSDALE, GEN. WM., at Fredericksburg, 345; at Chancellorsville, 363; killed at Gettysburg, 389.

BARLOW, GEN. FRANCIS C., distinguishes himself at Antietam, 208; wounded at Gettysburg, 388; at the Wilderness, 567 to 571; his assault near Richmond, 591.

BARNARD, GEN. J. G., his remarks on McClellan's failure, 107; extract from his report, on McClellan's delay at Yorktown, 122; on McClellan's failure to improve the opportunity at Fair Oaks, 147.

BARNES, Col., 12th S. C., killed at Antietam, 210.

BARRETT, COL., attacked by Gen. Slaughter, at Brazos, 757.

BARTLETT, GEN., at Gaines's Mill, 436.

BARTON, COL., 3d N. H., at Fort Wagner, 477.

BATESVILLE, ARK., Marmaduke defeated at, 447.

BATON ROUGE, LA., occupied by Admiral Farragut, 101; Breckinridge defeated at, 102.

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